Electoral democracy and the elusive search for a new peaceful electoral consensus in Tanzania

 

Authors: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Electoral consensus has been elusive in many African countries. This short study brief attempts to trace, document and discuss the electoral democracy environment in Tanzania since 1995,  experiences from  the Muafaka in delivering  a semblance of peace in a polarised political environment. Perhaps by looking back in history, we can shape the future of electoral democracy in Tanzania and Africa generally.

Introduction

Tanzania has always been lauded as model of electoral democracy however over the past few years there seems to be some pointers towards a potential stagnation and regression largely caused particularly by contradictions over electoral processes. While Tanzania has gone to elections since 1995 and remained a good exemplar of peaceful power transition in a region where peaceful transitions are scarce, the general electoral processes that underlie these transitions have constantly faced contestations, with some tuning violent.  For instance, the last general elections in 2021 were marked by some electoral concerns and judged by both local and international observers as not free and fair. The electoral outcomes and the political environment thereafter became polarized, political and civic spaces was constrained, forcing some opposition politicians to seek political asylum outside Tanzania.

After the sudden death of President John Pombe Magufuli in 2022, the new President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s government in 2023 made some electoral reforms with partial amendments to three major laws governing elections (The National Election Commission Act 2023, Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Government Elections Bill (2023), The Political Parties Affairs Laws (Amendment) Bill (Amending the Political Parties Act RE 2019 and the Elections Expenses Act, 2010).

The government lifted a ban on political mobilization, granted amnesty to all opposition political leaders in exile, called for dialogue and committed to fostering a new culture of competitive democracy. However, this hiatus of political serenity appears to have been short lived. Local government elections held in November 2024 were marred with reports of political violence, kidnaps and death (Aljazeera, 2020). And in a dramatic turn of events, in April the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) banned the leading opposition political party CHADEMA from participating in General elections for five years. This trend, irrespective of its intentions and underlying legal justification, tainted Tanzania’s democratic credentials and potentially threatens the future of democracy in Tanzania.  For these acts and the noticeable trend, Tanzania has come under increasing scrutiny and pressure from both internal, regional and international human rights and democracy advocates with calls for reforms and peaceful resolution of the long-standing political grievances (IDU, May 2025). 

Ahead of the 2025 General Elections and thereafter, multiple questions are raised whether the current political context can guarantee Tanzania’s past glory as the haven of peace and beacon of democracy in East Africa and Africa generally? How can government secure peaceful elections and restore confidence in electoral democracy in 2025?  These questions are legitimate given that Tanzania has for decades remained peaceful and played a major role as a stabilizing variable in the East and Great Lakes region which is embroiled with conflicts and regalia of collapsed states.

To attempt and dissect these questions, we look at Tanzania’s electoral democracy history and the turbulent electoral cycles it has gone through and how it has navigated around these political currents of a multiparty dispensation towards the state that it is today. The lessons from these episodes are quite relevant in helping Tanzania forge its current and future electoral trajectory.

Overview of Electoral Democracy in Tanzania (1980-2021)

The concept of electoral democracy is not alien to Tanzania. Until 1995 internal party electoral democracy was a present concept in Tanzania’s political dispensation. Contrary to what some naysayers may widely hold, Mwl Julius Nyerere, within the ambits of his socialist values believed and practiced a level of internal party democracy. Even under the socialist single party era in the 1960s to the 1980s, TANU and later Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), political party delegates contested internally as candidates and were voted for electoral positions. Party members vied for electoral positions such as members of the local party branch leadership, the National Executive Committee (NEC), the Central Executive Committee (CEC) and for parliamentary seats. The records of intra-party elections held between 1980-85 are available and show some rigorous internal political dynamics ahead of intra party elections.

The October 1995 Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Tanzania were the climax of this single intra party democracy that had been practiced since the 1960s. The general elections marked an important milestone in the country’s transition to multi- party electoral democracy. They were the first multiparty general elections after the lifting of the ban on political parties that had seen Chama Cha Mapinduzi rule as single party for more than 20 years.  The elections brought to an end the intense debates about the role of multi-partyism in democracy and governance. Prior to the elections, there were contestations as to whether Tanzania must adopt democracy or remain a single party state. Fundamentally, there were intra-party debates during the preparation for the elections on who was best suited to lead Tanzania in a new evolving political context.   Significantly, these elections marked a termination to the Mwl Julius Nyerere single party era (TEMCO, 1997) and repositioning of Tanzania as a new fountain of democracy in the East African region.

The political rallies and debates in 1995 were contentious and exciting to attend for the citizens and a country that had been ruled under a single party. As the political space opened, new centers of opposition political power and leadership emerged. The opinions coming from these were diverse and the candidates quite combative in asserting the new direction that Tanzania would take as a multiparty democracy.  Some of these described themselves as reformers (Wanamageuzi) and political parties such as NCCR-Mageuzi were born.  Tanzania had changed and moving into a new political future. An era of electoral democracy had been ushered in. However, this excitement did not take long before the tenets of electoral democracy in a multiparty dispensation were strained and tested.

The 1995 election outcomes on Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar

The 1995 election results gave a resounding victory for CCM on the mainland Tanzania. After the election results were announced, CCM’s candidate Benjamin Mkapa won the presidential election with 61.82% (4,026,422 votes) and 186 of the 232 electoral constituencies.  Augustino Mrema of NCCR-M came second with 27.77% (1,808,616 votes), Professor Ibrahim Lipumba of the Civic United Front secured 6.43% (418,973 votes) while John Momose Cheyo of United Democratic Party (UDP) came fourth with 3% (258,734). Overall CCM won 182 constituencies on the mainland, and 50 in Zanzibar.

After the election, 37 additional seats for women MPs were awarded to the parties based on the proportion of seats in the National Assembly, while five members were elected by the House of Representatives of Zanzibar and ten members nominated by the President. The Attorney General was also an ex-officio member, resulting in a total of 285 MPs in the legislature. Electoral democracy had delivered its verdict. The electoral land scape had changed but CCM was still a dominant party in power.

The test of electoral democracy and contestations of the 1995’s elections aftermath

Despite being highly competitive, the elections were a judged by both national and international observers as largely peaceful, free and fair on the mainland Tanzania. However, the elections in Zanzibar were widely disputed.  Neither the local nor the international observers endorsed the elections (ibid). The CUF Presidential Candidate in Zanzibar, Seif Sharif Hamad disputed the election results announced by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission, declared self-victory, refused to recognize the CCM led government in Zanzibar and ordered elected all CUF legislators to boycott parliamentary sessions. Protests broke out in Zanzibar and there was a clamp down on the new emerging media such as DTV that had announced the results before ZEC’s declaration. The International Foundation on Electoral Systems (IFES) reported that inadequate administration, inappropriate secrecy, and general inefficiency marred the process and cast doubt and mistrust over much of the outcome. Neither the National Electoral Commission of Tanzania nor the Zanzibar Electoral Commission was able to win the trust of the electorate (IEFS, 1995). Tanzania’s new exercise in democracy had started on a wobbly foot and was under an early test.

The implications on the future electoral democracy

The general elections showed the nation was divided between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, with CCM as a dominant party on the mainland and the Civic United Front (CUF) as a dominant opposition party to reckon with in Zanzibar. In Zanzibar the country was split right in the middle, along geographical lines. One of the parties (CUF) was dominant in the island of Pemba, while the ruling party (CCM) held sway in the island of Zanzibar. What this meant in the Zanzibar context was that neither of the parties was a ‘national’ party.

The elections exposed fundamental constitutional and political questions that would later become a nemesis of Tanzania’s young democracy for decades to come. For example, the position of Zanzibar as a political entity in Tanzania’s politics was redefined with emergence of a new political force based on the island. Questions lingered as to what would be the appropriate system of political participation, choice and governance moving forward. Would Tanzania’s political union between Zanzibar and Tanzania mainland hold? How would the emerging political dynamics between the Islands of Unguja and Pemba be handled?

Fundamentally, the electoral systems and electoral management were equally tested and gaps exposed.  While the elections for the presidency were plebiscitary (voters could only vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a single candidate), elections for parliament were classified- This showed that there was still ground for future electoral reforms to improve electoral transparency and democratic consolidation.

Moreover, the elections showed that CCM was still fused with the state. Despite protests and condemnation from the international community, CCM ruled in Zanzibar, was supported by all institutions of the state.  An examination by political analysts of the question as to whether the competition that emerged during the switch to multiparty and during the first general election represented an expansion of political choice for citizens and a broader representation of societal forces concluded that the legal and institutional framework after 1995 strongly favored the ruling party. The difference between the state and CCM was still blurred (Hassan Kaya, 2004).

Even after the introduction of the multi-party system the electoral process and election system was still dominated by the ruling party. The conduct of elections remained a major source of discontent for the opposition. The underlying political currents and unanswered questions led to contentious elections and a spiral of electoral violence which re-occurred during next electoral cycles and have remained a common feature up to date. While electoral democracy had been well introduced, the state was yet to learn how to avoid or manage the electoral violence that emanated from the contradictions and contestations of an electoral process. Tanzania would soon witness violent elections in 2000.

Chronology of Electoral Violence in Tanzania 2000-2024

The expectations of Zanzibaris prior to the 1995 elections, like their compatriots on the mainland, were that they would enjoy greater democracy and have more human rights synonymous to an autonomous state. But, in their view, this was not how it turned out in Zanzibar. Instead, even the small gains that had been won before the elections were lost (Ibid).

After the disputed 1995 elections, the international community brokered some form of consensus (Muafaka 1) between the CCM and CUF. Some of the concessions included granting of some political privileges extended to CUF and its leader, Seif Sharif Hamad. The political grievances however did not go away.  The opposition CUF felt that its victory had been usurped, and that its candidate who won the Presidency, in their view had been denied a legitimate chance to rule. The Zanzibar ‘issues’ which among others included concerns over the autonomy of Zanzibar and its fair share of the Union national cake had not been addressed.

The political will to support the Muafaka from both political parties was lacking and Zanzibar was destined for a violent election in 2000 and registering a wave of Tanzania’s first export of refugees to Kenya. Violence was gradually becoming a feature in Tanzania’s elections.

The Civic United Front and violence in Zanzibar elections -2000- 2003

The simmering political tensions and anger of the 1995 elections had persisted and ultimately exploded in violence after the 2000 election results were announced by the Zanzibar electoral commission. During these elections, the ZEC announced that the CCM Presidential candidate, Amani Abeid Karume had garnered 248,095 votes (67.04%) against CUF’s Presidential Candidate, Seif Sharif Hamad’s 122,000 (32.96%). Election results in some constituencies were cancelled for reported irregularities.

While all observers commended the way the elections were conducted on the Mainland, the Zanzibar elections were characterized by the Commonwealth Observer Team as a shambles. In fact, all observers were more critical this time of the way the elections were run, and they all demanded fresh elections (Ibid).

This time the opposition CUF did not recognize both the Union and Zanzibar Presidents, and they demanded their members of the Union Parliament and those of the House of Representatives to boycott both legislative bodies. The two bodies using the House Rules, decided to throw out all CUF representatives from both Houses. The result of this was that Zanzibar had a one-party House of Representatives. The exercise of electoral multiparty democracy was being tested once again.

What followed was an insurrection of mass protests and confrontation with the police and other security organs. It was estimated that 40 Zanzibaris were shot dead and a further 600 injured when the Tanzanian army and police opened fire on a crowd of CUF supporters who were protesting against the results of the ballot. The violence was more pronounced in the Island of Pemba.  In the days following the 2000 elections, Tanzanian security forces and militias conducted a house-to house operation arresting and beating defiant residents. During that period, property was destroyed and an estimated 2,000 Zanzibaris fled to Kenya (Relief Web, 2005)

The 2000 General elections were the most violent elections in Zanzibar.  The violent protests and police killings in Zanzibar in January 2001 dented Tanzania’s political electoral history and democratic aspirations as a young multiparty state. What was very clear (from this aftermath) was that the country during this period lost political leadership of the security forces and that the security forces lacked technical means (at the time), to do their professional work in an evolving and highly charged multiparty setting. There was both local and international pressure for the Tanzania’s government to form an independent commission of inquiry to investigate what happened. CCM as the victorious and ruling party was compelled to negotiate another consensus political Accord (Muafaka 11) which provided substantive concessions. These included undertaking electoral and political reforms and to a power sharing formular for government positions.

 Zanzibar Elections and Political Consensus (Muafaka 11) reforms 2003 and 2010

The political and electoral reforms consensus under Muafaka II included the promulgation of the 8th and the 9th constitutional amendments; reconstitution of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) to include two members of the official opposition; establishment of the office of Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP); development of a cordial relationship between the leaderships of Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF), and enhanced access to the grassroots by the opposition (Kituo cha Katiba, 2003). It concluded with  a by election held in the disputed constituencies in 2003. Zanzibar was attempting to master electoral democracy and address the root causes of electoral violence.

The main objective of the Muafaka Accord was to create a level playing field and a conducive atmosphere for 2005 elections (Ibid).  The Zanzibar Electoral Commission would be managed with representatives from both political parties. Moreover, the opposition parties would be granted unfettered access to their grass root structures.

Significance of Political consensus (Muafaka)

While Muafaka I had died for a lack of political goodwill, the 2nd Muafaka registered considerable success. The Muafaka II did not fully eliminate electoral violence in Zanzibar, as this was to happen again in 2005, albeit at a lower level compared 2000.  But and significantly, the Muafaka II laid ground for wider constitutional and electoral reforms which led to a powers sharing approach adopted in 2010. Since the adoption of Muafaka II, Zanzibar elections have remained contentious but with minimal violence. For instance, the October 2015 elections were annulled by the Chairperson of ZEC for not being free and fair (BBC, 2015) .  However, the power sharing approach adopted in 2010 held Zanzibar together with the opposition CUF taking up the seat of the First Vice President in the government led by CCM.

To date Muafaka II still with stands, pointing to a positive democratic development on the Islands and Tanzania generally. Zanzibar’s power-sharing strategy appears to have ended the zero-sum nature of Zanzibari politics, as it ushered in a more consensus-based approach reminiscent of Julius Nyerere’s concept of ujamaa (unity). Government (Aley Soud Nassor & Jim Jose, 2014) For Nyerere, Ujamaa was a specifically African alternative to the institutionalized oppositional politics of western liberal democracy. Nyerere emphasized a system of people governance driven by a common national ideology and cause traversing tribe, economic and social status.

Moreover, the success so far achieved through Muafaka II and the power sharing structure demonstrates the usefulness and feasibility of consensus where even adversarial political parties such as CUF and CCM can work together. The Zanzibar’s experiment in power-sharing demonstrates that a multi-party-political system need not be structured according to a two-party oppositional model in order to achieve stable and functional democratic government (Ibid).  Political consensus on contentious issues and openness to continuous reforms can be a guarantor against electoral violence and elusive peace.  This experiment has given Zanzibar a semblance of relative peace, despite the historical political differences.

Moreover, the Muafaka dismantled the awkward label on CUF as a violent political party, increased its presence and role in running Zanzibar government, although its political influence and dominance in Zanzibar has dwindled significantly due its own internal party dynamics.

By 2021 AcT Wazalendo had emerged as the new strongest opposition political contender in Zanzibar after CUF’s founding leade, Seif Sharif Hamad, defected from CUF, carrying along with him multitudes of former CUF supporters.

Zanzibar Presidential Election Results 1995-2020

Year	Candidate	Political Party	Votes	%of the vote
1995	Salim Amour	CCM	165, 271	50.27%
	Seif Sharif Hamad	CUF	163,706	49.76%
2000	Amani Abeid Karume	CCM	248,095	67.04%
	Seif Sharif Hamad	CUF	122,000	32.96%
2005	Amani Abeid Karume	CCM	239,832	53.18%
	Seif Sharif Hamad	CUF	207,733	46.06%
2010	Mohamed Shein	CCM	179,809	50.11%
	Seif Sharif Hamad	CUF	176,338	49.14%
2015	Mohamed Shein	CCM	–	–
	Seif Sharif Hamad	CUF	–	–
2020	Dr Hussein Mwinyi	CCM	380,402	77.9%
	Seif Sharif Hamad	AcT- Wazalendo	99,103	20.31%

Source: Computed Elections results data by GEPC researchers from different publicly available data

Despite starting on a wobbly footing with electoral violence in Zanzibar,  the Muafaka experience had delivered a perfect template of managing political differences in a polarized political and electoral context. However, this hiatus  faded away, with a resurgence of electoral violence, targeting a section of political parties and a brutal ‘panda gari’ culture that threatens peace. In  the next part of this study we will evaluate the resurgence and chronology of political and electoral violence, with lessons from neighboring countries and how the 2025 general elections must and can reclaim Tanzania’s electoral glory.