WB Reports Tanzania Economic Growth was lower , warns Poverty reduction is Constant

According to the World Bank Group, Tanzania’s economy is estimated to have grown by 5.2 percent in 2018, a figure which is lower and in contrast to the government’s National Bureau of Statistics estimates of 7 percent but still more than the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 2.3 percent.

The Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics reports that real GDP growth was 7%, slightly higher than 6.8 percent in 2016, however, the Wold Bank reported, official demand side data including data related to consumption, investment and net trade suggest that growth softened in 2018. This is according to the WB’s latest Tanzania Economic Update report released in July, 2019 titled ‘’Tanzania Economic Update: Human Capital: The Real Wealth of Nations” 12th Edition
Using demand side data World Bank Staff estimate that real GDP growth from 2018 was 5.2 percent lower than the NBS estimate but still more than double the SSA average of 2.3%.

The softening of consumption growth was supported by Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) data showing lower consumption tax collection as well as tight controls on public consumption expenditures.
The report is quite critical of government’s investment and fiscal performance, whereby it stated that investment growth remains’ dampened as significant under execution of public development plans, lower levels of FDI inflows and improved but relatively low private sector credit growth.

The trade balance also deteriorated in 2018 with exports contracting by 3.9% in gross value and imports increasing by 7.8%
Mid fiscal year accounts for 2018/19 show a low deficit and significant shortfall in both spending and financing which together with high payment arears raise questions about budget credibility. Whereby, the deficit for the first half of the fiscal year was a low 0.7% of GPD against a budgeted 1.6%. The revenue shortfall relative to budget were even larger than spending shortfalls. Domestic revenues especially tax collections under performed by about 12% against mid-year targets and fiscal external financing under performed by more than 80%. As a result, the budget significantly was under executed for capital projects needed for growth and job creation.

Government arears to contractors and supplies to pension funds by utilities such as Tanzania National Electricity Supply Company (TANESCO) to their suppliers remain unsustainable high at an estimated 5.7% of GDP in mid-2018.
The WB also warned that although the level of public debt currently was sustainable, recent changes in its composition raised concerns about liquidity risks.

The external position was challenged by an expanding current account deficit and declining reserves. The exports had fallen partly due to lower cashew nut exports and imports increased because of capital goods imported to supply development projects. The current account deficit had to 5.2% of GDP for the 12 months ending January, 2019 up from 3.2 percent a year earlier.

Reforms to relieve the regulatory burdens on business was moving slowly. According to the WB government had introduced abruptly new laws affecting mining, public –private partnership and statistics that had raised private sector concerns about policy predictability.
High population growth was undermining the reduction of poverty. Despite efforts between 2007 and 2016 that had reduced the Country’s poverty rate from 34.4% to 26.8% the absolute number of poor people had remained at about 13 million due to high population growth.

Although the most recent poverty measures based on the Household Budget Survey of 2017/18 was still being processed, it seemed likely that the downward trend poverty rate continued but had become more gradual, the WB stated.
The WB report figures raise further controversy on the accuracy in generation of Tanzania’s statistical figures and throw a spanner into the ongoing debate among stakeholders on which statistics should be considered as credible for planning purposes.

The government maintains that its statistics are credible and should be quoted as official and in 2018 passed a law (The Statistics Act of 2018) to enforce this. The Act made it a criminal offence to invalidate, distort or discredit any official data or to collect and publish any statistics which contradicted statistics from the NBS.

However, this law faced criticism from different actors arguing that it gives undue monopoly to government in generating statistical figures and limits room for debate and criticism of official data which may have some errors or generation of alternative statistical data by independent private entities and organisations. Some amendments were made in June to relax on some of the stringent provisions but the Act still requires some kind approval from the NBS.
The report raises significant concerns and challenges on the state of the economy and progress of reforms to improve the business and investment environment.

The latest reported figures which contradicts some of government’s official statistics and economic progress perhaps should serve as a wakeup call to the government to reassess its figures and provide clarity.

Election Coordination Mechanisms: A comparative study of Tanzania, South Africa and Nigeria

Proper election coordination is a major factor in successful elections in a multiparty democracy. The findings and key message coming out of a short policy study and governance practice note by GEPC suggests that there is no universal approach to coordination between Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) and Office of Registrar of Political Parties (ORPPs). Each country has developed some sort of coordination based on its existing political and legal dispensation.

This short policy study and governance practice note sought to undertake a comparative study of Tanzania and South Africa, Nigeria with a view of contributing towards electoral reforms and minimizing of electoral disputes.

However when ranked on the common standards and guidelines for electoral management and  regulation of political parties, Tanzania scores unfavorably on a number of major aspects; Finality of decisions of its EMB (the National Electoral Commission) and Office of Registrar of Political parties, whereby there decisions are final and cannot be challenged in court,

The appointment of Tanzania’s National Electoral Commission (NEC’s) commissioners is not subject to a parliamentary vetting process, NEC’s mandate is limited to Presidential elections and local elections organised and supervised by local government executives under the Minister responsible for local government. The EMB and Officer of Registrar of political parties’ report to the responsible Minister compared to its comparative Countries such as South Africa and Nigeria where these institutions are answerable to parliament.

Tanzania only ranks in equal measure with its comparative peers EMB and Office of the registrar of its political parties in the as Constitutional bodies and its organs headed by persons of high integrity at a level of a judge or retired judge.

The study therefore recommends that as Tanzania prepares for the next local and general elections, the country should practical measures to

  • Review of current election coordination mechanisms with view of minimizing overlaps and election disputes
  • Implement Court decisions current and previous in regards to election related matters such as independent candidates and role of local government executives in election management
  • Increase avenues for transparent and objective dispute resolution. These should be documented and formalised in law
  • Adopt and adapt best practices from the comparative countries on matters related to election management and coordination, including opportunities to legally challenge the finality of decisions by the election coordination mechanism

 

A table summary of salient features of EMB and ORPP structures, functioning and coordination and our ranking based on European Commission (EC) Common Standards & guidelines for Electoral Management and Political parties Regulations [1]

  1. No Issue Explanation Traffic Signal
    1 Constitutional protection of EMB and ORPP Strengthens independence, confidence and performance Green
    2 Presidential Appointment of EMB Commissioners and ORPP heads Bad practice, Creates mistrust and may encourage patrimony Red
    3 Existence of Nomination Panel or Committee  for EMB Commissioners and ORPP Strengthens political and public trust in the institutions Green
    4 EMB and ORPP Chaired by Judge or Justice of high court May strengthen political and public trust that the actions and decision of these institutions are just and fair, but fair outcome is not guaranteed Yellow
    5 Civil Society involvement in Nomination of EMB Commissioners and ORPP heads Widens participation, increases public trust and credibility of the institutions Green
    6 EMB and ORPP embed Roles within a single institution such as IEC in South Africa or INEC in Nigeria May encourage ambiguity, Best to separate but also depends on accountability structures and clarity of the roles Yellow
    7 EMB and ORPP heads accountable to Minister Bad practice, may encourage direct political interference and patrimony Red
    8 EMB and ORPP heads accountable to Public Service Commission May be subject to limitations of public service administrative codes of conduct and requirements Yellow
    9 EMB and ORPP accountable to Parliament Increases accountability and public  scrutiny Green
    10 EMB and ORPP direct participation in nominations and vetting of candidates Encourages the EMB and ORPP to ensure candidate standing for election meet the eligibility criterion and legal requirements Green
    11 EMB and ORPP direct engagement in development of Party and Membership list for political parties Bad practice, Infringes on right of Political parties to determine their candidates Red
    12 Restriction of EMB and ORPP electoral  organization and coordination mandates to Presidential and Parliamentary elections (Tanzania’s case) Bad practice , may encourage direct political influence, foments elections disputes Red
    13 EMB and ORPP enforcement of Separate Codes of conduct or ethics Good to separate political issues from electoral matters Green
    14 EMB and ORPP separate Management of Party subventions, Financing Largely dependent on accountability structures Yellow
    15 Existence of EMB and ORPP elaborate operational procedures and independent guiding  law Provides clarity in operational mandates Green
    16 Existence of other constitutional institutions to support EMB and ORPP in democracy-such as  in South Africa Strengthens independence, trust and performance Green
    17 Decisions of EMB and ORPP Final on electoral and political matters Bad practice, May defeat justice and Fairness Red
    18 Detailed regulations for EMB and ORPP dispute resolution Provides clarity in dispute resolution Green
    19 Existence of formalised PPLC  and other similar bodies  to work with EMB and ORPP Enhances collaboration and potential dispute resolution Green
    20 Existence of an Independent Electoral Court or Tribunal to adjudicate on matters relating to EMB and ORPP Strengthens performance And expedites justice Green

     Comparative thematic analysis of Tanzania, Kenya, South Africca and Nigeria’s EMB and ORPP institutional setup, functions and our ranking based on European Commission (EC) Common Standard & guidelines for Electoral Management & Political Parties Regulation Standards[2]

    Issue Country Analysis Traffic sign
     

     

    Legal Constitution

    Tanzania EMB Constitutional body, ORPP enacted by law Green
    Kenya EMB  Constitutional Body, ORPP enacted by Green
    South Africa EMB and ORPP Constitutional bodies Green
    Nigeria EMB and ORPP Constitutional bodies Green
     

     

    Appointments

    Tanzania EMB and ORPP Commissioners and heads are presidential appointees, without nomination Red
    Kenya EMB and ORPP heads are presidential appointee , upon nomination Green
    South Africa EMB and ORPP Commissioners and heads are Presidential appointee, upon nomination Green
    Nigeria EMB and ORPP heads are Presidential appointees, upon nomination Green
     

     

    Leadership

    Tanzania EMB and ORPP headed by a Judge or Retired justice Green
    Kenya EMB and ORPP headed by  none Judges Red
    South Africa EMB and ORPP headed by a Judge Green
    Nigeria EMB and ORPP headed by a Judge Green
     

     

    Roles

    Tanzania EMB electoral mandated limited to Presidential and Parliamentary elections, Local elections organised by Minister Red
    Kenya EMB electoral mandate extended to organise all elections Green
    South Africa EMB mandated to organise all elections Green
    Nigeria EMB mandated to organise all elections Green
     

     

    Accountability

    Tanzania EMB reports to the Responsible Minister Red
    Kenya EMB reports to Parliament Green
    South Africa EMB reports to Parliament Green
    Nigeria EMB reports to parliament Green
     

    Jurisdiction

    Tanzania EMB organise elections partially in Zanzibar. Zanzibar President and House of Representative elections organised by Zanzibar Electoral Commission Yellow
    Kenya EMB has nationwide jurisdictive coverage Green
    South Africa EMB has nationwide jurisdictive coverage Green
    Nigeria EMB has nationwide jurisdictive coverage Green
     

    Dispute Resolution

    Tanzania EMB and ORPP decisions are final Red
    Kenya EMB and ORPP decisions challengeable in court Green
    South Africa EMB and ORPP decisions challengeable in court Green
    Nigeria EMB and ORPP decisions challengeable in court Green

    [1] We developed these common standards and traffic signals based on standard democratic and accountability principles, international conventions, international benchmarks and European Commission (EC) guidelines for Political Parties Regulation.

    [2] Ibid. The European Commission (EC) (Venice Commission) guidelines for Political Parties Regulation guideline provide an overview of issues regarding the development and adoption of legislation for political parties’ regulation in democracies.

    ** The full report of this study can also be downloaded from our reports and publications sections