Extractive Governance

Extractive Governance Natural Resource Policy

Regulation of Mining and Critical Minerals in East Africa: A comparative overview of Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi

Photo Credit: President of Burundi, HE Évariste Ndayishimiye inspects a Mine in Burundi

Authors: Dr Ange-Dorine Irakoze, Moses Kulaba, & Eva Kihupi, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Executive Summary

There is an increasing discussion as to whether Africa’s critical minerals potential can contribute to lasting economic benefits for mineral rich countries. This short study report provides an overview of the current legal regulatory terrain governing mining in selected East Africa Community (EAC) Countries with a particular focus on mining regulatory framework in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.

It highlights the critical mineral potential, policy and legal framework governing the allocation of mining rights, taxation and fiscal regime, exemptions and incentives, local content provisions, land compensation and environmental regulations, Artisanal and Small Mining (ASM), Minerals Value Addition and Trading. The findings suggest that despite the developments in legal reforms over the last decade, progressive movement on critical minerals regulation and safeguards of environmental, community rights and responsible business conduct has remained varied across countries and stagnant

This report cannot be used as an exclusive source document on East Africa’s minerals and mining regulatory landscape. Interested stakeholders such as investors are encouraged to reach out to the respective EAC governments for detailed updated information. The findings, however, provide essential topline information for key stakeholders (government, mining companies, investors, researchers, members of legislative bodies and civil society) on the general regulatory landscape of mining in the EAC.

Background

Mining is a critical sector for East Africa’s development. So far Mining contributes about 2.3% of GDP and a leading foreign exchange earner within the nontraditional exports of EAC member states^[1]. The EAC region is endowed with a variety of minerals resources such as gold, diamonds, copper, coal, iron ore oil, gas, fluorspar, titanium and zirconium, cobalt and nickel. These mineral resources present an opportunity for development of the mining industry, which is currently underdeveloped. Further, the sector has great potential for economic growth, employment opportunities and spearheading both the forward and backward linkage of the region’s economy.

Respective EAC member states aim to attract more investments and increase the contribution of the mining sector significantly with Tanzania aiming for 10% by 2026^[2]. Over the last decade the EAC member states have recorded an increase or upsurge in exploration for critical energy transition minerals and it is projected that their mining activities will increase over the next decade. However, realising full benefits from the mineral wealth is held back by weak or unpredictable regulatory regimes, economic injustice and environmental concerns.

The UN and IEA warns that increasing exploration and mining activities for critical minerals will potentially aggravate harm in mining communities. And there is an increasing discussion as to whether Africa’s infamous resource curse can be reversed and its critical minerals potential can contribute to lasting economic benefits for mineral rich countries.

Critical Minerals are loosely defined as raw minerals and materials required to support the clean industrial technology and energy transition to a more sustainable low carbon future (IGF:2022). These minerals include copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, tantalum, manganese and graphite and other rare earth elements. Lithium, nickel and cobalt are core components of batteries, like those that power electric vehicles. Rare earth elements are part of the magnets that turn wind turbines and electric motors. Copper and aluminum are used in massive amounts in power transmission lines (UNEP).^[3]

There is a surge in demand for these minerals, with the IEA estimating that demand for graphite and copper will increase by folds by 2050 (IEA). At least 900,000 tons of graphite is required to manufacture 12 million EVs ^[4]. Their distinct characteristics, spatially restricted distribution and significant role they are playing in driving the technology to support a clean future makes them a special type of minerals warranting special governance emphasis. Because of their limited geographical occurrence, amidst surging demand, it is imperative that their extraction is just, fair and does not aggravate economic injustices, more harm and human rights abuses.

With out proper policy and legal regulatory governance frameworks and strategic re-positioning, EAC’s mining sector and its critical green transition minerals rich countries could again miss out from this 4^th industrial mineral revolution boom.

Rationale

The EAC hosts vast deposits of critical and strategic energy transition minerals such as coltan, nickel, tantalum, platinum, niobium, copper and other Rare Earth Elements vital in driving the green technological revolution to a cleaner energy future. Tanzania holds 3^rd largest graphite reserves in Africa and accounting for about 5% globally, Rwanda is a leading producer of the 3Ts (Tantalum, Tungsten and Tin) , Uganda has vast deposits of Copper, Kenya leads in Platinum and Burundi has the second reserve of coltan in East Africa.

The admission of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the EAC in 2022 increased the region’s position as a global player in the critical and strategic mineral’s space as the DRC holds and accounts for about 68% of the global cobalt production. Graphite, copper and Cobalt are key ingredients in the manufacture of Electric Vehicle components. The presence of abundant critical minerals is not enough. This abundance must be accompanied by concomitant conducive regulatory frameworks to attract investment while at the same time maximizing value and harnessed benefits for mineral rich countries.

The EAC treaty states that natural resources must be harnessed for the benefit of citizens and Article 114 of the treaty requires member states to cooperate in natural resource management but this commitment is fully to be achieved. There is no harmonized approach to mining governance and the EAC model mining law remains unpassed. The transition to a clean future provides an opportunity for the EAC Green Transition Mineral rich countries to benefit from their mineral wealth.

Yet the history of governance and management of the mineral sector has so far yielded low dividends for mineral-rich countries in the region. There is an increase in exploration for critical green transition minerals but this is undermined by concerns for environment safety and economic justice for mining communities. It is evident that without proper regulation environment and strategic positioning, critical green transition minerals rich countries could again miss out from this mineral boom.

Proper Governance of the mining sector can help the EAC address these challenges and thereby void the infamous resource curse that has bedeviled some of its member states for decades. Effective governance and regulatory framework for critical minerals can catapult the region into a major global player in the future green industrial and technological revolution, without aggravating human rights and more harm.

The Constitutions of all the EAC member states provide that natural resources and all minerals are public property vested in the President as Head of State or governments in trust on behalf of their citizens. With proper governance and regulation, citizens can have a stronger say in the governance of their Natural Resource wealth. Adequate policy and legal frameworks facilitate a predictable investment regime and increased government and corporate accountability, ensuring ethical investment and that benefits from the available mineral wealth are shared equitably.

Overview of EAC’s Mineral Resources

Country	Precious metal, Gemstones & Semi-Precious Metal	Metallic Minerals	Industrial minerals
Burundi	Gold	Tin, Nickel, copper, cobalt, niobium, coltan, vanadium, tungsten	Phosphate, Peat
Kenya	Gemstones, gold	Lead, zircon, iron, titanium	Soda ash, flourspar, salt, mica, chaum, oil, coal, diatomite, gypsum, meers, kaolin, rare earth
Rwanda	Gold, gemstones	Tin, tungsten, tantalum, niobium, columbium	pozzolana
Tanzania	Gold, diamond, gemstones, silver, PGMs	Nickel, bauxite, copper, cobalt, uranium	Coal, phosphate, gypsum, pozzolana, soda ash, gas
Uganda	Gold, diamond	Copper, tin, lead, nickel, cobalt, tungsten, uranium, niobium, tantalum, iron	Gypsum, kaolin, salt, vermiculite, pozzolana, marble, soapstone, rare earth, oil
South Sudan	Gold, silver	Iron, copper, tungsten, zinc, chromium	Oil, mica
Democratic Republic of Congo -DRC	Gold, diamond, silver, gemstones	Cobalt, Nickel, bauxite, copper, uranium, Coltan, Tantalum

Objective

The overall objective of this study was to provide an overview of the mining regulatory frameworks of five selected East African Community (EAC) member states: Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, with a view of identifying potential gaps and making recommendations to strengthen overall governance of the sector and mining for critical minerals in identified member states and the EAC generally.

Methodology and Scope

The study compares the mining and critical-minerals regulatory frameworks of five East African Community partner states: Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi. The five were selected on the basis of their critical-mineral endowment and the accessibility of their primary legal frameworks; the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan are included in the regional resource table for context. The analysis is based on a desk review of national constitutions, mining and minerals laws and their subsidiary regulations, fiscal and investment legislation, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) reports, and official government and industry data available up to the second quarter of 2026. The depth of treatment varies between countries according to the availability of primary legal sources in each jurisdiction. All quantitative figures are reproduced as published by the cited sources and have not been independently audited. Before relying on the information contained in this report and subsequent briefs, readers are advised to check with the relevant national authorities to see if any legislative changes or revisions to the figures have occurred since its publication.

From this report, stakeholders can take notice of the gaps and determine whether the current mining regulatory regime in the EAC is suited for the evolving mining context driven by a surge in demand for critical minerals. And whether the EAC member states require a facelift of their minerals regulatory regimes to attract large new investments in the critical minerals sector while at the same time mitigating harm. At the same time, it provides some key takes as guard rails against exploitative mining practices for critical minerals and the mining sector generally, with recommendations as advocacy pointers for the necessary reforms required to maximize value and benefits from mining generally, mitigating harm from mining of critical minerals and advancing a just energy transition.

Key findings

The study shows that a new wave of policy and regulatory regimes have been passed in the last 5-10 years replacing old regulatory regimes of the 1990s. However, it reveals disjointed and truncated approach to mineral regulation across countries, with significant gaps in regards to governance of critical transition minerals in particular. While some countries such as Tanzania have developed draft strategic plans to guide the sector, which also proposes the country’s strategic and critical mineral lists, other countries have no distinct strategies and have an omnibus regulatory approach covering critical minerals within the ambits of existing mining laws, while others have not even started.

2. Moreover, there is no harmonized EAC regulatory framework on treatment of key, essential provisions for mineral governance. EAC member states have taken a lonesome and national centric approach to regulation with each country developing its own regulatory regime, competing to offer a raft of incentives and exemptions to attract investment, varying levels of state participation and free carried interests, fiscal terms and royalty treatment, value addition and mineral beneficiation, local content, community participation rights, land compensation and benefit sharing.

3. There are also variations in treatment of environmental rights and responsible business conduct thresholds. For instance, Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda’s regulatory frameworks provide for mandatory community consultation, participation and rights to negotiate Community Development Framework Agreements (CDAs) with mining companies. The Community Development Framework must be prepared in both English and local languages. Meaningful consultation is well defined in Uganda’s law. The law on Community Development Framework Agreements is less explicit in Tanzania, provides for local government authorities to participate and approve the negotiations.

4. Land compensation in Uganda and Kenya is negotiated and determined by mutual agreement or market rates while in Tanzania the government plays a major role in determination and payout of compensation.

5. There are differences in Royalty sharing structures, with Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda providing an extensive royalty retention scheme starting at community to national level. In Uganda the land owner, lawful or Bonafide occupant is entitled to 5% share of the royalty. In Tanzania the royalty is 100% collected by the Central government via the Mining Commission and directly channeled to the Consolidated fund.

6. There are differences in Value addition, beneficiation and trading provisions. Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda have mandatory requirements for beneficiation. In Burundi this requirement can be waived, while Kenya’s regulatory regime does not require mandatory value addition, beneficiation. Exportation of raw minerals is allowed.

7. The study further reveals differences and gaps in the regulatory approach to transparency and anti-corruption measures. While Tanzania has a dedicated TEITA Act in place, the other 4 member states have no similar comparative law yet. Uganda has a dedicated Anti-Corruption provision in its mining law (Sect 283), making Uganda the only Country in the EAC with such an explicit provision. The mining law clearly prohibits offers, promises, donations, gifts or benefits off all kind to government officials in the mining sector.

8. The regulatory frameworks show variations to dispute resolution and approaches, with some countries channeling appeals to the Minister, commission or board. They contain provisions for corporate dispute resolution settlement, including options for international arbitration but weak on local grievance handling mechanisms. Some have requirements to establish grievance handling mechanisms but no guarantees that settlements reached are satisfactory to the claimant and parties to the dispute. Creates opportunities for local and international arbitration.

9. Rwanda presents one of the strongest examples of mineral traceability and investment facilitation in the region and its critical-minerals approach is set across several policy framework.

10. Burundi’s 2023 reforms demonstrate increasing efforts to strengthen state participation and local beneficiation, however, the country has not yet adopted a dedicated critical minerals strategy.

11. Community participation mechanisms remain uneven across the region: Uganda and Kenya provide stronger statutory protections through Community Development Agreements than Rwanda and Burundi, where benefits are channeled mainly through local government and municipal transfers.

Key Recommendations

The relevant Ministry of Minerals must develop proper Strategic Plans to govern critical minerals. An embedded approach to governance of critical minerals within the existing regulatory framework is insufficient as critical minerals have distinct characteristics and contextual aspects which require distinct governance undertaking. The Ministry of minerals in Tanzania must finalise and pass the Tanzania Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy, clearly including the role of host communities and measures to maximize benefits from the Mining of green transition minerals. Value that should be derived.

2. The Relevant Ministries of Minerals and Departments must initiate processes to update and align existing frameworks to be in synchrony with the contemporary context and future demands of the mining sector. This includes developing tax and fiscal regimes that ensure maximum value is derived from EAC’s mining and critical mineral wealth

3. The EAC parliament (EALA) must harmonise or pass the EAC model mining law to provide guidance to member states when drafting new or updating existing mining regulatory frameworks. In the same respect develop a harmonized position in negotiation of new mining deals in the critical minerals sector with companies and regional players such as China, the US and EU.

4. The relevant Ministries and Departments of mineral must strengthen policy and legal provisions relating to host community participation, consent and compensation measures including rights to enter and benefit from Community Development Framework Agreements. Tanzania and Burundi in particular have significant gaps in this area. This is key and must be timely given that the discovery of critical transition minerals is largely taking place in remote under developed and underserved communities

5. EAC governments must review and strengthen environmental rights and safety standards, human rights due diligence measures in their laws, given that the mining of critical minerals such as graphite generates heavy dust pollution and nickel is water intensive.

6. Strengthen or include explicit Anti-Corruption and Ethical provisions in the mining laws, where they are none existent, so as to mitigate the lacuna for corruption and unethical behavior. This must be followed with punitive measures for corrupt and unethical behaviors in the mining sector.

Comparative Snapshot of Mining Regulatory Regimes in 5 EAC Countries

Dimension	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Rwanda	Burundi
Primary mining law	2017 Mining Laws and RE 2022	Mining & Minerals Act 2022	Mining Act 2016	Law 072/2024	Mining Code 2023; 2023 and 2025 decree
Dedicated critical-minerals strategy	Yes (2025, draft)	No	No, (14 minerals declared strategic)	Strategic minerals approach set across several policy frameworks	No (strategic-mineral clause only)
Mineral ownership	Vested in the President on behalf of citizens	Vested in the government on behalf of Citizens	Vested in National government in trust of Kenyans	Vested in the state for Rwandans	Vested by the State on behalf of the Citizens
Licensing Regime and allocation of rights	Prospecting Licenses (PL), Primary Mining licence (PML), Mining License (ML) and Special Mining Licenses	Prospecting, Exploration, Retention licence, Large-scale, Medium scale, small scale or an artisanal mining licence	reconnaissance, prospecting, retention, a mining license, and Artisanal mines permit	Exploration, Small, Medium, Large and Mineral trading	Prospecting Authorisation, Exploration/ research permit, large permit, small mine
State free-carried / participation	≥16% free carried; up to 50%	Via UNMC / MDA	10% free equity (NMC)	Negotiated; carried interest possible	≥16%, +5% per renewal
Incentives and exemptions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Taxation, Fiscal and Headline royalty (metallic/base)	6% metallic	Set by Minister (gross value)	Per regulations (gross value)	3% base metals (norm value)	4% base metals (ad valorem)
Royalty Sharing structure	100% Nationally collected	70 % Govt, 15% Local Govt, 10% Subcounty/town council, 5% land owner, lawful or Bonafide occupant	10% Community, 20% County, 70% National	10% of Mining revenue spent at community	0.5% of Annual turnover to host Municipalities
Mandatory value addition, beneficiation and trading	Yes (med/large licences)	Promoted; permits required	No (raw export allowed)	Mineral processing requires a dedicated licence; government actively promotes domestic processing and expansion of processing facilities	Yes (prior processing, with waiver)
Local-content threshold	Min. 25% -51% local shareholding	Preference; recruitment/training plans	Hire/train + local sourcing	Preference to Rwandan firms	25%–100% Burundian in defined cases
Community Consultation, Participation, FPIC & Benefit sharing	Not explicit, No Community Development Framework agreements	Yes, Mandatory, Consultation defined, right to sign Community Development Agreements	Yes, Mandatory, right to sign Community Development Agreements	Yes, but through local district dev’t plans	Local development plan required, but no mandatory Community Development Agreement framework
Land Rights and Compensation	Market rate, Govt determined	Market rate, Negotiation and Govt as advisory	landowner or lawful occupier entitled to fair compensatio	Provides for fair compensation	Customary and statutory land tenure coexist; implementation and compensation challenges remain
Environmental and Human rights safeguards	Yes, Mining commission with powers to enforce.	Yes, Mandatory for content for MDA and CDA	Yes	Yes, with stringent penalties	Yes, well-articulated, weak implementation
Transparency / anti-corruption and Ethical Conduct	TEITA Act 2015; EITI Membership	EITI, no transparency law, Has Anti-Corruption provision in law	Reforms ongoing, No stand-alone provisions, reliant on the national anti-corruption law	iTSCi; traceability, Anti-corruption spilt btn mining law & standalone Anti-corruption law.	iTSCi , Traceability fees; limited disclosure, No ethical conduct chapters in the law, Relies on national penal and anti-corruption legislation.
Dispute resolution and grievance handling provisions	Mining Commission may handle disputes (Sect 119), no provision for local or international arbitration, no provisions for local grievance handling mechanisms	Yes, Mandatory awareness of dispute resolution mechanisms, local govt authorities as facilitators,	Yes, including opportunities for local arbitration and mediation	No stand-alone statutory provisions in the law	Explicit provisions on dispute settlement, limited community grievance

Note: Summary matrix compiled from the country chapters in the main report. Entries are indicative; consult each country chapter and the cited primary sources for exact provisions and current figures.

For more about this study and full report contact us via: www.gepc.or.tz email: info@gepc.or.tz

[1] https://www.eac.int/environment/terrestrial-ecosystems/mineral-resources

[2] URT: Ministry of Energy Budget Speech, 2024/25

[3] https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/what-are-energy-transition-minerals-and-how-can-they-unlock-clean-energy-age

[4] https://goodelectronics.org/climate-change-impacts-of-graphite-production/

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Sep, Tue, 2026

Extractive Governance Natural Resource Policy

Responsible Business Conduct in Tanzania’s Transition Minerals: An Analysis of Policy and Legal Gaps

Photo credits: Jumbo Graphite, Lindi

Authors: Moses Kulaba, Don Malish and Stephano Alloys, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Global Context: Transition Minerals

The global demand for critical minerals essential for the production of batteries, electric vehicles, and renewable energy technologies currently projected to grow dramatically as the world pursues net-zero ambitions. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that demand for critical minerals could increase sixfold by 2050, with their market value set to reach approximately USD 400 billion. An estimated 3 billion tons of critical minerals will be required by 2050 to drive the green transition.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) indicates the demand for critical minerals to achieve the net-zero goals of the Paris Agreement could increase sixfold by 2050, with their value reaching about USD400 billion[1]. To drive the transition to renewable energies, it is estimated that about 3 billion tons of critical minerals will be needed by 2050[2] and this will require an increase in mining activity to supply these quantities.

The IEA Sustainable Development Scenarios [SDS], show the share of total demand for transition minerals will rise significantly over the next two decades to over 40% for copper and rare earth elements, nickel and cobalt (60-70%), and almost 90% for lithium.[3] Further estimates indicate that production of minerals such as graphite, lithium, and cobalt will increase by nearly 500% by 2050, and demand for copper will surge and remain high for a long time.

The global energy transition and the corresponding surging demand for transition minerals offer opportunities for host nations through increased investment and mineral export revenue. However, the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the African Union (AU) have all noted with concern that the increase in demand and mining of transition minerals has the potential to exacerbate economic injustice and human rights risks in mineral-rich countries and mining communities

Mining and processing transition minerals risk damaging landscapes, degrading biodiversity, and fueling greenhouse emissions and human rights abuses. For example, extracting just one ton of lithium consumes about 2 million liters of water, with nearly half of global copper and lithium production occurring in water-stressed regions. There are further concerns that competition for these resources could worsen existing tensions and escalate mineral-driven conflicts in countries and mining communities.

Weak policies and institutions in mineral-rich nations exacerbate such risks, rendering it imperative to navigate the transition minerals sector without adverse repercussions on human rights.

Tanzanian Context

Tanzania hosts globally significant reserves of transition minerals, including graphite, nickel, cobalt, and lithium, positioning it as a potential key global supplier. The mineral resource range from precious metals (gold, silver, PGE), critical minerals (graphite, nickel, cobalt, lithium, niobium, neodymium, praseodymium, vanadium, titanium, tin), and energy minerals (uranium, coal, and helium gas). Tanzania is among the top five largest graphite reserves in the world. (Ministry of Minerals, 2024).

The government aims to accelerate transition minerals exploration, targeting 50% national coverage by 2030. Currently, ongoing transition minerals projects include the Tembo, Dutwa, and Ngwena nickel sites; the Panda Hill niobium site; the Ngualla rare earth site; and the Uranex, Mahenge, Lindi Jumbo, Chilalo, and Epanko graphite sites.

The government is developing a Critical Mineral Strategy to regulate and guide investment, aiming to accelerate exploration to 50% national coverage by 2030. These minerals are essential for the production of batteries, electric vehicles, and renewable energy technologies. Tanzania continues to attract interest from key global mining players.

On the other hand, the government is seeking efficient ways to unlock and maximize the benefits of critical mineral resources, mindful that, in the past, the sector was marred by economic, tax, and human rights injustices.

Why This Matters

Over the last decade, the government has undertaken several policy and legal reforms to improve the sector with the aim of addressing the above concerns. There are still significant governance gaps, particularly in relation to business conduct and human rights. Tanzania’s drive for a sustainable mining future is a unique opportunity to embed Responsible Business Conduct and Human Rights Due Diligence into mineral policies, as the global demand for transition minerals increases.

At the national level, Tanzania has established multiple frameworks to govern the mining sector, including the Mineral Policy 2009, Mining Act 2010, Permanent Sovereignty Act 2017, Natural Wealth and Resource Contracts Act 2017, Local Content Policy and Regulations 2018, National Environmental Policy 2021, and Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations 2005. The government is also developing the CMS to guide regulation and investment in transition minerals. Mining is recognized as a key economic pillar in the National Development Plans, and the National Development Vision 2050 positions the sector as one of the major economic pillars for driving Tanzania to become a middle-income country.

Despite these frameworks, there are salient gaps from an RBC perspective that need to be addressed. For instance, the government has not yet developed a comprehensive national framework for the implementation of RBC and HRDD in company operations. Moreover, Tanzania’s efforts to attract large‑scale mining through generous incentives and simplified procedures risks weakening HRDD and RBC. The global demand for transition minerals also heightens the risks of conflict, corruption, and environmental harm, underscoring the need for strong policies and governance to ensure the country fully benefits from its mineral wealth.

Study Objectives

The main goal of this study was to encourage policy dialogue and involvement from civil society in promoting Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) and protecting human rights within Tanzania’s transition minerals sub-sector.

The analysis reviewed key policy frameworks, including the Mineral Policy of 2009, the Mining Act of 2010 (revised in 2022), the EITI Act of 2015, and the draft Critical Minerals Strategy (CMS). It evaluated their relevance to the sector’s transition, identifies gaps in RBC, and highlights opportunities for policy improvement.

The specific objectives were to:

Contextualize Tanzania’s development of critical mineral resources from an RBC and energy transition perspective.
Conduct an RBC gap analysis of the four selected policies and legal frameworks, aiming to identify gaps and opportunities to strengthen HRDD and RBC.

This is analysis was conducted by Governance and Economic Policy Centre (GEPC) with the support of HakiRasilimali as part of the ‘Supporting a Just Transition through Responsible Business Conduct in Africa 2024-2027’ project, made possible thanks to support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The project aimed to support a fair and inclusive transition in Africa’s extractive sector, thereby promoting responsible business conduct, local community engagement, and sustainable development practices. The full study report of the study is available at GEPC and Hakirasilimali

Key Findings:

The study identified significant governance gaps in the analyzed frameworks, particularly in relation to Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) and Human Rights Due Diligence (HRDD).

Draft Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy 2025

The Strategy forms an economic governance road-map to position Tanzania as a global critical mineral supplier.

The draft strategy does not establish remedy mechanisms for communities adversely affected by critical mineral operations, offering insufficient clarity on how human rights or environmental harms will be addressed.

While it makes broad references to ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) principles, it fails to integrate internationally recognized frameworks like the UNGPs or OECD Due Diligence Guidance, and does not mandate companies to implement or report on HRDD practices.

2. Tanzania’s Mineral Policy 2009

The policy is the overarching framework for the mining sector, currently set for review.

The policy recognizes the importance of engagement but overlooks the key principles of consultation and engagement, such as Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC), creating concerns about alignment with international human rights standards.
It acknowledges socioeconomic, environmental, and community participation rights but does not explicitly require companies to operationalize RBC or HRDD.
It fails to address the rights of Indigenous communities, despite Tanzania’s endorsement of international instruments.
It is vague on addressing HRDD, focusing mainly on government monitoring of safety and environmental protection, but stops short of legally demanding that companies conduct or report on comprehensive HRDD processes.
The policy includes specific provisions for compensation, relocation, and environmental rehabilitation. However, lacks specific provisions for non-judicial grievance handling, falling short of Pillar III of the UNGPs on effective remedy.

3. Tanzania’s Mining Act 2010 (CAP 123 RE 2019)

This is the overarching law governing the mining sector and matters relating to prospecting for minerals, mining, processing and dealing in minerals, granting, renewal and termination of mineral rights, payment of royalties, fees and other charges, and any other relevant matters. Over the past 10 years, the mining law has undergone significant reviews and amendments, particularly to strengthen government participation in the mining sector. The government plans to review the existing law(s) to ensure alignment with emerging geo-economic developments and the newly formed Tanzania Development Vision 2050.

The Mining Act acknowledge human rights by addressing land rights, relocation, resettlement, and fair compensation, and by requiring community participation and consent before mining companies can access land. It grants various mineral rights, such as prospecting, retention, primary, and special mining licenses under Section 7, and safeguards community land rights through provisions like Section 95, which mandates village council approval and lawful occupier consent.

However, there is no explicit requirement that all mining sector decisions and operations comply with international human rights standards would ensure that the revised law balances economic interests with the protection of communities and their rights.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The study concluded that Tanzania needs to move beyond procedural safeguards and embed Responsible Business Conduct and Human Rights Due Diligence at the core of its policy and legal frameworks to ensure a just and sustainable future. Key recommendations include:

Ministry of Minerals:

Integrate Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) and Human Rights in Strategy & Policy: Ensure that the finalization of the Critical Minerals Strategy incorporates RBC and human rights considerations, and that insights from this analytical review informs the development of the upcoming Mining Policy.
Strengthen Licensing Conditions: Integrate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) benchmarks into mineral licensing, making compliance a prerequisite for exploration and production rights.
Develop Transparency Portal: Build centralized digital platform for public access to contracts, production data, revenue flows, and disclosure reports, ensuring accountability across the sector.
Integrate Gender Equity in Mining: Compel mining companies to adopt gender‑responsive policies and mandatory reporting on gender inclusion.
Monitoring & Enforcement Capacity: Develop and equip specialized compliance unit within the Ministry to audit disclosures, monitor ESG performance, and sanction non‑compliance.

Parliament of Tanzania

Legislate Mandatory ESG Reporting: Pass amendments to the mining law that enforces disclosure of human rights, gender equity, and environmental impacts, harmonized with existing global standards (e.g., OECD, EU).
Strengthen Oversight Roles: Empower parliamentary committees to audit mineral revenues, monitor state‑owned enterprises, and further review compliance with established disclosure standards.
Improve Community Participation: put in place mandatory provisions requiring free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) for affected communities in critical minerals projects, embedding social license into law.
Amend and strengthen the Extractive Industries Transparency and Accountability (TEITA) Act to mandate full contract disclosure and human rights disclosures.

Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (TEITI) Committee

The TEITA Committee should apply its powers under Section 10(2)(a) and (k) to push for human rights disclosures across the mining sector, including within state-owned enterprises and joint ventures in critical minerals.
Establish community-level multi-stakeholder structures that replicate TEITI’s national committee model. This would expand transparency and accountability by involving host communities, civil society, and local governments directly in monitoring extractive operations and revenue flows.

Mining Companies (Private and State-Owned Enterprises, including STAMICO)

Mining companies should adopt comprehensive human rights due diligence (HRDD) frameworks to align with established global standards.
Companies should regularly publish non‑financial reports that disclose their performance on human rights, gender inclusion, and environmental sustainability, which would be subject to independent verification to enhance credibility.
Companies should operationalize community grievance mechanisms at the project level operational level

Local Government Authorities

Institutionalize effective stakeholders’ engagement including FPIC processes in land acquisition, resettlement, and compensation.
Local authorities should be trained and resourced to oversee negotiations, safeguard the rights of vulnerable groups (indigenous peoples, women, youth, persons with disabilities), and ensure equitable benefit-sharing agreements.

Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG)

Strengthen its role in monitoring mining-related human rights violations and handling community grievances. CHRAGG should be empowered with resources and legal authority to ensure timely remedies, independent investigations, and enforcement of sanctions for corporate or state non-compliance.
CHRAGG should further strengthen its legislative review mandate by actively recommending reforms to ensure that legal and regulatory frameworks governing the extractive sector are fully aligned with human rights principles and Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) standards.

Civil Society and Media

Scale up capacity-building on Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) and HRDD frameworks (UNGPs, OECD, AMV, AU Green Minerals Strategy) for communities in critical minerals zones.
Civil society and media should work to document, monitor, and report abuses, while supporting communities in accessing legal aid, remedies, and negotiation processes.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) should provide technical support, knowledge, and practical tools to enable businesses and government institutions to effectively implement Responsible Business Conduct (RBC).

Conclusion

Tanzania’s mineral wealth is a once-in-a-generation opportunity. However, without strong communication and enforcement of RBC safeguards, the country risks repeating past mistakes of human, ecological and tax injustices.

If managed responsibly, it can:

Drive industrial transformation.
Attract responsible investment.
Empower communities and protect rights.
Position Tanzania as a global leader in sustainable mining.

[1] https://www.iea.org/news/clean-energy-demand-for-critical-minerals-set-to-soar-as-the-world-pursues-net-zero-goals

[2] https://www.unep.org/topics/energy/renewable-energy/critical-energy-transition-minerals

[3] https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/executive-summary

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Sep, Thu, 2026

Extractive Governance Conflicts Natural Resource Peace Security

An evaluation of Regional Minerals Certification Mechanisms on Mitigating harm from Critical Minerals: A case of KP, ICGLR, RMI & OECD Certification Mechanisms

Photo Credit: ICGLR
Authors: Moses Kulaba and Roger Vutsoro, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Introduction

Decades ago, mineral certification was mooted as a solution to addressing the chronic problems of illegal mining, mineral smuggling and mineral driven conflicts, economic injustices and impunity in mineral rich countries. To this regard, regional and global mineral certification mechanisms were developed with countries and mining companies required to sign up to these new certification principle and mechanisms. However, decades after, minerals continue to be drivers of conflict and harm in many countries.

As the appetite for Critical or Transitional minerals required for the green and clean energy industrial technology gains gusto momentum, there are concerns that this new mineral dash may exacerbate corruption, conflict and suffering in critical minerals rich countries. Apart from calls to establish regional value chains, there is evidence to suggest that a proper global certification mechanism should be put in place to ensure responsive sourcing of critical minerals and that their extraction does not lead to further harm.

This short analytical study explores the existing national, regional and global certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly Process, ICGLR, OECD Due diligence measures, Responsible Mining Initiatives in the quagmire of improving of minerals governance. It entangles and assesses the increasing perceptions (based on evidence from countries such as the DRC and Ukraine) that the current certification regime is running dangerously obsolete, not designed for critical minerals and thus needs a review and realignment for new purpose, including proposing measures that go beyond the current regional certification.

The brief makes recommendations for the review and expansion of the current existing certification mechanisms. It is relevant and targets stakeholders such as the ICGLR and the Kimberly Process Secretariate, EAC & ICGLR member states, African Union Minerals Development Centre, UNOSEGLR, UN Critical Minerals High Level Panel and the UN SG and civil society organisations interested in stopping human rights abuse illegal smuggling and trading of blood and conflict critical mineral minerals.

What is mineral certification

Mineral certification is a process that verifies the origin and legitimacy of minerals, ensuring they are not associated with conflict or human rights abuses. It involves tracing minerals from the mine site to the final point of export and confirming they are free from illegal activities. This helps to prevent the financing of armed groups and other illicit activities linked to mineral extraction. This certification involves a thorough verification process to trace the minerals’ origin and verify they are free from illegal financing, armed group involvement, and human rights abuses.

At face value, this sounds like a good measure, however existing mechanisms of a similar nature such as the Kimberly process, ICGLR certification initiative and the OECD Due diligence measures have not succeeded in fully addressing the issue of conflict minerals and mineral smuggling. In Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, minerals continue to be a driver of conflict and mineral smuggling to neighboring countries is still rife. This therefore puts to question the efficacy of the existing global certification mechanism in strengthening governance, regulating supply, improving ethical mining business conduct and reducing harm from extractive resources.

Existing major Regional and Global Mineral Certification regimes

1. The Kimberly Process Certification System (KPCS)

The Kimberly Process (KPCS) is a global standard certification process established in 2003 by the United Nations General Assembly (Under resolution 55/56) to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the mainstream diamond market. KPCS was set up to ensure that diamonds as precious minerals are sourced and traded in a responsible manner, reducing financing conflicts and human rights violation.

KPCS has laid out requirements for participating member countries to comply including^[1] enforcement of regulatory standards to control export and import of rough diamonds, principles of transparent practices to ensure integrity of the diamond supply chains, selective trading with only KP certified and compliant members, verification of exports to ensure every traded diamond is accompanied by a conflict free certificate and an obligation for member countries to enforce theses standards. To date 60 participants (representing 86 countries) are signatory members to the Kimberley process and have committed to applying KP principles in the certification of its traded diamonds.

National Level Governance and Implementation of the Kimberly Process; A case of Tanzania

In Tanzania the Kimberly Process Office is situated in the Mining Commission, an Institution within the Ministry of Minerals. This office is responsible for the implementation of the KPCS activities, import and export of rough diamond; the office is under the authority of the Executive Secretary. The Mining Commission works closely with the Tanzania Revenue Authority’s Customs Department, Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service and the Police Force for strengthening internal control. The Kimberley Process Office forms a part of the Mineral Audit and Trade Department, which is under the Director for Mineral Audit and Trade who assists the Executive Secretary in administering the KPCS activities. The office issues Annual reports.

Before the issuance of Kimberley Process Certificate, the exporter of rough diamonds must submit a valid Dealer’s license/Mining license, which allows him to export minerals outside Tanzania. The Dealer’s license indicates full address, type of minerals, the premises and signature of Executive Secretary or a person authorized to sign. The exporter fills the application form which indicates license type, license number, weight, value, source of diamonds to confirm that diamonds are conflict free, place of export and declaration of exporter by putting his/her signature, name and qualification to apply for a certificate and pays to the government USD 100 as an application fee for Kimberley Process certificate. Post to the valuation process, the exporter is required to pay royalty (6% of a value) and inspection fee (1% of value) to the Government.

Any person who contravenes any of the provision in Diamond trading regulation commits an offence and liable: In case of an individual to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine not exceeding US dollar twenty thousand (US$ 20,000) or to both. In case of body corporate, to a fine not exceeding US dollar one hundred thousand (US$ 100,000), or c. Cancelation of his license and permanently be disqualified from prospecting, mining or dealing in diamond and any other minerals. Any rough diamonds obtained contrary to the provisions of Diamond trading regulations shall be forfeited in addition to other penalties[1].

The International Conference on Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Mineral Certification Measures

The ICGLR Certification mechanism was developed to address the persistent of mineral driven conflicts in the Africa Great Lakes region. It aims to create a conducive environment for cooperation among member states while also ensuring the protection and well-being of the people living in the Africa Great Lakes region.

The ICGLR Certificate confirms a mineral shipment is conflict-free and meets the ICGLR’s ethical sourcing standards, ensuring it’s free from illegal influence and responsibly traced from mine to market. This certification involves a thorough verification process to trace the minerals’ origin and verify they are free from illegal financing, armed group involvement, and human rights abuses. It provides buyers with the assurance that the minerals meet ICGLR requirements for transparency, legality, and responsible sourcing, supporting ethical supply chains in the region[1].

Currently the DRC, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi are members to the ICGLR’s certification mechanism. Mineral flows are analyzed via an ICGLR Regional Database, using the data on individual shipments collected and transmitted to the ICGLR by each Member States. The database is verified annually via ICGLR Third Party Audits. The mechanism is viewed as an important regional standard and tool for enhancing collaboration, transparency, and development in Africa’s Great Lakes region, promoting accountability and encouraging businesses to pursue certification for adherence.

The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Mineral Supply Chain

Requires that company supply chains of all minerals from conflict affected and high-risk areas, must respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral or metal purchasing decisions and practices. Recognizes that trade and investment in natural mineral resources hold great potential for generating income, growth and prosperity, sustaining livelihoods and fostering local development. However, a large share of these resources is located in conflict affected and high-risk areas. In these areas, exploitation of natural mineral resources is significant and may contribute, directly or indirectly, to armed conflict, gross human rights violations and hinder economic and social development[2].

The OECD Due Diligence Guidance is considered as the first example of a collaborative government-backed multi-stakeholder initiative on responsible supply chain management of minerals from conflict-affected areas. Its objective is to help companies respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral sourcing practices[3].

The Guidance is also intended to cultivate transparent mineral supply chains and sustainable corporate engagement in the mineral sector with a view to enabling countries to benefit from their mineral resources and preventing the extraction and trade of minerals from becoming a source of conflict, human rights abuses, and insecurity. With its Supplements on Tin, Tantalum, Tungsten and Gold, the OECD Guidance provides companies with a complete package to source minerals responsibly in order for trade in those minerals to support peace and development and not conflict
[4]

Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI)

The Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) is a voluntary membership body of companies and industry players with a vision to ensure that mineral supply chains contribute positively to social economic development globally. It seeks to promote the common goal of understanding and contributing to mitigating the salient social and environmental impacts of extraction and processing of minerals in supply chains. It leverages partnerships and use of international standards such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights or the OECD Due Diligence Guidance as guideposts[5].

Comprised of more than 500 member companies; the Responsible Minerals Initiative is considered one of the most utilized and respected resources for companies from a range of industries addressing responsible mineral sourcing issues in their supply chains. RMI provides companies with tools and resources to make sourcing decisions that improve regulatory compliance and support responsible sourcing of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. RMI undertakes due diligence, assurance and reporting templates for cobalt, gold, tin, tungsten, tin, tantalum and other minerals.

The Nexus between Critical Minerals, Conflict and Harm

There is a strong connection between the extraction and trade of certain minerals and the exacerbation of armed conflicts and instability in various regions, particularly in developing countries. Globally, critical minerals fueling Green Tech are also fueling conflict[6] Armed groups often exploit the demand for these minerals (like tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold, collectively known as “conflict minerals”) to fund their operations, including the purchase of weapons[7]. This reliance on minerals to fuel conflict can lead to human rights abuses environmental degradation, and social unrest, hindering sustainable development.

Critical minerals such as bauxite, manganese cobalt, lithium and uranium have fuelled conflicts in the DRC, Guinea, Niger, Mali, Chad and Central Africa Republic[8] Myanmar has also experienced a post-coup rush for control over its rare earth minerals, while Latin American countries like Chile and Colombia are grappling with how to ensure that their lithium wealth benefits local economies rather than multinational corporations[9].

Critical Minerals and conflict; A case for DRC and Ukraine

Multiple reports produced by UN and Civil society show that the ongoing violence in the DRC is linked to mineral extraction, with rebel insurgents motivated by a desire to extract from the region’s vast cobalt and coltan reserves. Since the onset of the infamous second Congo War in 1998, control over the DRC’s vast mineral resources has fuelled conflict between armed groups and militias. These factions fight over mining territories, using profits from the illegal extraction and smuggling of conflict minerals to finance their operations and purchase weapons. The struggle for control over mineral-rich areas has led to prolonged violence, contributing to the deaths of millions and leaving entire regions destabilized[1]. Through taxation and smuggling of minerals, armed groups are financially benefiting from DRC’s mineral resources. For instance, The UN Group of Experts estimated that armed groups based in Ituri Province generated approximately $140 million USD in 2024, dwarfing the illicit revenue generated by 3Ts[2]. In light of this reality, the abundance of critical minerals offers a potential opportunity for economic wellbeing but the dash for their control and extraction has potential of increasing conflicts in Africa[3]

Moreover, the extraction and trade of some critical minerals has intensified new geopolitical tensions and reinforced long-standing patterns of exploitation[4] including conflicts. According to Global Witness, the Trump Ukraine proposed deal in 2025 revealed a connection of critical minerals to the Russia and Ukraine war and how natural resources in Ukraine have become a key bargaining chip in international diplomacy between the US and Russia. In the same perspective, the US and the Democratic Republic of Congo signed a minerals-for-security deal, highlighting the increase role of critical minerals in geopolitics and conflict. These case studies clearly show that geopolitical interests are too heavy to be counterbalanced by the existing mineral certification regimes alone.

Gaps and why a new regime for mineral certification is required

From the above analysis and case studies, the existing major regional and global mineral certification regimes have significant gaps that necessitate that a new certification regime is developed. Their gaps are diverse but can be categorized as follows:

Narrowness in focus and scope: Existing certification mechanisms such KP are narrow in scope largely target diamonds and were not designed to cover a broader mining sector. The ICGLR covers the 3Ts and gold. The emergency of a wider list of critical minerals adds a new context which the KP and ICGLR certification mechanisms were not designed for.

Voluntary mechanisms; The existing mechanisms are largely voluntary and member states companies encouraged to join and comply with the standards. For instance, the 21st meeting of the CIRGL Regional Committee on the fight against the illegal exploitation of natural resources recommended ICGLR Secretariat to compile a comprehensive report on the status of implementation of the six tools of the regional certification mechanism. This report revealed that the Republic of Rwanda has not yet established the traceability chain for gold. Instead, Rwanda controls gold extraction and trade using conventional methods and does not issue ICGLR certificates for gold exports[5].”

Limited in geographical and legal scope: For instance, the OECD Due diligence Guidance is largely applicable to companies from OECD member countries but with limited enforcement mechanisms in non-OECD countries. Yet mining companies from non-OECD Countries such as China are emerging as the leading exploiters of Africa’s critical minerals according to WTO reports[6]. from the DRC. Chinese based companies own or operate 80 percent of the critical mineral production in the DRC, much of which is sent to China for processing for export via the global supply chain[7] Moreover the ICGLR is confined to its member states while the RMI covers only its 500 members.

Continuous illicit smuggling and trading in conflict minerals despite the presence of current certification mechanisms. For instance, despite its membership to the Kimberley Process (KP) and ICGLR commitments, Tanzania’s diamond sector is reported as facing entrenched governance challenges such as opaque supply chains, smuggling, and minimal community benefits. Tanzania’s diamonds have suffered from environmental concerns, price volatility from synthetics and smuggled diamonds from regional conflicts areas[8].

Moreover, critical minerals including diamonds are smuggled across borders, transacted in established commercial capitals and hubs such as Kigali, Kampala, Nairobi and Dubai. For instance, a Global Witness investigation report indicates that an international commodities trader bought conflict coltan smuggled from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Rwanda.[9] Based on customs documents seen by Global Witness, the investigation revealed that a multibillion-dollar company headquartered in Luxembourg bought 280 tonnes of coltan from Rwanda in 2024.

Despite having limited or no known deposits and operational mines, some countries in East Africa and the Middle East have emerged as leading exporters of critical minerals such as cobalt, lithium and coltan. Study reports show large volumes of critical minerals transacted via East Africa to foreign markets such as the UAE and China[10]. For instance, in 2025 Kenyan authorities intercepted 10 containers of suspected smuggled copper at the port of Mombasa[11] These illicitly acquired, smuggled and transacted minerals have found market into the UAE and Western capitals in Switzerland and New York. In 2023 alone, Kenya’s exports of copper to the United Arab Emirates were valued at US$22.27 million. The UAE exports mineral products, including critical minerals, in significant quantities, primarily to Japan, China, and India, despite having little known deposits of these minerals.

Weak in countering new geopolitical interests and ongoing critical minerals driven conflicts in producer countries: The ongoing mineral driven conflicts have already been documented in the cobalt, coltan mineral rich Eastern DRC and elsewhere but the rush for securing access and control of mineral supply chains by global economic and military superpowers is reviving geopolitical interests and may result in new geopolitical conflicts.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for instance, since the revision of its mining law in 2018, the country has attracted no responsible Western investors in the mining industry. Meanwhile, China has come to dominate the production of cobalt and copper, primarily mined in the Katanga and Lualaba regions. The recent re-negotiation by the Tshisekedi Administration of the imbalanced minerals-against infrastructure deal signed in 2008 under the Kabila administration between the DRC and China was perceived by China as triggered by the geopolitical influence of United State of America.

Aware of the security and economic implications of China’s control over the DRC’s critical minerals supply chain, the United States has signaled its return to the DRC mining sector through the recent acquisition of Australian AVZ Minerals’ assets in the Manono Lithium Project by KoBold Metals. In addition, the U.S. is committed to funding the Lobito Corridor—a strategic railway project essential for transporting critical minerals from the Central African Copperbelt to Western markets.

Through its International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the U.S. has pledged a $550 million loan to support the Lobito Corridor. This project is considered vital in countering Chinese influence in the region by providing an alternative route for exporting critical minerals. The corridor is viewed as part of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, a G7 initiative aimed at competing with China’s growing presence on the continent.

While the Lobito project is designed to challenge Chinese dominance, both Western and Chinese firms will be allowed to use the infrastructure it provides. This dual-access approach raises questions about its strategic value, particularly under a US administration led by President Donald Trump, whose priority is competition with Beijing. The Lobito Corridor railway could be a physical indicator of the resuscitated geopolitical rivalry and reconvergence of global superpowers on the African continent as a source for critical mineral resources.

Failure to implement due diligence and traceability mechanisms: During the OECD conference on responsible minerals supply chain held in May 2024 in Paris, many Congolese civil society organizations raised concern over the increasing failure in the implementation of due diligence standards in the DRC. CSO mentioned that private sector actors have failed to fully implement supply chain due diligence in alignment with international standards, most notably the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Minerals Supply Chains from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Area. IMPACT added that companies are either turning a blind eye, preferring not to ask questions about the source of their purchases, or have been complicit by over relying on industry schemes despite red flags being raised in UN Group of Experts reports.

The concern around ITSCI—the sole traceability and due diligence provider for 3Ts in DRC—has been so great that in 2024 it lost its recognition with the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI), with RMI noting that important gaps remained in the scheme’s fulfilment of recognition terms. Despite this move, the UN Group of Experts has expressed concern that many private sector actors still rely on the scheme to conduct due diligence without carrying out additional independent quality controls required by international standards[12].

Civil Society Concerns and call for reforms

Because of these gaps civil society organisations have constantly called for a review and development of a new certification mechanism regime, expanded and aligned to emerging context of transition minerals. For instance, at the start of the 2025 KP plenary in Dubai the Civil Society Coalition pointed out the gaps of the KP in addressing the challenges of diamond mining, smuggling and poverty in the Central African Republic[13].

CSO observed that the KP was narrow in focus, limited to diamonds and the imposed conflict diamond embargos had targeted smugglers without protecting the diamond mining communities. The KP does not—and likely will not soon—prevent diamonds from being associated with issues outside the narrow conflict diamond definition, including human rights abuses, violence by public and private security forces, forced labour, and environmental degradation. Rigorous due diligence is essential, yet it remains insufficiently addressed.

Further, the instance, the KP in Central Africa Republic’s (CAR) experience demonstrated that the sole existence of the certification scheme does not make diamond governance exemplary. Though diamonds share similar governance challenges with other minerals, the Kimberley Process has largely remained isolated from broader dialogues on mineral-related due diligence.
Civil society demanded for the need to bridge the gaps in the KP certification mechanism by inter alia increasing transparency and engagement with mining communities. CSOs argued thatwithout transparency, the KP will never effectively achieve its mandate of conflict prevention.

Moreover, the existing certification mechanisms are criticized as elitist, disconnected from the community needs and blind to social economic injustices. For example, the KP certification mechanism does not cover the extent to which the mining of the diamond minerals has benefited the communities from where they are sourced. Investigations by the Kimberly Process Civil Society Coalition of mining operations in Sierra Leone, Lesotho, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, reveals the often-ignored consequences of large-scale diamond mining on local communities in African countries[14].

In Tanzania, despite mining diamonds for more than 100 years, Shyinyanga remains amongst the poorest region in the country[15]. The critical minerals rich Eastern DRC provinces of Kasai Oriental, Kasai Central, North and South Kivu are among the poorest and least developed in the world.

For diamond resources to truly benefit communities, the documentary identifies greater transparency and independent monitoring as key elements to enhance corporate accountability. Mining companies, industry actors and states all have a role to play to protect community rights and improve both mining and sourcing practices[16].

Further, certification mechanisms do not sufficiently cover or protect citizen against state excesses and inspired violence. Yet the very atrocities committed by rebel groups, which led to the KP’s creation in 2003, are now mirrored by certain governments and their security forces. Top ranking government officials and security forces in the Eastern DRC have been accused of being complacent to illicit mineral trade, despite the existence of the ICGLR certification mechanism.

Conclusion

While certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly process were established for a major purpose of controlling blood diamonds over the years, they have played this role to an extent but equally shown inherent gaps and shortcomings. Their limitation in scope, involuntary membership nature and poor implementation is a major limitation. They were set up when diamond was among the top most traded commodity and driver of conflicts in countries such as Angola, Liberia and Siera Leone. With the increasing surge in demand for critical minerals such as Nickel, Cobalt, Coltan, Graphite, Lithium, Tin Tungsten and Rare Earth Elements, the new frontiers mineral driven conflicts have expanded and cannot continue to remain on diamonds. In the current and future context, it will be untenable for critical minerals to remain outside the purview of mineral certification. For the existing certification mechanisms to be relevant and fitted for the changing context and era of energy of transition, substantive reviews and reforms are required.

Recommendations for future certification mechanisms

1. Expand the KPI and ICGLR certification to cover a broad range of critical minerals or develop a new commensurate certification measure for critical minerals, with a focus on ethical sourcing, conflict and governance.

2. Pay attention to the ongoing problems in mining such as the environmental concerns in critical minerals mining operations and their contribution to social and ecological harm to communities and countries from where they are sourced.

3. Pay close attention to ongoing issues within critical minerals supply chains, including human rights abuses, armed conflicts, the fair distribution of benefits to local communities, and compliance with national labor laws

4. Review the existing mineral audit standards, blend composition of audit teams with experts, civil society and community representatives to increase transparency and integrity in certification

5. Require exporting countries to demonstrate significant economic presence of the critical mineral commensurate with export volumes.

6. Impose export embargoes and critical mineral trading sanctions on countries or companies involved in perpetrating smuggling and export of illicitly acquired and conflict critical minerals.

7. Expand the scope of existing certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly process to capture community benefits from diamonds and critical minerals.

8. Demand that membership to regional and global certification and tracking mechanism must be mandatory for all critical minerals producing and exporting countries

9. Countries that produce critical minerals should diversify their investors and pursue win-win partnerships to prevent their territories from becoming geopolitical battlegrounds for superpowers competing for access to these resources in the era of energy transition

10. Enhance public database and reconciliation system for tracking mineral flows from mining, purchases, and exports at various levels of the value chain

11. Mineral certification must be complemented with value addition. This approach will facilitate technology transfer, generate more jobs to stimulate economic growth, and reduce susceptibility to conflict and mineral smuggling

References

Aikael Etal (2021) Understanding poverty dynamics and vulnerability in Tanzania: 2012–2018 available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rode.12829 accessed on 15 May 2025
Martin A, etal (2014), All that Glitters is not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the illicit trade of critical minerals, Partnership Africa Canada, May 2014

Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

Global Witness (2025) available at https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/new-investigation-suggests-eu-trader-traxys-buys-conflict-minerals-from-drc/ accessed on 15 May 2025

IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm
ICGLR, Report on the Status of Implementation of the Six Tools of the ICGLR Regional Initiative on Natural Resources in Member States, P14
ISSD (2018) Green Conflict Minerals; The Fuels of conflict in the transition to a low carbon economy; available at https://www.iisd.org/story/green-conflict-minerals/ accessed on 15 May 2025
Panzi Foundation available via https://panzifoundation.org/conflict-minerals-and-sexual-violence-in-the-drc/# accessed on 15 May 2025
The African Climate Foundation Report; Geopolitics of Critical Minerals in Renewable Supply Chains available at https://africanclimatefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/800644-ACF-03_Geopolitics-of-critical-minerals-R_WEB.pdf accessed on 15 May 2025
The Eastleigh Voice (2025); Police launch investigation into suspected copper smuggling at Mombasa port; available at https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/business/112007/police-probe-suspected-copper-smuggling-at-mombasa-port accessed on 15 May 2025

US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.
WTO (2024): High demand for energy-related critical minerals creates supply chain pressures; available at https://www.wto.org/english/blogs_e/data_blog_e/blog_dta_10jan24_e.htm#:~:text=Exports,all%20at%206%20per%20cent). Accessed on 15 May 2025

Online sources
https://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/49111368.pdf
https://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/
https://www.kpcivilsociety.org/press/beyond-shining-illusions-new-documentary-exposes-the-unspoken-realities-of-diamond-mining-in-african-countries/

[1] Panzi Foundation available via https://panzifoundation.org/conflict-minerals-and-sexual-violence-in-the-drc/# accessed on 15 May 2025
[2] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm
[3] The African Climate Foundation Report; Geopolitics of Critical Minerals in Renewable Supply Chains available at https://africanclimatefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/800644-ACF-03_Geopolitics-of-critical-minerals-R_WEB.pdf accessed on 15 May 2025
[4] Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025
[5] ICGLR, Report on the Status of Implementation of the Six Tools of the ICGLR Regional Initiative on Natural Resources in Member States, P14
[6] WTO (2024): High demand for energy-related critical minerals creates supply chain pressures; available at https://www.wto.org/english/blogs_e/data_blog_e/blog_dta_10jan24_e.htm#:~:text=Exports,all%20at%206%20per%20cent). Accessed on 15 May 2025
[7] US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.
[8] URT: Ministry of Minerals, Mining Commission; A Report on implementation of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme for Tanzania Year 2023
[9]Global Witness (2025) available at https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/new-investigation-suggests-eu-trader-traxys-buys-conflict-minerals-from-drc/ accessed on 15 May 2025
[10] Martin A, etal (2014), All that Glitters is not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the illicit trade of critical minerals, Partnership Africa Canada, May 2014
[11] The Eastleigh Voice (2025); Police launch investigation into suspected copper smuggling at Mombasa port; available at https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/business/112007/police-probe-suspected-copper-smuggling-at-mombasa-port accessed on 15 May 2025
[12] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm
[13] https://www.kpcivilsociety.org/activity/kimberley-process-lifts-ineffective-embargo-end-of-an-era-for-the-central-african-republic-and-another-clear-signal-that-conflict-diamond-scheme-needs-serious-fixing/
[14] Kimberly Civil Society Coalition (2025); BEYOND SHINING ILLUSIONS: New documentary exposes the unspoken realities of large-scale diamond mining available at https://www.kpcivilsociety.org/press/beyond-shining-illusions-new-documentary-exposes-the-unspoken-realities-of-diamond-mining-in-african-countries/ accessed 15 May 2025
[15] Aikael Etal (2021) Understanding poverty dynamics and vulnerability in Tanzania: 2012–2018 available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rode.12829 accessed on 15 May 2025
[16] ibid

[1]ICGLR; available via https://icglrcertification.com/ accessed 13 May 2025
[2]OECD Report (2016) available via https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-supply-chains-of-minerals-from-conflict-affected-and-high-risk-areas_9789264252479-en.html, accessed on 13 May 2025

[3] OECD (2016), OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas: Third Edition, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264252479-en.
[4] ibid
[5] https://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/
[6] https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/critical-minerals-conflict-eu/
[7] European Commission: Trade and Economic Security, Conflict Minerals regulation available at https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/conflict-minerals-regulation_en#:~:text=In%20politically%20unstable%20areas%2C%20armed,mobile%20phones%2C%20cars%20and%20jewellery. Accessed on 15 May 2025
[8] ISSD (2018) Green Conflict Minerals; The Fuels of conflict in the transition to a low carbon economy; available at https://www.iisd.org/story/green-conflict-minerals/ accessed on 15 May 2025
[9] ibid

[1] The United Republic of Tanzania: Mining Commission; A Report on implementation of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme for Tanzania Year 2023

[1] https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/about/what-is-kp

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Sep, Thu, 2026

Diplomacy Conflicts Extractive Governance Natural Resource Policy Regional Cooperation Security Trade and investment

An Analysis of the geopolitical gains and risks of EU Strategic Partnerships, Lobito Corridor and Minerals for Security Deals on East and Southern Africa’s Critical Transition Minerals

Photo credit: Atlantic Council

Authors: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre and Robert Letsatsi, Botswana Watch Organization

This policy brief is a significant resource in understanding the geopolitics at play of critical minerals and support of advocacy surrounding regional collaborative initiatives for critical minerals and the necessary positionings that the region must take to benefit from these initiatives.

Introduction

This short analytical brief provides an overview of the critical mineral wealth in Eastern and Southern Africa with a particular focus on the strategic gains and risks the geopolitical initiatives such as the EU Strategic Minerals Partnerships, the Lobito Corridor and emerging minerals for security deals offer. It is estimated that the mining industry needs to invest $1.7 trillion over the next 15 years to extract and supply enough metals for renewable energy and Africa possess almost half of these. The brief discusses the geostrategic posture of superpowers such as the US, Europe, Russia and China in the context of the dash for control of critical minerals for the green transition and the current extractive governance challenges facing the region. While strategic alliances may not entirely be a bad idea, the brief highlights the geopolitical, security and perceived neocolonial undertones that may come with these initiatives. And how the historical socio-economic justice concerns of similar geopolitical jostling, security guarantees at the Berlin conference and hinterland to port initiatives contributed to the exploitation of Africa’s resources for benefits elsewhere. The brief further highlights on the possible benefits that the region can garner from these initiatives and measures the region can take so as to avert the risks and maximise benefits from these partnerships.

This policy brief is a significant resource in understanding the geopolitics at play of critical minerals and support of advocacy surrounding regional collaborative initiatives for critical minerals and the necessary positionings that the region must take to benefit from these initiatives.

Background

The surging demand for minerals critical to green transition offers potential economic benefits for mineral rich countries however the dash to secure their supply chain has kicked off geopolitical interests, competition and realignments whose outcomes could have long lasting relationship with divergent unforeseen impacts. With the Eastern and Southern Africa combined as a single economic bloc, the region has the highest concentration of critical green transition minerals such as cobalt, coltan, nickel, graphite, tungsten, tantalum, copper in the world. Yet the history of governance and management of the mineral sector has never yielded very positive dividends for mineral-rich countries in the region. Minerals have fueled conflicts in the DRC and Mozambique, Debt traps in Zambia, political patronage and environmental concerns in Zimbabwe and economic inequalities in South Africa and Botswana.

So far, the EU has signed Critical Minerals Strategic Partnerships with 5 Africa green minerals rich countries and the US led Lobito Mineral Corridor partnership plan to connect the Democratic Republic Congo’s mineral rich Katanga region and Zambia with a railway line to the Angolan Port of Lobito. Moreover, in recent years we have witnessed the emergence of Minerals for Security deals signed between the US and Ukraine and the US with the DRC and Rwanda. These developments offer a new geopolitical twist in this global race to secure the critical green transition minerals, pitting the developed western economic superpowers against China in the dash for Africa’s critical mineral resources. Amidst this mineral dash and geopolitical balkanization, it is feared that without strategic positioning, the Eastern and Southern Africa critical minerals rich countries could again miss out from this mineral boom.

Overview of Critical Minerals in Eastern and Southern Africa

Critical Minerals in East Africa

East Africa is vastly endowed with critical minerals with Tanzania having the 5^th largest graphite reserves globally (18million tons) and 1.52 million tons of high-grade nickel (URT: Madini). With the DRC combined, the East Africa accounts for more than 50% of Africa’s critical minerals output of graphite, copper, cobalt, coltan and nickel. For instance, the DRC holds the world’s largest cobalt reserves, accounting for about 70% global output and ranks as Africa’s largest and the world’s second-largest copper producer. The recent discoveries of coltan in Kenya also further adds to the EAC’s critical minerals deposits size.

Despite this potential, EAC as a block has not yet maximized benefits from its mineral wealth. Member states have been working on competing policies to improve governance, attract ethical investments and increase local beneficiation. The DRC government is working on policies to improve governance, local beneficiation, and attract ethical investment to reduce dependency on Chinese processing yet its neighbors are equally setting mineral refineries to perform the same functions.

Mineral Resources in EAC

Country	Precious metal, Gemstones & Semi-Precious Metal	Metallic Minerals	Industrial minerals
Burundi	Gold	Tin, Nickel, copper, cobalt, niobium, coltan, vanadium, tungsten	Phosphate, Peat
Kenya	Gemstones, gold	Lead, zircon, iron, titanium	Soda ash, flour spar, salt, mica, chaum, oil, coal, diatomite, gypsum, meers, kaolin, rear earth
Rwanda	Gold, gemstones	Tin, tungsten, tantalum, niobium, columbium	pozzolana
Tanzania	Gold, diamond, gemstones, silver, PGMs	Nickel, bauxite, copper, cobalt, uranium, graphite	Coal, phosphate, gypsum, pozzolana, soda ash, gas
Uganda	Gold, diamond	Copper, tin, lead, nickel, cobalt, tungsten, uranium, niobium, tantalum, iron	Gypsum, kaolin, salt, vermiculite, pozzolana, marble, soapstone, rear earth, oil

_{Source: EAC Vision 2050 and South Sudan Development Strategy}

Critical Minerals in Southern Africa

Southern Africa holds vast deposits of the world’s critical minerals. For example, South Africa holds the largest (90%) reserves of Platinum Group Minerals (PGMs) globally (Critical Minerals and Metals Strategy South Africa 2025). South Africa and Zimbabwe account for 92% of global reserves of PGM and produced 82% of platinum globally in 2022 (UNCTAD: 2023). Zambia has large Copper deposits accounting for 70% of Africa’s exports while Zimbabwe has the largest lithium reserves globally (estimated at 11 metric tons in Masvingo Province). Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia and Angola have some of the largest deposits of diamond. Angola has been diversifying beyond oil and diamonds, promoting critical minerals exploration and processing. The government is enhancing mining regulations, attracting foreign investment, and seeking strategic partnerships to develop local value chains. As one of the world’s top ten largest copper producers, Zambia is strengthening policies to boost value addition, encourage local smelting and refining, and attract Western investment. Zambia is Africa’s second-largest copper producer after Democratic Republic of Congo and the country is positioning itself as a major supplier in clean energy and EV industries.

From the above data, the Eastern and Southern Africa combined accounts for more than half of the global supply of critical minerals such as copper, coltan, platinum, graphite, manganese, nickel and lithium. In recent years there has been an increasing focus towards critical minerals with global mining exploration budgets for minerals such as lithium, copper and nickel rapidly spiking up since 2022. This places the East and Southern Africa region at the heart of competing geopolitical interest in race for the control of critical minerals supply chains. In the midst of this rush, the Eastern and Southern Africa region countries have been competing amongst themselves and undercutting each other to attract key large-scale players in the mining sector. This race has both socio-economic, human rights and geopolitical risks and concerns.

What are the key socio-economic justice concerns in the mining sector

The history of mining in the region has not been perfect. Like in previous mining experiences generally, increased extraction of critical minerals raises serious key socio-economic justice concerns like environmental injustice, gross violation of human rights, climate change, community displacement and land grabbing, lack of transparency and accountability, corruption and unequal distribution of benefits. Such concerns have been put in even greater spotlight, where demand for these minerals worldwide began to rise and will surge over the next 20 years in support of the energy transition and technological advancements.

Mining of critical minerals is happening in new land frontiers never explored or exposed to large scale mining before. This contributes to significant environment impacts around villages and communities where they are found. Their effects range from land rights violations via new evictions to destruction of social infrastructures such as schools, hospitals and residential homes due to blasting for minerals (BHRT: 2025). Land degradation, dust pollution and loss of arable agricultural land through clearances for new mines affects health and livelihoods. Processing of minerals such as Lithium and Nickel requires a lot of water and this is contributing to water shortages and pollution of water sources around the mining communities[1].

Courtesy photo credit: Graphite mining site preparation by Jumbo Graphite Company in , Lindi, Tanzania

Moreover, critical minerals are driving existing and new conflicts in many African countries such as the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Mozambique. According to UN reports, the desire to control exploitation of critical minerals are a major driver for the ongoing conflict in DRC[2].

Geopolitics of Critical Minerals

The increasing demand and competition for critical minerals is driving unending geopolitical tensions over which countries can gain access to these resources and how best to manage them. Critical minerals geopolitical competition amongst global economic superpowers; China, US, EU, Russia, United Kingdom and new emerging powers such as Australia, UAE and India have increased in recent years. A raft of strategic partnerships and infrastructure partnerships such as the Lobito corridor have been signed. Recently, we have witnessed the emergence of ‘Mineral for Security deals’ such as the ones signed between the US- Ukraine and the US- DRC aimed at transferring control of portions of critical mineral supplies in exchange for security guarantees and protection. There are many geopolitical interests and used tools at play but these are the noticeable physical manifestations of this geopolitical competition for critical minerals that is evolving across Africa.

The potential benefits and consequences of these new geopolitical realignments are diverse but alignments and signed deals effectively force smaller and poor countries to surrender sovereignty of their mineral natural resources by attaching their political interest and survival to the supply of critical minerals to the stronger states or regional economic power centers.

Moreover, there has been a surge in the use of counter friendshoring measures by importing countries establishing direct partnerships with exporting countries for raw critical minerals. While this may be viewed as a positive development for minerals and commodities trade, the tilted partnerships reinforce the underdevelopment of the downstream supply chain capacity for critical minerals, especially as developed countries secure the Just Energy Transition (JET) technologies. And are not willing yet to transfer this technology to the minerals source countries. The complex dynamics and intricate geopolitical forces surrounding critical minerals therefore demands a comprehensive and forward-thinking strategy to effectively navigate the evolving global landscape[3]. Without this, the risk of securing little benefits from the critical mineral wealth for Eastern and Southern Africa is real.

The EU Strategic Minerals Partnerships and implications on Africa’s critical Minerals

Amid global geopolitical tensions, the EU has been ramping up efforts to diversify its mineral value chains. The EU has forged strategic partnerships with critical minerals resource-rich African nations like Tanzania, Namibia, DRC, Zambia and Rwanda. To date the EU has established partnerships for critical raw materials with at least 14 countries [4]. These nitty-gritties of these partnerships are widely known to the public and citizens of the mineral rich countries but the EU states they are designed to secure access to critical minerals at various stages of the value chain, strengthen European industrial resilience and accelerate the green transition of its economies while supporting Africa’s own industrialization ambitions. The EU has further established a multistakeholder partnership with the US to develop the Lobito corridor project^[5]. While these partnerships are considered vital in ensuring improved mineral governance and securing investment inflows into Africa’s mining sector, on the flipside they are viewed controversially as a strategic path for the EU’s footstep into the Critical Minerals arena and its continued dominance by tightly tying Africa as a source of raw critical materials to feed Europe’s industrial base.

According to the EU, the strategic partnerships will involve cooperation on supply chain integration, infrastructure financing, research and innovation, capacity building, and sustainable sourcing of minerals. The EU strategic minerals partnerships therefore have a prospect of placing Africa as a global player in the critical minerals space and potentially securing Africa’s positive contribution towards a net zero future.

Africa does not have an establish strong industrial base to consume all its critical minerals wealth and therefore foreign investment and partnerships like these is important. With strategic leverage and tactful negotiation, Africa can potentially wean itself off the largely exploitative contracts previously signed with mining companies that were economically biased, had disregard for human rights and responsible sourcing. Without tearing the existing contracts apart, Africa can establish a new progressive framework to guide its mining.

However, the EU mineral partnerships are viewed as inherently biased and pursued with less consideration of transparency, socio-economic and environmental considerations. The terms of these partnerships are not widely known to the public and citizens where they are signed. The EU has not been keen and proactive in promoting the contents of these partnerships . By pursuing this silent approach, the EU risks falling into the widely criticized opaque foreign policy relations trajectory taken by other players such as China.

According to SOMO, the EU strategic partnerships are perceived as not good for addressing climate change and net zero. Despite the green tint, the EU is focused on the minerals and less on the effects. Europe is ultimately pursuing a resource-intensive growth strategy to bolster its industries in profiting from low-emission technologies. This prioritization of growth neglects that affluent countries’ overconsumption of resources is the root cause of climate change and the major driver of biodiversity loss, pollution, and waste. Worse, the unfavorable trade regimes [secured under the partnerships] can prevent poor resource-rich countries from climbing up the global value chains[6].

For the EU strategic partnerships to be beneficial and widely supported, they have to be structured differently if compared to other Critical Minerals Resource deals which are considered lopsided, exploitative and largely promoting the hinterland to port resource extractive infrastructural legacy. The EU critical minerals partnerships will have to, as a must, adhere to principles of transparency, equity, promote creation of value, reduction of human and environmental rights and conflicts in the countries and communities where these minerals are exploited.

The Lobito Corridor Initiative and its implications

The Lobito Corridor is a 1 300 km rail and infrastructure project stretching from the Angolan port of Lobito to mining regions of Kolwezi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia. Financed by the US and its EU allies, the project provides an alternative route to transport minerals such as cobalt and copper, helping to diversify mineral supply chains in the region. According to the US Department for Finance Corporation (DFC), the Lobito corridor initiative is not just any traditional development aid project but a strategic initiative aimed at strengthening critical mineral supply chains by countering China’s dominance[7]

Justification for the Lobito Corridor Project

According to the US Department for Finance Corporation (DFC) the Lobito Corridor project is poised to spur trade, industrialization, and regional integration across Southern Africa. The advanced technologies required for the industries of the future depend on reliable access to copper and cobalt. These minerals are essential for batteries, wind farms, electric vehicles, as well as energy transmission and distribution.

But critical mineral supply chains are threatened by Chinese dominance. Companies based in China own or operate as much as 80 percent of the critical mineral production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), much of which is sent to China for processing. And China is pushing new projects to further secure its dominance, adding to the estimated $1 trillion it has spent on its global infrastructure initiative known as its Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI.

Additionally, many of the world’s most mineral-rich countries such as the DRC lack the infrastructure to transport growing volumes of these materials to major coastal ports where they can be exported to markets around the world. DRC is the second-largest global producer of copper, and the largest producer of cobalt with a 70 percent global market share[8].

Key gains from Lobito Corridor Initiative

Offers an opportunity of revitalizing defunct infrastructure in a region severely affected by war. A railway built more than 100 years ago connecting mining sites in the DRC to the Lobito port in Angola was largely destroyed during the Angolan civil war. A reconstructed railway suffered from poor construction and upkeep. As a result, these critical minerals are currently transported by heavy-duty trucks to ports in South Africa and Tanzania over roads that can take months to travel. Growing demand for critical minerals threatens to exacerbate the problem. Analysts predict that cobalt demand will exceed the pace of production before the end of 2024 and thereby justifying the construction of new infrastructure projects such as the Lobito Corridor project[9].

The Lobito corridor project provides an opportunity for opening up new investments into the region. According to the initial plans the US Finance Cooperation would provide a $553 million loan to the Lobito Atlantic Railway to finance the upgrade and rehabilitation of more than 800 miles (1,300 km) of the rail connecting the city of Luau on the border of the DRC to the port city of Lobito in Angola, as well as the upgrade and rehabilitation of the mineral port in Lobito.

The investment is intended to improve the cost-effectiveness, speed, and resilience of global supply chains by upgrading and rehabilitating the railway in Angola that increases the efficiency and reliability of transportation out of the DRC’s mines. And it ensures China will not secure a monopoly on critical minerals access and transit routes in this key region.

Over the last decade, China had subsidized new construction and upgrades to rail systems in the region, including in Angola, DFC’s neighbor to the west and home to several key coastal transportation hubs, such as the Port of Lobito and the Benguela Railway that extends eastward from it into the DRC. Chinese companies and China-linked entities have worked to control regional transportation systems and restrict access to U.S. and allied businesses, creating challenges to investments in markets like the DRC. However, those projects have suffered from what The Wall Street Journal described as “poor construction and upkeep,” leading to “rundown stations, malfunctioning safety systems offline servers and frequent derailments on the train line.”

According to the US, the DFC’s investment will diversify away from Chinese-controlled economic corridors. It will reinforce railway tracks and bridges along the route and add containers, trains, and equipment such as mobile cranes and forklifts. These investments are expected to increase Lobito’s transportation capacity from 0.4 million metric tons per year as of the end of 2024 to 4.6 million metric tons. It will also benefit the local economy, where minerals make up 90 percent of the DRC’s total exports, accounting for 40 percent of its GDP and $30 billion in value as of last year.

Lobito and projects like will bolster trade access in and around Angola. The coordination led by DFC—which is poised to expand to new projects— presents a boom for U.S. industries, with Angolan organizations already looking to source equipment from the United States for mining, storage, and other integral elements of the project.

More broadly, the Lobito project strengthens Angola’s role as a key security and economic partner of the United States and as a leader in Sub-Saharan Africa working to resolve issues—including those that affect American interests such as the peace process in eastern DRC. Angolan President João Lourenço also recently assumed the role of chairman of the African Union, and the Lobito project is considered as a potential lever for influencing positions and securing other strategic projects across Africa.

Graphic highlighting 30% reduction in shipping cost and 29-day reduction in shipping time as a result of DFC’s investment in the Lobito Atlantic Railway

Source: US International Finance Corporation

According to the DFC, within Angola, the project will upgrade critical infrastructure to international standards and will ensure that access to rail remains open to all paying customers. It is expected to generate significant local income there, with total local procurement of goods and services expected to reach more than $350 million within the first five years.

And it is expected to create more than 1,000 new full-time jobs for Angolans, growing the existing workforce from 434 to more than 1,500. Other support projects will benefit from the investments in the Lobito Corridor. For example, a $10 million loan from DFC to Seba Foods Zambia Ltd. is designed to support the expansion of its food production and storage capacity for maize-based, soya-based, and other nutritious and affordable consumer food products, strengthening the food value chain in Zambia, which is on the eastern end of the Lobito Corridor. Seba Foods was the first U.S. Government-financed food security and agribusiness-focused investment following the announcement of the vision for the Lobito Corridor.

The Lobito Corridor initiative exemplifies the competition, with the US and EU aligning efforts to establish stronger supply chains. China, already investing heavily, aims to enhance its Belt and Road Initiative along the corridor. The US has indicated that China can still utilize the railway for its exports. The US-China cooperation on this project may create new avenues for sustainable development in Africa. If the two superpowers align their Lobito strategies, it could accelerate Africa’s green industrialization. Jointly-driven investments would align with Africa’s broader economic growth and sustainable development goals. Africa’s potential for growth will attract both powers, as both seek competitive positions within the Lobito Corridor. China has already recently signed a $1 billion deal to restore the TAZARA railway^[10].

Key concerns of the Lobito Corridor Initiative

The Lobito Corridor project exemplifies the geopolitical interests to serve the US and EU interests rather than Africa (Zambia Angola & DRC’s) interests. As clearly stated by the US and the EU, the Lobito corridor initiative is intended to strategically increase the US and EU’s dominance and security of access to Africa’s critical minerals supply chains and diversifying Africa away from Chinese-controlled economic corridors. This project is therefore largely driven by external interests and Africa finds itself in the middle of these competing geopolitical interests.

The project exacerbates the colonial hinterland to port extractive infrastructure, designed with a major purpose of extracting and transporting Africa’s resources as raw materials from the hinterland to the port ready for export to benefit elsewhere. The Lobito initiative railway project has no interconnection with other transport nodes to facilitate in country mobility and connectivity to other economic sectors. It is therefore designed with an exploitative lens driven with an ‘extract and take away’ mindset, with less beneficial considerations to the broader national public concerns. Financing of arteries linking the railway to other transport infrastructures would address significant infrastructure problems affecting millions of people across the countries in the corridor. For example, an East-West railway connection could link Lobito and TAZARA routes, creating Africa’s first transcontinental railway. Such a corridor could bridge the Atlantic and Indian ocean[11].

The project will be financed with loans acquired from the US and EU, whose payment will be recouped from revenues from the operations and sale of the critical minerals. This is ironical as the lenders will be the major beneficiaries from the mineral export. The long-term net effect or benefit from these may be negligible as the debt burden for the corridor countries (Angola, DRC and Zambia) will increase and they may be forced to pay using their minerals resources.

The strategic partnerships and Lobito corridor project have no plans to invest in critical minerals value addition with in the participating countries. As a consequence, the project may consolidate Africa’s exclusion from the critical minerals global value chain, locking Africa to lower tier of the value chain as a supplier of critical raw materials. Current studies and evidence show that Africa integration in the Global Value Chain is largely through forward linkages whereby it primarily provides unprocessed raw materials to feed the industrial development and economic prosperity elsewhere.

For example , the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and UNCTAD data shows that the DRC and Zambia refine only about 7% and 3.5% of all the copper produced, which is far much lower than their share in the global production.[12] In recent years China has emerged as the leading processor of critical minerals (Lithium, Copper, Nickel & Cobalt) implying that Africa’s minerals are exported raw, processed and re-exported back to Africa as intermediary or finished goods.

Moreover, the Lobito corridor does not promote intra Africa trade in minerals and therefore runs contrary to Africa’s mineral and economic development ambitions as articulated in the various propositions of the Africa Unions Agenda 2063 and the Africa Mining Vision particularly in regards to regional cooperation and beneficiation. The USGS report for 2023 shows that African Minerals are largely traded with countries outside Africa. For instance, the DRC accounts for 77% of Africa’s cobalt exports, however, its intra Africa links are few. This suggests its trade is largely more with countries outside the continent. Several countries with insignificant cobalt reserves and production re-export more beneficiated cobalt through regional networks as indicated in the table below, reaping bigger economic benefits from added value.

Table showing Africa Major Critical Minerals Export Destination, Intra Africa Trade and Linkages

Africa Critical Mineral	Top Five Global Export Destinations	Africa trading partners	Intra Africa trade share	Implication
Cobalt	China (72%), Belgium (2%), Malaysia (2%), Switzerland (2%)	Zambia, Namibia, Morocco, Congo, Madagascar, South Africa, DR Congo, Mali, Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, and Kenya.	South Africa (1%), DRC (89% to Zambia, Namibia and Morocco), Congo (4.4%), Zambia (3.5%)	The top five global destinations consume 80% of Africa’s cobalt More of DRC’s cobalt is re-exported by other countries.
Graphite	China (28%), Germany (15%), India (9%), USA (7%) and Malaysia (7%)	Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Niger, Guinea, Tanzania, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Sudan, Namibia, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, Mozambique, Cameroon, Egypt, 30 Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mauritius, Ghana, Botswana, Libya, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, and Mali.	South Africa (51%), Tanzania (14%), Seychelle (12%), Kenya & Morocco (3%).	The top five global destinations account for 64% of Africa’s Graphite export These countries export to fewer African countries. Tanzania only has eight intra-Africa graphite export links (Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, DR Congo, Burundi, Comoros and Madagascar, while Seychelles has one (South Africa)
Lithium	France (7%), USA (5%), Russia (1%) Germany & China (2%)	36 African Countries	DRC (77%), South Africa (15%), Morocco (1%), Tanzania (1%)	The top five consume 15% of Africa total lithium exports from at 36 countries DRC has the lowest intra exports links to Africa while South Africa, Kenya and Morrocco lead in number of intra Africa export links.
Managanese	China (58%), India (10%), Norway (5%), Japan (4%), and Russia (3%)	31 African Countries	Morocco (42%), Zambia (11%), South Africa (20%), Ghana (1%)	These countries account for about 80% of Africa’s Manganese exports outside Africa. Morocco, South Africa, and Zambia (in consecutive order) emerge as countries with the highest intra-Africa export shares for Manganese. South Africa and Kenya have the highest intra-Africa export links.
Platinum Group of Metals (PGM)	United Kingdom accounting for about 28%, Japan 17%, Belgium about 15%, United States of America 12% and Germany 9%.	45 Countries	Zimbabwe (86%), Ghana and DRC (3%),	These countries account for about 89% of Africa’s PGM export outside the region South Africa has the highest intra-Africa export links to thirteen countries, followed by Swaziland and Malawi

In the long run, the Lobito corridor project will potentially weaken further existing limited intra Africa linkages and collaborative projects by setting up or creating an unfavorable competition for already existing infrastructure such as the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) and the Ports of Dar es Salaam, Beira in Mozambique and Durban, which have recently received major uplifts with costly loans from China and other global financial institutions such as the World Bank.

The Lobito Corridor project excludes itself from other major problems facing mining in the region, including addressing previous economic injustices and human rights related issues, the long-term effects of war and climate change. Because of the fear of being edged out by China, the Lobito corridor project does not come with stringent requirements and expectation for adherence to high human rights standards by the partner countries.

Mineral for Security Deals and implications on Africa’s critical minerals.

Amidst the ongoing geopolitical interest for critical minerals, recently we have witnessed the emergence of Minerals for Security Guarantee deals as a tool for control of access to critical minerals supply chains. On 30^th April 2025 the US signed a Minerals for security deal with Ukraine and in June, the US signed a similar Mineral for Security deal with the DRC and Rwanda. The deals provide access to critical minerals in return for security guarantees from the US. Although the deals have been covered with a peace and conflict resolution imperative, they are perceived as essentially aimed at securing the US’s access to critical minerals. In multiple speeches, President Trump has been categorical that these deals must secure critical minerals for the US and thereby amplifying the nexus between geopolitics, Africa’s critical minerals and conflicts.

According to Global witness, the deals like the extraction and trade of some critical minerals intensify new geopolitical tensions, reinforcing long-standing patterns of exploitation^[13] including conflicts. For instance the Trump-Ukraine deal revealed a connection of critical minerals to the Russia and Ukraine war and how critical mineral natural resources in Ukraine have become a key bargaining chip in international diplomacy between the US and Russia.

In fact, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo reached out to the Donald Trump administration with a Ukrainian-style proposal in February 2025 in response to the rapid advance of the M23 rebel group in the east of the country. At stake are the mineral riches of North and South Kivu provinces, a major but highly problematic source of metals such as tin, tungsten and coltan[14].

According to different sources, this deal was presented as a pacification tool for eastern DRC as it could stop the advance of belligerent forces in the region but equally boost Rwanda’s processing of Congo minerals while providing the US with an assured source of processed critical minerals required to support its industrial technology and security needs.

The full contents of deal are not readily available to the public but leaked versions mentioned requirements for withdrawal of Rwandan Forces from the Eastern DRC and integration of the M23 belligerent factions into the DRC’s forces.

Researchers and analysists argue that the mineral deals essentially consolidate a firm grip of the US on access to DRC’s critical minerals, closing off competition against other potential rival countries such as China and Russia, there by exacerbating grounds for economic injustice, opacity, lack of transparency and potential for unfair mining deals, biased in favour of the security guarantors.

Mineral deals are tainted with opacity, designed with a biased exploitative and a neocolonial mindset aimed at rewarding the dominant superpower and the aggressor against the victim. They are negotiated behind closed doors and their full terms are not availed neither to the public nor the citizens of the mineral rich country.

According to Kambale Musavuli of the Centre for Research on Congo-Kinshasa, the US brokered deal between the DRC and Rwanda is wild. The US is getting access to $2 trillion of worth of DRC minerals in exchange for forcing the withdrawal of M23 militias. That is one tenth of the DRC’s total mineral wealth, more than any single foreign country claims. This is strange because analysts of the region have long argued that the US effectively enabled foreign support for the M23 in order to destabilise the DRC, prevent a functional state from arising and achieving sovereignty over its mineral wealth, and thus ensure minerals stay cheaply available for US firms. If this analysis is correct then the US acquired $2 trillion mineral rights in exchange for stopping a conflict that it has effectively supported. Consider also how media discourse is playing out. Remember that in 2008 Chinese firms signed a deal with the DRC to obtain $9billion in minerals in exchange for infrastructure development. Western media went wild with narratives of “Chinese colonisation”. Now the US has secured minerals deal 200x larger and the media narrative is all about how the US brings “peace”

The mining security deals were negotiated in secrecy led by political elites and diplomats. As such citizens are disempowered from having a say in the future management of a vital sector, whose benefits are signed off to another country by a few, dashing hopes for citizens stake into a better future.

The minimum threshold of minerals signed off in the form of US mining companies investing in the critical minerals sector is not clear and whether the DRC has any stake at what percentage in the minerals extracted by the US companies is largely unknown.

Natural resource policies have a contagion effect. The deals potentially open up a can of worms for future similar deals, covering natural resources such as forestry, wild life management and critical infrastructure such as ports, airports, water ways and food supply chains.

Moreover, the deals may not be a permanent solution to ongoing conflicts. The mineral for security deals largely covers security guarantees against ‘external aggression’ and may not be fitted for dealing with internal political and socio-economic drivers for conflict such as historical injustices, land and citizenship rights, regional economic imbalances, bad governance and banditry. Local insurgent rebel groups and militias may continue to pursue their political and economic ends outside the ambits of the security deal. For example, on the very day that the US-DRC and Rwanda deal was signed, one of the rebel groups, Codeco militia attacked and killed at least 10 people at a displaced people’s camp in Ituri province. There are more than 100 rebel groups in Eastern DRC. The M23 which was largely mentioned in the US deal has already described it as a tiny part’ of a solution to the conflict.

Further, the security guarantees provided under the deal are not clear. It is not clear what these mean and when and how such guarantees can be deployed. For instance, does security guarantee mean supply of arms or armed mercenaries, military intervention or alliances with US soldiers fighting alongside or against the aggressor. Moreover, it is not clear whether the US can be directly involved in fighting internal rebel groups and insurgents without triggering nationalistic and constitutional challenges, driving internal political conflicts further.

By nature, deals of this nature are long term and cannot easily be breached without consequences. The terms and consequences for such breach are less known to the public. The conditions for termination or renegotiation are equally not known. Therefore, the mineral security agreement essentially locks countries towards dealing with one major economic superpower whose primary interest is access to the country’s critical mineral wealth.

Conclusion

The EU strategic partnerships, the mineral security guarantee deals and the Lobito project may entirely not be a bad idea, however their implicit risks cast shadows about their potential in advancing Africa’s critical minerals and economic development goals. The key concerns around these strategic mineral alliances and the Lobito Corrido are embedded within the broader critical development discourse and concerns about decolonization and recolonization, sovereignty, security and resource nationalism, state capture, perpetration of socio-economic injustices by dominant global capital and Africa’s wealth transfer. Specific concerns include risks for increasing mineral bad governance and economic injustices and vulnerabilities, geopolitical tension, and the need to pursue sustainable mining practices.

With these strategic partnerships, mineral for security deals and the Lobito railway in place, these critical rich countries are locked into long-term commitments to ensure the supply of metals. The major question constantly paused is how can Africa relate as an equal partner with other powers in the race for critical minerals without surrendering its critical minerals wealth to the full benefit of others elsewhere. Moreover, over dependence on certain countries can pose risks when such countries face political instability or become embroiled in geopolitical disputes drawing in Africa’s mineral rich countries in their midst. For these alliances to be mutually beneficial, they must ensure that the resources are accessed equitably, that benefits are fairly distributed, and that environmental impacts are kept to a minimum for their sustainability in the long run .

Recommendations

The strategic partnerships must go beyond critical minerals exploitation but venture into addressing broader social economic development concerns of the people in the mineral rich countries.
The Lobito Corridor initiative must avoid the ‘hinterland to port’ colonial legacy by establishing railway transport interconnection nodes to other existing railway infrastructure so as to improve connectivity across the project countries to ease the bigger infrastructure challenges that these countries face.
The strategic partnership and Lobito Corridor must encourage value addition by investing in processing and exporting of value-added products, so as to generate wealth at source.
Africa Mineral rich countries must explore and establish south to south partnerships, thereby increasing their leverage and power to negotiate with external partners and mining companies
The EU strategic partnerships and the Lobito Corridor project must not exacerbate the role of minerals as drivers of conflict by supporting and buying minerals from conflict zones.
Moreover, these alliances must ensure that the resources are accessed equitably, that benefits are fairly distributed, and that environmental impacts are kept to a minimum for their sustainability in the long run.
The Minerals for security deals must be transparent and not biased exclusively in favour of the dominant economic super power.
The Minerals for Security deals must avoid advancing human rights abuses by US mining companies under the US government protection
The strategic partnerships, security deals and their associated projects must promote national dialogues and citizens participation in governance of critical minerals and mitigation of harm from mining

Selected References

Andreoni et al., (2023) Critical Minerals and routes to diversification in Africa: Linkages, pulling dynamics and Opportunities in medium-high tech supply chains; Backup paper commissioned by the UNCTAD Secretariate for the 2023 edition of the Economic Development in Africa Reports

Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

EITI; Using Transparence Benefits EU Mineral Partnerships; Accessed via https://eiti.org/blog-post/using-transparency-benefit-eus-mineral-partnerships

Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025

IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

Railway Supply ; (2024) US-China Lobito Corridor Investments Drive Africa’s Economic and Sustainable Growth; https://www.railway.supply/en/us-china-lobito-corridor-investments-drive-africas-economic-and-sustainable-growth/

Somo; The EU Critical Minerals Crusade (2024) ; accessed via: https://www.somo.nl/the-eus-critical-minerals-crusade/

US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.

URT: Madini accessed via: https://www.madini.go.tz/page/e8a4201d-286f-4409-9db0-719311652336/

[1] https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202505/critical-minerals-and-metals-strategy-south-africa-2025.pdf

[1] Emerging Human Rights Implications of Transition Minerals Extraction and processing: Case Studies from Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Zimbabwe

[2] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[3] ibid

[4] https://eiti.org/blog-post/using-transparency-benefit-eus-mineral-partnerships

[5] https://ecfr.eu/event/critical-minerals-and-eu-africa-strategic-partnerships-where-do-we-stand/

[6] https://www.somo.nl/the-eus-critical-minerals-crusade/

[7] US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.

[8] ibid

[9] ibid

[10] https://www.railway.supply/en/us-china-lobito-corridor-investments-drive-africas-economic-and-sustainable-growth/

[11] https://www.railway.supply/en/us-china-lobito-corridor-investments-drive-africas-economic-and-sustainable-growth/

[12] Andreoni et al., (2023) Critical Minerals and routes to diversification in Africa: Linkages, pulling dynamics and Opportunities in medium-high tech supply chains; Backup paper commissioned by the UNCTAD Secretariate for the 2023 edition of the Economic Development in Africa Reports

[13] Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025

[14] Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

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Aug, Sun, 2026

Extractive Governance Natural Resource Policy Tax

How investment treaties impact Tanzania’s mining regulatory policy

Photo credit: Mining Review Africa

Author: Joshua Woodend, Associate Researcher and Analyst, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Abstract

Tanzania’s mining sector is central to national economic growth, contributing significantly to GDP and employment. However, the country’s reliance on foreign investment has bound its regulatory space to the constraints of international investment treaties. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), in particular, grant expansive investor protections such as the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard, which often allow companies to challenge legislative reforms through costly arbitration. These mechanisms restrict Tanzania’s ability to implement necessary policies, including reforms aimed at increasing tax revenues, enhancing local employment, and addressing social and environmental concerns.

While reforms since 2010 have boosted government revenues and domestic benefits, they have also triggered arbitration claims, with Tanzania already paying over $100 million in related costs. To regain policy autonomy, Tanzania may consider terminating existing treaties, clarifying regulatory frameworks, and developing a model BIT with targeted carve-outs, thereby balancing investment promotion with sovereign control and sustainable development objectives.

Introduction

Tanzania’s mining sector is a major contributor to the nation’s economic development. Over the past decade, the industry has experienced steady growth, with mining projected to contribute 10% of GDP in 2025 (Ministry of Minerals, 2024). This significance is equally reflected in employment trends. A 2018 UNEP study estimated that the artisanal small-scale mining sector employed over a million Tanzanians, and in 2021, large scale mines were recorded to employ 14,742 people, significant figures for a nation of 60 million (Mutagwaba et al, 2018; Ministry of Minerals, 2024).

Tanzania’s mineral wealth has drawn substantial international investment, a trend actively encouraged by the government given the country’s limited capacity to exploit these resources without external capital. Consequently, as with many African nations, the mining industry is inexorably tied to foreign investment and ownership. The nation’s 2023 investment report on foreign private investments demonstrates this as mining and quarrying dominates FDI, being over 3 times larger than the second highest ranking sector, manufacturing (Bank of Tanzania, 2023).

For Tanzania, attracting international investment in the mining sector is a complex balancing act. On the one hand, the government must provide conditions favourable enough to persuade international mining companies to supply the capital needed to stimulate national growth and drive economic development. On the other hand, it is necessary to ensure these terms are not so generous that they undermine the government’s ability to control the mining sector, or that they provide conditions so favourable for foreign mining firms that there is no incentive to protect local people and retain some profits locally. This challenge is clearly reflected in Tanzania’s investment treaty regime.

What are investment treaties?

Investment treaties are agreements that define how a state treats foreign investors within its territory. Their scope is broad, encompassing a range of formats and parameters. Some are bilateral, covering investment flows between two states, such as the treaty between Tanzania and Finland. Others are multilateral, like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), or regionally focused, such as the African Continental Free Trade Area. At present, Tanzania has 11 bilateral investment treaties in force, 7 treaties with investment provisions, is party to a range of multilateral intergovernmental agreements, and has also entered into an unknown number of privately negotiated investment agreements with large-scale investors (UNCTAD).

Whilst these treaties often succeed in creating favourable conditions for international companies investing in the mining sector, they also limit the government’s power to regulate this sector. This stems from the broad protections such agreements provide and the stringent enforcement mechanisms they enable. In particular, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are especially known for constraining a nation’s ability to enact legislation changes, an especially contentious issue in Tanzania’s mining sector.

This is because the wording of BIT provisions is notoriously vague, leaving room for extremely broad interpretation. For example, all of Tanzania’s BITs include a provision guaranteeing the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ of investments. Whilst this may appear innocuous, it has often been interpreted to protect a business’s legitimate expectation of a stable regulatory environment. As a result, even necessary changes to the mining industry can breach these treaties, as the regulatory environment is no longer stable. This results in a process known as investment treaty arbitration, a legal mechanism that favours investors over governments, allows companies to bypass domestic legal systems, and, on average, costs respondent states $4.7 million USD in legal fees, before any damages are awarded (Hodgson, Kryvoi, and Hrcka, 2021).

The threat of arbitration, combined with the broad scope of BIT provisions, often enables international mining companies to protest any legislative changes, including those aimed at improving the well-being of local communities. For example, in Foresti v. South Africa (2007), an Italian mining company alleged South Africa had breached the FET clause of the South Africa-Italy BIT by introducing affirmative action legislation that required mining license owners to divest a percentage of shareholdings to historically disadvantaged South Africans (Poulsen, 2015). Whilst this legislation was obviously necessary to reduce apartheid era inequalities, was universally applied and non-discriminatory in its implementation, the FET provision presented a huge legislative hurdle and cost in its implementation.

Since the 1960’s Tanzania has signed a long list of Double Taxation Agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaties with different Countries. Some of these have since been terminated while a number of these continue in force with their corresponding provisions having relative effect on the mining.

Table 1 – Tanzania’s BITs in force (Excluding Investment Related Instruments)

Tanzania’s BIT Obligations
Treaty	Date of Signature	Termination Protocol	Key Provisions Relating to Mining	Status (Active/ terminated/ Renegotiated/
Canada Tanzania BIT	2013	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2023) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 15 years after termination.	Provides carve outs protecting the regulation of exhaustible natural resources provided such measures are not applied arbitrarily	Active
China Tanzania BIT	2013	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2023) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 10 years after termination.	Provides carve outs for regulation protecting the environment, provided they are not applied arbitrarily.	Active
Turkey Tanzania BIT	2011	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2021) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 10 years after termination.	Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.	Active
Mauritius Tanzania BIT	2009	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2019) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 10 years after termination.	Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.	Active
Switzerland Tanzania BIT	2004	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2014) with termination becoming effective six months after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 10 years after termination.	Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.	Active
Finland Tanzania BIT	2001	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2011) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 15 years after termination.	Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.	Active
Italy Tanzania BIT	2001	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2011) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. All articles shall remain in force for 20 years after termination.	Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.	Active
Denmark Tanzania BIT	1999	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2009) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. All articles shall remain in force for 10 years after termination.	Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.	Active
Sweden Tanzania BIT	1999	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2009) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 15 years after termination.	Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.	Active
United Kingdom Tanzania BIT	1996	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2006) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. All articles shall remain in force for 20 years after termination.	Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.	Active
Germany Tanzania BIT	1968	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (1978) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 20 years after termination.	Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.	Active
Tanzania’s Treaties with Investment Provisions
Treaty	Date of Signature	Termination Protocol	Key Provisions Relating to Mining	Status
African Continental Free Trade Area	2018	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 5 years after entry into force (2023), with termination becoming effective two years after notice is given. Pending rights and obligations shall continue to apply despite termination.	No obligations in the treaty prevents the enforcement of measures related to the importations and exportations of gold or silver, the conservation of exhaustible natural resources or exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry	Active
Trade Agreement Between the East African Community and United States of America	2008	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated at any point after signing, with termination becoming effective 180 days after notice is given. No survival clauses apply.	Does not specify mining but is included under its remit	Active
South African Development Community Protocol on Finance and Investment	2006	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated at any point, with termination becoming effective 12 months after notice is given. No survival clauses apply.	States shall promote the use of their natural resources in a sustainable and an environmentally friendly manner; recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures; Nothing in this Annex shall be construed as preventing a State Party from exercising its right to regulate in the public interest	Active
East African Community Treaty	2000	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated at any point, with termination becoming effective 12 months after notice is given. No survival clauses apply.	Requires integration of environmental management in mining sector and the sustainable use of natural resources	Active
The Treaty on Southern African Development Community	1992	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated at any point, with termination becoming effective 12 months after notice is given. No survival clauses apply.	Mandates member states to cooperate in mining and natural resource sectors for purpose of regional development	Active
Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community	1991	Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated at any point, with termination becoming effective 12 months after notice is given. No survival clauses apply.	Requires mutual cooperation on policy around natural resources	Active

Impacts of Investment treaties on Tanzania’s mining sector regulation

The Tanzanian mining sector has been repeatedly constrained by treaty obligations, facing both threats and actual arbitration proceedings in response to reforms aimed at retaining greater value within the country. Notable measures include the Mining (Value Addition) Regulations of 2020, which require the use of local service providers and processing facilities; the Mining (Local Content) Regulations of 2018, which mandate the employment of Tanzanian nationals; and the Mining Act of 2010, which significantly increased royalty rates.

Whilst all these changes may violate investment treaty provisions, such as the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard, due to their radical nature, such efforts for reform are to be expected given the previous unfavourable legislative status quo that disadvantaged Tanzanian people. The scale of this disadvantage is stark: between 1997 and 2005, Tanzania exported over US $2.54 billion worth of gold yet collected merely 10% in tax revenue, a disparity that generated significant social tension (Curtis and Lissu, 2008; Noe, 2006). In 2015 Tanzania instituted significant mining reforms, including changes to the mining fiscal regime, increasing government stake and control of the mining sector. For comparison, since Tanzania’s mining sector reforms, between 2023/24 alone, Tanzania raised over US $2.5 billion in tax revenue and massively increased the employment of local people (Ministry of Minerals, 2024). These reforms triggered investment disputes and led to costly arbitral awards.

Determining the precise financial cost of Tanzania’s mining regulation changes through investment arbitration fees and penalties is challenging. Through ICSID, a widely-used arbitration mechanism, Tanzania had by 2025 already paid over $100 million USD in fees for its legislative changes, specifically for cancelling retention licenses that had granted foreign mining companies pre-emptive rights to specific locations (UNCTAD, 2025).

However, this figure likely represents only a fraction of the total arbitration costs stemming from Tanzania’s mining policy reforms. Many BITs enable arbitration through mechanisms that operate without public disclosure requirements outside of ICSID, meaning the actual financial burden on the Tanzanian government may be substantially higher than publicly reported figures suggest.

Consequently, investment treaties significantly impact Tanzania’s capacity to introduce mining reforms by granting investors broad rights that enable litigation over even minor regulatory changes. The threat of compensation payments, combined with high arbitration costs, at best imposes a substantial financial burden on mining sector reform efforts, and at worst, creates powerful disincentives that discourage the government from proposing or implementing changes that improve local development. This can easily result in a regulatory environment that favours investors and foregoes significant taxation revenue that could benefit the nation at large, including those who are proximate to mining enterprises and it’s damaging effects.

Consequently, investment treaties constrain Tanzania’s capacity to reform its mining sector by granting investors expansive rights that allow them to litigate against even modest regulatory changes. While the immediate impact is the risk of substantial compensation awards and the heavy financial burden of arbitration proceedings, the implications extend further. Bilateral investment treaty provisions can lock in tax concessions or limit fiscal space, resulting in foregone revenues that could otherwise support national development. Equally, non-financial costs emerge: the prospect of diplomatic or political pressure, the withholding of aid, and negative media portrayals of Tanzania as a hostile investment destination. Together, these pressures can deter policymakers from pursuing reforms that prioritise domestic welfare over investor interests. In practice, this often produces a regulatory environment that privileges foreign mining companies at the expense of local communities and the state’s ability to capture taxation revenues.

Policy Recommendations

So, what can Tanzania do to remedy this situation? The most direct step would be to terminate its existing bilateral investment treaties, a move already taken by countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia, South Africa, Indonesia and India (Public Citizen, 2018). Yet this is far from a quick solution. As shown in table one, many of Tanzania’s treaties contain survival clauses that ensures provisions can be in force for up to 20 years after termination, this makes termination a necessary but inevitably long-term measure.

In the meantime, Tanzania must work to reduce perceptions of risk by presenting a clearer and more predictable regulatory environment. While past legal reforms in the mining sector have often appeared erratic, future changes should be grounded in transparent communication with stakeholders and shaped around consistent licensing and tax frameworks. This would build investor trust in the market, despite the lack of BITs, as they can rely on the government to act in rationale, legal manner, with space for negotiation.

Finally, Tanzania may invest in developing its own model BIT, complete with prudential carve-outs that reflect Tanzania’s development priorities. The development of such a treaty would allow the country to reassure investors of fair treatment while avoiding the loss of vital policy space.

Bibliography:

The Bank of Tanzania, The Tanzania Investment Centre and The National Bureau of

Statistics (2023). Tanzania Investment Report 2023 – Foreign Private Investments. Dar

es Salaam: Government of Tanzania.

Curtis, M. and Lissu, T. (2008). How Tanzania is Failing to Benefit from Gold Mining. Dar es Salaam: The Christian Council of Tanzania.

Hodgson, M., Kryvoi, Y. and Hrcka, D. (2021). 2021 Empirical Study: Costs, Damages and Duration in Investor-State Arbitration. London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Allen and Ovary.

Ministry of Minerals (2024). Investor’s Guide Tanzania Mining Sector 2024. Dar es Salaam: The Ministry of Minerals, pp.1–23.

Ministry of Minerals (2024). Ministry of Minerals – Republic of Tanzania. [online] Madini.go.tz. Available at: https://www.madini.go.tz/page/03cef72a-bdd3-41dc-ba84-40954095b835/.

Mutagwaba, W., Bosco Tindyebwa, J., Makanta, V., Kaballega, D. and Maeda, G. (2018). Artisanal and small-scale mining in Tanzania – Evidence to inform an ‘action dialogue’. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.

Noe, C. (2020) Graduated Sovereignty and Tanzania’s Mineral Sector. Utafiti. [Online] 14 (2), 257–280.

Poulsen, L. N. S. (2015) Bounded rationality and economic diplomacy: the politics of

investment treaties in developing countries / Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen (University

College London). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Public Citizen (2018). Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties Has Not Negatively

Affected Countries’ Foreign Direct Investment Inflows. Washington D.C: Public Citizen.

The Bank of Tanzania, The Tanzania Investment Centre and The National Bureau of Statistics (2023). Tanzania Investment Report 2023 – Foreign Private Investments. Dar es Salaam: Government of Tanzania.

UNCTAD (2022). The International Investment Treaty Regime and Climate Action | Publications | UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub. [online] Available at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/publications/1269/the-international-investment-treaty-regime-and-climate-action

UNCTAD (2025). Tanzania, United Republic of | Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator | UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub. [online] Unctad.org. Available at:

https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/country/222/united-republic-of-tanzania [Accessed 17 September 2025].

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Aug, Tue, 2026

Climate Change Governance Extractive Governance Governance Natural Resource Policy Uncategorized

Analysis of Climate Change and Energy Transition impacts on women in Tanzania: Policy and governance gaps

Climate Change and Energy Transition are pertinent issues in contemporary global development challenge facing the world yet women are still at the periphery. Moreover there is a varied difference in how poor rural versus urban women experience the climate change and energy transition effects. The situation in Tanzania is not different.

Author(s): Gloria Shechambo, Researcher and Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Climate Change and Energy Transition are pertinent issues in contemporary global development challenge facing the world yet its impacts on women and their practical engagement have remained nuanced and camouflaged in of volumes of endless winding texts and UN resolutions, with less significant impact. Women are still at the periphery and there is a varied difference in how poor rural versus urban women experience the climate change and energy transition effects . Despite attempts, the situation in Tanzania is not different and warrants immediate consistent and purposefully intentional attention.

The world is one place yet climate change and energy transition problems facing women are distinct because of their economic and social vulnerabilities and traditional care giving roles compared to men.

Because women face a higher level of economic and social vulnerability compared to men, the meta question in climate change and energy transition must not remain how can the world and particularly developing countries be better positioned to be more adaptive, resilient and responsive but rather why is it a concern for women in particular? How and why should poor women be at the center of these discussions? In Tanzania this is even more critical given that women are disproportionately more affected than any other group.

In fact, and justifiably, the demand for more women engagement in climate change and energy transition is not a feminist ask but a development imperative that must be addressed.

This policy brief examines the intersection of gender, climate change, and energy transitions in Tanzania, emphasizing the importance of engaging women in bridging the disparities to inclusive actions and successful interventions for sustainable development. The brief highlights the disproportionate impact of climate change and energy-related disasters on women due to their caregiving roles and limited access to resources and efforts in place.

By prioritizing gender justice and equality, Tanzania can strengthen resilience to climate change, reduce energy injustice gap and advance sustainable development.

Nexus of Climate Change and Energy injustice on women in Tanzania

Women often play key roles in food production and household food security yet climate change and energy significantly impact agriculture and productive sectors in Tanzania. Women, who constitute a substantial portion of the agricultural labor force, face heightened vulnerability to climate-related disasters and energy insecurity due to various social, economic, and cultural factors[1].

UNDP reports that more women than men (67 percent of the country’s total female labor force versus 64 percent of the male labor force) are engaged in agriculture.

Tanzania’s recent Agricultural Transformation Strategy known as Agenda 10/30 emphasizes the role of women in facilitating the sector’s growth to 10% by 2030[2] and thus places women in direct confrontation with the effects of climate change on agriculture and food production.

Additionally, in terms of energy; data from Gender and Energy country briefs for Tanzania indicates that by 2020 only 8.1% of households used clean energy sources and in 92% of households it is merely women who are vested with the responsibility to cook and collect firewood for use and thus affecting their health and time productivity (Energia, 2020). There are wider gender disparities when it comes to the impact of climate change and energy-related disasters in terms of vulnerability, resilience, and adaptation spread across a short and longer term.

Women often face disproportionate health impacts from climate change due to their roles as caregivers and their biological vulnerability. For example, during natural disasters or heatwaves, pregnant women and those with reproductive health issues may face increased risks.

Both rural and urban women face systemic gender inequalities that limit their access to resources, education, and decision-making processes, exacerbating their vulnerability to climate change impacts. However, it is undeniably also true that poor rural women are more disproportionately affected due to their higher dependency on natural resources, their heavier involvement in agriculture, lower access to clean energy and more limited access to technology and information.

On the other hand, urban women face more exposure to heat waves and poor air quality; they are more exposed to energy poverty particularly in low-income households; urban women are also more prone to working in sectors that are particularly affected by climate change or the energy transition, such as retail, hospitality, or informal sectors; urban women are also more likely to face affordability reliability and quality issues related to energy services.

Climate change-induced changes such as droughts or floods can impact agricultural productivity, potentially leading to food shortages and malnutrition, which disproportionately affect women and children. Climate-Induced changes can lead to increased burden for women such as traveling longer distances to obtain water for household use in turn causing higher chances of GBV (National Climate Change Strategy, 2021-2026).

Additionally, poor women’s ability to adapt and mitigate climate and energy-related impacts is limited by their limited access to resources such as land (33% women vs 47% men sole land ownership and 25% women vs 30% men joint land ownership)[3]

Other crucial reasons that place women’s involvement in these discussions high on the agenda include the income disparities between women and men when it comes to dealing with the aftermath of disasters. According to UN Economic Commission for Africa, Women in Tanzania are one and a half times more likely to be unemployed at 12.3 per cent than men at 8.2 per cent with implications for household income disparities[4] (UNECA, n.d.)

Women’s disproportionate position in disastrous situations is fueled by the different gender roles played by women and men, for example in caregiving during and after disasters, collection of household water, and managing household sanitation; underrepresentation of women in decision-making processes related to climate change mitigation and adaptation. Women especially in rural areas experience lower access to information about adaptation technologies, cropping patterns, and weather events.

The net costs of climate change on women are staggeringly high yet the current climate change and energy transition debates and response measures have not adequately augmented, rallied and addressed the significant concerns facing women.

According to UN reports, particularly in developing countries, the consequences of climate change can increase the burden for rural women and girls, for example, causing them to travel further to obtain daily supplies such as firewood and biomass, leaving less time for paid work and potentially exposing them to greater risk to their personal safety^[5] Climate change has exacerbated gender violence and injustice against women and drop out of young girls from school in search for water, food water and energy.

Moreover, the constant use of biomass as source of energy for cooking increases exposure to toxic fumes leading to high respiratory, cardiovascular diseases, cancers and death. According to medical reports, Cardiovascular and respiratory diseases were the top two leading cause of women’s deaths in Tanzania with the occurrence of cancerous cardiogenic diseases being more likely in urban women and respiratory diseases being more likely in rural areas due to indoor air pollution. These two accounted for 92.84 and 82.58% of all deaths per 100,000 in 2019, overtaking Maternal and Neonatal disorders.^[6]

Pulmonary experts at Muhimbili National Hospital estimate that about 33,000 people, mostly women, die annually in Tanzania due to the use of charcoal, firewood and biomass for cooking^[7]

Clearly there is a nexus between climate change, energy and deaths amongst women and that is why it is very important to engage women and consider the gender dimensions of climate change and energy injustice on women from planning interventions to implementation such that interventions address inequalities, are efficient, effective and sustainable.

Existing frameworks or mechanisms for women in climate change and energy in Tanzania

Tanzania has developed various policies and strategies to address gender issues within climate and energy contexts. Key instruments include among others the National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) 2021-2026 and the National Strategy for Mainstreaming Gender in Climate Change (NSMGCC) 2023 with the overall objective of ensuring that gender considerations are mainstreamed into national policies, programs and strategies related to climate change. The government is a signatory to a number of Multilateral Instruments on climate change.

In 2015 the government passed the Tanzania Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) Action Agenda (2015). The goal of this agenda is to ensure access to modern energy, preferably clean energy; improvement of energy efficiency; and increase share of renewable energy in the global mix. The Government of Tanzania fully embraces the SE4ALL objectives. This includes recognising the fact that access to modern energy services is a necessary precondition for achieving development goals that extend far beyond the energy sector, such as poverty eradication, access to clean water, improved public health and education, women’s empowerment and increase food production. Further, the government passed the LPG promotion plan and the National Gas Utilisation Master Plan, aimed at increasing the use of gas as a clean fuel.

The National Guidelines for Mainstreaming Gender into Climate Change Adaptation-related Policies, Plans, Strategies, Programmes and Budgets (2014) Tanzania has mainstreamed gender into a number of national development frameworks and ratified international and regional gender instruments. Some of these frameworks include the National Development Vision 2025. Moreover, in 2022, the government convened the first national clean cooking conference and in 2024 launched The National Clean Energy Cooking Strategy 2024-2034. The strategy aims at scale up the use of clean cooking gas as a source of energy.

According to Dr Dotto Biteko, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Energy/ the Ministry of Energy, the government expects that by the year 2034, 80% of Tanzanians will be using clean energy to cook and therefore reducing on the amount of carbon emissions and exposure to toxic fumes by women[8].

Currently, the government is implementing a project funded by the Government of Sweden, to support market-based approaches for clean cooking in the United Republic of Tanzania. This intended to scale up use of clean cooking gas amongst rural households.

To back this up, during the COP28 in the UAE, President Suluhu Samia Hassan launched the Africa Women Clean Cooking Support Program (AWCCSP. This program encompasses promotion of use of gas cooking stoves and gas cylinders in Africa and Tanzania in particular by fostering energy and policies changes to cater for the earth’s prosperity, will cut carbon emission significantly. President Samia acknowledges that women and girls bear the brunt of lack of sustainable energy cooking solutions and clean cooking energy is about mitigation, women empowerment and welfare.

Despite these efforts, there are significant policy and governance gaps that exist. In our second part of this brief we will bring you the policy and governance gaps and how government can address them. Keep on the look out and visiting this site for the next part of this brief.

admin

Sep, Tue, 2024

Extractive Governance Natural Resource Policy Trade and investment

Solar and Energy Transition: Good policy intentions but less progress: Assessing Tanzania and EAC’s Utility scale solar energy potential and policy gaps to fix

Governments are struggling with little success to attract and retain utility scale solar projects and many have died in their nascent stages. Yet utility scale solar projects could be a significant contributor to resolving the regions power shortages and increased energy access by sizeable proportions. So, what is holding back utility scale solar projects and how can governments maneuver to attract and retain more investors.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

@energypolicy @cleanenergy @solarafrica @energytransition

Multiple studies have concluded that the Eastern Africa region has the highest technical potential for solar power technologies, with estimates of 175 PWh and 220 PWh annually for Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) and Photovoltaics (PV) respectively. African countries with the highest CSP and PV potentials are Algeria, Egypt, Namibia, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania. The annual technical solar power potential in Tanzania is estimated to be 31,482 TWh for CSP technology and 38,804 TWh for PV technology. Despite this potential, Tanzania and EAC lags behind its peers such as South Africa, Algeria and Egypt. Besides the technical aspects as earlier discussed, the policy terrain in East Africa has been largely zig zag and therefore not coherent enough to support investment.

In this second part of our analytical series on solar as a clean energy source, we attempt to shade some light on the policy terrain in Tanzania and East Africa generally and how this is contributing towards holding back large-scale investment and utility scale solar penetration.

Policy and investment terrain

Generally, the policy and investment landscape in East Africa has been evolving at a snail pace. Both Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda have renewable energy policies in place however these are not backed up by adequate promotion, implementation and funding. The regulatory terrain has also been discordant. For the region to benefit, the policy and investment trajectory will have to align and move faster, catching up with the global trends and the drive to clean energy.

Tanzania’s policy terrain.

The government passed a National Energy Policy (NEP) in 2015 with a commitment to increase the share of renewables in its energy mix. The NEP 2015 seeks to facilitate improvement of investment environment to promote and support private sector participation. The policy further commits to scaling up utilization of renewable energy source by among others introducing a.. feed-in-tariffs for renewable energy technologies and structure power purchase agreements for renewable energy.

It further commits to facilitate integration of renewable energy technologies in buildings and industrial designs and establish frameworks for renewable energy integration into the national and isolated grids; an Promote sustainable biofuel production and usage.

However, actualization of this has been slow. To date contribution of renewables to Tanzania’s energy mix remains low at 1.2 %. By 2021 Tanzania’s electricity generation came mostly from natural gas (48%), followed by hydro (31%), petrol (18%) with solar and biofuels contributing a mere 1% each. The National energy consumption balance is still dominated with biomas (charcoal and firewood) use at around 85%.

Tanzania government admits that that solar utilization is constrained by high initial costs, poor after sales services, insufficient awareness on its potential and economic benefits offered by solar technologies plus inappropriate credit financing mechanisms.

Previous policies, particularly the 2003 was successful in the establishment and operationalization of Energy and Water utilities regulatory authorities, the Rural Energy Agency (REA) and the Rural Energy Fund, However, it fell short of making advancements on the renewable energy, particularly by not creating a designated and operational Renewable Energy Fund. By design it is implied that funding of the renewable sector would come directly from the consolidated Energy Fund. However, with conflicting priorities and government’s focus on increasing energy access to hydro and gas fired electricity, much of the available funding was channeled towards rural electrification.

In 2012 Tanzania was one of the pilot countries selected to prepare the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP). The chief objective of this plan was to transform the energy sector of Tanzania from one that is more dependent on fossil fuels to one that is more diversified with a greater share of renewable sources contributing to the energy mix through catalyzing the large–scale development of renewable energy.

The SREP–Tanzania Investment Plan was prepared by the Government of Tanzania, through a National Task Force led by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) with support from the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). However much of this plan is yet to fully takeoff and its translation into actual deliverables yet to materialise

Cognizant of the significant gaps that exist, in 2023 the Minister of energy at time, Hon January Makamba revealed that the government was developing a new Renewable Energy Policy to further enhance investments in renewable energy. This policy would capitalize on the substantial financial resources, capital markets, and advancements in new technologies dedicated to renewable energy globally. He also announced ongoing efforts to identify areas with renewable energy resources and prioritize native investments in wind and solar projects. The government would provide support in this regard and establish guidelines for project implementation.

In 2023 Tanzania entered into an agreement to construct the Country’s first-ever solar photovoltaic power station to feed into the national electricity grid. According to the Ministry of Energy, the project is part of a larger initiative of installing 150 MW of solar energy in the Kishapu district of the Shinyanga region. The first phase of the project to be constructed by Sinohydro Corporation from China was estimated at TZS 109 billion and was scheduled for completion before end of 2024.

According to the Minister, the implementation of the solar project reflected the government’s commitment to establishing a diverse mix of electricity sources in the national grid, incorporating water, gas, wind, and solar power. This approach aims to ensure a continuous supply of electricity, even in the event of a failure in one source.

There are also several large-scale solar power projects under development, including the 30 MW Singida project and the 50 MW Nyumba ya Mungu project. In addition to government efforts, there are also private companies and organizations working to develop renewable energy projects in Tanzania.

Similarly, Zanzibar, the semi-autonomous Island of Tanzania, also signed in 2023 an agreement with a Mauritius-based Generation Capital Ltd and Tanzania’s Taifa Energy to build its first large-scale 30MW solar PV power plant, as it seeks to become energy independent. The plant will cost $140 million. The Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) between the state-owned Zanzibar Electricity Corporation (Zeco) and the two companies to develop the 180 megawatts plant will be implemented in phases, according to Zanzibar’s Ministry of Energy and Minerals.

Kenya’s solar terrain

So far, Kenya is leading in large solar projects. There are at least 10 large solar farms in Kenya. The Garisa solar farm, is the largest in East and Central Africa, with 55 MW generation capacity. The solar farm sits on85 hectares (210 acres) and consists of 206,272 265Wp solar panels and 1,172 42kW inverters owned and operated by Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Corporation. Others already operational or proposed include; Malindi Solar (52MW), Alten Kasses (52 MW), Kopere Solar Project (50MW), Eldosol Solar Project (48MW), Radiant (50MW), Rumuruti (40 MW), Nakuru Solar project (40MW), Witu (40MW) and Makindu (40MW).

Kenya has buttressed its renewable energy credentials with a new Energy Transition and Investment Plan (ETIP) launched in 2023. The ETIP spells out Kenya’s road map to delivering a 100% clean energy driven economy by 2050. The country is however yet to figure out how it will fund this ambitious plan. Over the past recent years Kenya has been facing significant budgetary constraints affecting funding of its major national development plans. Even when the government has committed to achieving 100% clean energy by 2030, it bets heavily on funding from external donors. With the recent trend in aid inflows and if they remain unchanged in the short and medium term, it will be a tall order Kenya to meet this target.

Uganda’s solar uptake

Uganda has been slowly catching up with its peers. Uganda’s policy commits to make modern renewable energy a substantial part of the national energy consumption. To increase the use of modern renewable energy, from the current 4% to 61% of the total energy consumption by the year 2017^[i].

The policy terrain has been zigzagging and investment in renewables is still low but the government has blended its focus on hydropower generation with small investments in solar projects as back up for its hydropower. There was a big growth in 2021, reaching 92 MW, followed by a significant increase of around 6.9 MW, reaching a total of 98.9 MW Uganda’s installed solar energy capacity in 2022.

Some of the projects contributing to this growth include Kabulasoke Solar PV Park is a 20MW solar PV power project, located in Central, Uganda, Bufulubi solar project in Tororo and Access solar plants in Soroti. New pipeline projects include the Amea West Nile Solar PV Park, a ground-mounted solar project, whose construction was expected to commence from 2024 and subsequently enter into commercial operation in 2025. The power generated from the project will be sold to Uganda Electricity Transmission under a power purchase agreement.

This however falls short of achieving the targets as stipulated in Uganda’s Renewable Energy policy. Uganda’s renewable energy policy commits to establish and maintain a responsive legislative, appropriate financing and fiscal policy framework for investments in renewable energy technologies. It mentions forms of financing such as strengthening the Credit Support Facility and Smart Subsidies which are intended to scale up investments in renewable energy and rural electrification.

Moreover, a special financial mechanism, a credit support facility known as the Uganda Energy Capitalisation Trust, was instituted to help realise the policy but this expired in 2012 and had never been renewed^[ii]. Uganda lags in meeting its policy targets as only 10 solar projects had been completed by 2022^[iii].

What is the current market and investment size?

According to global energy reports, there is a substantive market size of solar photovoltaic (PV) in East Africa and Africa generally. The Middle East & Africa solar photovoltaic (PV) market size was valued at USD 5.00 billion in 2022. The market was projected to grow from USD 6.93 billion in 2023 to USD 37.71 billion by 2030, exhibiting a cumulative Average growth rate (CAGR) of 27.4% during the forecast period.

Despite its immense solar power potential, East Africa and Africa generally continues to lag behind other continents when it comes to building up utility scale grid and off-grid solar capacity, in part due to a stagnant policy regime, overlapping institutional roles, limited research, technical capacity and lack of appropriate financing facilities for investment. Some proposed projects have failed to take off. As a consequence, the total investment share of utility scale projects into East Africa remains comparable low.

So, what can EAC governments do to make utility scale solar markets attractive?

Recommendations

# Governments must make policy switches from paper to aggressive attracting of investment into the solar PV East African markets. The policies may exist but the implementation gap is too big. Policy interventions and a national course-correction is urgently needed to effectively overcome structural barriers and create local value in the emerging solar market many of which is still left behind in this progress.

# Decentralization of energy generation away from vertically integrated power monopolies such as TANESCO and Kenya power could be a game changer. De regulation and introduction of net metering by independent Solar PV power producers to directly generate and sell to customers could improve profitability of solar projects and attract new investments.

# Financing institutions must scale up project financing of renewable energy projects. Solar projects are still expensive and funding is difficult to come by. Kenya’s Garisa solar project required an investment of KSh13. 7 billion ($135.7 million) and was funded by the Exim Bank of China. Other projects have required substantive investment with funds generated from private developers and energy venture capitalists. The existing financial institutions are yet to master tailing project financing to utility scale solar projects.

# Addressing land rights and underlying injustices. Large solar farms require large tracts of land and these can be a source of land grabbing, land deprivation and injustice, generating conflicts and endless litigation between potential investors and the communities. The renewable policies and investments have to sit well with land rights, guaranteeing free prior informed consent, fair compensation and equity,

# Socio-economic: Identifying and prioritizing suitable areas for building large-scale solar power plants is a complex problem. In contrast with the simplistic view, identifying appropriate geographical areas for solar power installation is not only linked with the amount of received solar radiation, but there are many other technical, economic, environmental, and social factors that should be considered like: alternative land uses, topographical characteristics of the land, conserving protected areas, potential environmental impacts, water availability, potential urban expansion, proximity to demand centers, roads proximity, and potential for grid connectivity.

# Solar technology firms must address intermittence and storage of renewable energy. Solar power is generally reliant on the availability of sunshine. Depending on the weather and hours of the day and night. Unfortunately, the technology has not advanced far enough and made cheaply available to East for storage of solar power. For solar power users the days are hot and the nights are cold.

# Government leaders must have a unified political will to support renewables as part of the master energy mix and regional energy power pool. So far there is a divided political opinion on what solar power can do in helping the governments to meet their national energy demands. While Kenya is a front runner, other countries are still focused on hydro and gas. The future of distributed solar therefore depends largely on good political will driving favorable polices and changing mindset to embrace solar power as a new source of energy. This could be reflected in new generation policy drivers such as requirement for solar considerations in building designs and integrated power systems.

[i] Renewable Policy for Uganda; https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3.sourceafrica.net/documents/118159/Uganda-Renewable-Energy-Policy.pdf

[ii]

[iii]

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May, Tue, 2024

Citizen Conflicts Diplomacy Economic Analysis Extractive Governance Governance Peace Regional Cooperation Security

The Petals of Blood: Dissecting the contagion effect of Sudan war on South Sudan and EAC with lessons on governance and state failure

The Sudan war has been raging for almost a year, with catastrophic effects now spreading beyond Sudan’s borders, affecting its neighboring South Sudan and the East Africa Community (EAC) in many ways.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre & James Boboya, Institute of Social Policy and Research (ISCPR), South Sudan

According to the United Nations, since it started, the war has now destabilized the entire region, leading to the deaths of more than 5,000 Sudanese and displacing millions both within the African nation and across seven national borders.[1] Sudan is now home to the highest number of internally displaced anywhere in the world, with at least 7.1 million uprooted.[2] More than 6 million Sudanese are suffering from famine, and these numbers are growing every day. The health system has broken down, and more than 1,200 children have died from malnutrition and lack of essential care. [3]The UN now describes the Sudan conflict as a forgotten humanitarian disaster, while the International Crisis Group has warned that Sudan’s future, and much else, is at stake.

Lest we forget, within a short period, the third largest nation in Africa, with a size of more than 1.8886 million square kilometers and at least 46 million people, has no properly functioning government, and all state institutions have collapsed with the effects of its meltdown spilling over to its neighbors, particularly South Sudan.

South Sudan is host to thousands of Sudanese refugees forced across the border into South Sudan, exerting social and economic pressure on an already fragile state that was already sinking under the burden of its own civil war and internal conflicts.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) reports that more than 500,000 people have now fled from the war in Sudan to South Sudan. [1]This means that over 30 percent of all the refugees, asylum seekers, and ethnic South Sudanese were forced to flee Sudan since the war exploded in April 2023 for protection in one of the poorest places on earth. “South Sudan, that has itself recently come out of decades of war, was facing a dire humanitarian situation before the war in Sudan erupted. It already had nine million people in need of humanitarian aid, and almost 60 per cent of the population facing high levels of food insecurity.

As of 28 January 2024, more than 528,000 ethnic South Sudanese, Sudanese refugees, and other third-country nationals had crossed at entry points along the South Sudan border into Abyei Administrative Area, Upper Nile, Unity, Northern, and Western Bahr El Ghazal. The majority, 81 percent, entered at Jodrah before making their way to the transit center in Renk. Ethnic South Sudanese who have crossed the border from Sudan are commonly referred to as “returnees.” Still, in reality, many of them were born in Sudan and have never been in South Sudan, and therefore have no kinship connection in host communities.

The conflict has spilled deeper into other East African countries, with thousands seeking refuge and safety from it. The education system collapsed, sending thousands of learners back home and hundreds who could afford to flee exile to continue their studies. Some of these were admitted to Rwandan and Tanzanian Universities.

The Sudan and South Sudan experiment was a governance disaster in the waiting and perhaps serves as a lesson of how a firm grip on power, corruption, and misgovernance can ultimately lead to catastrophic state failure and collapse.

Donald Kasongi, Executive Director of Governance Links and a former senior officer with the Accord, a regional conflict organization, describes the post-Garang South Sudan and post-Bashir Sudan as a protracted governance failure. The diverse strategic roles of Khartoum, Beijing, and Washington in the Sweet South Sudanese oil are now evident. So far, none is a victor.

The role of external interests in shaping national discourse has been at play. Sudan is caught between the interests of the West and the Middle East and China, with both interested in controlling access to Sudan’s resources, cultural wealth, and strategic positioning as a buffer between the North and South. Before the war, Sudan identified itself with the Islamic world and pronounced itself as an Islamic state. Despite this alignment, the OIC and the larger Islamic world has not come to its help. Sudan remains an isolated state left to collapse at its fate.

In South Sudan, the Garang vision of a strong independent nation was lost. After his demise most of the post Garang political elites or military war generals became pre-occupied on restoring the lost years at war by amassing wealth through corruption and sharing out of the limited resources from the oil resources. As a consequence, a strong nation is yet to be built. They had won the war but lost their country. The same mistake plays out in Sudan. Perhaps the conflict is a lesson on what it means to lose what is so dear to one- A country.

In short, the transition in both countries (Sudan and South Sudan) were not well managed and what we see are petals of blood from toxic flowers of bad governance which have flourished like a forest planted along the banks of the river Nile.

According to James Boboya, the Executive Director of the South worrisome. The raging war has made South Sudan’s oil exports via Port Sudan difficult. Oil exports have collapsed by more than half from 160,000 barrels per day in 2022 to 140,000 barrels per day in 2023. This was more than half of the previous peak of 350,000 barrels per day before civil war broke out in 2013.[2] The South Sudanese dollar collapsed in value. There is a financial crunch and the South Sudanese government has not paid its public and civil servants for months. There is a risk of insurrection and demonstrations by public servants that will be likely joined by the military. This would plunge South Sudan into chaos and total collapse just like its Northern neighbor.

Moreover, this conflict and its associated effects comes in an election year for South Sudan. The general elections are viewed as a watershed moment which may see a transition from President Salva Keir to a new cadre of leadership. With the economic crunch, South Sudan may not be able to organize and fund a credible general election. This will be not good for South Sudan’s democracy and desired future.

With the world’s media focused on the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Gaza wars, little is covered about the Sudan conflicts nor the total economic catastrophe that South Sudan faces.

If not addressed, the Sudan war will be soon inside the borders of the EAC. Can the EAC afford to stand by and watch longer as its member state, collapses. Mediation efforts led by Kenya and Djbouti were postponed last year. Direct talks between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s army chief and de facto head of state, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, head of the RSF paramilitaries remain futile. What can South Sudan and the EAC do now to avert further catastrophe?

During a joint webinar organized by the Governance and Economic Policy Center (GEPC) and the Institute of Social Policy and Research (ISCR) in South Sudan in April, a distinguished panel of experts discussed and enabled us to understand the contradictions and magnitude of this war with implications and lessons on extractive governance, and state collapse drawn for East Africa and Africa generally, can be taken to avert the situation and its contagion effect on the EAC and Africa generally. The panelists and participants highlighted some key lessons and takeaways that can be drawn from the conflict.

Key lessons and takeaways

Ethnicization of politics and governance can lead to a spiral of violence and catastrophic state collapse, especially when the strong ruling elite and regime finally lose control of power.

A previously united Sudan started getting balkanized when the ruling elites started practicing the politics of ethnicity and religion pitting the largely Muslims in the northern and western parts of the country against their Christian southerners. The Christians were portrayed as slightly inferior, denied political and economic opportunity, and subjected to forced Islamisation, and inhumane conditions such as slavery. Faced with what was considered unbecoming conditions the Southerners opted for a rebellion and demand for independence. The first and second Sudanese civil war (including the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM/A) were born and the political dynamics in Sudan changed for decades after. New factions such as the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) emerged and Sudan never remained the same. Sentiments for cessation and independence in Darfur flared and faced with an insurgency, President Omar enlisted militias including the Janjaweed to quell the rebellions. Around 10,000 were killed and over 2.5 million displaced. The balkanisation of Sudan was continuing to play out.

Militarisation of politics erodes democratic values and principles which can take decades to rebuild.

Omar Bashir came to power in 1989 when, as a brigadier general in the Sudanese Army, he led a group of officers in a military coup that ousted the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi after it began negotiations with rebels in the south. Omar Bashir subsequently replaced President Ahmed al-Mirghani as head of state and ruled with the military closely fused into the politics and governance of Sudan.

The military elites elevated to power during President Omar Bashir’s government enjoyed privileged positions. Even with his overthrow in 2019, these generals maintained a firm grip on the Transition Military Council and the Civil-Military Sovereignty Council. These are less likely to accept any position below total control of the central authority. The net effect is that the return to full civilian and democratic rule of state governance in an entrenched militarized political environment such as Sudan can or may take decades to be rebuilt.

Vulnerability to geopolitical manipulation and fiddle diddle can be a driver to political instability and eventual weak governance

Both Sudan and South Sudan have been victims of well-orchestrated geopolitical game plans from external powers interested in taking control of the rich natural resources wealth that these countries possess. Sudan and South Sudan have vast oil deposits and forestry products. With eyes focused on these resources external powers succeeded in playing one community against another and one country against the other and successfully throwing the region into an abyss of endless crisis. Religion was used as a tool to play the North against the South and continues to be used in some segments of the Sudanese and South Sudanese communities.

Key Takeaways

The East African Community (EAC) governments cannot afford to take a wait-and-see attitude. The problems facing Sudan and South Sudan are latently present in several other EAC countries. For this reason, therefore without taking lessons from Sudan and South Sudan other countries can also easily erupt in the future, bringing down the entire EAC. The EAC has therefore an obligation to ramp up support for the resumption of the peace process and finding lasting solutions for peace and tranquility in the two countries. For this to happen there has to be trust and objectivity of the actors to the crisis and the EAC mediators.

Stop ethnicization and militarization of politics and state governance: The Sudan experience demonstrates this, whereby the collapse of President Omar Bashir’s strong grip on power let loose the lid off a can of worms that had eaten the state to its collapse. Similar conditions of ethnic rivalry in state governance have created uncertainty about guaranteed stability in South Sudan. In some other EAC member states there have been attempts to elevate dominant ethnic groups to power and military influence in state politics built around one strong leader. The Sudan experience demonstrates that the absence of such a strong leader holding the center together can lead to a lacuna, leading to a trail of conflict and instability leading governance to fall apart and eventual state collapse.

The EAC countries must stop viewing at South Sudan as merely a market but as an independent viable state whose stability is good for the entire region. According to the EAC trade statistics, South Sudan was the leading market for goods from Uganda and Kenya. With a total population of 11 million and a collapsed agricultural and industrial base, South Sudan has provided a ready market for agricultural goods and manufactured goods from Uganda and Kenya. According to UN Comtrade Data Uganda exported goods worth USD483.9Mln and Kenya’s exports to South Sudan were worth USD170Mln. Uganda’s exports to Sudan also increased by 154% from around USD48Mln in 2016 to USD123Mln in 2022. With the eyes largely focused on trade opportunities, there can be a tendency to lose track of the human suffering that the people in these countries face. Also, the jostle for geopolitical control over trade deals can overwhelm the genuine solidarity intentions of good neighbors. The EAC members should focus on the stability of these countries.

The International Community Must not give up on Sudan and South Sudan. Despite the donor fatigue and reports of corruption, the international community has a moral obligation to continue engaging with the protagonists in the war, facilitating the avenues for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and providing humanitarian aid to the suffering people. The Sudan and South Sudan conflict must be treated with equal measure with the Ukraine-Russia, Israel, and Gaza conflicts. The EAC must scale up diplomatic efforts and be an Anchor in Chief in this process, coordinating and connecting Sudan, South Sudan to the world.

The EAC media and Civil society must continue highlighting the suffering in Sudan and South Sudan. With the Israel and Gaza war ongoing, the Sudan and South Sudan stories that were largely covered by the Western media have since died out. There has been little coverage given within the EAC of the recent developments in this war and how it is affecting its neighbors. Moreover, with limited internet connectivity and restrictive conditions, communication advocacy from inside Sudan and South Sudan is quite difficult. The media and civil society in the EAC therefore must speak loud on behalf of their Sudanese counterparts

[1] War in Sudan displaces over 500,000 to South Sudanhttps://www.nrc.no/news/2024/january/sudan-refugees-to-south-sudan/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CMore%20than%20500%2C000%20people%20have,the%20poorest%20places%20on%20earth.

[2] The East African Business Khartoum unable to ensure smooth export of South Sudan oil https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/khartoum-unable-to-ensure-smooth-export-of-south-sudanese-oil-4564064

[1] Sudan conflict: ‘Our lives have become a piece of hell’ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67438018

[2] War in Sudan: more than 7 million displaced – UNhttps://www.africanews.com/2023/12/22/war-in-sudan-more-than-7-million-displaced-un//

[3] More than 1,200 children have died in the past 5 months in conflict-wrecked Sudan, the UN sayshttps://apnews.com/article/sudan-conflict-military-rsf-children-measles-malnutrition-ec7bb2a1f49d74e7b5f01afa12f16d99

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Apr, Mon, 2024

Economic Analysis Extractive Governance Governance Natural Resource Regional Cooperation

Oil and Energy Transition: Why Sudan conflict provides new hope for EACOP

The Sudan conflict is a catastrophe that must be stopped but its unintended consequences provide new optimism for the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP).

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Center

With the constant fighting and insecurity along the pipeline and its pumping stations, the South Sudanese government is now open to exploring new opportunities via EACOP to guarantee its future oil exports.

On March 16^th the government of Sudan admitted that it cannot guarantee the smooth export of oil from South Sudan, as a year of war has made it difficult to maintain or even protect the pipeline to Port Sudan.

In a letter to major oil companies involved in the oil production and export, Sudan’s Minister of Energy and Petroleum Dr Mohieldin Nam Mohamed Said admitted that the war had made it difficult to provide any guarantees for safety.

He acknowledged that the conflict was hampering the flow of oil to Port Sudan, as it took time to repair pipelines ruptured during the fighting. In addition, there was a telecommunications breakdown between the pumping stations (PS4) and PS5 in Sudan, which were shut down in the midst of heavy fighting. The area was an active military zone and access for repairs was not guaranteed.

As a response the South Sudanese government had declared a force majeure, making production and export impossible and thereby revamping suggestions to explore new possible safer routes for South Sudan’s oil.

The war in Sudan added to the challenges South Sudan faces in maximizing its only major resource – oil – to fund a financially constrained government and other operations. As a consequence of the war, South Sudan’s oil production fell from 160,000 barrels per day in 2022 to 140,000 barrels per day in 2023. This is was more than half of the previous peak of 350,000 barrels per day before civil war broke out in 2013.

Talks to have South Sudan pump its oil south wards had all along been explored and presented as part of Uganda’s grand plan to make the EACOP an East African project by connecting and supplying all the EAC member states with oil and gas.

Under this grand plan and initial drawings, the Oil pipeline would radiate from its nerve center in Hoima with an artery of pipelines running northwards to South Sudan, westwards to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), eastwards to connect Kenya’s oil from Turkana and southwards with an arm extended to Rwanda and long route via Tanzania to Tanga port.

***Map showing initially considered alternative EACOP routes***

But the progress of this was partly hampered by Uganda’s fall out with the Kenyan route and the existing agreements signed between Khartoum and Juba during the independence talks. Provisions in these required among others a concession that Sudan will retain territorial control of some oil rich territories and that South Sudan would continue exporting its oil via Port Sudan. By doing this, the government in Khartoum would maintain some revenues from the oil sector that had been largely lost with South Sudan’s cessation and independence.

I remember in a private conversation with a friend from Sudan some years ago he confided that during one meeting with Sudanese youth and young professionals, President Omar Bashir, before his overthrow, had admitted that he was not sure about the economic future of Sudan without South Sudan. He clearly predicted a catastrophic economic meltdown leading to chaos and that was why Sudan had to maintain a grip on South Sudan. The oil pipeline was a win-win infrastructure politically and economically anchoring the two countries as good neighbors.

By Sudan admitting that the safety cannot be guaranteed and reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure will take longer than usual provides South Sudan with a legitimate cause to start exploring new safe routes for its oil.

An oil route from Juba southward would be beneficial to South Sudan, the EACOP but also good for the East African Community as a region. South Sudan derives 90% of its revenues from oil exports and would like to have a constant flow of this oil to sustain its economy. EACOP would guarantee that flow. South Sudan would also have access to other EACOP related infrastructure such as the refinery and international airport for other logistical needs.

An extended pipeline from Hoima northwards to connect with the oil from South Sudan would increase volumes of oil pumped out of EACOP by at least 150,000 to 200,000 barrels per day, increasing EACOP’s profitability and attractiveness to investors.

Moreover, with its oil, South Sudan would become a major regional player with a stronger voice in EAC matters perhaps more than it is today. The pipeline would bring Sudan in the north closer to the EAC, increasing its prospects for joining the EAC and thus facilitating the region’s expansion ambitions.

There could be some differences in the chemical composition and technical aspects of the two oils (Uganda and South Sudan) with perhaps one being waxier than the other but these complexities can be handled through technical re-engineering and design of the oil pipeline.

The EACOP has always been a controversial project with environmental activists and anti-oil crusaders campaigning against its construction. Environmentalists argued that the world’s longest heated pipeline will have serious environmental impacts and contribute to global warming. The future profitability of the pipeline was also questioned given the global push towards a transition away from fossil-based system and uncertainty about the future of oil as an energy source.

None the less, plans for construction of the pipeline are ongoing. Land compensations in Uganda and Tanzania was completed. An advance consignment of pipes was delivered and a coating and insulating plant for the pipelines was commissioned and already operational in Tanzania, paving way for the pipeline construction and ground laying to commence before end of 2024.

The conflict in Sudan therefore provides more impetus to the project as it opens a new door for possible access and increased volumes from South Sudan’s oil and taping into already existing markets can be guaranteed.

The future of oil as a dominant fuel in the global energy system is a controversial subject and a debate exists whether it makes sense to construct new oil pipelines and infrastructure.

However, the crisis and the significance of oil in driving South Sudan’s economy comes at a time when there are all indications that major global super powers such as the United States and United Kingdom are backtracking on their commitments to end and move away from fossil or oil as source of energy.

Despite the announcements made at the COP27 and 28, in his maiden speech to Parliament, King Charles in November 2023 announced that the UK government will issue new licensing rounds for exploration and drilling of oil and gas in the North Sea. The rounds will go ahead each year so long as the UK remains a net importer of oil and gas and if emissions from UK-based production remain lower than those associated with imports.

In the US, Republicans have maintained a firm support for oil and Donald Trump, the most preferred Republican nominee for President has vowed to overturn any existing legislation and commitments made by the Democrats against the fossil energy sector, by signing an executive order to issue new rounds oil and gas drilling. According to Trump this would be his first executive order immediately signed, if he was elected to power in November of 2024. Clearly, the US political will is divided and the future US policy terrain on oil and gas cannot be guaranteed.

Quietly, the leading oil producers are strongly supporting continued pumping of oil. Despite global campaigns, large oil producers are still skeptical that renewables can replace oil in the medium term and by 2050. They believe that the focus should be on decarbonizing oil and not ending its supply and use all together. Ending use of oil would be returning the world to stone age error, one Middle East leader remarked at COP28 before backtracking after coming under intense criticism. The approved language at COP28 was phase down and not phaseout. Oil therefore may have a longer lifetime than earlier anticipated.

Despite the catastrophe that the war has caused, that we all condemn, Uganda and Tanzania should exploit the opportunity it provides to ramp up and conclude talks with South Sudan on the viability of exporting its oil via EACOP.

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Mar, Sun, 2024

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How EAC can benefit from its Critical or Transitional Minerals

The EAC has vast deposits of minerals critical to driving technology to support the green industrial revolution and yet the region lacks a proper framework to govern and maximize benefit from this mineral potential. Our analysis shows that all is not lost. There is still an opportunity for the EAC to reorganize and take a share from the increasing critical or transitional minerals demand.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Center

@critical minerals @mineralsgovernance @eac

What is the EAC’s regional problem?

Critical or transitional minerals are loosely defined as mineral commodities that have important uses to industrial technology to support the transition to a clean energy future, have no viable substitutes, yet face potential disruption in supply. These minerals include (but limited to); Graphite, Coltan, Nickel, Tungsten, Tantalum, Tin, Lithium, Manganese, Magnesium, palladium, Platinum, Beryllium, copper, fluorspar, Holmium Niobium, Rhodium, Titanium, Zinc etc. The EAC has vast deposits of some these and yet the region lacks a proper framework to govern and maximize benefit from this mineral potential.

Minerals as a national resource vs regional resource

The issue of mineral is politically sensitive. It lies at the intersection of national pride and sovereignty. Minerals are considered as a national resource whose value cannot be discussed or shared at regional level. Most countries have chosen to address mineral issues at a national level, carefully safeguarding what they consider their national interests.

Unfortunately, by taking this route, EAC mineral rich countries have exposed themselves to weaker negotiation power, and fallen easy prey to the divide and rule game played by some quick profit accumulation seeking multinational mining companies. These mining companies take on each country as an independent jurisdiction, setting each up for competition against the other and demanding exorbitant favorable terms to invest. The net effect is that EAC mineral rich countries have weaker negotiating powers and signed off bad deals. It is perhaps for this reasons that the EAC has selected to focus on protecting aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems such as forests and mountains in shared areas.

Raging political instability and counter accusations for harboring insurgents. East Africa’s mineral rich regions face raging political instability, with each member states accusing the other of supporting and harboring hostile insurgent’s, violation territorial sovereignty and plundering of the abundant mineral resources. For example, the DRC accuses Rwanda of supporting the M23 in Eastern Congo while Rwanda has constantly accused the DRC of harboring the FDRL. Similarly, Uganda’s Ailed Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels have found refuge in the DRC. Burundi accuses Rwanda of supporting hostile rebel groups against the Burundi government. As a consequence, EAC’s mineral rich regions have failed to secure maximum economic benefits from its mineral wealth. Efforts to jointly pacify the region through a military intervention by the East Africa Regional Standby Force failed miserably with the force withdrawn at the end of 2023.

Failure to curb cross border smuggling and illicit minerals trade. The UNCTAD data from COMTRADE and other online sources show a big difference between reported mineral exports and imports data from receiving countries. For example, in 2021 the DRC reported exporting a net weight of cobalt of 898,869 kg valued at USD 3,277,615 while China reported importing a net weight of 190032 kg valued at valued at USD92,065, 332 in the same period. The difference between the reported export value by the DRC and the reported import value by China was a whooping USD 88,784,717. There are large disparities between the DRC’s minerals trade data with Dubai and similarly Kenya’s mineral trade data with Dubai.

Yet, the vice has continued unabated. The recent arrests of fake gold traders in Nairobi’s upscale Kileleshwa suburb confirms that illicit mineral business is rife in the region. Illicit minerals are crossing borders undocumented, with cartels exploiting the weaknesses in the border control mechanisms to make shoddy deals worth millions of dollars. The arrested illegal mineral traders had fake Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) documents and stamps showing that Uganda was the source country. There are reports that DRC’s gold and coltan is smuggled through Rwanda and Uganda. Rwanda , a fairly none rich mineral country is a large mineral exporter. According to government reports, Rwanda’s annual mineral export earnings in 2023 was USD1.1billion reflecting a 43% increase from USD772bln in 2022. Clearly illegal trade is denying the EAC millions of dollars in economic benefits.

Lack of regional harmonization of the extractive sector regulatory framework. There were attempts to develop a model minerals legislation but all these efforts suffered a silent death. As expressed by one of the EAC members of parliament, Arusha has become a cemetery of good policy intentions. Good at expressing desire and slow at action and implementation.

Poor geological survey data, compared to superior data sets in possession of mineral companies. This has often tilted the negotiation power balance in favor of the companies, leading to signing off poor deals by mineral rich host countries.

What opportunities exist?

Maximizing on current EAC partners trade in minerals and mineral based products.

According to EAC regional statistics, the trade by EAC partner states in minerals fuels, mineral oils, products of their distillation, bituminous substances and mineral waxes were the most traded with a value of USD810.7million dollars in 2022. This was followed by trade in natural or cultural pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals valued at USD588.3million. Trade in nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances thereof ranked third with a value of USD238million[1]

This therefore shows there are a raw material and there is a market for mineral based products even within the EAC. Scaled value addition and intra trade in minerals and mineral based products to serve the existing demand can significantly boost internal regional industrialization, create jobs and economic growth

Leveraging on current and future global critical/transitional minerals demand

With a regional approach, the EAC could benefit from the rapidly expanding demand and prices for green transitional minerals. Since 2020 the global commodity prices for Nickel, Cobalt, Coltan, Lithium and Copper has been on the rise. According industry experts, such as Equity Group’s CEO, Dr James Mwangi, the demand for these minerals can only go up, and prices can only go up because of their limited supply versus the global targets to reduce emissions by 2030. It is for this reason that global consumers such as China, Australia are in the rush to secure supply chains all over the World. Tech players such as Tesla’s Boss, Elon Musk have equally explored possibilities to establish plants in the DRC and Tanzania so as to secure the raw materials and add value at source. So far, neither the EAC nor its member states have capitalized on these interests to develop a regional road map for investments into the green or transitional minerals subsector. Elon Musk’s investment plans have not materialized.

Use critical/transitional minerals demand to forge new strategic economic relationship

According to the Carnegie foundation, the combination of key mineral endowments in African countries and U.S. objectives to reorient clean energy supply chains away from competitors like China can serve as the foundation for a new economic and strategic relationship. In 2022 the US announced its desire to re-establish a new relationship with Africa driven by trade and investment. The EAC can use its abundant critical or transitional minerals potential to negotiate new long-term relationships based on mutual economic benefits away from the traditional donor recipient approach.

Attracting investments in Energy Sector

The EAC has large opportunity for investment into its renewable energy sector. Uranium, a key fuel in nuclear plants and nuclear fission, is found in eight locations in the South Kivu and Katanga provinces in the south of DRC. Tanzania and Uganda have large deposits of Uranium. These clean energy minerals are also backed with hydropower potential of the giant inga dam and Kenya’s geothermal potential.

The EAC commits to development of the energy sector covering both renewable and non-renewable energy sources. This is aimed at facilitating the broader EAC objectives of attracting investments, competitiveness and trade for mutual benefit. Despite this, there has not been joint EAC investment attraction drive purposed towards its regional power potential. The regional plans to develop the giant inga dam as a flagship Agenda 2023 project contributing to the towards East Africa’s power pool have remained stagnant.

What EAC member states can do

Abandon limited nationalistic views and pursue large economic interests, from a regional lens
Conduct regional mapping and improve mineral geodata sets
Rekindle and accomplish plans to develop regional frameworks for mineral governance
Facilitate regional investment campaigns profiling critical minerals and clean energy sources as tier one commodities available for investment for the EAC
Stop the guns and think development

What would be the benefits of acting as an EAC region

Joint investment promotions and attraction of the best investors
Increased negotiation power and leverage for better deals
Expanded regional value additional chains and industrial projects driven by large economies of scale. According to global statistics the DRC was the largest cobalt reserve (about 3.6million metric tons yet China was the largest processor(85Mt)
Increased cooperation and opportunities for lasting peace
Expanded economic opportunity and benefit for citizens.

[1] https://eac.opendataforafrica.org/

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Mar, Mon, 2024

Category Extractive Governance