How to manage transboundary petroleum resources as Somalia and Kenya talk conflict off East African Coastline

 

The war of words and negative diplomacy between Kenya and Somalia over the disputed potentially oil and gas rich territory in the Indian Ocean has rekindled the importance of understanding how to manage transboundary petroleum resources. Petroleum does not know political borders. The vagaries of geology have dictated that sometime petroleum resources occur in trans boundary areas. How nation states collectively manage these resources can determine whether they effectively harness the benefits from these resources without going to conflict.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre

Management of petroleum resources or revenues from ‘trans boundary or ‘disputed’ areas has always been an issue of controversy in most petroleum resource rich countries.  It is a source of disputes and a challenge to investors, planners and policy makers when parties or Countries fail to agree amicably on the ownership of these resources and revenue sharing mechanisms for resources from these areas.  Trans-boundary resources are also called ‘common’ or shared resources.

In Tanzania and the wider East Africa region management of resources in ‘potentially contestable areas’ and ‘trans boundary’ areas are becoming a major challenge as some of the petroleum resources are found closer or along the boundary areas. It will be even more challenging in the nearby future as the gas and oil starts flowing.  If not addressed it will be a big hindrance to investment and development of the petroleum sector. In East Africa, currently there is no concrete and pragmatic approach to addressing this challenge.

The East African dimension

In a broader East African context, seismic studies have indicated that petroleum resources may be largely found along Trans international boundary areas. This has created disputes and raised challenges for proper resource management and revenue sharing arrangements. For example the discovery of petroleum deposits in the Albertine basin generated trans boundary tensions between Uganda and the DRC along the Lake Albert. There are disputes over petroleum in Unity state along the South Sudan and Sudan border. There are disputes between Kenya and South Sudan along the Nadapal area (Block 11 A & B) and Kenya and Somalia along the Wajir border area (block 1, 2 &3) and Indian Ocean Coastline continental shelf.

In 2014, Somalia filed a before the International Court of Justice, accusing Kenya of encroaching on its potentially rich petroleum rich maritime territory off its continental shelf. Both countries have claimed ownership of an approximately 100,000 square miles in the Indian ocean waters suspected of having vast oil and gas deposits.

The conflict largely arises from a dispute in regards to how the international border between Somalia and Kenya should drawn and internationally recognized. In the case before the ICJ, Somalia wants the maritime boundary to run diagonal, as an extension of the land boundary, while Kenya wants it to run parallel to the latitude, east wards, south of Kyunga. Both countries have relied on the straight-line principle in the International Law of the sea. Somalia wants the boundary to run south east wards and has vowed not surrender what it considers, its territorial integrity.

Figure 3: East African Exploration Map 2010-Source: Vanoil Ltd Energy-Kenya

In recent months there has been an escalation the war of words and negative diplomatic relations. Kenya in April barred Somali Officials from entering into Kenya and further banned unaccompanied luggage from Somalia and required that all aircrafts flying into Kenya from Somalia should temporary land in the Northern town of Wajir for a mandatory security check before flying into Nairobi.

The recent diplomatic row represents a significant development between the two neighbors which could escalate into a full-blown out conflict. It further reflects the common resource quagmire that neighboring petroleum rich nation states often find themselves and further shows that latent conflicts emanating from transboundary petroleum resources exist in East Africa.

It is therefore important that viable solutions are reached even without addressing the international law (Law of the sea) challenges facing Kenya and Somalia and the international political concerns or interests in East Africa yet significant challenges and ways of resolving this problem do exist.

Specific problem

  • There is lack of clarity for policy makers, planners and tax administrators on how to share the revenues from these areas
  • Uncertainty and wavering Investor confidence to fully commit their investment and as a consequence petroleum resources in potentially disputed or Trans boundary areas have remained unexplored. For example, licensed blocks operated by Shell in Tanzania’s waters closer to Zanzibar have remained   unexplored for a long time
  • On a wider East African level there are missed opportunities for joint investment promotion.
  • There is a ‘Race to the bottom’ as East African Countries under cut each other with lucrative fiscal terms in competition to attract petroleum investors into their own territories, without looking at East Africa as a whole
  • There are ongoing and underlying territorial disputes which could erupt into full blown out conflicts, risking the current and future investments into the petroleum sector

Currently, a lot has been written about these possible challenges but very limited pragmatic steps have been taken to address these challenges. There has been some significant discussion about the issue but there have been no pragmatic viable options provided which can be acceptable to the protagonists in the conflict.

If some pragmatic solutions are found for Kenya and Somalia, similar suggestions could also be used to inform approaches taken by other East African governments within the wider East African framework to address similar other potential disputes along their border frontiers.

Some international approach to similar challenges

The answer to nature’s conundrum where petroleum resources migrates within or across a country’s border has always been unitization.  Unitisation is one of the legal devices which seek to remove the destructive competitive elements stimulated by the rule of capture (as advanced in the United States legal tradition under which the title to petroleum belongs to the owner who physically extracts it from a well on his land, even if petroleum has migrated underground from neighboring lands). With unitisation petroleum deposits are exploited as a whole, expenditure is reduced and recovery is maximized.  Unitisation is accomplished through a unitization agreement. A unitization agreement is an amicable solution between parties as individuals, group of individuals or states holding exploitation rights in common petroleum reservoirs by which the reservoirs will be exploited in an integrated manner.  The reservoir is treated as one whole and the costs and revenues shared between the parties according to an agreed formula defined by parameters such as geological technical factors, investment or operational costs and volumes of the reservoir. An international unitization agreement (Unit operating Agreement) can be signed between relevant international companies from both states subject to the bilateral treaty outlining the rights and obligations of each company and issues like selection of operator or determination of tract of participants.

International law remedy and Joint Development Areas

The International law remedy to offshore ‘trans international boundary’ petroleum resources is provided within the ambits of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 (UNCLOS) which obliges states which have not been able to agree on boundaries of their continental shelves and exclusive zones to make efforts to enter into provisional arrangements  of a practical nature to develop the petroleum deposit  located in the overlapping geographical area under dispute whilst not foregoing their sovereignty rights to the deposits  in place  in its territory or continental shelf.

This international law remedy is the backbone on which the idea of Joint Development Areas or Zones is built. Joint development is an arrangement between two states to develop and share in agreed proportions the petroleum found within a geographical area whose proportions the petroleum found in a geographical area whose sovereignty is disputed; and the geographical area is an overlapping area under dispute with undefined boundaries to which the two states are entitled under International law. The JDA is established by a treaty, agreement or any recognisable legal document stating the rights and obligations of each party. The JDA’s can be divided into separate contract areas where deposits can cross the internal boundaries of those contracts and those that cross the JDA’s into third party states.  Both approaches are geared towards securing mutual cooperation and maximizing benefits from the petroleum resources. The treaties or agreements incorporate procedures to minimize disputes and resolve disputes. The following country experiences can be benchmarked:

Possible country experiences for benchmarking

Norway’s experience with United Kingdom

Norway is a good example of the significant economic benefits that can be achieved through strong cooperation and bilateral relationship. Norway has entered various treaties as examples of successful border unitization and management of resources straddling across a vast maritime area between Norway and United Kingdom. On March 10, 1965 Norway and the United Kingdom signed a bilateral delimitation treaty and this agreement constituted the first detailed provisions for action to be taken in the case of a petroleum deposit straddling cross border. This treaty was a voluntary agreement of a maritime border and acceptable cost and revenue sharing formula based on the volume of resources. This treaty provided a basis for three more cross border unitization agreements covering the Frigg, Stratfjord and Murchison Field signed in 1976, 1979 and 1979 respectively.

Norway is also a unique good example of managing Trans boundary petroleum resources by three neighboring states. This experience was demonstrated in the joint management of the Markham Field reserves. In 1965 the United Kingdom and the Netherlands signed a bilateral agreement to establish the boundaries of the Dutch continental shelf, when a petroleum reserve of approximately 700 cubic feet was discovered the licence was awarded to a Dutch company-Ultramar Exploration (Netherlands BV). The discovery was named Markham Field and jointly managed under the Markham agreement signed between the United Kingdom and Norway for unitization of petroleum resources straddling across the maritime borders. The United Kingdom’s health and safety authorities and their Dutch counterparts, the Straatstoezicht op de mijen, had unlimited access to all facilities and information related to the management of the resources. The UK and the Netherlands governments imposed taxes and shared profits as per their fiscal regimes and applicable double taxation conventions The Markham agreement provided a framework for successful development of the field and a possible template for any future unitization between three states

Norway has also taken a pragmatic framework agreement approach in resolving managing Trans boundary petroleum fields without involving distinct intergovernmental treaties. This approach was taken in 2005 by Norway and the United Kingdom in managing the Enoch & Balne Oil fields Norway’s focus has been on securing economic benefits for both states, with provisions made for possible development of resources with infrastructure located on the one side of the boundary. More examples of such approaches include the development of the Boa field which is mostly in Norway and the Playfair fields which are almost entirely in the United Kingdom. Since 2005 Norway has signed more treaties with Russia in the Barents Sea and thus excelled as a champion in managing off shore Trans boundary resources in contentious territories.

East Timor (Timor Leste) and Australia’s experience

In Asia-Timor Leste and Australia are good examples of joint management of Trans boundary petroleum resources. In 2002 East Timor and Australia signed the Timor Sea treaty between the two governments. This treaty enabled the joint development of petroleum resources in the maritime area located between East Timor and Australia. This area also known as the ‘Timor Gap’ had been controversially disputed and subjected to an earlier Timor Gap Treaty in 1989 between East Timor, Australia and Indonesia.

The Timor Sea treaty established a Joint Development Administration (JDA) and provides that Australia and East Timor shall jointly manage, facilitate, exploration, development and exploitation of the resources within the JDA for the benefit of the people of the two countries. The treaty has also provided an acceptable revenue formula whereby 90% of the revenues from the JDA would go to East Timor and 10% would belong to Australia.

The treaty resolved the long political impasse related to the management of the Sunrise and Troubadour petroleum reserves, also collectively referred to as the ‘Greater Sunrise’ which spanned across the Eastern boundaries of the new Joint Petroleum Development Authority (JPDA). The Sunrise and Troubadour deposits were unitized and an acceptable revenue sharing formula agreed. A joint management committee was established to oversee its implementation. To date the approach is a successful model of joint petroleum resource administration in Asia. Similar approaches have been taken by Qatar and United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabi and Bahrain.

Nigeria and Sao Tome et Principe’s Experience

In cases where countries have longstanding territorial disputes, they can reach out for third parties or independent arbitration panels or international courts of justice to resolve or advice on the best alternative to manage the petroleum resources located in these areas. This approach is referred to as the third-party approach.

This was the approach taken by Nigeria and Sao Tome et Principe in Africa, to create a border upstream cooperation and Joint Development Zones (JDZ) through Unitisation of two major fields (Ikanga and Zafiro) between Nigeria and Equatoria Guinea. On this backdrop, the government of Sao Tome et Principe claimed an archipelago status under Article 46 of the United Nations Conventions of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as based on the 200 miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) determined by a median line in the North East and the North West as the median line between Sao Tome and Nigeria. The Nigerian government based its claim on the Exclusive Economic Zones Act (CAP 116) and claimed an EZZ which overlapped with Sao Tome et Principe’s zone. The two countries agreed to resolve their differences by creating a Joint Development Zone in the area of overlap to enable exploitation and licensing to proceed. Both countries have since mutual benefited economically.

Relevancy of these Countries’ experience to Tanzania and East Africa’s trans boundary petroleum resources management

As a result of these experiences, unitisation is now a major compulsory feature in petroleum legislations of these countries. The United Kingdom Petroleum Act 1998 and the 1988 Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations, the Nigerian Petroleum Act of 1969 and the 1969 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) laws impose a compulsory unitization. All licence holders or contractors have an obligatory requirement to agree on a unitization. They are obliged to cooperate if and when reservoirs straddling within or beyond national borders must be developed and it is within the national interests to secure efficient maximum recovery of petroleum. Resources and revenues are managed in agreed manner without losing national or international ownership and sovereignty.

Although the Nigeria and Sao Tome’s case was an arrangement between sovereign states, this approach is relevant to Tanzania, given the similarities of the issues involved. Zanzibar is an archipelago with a specific claim to territorial waters along its coastline. Mainland Tanzania’s 200 miles EEZ overlaps Zanzibar’s territory. Nigeria and Sao Tome’s approach could towards resolving Tanzania’s petroleum resources management challenge with Zanzibar.

These benchmarked examples indicate that geological constrains, territorial disputes, political and economic differences, constitutional limitations and international boundaries should never be a limiting factor to development of petroleum resources located or straddling from one territory to another. Tanzania and the wider East African region can draw alternative solutions to the current challenges facing management of trans boundary petroleum resources:

Possible alternative or supplementing solutions

  1. In Tanzania, within the current constitutional framework there could be a ‘Partial delegation’ of legal powers to Zanzibar to enter into agreements with oil companies (state and non-state actors) subject to the Union Constitution and the Union government’s Petroleum and fiscal management legislations
  2. Delimitation of temporary boundaries for oil and gas management purposes and earmarking specific petroleum blocks which could be legally assigned to Zanzibar’s control for revenue purposes
  1. Establish Joint Development Area (JDA) or Joint Development Zone (JDZ) arrangements modeled successful arrangements like Norway and United Kingdom, Timor Leste and Australia. Agree on unitization arrangements for licensed blocks straddling outside the JDA and develop a revenue sharing formula for managing resources from JDA and Trans boundary areas. Establish a joint petroleum revenue management committee for trans international boundary areas
  1. Develop East African guidelines for unitization and Joint Development Area Management and revenue sharing for Trans boundary petroleum resources.
  1. Either off the above approaches could be adapted in resolving the dispute between Kenya and Somalia

Benefits from these options

If resolved this could lead to peaceful co-existence and increased joint attraction of foreign investment into the areas

Increase investor confidence in East Africa and open up new avenues for investment and value creation in its Petroleum sector.

Unfreeze the current blocks which are closer to Zanzibar for licensing, exploration and development. These blocks have remained unlicensed for many years, despite expression of interests from petroleum companies to develop them

Provide avenues for possible cross border petroleum resources development and sharing of petroleum energy resources at low costs and thus reduce the acute shortages of electricity and over reliance on hydroelectricity for power generation in the region.

References

  • Beyene, Zewdineh and Wadley, Ian L.G. Common goods and the common good: Transboundary natural resources, principled cooperation, and the Nile Basin Initiative. Berkerley, UC Berkeley: Center for African studies 2004.(Breslauer Symposium on Natural Resources Issues in Africa😉 at pg4
  • Cameron P.D: Cross Border Unitisation in the North Sea (Vol. 5 OGEL 2007)
  • Denis V.Rodin: Offshore transboundary petroleum deposits: Cooperation as a customary obligation; Small Masters of Laws thesis in the Laws of the Sea; University of Tromso, Faculty of Law, Fall 2011
  • Perry A: Oil and Gas deposits at international boundaries-New ways for governments and oil and gas companies to handle an increasingly urgent problem (Vol. 5 OGEL 2007);  M.O Igiehon, Present International law on delimitation of the Continental shelf (Sweet & Maxwell 2006
  • Rod Chooramum; Notes to the Field: An English law perspective on the oil and Gas Market, August , 2014
  • Sustainable Development or Resource Cursed: Managing Timor Leste’s Petroleum Revenue, Chapter 4
  • URT: The National Natural Gas Policy, 2013
  • Zanzibar Oil, Gas win cools political heat; The East African Newspaper; http://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/australian-law/joint-petroleum-developmet-area.php
  • http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Zanzibar-oil-gas-win-cools-political-heat/-/2558/2877248/-/view/printversion/-/1485oatz/-/index.html. Also read: Oil and gas: How EA Can become a key global player; http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/oil-and-gas…
  • http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2014/01/08/the-10-biggest-oil-and-gas-discoveries-of-2013/ accessed on 19th May 2015 at 7:45 pm
New threats to peace and Security:  Extent to which new security threats of Piracy have affected economic and human security in East Africa

New threats to peace and Security:  Extent to which new security threats of Piracy have affected economic and human security in East Africa

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre, Dar es Salaam-Tanzania

Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile.

In recent years piracy and cyber security have emerged to represent new security threats to economic and human security like never before.

Security has been defined as protection from any kind of threat but in total departure from the orthodox view as perceived by the military and war professional. Experts such as Buzzan (1991) have defined security as freedom from fear or threat of social, economic, society, environmental and military concerns.  Buzzan therefore expands the definition of security to include human and economic security dimensions to the concept of security. 

Human security, as an approach gives understanding to national and international security by adding a dimension that gives primacy to the safety of human beings and their complex social and economic interactions.  In this approach to security, the subjects are individuals and the end goal is the protection of people from traditional threats such as military concerns to nontraditional threats such as poverty and disease.

The UN has advanced this concept further by declaring that “Human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people” (General Assembly resolution 66/290

Other organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross view security from an economic lens. The ICRC defines economic security as the ability of individuals, households or communities to cover their essential needs sustainably and with dignity. This can vary according to an individual’s physical needs, the environment and prevailing cultural standards. Food, basic shelter, clothing and hygiene qualify as essential needs, as does the related expenditure; the essential assets needed to earn a living, and the costs associated with health care and education also qualify.

By understanding peace and security from such a broad lense, it is therefore possible to understand the nexus and extent to which new threats such as piracy and cybercrime have on human security.

Piracy as a security threat

Piracy has been defined as an act of robbery or criminal violence at sea. It includes acts committed on land, in the air, or other major bodies of water or on shore. It generally involves unlawful, boarding, kidnap and commandeering of marine or land vessels or convoys to undesignated locations or destinations for looting, ransom or other purposes.

Although the term “piracy” may conjure up images of bearded men with eye patches, wooden legs and parrots who were convicted and buried centuries ago, pirate attacks are indeed posing a threat today’s shipping lines (and human wellbeing) all over the world.   According to reports, the number of Pirate Attacks globally between 2009 and 2017 was 2717 with 180 attacks registered in 2017 alone.

Causes of an upsurge in piracy

There are many reasons to explain the increasing rise in piracy but some of these have been constantly made;

  • The disappearance of US naval forces fleets from major international water bodies after the end of the cold war. This has allowed pirates and criminal gangs to operate freely on the open high seas with minimal interference
  • The improvement in maritime navigation and technology which has enabled launching and navigation of larger ships manned by smaller crew who are extremely vulnerable to pirate attacks
  • Expansion of jurisdictional waters beyond those which are directly in effective control and patrol of their claimant states.
  • Instability, state collapse and increasing harsh economic conditions in Countries such as Somalia and Yemen.
  • Falling states and absence of centralized governments in Countries such as Somalia
  • Lucrative ransoms paid which acted as incentives for more attacks
  • Long uncompleted trials and deterrent punitive measures to convicts which motivated others to conduct attacks
  • Radicalization and justification of piracy as tool in response to political interference, economic dominance and over exploitation of marine natural resources by global super powers such as America.

Today, pirates’ attacks pause a genuine threat to maritime transportation and security. Pirates are capable of cutting off important transit choke points such as the Strait of Bab al-Mandab between Arabia and Africa or the Strait of Malacca in South East Asian waters.  In 2017, the trade routes around the Indonesian coast as well as in Bangladeshi and Nigerian waters were counted among the most perilous at sea paths globally.

The Horn of Africa, along the Somalian coastline, has become one of the most dangerous waters prone to piracy attacks.  According to various reports maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa grew in frequency, range, aggression, and severity at an alarming rate covering more than 2.5 million square miles of ocean. Since 2007, Somali pirates attacked and harassed vessels transiting up to 450 miles offshore in the Indian Ocean and in the Gulf of Aden, a natural chokepoint providing access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.  The number of actual or attempted attacks in the Somalia’s territorial waters off the East African coastal shore line was 462 with 5 attacks reported in 2017 alone

For 2017, an International maritime organization, One Earth Future (OEF)’s Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP)  recorded a total of 54 incidents in the Western Indian Ocean region, marking an increase of 100 percent from 2016. Accordingly, 2017 saw an increase in the number of seafarers affected by incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea, from 545 in 2016 to 1,102 in 2017. For the first time in two years, OBP recorded incidents of hijacking and kidnapping at sea in the region. Suspicious activity continued to be the highest represented incident in the region in 2017 reporting a significant increase from 13 recorded incidents in 2016 to 32 in 2017.

The short surge in hijacking attacks in the first quarter of 2017 was attributed to several factors. These include the continued intent of pirate action groups to launch attacks and the opportunity to do so, due to lessened adherence to ship self-protection measures, including Best Management Practices (BMP). Independent deployers represented the primary naval presence in the region, but both coalition forces and independent deployers decreased days of operation, or days on station in the region, in 2017.

Effects of Piracy on human security

Piracy has led to significant decline in human security, by instilling fear, insecurity and fatalities along the East African coastal shoreline. According to OEF- OBP on the state of piracy, the number of piracy on the East African coastline tripled in 2016. There were 54 piracy incidents on the East African coast in 2017—more than triple the 16 incidents recorded in 2016.  It states that the number of sailors affected increased from 306 in 2015 to 1,102 in 2017, with at least 79 of them injured or threatened in the attacks in which 41 per cent of the attackers were armed. The number of attacks as in previous years shows that the capability and intent of pirate networks has not decreased. This was witnessed with the increased number of hijackings, including of the Aris 13, the Asayr 2, and Al Kausar. The number of hostages killed or injured by Somali pirates increased significantly in 2017, according to further maritime reports.

Nearly 4,000 seafarers were fired upon by Somali pirates, the report said. Of that number, 968 seafarers faced armed pirates who managed to board their vessels, while some 413 of those seafarers were rescued from secured rooms on their vessels by naval forces. At least 1,206 hostages were held by Somali pirates in 2011, including 555 seafarers attacked and taken hostage during the year, and 645 captured in 2010 who remained in pirate hands. Half of those held were subjected to punching and slapping and 10% suffered violent abuse such as being locked in freezers, burned with cigarettes and having their fingernails pulled out with pliers, the reports stated.

Effects of piracy on economic security

In 2017 the economic effect of piracy on East Africa was estimated at USD1.4billion. This was a slight decline from $1.7 billion in 2016, mainly due to a 13 per cent decrease in the use of privately contracted armed security personnel. The costs had stabilized over the past three years, after a decline between 2010 and 2015, from about $7 billion in 2010 to $1.3 billion in 2015.  None the less, these amounts are substantively high if measured in correlative development terms and represent a significant economic security risk to the region.

Piracy has increased administrative cost measures in counter piracy measures. It has led to increased military presence and diversion of vital resources to combat piracy.  In 2011 the total costs in military counter piracy measures was estimated at USD 1.27bln.  This was spent on administrative budgets, military vessels and unmanned aerial vehicles. An additional USD 635 million was spent on insurance premiums. The cost of prosecuting pirates in trials and imprisonment was USD5.3 million.  These figures have substantively increased in 2017.

These are vital resources which could have been used for other development activities such as social service provision and infrastructure development but have been switched towards addressing piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Effect on trade and commerce

Piracy has affected trade and commerce along the East African coastline. According to the South African Institute for Strategic studies (ISS), trade in sub-Saharan Africa was slowly suffering from the consequences of piracy on major shipping liners along the Eastern African coast.

The resurgence of incidents of piracy has the potential to affect international trade and maritime movement of cargo around the East African coastline. In advertently this has collateral damage to East African economies and other Countries around the world.  Shipping liners have to consider alternative routes which are perceived safer routes such the Suez Canal, the South African tip or even the Panama Canal.

Increased costs in freight and insurance charges.

One of the major consequences of piracy is the increase in insurance rates for the shipping industry and the need to purchase additional insurance to cover the risk associated with transiting a piracy prone region. For example, insurance companies now offer “kidnap for ransom” policies to ships that move through the Suez Canal.  According to one insurance company, the U.K. based Hiscox, prices the policy at US$15,000 per trip through the Gulf of Aden and was reported to have increased dramatically.  Also, because of the danger posed to shipping transiting the Gulf of Aden, insurance premiums had risen tenfold. For example, insurance companies had increased premiums for sending a cargo shipment through the Gulf of Aden to about US$9,000 from US$900 in a period of one year.

From an economic point of view, having Africa’s access to internationally developed materials such as nuclear reactors, vehicles, tractors, imported and exported food, and other materials reduced will be devastating. More worrying is the impact of a decrease in exports of natural resources from African countries.

Piracy has changed the livelihoods of communities along the Somali coastline who have abandoned vital livelihoods such as agriculture and nomadic farming to join piracy. Fishing communities have also been forced to abandon fishing from fear of attacks at sea and hence changed the entire economic security of communities living along the coast of Somalia. According to the UNDP many Somali youth joined piracy as a source of employment and piracy is seen and proven to be a vital ready source of income and path to quick wealth and prosperity.

Piracy financing of money laundering and terrorism

The proceeds from piracy have found their linkages to finance money laundering and terrorism activities. According to the World Bank, the Somali pirate business model relies heavily on onshore support infrastructure to conduct ransom negotiations. Generically a pirate operation consists of armed offshore operations with onshore support that provides shelter for returning pirates and access to markets for stolen goods and for the goods, services, and manpower needed for pirate attacks. The total amount of money paid in ransom fees by various companies was estimated billions of dollars. Most of this was invested in legitimate business such as real estate, forex bureaus and financing Alshabab terrorist activities.

There is risk of fueling war and further instability with deadly military hardware captured by pirates falling in the hands of militants.  Although previously pirates targeted fishing vessels and smaller cargo ships, they later targeted larger vessels such as chemical tankers, bulk carriers and thus pausing a higher security risk than ever.

Amongst their high-profile targets included a Ukrainian vessel loaded with heavy weapons and a Saudi owned VLCC. The MV Faina, or “crown” in Russian, was a Ukrainian vessel loaded with rifles, heavy weapons and 33 Soviet made T-72 tanks that the pirates captured on 25 September 2008. The ship was initially thought to have been heading for Sudan or some other African country, possibly Kenya. The MV Faina was then surrounded by three warships from the Combined Task Force 150 during its hijack to prevent the ship’s deadly cargo from ending up in the hands of Somalia’s Islamic insurgents and other terrorists. The initial ransom demand was for US$35 million but it was finally released for a reported sum of US$3.2 million.

Piracy has affected Tourism and investment along the East African coast of Somalia. Piracy attacks on hotels and large deep-sea fishing vessels has significantly retarded invested in East African coastal economy, along the Somalian coastline.

There have been regional attempts to combat piracy. The US and EU Naval patrols and tracks pirates off the East African Coastline and the Gulf of Aden under the auspices of Joint Task Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 including troops from the US, EU and Canada. This has accounted for the declining numbers of attacks in the recent years. The downside of this effort is that the task force is externally funded and cannot be a long-term solution.  This therefore demands that Eastern Africa states step up their capabilities to counter piracy along its long coastline.

In a nutshell, piracy represents one single new threat to human and economic security. Despite a reduction in reported cases of piracy in 2018, the disappearance of piracy in the 19th Century and its resurgence in the 1990s and increase between 2000 and 2017 shows that this security threat is not over. Perhaps the pirates and their benefactors are planning and waiting to strike their next target.  Extra vigilance, collective military and civilian measures are required to contain this threat.

 

 

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