How to manage transboundary petroleum resources as Somalia and Kenya talk conflict off East African Coastline

 

The war of words and negative diplomacy between Kenya and Somalia over the disputed potentially oil and gas rich territory in the Indian Ocean has rekindled the importance of understanding how to manage transboundary petroleum resources. Petroleum does not know political borders. The vagaries of geology have dictated that sometime petroleum resources occur in trans boundary areas. How nation states collectively manage these resources can determine whether they effectively harness the benefits from these resources without going to conflict.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre

Management of petroleum resources or revenues from ‘trans boundary or ‘disputed’ areas has always been an issue of controversy in most petroleum resource rich countries.  It is a source of disputes and a challenge to investors, planners and policy makers when parties or Countries fail to agree amicably on the ownership of these resources and revenue sharing mechanisms for resources from these areas.  Trans-boundary resources are also called ‘common’ or shared resources.

In Tanzania and the wider East Africa region management of resources in ‘potentially contestable areas’ and ‘trans boundary’ areas are becoming a major challenge as some of the petroleum resources are found closer or along the boundary areas. It will be even more challenging in the nearby future as the gas and oil starts flowing.  If not addressed it will be a big hindrance to investment and development of the petroleum sector. In East Africa, currently there is no concrete and pragmatic approach to addressing this challenge.

The East African dimension

In a broader East African context, seismic studies have indicated that petroleum resources may be largely found along Trans international boundary areas. This has created disputes and raised challenges for proper resource management and revenue sharing arrangements. For example the discovery of petroleum deposits in the Albertine basin generated trans boundary tensions between Uganda and the DRC along the Lake Albert. There are disputes over petroleum in Unity state along the South Sudan and Sudan border. There are disputes between Kenya and South Sudan along the Nadapal area (Block 11 A & B) and Kenya and Somalia along the Wajir border area (block 1, 2 &3) and Indian Ocean Coastline continental shelf.

In 2014, Somalia filed a before the International Court of Justice, accusing Kenya of encroaching on its potentially rich petroleum rich maritime territory off its continental shelf. Both countries have claimed ownership of an approximately 100,000 square miles in the Indian ocean waters suspected of having vast oil and gas deposits.

The conflict largely arises from a dispute in regards to how the international border between Somalia and Kenya should drawn and internationally recognized. In the case before the ICJ, Somalia wants the maritime boundary to run diagonal, as an extension of the land boundary, while Kenya wants it to run parallel to the latitude, east wards, south of Kyunga. Both countries have relied on the straight-line principle in the International Law of the sea. Somalia wants the boundary to run south east wards and has vowed not surrender what it considers, its territorial integrity.

Figure 3: East African Exploration Map 2010-Source: Vanoil Ltd Energy-Kenya

In recent months there has been an escalation the war of words and negative diplomatic relations. Kenya in April barred Somali Officials from entering into Kenya and further banned unaccompanied luggage from Somalia and required that all aircrafts flying into Kenya from Somalia should temporary land in the Northern town of Wajir for a mandatory security check before flying into Nairobi.

The recent diplomatic row represents a significant development between the two neighbors which could escalate into a full-blown out conflict. It further reflects the common resource quagmire that neighboring petroleum rich nation states often find themselves and further shows that latent conflicts emanating from transboundary petroleum resources exist in East Africa.

It is therefore important that viable solutions are reached even without addressing the international law (Law of the sea) challenges facing Kenya and Somalia and the international political concerns or interests in East Africa yet significant challenges and ways of resolving this problem do exist.

Specific problem

  • There is lack of clarity for policy makers, planners and tax administrators on how to share the revenues from these areas
  • Uncertainty and wavering Investor confidence to fully commit their investment and as a consequence petroleum resources in potentially disputed or Trans boundary areas have remained unexplored. For example, licensed blocks operated by Shell in Tanzania’s waters closer to Zanzibar have remained   unexplored for a long time
  • On a wider East African level there are missed opportunities for joint investment promotion.
  • There is a ‘Race to the bottom’ as East African Countries under cut each other with lucrative fiscal terms in competition to attract petroleum investors into their own territories, without looking at East Africa as a whole
  • There are ongoing and underlying territorial disputes which could erupt into full blown out conflicts, risking the current and future investments into the petroleum sector

Currently, a lot has been written about these possible challenges but very limited pragmatic steps have been taken to address these challenges. There has been some significant discussion about the issue but there have been no pragmatic viable options provided which can be acceptable to the protagonists in the conflict.

If some pragmatic solutions are found for Kenya and Somalia, similar suggestions could also be used to inform approaches taken by other East African governments within the wider East African framework to address similar other potential disputes along their border frontiers.

Some international approach to similar challenges

The answer to nature’s conundrum where petroleum resources migrates within or across a country’s border has always been unitization.  Unitisation is one of the legal devices which seek to remove the destructive competitive elements stimulated by the rule of capture (as advanced in the United States legal tradition under which the title to petroleum belongs to the owner who physically extracts it from a well on his land, even if petroleum has migrated underground from neighboring lands). With unitisation petroleum deposits are exploited as a whole, expenditure is reduced and recovery is maximized.  Unitisation is accomplished through a unitization agreement. A unitization agreement is an amicable solution between parties as individuals, group of individuals or states holding exploitation rights in common petroleum reservoirs by which the reservoirs will be exploited in an integrated manner.  The reservoir is treated as one whole and the costs and revenues shared between the parties according to an agreed formula defined by parameters such as geological technical factors, investment or operational costs and volumes of the reservoir. An international unitization agreement (Unit operating Agreement) can be signed between relevant international companies from both states subject to the bilateral treaty outlining the rights and obligations of each company and issues like selection of operator or determination of tract of participants.

International law remedy and Joint Development Areas

The International law remedy to offshore ‘trans international boundary’ petroleum resources is provided within the ambits of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 (UNCLOS) which obliges states which have not been able to agree on boundaries of their continental shelves and exclusive zones to make efforts to enter into provisional arrangements  of a practical nature to develop the petroleum deposit  located in the overlapping geographical area under dispute whilst not foregoing their sovereignty rights to the deposits  in place  in its territory or continental shelf.

This international law remedy is the backbone on which the idea of Joint Development Areas or Zones is built. Joint development is an arrangement between two states to develop and share in agreed proportions the petroleum found within a geographical area whose proportions the petroleum found in a geographical area whose sovereignty is disputed; and the geographical area is an overlapping area under dispute with undefined boundaries to which the two states are entitled under International law. The JDA is established by a treaty, agreement or any recognisable legal document stating the rights and obligations of each party. The JDA’s can be divided into separate contract areas where deposits can cross the internal boundaries of those contracts and those that cross the JDA’s into third party states.  Both approaches are geared towards securing mutual cooperation and maximizing benefits from the petroleum resources. The treaties or agreements incorporate procedures to minimize disputes and resolve disputes. The following country experiences can be benchmarked:

Possible country experiences for benchmarking

Norway’s experience with United Kingdom

Norway is a good example of the significant economic benefits that can be achieved through strong cooperation and bilateral relationship. Norway has entered various treaties as examples of successful border unitization and management of resources straddling across a vast maritime area between Norway and United Kingdom. On March 10, 1965 Norway and the United Kingdom signed a bilateral delimitation treaty and this agreement constituted the first detailed provisions for action to be taken in the case of a petroleum deposit straddling cross border. This treaty was a voluntary agreement of a maritime border and acceptable cost and revenue sharing formula based on the volume of resources. This treaty provided a basis for three more cross border unitization agreements covering the Frigg, Stratfjord and Murchison Field signed in 1976, 1979 and 1979 respectively.

Norway is also a unique good example of managing Trans boundary petroleum resources by three neighboring states. This experience was demonstrated in the joint management of the Markham Field reserves. In 1965 the United Kingdom and the Netherlands signed a bilateral agreement to establish the boundaries of the Dutch continental shelf, when a petroleum reserve of approximately 700 cubic feet was discovered the licence was awarded to a Dutch company-Ultramar Exploration (Netherlands BV). The discovery was named Markham Field and jointly managed under the Markham agreement signed between the United Kingdom and Norway for unitization of petroleum resources straddling across the maritime borders. The United Kingdom’s health and safety authorities and their Dutch counterparts, the Straatstoezicht op de mijen, had unlimited access to all facilities and information related to the management of the resources. The UK and the Netherlands governments imposed taxes and shared profits as per their fiscal regimes and applicable double taxation conventions The Markham agreement provided a framework for successful development of the field and a possible template for any future unitization between three states

Norway has also taken a pragmatic framework agreement approach in resolving managing Trans boundary petroleum fields without involving distinct intergovernmental treaties. This approach was taken in 2005 by Norway and the United Kingdom in managing the Enoch & Balne Oil fields Norway’s focus has been on securing economic benefits for both states, with provisions made for possible development of resources with infrastructure located on the one side of the boundary. More examples of such approaches include the development of the Boa field which is mostly in Norway and the Playfair fields which are almost entirely in the United Kingdom. Since 2005 Norway has signed more treaties with Russia in the Barents Sea and thus excelled as a champion in managing off shore Trans boundary resources in contentious territories.

East Timor (Timor Leste) and Australia’s experience

In Asia-Timor Leste and Australia are good examples of joint management of Trans boundary petroleum resources. In 2002 East Timor and Australia signed the Timor Sea treaty between the two governments. This treaty enabled the joint development of petroleum resources in the maritime area located between East Timor and Australia. This area also known as the ‘Timor Gap’ had been controversially disputed and subjected to an earlier Timor Gap Treaty in 1989 between East Timor, Australia and Indonesia.

The Timor Sea treaty established a Joint Development Administration (JDA) and provides that Australia and East Timor shall jointly manage, facilitate, exploration, development and exploitation of the resources within the JDA for the benefit of the people of the two countries. The treaty has also provided an acceptable revenue formula whereby 90% of the revenues from the JDA would go to East Timor and 10% would belong to Australia.

The treaty resolved the long political impasse related to the management of the Sunrise and Troubadour petroleum reserves, also collectively referred to as the ‘Greater Sunrise’ which spanned across the Eastern boundaries of the new Joint Petroleum Development Authority (JPDA). The Sunrise and Troubadour deposits were unitized and an acceptable revenue sharing formula agreed. A joint management committee was established to oversee its implementation. To date the approach is a successful model of joint petroleum resource administration in Asia. Similar approaches have been taken by Qatar and United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabi and Bahrain.

Nigeria and Sao Tome et Principe’s Experience

In cases where countries have longstanding territorial disputes, they can reach out for third parties or independent arbitration panels or international courts of justice to resolve or advice on the best alternative to manage the petroleum resources located in these areas. This approach is referred to as the third-party approach.

This was the approach taken by Nigeria and Sao Tome et Principe in Africa, to create a border upstream cooperation and Joint Development Zones (JDZ) through Unitisation of two major fields (Ikanga and Zafiro) between Nigeria and Equatoria Guinea. On this backdrop, the government of Sao Tome et Principe claimed an archipelago status under Article 46 of the United Nations Conventions of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as based on the 200 miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) determined by a median line in the North East and the North West as the median line between Sao Tome and Nigeria. The Nigerian government based its claim on the Exclusive Economic Zones Act (CAP 116) and claimed an EZZ which overlapped with Sao Tome et Principe’s zone. The two countries agreed to resolve their differences by creating a Joint Development Zone in the area of overlap to enable exploitation and licensing to proceed. Both countries have since mutual benefited economically.

Relevancy of these Countries’ experience to Tanzania and East Africa’s trans boundary petroleum resources management

As a result of these experiences, unitisation is now a major compulsory feature in petroleum legislations of these countries. The United Kingdom Petroleum Act 1998 and the 1988 Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations, the Nigerian Petroleum Act of 1969 and the 1969 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) laws impose a compulsory unitization. All licence holders or contractors have an obligatory requirement to agree on a unitization. They are obliged to cooperate if and when reservoirs straddling within or beyond national borders must be developed and it is within the national interests to secure efficient maximum recovery of petroleum. Resources and revenues are managed in agreed manner without losing national or international ownership and sovereignty.

Although the Nigeria and Sao Tome’s case was an arrangement between sovereign states, this approach is relevant to Tanzania, given the similarities of the issues involved. Zanzibar is an archipelago with a specific claim to territorial waters along its coastline. Mainland Tanzania’s 200 miles EEZ overlaps Zanzibar’s territory. Nigeria and Sao Tome’s approach could towards resolving Tanzania’s petroleum resources management challenge with Zanzibar.

These benchmarked examples indicate that geological constrains, territorial disputes, political and economic differences, constitutional limitations and international boundaries should never be a limiting factor to development of petroleum resources located or straddling from one territory to another. Tanzania and the wider East African region can draw alternative solutions to the current challenges facing management of trans boundary petroleum resources:

Possible alternative or supplementing solutions

  1. In Tanzania, within the current constitutional framework there could be a ‘Partial delegation’ of legal powers to Zanzibar to enter into agreements with oil companies (state and non-state actors) subject to the Union Constitution and the Union government’s Petroleum and fiscal management legislations
  2. Delimitation of temporary boundaries for oil and gas management purposes and earmarking specific petroleum blocks which could be legally assigned to Zanzibar’s control for revenue purposes
  1. Establish Joint Development Area (JDA) or Joint Development Zone (JDZ) arrangements modeled successful arrangements like Norway and United Kingdom, Timor Leste and Australia. Agree on unitization arrangements for licensed blocks straddling outside the JDA and develop a revenue sharing formula for managing resources from JDA and Trans boundary areas. Establish a joint petroleum revenue management committee for trans international boundary areas
  1. Develop East African guidelines for unitization and Joint Development Area Management and revenue sharing for Trans boundary petroleum resources.
  1. Either off the above approaches could be adapted in resolving the dispute between Kenya and Somalia

Benefits from these options

If resolved this could lead to peaceful co-existence and increased joint attraction of foreign investment into the areas

Increase investor confidence in East Africa and open up new avenues for investment and value creation in its Petroleum sector.

Unfreeze the current blocks which are closer to Zanzibar for licensing, exploration and development. These blocks have remained unlicensed for many years, despite expression of interests from petroleum companies to develop them

Provide avenues for possible cross border petroleum resources development and sharing of petroleum energy resources at low costs and thus reduce the acute shortages of electricity and over reliance on hydroelectricity for power generation in the region.

References

  • Beyene, Zewdineh and Wadley, Ian L.G. Common goods and the common good: Transboundary natural resources, principled cooperation, and the Nile Basin Initiative. Berkerley, UC Berkeley: Center for African studies 2004.(Breslauer Symposium on Natural Resources Issues in Africa😉 at pg4
  • Cameron P.D: Cross Border Unitisation in the North Sea (Vol. 5 OGEL 2007)
  • Denis V.Rodin: Offshore transboundary petroleum deposits: Cooperation as a customary obligation; Small Masters of Laws thesis in the Laws of the Sea; University of Tromso, Faculty of Law, Fall 2011
  • Perry A: Oil and Gas deposits at international boundaries-New ways for governments and oil and gas companies to handle an increasingly urgent problem (Vol. 5 OGEL 2007);  M.O Igiehon, Present International law on delimitation of the Continental shelf (Sweet & Maxwell 2006
  • Rod Chooramum; Notes to the Field: An English law perspective on the oil and Gas Market, August , 2014
  • Sustainable Development or Resource Cursed: Managing Timor Leste’s Petroleum Revenue, Chapter 4
  • URT: The National Natural Gas Policy, 2013
  • Zanzibar Oil, Gas win cools political heat; The East African Newspaper; http://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/australian-law/joint-petroleum-developmet-area.php
  • http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Zanzibar-oil-gas-win-cools-political-heat/-/2558/2877248/-/view/printversion/-/1485oatz/-/index.html. Also read: Oil and gas: How EA Can become a key global player; http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/oil-and-gas
  • http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2014/01/08/the-10-biggest-oil-and-gas-discoveries-of-2013/ accessed on 19th May 2015 at 7:45 pm
Tanzania Gold Exports increasing, amidst standoff with mining companies

 

Pundits suggested that the faceoff with mining companies over tax payments and drastic changes in the mining legislations and practices indicated that Tanzania’s mining sector was on a cliff edge with some analysists suggesting that perhaps it was headed for the unknown. With the latest reports, it is evident that the government is wining some dividends.

Figure 1: The Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Minerals Prof. Msanjila opens a Mineral trading Centre in Chunya, Southern Tanzania

According to the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) monthly economic review report indicates that value of Gold exports which accounted for more than half of nontraditional exports in March of 2019 grew by 9.8% to USD 1,684.6million.

The report adds that the value of Gold and diamond produced by large scale miners was USD325.9Mln in quarter ending March 2019, compared to USD324 mln recorded in the corresponding quarter in 2018. Production of gold increased by 7.8% to 10,063.4 kilograms quarter -on-quarter, while that of diamond rose by 18.2%

Foreign receipts from services which accounts for 47.8% of exports of goods and services increased to USD4,085.3million in the year ending march 2019 from USD 3,823.6Mln in the corresponding period in 2018. This was largely driven by travel and transport receipts.

The value of goods and services exported in the year ending March, 2019 increased to USD 8,544.5 Mln from USD 8,488.2Mln in the corresponding year period of 2018 owing to an increase in nontraditional goods, exports which accounts for 78.0% of goods exports and 40.7% of total exports.

The central bank reported that gold exports in 2018 was worth USD 1,549 bln compared to USD1,541 bln recorded in 2017.

These central bank reports show an increase despite the standoff between the government of Tanzania and mining companies such as Accacia-Barrick Gold Company for non-tax payment. This led to a government seizure and ban on export of Acacia’s gold concentrates forcing the company into financial and operational turbulence. Accacia has since scaled back and closed some of its mining operations in Tanzania.

The government move left mining companies and stakeholders guessing what would befall the sector. Since the standoff, many major mining investment decisions in the country’s lucrative mining, oil and gas sectors have stagnated.

Companies complained that the new laws passed in 2017 were onerous, costly and bad business which included hiking of taxes on Mineral exports and mandatory requirement for a higher government stake in all mineral operations.

Recently, the government established mining trading centers where gold miners can sell their gold to the government. In early 2019, the Prime Minister gave the Ministry of Minerals six months to establish government controlled mineral trading centres in all major mineral producing areas of Tanzania.

The first mineral trading center was inaugurated by the Prime Minister in the North Western town of Geita in March, 2019, close to the biggest Gold mine owned by South Africa’s Anglo Gold Ashanti. Since then similar mineral trading centers have been opened in Chunya, Tabora and Kyerwa.

The government said these efforts were aimed at accelerating efforts to curb illegal exports of gold and other processing minerals. The trading centers will give small scale miners direct access to a formal regulated market where by they can go directly and trade their gold. They currently struggle to access formal gold dealers who mostly based in the capital, Dar es Salaam and major towns, the government affirmed.

According to Reuters, Tanzania is Africa’s 4th biggest gold producer after South Africa, Ghana and Mali and gold exports are key sources of foreign exchange.

Small scale mines produce around 20 tons of gold per year in Tanzania but an estimated 90% of the output is illegally exported according to a parliamentary committee report.

These reports suggest that perhaps the recent government moves have reduced on smuggling gold to the neighboring Countries and this perhaps explains the increased sale.

Basic understanding of Tax justice and illicit financial flows in extractive sector

Basic understanding of Tax justice and illicit financial flows in extractive sector

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre, Dar es Salaam-Tanzania

The call for tax justice has in recent years gained credence as alarming evidence now shows that while ordinary tax payers are sinking under the burden of taxation on the other hand,  multibillion profiteering corporate and well connected individuals use both illegal (illicit) and deemed appropriate means to dodge taxes and shift their profits and financial proceeds   outside the country and the African continent to other destinations and largely low tax jurisdictions. The amounts moved out of less developed countries and the African continent is estimated in billions of United States dollars. The extractive sector is evidently of one of the major conduits of this illicit game of sorts and hence the focus on illicit financial flows as a subject in the extractive sector makes sense.

This policy brief highlights the basic concepts and practice of this increasing murky subject and the relevancy of   talking about tax justice and tax dogging in the Extractive Sector with various stakeholders such as professionals and students in higher institutions of learning. Students in higher institutions are a critical nexus in defining the current and future landscape of fiscal policy, taxation, tax justice and curbing illicit capital flight from Tanzania and the African continent as a whole. They are;

  • Citizens and have a right to know the intricacies of taxation, dodging tax and development
  • Scholars and Researchers
  • Future politicians and leaders
  • Future policy and decision Makers
  • Future Government Negotiators
  • Future Corporate professional and executives
  • Future Civil Society Activists, Community and Development workers

In simple terms, the future lies in the present!

Taxation and tax justice

A tax is a compulsory imposition of the state on its citizens. The tenor of Tax Justice is that everyone should pay a fair amount of tax so that the government can be able to finance or provide social, public and development needs for its citizens.

Taxation and a strong tax system may contribute to improved governance through 3 maximum channels. Taxation establishes a fiscal social contract between citizens and the taxing state. Tax payers have a legitimate cause to expect something in return for paying taxes and are more likely to hold their governments to account. Governments have a stronger incentive to promote economic growth when they are dependent on taxes.

The major concern from a tax justice point of view is that in recent times, it is evident that those who are able and should pay more are paying less or none while poor and less privileged carry a big burden through payment of various direct and indirect taxes like VAT which are regressive and unfair in nature

In this case, the concern is that available data shows that Corporate persons in the extractive and telecommunications sector dodge paying taxes by enjoying generous tax exemptions and by engaging in tax planning , tax avoidance, outright tax evasion and moving their proceeds out of the country or African continent where its generated to low or zero tax jurisdictions through illicit or deemed legal means.

These illegal movement of tax proceed and capital from one jurisdiction to another is what has been described as Illicit Financial Flight (IFF). According to reports, IFFs typically originates from three sources: Commercial tax evasion (trade mis-invoicing and abusive transfer pricing); criminal activities (including drug trade, human trafficking, and illegal arms dealing, smuggling of contraband; bribery and theft by corrupt government officials.

According to experts (Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye 2015), Africa’s high level of poverty has been aggravated by the high level of capital flight. As a consequence of IFFs, tax revenue collection is low, social delivery has remained poor and development agenda are stagnating in most poor countries where it occurs

Tanzania’s Tax Collections and tax gap 2016/17

According to Tanzania’s Revenue Authority (TRA)

  • Tax Collection of 12.6% of GDP (Tsh15.1Trillion) was envisaged in 2016/17
  • However, proportion of GDP collected has not increased
  • Tanzania’s tax revenues are also low compared to international standards
  • Tax to GDP ratio is 11.9% below the EAC standards which is at 13.1% to 14.7%
  • The current tax to GDP ratio of 12% is far below the targeted mark of 20% by
  • PAYE  and VAT as largest contributors

Illicit capital flight or Illicit Financial Flows (IFF)

Illicit or illegal Capital flight is the transfer of assets abroad in order to reduce loss of principal, loss of return, or loss of control over one’s financial wealth due to government-sanctioned activities”

  • Also referred to as movement of resources from one jurisdiction to another through illegal means.
  • Legal means are supported by the law or through tax avoidance measures which are used to exploit the weaknesses and lacunas within the tax laws
  • Illicit flows take place through transfer mis pricing, tax scheming, illicit profit repatriation, tax dodging and money laundering.
  • In Tanzania capital flight was reported to be taking place through both legal and illegal means

Statistics of Illicit Financial Flows from Tanzania

  • According to existing studies, it is estimated that Tanzania loses USD1.83Bln (Tsh4.09Trillion) every year from tax incentives, illicit capital flight, failure to tax informal sector and other forms of evasion. This figure is an estimate and yet to be confirmed by the Tanzanian government which commissioned its own independent study.
  • If estimated loss was collected, it would triple government budget on health and nearly double spending on education.
  • Global Financial Integrity (GFI) estimates, USD7.73bln lost from Tanzania illegally in the past five years as a result of trade –mis-invoicing
  • At corporate rate of 30% Tanzania could have lost an average of USD464Mln annually

Statistics of Illicit Financial Flows in Extractive Sector

  • Export revenue from mining increased from 16% in 2013 to 26% in 2015 due to increase in taxes paid by companies. However, this is still low compared to an average 30% for other Countries such as South Africa.
  • TMAA Audit showed Mining (Including Construction) had not paid up to USD688Mln worth of taxes between 2013-2015. An average of USD229Mln annually is not paid
  • This figure has since increased as per the estimates made by the Presidential Commission reports (Dr Osoro report).

Some statistics on Gold mining and Resource leakage in Tanzania in 1998-2005

According to available study reports

  • Gold worth more than USD 2.54bln was exported between 1998-2005
  • Only USD 28mln received in Royalties and taxes
  • This was equivalent to only 10% over a 9-year period
  • The 3 % royalty charged then brought government only an average USD 17mln a year in recent years
  • Cumulatively, USD 26.5mln lost in excessive low rate, government tax concession
  • In 2005 at least 400,000 small artisan miners were unemployed since 1998 when they were evicted from the mining areas and therefore denying government billions in tax revenue.

Consequences of extractive resource leakage and development potential

  • According to the UNDP and World Bank measure of poverty and development standards, Tanzania is still among the poorest Countries in the world. At least 12mln out of 39mln live in abject poverty. Yet, Tanzania processes around 45mln ounces of Gold.  At current prices, Tanzania has a fortune of USD39bln. If well, harnessed Tanzania would be compelled to a middle-income country within less than 10 years.

Vents for extractive resource leakage

  • As per the Mining Act of 2010, mining companies offset 100% after their capital expenditure
  • 100% ownership of Gold mining Companies
  • Mining dominated by two foreign mining companies-Barrick Gold and Anglo Gold Ashanti
  • In 2005-AGA paid USD144mln in Royalties
  • It sold gold worth USD 1.55bln, paid only 9% royalty
  • Barrick Gold paid only 13% of its export. No accurate data on total exports was available
  • The Parliamentary Accounts (PAC) reported in 2007, both companies declared losses worth USD1.045bln. Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (TEITI) reconciliation reports also indicate that Barrick has persistently reported loses and never paid corporate tax
  • Yet, a leaked ASA tax audit report indicated companies overstated losses by USD502mln between 1999-2003
  • Government thus lost revenues worth USD132.3mln between that period alone.

Tanzania’s tax incentive regime as at 2017

  • Non tax incentives include
  • immigration quotas on employment of foreign staff,
  • guaranteed transfer of net profits or dividends of the investments,
  • payment in respect of foreign loans, remittance of proceeds net of all taxes and other obligations, royalties, fees and other charges on emoluments and other benefits to foreign personnel
  • Under mining Act , 2010, Royalty of 3% execpt for diamonds which is 5% & 12.5% for petroleum
  • No tax, duty, fee or other fiscal impost on dividends
  • No capital gain tax
  • No windfall tax
  • Losses carried forward for unrestricted period
  • Duty rate at 5% and VAT charged after 5 years of commercial production
  • Yearly appreciation  of unrecovered capital in investment, exploration, prospecting, mineral assaying, drilling or mining company of goods, imported are eligible from duty under customs law
  • Services  for exclusive use in exploration, prospecting, drilling or mining activities
  • Zero rating of all capital goods, spare parts, fuel, oils together with explosives
  • Corporate tax of 30% and capital allowance of 50% on  Y1 of income
  • All capital expended on  prospecting and mining is expended
  • 100% transferability of  profits  to foreign accounts

Major strategies for facilitating illicit financial flows in Extractive Sector

Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)

  • Collective tax planning strategies used by multinational companies that exploit gaps and maximizes in tax rules to artificially reduce its tax base or obligations by shifting profits to low or no tax locations where there is little or no economic activity. In 2012 the OECD Countries initiated collective efforts to tackle concerns over BEPS and perceived international tax systems facilitating tax avoidance (BEPS project and action plan).

Tax avoidance

  • Tax ‘avoidance’ constitutes an ‘arrangement of tax payer’s affairs that is intended to reduce his ability and that although the arrangement could be strictly legal it is usually in contradiction with the intent of the law it purports to follow’
  • Justice Reddy in Mc Dowell & Co. Ltd Vs CTO 154 ITR 148 (19985) India, has defined tax avoidance as ‘the art of dodging tax without breaking the law. It is the avoidance of tax payment without the avoidance of tax liability.
  • Tax avoidance simply involves structuring your affairs legally so that you are paying less tax than you might otherwise pay. It could involve exploiting lacunas with the law to ones advantage.

Tax Evasion

  • Tax evasion can be defined as a deliberate measure to escape one’s tax obligation through illegal means
  • tax evasion is also defined as the illegal non payment or under payment of taxes, usually by making a false declaration or no declaration to tax authorities; it entails criminal or civil legal penalties
  • Tax ‘evasion’ involves ‘illegal arrangements through or by means of which liability to tax is hidden or ignored’ as a consequence of which “the tax payer pays less than he is legally obliged to pay by hiding income or information from the tax authorities

Tax planning

  • Tax planning’ is defined as the arrangement of a person and or private affairs in order to minimise tax liability
  • It enables reduction in the liability through the movement or non movement of person, transaction or funds or other activities that are intended by the legislation
  • There is also something called as ‘aggressive Tax planning’ which is the severest form of tax planning -illegal

Differences and similarities of Tax Evasion and Tax planning

Tax Evasion

Tax Avoidance

A deliberate refusal to pay a tax

Exploitation of the weakness in the low to pay less or nothing at all

Clearly illegal

Appears to be legal

Similarities

Thin line exists between the two and quite often all use to achieve the same goal-minimal or none payment of the tax

Both are unethical in the face of tax Justice

Overlap between tax evasion, avoidance and tax planning

How is tax evasion

  • Failure by a taxable person to notify of a tax authority of a presence of its operations, if they are taxable operations,
  • Failure to report full amounts of taxable income, deduction claims for expenses that have not been incurred or which exceed the amounts incurred but not for the purposes stated,
  • Falsely claiming reliefs that are not due, for example VAT refund and exemptions
  • Failure to pay over to tax authorities’ due taxes,
  • Departure from a country leaving taxes unpaid without intention to pay and
  • Failure to report items or sources of taxable income for example profits or gains where there is an obligation to do so

Tax Avoidance measures include

  • Income splitting measures whereby incomes are shared amongst more than one tax payer for purposes of reducing tax rate or tax obligation.
  • where transactions between two related parties are inflated or fixed a Transfer pricing or mispricing measures above the average market price (arms-length) for purposes of avoiding taxes by minimising profits in a high tax location and maximising profits in a low profit location

Relevant readings

  • Marc Curtis, Tundu Lissu: A Golden Opportunity? How can Tanzania is failing to benefit from gold mining; A report for the Christian Council of Tanzania, Tanzania Episcopal Conference and the National Muslim Council of Tanzania, 2015
  • Marc Curtis, Dr Prosper Ngowi and Dr Attiya Waris: One Billion Dollar Question: How can Tanzania stop losing so much tax revenue; A report for the Christian Council of Tanzania, Tanzania Episcopal Conference and the National Muslim Council of Tanzania, 2012
  • CMI Chr Michelsen Institute: Lifting the veil of secrecy; Perspectives on international taxation and capital flight from Africa, Norway, 2017