Electoral democracy and the elusive search for a new peaceful electoral consensus in Tanzania

 

Authors: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Electoral consensus has been elusive in many African countries. This short study brief attempts to trace, document and discuss the electoral democracy environment in Tanzania since 1995,  experiences from  the Muafaka in delivering  a semblance of peace in a polarised political environment. Perhaps by looking back in history, we can shape the future of electoral democracy in Tanzania and Africa generally.

Introduction

Tanzania has always been lauded as model of electoral democracy however over the past few years there seems to be some pointers towards a potential stagnation and regression largely caused particularly by contradictions over electoral processes. While Tanzania has gone to elections since 1995 and remained a good exemplar of peaceful power transition in a region where peaceful transitions are scarce, the general electoral processes that underlie these transitions have constantly faced contestations, with some tuning violent.  For instance, the last general elections in 2021 were marked by some electoral concerns and judged by both local and international observers as not free and fair. The electoral outcomes and the political environment thereafter became polarized, political and civic spaces was constrained, forcing some opposition politicians to seek political asylum outside Tanzania.

After the sudden death of President John Pombe Magufuli in 2022, the new President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s government in 2023 made some electoral reforms with partial amendments to three major laws governing elections (The National Election Commission Act 2023, Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Government Elections Bill (2023), The Political Parties Affairs Laws (Amendment) Bill (Amending the Political Parties Act RE 2019 and the Elections Expenses Act, 2010).

The government lifted a ban on political mobilization, granted amnesty to all opposition political leaders in exile, called for dialogue and committed to fostering a new culture of competitive democracy. However, this hiatus of political serenity appears to have been short lived. Local government elections held in November 2024 were marred with reports of political violence, kidnaps and death (Aljazeera, 2020). And in a dramatic turn of events, in April the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) banned the leading opposition political party CHADEMA from participating in General elections for five years. This trend, irrespective of its intentions and underlying legal justification, tainted Tanzania’s democratic credentials and potentially threatens the future of democracy in Tanzania.  For these acts and the noticeable trend, Tanzania has come under increasing scrutiny and pressure from both internal, regional and international human rights and democracy advocates with calls for reforms and peaceful resolution of the long-standing political grievances (IDU, May 2025). 

Ahead of the 2025 General Elections and thereafter, multiple questions are raised whether the current political context can guarantee Tanzania’s past glory as the haven of peace and beacon of democracy in East Africa and Africa generally? How can government secure peaceful elections and restore confidence in electoral democracy in 2025?  These questions are legitimate given that Tanzania has for decades remained peaceful and played a major role as a stabilizing variable in the East and Great Lakes region which is embroiled with conflicts and regalia of collapsed states.

To attempt and dissect these questions, we look at Tanzania’s electoral democracy history and the turbulent electoral cycles it has gone through and how it has navigated around these political currents of a multiparty dispensation towards the state that it is today. The lessons from these episodes are quite relevant in helping Tanzania forge its current and future electoral trajectory.

Overview of Electoral Democracy in Tanzania (1980-2021)

The concept of electoral democracy is not alien to Tanzania. Until 1995 internal party electoral democracy was a present concept in Tanzania’s political dispensation. Contrary to what some naysayers may widely hold, Mwl Julius Nyerere, within the ambits of his socialist values believed and practiced a level of internal party democracy. Even under the socialist single party era in the 1960s to the 1980s, TANU and later Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), political party delegates contested internally as candidates and were voted for electoral positions. Party members vied for electoral positions such as members of the local party branch leadership, the National Executive Committee (NEC), the Central Executive Committee (CEC) and for parliamentary seats. The records of intra-party elections held between 1980-85 are available and show some rigorous internal political dynamics ahead of intra party elections.

The October 1995 Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Tanzania were the climax of this single intra party democracy that had been practiced since the 1960s. The general elections marked an important milestone in the country’s transition to multi- party electoral democracy. They were the first multiparty general elections after the lifting of the ban on political parties that had seen Chama Cha Mapinduzi rule as single party for more than 20 years.  The elections brought to an end the intense debates about the role of multi-partyism in democracy and governance. Prior to the elections, there were contestations as to whether Tanzania must adopt democracy or remain a single party state. Fundamentally, there were intra-party debates during the preparation for the elections on who was best suited to lead Tanzania in a new evolving political context.   Significantly, these elections marked a termination to the Mwl Julius Nyerere single party era (TEMCO, 1997) and repositioning of Tanzania as a new fountain of democracy in the East African region.

The political rallies and debates in 1995 were contentious and exciting to attend for the citizens and a country that had been ruled under a single party. As the political space opened, new centers of opposition political power and leadership emerged. The opinions coming from these were diverse and the candidates quite combative in asserting the new direction that Tanzania would take as a multiparty democracy.  Some of these described themselves as reformers (Wanamageuzi) and political parties such as NCCR-Mageuzi were born.  Tanzania had changed and moving into a new political future. An era of electoral democracy had been ushered in. However, this excitement did not take long before the tenets of electoral democracy in a multiparty dispensation were strained and tested.

The 1995 election outcomes on Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar

The 1995 election results gave a resounding victory for CCM on the mainland Tanzania. After the election results were announced, CCM’s candidate Benjamin Mkapa won the presidential election with 61.82% (4,026,422 votes) and 186 of the 232 electoral constituencies.  Augustino Mrema of NCCR-M came second with 27.77% (1,808,616 votes), Professor Ibrahim Lipumba of the Civic United Front secured 6.43% (418,973 votes) while John Momose Cheyo of United Democratic Party (UDP) came fourth with 3% (258,734). Overall CCM won 182 constituencies on the mainland, and 50 in Zanzibar.

After the election, 37 additional seats for women MPs were awarded to the parties based on the proportion of seats in the National Assembly, while five members were elected by the House of Representatives of Zanzibar and ten members nominated by the President. The Attorney General was also an ex-officio member, resulting in a total of 285 MPs in the legislature. Electoral democracy had delivered its verdict. The electoral land scape had changed but CCM was still a dominant party in power.

The test of electoral democracy and contestations of the 1995’s elections aftermath

Despite being highly competitive, the elections were a judged by both national and international observers as largely peaceful, free and fair on the mainland Tanzania. However, the elections in Zanzibar were widely disputed.  Neither the local nor the international observers endorsed the elections (ibid). The CUF Presidential Candidate in Zanzibar, Seif Sharif Hamad disputed the election results announced by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission, declared self-victory, refused to recognize the CCM led government in Zanzibar and ordered elected all CUF legislators to boycott parliamentary sessions. Protests broke out in Zanzibar and there was a clamp down on the new emerging media such as DTV that had announced the results before ZEC’s declaration. The International Foundation on Electoral Systems (IFES) reported that inadequate administration, inappropriate secrecy, and general inefficiency marred the process and cast doubt and mistrust over much of the outcome. Neither the National Electoral Commission of Tanzania nor the Zanzibar Electoral Commission was able to win the trust of the electorate (IEFS, 1995). Tanzania’s new exercise in democracy had started on a wobbly foot and was under an early test.

The implications on the future electoral democracy

The general elections showed the nation was divided between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, with CCM as a dominant party on the mainland and the Civic United Front (CUF) as a dominant opposition party to reckon with in Zanzibar. In Zanzibar the country was split right in the middle, along geographical lines. One of the parties (CUF) was dominant in the island of Pemba, while the ruling party (CCM) held sway in the island of Zanzibar. What this meant in the Zanzibar context was that neither of the parties was a ‘national’ party.

The elections exposed fundamental constitutional and political questions that would later become a nemesis of Tanzania’s young democracy for decades to come. For example, the position of Zanzibar as a political entity in Tanzania’s politics was redefined with emergence of a new political force based on the island. Questions lingered as to what would be the appropriate system of political participation, choice and governance moving forward. Would Tanzania’s political union between Zanzibar and Tanzania mainland hold? How would the emerging political dynamics between the Islands of Unguja and Pemba be handled?

Fundamentally, the electoral systems and electoral management were equally tested and gaps exposed.  While the elections for the presidency were plebiscitary (voters could only vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a single candidate), elections for parliament were classified- This showed that there was still ground for future electoral reforms to improve electoral transparency and democratic consolidation.

Moreover, the elections showed that CCM was still fused with the state. Despite protests and condemnation from the international community, CCM ruled in Zanzibar, was supported by all institutions of the state.  An examination by political analysts of the question as to whether the competition that emerged during the switch to multiparty and during the first general election represented an expansion of political choice for citizens and a broader representation of societal forces concluded that the legal and institutional framework after 1995 strongly favored the ruling party. The difference between the state and CCM was still blurred (Hassan Kaya, 2004).

Even after the introduction of the multi-party system the electoral process and election system was still dominated by the ruling party. The conduct of elections remained a major source of discontent for the opposition. The underlying political currents and unanswered questions led to contentious elections and a spiral of electoral violence which re-occurred during next electoral cycles and have remained a common feature up to date. While electoral democracy had been well introduced, the state was yet to learn how to avoid or manage the electoral violence that emanated from the contradictions and contestations of an electoral process. Tanzania would soon witness violent elections in 2000.

Chronology of Electoral Violence in Tanzania 2000-2024

The expectations of Zanzibaris prior to the 1995 elections, like their compatriots on the mainland, were that they would enjoy greater democracy and have more human rights synonymous to an autonomous state. But, in their view, this was not how it turned out in Zanzibar. Instead, even the small gains that had been won before the elections were lost (Ibid).

After the disputed 1995 elections, the international community brokered some form of consensus (Muafaka 1) between the CCM and CUF. Some of the concessions included granting of some political privileges extended to CUF and its leader, Seif Sharif Hamad. The political grievances however did not go away.  The opposition CUF felt that its victory had been usurped, and that its candidate who won the Presidency, in their view had been denied a legitimate chance to rule. The Zanzibar ‘issues’ which among others included concerns over the autonomy of Zanzibar and its fair share of the Union national cake had not been addressed.

The political will to support the Muafaka from both political parties was lacking and Zanzibar was destined for a violent election in 2000 and registering a wave of Tanzania’s first export of refugees to Kenya. Violence was gradually becoming a feature in Tanzania’s elections.

The Civic United Front and violence in Zanzibar elections -2000- 2003

The simmering political tensions and anger of the 1995 elections had persisted and ultimately exploded in violence after the 2000 election results were announced by the Zanzibar electoral commission. During these elections, the ZEC announced that the CCM Presidential candidate, Amani Abeid Karume had garnered 248,095 votes (67.04%) against CUF’s Presidential Candidate, Seif Sharif Hamad’s 122,000 (32.96%). Election results in some constituencies were cancelled for reported irregularities.

While all observers commended the way the elections were conducted on the Mainland, the Zanzibar elections were characterized by the Commonwealth Observer Team as a shambles. In fact, all observers were more critical this time of the way the elections were run, and they all demanded fresh elections (Ibid).

This time the opposition CUF did not recognize both the Union and Zanzibar Presidents, and they demanded their members of the Union Parliament and those of the House of Representatives to boycott both legislative bodies. The two bodies using the House Rules, decided to throw out all CUF representatives from both Houses. The result of this was that Zanzibar had a one-party House of Representatives. The exercise of electoral multiparty democracy was being tested once again.

What followed was an insurrection of mass protests and confrontation with the police and other security organs. It was estimated that 40 Zanzibaris were shot dead and a further 600 injured when the Tanzanian army and police opened fire on a crowd of CUF supporters who were protesting against the results of the ballot. The violence was more pronounced in the Island of Pemba.  In the days following the 2000 elections, Tanzanian security forces and militias conducted a house-to house operation arresting and beating defiant residents. During that period, property was destroyed and an estimated 2,000 Zanzibaris fled to Kenya (Relief Web, 2005)

The 2000 General elections were the most violent elections in Zanzibar.  The violent protests and police killings in Zanzibar in January 2001 dented Tanzania’s political electoral history and democratic aspirations as a young multiparty state. What was very clear (from this aftermath) was that the country during this period lost political leadership of the security forces and that the security forces lacked technical means (at the time), to do their professional work in an evolving and highly charged multiparty setting. There was both local and international pressure for the Tanzania’s government to form an independent commission of inquiry to investigate what happened. CCM as the victorious and ruling party was compelled to negotiate another consensus political Accord (Muafaka 11) which provided substantive concessions. These included undertaking electoral and political reforms and to a power sharing formular for government positions.

 Zanzibar Elections and Political Consensus (Muafaka 11) reforms 2003 and 2010

The political and electoral reforms consensus under Muafaka II included the promulgation of the 8th and the 9th constitutional amendments; reconstitution of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) to include two members of the official opposition; establishment of the office of Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP); development of a cordial relationship between the leaderships of Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF), and enhanced access to the grassroots by the opposition (Kituo cha Katiba, 2003). It concluded with  a by election held in the disputed constituencies in 2003. Zanzibar was attempting to master electoral democracy and address the root causes of electoral violence.

The main objective of the Muafaka Accord was to create a level playing field and a conducive atmosphere for 2005 elections (Ibid).  The Zanzibar Electoral Commission would be managed with representatives from both political parties. Moreover, the opposition parties would be granted unfettered access to their grass root structures.

Significance of Political consensus (Muafaka)

While Muafaka I had died for a lack of political goodwill, the 2nd Muafaka registered considerable success. The Muafaka II did not fully eliminate electoral violence in Zanzibar, as this was to happen again in 2005, albeit at a lower level compared 2000.  But and significantly, the Muafaka II laid ground for wider constitutional and electoral reforms which led to a powers sharing approach adopted in 2010. Since the adoption of Muafaka II, Zanzibar elections have remained contentious but with minimal violence. For instance, the October 2015 elections were annulled by the Chairperson of ZEC for not being free and fair (BBC, 2015) .  However, the power sharing approach adopted in 2010 held Zanzibar together with the opposition CUF taking up the seat of the First Vice President in the government led by CCM.

To date Muafaka II still with stands, pointing to a positive democratic development on the Islands and Tanzania generally. Zanzibar’s power-sharing strategy appears to have ended the zero-sum nature of Zanzibari politics, as it ushered in a more consensus-based approach reminiscent of Julius Nyerere’s concept of ujamaa (unity). Government (Aley Soud Nassor & Jim Jose, 2014) For Nyerere, Ujamaa was a specifically African alternative to the institutionalized oppositional politics of western liberal democracy. Nyerere emphasized a system of people governance driven by a common national ideology and cause traversing tribe, economic and social status.

Moreover, the success so far achieved through Muafaka II and the power sharing structure demonstrates the usefulness and feasibility of consensus where even adversarial political parties such as CUF and CCM can work together. The Zanzibar’s experiment in power-sharing demonstrates that a multi-party-political system need not be structured according to a two-party oppositional model in order to achieve stable and functional democratic government (Ibid).  Political consensus on contentious issues and openness to continuous reforms can be a guarantor against electoral violence and elusive peace.  This experiment has given Zanzibar a semblance of relative peace, despite the historical political differences.

Moreover, the Muafaka dismantled the awkward label on CUF as a violent political party, increased its presence and role in running Zanzibar government, although its political influence and dominance in Zanzibar has dwindled significantly due its own internal party dynamics.

By 2021 AcT Wazalendo had emerged as the new strongest opposition political contender in Zanzibar after CUF’s founding leade, Seif Sharif Hamad, defected from CUF, carrying along with him multitudes of former CUF supporters.

Zanzibar Presidential Election Results 1995-2020

Year

 Candidate

Political Party

Votes

%of the vote

1995

Salim Amour

CCM

165, 271

50.27%

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

163,706

49.76%

2000

Amani Abeid Karume

CCM

248,095

67.04%

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

122,000

32.96%

2005

Amani Abeid Karume

CCM

239,832

53.18%

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

207,733

46.06%

2010

Mohamed Shein

CCM

179,809

50.11%

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

176,338

49.14%

2015

Mohamed Shein

CCM

–

–

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

–

–

2020

Dr Hussein Mwinyi

CCM

380,402

77.9%

Seif Sharif Hamad

AcT- Wazalendo

99,103

20.31%

Source: Computed Elections results data by GEPC researchers from different publicly available data

Despite starting on a wobbly footing with electoral violence in Zanzibar,  the Muafaka experience had delivered a perfect template of managing political differences in a polarized political and electoral context. However, this hiatus  faded away, with a resurgence of electoral violence, targeting a section of political parties and a brutal ‘panda gari’ culture that threatens peace. In  the next part of this study we will evaluate the resurgence and chronology of political and electoral violence, with lessons from neighboring countries and how the 2025 general elections must and can reclaim Tanzania’s electoral glory.

Addressing Electoral Democracy and the Challenge of Violence and Impunity in East Africa
Featured photo credit: Daily Monitor, Arrest of Uganda’s Opposition  election protestors 

Authors:  Don Bosco Malish and Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Introduction

East Africa stands at a critical crossroads, where the promise of electoral democracy is being eroded by a surge in violence, shrinking civic space, and the manipulation of political and legal institutions. This policy brief exposes the complex interplay of corruption, commercialization of politics, and state-sponsored repression that has transformed elections from peaceful contests into battlegrounds of fear and exclusion. Through in-depth analysis of Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, the article reveals how entrenched power structures, weak institutions, and socioeconomic inequalities fuel cycles of violence and disillusionment, threatening the very foundations of democratic governance. Yet, amid these challenges, new dynamics-such as the activism of digitally connected youth-offer glimmers of hope for democratic renewal. By unpacking the root causes and far-reaching impacts of electoral violence, this brief provides actionable, evidence-based recommendations to restore public trust, strengthen institutions, and foster inclusive, resilient democracies in East Africa. The article delves further to discover not only the urgent risks facing the region’s electoral future, but also the pathways to reclaiming the ballot as a tool for peace, justice, and genuine political transformation.

Electoral Violence in East Africa: Issues and Stakeholder Impact

  1. Overview of electoral violence

East Africa is experiencing a worrying rise in electoral violence, which is undermining democracy and creating fear among citizens. Elections, which should be peaceful opportunities for people to choose their leaders, are increasingly marred by violence, intimidation, and manipulation. Electoral violence in East Africa is not a random or isolated phenomenon; rather, it stems from a complex web of interconnected issues that collectively undermine democratic processes in the region. Understanding these root causes is essential for anyone committed to promoting peaceful, credible, and inclusive elections.

One of the most significant drivers of electoral violence is the widespread corruption and commercialization of politics. Elections have increasingly become contests dominated by financial power rather than the strength of ideas or policy proposals. Candidates often resort to vote-buying and other corrupt practices to secure victory, transforming elections into costly transactions instead of genuine democratic competitions. This commercialization distorts fair competition, discourages honest candidates, and deepens public cynicism. When voters perceive that money, not merit, determines electoral outcomes, their trust in both the electoral process and democracy itself erodes, creating fertile ground for conflict.

Another critical factor is the weaponization of legal and security institutions by ruling elites. Courts, police, and the military are frequently manipulated to suppress opposition voices, intimidate civil society, and curtail media freedom. This deliberate use of state institutions to enforce the interests of those in power shrinks the space for dissent and civic engagement, fostering an atmosphere of fear and instability. Opposition parties, activists, and journalists often become targets, making it dangerous to participate in or report on political processes. Such repression undermines the foundations of democracy and escalates tensions during election periods.

The weakness of key democratic institutions further exacerbates electoral violence. The credibility of elections depends heavily on the independence and strength of electoral management bodies (EMBs) and the judiciary. In many East African countries, these institutions are either fragile or subject to manipulation by those in power. When electoral bodies are perceived as biased, or when courts fail to adjudicate electoral disputes fairly, public confidence in the electoral process collapses. This distrust often leads to violence, as losing parties and their supporters may feel that peaceful legal avenues for redress are unavailable or ineffective.

Systematic marginalization of vulnerable groups also plays a significant role in fueling electoral violence. Women, rural populations, and ethnic minorities are frequently excluded from meaningful political participation and are more vulnerable to violence. Women face entrenched cultural barriers, political intimidation, and exclusion from decision-making spaces despite legal frameworks promoting gender equality. Rural communities often lack access to information and political networks, making them susceptible to manipulation and patronage. Ethnic minorities are disproportionately affected by election-related violence, especially when politicians exploit ethnic divisions to consolidate power. This exclusion not only violates the principle of inclusive democracy but also perpetuates cycles of violence and political instability.

Finally, a pervasive culture of impunity sustains ongoing electoral violence. Perpetrators-including state actors, political party supporters, and security personnel-are rarely held accountable for their actions. This lack of consequences emboldens those who use violence as a political tool, as they face little fear of prosecution or punishment. Over time, violence becomes normalized as an acceptable means of political competition, making it increasingly difficult to break the cycle and restore faith in peaceful democratic processes.

These issues are deeply interconnected and mutually reinforcing. For example, corruption weakens institutions, which in turn facilitates the weaponization of law and security. Marginalization both results from and contributes to weak institutions and impunity. To effectively address electoral violence, it is crucial to understand not only each factor individually but also how they interact to create a challenging environment for democracy in East Africa.

For policymakers, civil society, and international partners, recognizing these root causes is the first step toward designing effective interventions. Supporting institutional reforms, protecting vulnerable groups, promoting transparency, and ensuring accountability for perpetrators are all essential. Only by tackling these underlying problems can East Africa hope to build more peaceful, credible, and resilient electoral systems that truly reflect the will of the people.

II. Trends in Electoral Violence in Select East Africa Countries

Case Study: Uganda

Electoral violence in Uganda is marked by systematic, state-sponsored repression designed to maintain the ruling National Resistance Movement’s (NRM) hold on power. Under President Yoweri Museveni, security forces-including the police, military, and specialized units such as the Joint Anti-Terrorism Taskforce (JATT)-are routinely deployed to intimidate, harass, and violently suppress opposition candidates and their supporters. This repression includes brutal crackdowns on opposition rallies, arbitrary arrests, beatings, and even killings, as witnessed in recent elections and by-elections like Kawempe North, where opposition teams faced targeted disruption and physical assaults.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) in Uganda operate in a highly constrained environment. Human rights defenders and election monitors face harassment, threats, and legal restrictions, especially during electoral periods. The shrinking civic space limits their ability to hold authorities accountable or mobilize citizens for peaceful participation. International and local election observers often encounter restricted access and intimidation, undermining their capacity to provide independent assessments of electoral integrity.

Women, youth, rural populations, and ethnic minorities continue to face exclusion and heightened vulnerability to electoral violence. Women candidates and activists are often targets of gender-based intimidation and violence. Youth, particularly politically active young people, face arrests and harassment, while rural voters are frequently manipulated through patronage or coerced by security forces. Ethnic minorities remain marginalized politically and are sometimes caught in violent clashes fuelled by political rivalries.

Independent media and journalists are aggressively targeted. Reporters covering opposition activities or electoral irregularities face physical attacks, arbitrary arrests, forced deletion of footage documenting state violence, and media shutdowns. This has led to widespread self-censorship, severely undermining press freedom and the public’s right to information. The suppression of media transparency fosters an atmosphere of fear that discourages political participation.

Opposition groups face continuous repression, including arrests of leaders and supporters, disruption of rallies, and legal harassment. The extraordinary rendition and terrorism charges against members of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) exemplify the state’s use of security apparatus to criminalize dissent. Opposition candidates face unfair disqualifications and intimidation, limiting genuine political competition.

Electoral institutions in Uganda are often perceived as lacking independence and being influenced by the ruling party. This perception undermines public confidence in the fairness of elections and contributes to disputes that can escalate into violence.

Uganda’s youth, a large and politically aware demographic, face significant challenges including unemployment, repression, and limited political space. Despite this, they remain a critical force for political change, often mobilizing through digital platforms. The general public’s participation is dampened by fear of violence and scepticism about electoral fairness, leading to political alienation.

Case Study: Tanzania

In Tanzania, electoral violence is closely linked to state-sponsored repression and sloganeering that overwhelmingly benefits the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party. The government blurs the line between state and party, with regional and local officials-including police-aligned with CCM and actively disrupting opposition activities. Opposition parties and pro-reform civil society groups face bans on rallies, restrictions on political association, and denial of media access, severely limiting their ability to operate.

Pro-reform civil society groups are subjected to harassment and legal restrictions, particularly during election periods. Election observers, both domestic and international, face obstacles including limited access and intimidation, which reduce their effectiveness in promoting electoral transparency. Civic education is closely guarded and restricted to follow predetermined procedures and syllabus approved by the electoral management body.

Women in Tanzania experience barriers and exclusion from political processes and are vulnerable to intimidation, and violence.  Women face economic, social and gender-based hurdles to fully engage in political processes and electoral contest.  Poor rural women are susceptible to voter bribery, by way of T-shirts, kangas and basic household items such as salt, soap and sugar, manipulating their independence to make informed political choices. Illiteracy amongst women compared to men exacerbates this factor yet rural populations often have limited access to unbiased information and are susceptible to manipulation.

Tanzania’s youth face high unemployment, low civic competence and limited political space, which fuels frustration and disengagement. The general public’s political participation is constrained by fear of repression and scepticism about electoral fairness.

In Zanzibar, opposition supporters face frequent crackdowns, exacerbating political tensions in the semi-autonomous region. In 2015 the Chair of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission unilaterally annulled general election results drawing wide spread condemnation from the opposition and international community. Since 2000 Zanzibar has witnessed more than one violent election, whose results were heavily disputed.

Independent vocal civil society and media outlets suffer from state harassment, including suspensions, censorship, and intimidation, especially when reporting critically on CCM or electoral irregularities. This suppression fosters a climate of fear and self-censorship, restricting transparency and public scrutiny.

Opposition parties face systemic obstacles such as disqualification of candidates under dubious pretexts, arrests, and intimidation. Ahead of the 2024 local elections, hundreds of opposition supporters were detained, and opposition candidates were disqualified, resulting in implausibly high victories for CCM. A head of the 2025 general election, the opposition leader, Tundu Lissu was detained and charged with treason. His political party, Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) was banned from engaging in political mobilization, remains operationally tattered and struggling to survive.

The opposition parties too contribute towards a violent election season by militant sloganeering, defying police orders for peaceful assembly and engaging in sensationalism.

Electoral commissions are widely perceived as biased in favour of CCM, undermining trust in electoral outcomes and fueling tensions. Calls to reform the electoral management body, including legal challenges in Tanzania’s court systems, against its operational structure and the use of presidential appointees as returning officers were unsuccessful.

According to Tanzania’s electoral experts such as Dr Deus Kibamba of Jukwa la Katiba, an independent network of CSOs engaged in electoral process, Tanzania’s constitutional dispensation on election is weak, and suffers from a catastrophic capture from a strong state and political elites. For elections to be sound and credible the constitutional reforms are required.

Case Study: Kenya

Kenya’s electoral violence has historically been shaped by a combination of state-sponsored repression, ethnic tensions, and suppression of opposition and media. The 2007-2008 post-election violence remains a stark reminder of the devastating consequences of disputed elections, where state security forces and pro-government militias targeted opposition supporters along ethnic lines. Militarized police tactics to intimidate protesters and opposition figures persist, contributing to a climate of fear and mistrust.

Civil society organizations and election observers play a vital role in monitoring elections and promoting transparency. However, they often face harassment and threats, particularly when exposing irregularities or human rights abuses. Despite these challenges, their work has contributed to gradual institutional improvements.

Women, youth, ethnic minorities, and rural populations face varying degrees of exclusion and vulnerability. Gender-based violence and discrimination limit women’s political participation. Ethnic mobilization remains a significant factor in electoral violence, with marginalized communities often caught in inter-ethnic conflicts. Rural voters sometimes face manipulation and intimidation.

Journalists covering elections and political dissent frequently encounter harassment, censorship, and violence, undermining media freedom and restricting transparent reporting. Despite these risks, the media remains a critical actor in informing the public and exposing abuses.

Opposition leaders and activists face arbitrary arrests, intimidation, and legal challenges. The judiciary, while making strides toward independence, still faces pressure and intimidation aimed at deterring constitutional challenges to election results.

Kenya’s electoral institutions have shown signs of maturation, with efforts to improve transparency and credibility. However, the winner-takes-all electoral system and ethnic-based political mobilization continue to fuel tensions and risks of violence. The general public remains divided, with some hopeful about reforms and others wary due to past violence.

The emergence of Generation Z (roughly ages 18 to 28) and their agitation for reforms in governance and respect to youth’s concerns has introduced new dynamics. Digitally connected and politically aware, this youth cohort actively organizes protests and demands accountability through social media. Their activism challenges traditional patronage networks but has also provoked harsher state responses. Protesting youth were violently dispersed by the police, some were killed, kidnapped and other have disappeared to date without trace. A significant percentage of youth remain unemployed, poor and vulnerable to manipulation by the political elites into perpetrating violence against opponents.

In summary, across Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, electoral violence is driven by state repression, weak institutions, and exclusion of marginalized groups. Civil society and election observers face shrinking space and intimidation, while media and opposition parties are targeted to stifle dissent. Youth activism offers potential for democratic renewal but also faces risks. The general public’s political participation is often constrained by fear and distrust, underscoring the urgent need for reforms that promote inclusion, transparency, and accountability.

Comparative Analysis of Electoral Violence in Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya

Similarities

Differences

Crosscutting Issues

– State-sponsored repression: Security forces intimidate opposition, disrupt rallies, and suppress dissent.

Uganda: Heavy militarization of elections; opposition leaders face terrorism charges and rendition.

Institutional Weakness: Electoral bodies perceived as biased; judiciary often co-opted or intimidated.

– Media suppression: Independent journalists face harassment, censorship, and violence.

Tanzania: Blurring of party (CCM) and state institutions; severe restrictions in Zanzibar.

Marginalized Groups: Women, youth, ethnic minorities, and rural populations face systemic exclusion and violence.

– Media suppression: Independent journalists face harassment, censorship, and violence.

Tanzania: Blurring of party (CCM) and state institutions; severe restrictions in Zanzibar.

Marginalized Groups: Women, youth, ethnic minorities, and rural populations face systemic exclusion and violence.

– Civil society under siege: Election observers and CSOs encounter legal restrictions, threats, and limited access.

Kenya: Emerging judicial independence; Gen Z digital activism challenges patronage systems.

Media Freedom: Widespread self-censorship due to state intimidation.

– Ethnic and socioeconomic divisions: Politicized ethnicity and economic inequality fuel violence.

Tanzania/Kenya: Rural voters manipulated via patronage; Uganda relies more on overt militarized coercion.

Regional Dynamics: AU/EAC’s limited capacity to enforce electoral standards.

– Youth disenfranchisement: High unemployment and repression limit political participation.

Kenya: History of ethnic-based electoral violence (e.g., 2007–08); Uganda/Tanzania focus on state-led repression.

Emerging Opportunities: Youth digital mobilization (Kenya) offers pathways for accountability.

 

  1. Summary Table: Stakeholder Impacts

Stakeholder

Role

How They Are Affected by Electoral Violence

Civil Society

Watchdog, advocate, educator

Harassed, restricted, silenced, limited impact

Election Observers

Transparency, reporting

Restricted access, hostility, limited enforcement power

Marginalized Groups

Voters, candidates

Targeted, excluded, manipulated, vulnerable to violence

Media/Journalists

Information, transparency

Harassed, censored, attacked, self-censorship

Opposition Parties

Alternative leadership

Intimidated, attacked, unfair competition

EMBs

Election management

Manipulated, distrusted, weak oversight

General Public

Voters

Fear, low turnout, disillusionment

Youth

Activists, mobilizers

Targeted for activism, hope for change, risk of repression

Policy Recommendations: Pathways to Peaceful and Inclusive Elections in East Africa

Electoral violence remains a major obstacle to democratic governance and political stability across East Africa. To overcome this challenge, we need a thoughtful, multi-layered approach that addresses both the deep-rooted causes and the immediate sparks of violence. The following recommendations invite all stakeholders to explore practical, innovative strategies that can transform elections into truly peaceful, credible, and inclusive processes.

  1. Governments and State Actors: Building Trust and Accountability

Governments hold a unique responsibility to create an environment where elections are safe and fair. Imagine a system where justice is swift and impartial-where those who use violence to win lose their power instead. To move toward this vision:

  • Enforce accountability without delay. Independent courts should be empowered to investigate and prosecute anyone involved in electoral violence, from political figures to security personnel and financiers. Transparent trials can break the cycle of impunity and send a clear message that violence will not be tolerated.
  • Clarify and humanize security roles during elections. Police and military forces need clear guidelines emphasizing respect for human rights and crowd management. Training security personnel to act professionally and peacefully can reduce tensions and build public confidence.
  • Invest in election management bodies (EMBs). Governments should prioritize funding EMBs so they can organize elections efficiently, transparently, and on time. Strong EMBs are the backbone of credible elections.

Looking ahead, governments can embrace technology to enhance electoral integrity. Biometric voter registration and electronic transmission of results, paired with independent audits, can reduce fraud and increase transparency. However, these technologies should be introduced thoughtfully, considering local capacities and resources.

Legal reforms are also essential. Laws must protect freedom of expression, assembly, and media independence. Harmonizing electoral laws with constitutional guarantees will ensure elections are inclusive and disputes are resolved fairly.

Finally, governments should actively promote inclusive governance by adopting gender quotas and affirmative action to empower women, rural communities, and ethnic minorities. Digital government services, equipped with strong privacy protections, can further enhance participation while bridging digital divides.

  1. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs): Catalysts for Dialogue and Inclusion

CSOs play a vital role in nurturing democracy from the grassroots up. Their work sparks curiosity and empowers citizens to claim their rights peacefully.

  • Facilitate inclusive dialogue. By regularly bringing together election officials, political parties, security agencies, community leaders, and marginalized groups, CSOs can help resolve conflicts before they escalate and build trust among stakeholders.
  • Expand civic education. Targeted campaigns, especially in rural and marginalized communities, can raise awareness about voting rights and the importance of peaceful participation, reducing vulnerability to manipulation.
  • Protect civic space. Collaborating regionally and internationally, CSOs can advocate for the repeal of restrictive laws and defend activists from harassment.

Over time, CSOs can strengthen their capacity for election monitoring and advocacy by partnering with international bodies and adopting new technologies. Programs that empower women, youth, ethnic minorities, and rural populations in governance and peacebuilding will foster more inclusive democracies.

Community-based peacebuilding initiatives, including rapid response teams, can intervene early in electoral conflicts, engaging diverse actors to prevent violence. Publicly naming those responsible for electoral violence, in partnership with media outlets, can increase accountability and deter future offenses.

  1. Election Observers: Guardians of Transparency and Reform

Election observers-both local and international-serve as impartial witnesses whose presence can deter malpractice and violence.

  • Secure full access and maintain impartiality. Observers should be granted unhindered entry to all stages of the electoral process, ensuring their reports are unbiased and credible.
  • Harness technology for real-time monitoring. Digital tools like mobile apps and biometric verification can help detect irregularities quickly, allowing timely interventions.

Beyond election day, observers can facilitate post-election dialogues to address grievances and advocate for reforms that strengthen future electoral integrity. Close collaboration with civil society and independent media can amplify findings and support civic education, nurturing democratic resilience.

  1. Regional Bodies: Architects of Peace and Standards

Regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) , East African Community (EAC) and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) have a pivotal role in preventing electoral violence and promoting democracy.

  • Enhance early warning and monitoring systems. Joint observer missions and early warning mechanisms can identify emerging threats, enabling rapid, coordinated responses.
  • Support national institutions. Providing technical assistance and training to EMBs, judiciaries, and security forces builds local capacity to manage elections peacefully.

Long-term, regional bodies can establish binding electoral standards and enforce protocols for free, fair, and transparent elections, including sanctions for violations. By creating inclusive platforms for dialogue among governments, opposition, civil society, and marginalized groups, they can foster consensus and prevent conflicts.

Championing digital governance innovations with strong human rights safeguards will help member states modernize election processes while protecting citizens’ privacy and inclusion.

  1. Donors and International Partners: Enablers of Democratic Resilience

International support can empower local actors and strengthen democratic institutions.

  • Prioritize funding for civic space and inclusion. Donors should invest in CSOs working on election monitoring, civic education, and empowerment of marginalized groups, ensuring resources reach those fostering peaceful participation.
  • Support responsible technology deployment. Funding electoral technologies and capacity-building initiatives, with safeguards against misuse or exclusion, can enhance transparency and trust.

Looking ahead, donors can facilitate cross-sector collaborations that unite governments, civil society, youth, and other stakeholders to address democracy and development holistically. Using diplomatic channels and aid conditionality, they can encourage respect for democratic principles and push for meaningful electoral reforms.

Invitation to Action and Learning

These recommendations are more than policies-they are invitations to explore, innovate, and collaborate. Each stakeholder has a role in shaping elections that reflect the true will of the people, free from fear and violence. By embracing transparency, inclusion, and accountability, East Africa can transform electoral contests into celebrations of democracy.

The journey is challenging but full of promise. What new ideas can you bring to strengthen peace during elections? How can your community or organization contribute to building trust and preventing violence? Together, by learning from experience and acting decisively, we can reclaim the ballot box as a powerful tool for justice, peace, and genuine political transformation.

This approach encourages stakeholders to reflect on their roles, inspires curiosity about innovative solutions, and motivates collective action toward democratic renewal.

 

INVITATION TO A WEBINAR ON ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY-ADDRESSING MONEYOCRACY VIOLENCE AND IMPUNITY IN EAST AND AFRICA GREAT LAKES REGION

You are invited to our next webinar on Elections and Democracy: Addressing the challenge of Moneyocracy, Violence and Impunity in East and Africa Great Lakes Region

As you may be aware the East and Africa Great Lakes region is going through another electoral cycle yet the region stands at a critical crossroads, where the promise of electoral democracy is being challenged and potentially eroded by a surge in moneyocracy, violence, shrinking civic space, and the manipulation of political and legal institutions. This webinar will expose the complex interplay of corruption, commercialization of politics, and state-sponsored repression that has transformed elections from peaceful contests into battlegrounds of titanic fear and exclusion.

Our distinguished Speakers will be:

  1. Mr Don Malish, Researcher, Human Rights Expert and Colosseum Member, Governance and Economic Policy Center

Mr Don Bosco Malish is a seasoned professional with over 20 years of experience in human rights, democracy promotion, and social justice. Before venturing into private practice, Don worked as a Senior Executive for the Open Society Foundations, where he  managed a substantial grant portfolio and supported initiatives focusing on governance, rule of law, and human rights across Eastern Africa, with a significant focus on South Sudan. He has a deep understanding of the local human rights, governance and elections contextual  challenges facing East Africa. Don is currently a distinguished independent researcher, consultant and Colosseum (Advisory Council) member of the Governance and Economic Policy Centre

  1. Mr Mulle Musau, Regional Coordinator Elections Observer Group (ELOG), Kenya

Mr Musau is an elections expert with over 20 years experience in electoral democracy, with special interest in Elections and Ethics in governance. He has been involved in Elections observation both domestic and international from 2007. Currently the national coordinator for the Elections Observation Group (ELOG) in Kenya and the regional coordinator for the East and Horn of Africa Election Observers Network (E-HORN).

  1. Deus Kibamba, Executive Director Tanzania Information Bureau & Jukwa la Katiba, Elections Expert, and Lecture in International Relations

Mr Kibamba is an experienced political and governance expert, researcher and analyst with over 20 years’ experience in international development. He trained in Political Science and Public Administration, with an international relations major. He has been actively involved in electoral processes in Tanzania and served as an international observer in a number of missions across Africa. His research interests have focused on the Constitutional aspects of the electoral democracy. He is the founding Director of Tanzania Information Bureau (TIB) and a Board member of Jukwaa la Katiba Tanzania, an independent organisation focusing on promoting constitutionalism and elections in Tanzania. Deus is currently a distinguished  lecturer in International Relations and Diplomacy at the Tanzania – Dr Salim Ahmed Salim Centre for Foreign Relations, Kurasini, Dar es Salaam. 

  1. Moses Kulaba, Executive Director Governance and Economic Policy Center, Moderator

Moses Kulaba is a political economist, Governance, policy and tax law expert, and trained as an economic diplomat with over 20 years of experience in the public and civil society sector.  Has researched and written on the subjects of  elections and governance, including the Ten Principles for free and fair elections in Tanzania. He is currently the Executive Director of Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Date: Friday, 29th August, 2025

Time:  15:00 (3PM) Nairobi Time, 14hrs (CAT), 12pm Lagos

Register in advance for this webinar via: https://us06web.zoom.us/meeting/register/A-yOjAcRStCEn2Y3U3B97Q


After registering, you will receive a confirmation email containing information about joining the meeting.

 

 

Geopolitics of Critical Minerals: An Analysis of the strategic gains and risks offered by the EU Strategic Partnership, Lobito Corridor and Minerals for Security deals on East and Southern Africa’s Critical Transition Minerals
 

Featured photo credit: Sipa photo by Graeme Sloan via AP).

Authors: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre and Robert Letsatsi, Botswana Watch Organization

Background

The surging demand for minerals critical to green transition offers potential economic benefits for mineral rich countries however the dash to secure their supply chain has kicked off geopolitical interests, competition and realignments whose outcomes could have long lasting relationship with divergent unforeseen impacts. With the Eastern and Southern Africa combined as a single economic bloc, the region has the highest concentration of critical green transition minerals such as cobalt, coltan, nickel, graphite, tungsten, tantalum, copper in the world. Yet the history of governance and management of the mineral sector has never yielded very positive dividends for mineral-rich countries in the region. Minerals have fueled conflicts in the DRC and Mozambique, Debt traps in Zambia, political patronage and environmental concerns in Zimbabwe and economic inequalities in South Africa and Botswana.

So far, the EU has signed Critical Minerals Strategic Partnerships with 5 Africa green minerals rich countries and the US led Lobito Mineral Corridor partnership plan to connect the Democratic Republic Congo’s mineral rich Katanga region and Zambia with a railway line to the Angolan Port of Lobito.  Moreover, in recent months we witnessed the emergence of minerals for security deals signed between the US and Ukraine and the US with the DRC and Rwanda.  These developments offer a new geopolitical twist in this global race to secure the critical green transition minerals, pitting the developed western economic superpowers against China in the dash for Africa’s critical mineral resources. Amidst this mineral dash and geopolitical balkanization, it is feared that without strategic positioning, the Eastern and Southern Africa critical minerals rich countries could again miss out from this mineral boom.

Overview of Critical Minerals in Eastern and Southern Africa

East Africa is vastly endowed with critical minerals with Tanzania having the 5th largest graphite reserves globally (18million tons) and 1.52 million tons of high-grade nickel. With the DRC combined, the East Africa has accounts for more than 50% of Africa’s critical minerals output of graphite, copper, cobalt, coltan and nickel. The DRC holds the world’s largest cobalt reserves, accounting for about 70% global output and ranks as Africa’s largest and the world’s second-largest copper producer. The DRC government is working on policies to improve governance, local beneficiation, and attract ethical investment while reducing dependency on Chinese processing.

Despite this potential, EAC as a block has not yet maximized benefits from its mineral wealth and member states have been working on competing policies to improve governance, attract ethical investments and increase local beneficiation.

Mineral Resources in EAC

Country

Precious metal, Gemstones & Semi-Precious Metal

Metallic Minerals

Industrial minerals

Burundi

Gold

Tin, Nickel, copper, cobalt, niobium, coltan, vanadium, tungsten

Phosphate, Peat

Kenya

Gemstones, gold

Lead, zircon, iron, titanium

Soda ash, flour spar, salt, mica, chaum, oil, coal, diatomite, gypsum, meers, kaolin, rear earth

Rwanda

Gold, gemstones

Tin, tungsten, tantalum, niobium, columbium

pozzolana

Tanzania

Gold, diamond, gemstones, silver, PGMs

Nickel, bauxite, copper, cobalt, uranium, graphite

Coal, phosphate, gypsum, pozzolana, soda ash, gas

Uganda

Gold, diamond

Copper, tin, lead, nickel, cobalt, tungsten, uranium, niobium, tantalum, iron

Gypsum, kaolin, salt, vermiculite, pozzolana, marble, soapstone, rear earth, oil

Source: EAC Vision 2050 and South Sudan Development Strategy

Southern Africa holds vast deposits of the world’s critical minerals. For example, South Africa holds the largest (90%) reserves of Platinum Group Minerals (PGMs) globally[1]. South Africa and Zimbabwe account for 92% of global reserves of PGM and produced 82% of platinum globally in 2022[2].  Zambia has large Copper deposits accounting for 70% of Africa’s exports while Zimbabwe has the largest lithium reserves globally (estimated at 11 metric tons in Masvingo Province). Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia and Angola have some of the largest deposits of diamond. Angola has been diversifying beyond oil and diamonds, promoting critical minerals exploration and processing. The government is enhancing mining regulations, attracting foreign investment, and seeking strategic partnerships to develop local value chains. As one of the world’s top ten largest copper producers, Zambia is strengthening policies to boost value addition, encourage local smelting and refining, and attract Western investment. Zambia is Africa’s second-largest copper producer after Democratic Republic of Congo and the country is positioning itself as a major supplier in clean energy and EV industries.

From the above data, the Eastern and Southern Africa combined accounts for more than half of the global supply of critical minerals such as copper, coltan, platinum, graphite, manganese, nickel and lithium. In recent years there has been an increasing focus towards critical minerals with global mining exploration budgets for minerals such as lithium, copper and nickel rapidly spiking up since 2022.  This places the East and Southern Africa region at the heart of competing geopolitical interest in race for the control of critical minerals supply chains. In the midst of this rush, the Eastern and Southern Africa region countries have been competing amongst themselves and undercutting each other to attract key large-scale players in the mining sector. This race has both socio-economic, human rights and geopolitical risks and concerns.

What are the key socio-economic justice concerns in the mining sector

The history of mining in the region has not been perfect. Like in previous mining experiences generally, increased extraction of critical minerals raises serious key socio-economic justice concerns like environmental injustice, gross violation of human rights, climate change, community displacement and land grabbing, lack of transparency and accountability, corruption and unequal distribution of benefits. Such concerns have been put in even greater spotlight, where demand for these minerals worldwide began to rise and will surge over the next 20 years in support of the energy transition and technological advancements.

Mining of critical minerals is happening in new land frontiers never explored or exposed to large scale mining before. This contributes to significant environment impacts around villages and communities where they are found. Their effects range from land rights violations via new evictions to destruction of social infrastructures such as schools, hospitals and residential homes due to blasting for minerals[1]. Land degradation, dust pollution and loss of arable agricultural land through clearances for new mines affects health and livelihoods. Processing of minerals such as Lithium and Nickel requires a lot of water and this is contributing to water shortages and pollution of water sources around the mining communities[2].   

Moreover, critical minerals are driving existing and new conflicts in many African countries such as the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Mozambique. According to UN reports, the desire to control exploitation of critical minerals are a major driver for the ongoing conflict in DRC[1].

Geopolitics of Critical Minerals

The increasing demand and competition for critical minerals is driving unending geopolitical tensions over which countries can gain access to these resources and how best to manage them.  As the geopolitical competition amongst global economic superpowers; China, US, EU, Russia, United Kingdom and new emerging powers such as Australia, UAE and India has increased in recent years. The strategic partnerships and infrastructure partnerships such as the Lobito corridor have been signed.  Recently, we have witnessed the emergence of ‘Mineral for Security deals’ such as the ones signed between the US- Ukraine and the US- DRC aimed at transferring control of a portion of critical mineral supplies in exchange for security guarantees and protection. There are many geopolitical interests and tools used at play but these are the noticeable physical manifestations of this geopolitical competition for critical minerals.

The consequences of these new geopolitical realignments are diverse but alignments and signed deals force smaller countries to surrender sovereignty of their mineral natural resources by attach their political interest to the supply of critical minerals. There has been a surge in the use of counter friendshoring measures by importing countries establishing direct partnerships with exporting countries for raw critical minerals. While this may be viewed as a positive development for minerals and commodities trade, the tilted partnerships reinforce the underdevelopment of the downstream supply chain capacity for critical minerals, especially as developed countries secure the Just Energy Transition (JET) technologies. And are not willing yet to transfer this technology to the minerals source countries. The complex dynamics and intricate geopolitical forces surrounding critical minerals therefore demands a comprehensive and forward-thinking strategy to effectively navigate the evolving global landscape[2]. Without this, the risk of securing little benefits from the critical mineral wealth for Eastern and Southern Africa is real.

The EU Strategic Minerals Partnerships and implications on Africa’s critical Minerals

Amid global geopolitical tensions, the EU has been ramping up efforts to diversify its mineral value chains. The EU has forged strategic partnerships with critical minerals resource-rich African nations like Tanzania, Namibia, DRC, Zambia and Rwanda. To date the EU has established partnerships for critical raw materials with at least 14 countries[3]. These partnerships are designed to secure access to critical minerals at various stages of the value chain, strengthen European industrial resilience and accelerate the green transition of its economies while supporting Africa’s own industrialization ambitions. The EU has further established a multistakeholder partnership with the US to develop the Lobito corridor project[4]. While these partnerships are considered vital in ensuring improved mineral governance and securing investment inflows into Africa’s mining sector, on the flipside they are viewed controversially as a strategic path for continued EU dominance by tightly tying Africa as a source of raw critical materials to feed Europe’s industrial base.

The EU strategic minerals partnerships have a prospect of placing Africa as a global player in the critical minerals space and potentially securing Africa’s contributing towards a net zero future. According to the EU, the strategic partnerships will involve cooperation on supply chain integration, infrastructure financing, research and innovation, capacity building, and sustainable sourcing of minerals. With strategic leverage and tactful negotiation, Africa can potentially wean itself off the largely exploitative contracts previously signed with mining companies that were economically biased, had disregard for human rights and responsible sourcing. Without tearing the existing contracts apart, Africa can establish a new progressive framework to guide its mining

However, the EU mineral partnerships are viewed as inherently biased and pursued with less consideration of socio-economic and environmental considerations. According to SOMO, the EU strategic partnerships are not good for addressing climate change and net zero. Despite the green tint, the EU is focused on the minerals and less on the effects. Europe is ultimately pursuing a resource-intensive growth strategy to bolster its industries in profiting from low-emission technologies. This prioritization of growth neglects that affluent countries’ overconsumption of resources is the root cause of climate change and the major driver of biodiversity loss, pollution, and waste. Worse, the unfavorable trade regimes [secured under the partnerships] can prevent poor resource-rich countries from climbing up global value chains

The Lobito Corridor Initiative and its implications

The Lobito Corridor is a 1 300 km rail and infrastructure project stretching from the Angolan port of Lobito to mining regions of Kolwezi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia. Financed by the US and its EU allies, the project provides an alternative route to transport minerals such as cobalt and copper, helping to diversify mineral supply chains in the region.

According to the US Department for Finance Corporation (DFC), the Lobito corridor initiative is not just any traditional development aid project but a strategic initiative aimed at strengthening critical mineral supply chains by countering China’s dominance[1]

Justification for the Lobito Corridor Project

According to the US Department for Finance Corporation (DFC) the Lobito Corridor project is poised to spur trade, industrialization, and regional integration across Southern Africa. The advanced technologies required for the industries of the future depend on reliable access to copper and cobalt. These minerals are essential for batteries, wind farms, electric vehicles, as well as energy transmission and distribution.

But critical mineral supply chains are threatened by Chinese dominance. Companies based in China own or operate as much as 80 percent of the critical mineral production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), much of which is sent to China for processing. And China is pushing new projects to further secure its dominance, adding to the estimated $1 trillion it has spent on its global infrastructure initiative known as its Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI. 

Additionally, many of the world’s most mineral-rich countries such as the DRC lack the infrastructure to transport growing volumes of these materials to major coastal ports where they can be exported to markets around the world. DRC is the second-largest global producer of copper, and the largest producer of cobalt with a 70 percent global market share[2].

Key gains from Lobito Corridor Initiative

Offers an opportunity of revitalizing defunct infrastructure in a region severely affected by war. A railway built more than 100 years ago connecting mining sites in the DRC to the Lobito port in Angola was largely destroyed during the Angolan civil war. A reconstructed railway suffered from poor construction and upkeep. As a result, these critical minerals are currently transported by heavy-duty trucks to ports in South Africa and Tanzania over roads that can take months to travel. Growing demand for critical minerals threatens to exacerbate the problem. Analysts predict that cobalt demand will exceed the pace of production before the end of 2024 and thereby justifying the construction of new infrastructure projects such as the Lobito Corridor project[3].

The Lobito corridor project provides an opportunity for opening up new investments into the region.  According to the initial plans the US Finance Cooperation would provide a $553 million loan to the Lobito Atlantic Railway to finance the upgrade and rehabilitation of more than 800 miles (1,300 km) of the rail connecting the city of Luau on the border of the DRC to the port city of Lobito in Angola, as well as the upgrade and rehabilitation of the mineral port in Lobito.

The investment is intended to improve the cost-effectiveness, speed, and resilience of global supply chains by upgrading and rehabilitating the railway in Angola that increases the efficiency and reliability of transportation out of the DRC’s mines. And it ensures China will not secure a monopoly on critical minerals access and transit routes in this key region.  

Over the last decade, China had subsidized new construction and upgrades to rail systems in the region, including in Angola, DFC’s neighbor to the west and home to several key coastal transportation hubs, such as the Port of Lobito and the Benguela Railway that extends eastward from it into the DRC. Chinese companies and China-linked entities have worked to control regional transportation systems and restrict access to U.S. and allied businesses, creating challenges to investments in markets like the DRC. However, those projects have suffered from what The Wall Street Journal described as “poor construction and upkeep,” leading to “rundown stations, malfunctioning safety systems offline servers and frequent derailments on the train line.”

DFC’s investment will diversify away from Chinese-controlled economic corridors. It will reinforce railway tracks and bridges along the route and add containers, trains, and equipment such as mobile cranes and forklifts. These investments are expected to increase Lobito’s transportation capacity from 0.4 million metric tons per year as of the end of 2024 to 4.6 million metric tons. It will also benefit the local economy, where minerals make up 90 percent of the DRC’s total exports, accounting for 40 percent of its GDP and $30 billion in value as of last year.

 Through the upgraded railway, port, and corresponding sea routes, exports for these critical minerals to global markets are expected on average to cost 30 percent less and take 29 fewer days. Lobito and projects like will bolster trade access in and around Angola. The coordination led by DFC—which is poised to expand to new projects— presents a boom for U.S. industries, with Angolan organizations already looking to source equipment from the United States for mining, storage, and other integral elements of the project. 

More broadly, the Lobito project strengthens Angola’s role as a key security and economic partner of the United States and as a leader in Sub-Saharan Africa working to resolve issues—including those that affect American interests such as the peace process in eastern DRC. Angolan President João Lourenço also recently assumed the role of chairman of the African Union, and the Lobito project is considered as a potential lever for influencing positions and securing other strategic projects across Africa.  

According to the US DFC, within Angola, the project will upgrade critical infrastructure to international standards and will ensure that access to rail remains open to all paying customers. It is expected to create a 30% reduction in shipping costs and 29 day reduction in shipping time as a result of the DFC’s investment in the Lobito Atlantic Railway. Moreover, it is expected to generate significant local income there, with total local procurement of goods and services expected to reach more than $350 million within the first five years.  

And it is expected to create more than 1,000 new full-time jobs for Angolans, growing the existing workforce from 434 to more than 1,500. Other support projects will benefit from the investments in the Lobito Corridor.   For example, a $10 million loan from DFC to Seba Foods Zambia Ltd. is designed to support the expansion of its food production and storage capacity for maize-based, soya-based, and other nutritious and affordable consumer food products, strengthening the food value chain in Zambia, which is on the eastern end of the Lobito Corridor. Seba Foods was the first U.S. Government-financed food security and agribusiness-focused investment following the announcement of the vision for the Lobito Corridor. 

The Lobito Corridor initiative exemplifies the competition, with the US and EU aligning efforts to establish stronger supply chains. China, already investing heavily, aims to enhance its Belt and Road Initiative along the corridor. The US has indicated that China can still utilize the railway for its exports. The US-China cooperation on this project may create new avenues for sustainable development in Africa. If the two superpowers align their Lobito strategies, it could accelerate Africa’s green industrialization. Jointly-driven investments would align with Africa’s broader economic growth and sustainable development goals. Africa’s potential for growth will attract both powers, as both seek competitive positions within the Lobito Corridor. China has already recently signed a $1 billion deal to restore the TAZARA railway[4].

Key concerns of the Lobito Corridor Initiative
CSOs are concerned the Lobito Corridor project exemplifies the geopolitical interests to serve the US and EU interests rather than Africa (Zambia Angola & DRC’s) interests. As clearly stated by the US and the EU, the Lobito corridor initiative is intended to strategically increase the US and EU’s dominance and security of access to Africa’s critical minerals supply chains and diversifying Africa away from Chinese-controlled economic corridors. This project is therefore largely driven by external interests and Africa finds itself in the middle of these competing geopolitical interests.

The project exacerbates the colonial hinterland to port extractive infrastructure, designed with a major purpose of extracting and transporting Africa’s resources as raw materials from the hinterland to the port ready for export to benefit elsewhere. The Lobito initiative railway project has no interconnection with other transport nodes to facilitate in country mobility and connectivity to other economic sectors. It is therefore designed with an exploitative lens driven with an ‘extract and take away’ mindset, with less beneficial considerations to the broader national public concerns. Financing of arteries linking the railway to other transport infrastructures would address significant infrastructure problems affecting millions of people across the countries in the corridor. For example, an East-West railway connection could link Lobito and TAZARA routes, creating Africa’s first transcontinental railway. Such a corridor could bridge the Atlantic and Indian ocean[1].

The project will be financed with loans acquired from the US and EU, whose payment will be recouped from revenues from the operations and sale of the critical minerals. This is ironical as the lenders will be the major beneficiaries from the mineral export. The long-term net effect or benefit from these may be negligible as the debt burden for the corridor countries (Angola, DRC and Zambia) will increase and they may be forced to pay using their minerals resources.

The strategic partnerships and Lobito corridor project have no plans to investment in critical minerals value addition with in the participating countries. As a consequence, the project may consolidate Africa’s exclusion from the critical minerals global value chain, locking Africa to lower tier of the value chain as a supplier of critical raw materials.   Current studies and evidence show that Africa integration in the Global Value Chain is largely through forward linkages whereby it primarily provides unprocessed raw materials to feed the industrial development and economic prosperity elsewhere.

For example , the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and UNCTAD data shows that the DRC and Zambia refine only about 7% and 3.5% of all the copper produced, which is far much lower than their share in the global production.[2] In recent years China has emerged as the leading processor of critical minerals (Lithium, Copper, Nickel & Cobalt) implying that Africa’s minerals are exported raw, processed and re-exported back to Africa as intermediary or finished goods.

Moreover, the Lobito corridor does not promote intra Africa trade in minerals and therefore runs contrary to Africa’s mineral and economic development ambitions as articulated in the various propositions of the Africa Unions Agenda 2063 and the Africa Mining Vision particularly in regards to regional cooperation and beneficiation. The USGS report for 2023 shows that African Minerals are largely traded with countries outside Africa. For instance, the DRC accounts for 77% of Africa’s cobalt exports, however, its intra Africa links are few. This suggests its trade is largely more with countries outside the continent. Several countries with insignificant cobalt reserves and production re-export more beneficiated cobalt through regional networks as indicated in the table below, reaping bigger economic benefits from added value. 

Table showing Africa Major Critical Minerals Export Destination, Intra Africa Trade and Linkages

Africa Critical Mineral

Top Five Global Export Destinations

Africa trading partners

Intra Africa trade share

Implication

Cobalt

China (72%), Belgium (2%), Malaysia (2%), Switzerland (2%)

Zambia, Namibia, Morocco, Congo, Madagascar, South Africa, DR Congo, Mali, Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, and Kenya.

South Africa (1%), DRC (89% to Zambia, Namibia and Morocco), Congo (4.4%), Zambia (3.5%)

The top five global destinations consume 80% of Africa’s cobalt

More of DRC’s cobalt is re-exported by other countries.

Graphite

China (28%), Germany (15%), India (9%), USA (7%) and Malaysia (7%)

Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Niger, Guinea, Tanzania, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Sudan, Namibia, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, Mozambique, Cameroon, Egypt, 30 Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mauritius, Ghana, Botswana, Libya, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, and Mali.

South Africa (51%), Tanzania (14%), Seychelle (12%), Kenya & Morocco (3%).

The top five global destinations account for 64% of Africa’s Graphite export

These countries export to fewer African countries. Tanzania only has eight intra-Africa graphite export links (Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, DR Congo, Burundi, Comoros and Madagascar, while Seychelles has one (South Africa)

Lithium

France (7%), USA (5%), Russia (1%) Germany & China (2%)

36 African Countries

DRC (77%), South Africa (15%), Morocco (1%), Tanzania (1%)

The top five consume 15% of Africa total lithium exports from at 36 countries

DRC has the lowest intra exports links to Africa while South Africa, Kenya and Morrocco lead in number of intra Africa export links.

Managanese

China (58%), India (10%), Norway (5%), Japan (4%), and Russia (3%)

31 African Countries

Morocco (42%), Zambia (11%), South Africa (20%), Ghana (1%)

These countries account for about 80% of Africa’s Manganese exports outside Africa.

Morocco, South Africa, and Zambia (in consecutive order) emerge as countries with the highest intra-Africa export shares for Manganese.

South Africa and Kenya have the highest intra-Africa export links.

Platinum Group of Metals (PGM)

United Kingdom accounting for about 28%, Japan 17%, Belgium about 15%, United States of America 12% and Germany 9%.

45 Countries

Zimbabwe (86%), Ghana and DRC (3%),

These countries account for about 89% of Africa’s PGM export outside the region

South Africa has the highest intra-Africa export links to thirteen countries, followed by Swaziland and Malawi

 

In the long run, the Lobito corridor project will potentially weaken further existing limited intra Africa linkages and collaborative projects by setting up or creating an unfavorable competition for already existing infrastructure such as the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) and the Ports of Dar es Salaam, Beira in Mozambique and Durban, which have recently received major uplifts with costly loans from China and other global financial institutions such as the World Bank.

The Lobito Corridor project excludes itself from other major problems facing mining in the region, including addressing previous economic injustices and human rights related issues, the long-term effects of war and climate change. Because of the fear of being edged out by China, the Lobito corridor project does not come with stringent requirements and expectation for adherence to high human rights standards by the partner countries.

Mineral for Security Deals and implications on Africa’s critical minerals.

Amidst the ongoing geopolitical interest for critical minerals, recently we have witnessed the emergence of Minerals for Security Guarantee deals as a tool for control of access to critical minerals supply chains. On 30th April 2025 the US signed a Minerals for security deal with Ukraine and in June, the US signed a Mineral for Security deal with the DRC and Rwanda. The deals provide access to critical minerals in return for security guarantees from the US. Although the deals have been covered with a peace and conflict resolution imperative, they are essentially aimed at securing the US’s access to critical minerals.

According to Global witness, the deals like the extraction and trade of some critical minerals intensify new geopolitical tensions, reinforcing long-standing patterns of exploitation[3] including conflicts. The Trump Ukraine deal revealed a connection of critical minerals to the Russia and Ukraine war and how critical mineral natural resources in Ukraine have become a key bargaining chip in international diplomacy between the US and Russia.

In fact, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo reached out to the Donald Trump administration with a Ukrainian-style proposal in February 2025 in response to the rapid advance of the M23 rebel group in the east of the country. At stake are the mineral riches of North and South Kivu provinces, a major but highly problematic source of metals such as tin, tungsten and coltan[4].

According to different sources, this deal was presented as a pacification tool for eastern DRC and once signed could boost Rwanda’s processing of Congo minerals while providing the US with an assured source of processed critical minerals required to support its industrial technology and security needs.

The full contents of deal are not readily available to the public but leaked versions mentioned requirements for withdrawal of Rwandan Forces from the Eastern DRC and integration of the M23 belligerent factions into the DRC’s forces.

The mineral deals essentially consolidate a firm grip of the US on access to DRC’s critical minerals, closing off competition against other potential rival countries such as China and Russia, there by exacerbating grounds for economic injustice, opacity, lack of transparency and potential for unfair mining deals, biased in favour of the security guarantors. Mineral deals are tainted with opacity, designed with a biased exploitative and a perceived neocolonial mindset aimed at rewarding the dominant superpower and the aggressor against the victim. They are negotiated behind closed doors and their full terms are not availed neither to the public nor the citizens of the mineral rich country.

According to Kambale Musavuli of the Centre for Research on Congo-Kinshasa, the US brokered deal between the DRC and Rwanda is wild. The US is getting access to $2 trillion of worth of DRC minerals in exchange for forcing the withdrawal of Rwandan backed M23 militias. That is one tenth of the DRC’s total mineral wealth, more than any single foreign country claims. This is strange because analysts of the region have long argued that the US effectively enabled Rwandan support for the M23 in order to destabilise the DRC, prevent a functional state from arising and achieving sovereignty over its mineral wealth, and thus ensure minerals stay cheaply available for US firms. If this analysis is correct then the US has just acquired $2 trillion mineral rights in exchange for stopping a conflict that it has effectively supported. Consider also how medi discourse is playing out. Remember that in 2008 Chinese firms signed a deal with the DRC to obtain $9billion in minerals in exchange for infrastructure development. Western media went wild with narratives of “Chinese colonization”. Now the US has secured minerals deal 200x larger and the media narrative is all about how the US brings “peace”

The mining security deals were negotiated in secrecy led by political elites and diplomats. As such citizens are disempowered from having a say in the future management of a vital sector, whose benefits are signed off to another country by a few, dashing hopes for citizens stake into a better future.

The minimum threshold of minerals signed off in the form of US mining companies investing in the critical minerals sector is not clear and whether the DRC has any stake at what percentage in the minerals extracted by the US companies is largely unknown.

The deals potentially open up a can of worms for future similar deals, covering natural resources such as forestry, wild life management and critical infrastructure such as ports, airports, water ways and food supply chains.

Moreover, the deals may not be a permanent solution to ongoing conflicts. The mineral for security deals largely covers security guarantees against ‘external aggression’ and may not be fitted for dealing with internal political and socio-economic drivers for conflict such as historical injustices, land and citizenship rights, regional economic imbalances, bad governance and banditry. Local insurgent rebel groups and militias may continue to pursue their political and economic ends outside the ambits of the security deal. For example, on the very day that the US-DRC and Rwanda deal was signed, one of the rebel groups, Codeco militia attacked and killed at least 10 people at a displaced people’s camp in Ituri province.  There are more than 100 rebel groups in Eastern DRC. The M23 which was largely mentioned in the US deal has already described it as a tiny part’ of a solution to the conflict.

Further, the security guarantees provided under the deal are not clear. It is not clear what these mean and when and how such guarantees can be deployed. For instance, does security guarantee mean supply of arms or armed mercenaries, military intervention or alliances with US soldiers fighting alongside or against the aggressor. Moreover, it is not clear whether the US can be directly involved in fighting internal rebel groups and insurgents without triggering nationalistic and constitutional challenges, driving internal political conflicts further.

By nature, deals of this nature are long term and cannot easily be breached without consequences. The terms and consequences for such breach are less known to the public. The conditions for termination or renegotiation are equally not known.  Therefore, the mineral security agreement essentially locks countries towards dealing with one major economic superpower whose primary interest is access to the country’s critical mineral wealth.

Conclusion

The EU strategic partnerships, the mineral security guarantee deals and the Lobito project may entirely not be a bad idea, however their implicit risks cast shadows about their potential in advancing Africa’s critical minerals and economic development goals. The key concerns around these strategic mineral alliances and the Lobito Corrido are embedded within the broader critical development discourse of recolonization and recolonization, sovereignty, security and resource nationalism, state capture, perpetration of socio-economic injustices by dominant global capital and Africa’s wealth transfer. Specific concerns include risks for increasing mineral bad governance and economic injustices and vulnerabilities, geopolitical tension, and the need to pursue sustainable mining practices.

With these strategic partnerships, mineral for security deals and the Lobito railway in place, these countries are locked into long-term commitments to ensure the supply of metals. Without good governance and value addition,  Africa’s critical minerals will benefit others elsewhere. Over dependence on certain countries can pose risks when such countries face political instability or become embroiled in geopolitical disputes drawing in Africa’s mineral rich countries in their midst. For these alliances to be mutually beneficial, they must ensure that the resources are accessed equitably, that benefits are fairly distributed, and that environmental impacts are kept to a minimum for their sustainability in the long run.

Recommendations
  1. The strategic partnerships must go beyond critical minerals exploitation but venture into addressing broader social economic development concerns of the people in the mineral rich countries.
  2. The Lobito Corridor initiative must avoid the ‘hinterland to port’ colonial legacy by establishing railway transport interconnection nodes to other existing railway infrastructure so as to improve connectivity across the project countries to ease the bigger infrastructure challenges that these countries face.
  3. The strategic partnership and Lobito Corridor must encourage value addition by investing in processing and exporting of value-added products, so as to generate wealth at source.
  4. Africa Mineral rich countries must explore and establish south to south partnerships, thereby increasing their leverage and power to negotiate with external partners and mining companies
  5. The EU strategic partnerships and the Lobito Corridor project must not exacerbate the role of minerals as drivers of conflict by supporting and buying minerals from conflict zones.
  6. Moreover, these alliances must ensure that the resources are accessed equitably, that benefits are fairly distributed, and that environmental impacts are kept to a minimum for their sustainability in the long run.
  7. The Minerals for security deals must be transparent and not biased exclusively in favour of the dominant economic super power.
  8. The Minerals for Security deals must avoid advancing human rights abuses by US mining companies under the US government protection
  9. The strategic partnerships, security deals and their associated projects must promote national dialogues and citizens participation in governance of critical minerals and mitigation of harm from mining
Selected References

Andreoni et al., (2023) Critical Minerals and routes to diversification in Africa: Linkages, pulling dynamics and Opportunities in medium-high tech supply chains; Backup paper commissioned by the UNCTAD Secretariate for the 2023 edition of the Economic Development in Africa Reports

Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

EITI; Using Transparence Benefits EU Mineral Partnerships; Accessed via https://eiti.org/blog-post/using-transparency-benefit-eus-mineral-partnerships

Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via  https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025

IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[1] https://www.railway.supply/en/us-china-lobito-corridor-investments-drive-africas-economic-and-sustainable-growth/

[2] Andreoni et al., (2023) Critical Minerals and routes to diversification in Africa: Linkages, pulling dynamics and Opportunities in medium-high tech supply chains; Backup paper commissioned by the UNCTAD Secretariate for the 2023 edition of the Economic Development in Africa Reports

[3] Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via  https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025

[4] Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

[1] US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.

[2] ibid

[3] ibid

[4] https://www.railway.supply/en/us-china-lobito-corridor-investments-drive-africas-economic-and-sustainable-growth/

[1] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[2] ibid

[3] https://eiti.org/blog-post/using-transparency-benefit-eus-mineral-partnerships

[4] https://ecfr.eu/event/critical-minerals-and-eu-africa-strategic-partnerships-where-do-we-stand/

[1] BHRT: Briefing on “Human Rights Incidents in Transition Minerals; Quarter 1: January-March 2025

[2] Emerging Human Rights Implications of Transition Minerals Extraction and processing: Case Studies from Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Zimbabwe

[1] https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202505/critical-minerals-and-metals-strategy-south-africa-2025.pdf

[2] https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/edar2023_BP1_en.pdf

Webinar on Geopolitics of Critical Minerals and implications for Eastern and Southern Africa

Topic: An Analysis of the strategic gains and risks offered by the EU Strategic Partnership, Lobito Corridor and Minerals for Security deals on East and Southern Africa’s Critical Transition Minerals

The surging demand for minerals critical to green transition offers potential economic benefits for mineral rich countries however the dash to secure their supply chain has kicked off geopolitical interests, competition and realignments whose outcomes could have long lasting relationship with divergent unforeseen impacts.

With the Eastern and Southern Africa combined as a single economic bloc, the region has the highest concentration of critical green transition minerals such as cobalt, coltan, nickel, graphite, tungsten, tantalum, copper in the world. Yet the history of governance and management of the mineral sector has never yielded very positive dividends for mineral-rich countries in the region. Minerals have fueled conflicts in the DRC and Mozambique, Debt traps in Zambia, political patronage and environmental concerns in Zimbabwe and economic inequalities in South Africa and Botswana.

This webinar will provide an overview of the critical mineral wealth in Eastern and Southern Africa with a particular focus on the strategic gains and risks that geopolitical initiatives such as the EU Strategic Minerals Partnerships, the Lobito Corridor and emerging minerals for security deals offer. It is estimated that the mining industry needs to invest $1.7 trillion over the next 15 years to extract and supply enough metals for renewable energy and Africa possess almost half of these.   

The webinar will discuss the geostrategic machinations at play by superpowers such as the US, Europe, Russia and China in the context of the dash for control of critical minerals for the green transition and the current extractive governance challenges facing the region. While strategic alliances may not entirely be a bad idea, there are concerns over the underlying possible geopolitical, security and perceived neocolonial undertones that may come with these initiatives.

And how the historical socio-economic justice concerns of similar geopolitical jostling, security guarantees at the Berlin conference and hinterland to port initiatives contributed to the colonial exploitation of Africa’s resources for benefits elsewhere. Moreover, the mineral for security deals are tainted with opacity, designed with a biased potentially exploitative and a perceived neocolonial mindset aimed at rewarding the dominant superpower and the aggressor against the victim in exchange for its resource. The minerals for security deals are negotiated behind closed doors and their full terms are not availed neither to the public nor the citizens of the mineral rich country.

Amidst this mineral dash and possible geopolitical balkanization, it is feared that without strategic positioning, the Eastern and Southern Africa critical minerals rich countries could again miss out from this mineral boom.

Our expert speakers at this webinar will delve deeper into this topic, highlighting on the possible risks and benefits that the region can garner from these initiatives and measures the region can take so as to avert the risks and maximize benefits from these partnerships. This webinar is organized by the Governance and Economic Policy Centre in Collaboration with Botswana Watch Organisation. 

Our distinguished speakers will be

  1. Ketakandriana Rafitoson, Executive Director, Resource Justice Network (formerly PWYP): Key concerns for critical minerals Governance and our desired sustainable future. Dr Ketakandriana is a political scientist, researcher, activist, and human rights defender with distinguished career in anti-corruption, where she served as leader of Transparency International Chapter in Madagascar. Her work mainly focuses on issues of resource governance, anti-corruption, citizens’ participation, good governance and democracy.

 

  1. Adriano Nuvunga, Executive Director, Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (CDD), Mozambique: The Geopolitics of critical minerals, neocolonial extractivism and conflict. Prof Adriano Nuvunga is a Mozambican scholar, anti-corruption advocate and human rights defender. He is the director of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CDD), an organization that promotes democracy and protects human rights in Mozambique and Professor of professor of political science and governance at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. He has widely published on resource governance and violence in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province.

 

  1. Mr Robert Lestatsi, Executive Director, Botswana Watch Organisation; Assessing the Lobito corridor project and Africa’s desired benefits from critical mineral wealth. Robert Letsatsi is the Executive Director of Botswana Watch (BW), an organization focused on promoting transparency and accountability in Botswana. He is also involved with the PWYP coalition in Botswana and the UNCAC Coalition, an international anti-corruption network. Additionally, he has been involved in advocacy of mineral resource governance and training on human rights violations, in collaboration with Ditshwanelo – The Botswana Centre for Human Rights.
  1. Moses Kulaba, Executive Director, Governance and Economic Policy Centre, Moderator. Mr Moses Kulaba is a Governance and political economist, tax law expert and economic diplomat with more than 20 years of active service in international public, private and civil society sector.  Prior to joining GEPC he served as the East Africa Regional Manager for the Natural Resources Governance Institute, where he worked with various stakeholders including governments to advance governance of the extractive sector. Has served on the international board of the EITI and in consultancy roles for DFID , the EU and the UN on governance, extractives and peace processes in Eastern and Africa Great Lakes region.

 Date: 30th July, 2025

Time: 12pm EAT, 11 AM Gaborone (CAT) and 9 AM Lagos

Login:  https://us05web.zoom.us/j/84450912293?pwd=lwabYIwsvJ27A8bP0v8hVQpaUOaYQ3.1

Meeting ID: 844 5091 2293

Passcode: 7XFcHc

Political Risk and Investment in EA: An Expose of violent tax protests and political risk on Trade and Investment in East Africa

In our previous brief on Tax and Fiscal governance in East Africa, we observed that with dwindling foreign aid, it appears the governments in East Africa have resorted to squeezing everywhere to raise some dime.  We cautioned that Taxation may be good however, when the extremes are beyond reasonableness, governments are bound to break their break the back of the economies they aspire to build[1]. The recent and ongoing tax protests that have rocked the East African regions, with violence and vandalism spiraling out of control in Kenya, clearly underscore this point. A failed tax administration and an irate society.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

@taxjustice @politicalrisk

Freedom of expression, the right to picket and demonstrate and resist punitive taxation has been established over the years.  The doctrine of no taxation without proper representation was long established by the Romans, Greeks and Americans during the famous Boston Tea Party 1773) and American war of independence, The French Revolution and the English, paving way into the famous Magna Carta.

This was further advanced by Adam Smith in his legendary Canons of Taxation asserting that generally, a good tax system must be underlined by proportionality and ability to pay[2] and political scientist Harold D Laswell’s tax law of who pays, what and when, and each individual or group should “pay their fair share. These principles that tax liability should be based on the taxpayer’s ability to pay is accepted in most countries as one of the bases of a socially just tax system and generally citizens are duty bound to reject a system that is regarded as unfair and disproportionally beyond their means[3].

However, when peaceful protests and demonstrations strategically drift towards violence, vandalism and murder like the ones we saw in Kenya, then these effectively transform into high level political risks to trade and investment.

According to multiple sources a political risk is a type of risk faced by investors, corporations, and governments that political decisions, events, or conditions will significantly affect the profitability of a business actor or the expected value of a given economic action. In simple terms, a political risk is the possibility that your business could suffer because of instability or political changes in a country: conflicts and unrest, changes in regime or government, changes in international policies or relations between countries, as well as changes that occur in a country’s policies, business laws or investment regulations[4]. Examples of political risks include; unilateral state decisions, war, terrorism, and civil unrest

By their nature, these risks are expensive to be insured against and constitute a major determinant factor for business in deciding where to invest or do business. Highly political risk countries experience sharp declines in investment and may attract low new trade and investments flows.

According to Trade and Investment experts such as Pierre Lamourelle, Deputy Global Head of Specialty Credit within Allianz Trade for Multinationals, the interconnected nature of the global economy makes it very possible that a political risk in one country may affect many businesses across the globe.

“What has changed in the 25 years since I started in this business is that we are living in a more connected world today,” says Pierre. On the upside, that means business is easier to conduct on a global scale. Almost everybody now has the ability to reach out to emerging countries or to conclude a contract and secure a sale in a foreign country.

On the downside, this means that when something goes wrong in one part of the world, you can feel the impact halfway around the globe – directly, if you are dealing with the country in question, or indirectly because of your diverse supply chain. Remember when the 20,000-ton container ship “Ever Given” got stuck in the Suez Canal in March 2021, shutting down international trade for a week?

In today’s increasingly interconnected world, “just-in-time” supply chains, global internet connection, and smartphones give SMEs the ability to conduct business in a global arena. This means the possibility for great opportunities, but also that every business is just steps away from political risk.

Persistent violent tax protests can make it difficult and unpredictable for the government to raise enough tax revenue to finance its obligations, including servicing of sovereign commitments such as paying off its debts and makes the economic environment very unpredictable. This can lead  global economic and financial institutions to flag or down grade the Country’s economic status as risky , making difficult and more expensive for the country and companies to raise external capital for investment.

Moreover, the violent protests occurred or are happening at a critical period of the year when East African Countries such as Kenya record the highest number of tourist arrivals into the Country for the summer holiday. Before the protests, national parks, hotels and beaches in Kenya’s tourist hot spots had already recorded high tourist bookings and were expecting a bumper harvest this season as the global economies and travelers rebound from the COVID 19 lock down.  Reports from multiple travel agents and hoteliers already indicate that most tourists have either cancelled or postponed their decisions to travel to Kenya and East Africa generally. Indeed, some already in the Country were gripped with fear of uncertainty and have left.

The burning image of an old plane at Uhuru Park did not send a good image either as most people around the world, unfamiliar with Kenya, thought Jomo Kenyatta International Airport was attacked and planes on the tarmac set on fire.  A recorded video clip that trended on social media of passengers crammed up at JKIA with a voice note indicating that many were fleeing the country added salt to the pinch suggesting Kenya was not safe anymore!

Similarly, travel advisories have been issued to foreigners in country and intending to travel to Kenya, to do that if it is essential and be vigilant of their security as safety during this violent period cannot be guaranteed. With all these at play, Kenya may remain a blacklisted destination among some foreign tourists for some period to come, denying the country the much-needed foreign revenue and jobs in its service sector. At least a number of high conferences that were planned for Nairobi were cancelled.

The net effects of the demonstrations therefore go beyond having the bill rejected but have long-term economic effects on Kenya’s economy. The violent Gen-Z’s may have to reconsider their approach to avoid a full economic meltdown.

Of course, there are legitimate concerns that some current established large business and investments were already not providing benefits to the young people. Multiple reports have shown that some businesses were tax dodgers while others belong to the politically connected who used their political connections to shove deals and amassing wealth on the backbone of the majority Kenyans. Moreover, given the current loopholes in the governance systems, new trade and investment opportunities would not support or create many new economic opportunities either.

However, when these arguments are advanced, it is also imperative to look at the broader picture of the net effect that violent protests can have on Kenya’s economy and future that the Gen-Z seeks to address. Kenya’s economy is extensively connected and dependent on the global economy with most global business having chosen Nairobi as a regional financial hub.  Violent demonstrations and disruption of such a magnitude can have significant long-term impacts.

With a government under siege and  constrained with a debt tinkering on the margins of default and  unrelenting rancorous youth roaming and burning the streets of Nairobi armed with negative social media, Kenya’s economy could slide into a free fall and recession, whose impacts on everyone could be far reaching.

Taxation and a strong tax system may contribute to improved governance through 3 maximum channels. Taxation establishes a fiscal social contract between citizens and the taxing state. Tax payers have a legitimate cause to expect something in return for paying taxes and are more likely to hold their governments to account. Governments have a stronger incentive to promote economic growth when they are dependent on fair taxes.

In this regard, we suggest the following;

  1. Resistance demonstrations and protests for tax rights must be expressed with limitations and restraint from both sides- The state and citizens alike
  1. Government must be rational when imposing taxes. Tax policies must be clear and predictable.  Clearly, imposing taxes on bread and blanket exemption of choppers is a sign missed priorities.
  1. Government communication apparatus must be robust enough to explain to the citizens the justifications for taxation and the political class must lead by example demonstrating frugality in public expenditure.
  1. There must be distinction between private, public and national critical infrastructure, whose destruction may or can affect Kenya’s national security interest and state existence. Lest we forget, Kenya has been a victim of terrorism and still faces extensive threats from both internal and external elements, whose interests to harm Kenya has never wavered. Attacks on its critical infrastructure exposes the Country and Kenyans further to major threats.
  1. Re-engineering of Kenya’s governance and economy to address the contemporary needs for the Gen-Z. Times have changed and the Gen-Z who now constitute an overwhelming majority will effectively from 2027 be forever a major determinant of East Africa’s political future. Women will no longer be a game changer in electoral politics and outcomes but the Gen-Z will be.
  1. There is need for both political and social sobriety. East Africa needs good leadership and peace!

[1] Tax and Fiscal Governance: Is VAT milking the broken tax cow dry? An analysis of tax trends and impacts on EAC small traders, with a case of the recent traders’ demonstrations and boycotts in Uganda:

[2] Adam Smith, in his book, The Wealth of Nations, 1776

[3] Schronharl, K,  etal; Histories of Tax Evasion , Avoidance and Resistance; https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/id/346cfc5f-6001-40e3-8a3b-fe46405df8c2/9781000823882.pdf

[4] https://www.allianz-trade.com/en_US/insights/what-is-political-risk.html#:~:text=Political%20risk%20is%20the%20possibility,country’s%20policies%2C%20business%20laws%20or

The Petals of Blood: Dissecting the contagion effect of Sudan war on South Sudan and EAC with lessons on governance and state failure

The Sudan war has been raging for almost a year, with catastrophic effects now spreading beyond Sudan’s borders, affecting its neighboring South Sudan and the East Africa Community (EAC) in many ways.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre & James Boboya, Institute of Social Policy and Research (ISCPR), South Sudan

According to the United Nations, since it started, the war has now destabilized the entire region, leading to the deaths of more than 5,000 Sudanese and displacing millions both within the African nation and across seven national borders.[1]  Sudan is now home to the highest number of internally displaced anywhere in the world, with at least 7.1 million uprooted.[2] More than 6 million Sudanese are suffering from famine, and these numbers are growing every day.  The health system has broken down, and more than 1,200 children have died from malnutrition and lack of essential care. [3]The UN now describes the Sudan conflict as a forgotten humanitarian disaster, while the International Crisis Group has warned that Sudan’s future, and much else, is at stake.

Lest we forget, within a short period, the third largest nation in Africa, with a size of more than 1.8886 million square kilometers and at least 46 million people, has no properly functioning government, and all state institutions have collapsed with the effects of its meltdown spilling over to its neighbors, particularly South Sudan.

South Sudan is host to thousands of Sudanese refugees forced across the border into South Sudan, exerting social and economic pressure on an already fragile state that was already sinking under the burden of its own civil war and internal conflicts.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) reports that more than 500,000 people have now fled from the war in Sudan to South Sudan. [1]This means that over 30 percent of all the refugees, asylum seekers, and ethnic South Sudanese were forced to flee Sudan since the war exploded in April 2023 for protection in one of the poorest places on earth. “South Sudan, that has itself recently come out of decades of war, was facing a dire humanitarian situation before the war in Sudan erupted. It already had nine million people in need of humanitarian aid, and almost 60 per cent of the population facing high levels of food insecurity.

As of 28 January 2024, more than 528,000 ethnic South Sudanese, Sudanese refugees, and other third-country nationals had crossed at entry points along the South Sudan border into Abyei Administrative Area, Upper Nile, Unity, Northern, and Western Bahr El Ghazal. The majority, 81 percent, entered at Jodrah before making their way to the transit center in Renk. Ethnic South Sudanese who have crossed the border from Sudan are commonly referred to as “returnees.” Still, in reality, many of them were born in Sudan and have never been in South Sudan, and therefore have no kinship connection in host communities.

The conflict has spilled deeper into other East African countries, with thousands seeking refuge and safety from it. The education system collapsed, sending thousands of learners back home and hundreds who could afford to flee exile to continue their studies. Some of these were admitted to Rwandan and Tanzanian Universities.

The Sudan and South Sudan experiment was a governance disaster in the waiting and perhaps serves as a lesson of how a firm grip on power, corruption, and misgovernance can ultimately lead to catastrophic state failure and collapse.

Donald Kasongi, Executive Director of Governance Links and a former senior officer with the Accord, a regional conflict organization, describes the post-Garang South Sudan and post-Bashir Sudan as a protracted governance failure. The diverse strategic roles of Khartoum, Beijing, and Washington in the Sweet South Sudanese oil are now evident.  So far, none is a victor.

The role of external interests in shaping national discourse has been at play. Sudan is caught between the interests of the West and the Middle East and China, with both interested in controlling access to Sudan’s resources, cultural wealth, and strategic positioning as a buffer between the North and South. Before the war, Sudan identified itself with the Islamic world and pronounced itself as an Islamic state. Despite this alignment, the OIC and the larger Islamic world has not come to its help. Sudan remains an isolated state left to collapse at its fate.

In South Sudan, the Garang vision of a strong independent nation was lost. After his demise most of the post Garang political elites or military war generals became pre-occupied on restoring the lost years at war by amassing wealth through corruption and sharing out of the limited resources from the oil resources. As a consequence, a strong nation is yet to be built. They had won the war but lost their country. The same mistake plays out in Sudan. Perhaps the conflict is a lesson on what it means to lose what is so dear to one- A country.

In short, the transition in both countries (Sudan and South Sudan) were not well managed and what we see are petals of blood from toxic flowers of bad governance which have flourished like a forest planted along the banks of the river Nile.

According to James Boboya, the Executive Director of the South worrisome. The raging war has made South Sudan’s oil exports via Port Sudan difficult. Oil exports have collapsed by more than half from 160,000 barrels per day in 2022 to 140,000 barrels per day in 2023. This was more than half of the previous peak of 350,000 barrels per day before civil war broke out in 2013.[2] The South Sudanese dollar collapsed in value. There is a financial crunch and the South Sudanese government has not paid its public and civil servants for months. There is a risk of insurrection and demonstrations by public servants that will be likely joined by the military. This would plunge South Sudan into chaos and total collapse just like its Northern neighbor.

Moreover, this conflict and its associated effects comes in an election year for South Sudan.  The general elections are viewed as a watershed moment which may see a transition from President Salva Keir to a new cadre of leadership. With the economic crunch, South Sudan may not be able to organize and fund a credible general election. This will be not good for South Sudan’s democracy and desired future.

With the world’s media focused on the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Gaza wars, little is covered about the Sudan conflicts nor the total economic catastrophe that South Sudan faces.

If not addressed, the Sudan war will be soon inside the borders of the EAC. Can the EAC afford to stand by and watch longer as its member state, collapses.  Mediation efforts led by Kenya and Djbouti were postponed last year. Direct talks between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s army chief and de facto head of state, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, head of the RSF paramilitaries remain futile.  What can South Sudan and the EAC do now to avert further catastrophe?

During a joint webinar organized by the Governance and Economic Policy Center (GEPC) and the Institute of Social Policy and Research (ISCR) in South Sudan in April, a distinguished panel of experts discussed and enabled us to understand the contradictions and magnitude of this war with implications and lessons on extractive governance, and state collapse drawn for East Africa and Africa generally, can be taken to avert the situation and its contagion effect on the EAC and Africa generally. The panelists and participants highlighted some key lessons and takeaways that can be drawn from the conflict.

Key lessons and takeaways

Ethnicization of politics and governance can lead to a spiral of violence and catastrophic state collapse, especially when the strong ruling elite and regime finally lose control of power.

A previously united Sudan started getting balkanized when the ruling elites started practicing the politics of ethnicity and religion pitting the largely Muslims in the northern and western parts of the country against their Christian southerners.  The Christians were portrayed as slightly inferior, denied political and economic opportunity, and subjected to forced Islamisation, and inhumane conditions such as slavery. Faced with what was considered unbecoming conditions the Southerners opted for a rebellion and demand for independence. The first and second Sudanese civil war (including the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM/A) were born and the political dynamics in Sudan changed for decades after. New factions such as the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) emerged and Sudan never remained the same.  Sentiments for cessation and independence in Darfur flared and faced with an insurgency, President Omar enlisted militias including the Janjaweed to quell the rebellions. Around 10,000 were killed and over 2.5 million displaced. The balkanisation of Sudan was continuing to play out.

Militarisation of politics erodes democratic values and principles which can take decades to rebuild.

Omar Bashir came to power in 1989 when, as a brigadier general in the Sudanese Army, he led a group of officers in a military coup that ousted the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi after it began negotiations with rebels in the south. Omar Bashir subsequently replaced President Ahmed al-Mirghani as head of state and ruled with the military closely fused into the politics and governance of Sudan.

The military elites elevated to power during President Omar Bashir’s government enjoyed privileged positions.  Even with his overthrow in 2019, these generals maintained a firm grip on the Transition Military Council and the Civil-Military Sovereignty Council.  These are less likely to accept any position below total control of the central authority. The net effect is that the return to full civilian and democratic rule of state governance in an entrenched militarized political environment such as Sudan can or may take decades to be rebuilt.

Vulnerability to geopolitical manipulation and fiddle diddle can be a driver to political instability and eventual weak governance

Both Sudan and South Sudan have been victims of well-orchestrated geopolitical game plans from external powers interested in taking control of the rich natural resources wealth that these countries possess. Sudan and South Sudan have vast oil deposits and forestry products.  With eyes focused on these resources external powers succeeded in playing one community against another and one country against the other and successfully throwing the region into an abyss of endless crisis. Religion was used as a tool to play the North against the South and continues to be used in some segments of the Sudanese and South Sudanese communities.

Key Takeaways

  1. The East African Community (EAC) governments cannot afford to take a wait-and-see attitude. The problems facing Sudan and South Sudan are latently present in several other EAC countries. For this reason, therefore without taking lessons from Sudan and South Sudan other countries can also easily erupt in the future, bringing down the entire EAC. The EAC has therefore an obligation to ramp up support for the resumption of the peace process and finding lasting solutions for peace and tranquility in the two countries. For this to happen there has to be trust and objectivity of the actors to the crisis and the EAC mediators. 
  1. Stop ethnicization and militarization of politics and state governance: The Sudan experience demonstrates this, whereby the collapse of President Omar Bashir’s strong grip on power let loose the lid off a can of worms that had eaten the state to its collapse. Similar conditions of ethnic rivalry in state governance have created uncertainty about guaranteed stability in South Sudan. In some other EAC member states there have been attempts to elevate dominant ethnic groups to power and military influence in state politics built around one strong leader. The Sudan experience demonstrates that the absence of such a strong leader holding the center together can lead to a lacuna, leading to a trail of conflict and instability leading governance to fall apart and eventual state collapse.
  1. The EAC countries must stop viewing at South Sudan as merely a market but as an independent viable state whose stability is good for the entire region. According to the EAC trade statistics, South Sudan was the leading market for goods from Uganda and Kenya. With a total population of 11 million and a collapsed agricultural and industrial base, South Sudan has provided a ready market for agricultural goods and manufactured goods from Uganda and Kenya. According to UN Comtrade Data Uganda exported goods worth USD483.9Mln and Kenya’s exports to South Sudan were worth USD170Mln. Uganda’s exports to Sudan also increased by 154% from around USD48Mln in 2016 to USD123Mln in 2022.  With the eyes largely focused on trade opportunities, there can be a tendency to lose track of the human suffering that the people in these countries face. Also, the jostle for geopolitical control over trade deals can overwhelm the genuine solidarity intentions of good neighbors. The EAC members should focus on the stability of these countries. 
  1. The International Community Must not give up on Sudan and South Sudan. Despite the donor fatigue and reports of corruption, the international community has a moral obligation to continue engaging with the protagonists in the war, facilitating the avenues for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and providing humanitarian aid to the suffering people. The Sudan and South Sudan conflict must be treated with equal measure with the Ukraine-Russia, Israel, and Gaza conflicts. The EAC must scale up diplomatic efforts and be an Anchor in Chief in this process, coordinating and connecting Sudan, South Sudan to the world. 
  1. The EAC media and Civil society must continue highlighting the suffering in Sudan and South Sudan. With the Israel and Gaza war ongoing, the Sudan and South Sudan stories that were largely covered by the Western media have since died out.  There has been little coverage given within the EAC of the recent developments in this war and how it is affecting its neighbors. Moreover, with limited internet connectivity and restrictive conditions, communication advocacy from inside Sudan and South Sudan is quite difficult.  The media and civil society in the EAC therefore must speak loud on behalf of their Sudanese counterparts

 

[1] War in Sudan displaces over 500,000 to South Sudanhttps://www.nrc.no/news/2024/january/sudan-refugees-to-south-sudan/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CMore%20than%20500%2C000%20people%20have,the%20poorest%20places%20on%20earth.

[2] The East African Business Khartoum unable to ensure smooth export of South Sudan oil https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/khartoum-unable-to-ensure-smooth-export-of-south-sudanese-oil-4564064

[1] Sudan conflict: ‘Our lives have become a piece of hell’ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67438018

[2] War in Sudan: more than 7 million displaced – UNhttps://www.africanews.com/2023/12/22/war-in-sudan-more-than-7-million-displaced-un//

[3] More than 1,200 children have died in the past 5 months in conflict-wrecked Sudan, the UN sayshttps://apnews.com/article/sudan-conflict-military-rsf-children-measles-malnutrition-ec7bb2a1f49d74e7b5f01afa12f16d99

SADC in Economic Meltdown; Can Tanzania be German of the Region?

On Saturday 17th August, Tanzania assumed the chair of the South African Development Cooperation (SADC), amidst disturbing economic figures indicating that the region was facing a serious economic meltdown. Can Tanzania be the ‘German’ of the region, playing the economic big daddy role by calling the other states into political order and bailing out the struggling member states?

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Analysis Center, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

The SADC is a 16-member state regional economic block established with among others promoting sustained economic growth and sustainable development amongst its objectives. However, the recent economic data indicates that region is witnessing an economic meltdown with most of its member states, except perhaps Tanzania, positing negative or stunted economic growth over the past years.

According to the economic and social indicators data compiled and released by its secretariat the the SADC region posted an estimated average growth rate of 1.4% in 2016 compared to 2.3% in 2015. At country level Tanzania registered the highest growth of 7% among the member states followed by Botswana with a far below rate of 4.3%[i].  

In 2017 Tanzania recorded an economic growth of 7.1% followed by Seychelles (6.3%) whilst Angola registered negative growth for the second consecutive year in order of 2.5%[ii] The region’s growth was increasing at a decreasing rate since the post global period in 2009.

The region’s economic giant South Africa has witnessed rapid economic slowdown, bring along its small neighbors and trading partners under its weight.  Countries such as Zimbabwe were collapsing under the weight of economic sanctions, Namibia and Angola recorded negative annual real GDP (at market price) of 10.8% and -2.5% respectively in 2017 due to the slump in commodity prices and other related risks. Botswana at 2.4% did not perform well either. The region posted an overall trade deficit with rest of the world of USD6.7bln. 

The AfDB report for 2018 warned that the economic outlook for Southern Africa region was cautious[iii]. Broad based economic activity was expected to recover at slow pace, but the outlook remained modest given the diverging growth patterns for the region’s economies. Upper middle income countries turned in low and declining rates of growth meanwhile lower income transitioning economies recorded moderate and improved growth, albeit at reduced rates.

Despite the improvement, economic performance remained subdued as the region’s economic outlook continued to face major headwinds. High unemployment, weak commodity prices, fiscal strain, increasing debt and high inflation.

Real GDP was estimated to have grown at an average of 1.6% in 2017 before increasing to a projected 2.0% in 2018 and 2.4% in 2019.

The future regional growth was expected to be bolstered with primary expectations of increased investment in non-oil sectors such as electricity, construction and technology in large infrastructure projects, mining as well as continued recovery in commodity prices.

However, the latest figures show that the region was not well on that front either.  The decline in commodity prices in recent years reaching the lowest point in 2015 translated into significant income loses for the economies, implying a negative impact on public and private sector spending and therefore growth in employment.

Before the 2008-2009 global recession, the region experienced moderate growth, though individual countries contributed differently. For example, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia exhibited robust growth that collectively outpaced the regional group.

Thereafter, Angola, the region’s foremost oil producer and former raising economic star received the worst bashing with its economy experiencing adverse economic growth effects due to weak oil prices.

Overall the region experienced negative GDP growth with Swaziland (-10.08%), Zimbabwe (-8.38%),  and Angola (-6.31%)  being among the worst hit[iv]  Other Countries such as Zambia, Namibia , Mozambique and Malawi were not performing better either. South Africa reported the highest public debt soaring in billions dollars followed by Angola.

South African Institute of International Affairs observed that intra-regional investment and trade levels had declined markedly since the commodity slump in 2013. Moreover, the trade and economic growth in the region remained imbalanced, exacerbating political strains among member states. Non-tariff barriers and other factors had adversely affected intra-regional trade and investment in recent years.

Assuming the mantle, at the end of its 39th Summit held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’ President John Pombe Magufuli was furious with against the Secretariat for having not provided adequate and alert to the political leadership that the region was experiencing an economic meltdown with reduced or stunted growth and an expanding trade deficit.

Speaking at the SADC People’s forum on the sidelines of the main summit in Dar es Salaam, the South African Professor, Patrick Bond, described the situation as alarming, catastrophic and turbulent and yet no one was bold enough to speak about it.

He was perhaps communist in view and radical in approach, blaming what he described as the capitalistic enterprise and its puppeteers for under mining economic justice, risking lives of by putting profit before the people and causing climate change whose effects were ravaging SADC but remained quite revolutionary in suggesting that the ordinary people perhaps needed to send a clear signal to its political leadership that all was not okay. The economic fundamentals were tattered and the regional leaders needed to wake, Prof. Bond lectured.

Can Tanzania emerge and become the ‘German’ of the region?

With this state of the Union, the question therefore arose can Tanzania emerge and become the ‘German’ of the region, playing the economic messiah role by providing both political leadership and economic bail out to its neighbors. 

In 2013 up to 2015 when the European Union experienced economic turbulence, Brussels turned to German to liberate it from the gigantic economic Dracula which was tearing down its economic block and leaving some of its small states indebted and facing bankruptcy. German wrote cheques in financial bailouts, provided guarantees and political prop up for economically struggling states such as Greece, Portugal and Italy.

German relied on its economic prowess and its political might as the industrial central pillar of the European Union. The charismatic leadership of its Chancellor, Ms Angela Merkel, was a distinct asset. Even at the risk of her own political career and constant onslaught from the German far right, Merkel could not tolerate any nonsense and was not ready to allow Europe to fall back.

In the face of the similar economic doldrums which seems now to face SADC, can Tanzania afford such muscle or a German equivalent?

Tanzania has done it before. In the 1960’s until 1990’s when the region was facing serious political, Tanzania pulled up its resources and committed it to the liberation struggle. It hosted training camps and provided pupilage to thousands of liberation fighters. Dar es Salaam became to the political headquarters of Frontline States where the idea of SADC in its current form was initiated and a spring for independence for many of the current South African states.  For some, therefore SADC at 39 years, just came back home.

In assuming the SADC Chairmanship, President Magufuli warned the Secretariat that it will not be business as usual as of now and for the next one year his interest would be to see that resources placed at the disposal of the Secretariat were not spent on conferences but on meaningful tangible projects which benefited the people. Could this be the kind of approach that region needs to take in order to deal with its increasing economic challenges.

An agile kind of leadership which places the people at the heart of politics and fights with cunning shrewdness against corruption, public waste, nepotism and personal drive to accumulate wealth by those in power.

Over the years these have been some of the vices which have dogged the region and bringing the much needed progress to stagnation and ultimate halt in some member states. Comparatively, perhaps the SADC is the largest economic group in Sub-Saharan Africa. With over an estimated population of 337.1 million people in 2017, is larger than its western equivalent, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and obviously bigger than the European Union has a just a fraction of the SADC population yet somehow progress has been considerably steady in the other regions.

According to experts the region was faced by multiple non trade barriers and low intra region trade which still at around 20%.  Technically, speaking, the members are happy to do business with other countries outside the region rather than their economic neighbors partners in SADC. The member states are living alongside each other but not fully economically and trade integrated.

Political uncertainties which has dogged the former economic giants of the region such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola created fertile conditions negative to investment and economic growth.  The governments lost grip on the economic mantle and directed attention towards managing internal politics and mechanics for political survival.  

Xenophobic attacks in South Africa could have also created a sense of fear and caused disarray in a fragile informal sector which was quietly the driving factor or fulcrum on which the South African economy relied. Crushing cost of electricity, turmoil in the extractive sector and stalemate in the platinum industry in 2016 perhaps were also a contributory factor to South Africa’s political woes. 

Overall, according, to Professor bond, the region was just poorly governed and a new leadership impetus led by the people was necessary to bring back the declining glories

For many years SADC was so much preoccupied on political stability. With good success, it has managed to tackle conflicts and bring peace amongst its member states. Overall, political conflict in the form of civil wars in the region has been declining with all except the DRC reporting any semblance of a conventional Civil war in recent years. 

Even, this has significantly been downgraded in recent years. Currently, there is no severe risk of any threat from any member state to destabilize any other through an arms insurrection. The ongoing conflict in the Eastern DRC is largely a war of survival for the remaining tribal and ethnic elements rather than a fully-fledged military configuration to overall and capture power in the DRC. If it can be dealt with, then perhaps the war in the DRC will be over or significantly reduced to minimal levels in many decades.

The future wars of the SADC will therefore be largely economic and perhaps resource based on key issues such as land, water and control of the real means of production and profit. Acute poverty could be the other driver of the masses towards insurrection. For Tanzania therefore, to take up the German challenge will be a touch endeavor.

Tanzania’s economic benefit or contribution to the region is too minimal. According to trade statistics, Tanzania is among the least exporters to SADC and its overall trade balance with its SADC neighbors was still low. It therefore lacks the economic might of German stature.

Over the past three years Tanzania’s political leadership has commitment itself to building its economy first before looking outside. Cutting back on public waste and flogging its population into line to start paying up taxes to finance its public service and infrastructure ambitions, Tanzania is building its economy from within.

Throughout the 1960s to the 1990s Tanzania sacrificed a lot in order to politically liberate virtually all the SADC member states and yet gained very minimal in return.  Political historians have even have even argued with some level of confidence that Tanzania under developed itself in sacrifice for others to develop. Tanzania would be therefore quite cautious in economic diplomatic terms and perhaps uncomfortable at this moment in giving out too much of what it has acquired over the years to salvage its economic neighbors.

The conditions in the region appear to have turned so bad in the past few years with persistent drought raving across the region only to be replaced by wrecking floods leaving behind famine and death in communities along its way.  Approximately over 1000 people dies in the last floods in Mozambique and Malawi caused by cyclone Idai and Keneth. Millions at a risk of starvation.  Essential infrastructure such as road and bridges connecting rural areas to urban centers and across countries such as the port of Beira are badly battered and incapable of supporting economic productivity.

The region has not been able to attract in Foreign Investment into its natural resource wealth and flagship infrastructure projects such as the Mighty Inga dam electro power project in the DRC which would have brought life into the SADC power master plan have remained incomplete for many years now. The region is badly in need of both reconstruction and reconfiguration to sustain itself and its ambitions.

At the end of the summit Tanzania’s former President Benjamin Mkapa advised that SADC member states should stop relying heavily on foreign donors for aid to support or finance their development agenda. Building internal capacity through a reliable market for products from the block, investment in education, technology, domestic revenue collection and unlocking the potential amongst its budging population to drive the economies forward would be a better option. Perhaps the SADC leadership should fine tune an ear to the wisdom of its elders.

The meeting concluded with signing off of three development cooperation programs worth 47 Million Euro deal with the European Union under its European Development Fund (EDF) 11 financing round. According to official statement, the funds will be used over the next five-year period to support improvement in the Investment and Business Environment (SIBE), Trade Facilitation Program (TFP) and Support to Industrial Productive Sectors (SIPS) three programs to be implemented by the SADC over the next five-year period

The SIBE program aims at achieving sustainable and inclusive growth and job creation by transforming the region into an investment zone, promoting intra-regional investments, foreign Direct Investment and a focus on Small and Medium Enterprises. The TFP will contribute to enhance inclusive economic development in the region through deepened economic integration while the SIPs aimed at contributing to the SADC industrialization agenda, improving performance and growth of selected value chains. How this EU injection translates into lifting the region from its economic downward spiral will yet to be found out at the next summit when SADC turns 40. What is clear is that something has to be done.

[i] SADC: Selected economic and social indicators, 2016

[ii] SADC: Selected economic and social indicators, 2017

[iii] AfDB: Southern Africa Economic Outlook, 2018

[iv] https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/southern-african-development-community

New threats to peace and Security:  Extent to which new security threats of Piracy have affected economic and human security in East Africa

New threats to peace and Security:  Extent to which new security threats of Piracy have affected economic and human security in East Africa

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre, Dar es Salaam-Tanzania

Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile.

In recent years piracy and cyber security have emerged to represent new security threats to economic and human security like never before.

Security has been defined as protection from any kind of threat but in total departure from the orthodox view as perceived by the military and war professional. Experts such as Buzzan (1991) have defined security as freedom from fear or threat of social, economic, society, environmental and military concerns.  Buzzan therefore expands the definition of security to include human and economic security dimensions to the concept of security. 

Human security, as an approach gives understanding to national and international security by adding a dimension that gives primacy to the safety of human beings and their complex social and economic interactions.  In this approach to security, the subjects are individuals and the end goal is the protection of people from traditional threats such as military concerns to nontraditional threats such as poverty and disease.

The UN has advanced this concept further by declaring that “Human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people” (General Assembly resolution 66/290

Other organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross view security from an economic lens. The ICRC defines economic security as the ability of individuals, households or communities to cover their essential needs sustainably and with dignity. This can vary according to an individual’s physical needs, the environment and prevailing cultural standards. Food, basic shelter, clothing and hygiene qualify as essential needs, as does the related expenditure; the essential assets needed to earn a living, and the costs associated with health care and education also qualify.

By understanding peace and security from such a broad lense, it is therefore possible to understand the nexus and extent to which new threats such as piracy and cybercrime have on human security.

Piracy as a security threat

Piracy has been defined as an act of robbery or criminal violence at sea. It includes acts committed on land, in the air, or other major bodies of water or on shore. It generally involves unlawful, boarding, kidnap and commandeering of marine or land vessels or convoys to undesignated locations or destinations for looting, ransom or other purposes.

Although the term “piracy” may conjure up images of bearded men with eye patches, wooden legs and parrots who were convicted and buried centuries ago, pirate attacks are indeed posing a threat today’s shipping lines (and human wellbeing) all over the world.   According to reports, the number of Pirate Attacks globally between 2009 and 2017 was 2717 with 180 attacks registered in 2017 alone.

Causes of an upsurge in piracy

There are many reasons to explain the increasing rise in piracy but some of these have been constantly made;

  • The disappearance of US naval forces fleets from major international water bodies after the end of the cold war. This has allowed pirates and criminal gangs to operate freely on the open high seas with minimal interference
  • The improvement in maritime navigation and technology which has enabled launching and navigation of larger ships manned by smaller crew who are extremely vulnerable to pirate attacks
  • Expansion of jurisdictional waters beyond those which are directly in effective control and patrol of their claimant states.
  • Instability, state collapse and increasing harsh economic conditions in Countries such as Somalia and Yemen.
  • Falling states and absence of centralized governments in Countries such as Somalia
  • Lucrative ransoms paid which acted as incentives for more attacks
  • Long uncompleted trials and deterrent punitive measures to convicts which motivated others to conduct attacks
  • Radicalization and justification of piracy as tool in response to political interference, economic dominance and over exploitation of marine natural resources by global super powers such as America.

Today, pirates’ attacks pause a genuine threat to maritime transportation and security. Pirates are capable of cutting off important transit choke points such as the Strait of Bab al-Mandab between Arabia and Africa or the Strait of Malacca in South East Asian waters.  In 2017, the trade routes around the Indonesian coast as well as in Bangladeshi and Nigerian waters were counted among the most perilous at sea paths globally.

The Horn of Africa, along the Somalian coastline, has become one of the most dangerous waters prone to piracy attacks.  According to various reports maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa grew in frequency, range, aggression, and severity at an alarming rate covering more than 2.5 million square miles of ocean. Since 2007, Somali pirates attacked and harassed vessels transiting up to 450 miles offshore in the Indian Ocean and in the Gulf of Aden, a natural chokepoint providing access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.  The number of actual or attempted attacks in the Somalia’s territorial waters off the East African coastal shore line was 462 with 5 attacks reported in 2017 alone

For 2017, an International maritime organization, One Earth Future (OEF)’s Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP)  recorded a total of 54 incidents in the Western Indian Ocean region, marking an increase of 100 percent from 2016. Accordingly, 2017 saw an increase in the number of seafarers affected by incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea, from 545 in 2016 to 1,102 in 2017. For the first time in two years, OBP recorded incidents of hijacking and kidnapping at sea in the region. Suspicious activity continued to be the highest represented incident in the region in 2017 reporting a significant increase from 13 recorded incidents in 2016 to 32 in 2017.

The short surge in hijacking attacks in the first quarter of 2017 was attributed to several factors. These include the continued intent of pirate action groups to launch attacks and the opportunity to do so, due to lessened adherence to ship self-protection measures, including Best Management Practices (BMP). Independent deployers represented the primary naval presence in the region, but both coalition forces and independent deployers decreased days of operation, or days on station in the region, in 2017.

Effects of Piracy on human security

Piracy has led to significant decline in human security, by instilling fear, insecurity and fatalities along the East African coastal shoreline. According to OEF- OBP on the state of piracy, the number of piracy on the East African coastline tripled in 2016. There were 54 piracy incidents on the East African coast in 2017—more than triple the 16 incidents recorded in 2016.  It states that the number of sailors affected increased from 306 in 2015 to 1,102 in 2017, with at least 79 of them injured or threatened in the attacks in which 41 per cent of the attackers were armed. The number of attacks as in previous years shows that the capability and intent of pirate networks has not decreased. This was witnessed with the increased number of hijackings, including of the Aris 13, the Asayr 2, and Al Kausar. The number of hostages killed or injured by Somali pirates increased significantly in 2017, according to further maritime reports.

Nearly 4,000 seafarers were fired upon by Somali pirates, the report said. Of that number, 968 seafarers faced armed pirates who managed to board their vessels, while some 413 of those seafarers were rescued from secured rooms on their vessels by naval forces. At least 1,206 hostages were held by Somali pirates in 2011, including 555 seafarers attacked and taken hostage during the year, and 645 captured in 2010 who remained in pirate hands. Half of those held were subjected to punching and slapping and 10% suffered violent abuse such as being locked in freezers, burned with cigarettes and having their fingernails pulled out with pliers, the reports stated.

Effects of piracy on economic security

In 2017 the economic effect of piracy on East Africa was estimated at USD1.4billion. This was a slight decline from $1.7 billion in 2016, mainly due to a 13 per cent decrease in the use of privately contracted armed security personnel. The costs had stabilized over the past three years, after a decline between 2010 and 2015, from about $7 billion in 2010 to $1.3 billion in 2015.  None the less, these amounts are substantively high if measured in correlative development terms and represent a significant economic security risk to the region.

Piracy has increased administrative cost measures in counter piracy measures. It has led to increased military presence and diversion of vital resources to combat piracy.  In 2011 the total costs in military counter piracy measures was estimated at USD 1.27bln.  This was spent on administrative budgets, military vessels and unmanned aerial vehicles. An additional USD 635 million was spent on insurance premiums. The cost of prosecuting pirates in trials and imprisonment was USD5.3 million.  These figures have substantively increased in 2017.

These are vital resources which could have been used for other development activities such as social service provision and infrastructure development but have been switched towards addressing piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Effect on trade and commerce

Piracy has affected trade and commerce along the East African coastline. According to the South African Institute for Strategic studies (ISS), trade in sub-Saharan Africa was slowly suffering from the consequences of piracy on major shipping liners along the Eastern African coast.

The resurgence of incidents of piracy has the potential to affect international trade and maritime movement of cargo around the East African coastline. In advertently this has collateral damage to East African economies and other Countries around the world.  Shipping liners have to consider alternative routes which are perceived safer routes such the Suez Canal, the South African tip or even the Panama Canal.

Increased costs in freight and insurance charges.

One of the major consequences of piracy is the increase in insurance rates for the shipping industry and the need to purchase additional insurance to cover the risk associated with transiting a piracy prone region. For example, insurance companies now offer “kidnap for ransom” policies to ships that move through the Suez Canal.  According to one insurance company, the U.K. based Hiscox, prices the policy at US$15,000 per trip through the Gulf of Aden and was reported to have increased dramatically.  Also, because of the danger posed to shipping transiting the Gulf of Aden, insurance premiums had risen tenfold. For example, insurance companies had increased premiums for sending a cargo shipment through the Gulf of Aden to about US$9,000 from US$900 in a period of one year.

From an economic point of view, having Africa’s access to internationally developed materials such as nuclear reactors, vehicles, tractors, imported and exported food, and other materials reduced will be devastating. More worrying is the impact of a decrease in exports of natural resources from African countries.

Piracy has changed the livelihoods of communities along the Somali coastline who have abandoned vital livelihoods such as agriculture and nomadic farming to join piracy. Fishing communities have also been forced to abandon fishing from fear of attacks at sea and hence changed the entire economic security of communities living along the coast of Somalia. According to the UNDP many Somali youth joined piracy as a source of employment and piracy is seen and proven to be a vital ready source of income and path to quick wealth and prosperity.

Piracy financing of money laundering and terrorism

The proceeds from piracy have found their linkages to finance money laundering and terrorism activities. According to the World Bank, the Somali pirate business model relies heavily on onshore support infrastructure to conduct ransom negotiations. Generically a pirate operation consists of armed offshore operations with onshore support that provides shelter for returning pirates and access to markets for stolen goods and for the goods, services, and manpower needed for pirate attacks. The total amount of money paid in ransom fees by various companies was estimated billions of dollars. Most of this was invested in legitimate business such as real estate, forex bureaus and financing Alshabab terrorist activities.

There is risk of fueling war and further instability with deadly military hardware captured by pirates falling in the hands of militants.  Although previously pirates targeted fishing vessels and smaller cargo ships, they later targeted larger vessels such as chemical tankers, bulk carriers and thus pausing a higher security risk than ever.

Amongst their high-profile targets included a Ukrainian vessel loaded with heavy weapons and a Saudi owned VLCC. The MV Faina, or “crown” in Russian, was a Ukrainian vessel loaded with rifles, heavy weapons and 33 Soviet made T-72 tanks that the pirates captured on 25 September 2008. The ship was initially thought to have been heading for Sudan or some other African country, possibly Kenya. The MV Faina was then surrounded by three warships from the Combined Task Force 150 during its hijack to prevent the ship’s deadly cargo from ending up in the hands of Somalia’s Islamic insurgents and other terrorists. The initial ransom demand was for US$35 million but it was finally released for a reported sum of US$3.2 million.

Piracy has affected Tourism and investment along the East African coast of Somalia. Piracy attacks on hotels and large deep-sea fishing vessels has significantly retarded invested in East African coastal economy, along the Somalian coastline.

There have been regional attempts to combat piracy. The US and EU Naval patrols and tracks pirates off the East African Coastline and the Gulf of Aden under the auspices of Joint Task Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 including troops from the US, EU and Canada. This has accounted for the declining numbers of attacks in the recent years. The downside of this effort is that the task force is externally funded and cannot be a long-term solution.  This therefore demands that Eastern Africa states step up their capabilities to counter piracy along its long coastline.

In a nutshell, piracy represents one single new threat to human and economic security. Despite a reduction in reported cases of piracy in 2018, the disappearance of piracy in the 19th Century and its resurgence in the 1990s and increase between 2000 and 2017 shows that this security threat is not over. Perhaps the pirates and their benefactors are planning and waiting to strike their next target.  Extra vigilance, collective military and civilian measures are required to contain this threat.

 

 

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Effects of Cyber Security on Human and Economic Security

New threats to peace and Security:  Extent to which new security threats of Cyber security have affected economic and human security in East Africa

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre, Dar es Salaam-Tanzania

Cyber security or attacks by using highly sophisticated technology and cyber space to penetrate, modify, adulterate or alter existing ICT infrastructure to inflict significant, damage to a country, an installation, equipment, companies or individuals. According to NATO cyber insecurity is crippling of vital defence and military installations and capabilities to protect human security

Effects of Cyber Security on Human and Economic Security

From a military or defense security perspective, cyber security threat from the following angles or forms

  • Cyberterrorism is the disruptive use of information technology by terrorist groups to further their ideological or political agenda. This takes the form of attacks on networks, computer systems and telecommunication infrastructures.
  • Cyberwarfare involves nation-states using information technology to penetrate another nation’s networks to cause damage or disruption. In the U.S. and many other nations, cyberwarfare has been acknowledged as the fifth domain of warfare (following land, sea, air and space).
  • Cyberwarfare attacks are primarily executed by hackers who are well-trained in exploiting the intricacies of computer networks, and operate under the auspices and support of nation-states. Rather than “shutting down” a target’s key networks, a cyberwarfare attack may intrude into networks to compromise valuable data, degrade communications, impair such infrastructural services as transportation and medical services, or interrupt commerce.
  • Cyberespionage which is the practice of using information technology to obtain secret information without permission from its owners or holders. Cyberespionage is most often used to gain strategic, economic, political or military advantage, and is conducted using cracking techniques and malware.

In recent past cyber-attacks have become quite rampant. In 2008 the Estonian attack in which the entire Estonian Government agencies, financial institutions and broadcasters were jammed by Russian cyber attacker was a good example. In 2010 the reports of attacks on googles mails by Chinese hackers and Sony pictures were a clear reminder of the extent of the risk posed by Cyber security.

Cyber-attacks have capabilities to disrupt government systems, transport and communication infrastructure and defence capabilities.

However, from a human and economic security perspective, cyber insecurity has largely affected social and economic sectors. Cyber security has globalised or regionlaised organized crime. According to the UK government’s Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2017 found that the average cost of a cyber security breach for a large business was £19,600 and for a small to medium-sized business was £1,570. According to a CISCO Annual report on cyber security, over one third of organizations that experienced breach in 2016 reported loss of substantial customer opportunity and revenue loss in more than 20%

Effects of cybercrime of human and economic security in East Africa

Experts have described the East African digital economy as weak and vulnerable to multiple cyber attacks

“Essentially, in terms of cyber resilience, the Kenyan digital economy can be likened to a slow, plump gazelle stumbling through the ‘cyber savanah’’ in the full view of an agile, informed and hungry cyber predator, keen to sink their teeth into their sumptuous prize”

In 2016, African countries reportedly lost USD2bln in cyber-attacks. Remittance based economies, which depend on electronic wire transfers of money from its foreign sources and nationals living abroad via the international financial system were the worst hit

Effects on Financial systems

Financial transactions such as banking and money transfer services have been the largest targets affecting millions of people. In East Africa it was reported that Kenya was the worst affected with a total estimated of loss of USD 171Mln while Tanzania lost USD85million and Uganda lost USD 35million in its financial sector.

Tanzania’s cyber security report for 2016 warned of critical dangers facing the country. According to the report technology adoption is driving business innovation and growth in Tanzania, while at the same time, exposing the Country to new and emerging cyber security threats. Terrorists, spies, hackers, fraudsters are increasingly motivated to target Tanzania’s Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) infrastructure due to the value of information held within it, the report indicated.

One of the major risks was lack of awareness amongst technology users. According to the report over 1.6 million Internet Portals (IPs) were publicly accessible and over 138,000 network security events were reported.

Effects of exposure through interconnected and domestic gadgets

Cybercrime has reduced human security risk through exposure to interconnected things such as medical devices, smart TVs, cars and other gadgets. Research has found potential vulnerabilities in dozens of devices such as insulin pumps, and implantable defibrators. Hundreds of connected TVs are potentially vulnerable to click fraud, botnets, data, ransomware. Cybercriminals have developed mechanisms to remotely take control of personal gadgets such as remotely opened cars, personal computers.

Threat to privacy and confidentiality

There is a security risk of breach of confidentiality and personal privacy on vital confidential documents and personal data. As governments become digitalized through the drive for e-government, confidential government documents and personal details of its citizens are now more exposed to cybercrime. From passports, birth certificates, medical reports, pension numbers and personal IDs are now interlinked via the electronic networks

Costly policing and administration in cyber defence

Fighting cybercrime is very costly to police and enforcing cyber security diverts the already constrained government resources away from financing vital social services such as education and health. According to  cybersecurity readiness report very few governments and companies can afford to invest in highly sophisticated cyber security defence systems.  The Kenyan Cyber Security report highlighted that about 44% of financial institutions run on a paltry cyber security budget of USD1-1000 annually. About 33% of financial institutions in Kenya have spent nothing on all matters of cyber security.There are limited skills to manage and address it and keep ahead of cyber criminals, the report warns.

Regional attempts to counter and fight cybersecurity

Regional initiatives to combat cybercrime have been initiated through specialized units now established in the military and police forces of the East African states. However, they are still ill trained and under equipped to effectively contain the threats.

In conclusion, it is evident that the threats of piracy and cyber security has been increasing and pause a major threat to human and economic security of the region. Piracy and Cybercrime are highly organized global crimes with vast networks operating miles away. The weak counter measures and lack of adequate resources to counter these threats suggest that these will remain security threats to the region for longtime.

Indeed, given the increasing threat that cyber-crime has generated it is probable to suggest that future wars may/will not be fought on the battle fronts but in cyber space. Soldiers of the future will not be Generals commanding battalions and platoons of mobiles soldiers marching across battle fields.  The generals of the future will be technologically savy individuals sitting in high-tech offices and issuing commands to remote computers, gadgets and robots deployed to engage targets thousands of miles away.

 

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