Electoral Violence and rise of opposition in Tanzania: Lessons from Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique

Authors: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Featured photo credit: AP

Experiences from electoral violence and suppression in neighboring countries have not been good. In a separate brief (Addressing Electoral violence and impunity in East Africa) we delved deeper into this subject. Lessons from Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique show that uncontrolled electoral violence have a tendency of degenerating into a contagious cycle of violence that can engulf a country with extensive catastrophic effect. Moreover, excessive suppression of the opposition enders it to the public, making it more popular and can ultimately lead to a sympathy vote, including the collapse of a large ruling political party.

For years after the introduction of multiparty democracy, CHADEMA had remained a small political party, largely confined with support in some limited regions of the country, with few (5) seats in the Union parliament. It had no significant presence and representation in Zanzibar and had pockets of support on mainland Tanzania.

However, the consistent suppression and violent attacks against the opposition between 2000 and 2005 worked contrary to intentions of the state and popularity of the ruling party. Television images and newspaper reportage of bleeding, heavily bandaged opposition leaders and their supporters being arrested or dispersed by heavily armed police field force units portrayed them as heroes, and a true face of the cause for change. The violent actions generated sympathy from the public, endearing many young people and professionals towards the opposition. The opposition CHADEMA was gradually catapulted to popularity, and gained strength in the 2005 general elections. It increased the number of its seats in parliament from 5 in 2000 to 11 in 2005.

Despite the success of the Muafaka II in Zanzibar, the resurgence of excessive suppression of political opposition and dissent on the Main land Tanzania led to the rise and galvanization of Chama Cha Demokrasia na Mandeleo (CHADEMA) as a political party, catapulting it to prominence and redefinition of Tanzania’s political terrain and electoral democracy.

Its political limelight shone brighter in the 2010 general elections when CHADEMA emerged as the second largest political party on the mainland Tanzania. In a surge show of popularity CHADEMA’s Presidential candidate, Wilbrod Slaa garnered 27.05% (2,271,491) of the Presidential vote and the party bagged 48 seats in parliament.  Although CCM’s candidate Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete won the elections with 62.83% of the vote, this was however a decline from 80% of the vote that he had polled in 2005.

More political fortune followed in 2015 when CHADEMA’s Presidential Candidate Edward Lowasa scooped 39.97% of the total Presidential vote and 73 Members of parliament. Over a short ten-year period, CHADEMA’s prominence was effectively growing in leaps and bounds during every electoral cycle. The political power balance and focus had tilted away from CCM and the CUF towards CHADEMA.

Much as this success set CHADEMA on a new trajectory, it did not come lightly. Its mass mobilization around the slogan of ‘People power’ and ‘Movement for Change’ drew it closer to a younger energized generation. Emboldened with a troop of firebrand political youngsters and increased support base, CHADEMA saw itself as heartbeat away from dislodging CCM from power. Its political militancy and confrontations with security organs increased. 

As its strength surged, the level of electoral violence involving CHADEMA also increased.  During this period, leaders and supporters were reportedly either arrested, abducted or killed under mysterious circumstances. Barely two years after the 2015 elections there was an assassination attempt on one of its leaders and firebrand members of Parliament; Hon Tundu Lissu in 2017. The level of violence against the opposition sent shockwaves across CHADEMA, causing many to flee the country in fear of their lives.

The electoral violence followed into the next electoral cycle of 2020. Political party mobilization was restricted.  The elections were marred with what the opposition claimed was direct interference, malpractices, fraud and suppression. CHADEMA’s top leaders were arrested while others were disqualified from contesting and eventually lost their seats (Aljazeera, 2015) As a consequence its numbers in parliament dropped from 73 to a mere 1 elected constituency MP.

In the run-up to the polls, opposition parties had complained of threats and repression. Rights groups equally accused the government of curtailing free expression and press freedom (Aljazeera, 2020)  The government rejected such accusations but human rights groups such as Amnesty International reported that government had built up a formidable arsenal of laws to stifle all forms of dissent, effectively clamping down on the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly (ibid)

According to Tundu Lissu, CHADEMA’s presidential candidate, the process of 2020 general election was like ‘spitting in the face of democracy’, as he warned of brewing unrest. “Whatever happened…was not an election, and thus we do not recognize it. We do not accept the result,” Lissu told reporters in Dar es Salaam, saying opposition election monitors had been barred from entering polling stations and faced other interference (Aljazeera, 2020) CHADEMA declared the results as “illegitimate” and urged his supporters to demonstrate peacefully while asking the international community not to recognize the outcome.

These assertions were collaborated by other independent researchers and electoral observers. According to Nicodemus Minde, a researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, elections in 2020 took place amid intimidation, censorship, and overt violence against the opposition, disregarding democratic norms that ensure civil rights, political freedoms, and participation. The ruling party CCM was accused of determining to win at all costs.

Tanzania Mainland Presidential Election Results 2005-2020

Year	Candidate	Political Party	Votes	%of the vote
2005	Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete	CCM	9,123,952	80.28%
	Prof. Ibrahim Lipumba	CUF	1,327,125	11.68%
2010	Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete	CCM	5,276,827	62.83%
	Wilbrod Slaa	CHADEMA	2,271,491	27.05%
2015	John Pombe Magufuli	CCM	8,882,935	58.46%
	Edward Lowasa	CHADEMA	6,072,848	39.97%
2020	John Pombe Magufuli	CCM	12,516,252	84.40%
	Tundu Lissu	CHADEMA	1,933,271	13.04%

Source: Computed Elections results data by GEPC researchers from different publicly available data

Tanzania 2024 Local Government elections and the continuum of electoral violence

In Tanzania, local government leaders are major political anchor between the local and national political establishments. Local government leaders control vital access to resources and tools for grassroot political mobilization and therefore a vital factor in electoral success.  Local government elections are heavily contentious as they are commonly used as a test of a political party’s popularity ahead of the general elections.

As 2024 local government elections came up, the government was yet to fully address the concerns raised by CHADEMA during the 2020 general elections and political violence was apparent (Aljazeera, 2020) .

Indeed, as predicted by various commentators, a similar wave of electoral violence witnessed in 2015 followed in the 2024 local government elections. The wave of violence was directed towards politicians, independent media houses and vocal commentators. For instance, CHADEMA reported that three of its members were killed in incidents linked to local elections and accused the authorities of rigging the vote (France, 2024)

AFP journalists in the western town of Kigoma reported seeing voters clashing over alleged fake ballots, leading to arrests. Several of its leaders were reportedly abducted, severely beaten and left for dead by unidentified assailants (OWP, 2024) Local observers documented and condemned the widespread electoral malpractices and treatment of opposition candidates.  The continuum of electoral violence started more than a decade before was persisting. 

In short, despite the success recorded by the Muafaka accords, the consensual approach to settling political differences did not percolate across Tanzania’s political fiber.  As a consequence, Tanzania’s electoral violence as witnessed between 1995 and 2000 resurfaced and was directed beyond the Civic United Front and its supporters in Zanzibar. The violence was expanded and targeted to other political parties, escalating over the years.  Between 2010 and 2024 Tanzania witnessed waves of violent elections with CHADEMA bearing the heaviest brunt.  Amidst this CHADEMA’s popularity increased has remained a major variable at the heart of Tanzania’s election politics to date. However, the suppression and violence that surrounds its political environment points to challenges that face the state of Tanzania’s electoral democracy.

Key causes of electoral violence in Tanzania

Having traced the history and highlights of electoral democracy in Tanzania, the following pattern and causal factors emerge across all the waves of electoral violence that Tanzania has undergone. Perhaps by addressing these, an elusive search for electoral consensus and peaceful elections can be achieved.

1. The dominance of the incumbency and use of state resources for political and electoral advantage.
2. Perceived mistreatment or unfair treatment and unequitable share of resources, particularly between the mainland and Zanzibar, and in Zanzibar between Ugunja and Pemba
3. Disputes over electoral processes and results- Electoral laws and role of public servants and political appointees such as district and regional commissioners, Independence of the National Electoral Commission and Zanzibar Electoral Commissions, the selection process of commissioners, returning officers and their independency, electoral disputes and grievance settlement mechanisms, including the lack of avenues to challenge presidential results in court, constrained political space and lack of opportunities for independent candidates.
4. Gradual decline in the values of unity as cultivated and inspired by the founding father of the Nation, Mwl Julius Kambarage Nyerere under his philosophy of Ujama. These had addressed the issue and use of economic power, religion, tribe or ethnicity as levers for political power. Presently, whenever elections approach, people retreat to their ethnic origins, and the population is coming to slowly accept looking at things through their ethnic and religious perspectives^[1].
5. Excessive force by security agencies during electoral processes and against opposition parties- particularly the police and militias such as KMKM, Valantia etc in quelling protestors and opposition members, opposition leaders, restraining vocal media and those perceived to be a threat to the state.
6. Overzealous and provocative posture and sloganeering taken by political parties such as ‘Haki’, ‘Ngangari’ by CUF, People Power and Movement for Change (CHADEMA). Baptizing political party youth wings and branches with names associated to militants and global conflict hots such as, Komando Yoso, Kosovo,  Checheniya etc.  These were interpreted by security agencies as ‘drums of war’ a threat to national security, stability and cohesion, militancy in electoral processes and mobilization of masses for political violence and not meaningful participation.  For example, in 2000, the police counter responded to CUF’s Ngangari slogan with their own ‘Ngunguri’ slogan which was an imitation of the police bullets and tear gas that were ready for use against violent opposition.

Electoral violence and lessons from Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique

A young girl runs for safety during the Kenya violent electoral protests: Photo credit: Daily Nation

Experiences from neighboring Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique show that even a country perceived as peaceful can explode into cyclic violence, bringing down the politics and fundamentals of the state. Uncontrolled electoral violence has a tendency of degenerating into a contagious cycle of violence that can gradually engulf a country with extensive catastrophic effect.  This was the case in Kenya in 2007 and 2013.  A violent election aftermath that ensued in 2007 left thousands of people dead, more than a million displaced Homes and property worth billions of was destroyed and Kenya’s history was never the same (Oketch A Matilda, 2018 and Human Rights Watch 2017).

Moreover, excessive and violent suppression of the opposition works contrary to the of the state and the ruling party.  The excessive and perceived injustice against the opposition makes it more popular with the public and can lead to the eventual collapse of a large political party. This was the case in Kenya in 1990s when a violent crackdown on the opposition galvanized their agitation and support for multiparty democracy and in 2000s when the national support for NARC coalition of political parties culminated with the collapse of the ruling party KANU under President Moi in 2002 (The Guardian, 29 December, 2002)  

Further, excessive use of force or weaponization of state agencies such as the police, military, judiciary or the electoral commission as instruments of political coercion enders the opposition to the public. The experiences in Uganda have demonstrated this fact over last 20 years.  

In a period of less than five years of its formation, a nonexistent politician, Robert Kyagulanyi aka Bobi Wine and his political party, the National Unity Platform was catapulted to prominence, emerging as the second largest opposition party in Uganda by 2025. Similar experiences in the early 2000’s brought Dr Kizza Besigye and the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) to political limelight, emerging as top political contender against the ruling National Resistance movement party.

Additionally, lessons from both Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique show that there are common factors that drive electoral violence, these include perceived dominancy of the ruling party, weak electoral systems, ethnicization, monetization and militarization of electoral democracy and the use of criminal gangs for political expediency in elections. This was clearly demonstrated in the 2024 general elections in Mozambique when citizens erupted with anger and violence against what was conceived as a fraudulent electoral processes, militarization and imposition of unpopular candidate and in favour of the ruling Frelimo party (Ohchr, November 2024) Kenya and Uganda had shown similar patterns. The use of gangs for hire was evident in Kenya (National Crimes Report 2019) and while the level of discontent recorded in Uganda (Human Rights Watch 2021).

Significantly, lessons show that electoral violence can taint the democratic credentials of any given state. Even previously peaceful countries such as Kenya before 1992 and 2007 can gradually degenerate into a cycle of electoral violence as ethnic divisions, political entrepreneurs, criminal gangs and repressive security organs of the state take center of the democratic processes. In the long run the citizens lose interest in democratic electoral processes and ultimately the essence of elections as a tool for delivering a democratic outcome become eroded.

Broadly, consequences related to electoral violence include; undermined civil and political rights, human suffering, diminished trust in democratic processes and institutions, reproduction of repressive and on nonproductive structures, including institutions or agents of repression, reduced legitimacy in the incumbency and elected leaders. Investor confidence can be lost and take long to regain. The economic implications and financial burden on the country can be immense (a.c.e project reports) .

Conclusively, although there are multiple factors that drive electoral violence, causes ranging from ethnicity, perceived political repression and lack of opportunity appear to be dominant factors. Moreover, the increasing militarization of electoral processes, curtailment of free electoral campaigns and rejection of electoral outcomes are becoming a major factor for the surge of the new opposition in East Africa.

References

ACE reports available via https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ev/Electoral%20violence/consequences-of-electoral-violence/mobile_browsing/onePag

Aljazeera (2015) Tanzania opposition loses key seats in vote marred by fraud claim, Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/29/tanzania-opposition-loses-key-seats-in-vote-marred-by-fraud-claim; Accessed on 22 April 2025

Aljazeera (2020) Opposition complains of repression as Tanzania heads to the polls; Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/21/tanzania-heads-to-the-polls-opposition-complain-of-repression Accessed 22 April 2025

Aljazeera (2020) Fear of violence grows as Tanzania opposition denounces  election available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/29/fears-of-violence-grows-as-tanzania-opposition-denounces; accessed on 17 April 2025

France 24 (2024) Opposition candidates killed in Tanzania local electionhttps://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241127-opposition-figures-killed-as-tanzania-holds-local-election; Accessed on 17April 2025

Human Rights Watch (2017) Kenya: Post-Election Killings, Abuse available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/27/kenya-post-election-killings-abuse; accessed on 22 April 2025

Human Rights Watch (2021) Uganda: Elections Marred by Violence available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence , accessed on 22 April 2025

National Crimes Research Centre (2019) available at https://crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Issue-Brief-on-State-of-Organized-Criminal-Gangs-in-Kenya.pdf

Okech Achieng Matilda. The Impact of Electoral Violence on Economic Development: A Case of Kenya. Journal of Political Science and International Relations. Vol. 1, No. 3, 2018, pp. 55-71. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20180103.11, available at https://www.sciencepublishinggroup.com/article/10.11648/j.jpsir.20180103.11 accessed on 17 April 2025

OWP: The Organisation for World Peace (2024) Brutal Violence Against the Opposing Party in Tanzania https://theowp.org/brutal-violence-against-the-opposing-party-in-tanzania/ accessed on 17 April 2025

The Guardian (29 December, 2002); Kenya sweeps corrupt ruler out of power available  via: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/29/kenya.jamesastill, accessed on 15 October, 2025