Tragedy of Conflict, Economic Exclusion, and Meeting Public Economic Expectations in Times of Crisis: The Case of South Sudan

 

Authors: Boboya James Edimond,  Institute of Social Policy Research, South Sudan & Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

South Sudan continues to face profound economic and governance challenges rooted in prolonged conflict, institutional fragility, and structural economic exclusion. Despite abundant natural resources, particularly oil, the country has struggled to convert this wealth into broad-based economic development and improved social welfare. Persistent instability, weak public institutions, and economic mismanagement have exacerbated poverty and constrained the state’s capacity to meet public expectations for economic opportunity and effective service delivery.

This paper examines the interplay between conflict, economic exclusion, and public expectations during periods of crisis in South Sudan. Drawing on recent economic assessments and development literature, it argues that sustainable recovery requires comprehensive institutional reforms, economic diversification, and inclusive governance capable of addressing structural inequalities and restoring public trust.

Furthermore, the analysis contributes to ongoing regional debates on East African Community (EAC) national budget plans and the broader implications of the US–Israel–Iran war on energy and economic outlooks in the region. The conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran has caused major disruptions in global energy markets, including sharp rises in oil prices and risks to key chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, which carries roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply (2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis). These external shocks underscore the need for prudent, timely resource allocation and resilient fiscal frameworks to support post‑conflict reconstruction and strengthen regional economic resilience.

  1. Introduction

South Sudan gained independence in 2011 amid widespread optimism about the prospects for peace, political stability, and economic transformation. However, the country soon experienced severe political instability and violent conflicts that undermined its development trajectory. The outbreak of civil war in 2013 and recurring localized conflicts since then have significantly weakened the economy, damaged infrastructure, and displaced millions of citizens.

Conflict has had devastating effects on economic activity, reducing agricultural production, disrupting trade networks, and discouraging private investment. As a result, economic growth has remained fragile and heavily dependent on oil revenues. The country’s economic structure is highly vulnerable to external shocks, particularly fluctuations in global oil prices and disruptions to export infrastructure.

Recent economic assessments indicate that South Sudan’s economy has experienced sustained decline over several consecutive years. The economy was projected to contract by approximately 30 % in the 2024/25 fiscal year, largely due to disruptions in oil production and declining export revenues (World Bank, 2025). Resources mobilized or provided by development partners for post-conflict reconstruction have often been misused, while the country’s narrow tax base further constrains domestic revenue generation. In addition, annual national budgets have frequently been delayed or left unpassed before the National Assembly, undermining fiscal planning and disrupting efforts toward post-conflict reconstruction and development.

At the same time, citizens continue to expect the government to deliver economic stability, employment opportunities, and improved public services. This growing mismatch between public expectations and state capacity has emerged as one of the defining governance challenges in South Sudan, exacerbating public dissatisfaction and weakening trust in state institutions.

Contribution to the Ongoing Debate: EAC Budgets and the Implications of the US, Isreal and Iran War.

The analysis presented in this paper also contributes to broader discussions in regional dialogues, such as webinars and policy forums, on the East African Community (EAC) national budget plans and the implications of the US-Israel-Iran war for the region’s energy and economic outlooks. The EAC’s collective capacity to plan and implement effective national budgets is increasingly strained by both internal fiscal weaknesses and external shocks. As of the 2023–24 fiscal year, multiple EAC member states — including South Sudan — have experienced significant budget shortfalls and delayed remittances to the regional budget, impeding the bloc’s ability to fund operations and coordinate shared developmental priorities (EAC Secretariat, 2025).

The recent Middle East conflict between the United States and Iran — especially disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz — has major implications for global energy markets and regional economic stability. Roughly 20% of the world’s oil and natural gas trade flows through this strait, so prolonged tensions have driven up global oil prices and heightened supply chain risks, with ripple effects across Africa, including East Africa (Arita, S., Chakravorty, R., Kim, J., Lwin, W. Y., & Steinbach, S., 2026).

For EAC economies that are net importers of energy, the surge in crude oil prices increases the cost of fuel, transportation, and basic commodities, complicating fiscal planning and national budget implementation. Analysts have already warned that East African countries may face rising inflationary pressures, depreciating currencies, and widened current account deficits as a result of these disruptions. This trend makes it more difficult for governments to allocate resources toward development priorities while managing macroeconomic stability.

These regional debates underscore the interconnectedness of domestic fiscal policies and global geopolitical dynamics. They highlight the importance of strengthening EAC fiscal frameworks and diversifying energy sources to mitigate the economic fallout from international conflicts — a theme that aligns closely with the findings of this study on South Sudan’s economic vulnerabilities and the broader institutional challenges facing fragile economies in East Africa.

  1. Conflict and Economic Disruption

Armed conflict has been one of the most significant obstacles to economic development in South Sudan. The destruction of infrastructure, displacement of populations, and disruption of productive activities have severely constrained economic growth. Research indicates that conflict has destroyed key infrastructure, including roads, bridges, hospitals, and schools, while also disrupting agricultural production and supply chains (Journal of Developing Country Studies, 2024; Acheampong & Enders, 2024). The displacement of more than 3.8 million people has weakened the labor force, reduced productivity across multiple sectors of the economy, and increased dependency on humanitarian assistance (Journal of Developing Country Studies, 2024; UNHCR, 2025).

Photo Credits: UN News

The economic losses associated with conflict are substantial. Multiple studies estimate that armed conflict has resulted in billions of dollars in economic losses due to reduced productivity, destruction of physical assets, and declining investment flows (Zhou & Hsiao, 2025; Akol, 2024). The destruction of economic infrastructure raises the cost of reconstruction and slows the pace of post‑conflict recovery, placing an additional burden on already fragile public finances (Collier et al., 2024).

Furthermore, persistent instability has significantly discouraged both domestic and foreign investment. In the absence of a stable political and security environment, businesses face heightened risks that constrain economic expansion and limit job creation. Post‑conflict countries such as South Sudan, characterized by weak governance structures and fragile economic fundamentals, are particularly vulnerable to external regional and global shocks (IMF, 2024). Disruptions in key sectors—such as energy and trade—have had severe consequences; for instance, interruptions in oil production have resulted in estimated revenue losses of approximately $7 million per day, further straining government finances and fiscal sustainability (World Bank, 2025b).

  1. Fiscal Policy, Taxation, and National Budgets

An examination of South Sudan’s fiscal framework reveals deep structural weaknesses in revenue generation and public financial management. Government revenue remains overwhelmingly dependent on oil, which accounts for around 90% of total government revenue and approximately 95% of exports (African Development Bank, 2023; IMF, 2024). This high dependence exposes the economy to external shocks, particularly fluctuations in global oil prices and regional disruptions affecting production and export routes.

Domestic revenue mobilization remains extremely limited. South Sudan’s tax-to-GDP ratio was estimated at approximately 4.1% in FY2022/23, with projections of about 5.8% in FY2023/24, making it one of the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa (IMF, 2024). Moreover, non-oil revenues contribute less than 20% of the national budget, reflecting a narrow tax base and weak capacity for tax administration (World Bank, 2023). Key tax instruments such as value-added tax (VAT) contribute minimally, further highlighting structural inefficiencies in revenue collection.

On the expenditure side, fiscal data indicate volatility and weak budget credibility. Total government revenue declined from 34.7% of GDP in 2022/23 to about 26.5% in 2024/25, largely due to falling oil revenues, while expenditures remained relatively high at around 28–36% of GDP over the same period (IMF, 2024). This imbalance has contributed to recurring fiscal deficits and rising public debt, which is projected to reach approximately 48.6% of GDP in 2024/25 (IMF, 2024).

In addition to these structural constraints, persistent delays in the preparation and approval of national budgets have undermined fiscal discipline and effective public expenditure management. Weak transparency and governance challenges have further compounded the problem, with reports highlighting the mismanagement of significant public resources, including oil-backed financing arrangements (World Bank, 2025). These challenges disrupt service delivery, weaken development planning, and limit the government’s capacity to respond effectively to post-conflict reconstruction needs.

  1. Economic Exclusion and Persistent Poverty

Despite its natural resource wealth, South Sudan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Poverty levels remain extremely high, reflecting deep structural inequalities and limited economic opportunities.

According to the South Sudan Poverty and Equity Assessment, approximately 92% of South Sudanese live below the national poverty line, while extreme poverty affects more than two-thirds of the population (World Bank, 2024). Poverty is particularly severe in rural areas, where most households depend on subsistence agriculture. Limited access to markets, poor infrastructure, climate shocks, and ongoing insecurity severely restrict agricultural productivity and household income (World Bank, 2024; ISS Africa, 2026).

Economic exclusion in South Sudan is also evident in limited access to education, healthcare, financial services, and formal employment opportunities (World Bank, 2025; Journal of Developing Country Studies, 2024). Weak institutions, governance challenges, and mismanagement of public resources have further constrained the equitable distribution of economic opportunities, entrenching inequality (World Bank, 2023; IMF, 2024).

Additionally, inequality in access to economic opportunities fuels social grievances and undermines national cohesion. Large segments of the population remain excluded from economic growth, increasing the risk of conflict and political instability (Radio Tamazuj, 2025; ISS Africa, 2026). External shocks—such as regional instability, disruptions in oil exports due to conflict in Sudan, or global geopolitical tensions affecting energy markets—further exacerbate vulnerability, limiting South Sudan’s capacity to achieve sustainable economic resilience (World Bank, 2025a; African Development Bank, 2023).

Addressing these challenges requires inclusive governance, strengthened institutions, and targeted investments in social services and rural development. Without these interventions, structural poverty, economic exclusion, and inequality are likely to persist, continuing to undermine South Sudan’s long-term development and stability (World Bank, 2024; ISS Africa, 2026).

  1. Public Expectations and Governance Challenges

While economic conditions remain difficult, public expectations for economic improvement continue to grow. Citizens expect the government to provide employment opportunities, infrastructure development, and access to essential services such as healthcare and education.

However, the government faces severe fiscal constraints that limit its ability to meet these expectations. South Sudan’s economy remains heavily dependent on oil revenues, which account for over 90 % of government revenue and the majority of export earnings (World Bank, 2021).

This heavy dependence on a single resource exposes the country to significant economic volatility. When oil production declines or prices fall, government revenues drop sharply, resulting in reduced public spending and delayed salary payments for public servants.

External shocks have also worsened economic conditions. For example, disruptions in oil export infrastructure linked to regional conflicts have led to significant fiscal crises and foreign exchange shortages. These challenges have contributed to inflation, food insecurity, and declining purchasing power among households (IMF, 2024).  The gap between public expectations and government capacity to deliver services, therefore, continues to widen.

Photo Credit: FAO

  1. Structural Economic Vulnerabilities

South Sudan’s economic challenges are deeply rooted in structural vulnerabilities that limit long-term development.

First, the economy remains highly dependent on oil exports. Oil revenues constitute the majority of government income, making the country vulnerable to fluctuations in global commodity markets and geopolitical disruptions.

Second, economic diversification remains limited. Key sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and services remain underdeveloped due to insecurity, poor infrastructure, and limited access to capital.

Third, the country faces recurring humanitarian crises driven by climate shocks, flooding, and food insecurity. These crises place additional pressure on government resources and undermine household resilience.

Fourth, institutional weaknesses limit effective economic governance. Weak public financial management systems, corruption, and limited administrative capacity reduce the effectiveness of development policies.

Addressing these structural challenges is essential for building a resilient and inclusive economy.

  1. Conflicts and Regional Integration

South Sudan has gradually increased its economic integration with regional and international partners, thereby expanding trade opportunities but heightening its vulnerability to external shocks. As a member of the East African Community (EAC), South Sudan is economically linked with neighboring countries such as Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan. While regional integration enhances market access and trade flows, it also exposes the country to the spillover effects of regional instability.

The ongoing conflict in Sudan has had particularly severe consequences for South Sudan’s economy. Since South Sudan relies on pipelines that run through Sudan to export its oil, the conflict has disrupted production and transportation, leading to significant declines in oil export revenues. Given that oil accounts for the bulk of government income, these disruptions have constrained the government’s ability to finance its national budget and deliver essential public services.

Beyond the region, South Sudan has in recent years strengthened its economic and strategic ties with Middle Eastern countries, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, particularly in the energy and investment sectors. While these partnerships provide important sources of capital and market access, they also increase the country’s exposure to global geopolitical dynamics.

In this context, conflicts in the Middle East—especially tensions involving the United States and Iran—could have significant economic implications for South Sudan. Such conflicts may trigger volatility in global oil prices, disrupt energy markets, and affect investment flows. For a fragile, oil-dependent economy like South Sudan, these external shocks could undermine economic resilience, exacerbate fiscal pressures, and negatively influence the country’s economic outlook for 2026.

  1. Policy Pathways for Inclusive Economic Recovery and Outlook

Achieving sustainable economic recovery in South Sudan requires a coordinated approach that integrates peacebuilding, economic reforms, and institutional strengthening. The following policy pathways are critical:

Durable Peace and Political Stability – Ensuring lasting peace and political stability must remain a top priority. Without a secure environment, key economic activities such as trade, agriculture, and investment cannot thrive, and public confidence in the state will remain low. Stability provides the foundation for rebuilding infrastructure, attracting investment, and enabling productive livelihoods.

Economic Diversification – Reducing dependence on oil revenue is essential. Investments in agriculture, infrastructure, and small-scale enterprises can broaden the economic base, enhance resilience, and generate employment. Improving agricultural productivity, in particular, can strengthen food security and provide income opportunities for rural populations, who represent the majority of South Sudanese households.

Transparency and Accountability in Resource Management – Effective and transparent management of natural resources, especially oil revenues, is critical. Prudent resource allocation can finance development programs, expand public services, and reduce opportunities for corruption that undermine public trust and fiscal stability.

Human Capital Development – Investment in education, healthcare, and vocational training is necessary to cultivate a skilled and healthy workforce capable of supporting long-term economic transformation. Strengthening human capital also enhances innovation and productivity across all sectors of the economy.

Institutional and Public Financial Management Strengthening – Strengthening public institutions, including fiscal management systems, enhances government capacity to plan, implement, and monitor policies effectively. Strong institutions are necessary for efficient service delivery, improved budget execution, and the creation of an enabling environment for private sector development.

By pursuing these interconnected policy pathways, South Sudan can foster inclusive economic recovery, build resilience to internal and external shocks, and create conditions for sustainable development and long-term stability.

  1. Conclusion

South Sudan’s economic and governance challenges are deeply intertwined with its history of conflict, institutional fragility, and structural economic dependence on oil. Despite significant natural resource endowments, the country has struggled to translate its wealth into inclusive growth, poverty reduction, and effective public service delivery. Persistent instability, weak fiscal management, and limited domestic revenue mobilization have further constrained the state’s capacity to meet growing public expectations.

This paper has shown that the interplay between conflict, economic exclusion, and governance deficits continues to undermine development efforts. Declining oil revenues, a narrow tax base, and recurrent delays in national budget processes have weakened fiscal stability and disrupted post-conflict reconstruction. At the same time, increasing regional and global economic integration—through membership in the East African Community and expanding ties with countries such as United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia—has exposed South Sudan to external shocks, including the spillover effects of conflict in Sudan and geopolitical tensions in the Middle East.

Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive and sustained reform agenda. Strengthening public institutions, improving transparency and accountability in resource management, and broadening the domestic tax base are critical steps toward enhancing state capacity. Equally important is the need for economic diversification to reduce overreliance on oil and build resilience against external shocks. Moreover, ensuring that scarce public resources are allocated efficiently, transparently, and in a timely manner will be essential for restoring public trust and supporting long-term development.

Ultimately, sustainable peace and economic recovery in South Sudan will depend on the government’s ability to align public expectations with institutional capacity, foster inclusive governance, and create an enabling environment for investment and growth. Without these reforms, the cycle of fragility, economic decline, and unmet expectations is likely to persist, undermining the country’s prospects for stability and prosperity.

 

  1. References

Acheampong, T., & Enders, W. (2024). Conflict, infrastructure loss, and economic trajectories in fragile states. Journal of Peace Economics and Development.

Akol, L. (2024). Economic cost of conflict in South Sudan: Infrastructure, productivity, and investment. African Journal of Development Studies.

African Development Bank. (2023). South Sudan economic outlook 2023. African Development Bank Group.

Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2024). Post conflict reconstruction and the economics of rebuilding. Oxford University Press.

EAC Secretariat. (2025). East African Community budget and fiscal reports 2023–24. EAC Secretariat.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2024). South Sudan: Staff-monitored program review and economic outlook. IMF.

Journal of Developing Country Studies. (2024). The impact of armed conflict on economic growth and sustainability in South Sudan.

Radio Tamazuj. (2025). 11 million South Sudanese faced extreme poverty in 2024 – report. Retrieved from https://www.radiotamazuj.org

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2025). South Sudan displacement report 2025. UNHCR.

World Bank. (2021). South Sudan economic update: Pathways to sustainable food security. World Bank.

World Bank. (2023). South Sudan economic monitor: Enhancing domestic revenue mobilization. World Bank.

World Bank. (2024). South Sudan poverty and equity assessment. World Bank.

World Bank. (2025a). South Sudan economic monitor: A pathway to overcome the crisis. World Bank.

World Bank. (2025b). South Sudan economic update: Urgent reforms for stability and growth. World Bank.

Zhou, X., & Hsiao, C. (2025). Conflict-driven economic losses in fragile economies. Journal of Conflict and Development.

Arita, S., Chakravorty, R., Kim, J., Lwin, W. Y., & Steinbach, S. (2026). Strait of Hormuz Closure and Global Fertilizer Trade Disruptions. NDSU Agricultural Trade Monitor, 2026(3), 1–26.

Reuters. (2026). Egypt’s energy import bill more than doubles as global prices surge. Retrieved March 18, 2026, from https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/egypts-energy-import-bill-more-than-doubles-global-prices-surge-2026-03-18/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

ISS Africa. (2026). South Sudan country profile — Poverty and inequality analysis. Retrieved from https://futures.issafrica.org/geographic/countries/south-sudan/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

 

 

East Africa’s 2026/27 Budget plans and implications of US-Iran war on energy and economic outlook

Author: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

In February the major East Africa Communities Countries (Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi) presented to their budget expenditure framework papers and plans in which governments outlined their tax budget proposals and priorities for 2026/27 financial years. The plans are now tabled before their country’s respective parliamentary committees for scrutiny and deliberation.

This paper reflects on the East African Community (EAC) countries budget and tax proposals in the context of economic and tax justice, equity and fairness and the implications of the US, Israel and Iran war on East Africa’s economic outlook for 2026/27. The paper finds that economic benefits from increased budgetary expenditures have been uneven and the US, Israel and Iran war has adverse implications on the region’s economic performance

According to the framework papers, Kenya plans to spend Ksh 4.7 Trln, Uganda UGx78.24 Trln (U$ 21.78 bln) which is about 12.7% increase and Tanzania will spend a record Tsh61.9Trln representing 9.7 % increase compared to previous budget. The governments will raise from tax and non-tax measures with Tanzania focusing more on domestic tax mobilization strategies due to donor aid restraints arising after the violent 2025 general elections. The countries have laid out key expenditure priorities with Education, security, health, infrastructure ranging among the top.

Country

2025/26 budget

2026/27 plans

+/-

Key Priority areas

Uganda

UGX 72.4 Tln

($20 B)

UGX 78.24 Tln

($21.78 B)

+12.7%

Econ transformation, Infrastructure, Fiscal Strategy, Infrastructure (EACOP)

Kenya

Ksh 4.2 T to 4.3 T ( $32-33 Bln)

Ks4.7Tln

+173bln

Education, Security, Health and Agriculture

Tanzania

Tsh56.49 Trln ($21.7–$22.07 Bln)

Tsh 61.9 Trln

+9.7%

Energy, Health, Education, Domestic Revenue Mobilization

Rwanda

Rwf 6,952.1 Bln

 

(US$57.5 Mln)

–

– 27.8% (GDP)

Infrastructure (Bugesera Intl Airport, Recurrent expenditure cuts

Burundi

Bf 5.2 trln

( $1.77 billion).

–

–

Infrastructure, Agriculture, Social development projects

South Sudan

SSP 7.00 Trln

–

–

Wages, debt servicing, and infrastructure development.

Dem Republic Congo

Cf 49,846.8 bln ($17.5 bln to $17.6 bln)

–

–

Security, infrastructure, agriculture, and social services

 

Despite the grandeur of the plans, experiences from the past budgets and analysis of their implementation outcome and economic impacts on ordinary citizens shows that the devil lies in the details. Increasingly, the budgets and their tax plans have been not equitable, just and fair.

Over the last three years, the EAC Countries have increased budgetary expenditures, increased taxes and suppressed inflationary pressures but recorded unevenly distributed economic prosperity. Unemployment, income and food poverty are still persistent.

The World Bank reports poverty rates in East Africa are generally high, with significant variations by country and region. In 2022, approximately 39.8% of Kenya’s population lived below the national poverty line. Other estimates for 2022 indicate international poverty rates (at a day) of 42.3% for both Uganda and Rwanda, and 32.4% for Sudan, with rates often higher in rural, arid, and semi-arid areas. Data indicates that while some countries have made progress, substantial challenges remain, with high debt servicing and vulnerability to external shocks affecting poverty reduction efforts

For instance, according to a study by Kenya’s National Bureau of Statistics household food poverty rates have increased and about 65% families in Nairobi barely afford two meals a day over lack of money. As of 2024, approximately 70% of households in Nairobi experienced food insecurity, ranging from moderate to severe. The conditions are worsening with recent reports in 2025 indicated that the majority of residents can no longer afford three meals a day, and many are skipping meals or stopping cooking altogether due to high costs together[i] The situation is worse in the informal settlements where over 65% of Nairobi residents live (The Standard times)

Further reports indicate widening income inequality and impacts in Kenya. While around 25% of Nairobi households fall into the middle-income group, only a small minority (about 3.54% or 58,818 households) belong to the upper-income group, suggesting that for a large portion of the population, purchasing two proper meals daily is a financial challenges

The poverty rates in Tanzania and Uganda remain high and have remained stagnated or declined at very modest rates over the last five years.

Tanzania’s poverty rate remains high, with approximately 49% of the population living below the international extreme poverty line of $1.90 per day, a figure that remained stagnant between 2011/12 and 2018. While economic growth has been steady, about 27% of the population still lives below the national basic need’s poverty line. Poverty is heavily concentrated in rural areas, where over 57% of inhabitants are considered multidimensionally poor[i]

Uganda’s national poverty rate has shown improvement, declining to 16.1% in 2023/24 from 20.3% in 2019/20, according to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Despite this, a significant portion of the population remains vulnerable, with 57.2% experiencing multidimensional poverty based on 2016-2022 data. Rural areas, where poverty is concentrated, have seen slight improvements, with poor individuals decreasing to 5.3 million in 2023-2024

Graph showing Budget Expenditure growth, population, economic growth and Poverty reduction trends

Figure 1:  GEPC Research Data analysis

Despite what looks like well-structured priority sectors, the expanded budgetary expenditures are yet to be reflected in the pockets of ordinary citizens.

What is ideal budget and economic growth rates to cut poverty

Based on the World Bank and Africa Development bank projections, the national budget are ‘modest’ and insufficient to cut poverty. To put a dent in the poverty rates at the current population growth rates, the economic growth would need to be sustained between 7-10% for a period of about 5 years.  To achieve that level of sustained growth the budget expansion rates would require to consistently remain between 15-30%. The governments would require to target high fiscal multiplier efficiency.

With the current budget proposals, projected revenue collections and expenditure priorities characterized by significant portions of the national budgets spent on recurrent expenditure (salaries) and debt serving, achieving poverty reduction and economic justice targets in the EAC countries are unattainable.

Limitations to achieve ideal budget expansions and equitable economic growth for poverty reduction

Moreover, EAC countries’ economies and tax plans are still exposed to large external debts and vulnerable to internal and external shocks.  In 2023 Kenya and Uganda experienced violent tax protests. The DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan are still affected by conflicts that have stagnated their economic progress.

Rwanda plans to on fiscal consolidation with a reduction from 28.7% of GDP in 2025/26 to 27.8% of GDP in 2026/27 and projected economic growth of approximately 7.1% to 7.5% in 2026, driven by strong performance in services, industry, and continued public investment. However, these plans and growth trajectories are negatively affected by an ongoing conflict in the Eastern DRC which has adverse effects on Rwanda mining and tourism sector.

The DRC and South Sudan struggled to pass their last budgets on time while Burundi has struggled to service a huge external debt burden. The country heavily relies on domestic revenue (including occasion tax hikes on imports and services) and borrowing from domestic banks due to fiscal constraints and lack of external support. The Burundi, DRC and South Sudan experience demonstrate the tragedy of conflict, economic exclusion and meeting public economic expectations in time of crisis.

The high poverty rates, persistent conflicts and failure or delayed passing of the national budgets in our conceptualization constitutes a breach in public expectations, exacerbates the distance between the state and the public, creates further civil apathy and failure to deliver economic outcomes, which can lead to a vicious cycle of poverty economic exclusion, more conflicts and eventual state collapse.

Implications of US, Israel and Iran war on budget and regional economic outlook

The ongoing US, Isreal and Iran war characterized with a spike in oil and gas prices and logistics supply chain disruptions in its first days, will affect energy outlook, may thwart economic growth projections and budget plans in the short and midterm. The impacts will be worse if the war continues for more than six months.

Photo credit: Los Angles Times

The EAC and Middle East economic nexus

The EAC economy has been increasingly integrated with the Middle East, particularly, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) like the UAE and Saudi Arabia through a combination of high-volume trade, strategic infrastructure and financial aid. Since 2015 the Middle East has become to the top logistical hub and EAC’s export partners and The EAC is energy import reliant on the Middle East for petroleum products and Uganda and Kenya have signed fuel agreements to manage supply for potential disruptions. The GCC countries provide aid, infrastructure investment and currency stabilization facilities as was the case with the Kenya-UAE loan in 2025.

EAC countries have struck strategic partnerships beyond commerce. Gulf capital is present in infrastructure investments such as modernization of ports roads and sovereign investments focusing of mining, agriculture, forestry and tourism. This has increased aid dependence and debt exposure to gulf financing. Moreover, the over reliance on Gulf petroleum imports leaves EAC countries’ economies industrial production and transport sectors locked to the gulf and vulnerable to any shocks from the region.

Various models indicate there is a positive correlation of GDP elasticity with respect to world oil prices (i.e the ratio between percentage change in GDP and percentage change in World oil prices).  Prolonged high oil prices test global resilience, raising risks for growth, inflation and monetary policy. A 10% increase in oil prices, if sustained for most of the year, is estimated to reduce global economic output by approximately 0.2% and increase global inflation by about 0.4%. This acts as a tax on consumers and increases business production costs, slowing down growth in oil-importing economies.

An increase of 25% would lead to 0.5% loss in GDP and an increase by 50% will lead to 1% of loss of GDP. A doubling of oil prices can cause up to 14% of loss of economic outputs in countries over the years. In less developed countries like those in the EAC, where agriculture sector is the key contributor to GDP and the sector Is relatively less oil intensive due to less developed countries. However, the percentage of GDP loses in these countries are still higher compared to those of developed countries.

Based on these projections, we can the following risks and implications.

Key risks and implications

  1. Higher energy costs and disrupted logistics and generalized economic confidence shocks that will constitute meaningful drag on economic growth projects to slow down in Q4 of the 2025/26 budgets and Q1 and Q2 of the 2026/27 budgets and generally a gloomy economic outlook if the war continues for more than six months.
  1. Middle East export and import market disruptions affecting largely EAC’s agriculture sector, which is the major economic growth driver. The war has affected exports from the middle east of Ammonia and Sulphur, which are vital ingredients for the production of fertilizers, a vital product supporting the agricultural sector.
  1. Potential decline in aid, infrastructure investments and budget support from the Middle East as the GCC look inwards to finance their defence and war efforts. This will also trigger an aid squeeze from other regional blocks such as the EU as they focus on protecting Europe.
  1. Geopolitical pressures for realignment as the major contending powers the US and Isreal pressure EAC countries to choose sides, given some of their historical strategic and cultural relationships with Iran as a source of energy.
  1. The war represents in my theoretical construction a parody of the ‘Economic Big Boss and the Babies’, in international relations where the larger economic powers dictate the terms and the ‘babies’ deal with the negative consequences irrespective of their will, choice, location and contribution. In this construction of international relations one dominant state or group of states acting in consent and consort and through various means including state craft create an asymmetrical power relation with others analogous to a ‘Parent and baby relationship, where the stronger power exerts its spere of dominance beyond the physical and juristic territorial boundaries as recognized under international law, compelling the weaker states to act and respond to demands, desires, actions and geopolitical effects  of the bigger state.
  1. The world is yet to fully recover from the loss of markets and inflationary pressures the US global tariffs and were working towards realignment of new trading partners in the middle east. This war will add uncertainty to this economic quagmire. As the global economy snarls and slags, the EAC economies could follow too, albeit with levels and pace.
  2. The success of the US and its allies in the middle could increase appetite for it to attack elsewhere setting in motion a spiral of violence, war and economic disruptions around the world. It is widely believed that the US’s success in Venezuela and Isreal’s success in Palestine and Lebanon could have motivated its attack of Iran.

Key recommendations

Tax and budgetary actions.

Reclaim public trust and social contracts to serve via a just, fair and equitable taxes and redistributive budgetary policies.

To mitigate the unequitable distributed economic growth and achieve East Africa’s budget trajectory and economic outlook will require something beyond the traditional ‘invisible hand’ economic theory approach to correct.  The traditional approach suggests free markets naturally achieve optimal efficiency.

Keynesian economics fundamentally challenges the traditional “invisible hand” concept, arguing instead that economies can get stuck in prolonged recessions. Keynes believed the “hand” is not self-regulating during crises, necessitating active government intervention (fiscal policy and other interventions) to manage booms and busts or serious economic disruption.

Strategic recommendations

  • Pursue intra Africa regional trade so as to shelter against external shocks in the middle east
  • Increase investment in renewable energy sources to reduce over reliance from Middle East fossil petroleum
  • Pursue new geopolitical realignments to hedge against the potential fall out and of the middle east and other turbulent blocks

[i] World Bank Group: Poverty and Equity brief, Sub-Saharan Africa, Tanzania April, 2020 available at : https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_TZA.pdf#:~:text=Using%20the%20international%20extreme%20poverty%20rate%20of,people%20are%20considered%20poor%20along%20this%20line.

[i] The Standard Newspaper; Why majority of Nairobi residents can no longer afford to eat,  February, 08, 2025, available, at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001511317/why-majority-of-nairobi-residents-can-no-longer-afford-to-eat

 

[ii] Apolo Rosabella, Strengthening food and nutrition security in Nairobi’s informal settlements, Africa Cities Research Consortium (ARC), February, 2024 available: https://www.african-cities.org/new-paper-strengthening-food-and-nutrition-security-in-nairobis-informal-settlements/#:~:text=New%20paper:%20Strengthening%20food%20and%20nutrition%20security%20in%20Nairobi’s%20informal%20settlements,-Feb%208%2C%202024&text=Since%20independence%2C%20Kenya%20has%20grappled,residents%20of%20low%2Dincome%20households.

 

Why Decarbonization of fishing and Maritime Sector must be a priority for climate action

GEPC Reflection paper on Maritime Climate and Nature Governance

Despite progress, decarbonization of the maritime shipping and fishing sector remains one of the conundrums to disentangle in the global climate change and energy transition juggernaut. The process is slow and messy yet fossil pollution from the maritime sector in the form of oil dumps and carbon emission takes its toll on marine ecosystems, health and livelihoods.

According to study reports, the maritime sector contributes approximately 3% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, amounting to over 940 million to 1 billion tons of  annually. As the backbone of 80-90% of global trade, ships also emit 18-30% of nitrogen oxides and 9% of sulfur oxides, causing 60,000 annual, pollution-related deaths each year related to heart and respiratory diseases, particularly in communities near seaports. As global trade continues to grow, international shipping emissions could rise to 17% or more of global GHG by 2050 (Climate Works Foundation)

The maritime shipping sector remains a significant contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions, intensifying climate change and impacting the health of communities, ecosystems, and economies worldwide. Decarbonizing shipping isn’t just about tackling climate change — it’s about easing the health toll on port communities, which suffer most from polluted air (ibid)

Approximately 80% to 90% of global trade by volume is carried by sea and handled by ports worldwide, making maritime logistics the backbone of the global economy. By value, maritime transport accounts for over 70% of global trade. This reliance includes raw materials, fuel, and finished goods, with around 11 billion tons of goods transported by ship annually

Global fishing fleets, powered mainly by fossil fuels such as marine diesel, emit between 0.1% to 0.5% of global carbon emissions, or up to 159 million tons annually, according to the latest available UNCTAD data. The fisheries sector, crucial for the livelihoods of more than 40 million people worldwide, faces escalating threats from climate change. These include rising sea levels and warming waters that jeopardize fishing ports and deplete fish stocks. The risks are particularly high for developing countries, where small-scale and artisanal fishing prevails.  Yet the fishing industry lacks comprehensive global targets and guidelines for transitioning to cleaner energy, UNCTAD reports

Decarbonization of the sector will require political will and investment in new technologies that enable the fishing and maritime vessels to straddle the breadth of water surfaces without spilling and emission of toxic waste. Fishing fleets in their different sizes are a key contributor to the fisheries and seafood value chain, but also an important source of GHG emissions because they rely on fossil fuels such as marine diesel as a source of energy.

Fishing is an extractive sector and most emissions stem from the fuels that are used to propel the fishing vessels, but fuel is also used for processing fish on board vessels. Moreover, the fuel used in fishing vessels is often diesel or other forms of bunker fuel or heavy fuel oil (HFO), which contains more contaminants than regular fuel and is therefore more polluting. It is therefore imperative that lighting efforts are made to decarbonize the sector.

Decarbonising the Maritime and fishing sector focuses on achieving net-zero emissions by 2050, as targeted by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), through adopting alternative fuels (biofuels, methanol, ammonia), enhancing energy efficiency (hull optimization, wind-assisted propulsion), and utilizing digital technologies. For fishing, this involves electrifying small vessels and implementing hybrid systems on larger ones, alongside reducing overfishing to protect ocean carbon sinks. 

 Key Aspects of Maritime Decarbonisation

  • IMO Targets: The IMO aims for at least 20% to 30% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 and 70% to 80% by 2040, aiming for net-zero by 2050.
  • Alternative Fuels: Transitioning to biofuels, LNG, methanol, and ammonia is central to eliminating carbon from shipping, with ongoing testing and safety protocols.
  • Energy Efficiency: Immediate gains are achieved through hydrodynamic hull improvements, advanced propeller designs, and AI-driven performance optimization.
  • Technological Shift: The industry is moving towards digitalization for monitoring emissions and using IoT for real-time energy management. 

Decarbonising the Fishing Fleet

  • Fuel Savings: Implementing advanced trawl designs and efficient, low-resistance nets has shown up to 20% fuel savings in pilot studies.
  • Propulsion Systems: Small-scale, near-shore fishing vessels are best suited for electric battery propulsion, while larger vessels are transitioning to hybrid systems.
  • Operational Changes: Reducing speed, optimizing fishing times, and adopting smart, energy-monitoring gear are crucial, non-technical, or “soft” measures.
  • Policy & Incentives: Policies include phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, implementing carbon taxes, and directing funding toward green retrofitting. 

 Challenges and Strategies

  • Data and Methods: Fishing fleets often have high fuel reliance, contributing about 4% of food production CO2 emissions. Accurate, bottom-up data is needed to track progress.
  • Socioeconomic Factors: The transition must account for the impact on coastal communities, requiring support for fishermen to invest in new, greener technologies.
  • Ecological Benefit: Ending overfishing is key, as healthy oceans and fish stocks optimize natural carbon sequestration. 

 Decarbonizing the fishing fleets: Considerable recommendations

UNCTAD finds that considerable fuel use reduction can be achieved from fully implementing existing EU regulations (for instance, by rebuilding stocks and allocating fishing opportunities in accordance with Article 17 of the Basic Regulation on the common fisheries policy). To this end, fuel use efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions need to be integrated as an explicit goal of fisheries management, and monitored on the basis of robust data collection.

Moreover, the introduction of alternative fuels will require major investment in new infrastructure as well as regulatory changes in the short term, but lead to major gains in the long term, with regard to both costs and emissions. It is however important to optimise the choice of fuel and technology for the operational profile of each vessel. In the transition, it is crucial that economic policy instruments, such as taxes, fees and emission quotas, are used wisely to incentivise transition.

 A ban of fossil fuel use in fisheries by 2050 would give clear incentives and pave the way for the transition – but needs to be accompanied by well-designed funding opportunities for green investments and compensatory measures to minimise the rise in short-term costs. Overall, a systems perspective is needed to achieve an energy-efficient, decarbonized fishing sector, without this causing other environmental impacts.

 Balancing Decarbonization and Fairness to less developed countries and fishing communities

The Maritime and fishing industry needs to shift to alternative energy – but in a way that’s fair for vulnerable countries and communities. The Maritime sector accounts for more than 85% of global trade logistics and the fisheries sector is important for food security, jobs and for the livelihoods of millions of people, especially in developing countries.

Based on reports from the World Bank and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) maritime logistics is critical for developing economies, with over 80% of global trade volume carried by sea. Developing nations account for roughly 55% of seaborne exports and over 60–70% of imports, making their trade, particularly in raw materials and consumer goods, heavily dependent on maritime transport (World Bank)

Meanwhile approximately 500 million to 600 million people in developing countries and less developed countries (LDCs) rely on small-scale fisheries and aquaculture for their livelihoods. It is imperative that adopting alternative fuels and energy mix must be gradual and contextual to ensure a “just” energy transition that doesn’t disproportionately affect vulnerable countries or fishing communities.

Need for targeted and stronger regulations for maritime and fishing fleets. According to UNCTAD “Existing energy efficiency measures and regulations adopted by the International Maritime Organization for global shipping are of only limited application to fishing vessels, primarily due to their size and operational patterns.  For example, vessels that fall below certain tonnage thresholds or operate exclusively within a flag State’s jurisdiction are exempt. Fishing vessels are also currently excluded from reporting obligations and market-based measures for GHG reduction adopted at the European Union level, except for the taxation of energy products used to propel all vessels.

Moreover, in the context of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement – where countries outline their pledges to cut emissions and adapt to climate change – most of the top ten major aquatic food exporters show limited commitments to climate mitigation or adaptation in fisheries-related sectors. The IMO regulations thus need to be reasserted and enforced with time bound milestones for implementation and roll out across the maritime and fishing sector.

Scale up research and development in alternative fuels.  So far, green biofuels made from non-feedstocks or fish waste, stand out as the most readily available and mature option however still face challenges of safety, scalability, cost effectiveness, storage capacity of vessels and ports and, delivery infrastructure. For green methanol and liquefied natural gas faces challenges in terms of retrofitting and safety, with limited potential to fully decarbonize fleets. Other possible ways to reduce fishing vessels’ GHG emissions by use of electric and hybrid engines, wind propulsion technologies and digital technologies to improve energy efficiency must be explored, tested and scaled up.

 Harmonize Global Data Collection:  On the economic and technological fronts, UNCTAD calls for a globally harmonized system for data collection, adapted to small-scale and artisanal fisheries, to monitor and report fishing fleet GHG emissions.  The data must be openly shared with the countries and communities were fishing fleets operate.  Further exploration and use of sustainable fuel options from circular economy practices, such as converting fish waste and seaweed into biofuel or biogas for fishing vessels and expanding their delivery infrastructure must be used.

Start incremental phase-out and, ultimately, prohibit fossil fuel-based subsidies to the fisheries sector.  From a trade, value chain and infrastructure point of view, there must be incremental phase-out and, ultimately, prohibition of fossil fuel-based subsidies to the fisheries sector. Also crucially take effective measures on climate change adaptation, resilience-building and disaster risk reduction for seaport infrastructure, as well as improving access to affordable financing for developing countries.

On environmental considerations,  introduce fishing fleet decarbonization commitments into NDCs to align mitigation and adaptation efforts, since decarbonization cannot be separated from marine stewardship and fish stocks sustainability.

Polluter Must Pay.  Governments must impose heavy carbon taxes on large fossil polluting commercial fishing vessels in the form of excise duties to compensate for the environmental and health damage caused. These must be accompanied with guard rails on how much of these can be passed down to consumers.

Finally, address social and economic livelihood factors, by prioritizing the well-being, livelihoods and rights of fishers in the energy transition and enhancing safety standards

Efforts towards a Carbon Free Maritime Transport fleet and logistics industry: A Case of CMA CGM

The transition requires intense collaboration between ship owners, regulators, and energy suppliers to implement tailored solutions for the diverse global fleet. So far CMA CGM and Mearsk have joined efforts to address decarbonization in the shipping and maritime sector

According to the Company’s reports, CMA CGM a leading global player in Maritime transport and logistics adopted an ambitious operation and financial strategy to achieve net zero carbon across all its operations by 2050. The company targets to reach two intermediate stages for its shipping activities: -30% of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 and -80% by 2040 (vs 2008). 

CMA CGM’s decarbonization strategy is based on two pillars:

  1. Reducing energy consumption through operational excellence and optimization of the Group’s assets,
  2. Increasing the share of low-carbon energies, both by acquiring adapted assets and developing sustainable production channels.

CMA CGM has reduced the carbon intensity of each container transported on its ships by 50% between 2008 and 2022. To reduce its total CO2 emissions, the Group continues to optimize ship design and propulsion, and to improve the energy efficiency of its sea and land operations and infrastructures. Moreover, three fleet centers constantly assist crews on board with improved data to optimize routes, and the SMARTSHIP project will provide cutting-edge connectivity for 200 vessels to transmit real-time navigation and fuel consumption data by 2025.

The Group continuously improves its fleet performance with design innovation, including hydrodynamics and aerodynamics and new propulsion technology to save fuel.  Port terminals operated by the Group have been revamped to limit their environmental impact with the installation of solar panels, use of hybrid or all-electric handling equipment, supply of biodiesel, and LED lighting.

Diversifying the energy mix: The biggest challenge for more sustainable maritime transport is developing low-carbon energies. CMA CGM continues to diversify its energy mix by integrating alternative energies to power its maritime, road and air assets.

To date, CMA CGM has invested $15 billion in 119 new vessels ready to use biogas, bio methanol and e-fuels, that will be in fleet by 2028. Through partnerships with industrial and energy leaders, CMA CGM supports the development of a sustainable supply chain for these new low-carbon fuels. Convinced that the transition of the shipping sector will be driven by multiple energy solutions, The company has explored all alternative energies for the future such as ammonia, hydrogen and sail assistance. 

CMA CGM subsidiaries also contribute to the Group’s Net Zero target on land and in the air. By 2025, CEVA Logistics will operate a fleet of 1,450 electric vehicles for all logistics, and its entire warehouse facilities will use low -carbon electricity delivered by 1.8 million sqm of solar panels.

CMA CGM has also adopted an ambitious strategy to modal shift from road to lower-carbon transport, such as rail and barges, with the objective of reaching 70% by 2025.  Launched in March 2021, the Group’s air cargo division will be the first to launch the A350F, the most modern and energy-efficient model on the market.  CMA CGM supports a start-ups, universities and research centers nd drives innovation to build low-carbon, more sustainable global supply chains.

References:

Climate works Foundation: https://www.climateworks.org/programs/transportation/maritime-shipping/#:~:text=The%20challenge,other%20harborcraft%2C%20eliminating%20major%20pollutants.

EPRS: Decarbonizing the fishing sector: Energy efficiency measures and alternative energy solutions for fish, PE 740.225 – June 2023

UNCTAD: Energy transition of fishing fleets: Opportunities and challenges for developing countries: https://unctad.org/publication/energy-transition-fishing-fleets-opportunities-and-challenges-developing-countries

Word Bank;  Sustainable Development in Shipping and ports , ( August 14, 2025)  Available via: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/transport/brief/sustainable-development-in-shipping-and-ports#:~:text=Maritime%20is%20critical%20for%20Global,change%2C%20maritime%20transport%20is%20crucial.

How Seaweed Farming Empowers Women and Supports Climate Action Along Tanzania’s Swahili Coast

Authors: Gerald Sumari & Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Featured Photo Credit: Loshni Rodhia, Reef Resilience Network

Climate change has severely affected coastal livelihoods through declining fish stocks, ecosystem degradation, and rising ocean temperatures, disproportionately impacting women in fishing communities. Seaweed farming has emerged as an alternative livelihood that provides income stability, enhances gender equity, and delivers ecosystem services such as carbon capture, shoreline protection, and reduced ocean acidification.

  1. Introduction

Global climate change has become one of the most pressing challenges facing coastal communities worldwide, particularly in developing countries where livelihoods are intricately tied to fragile marine ecosystems. Rising sea surface temperatures, ocean acidification, and the destruction of nearshore habitats have significantly affected fisheries productivity and the socioeconomic stability of communities dependent on marine resources (IPCC, 2019). In Tanzania, the Swahili coastline, stretching over 1,424 kilometers and encompassing key regions such as Tanga, Bagamoyo, Lindi, Mtwara, and the Zanzibar Archipelago, is increasingly vulnerable to these climate-related disruptions (FAO, 2020). Fishing communities, long the backbone of coastal economies, face declining fish stocks, irregular seasonal patterns, and ecosystem degradation. These changes have disproportionately impacted women, who are often relegated to secondary roles in fisheries yet bear the primary responsibility for household sustenance and income diversification.

Seaweed farming has emerged as a promising alternative livelihood strategy for coastal women in Tanzania. Beyond providing a supplementary source of income, it has grown into a significant economic activity in Zanzibar, where it ranks as the third largest source of income and accounts for approximately 90 percent of marine exports (Msuya, 2013). This growth highlights the potential of seaweed farming not only as a means of economic empowerment for women but also as an important contributor to climate change mitigation and adaptation. From a climate perspective, seaweed aquaculture contributes to carbon sequestration by absorbing atmospheric carbon dioxide and storing it in biomass and sediments, while also providing ecosystem services such as shoreline protection and reduced ocean acidification (Krause-Jensen & Duarte, 2016).

Despite this potential, seaweed farming in Tanzania has not yet been fully recognized or developed as a sustainable economic sector. Current efforts remain fragmented, largely driven by donor agencies and philanthropic initiatives, with limited strategic integration into national marine and climate change policies. Furthermore, women farmers face barriers such as weak institutional support, limited technical knowledge, and restricted access to markets and finance, which constrain their ability to scale production and maximize climate and economic benefits

This study therefore seeks to explore the nexus between seaweed farming, women’s economic empowerment, and carbon sequestration along Tanzania’s Swahili coast. Specifically, it examines the economic opportunities created for coastal women through seaweed aquaculture, the climate benefits associated with carbon sequestration, and the institutional and policy gaps that hinder the sector’s growth. By situating seaweed farming within both the blue economy and climate resilience frameworks, the study aims to provide evidence-based insights and recommendations for scaling up this sector as a transformative pathway for women’s empowerment and climate change adaptation in Tanzania.

  1. Seaweed Farming and Carbon Sequestration

Seaweed farming refers to the cultivation of marine macroalgae in shallow coastal waters, often using ropes, stakes, or rafts to facilitate growth. Unlike wild harvesting, which can contribute to the depletion of natural stocks, seaweed aquaculture provides a sustainable means of production with both economic and ecological benefits. Globally, seaweed farming has grown into a multi-billion-dollar industry, producing over 35 million tonnes annually and supplying raw materials to food, pharmaceutical, cosmetic, and biofuel industries (FAO, 2022).

From an environmental perspective, seaweed farming is increasingly recognized as an important contributor to the blue carbon framework. Seaweeds, through photosynthesis, absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and the ocean, converting it into biomass. A portion of this captured carbon is sequestered through long-term storage in sediments or through export to deep ocean waters. Krause-Jensen and Duarte (2016) estimate that seaweed ecosystems contribute substantially to global carbon sequestration, with macroalgal forests and farms acting as carbon sinks. Although the exact sequestration potential varies by species and location, emerging evidence suggests that large-scale cultivation could significantly offset greenhouse gas emissions.

Beyond carbon sequestration, seaweed farming provides adaptation benefits to coastal ecosystems and communities. Seaweed farms reduce wave energy, thereby protecting shorelines from erosion. They also elevate local water pH, mitigating ocean acidification, and enhance oxygen levels, which support biodiversity and reduce the risk of hypoxic conditions. These ecosystem services make seaweed farming a nature-based solution that addresses both mitigation and adaptation to climate change.

In Tanzania, seaweed farming particularly in Zanzibar and Pemba has demonstrated the dual benefits of ecological sustainability and socioeconomic empowerment. However, despite its potential to contribute to the country’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, seaweed aquaculture has yet to be fully integrated into climate policy frameworks. With improved recognition, investment, and research into carbon accounting methodologies, seaweed farming could position Tanzania as a regional leader in blue carbon and sustainable aquaculture practices.

  1. Nexus between Climate Change, Seaweed Farming and Carbon Sequestration

The nexus between climate change, seaweed farming, and carbon sequestration represents a crucial intersection of environmental sustainability, economic resilience, and gender empowerment. Climate change has exacerbated challenges faced by coastal communities in Tanzania, including declining fish stocks, saltwater intrusion, and increased vulnerability to storms and coastal erosion (IPCC, 2019). These pressures have heightened the economic and social vulnerabilities of women, who are often responsible for household livelihoods yet face restricted access to productive resources.

Seaweed farming provides an important adaptation pathway, enabling women to diversify income sources away from fisheries and reduce their dependency on diminishing fish stocks. By engaging in seaweed aquaculture, women are not only able to supplement household incomes but also enhance food security, education, and health outcomes within their communities (Msuya, 2013). This diversification strengthens household resilience to climate shocks, while also enhancing women’s agency in economic decision-making.

At the same time, seaweed farming contributes directly to climate change mitigation through carbon sequestration. Seaweeds absorb substantial amounts of carbon dioxide, which can be stored in their biomass or transferred to deep ocean sinks when fragments are detached and transported offshore (Krause-Jensen & Duarte, 2016). In this way, seaweed farms act as localized carbon sinks that help offset greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, seaweed aquaculture improves the ecological health of coastal zones by buffering wave energy, providing habitat for marine species, and maintaining ecosystem functions that are essential for coastal biodiversity.

Therefore, the nexus illustrates a dual dividend: while women benefit from improved economic opportunities and empowerment, communities and ecosystems benefit from enhanced carbon storage and climate adaptation services. Scaling up seaweed farming along the Swahili coast can thus create synergistic gains that address both social equity and environmental sustainability, aligning with Tanzania’s commitments to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 13 (Climate Action), and SDG 14 (Life Below Water).

  1. Seaweed Farming and Economic Empowerment Opportunities for Coastal Women

Seaweed farming has emerged as one of the most significant livelihood opportunities for women along Tanzania’s Swahili coast. Traditionally marginalized within the fisheries sector, women have increasingly turned to seaweed aquaculture as an alternative that offers greater autonomy, income stability, and social recognition. In Zanzibar, where the practice is most developed, women constitute the majority of seaweed farmers and contribute substantially to household incomes (Msuya, 2013).

Economically, seaweed farming provides a relatively low-cost entry point for women, requiring limited capital investment and basic technical knowledge. Once established, seaweed farms generate steady income through the sale of dried seaweed to domestic and international markets. Current estimates suggest that women farmers in Zanzibar can earn between USD 70 and USD 100 per month, depending on yields and market prices (FAO, 2020). While this income is modest, it represents a critical supplement in communities where alternative employment opportunities are scarce.

Beyond income generation, seaweed farming has broader implications for women’s empowerment. Earnings from seaweed sales enable women to invest in children’s education, improve household food security, and access healthcare services. In some communities, women seaweed farmers have reported greater decision-making power within households and community organizations, marking a shift in gender dynamics traditionally dominated by men (Lugomela et al., 2021). Seaweed farming has therefore become a pathway not only for economic resilience but also for advancing gender equity along Tanzania’s coastline.

In addition, the growing global demand for seaweed-derived products including cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and biofuels offers significant potential for value addition. With adequate support in processing, branding, and marketing, Tanzanian women farmers could capture higher value from their produce, moving beyond raw material exports into niche international markets. Such a transition would further enhance women’s economic empowerment and position seaweed farming as a competitive sector within Tanzania’s blue economy framework.

Nevertheless, challenges remain. Price volatility in international markets, limited bargaining power, and the absence of cooperative structures reduce women’s profitability. Furthermore, inadequate access to credit and modern farming technologies constrains productivity. These challenges highlight the need for targeted policy interventions and institutional support to strengthen the role of seaweed farming as a driver of women’s empowerment and sustainable coastal development.

  1. Policy and Practice Gaps

Despite its economic and ecological potential, seaweed farming along Tanzania’s Swahili coast faces significant policy and practice gaps that limit its growth as a sustainable sector. These challenges can be broadly categorized into institutional, technical, financial, and environmental dimensions.

Institutional Gaps: Seaweed farming remains weakly integrated into Tanzania’s broader marine and aquaculture policies. While Zanzibar has made notable progress, the lack of a comprehensive national seaweed strategy undermines efforts to scale the sector. Policy implementation is fragmented, with limited coordination between government agencies, research institutions, and development partners.

Technical Gaps: Women farmers often rely on traditional, low-yield methods and face limited access to improved farming technologies and resilient seed varieties. Rising sea surface temperatures and ocean warming have also affected yields by weakening the productivity of commonly farmed strains such as Eucheuma spinosum and Kappaphycus alvarezii. Without investment in research and innovation, farmers remain vulnerable to climate-induced declines in production.

Financial Gaps: Access to finance remains a major barrier for women farmers, who often lack collateral and financial literacy to secure loans from formal institutions. The sector’s dependence on donor-funded projects has created uncertainty, with few sustainable financing mechanisms available to expand farm acreage, adopt new technologies, or invest in value addition. Limited access to cooperative structures and collective bargaining further weakens women’s market position.

Environmental Gaps: Competition for coastal space with tourism and fishing industries, coupled with environmental degradation, reduces the availability of suitable farming areas. Climate change continues to exacerbate these challenges through rising ocean temperatures, shifting tidal patterns, and increased frequency of extreme weather events, all of which impact seaweed yields and farm stability.

Comparative evidence from Kenya and Madagascar suggests that stronger policy frameworks, investment in seaweed breeding programs, and development of women-led cooperatives can significantly enhance sector resilience. Without similar reforms in Tanzania, however, seaweed farming will remain underdeveloped, leaving coastal women unable to fully harness its economic and climate-related benefits.

  1. Recommendations

To unlock the full potential of seaweed farming for women’s economic empowerment and climate resilience along Tanzania’s Swahili coast, a set of targeted recommendations is necessary. These measures should address institutional, technical, financial, and environmental barriers while aligning with national development priorities and global sustainability goals.

1. Training and Capacity Building: Strengthen technical training for women farmers on modern aquaculture techniques, resilient seed varieties, and farm management practices. Capacity-building programs should also include business management, marketing, and financial literacy to improve income stability and bargaining power.

2. Policy Reform and Institutional Support: Develop a comprehensive National Seaweed Farming Strategy that positions the sector within Tanzania’s Blue Economy framework. Policy reforms should enhance coordination among government agencies, research institutions, private sector actors, and women’s organizations to create an enabling environment for sector growth.

3. Scaling Up Production and Value Addition: Encourage expansion of farm acreage while supporting investments in processing, packaging, and value addition for products such as cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and biofuels. This would enable women to capture greater value beyond raw exports.

4. Financing and Investment Mechanisms: Establish tailored financial products, such as microcredit schemes and women’s cooperative funds, to address the sector’s financing gaps. Access to climate finance and blue carbon credits should also be explored to compensate women for the carbon sequestration benefits of seaweed farming.

5. Research and Development: Invest in research on climate-resilient seaweed species, disease management, and carbon accounting methodologies. Partnerships with universities, international research institutes, and regional organizations should be promoted to build a stronger knowledge base.

6. Environmental Management and Coastal Zoning: Introduce integrated coastal management practices that balance seaweed farming with tourism, fisheries, and conservation needs. Clear zoning and environmental monitoring frameworks would minimize conflicts and protect marine ecosystems.

  1. Strengthen Women seaweed farmers Association, as vehicles for engaging with government policy makers and other stakeholders while protecting the interests of women sea weed farmers. The existing networks are still infant, suffer from nascent resources and internal capacity challenges to into large scale ventures. Moreover, women sea farmers face significant health risks due to poor protection gear and over exposure to salty ocean water. Women complain of skin rushes and other risks due to over exposure.

By implementing these recommendations, Tanzania can transform seaweed farming into a resilient and competitive sector that delivers triple dividends: economic empowerment for women, enhanced climate mitigation through carbon sequestration, and strengthened adaptation for coastal communities. Aligning these efforts with the Sustainable Development Goals—particularly SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 13 (Climate Action), and SDG 14 (Life Below Water)—would further position Tanzania as a leader in inclusive and sustainable blue economy development.

  1. Conclusion

Seaweed farming holds transformative potential for Tanzania’s Swahili coastline, offering a sustainable livelihood for women, a pathway for climate change mitigation, and a contribution to the country’s broader blue economy agenda. As climate change continues to undermine traditional fisheries and coastal ecosystems, seaweed aquaculture provides an alternative that empowers women economically while also delivering critical ecological services such as carbon sequestration, shoreline protection, and improved marine biodiversity.

The evidence presented in this study demonstrates that while seaweed farming already plays a significant role in Zanzibar’s economy accounting for nearly 90 percent of marine exports it remains underdeveloped along the broader Tanzanian coastline. Institutional, technical, financial, and environmental gaps continue to constrain its full potential. Women farmers face challenges such as weak policy support, limited access to technology and finance, and exposure to climate-induced risks. Addressing these barriers is essential if seaweed farming is to deliver its dual dividends of economic empowerment and climate resilience.

Targeted interventions, including stronger policy frameworks, enhanced training, value addition, and innovative financing models, can unlock the sector’s potential. By scaling up seaweed farming and integrating it into national climate and marine strategies, Tanzania can position itself as a leader in sustainable aquaculture and blue carbon initiatives in East Africa.

In conclusion, seaweed farming is more than an economic activity; it is a climate-smart development strategy that empowers women, supports households, and strengthens ecological resilience. Harnessing this potential requires a coordinated effort among government, development partners, research institutions, and coastal communities. If pursued strategically, seaweed farming can significantly contribute to Tanzania’s achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, while building a resilient and inclusive coastal economy.

 

References

FAO. (2020). The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

FAO. (2022). Global production statistics for seaweed farming. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

IPCC. (2019). Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Krause-Jensen, D., & Duarte, C. M. (2016). Substantial role of macroalgae in marine carbon sequestration. Nature Geoscience, 9(10), 737–742.

Lugomela, C., Msuya, F. E., & Kyewalyanga, M. S. (2021). Seaweed farming and gender dynamics in coastal Tanzania. Journal of Applied Phycology, 33, 1457–1468.

Msuya, F. E. (2013). Social and economic dimensions of seaweed farming in Zanzibar. In D. Valiela (Ed.), Aquaculture: Ecological, Economic, and Social Dimensions (pp. 121–138). Springer.

Duarte, C. M., Wu, J., Xiao, X., Bruhn, A., & Krause-Jensen, D. (2021). Can seaweed farming play a role in climate change mitigation and adaptation? Frontiers in Marine Science, 8, 638802.

 

Enhancing the Viability of NDCs in East Africa: Assessing Progress, Gaps and path to net zero

Author: Nader Khalifa, Researcher, Governance and Economic Policy Centre*, December 2025

Introduction: COP30 as the Implementation Milestone

The COP30 in Belém – Brazil marked a critical milestone, being framed as the “Implementation COP,” arriving a decade after the signing of the Paris Agreement and returning to Brazil over 30 years since the landmark 1992 Earth Summit. The COP concluded with some proclamations on Just Transition Mechanism and adoption of Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) indicators, and increased focus on nature and finance but little radical actions to tame the climate crisis under 1.5°C target.

Despite the milestones, global implementation remains off-track, with countries collectively failing to reduce emissions and scale resilience at the pace required. The climate crisis is still treated with suspicion, geopolitical jostling and underfunded, highlighting a clear gap between ambition and action. Only small share around 12–15% of European climate finance is accessible to the poorest and most climate-vulnerable African countries, far below their share of climate risk and need (OECD, 2023). In East Arica, analysis of climate adaptation finance shows that approximately 52.7 % of funds committed for adaptation were actually disbursed between 2009 and 2018 (Savvidou et al., 2021).

This paper assesses the state of global progress on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), with a particular focus on East African countries—Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda. It further compares the level of NDC implementation and financial support needs in these countries against the climate finance commitments and disbursements of selected European nations, evaluating whether NDCs remain viable tools for achieving the Paris Agreement objectives, identifying gaps, and proposes strategic recommendations to strengthen their viability in achieving Paris Agreement goals.

Global NDC Assessment: Are We on Track for Paris Targets?

According to the UNFCCC’s latest NDC Synthesis Report (2023–2024), global emissions remain far above Paris-aligned trajectories. Current NDCs collectively put the world on a 2.4–2.6°C warming path far from the 1.5°C target (UNEP, 2023).

NDC Implementation Gap: Structural Barriers and Evidence of Underperformance

Although East African countries have strengthened their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) since 2015—many increasing mitigations ambition by over 20–30% and expanding adaptation priorities—the region continues to face a widening implementation gap as real-world emission reductions have not followed at the required scale. This gap reflects both systemic constraints and insufficient translation of political commitments into measurable action and raises serious questions about whether NDCs, as currently designed, can deliver the Paris outcomes.

Key Implementation Gaps and Challenges

High dependence on external climate finance

  • Most East African NDCs rely on 70–90% external financing, particularly for adaptation and energy transition.
  • The region collectively requires more than USD 280–300 billion by 2030, yet receives less than 12%–15% of that annually (AfDB, 2023).
  • Adaptation finance alone is underfunded by over USD 2.5 billion per year across the region (GCA, 2023).

Limited progress in translating NDC commitments into sectoral action

  • Updated NDCs include ambitious mitigation targets—such as Kenya’s 32% by 2030, Uganda’s 22%, and Ethiopia’s conditional 68%—yet emissions continue to rise in transport, agriculture, and industry.
  • Only 20–30% of planned mitigation actions are currently being implemented at scale.

Weak MRV systems and institutional capacity

  • More than 70% of East African countries lack fully operational MRV systems across energy, agriculture, and waste sectors.
  • Inadequate data collection and reporting reduce accountability and hinder access to climate finance, which increasingly requires robust tracking frameworks (ICAT, 2022).

Limited domestic integration and mainstreaming

  • NDCs remain insufficiently embedded in national and subnational development plans.
  • Fewer than 40% of sector ministries align annual budgets with NDC priorities, creating fragmentation and slow execution.
  • Local governments—key for adaptation delivery—receive less than 10% of the required climate financing.

Slow and complex climate finance disbursement

  • Global climate funds (e.g., GCF, GEF) take 18–24 months on average from concept to approval.
  • East Africa adaptation finance disbursement ratio (≈52.7 %), considerably below what’s needed and indicating a persistent delivery gap.
  • Private-sector investment remains below USD 4 billion per year, far short of the USD 24–30 billion needed annually.

Limited community participation in planning and delivery

  • NDC implementation often excludes rural and climate-vulnerable communities, despite these groups experiencing more than 70% of climate impacts (floods, droughts, crop failures).
  • This reduces local ownership and increases the risk of maladaptation.

East African NDCs: Ambition, Progress, and Implementation Realities

The second generation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in East Africa demonstrates a clear increase in ambition compared to 2015 submissions. However, implementation continues to lag far behind targets due to systemic financing, institutional, and capacity constraints. This section synthesizes the ambition levels, progress indicators, and the underlying structural barriers limiting effective delivery of NDC commitments in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda.

Ambition Levels and Emission Reduction Targets

All four East African countries have strengthened their 2030 climate commitments, reflecting enhanced sectoral coverage (Kenya: Energy, agriculture, LULUCF, transport, waste, Tanzania: Energy, transport, forestry, waste, Uganda: Energy, forestry, agriculture, Rwanda: Energy, industry, waste, agriculture) and improved quantification of mitigation and adaptation actions.

These targets indicate rising ambition; however, nearly 80–90% of planned mitigation outcomes remain dependent on external finance, highlighting an imbalance between national ambition and the available resource base.

  • Implementation Status: Progress and Performance

Despite strong stated ambition, real implementation remains uneven and significantly below required trajectories. Key observations include:

Positive Developments

  • Kenya continues to lead the region in renewable energy deployment, with geothermal providing over 40% of total power generation, complemented by utility-scale wind and solar.
  • Rwanda operates one of the most advanced MRV systems in Africa, integrating national inventories, sectoral reporting templates, and verification frameworks.
  • Tanzania and Uganda have made notable progress in adaptation planning, particularly in agriculture, water, and disaster risk management.

However, progress falls short of NDC trajectories due to:

  • Delayed and unpredictable international climate finance disbursement, especially for adaptation.
  • Limited mainstreaming of NDCs, with weak integration into national development plans, sectoral strategies, and district-level programs.
  • Technical gaps in MRV, GHG accounting, emissions modeling, and data management.
  • Insufficient private sector participation due to regulatory uncertainty, weak incentives, and few bankable climate projects.

Overall, implementation progress remains slow, fragmented, and insufficient to place the region on a Paris-aligned trajectory.

Climate Finance Needs, Delivery, and the Widening Gap

East African NDCs require substantial financing for both mitigation and adaptation. Country estimates highlight an urgent mismatch between required and delivered resources:

Evidence of the Finance Gap

  • East Africa receives less than 12% of Africa’s total climate finance inflows (CPI, 2024).
  • Adaptation finance remains below 30% of total flows to the region, despite East Africa being among the world’s most climate-vulnerable regions (Brookings Institution, 2022).
  • GCF projects in East Africa face approval timelines averaging 24–36 months, slowing implementation of urgent projects.
  • National institutions struggle to meet stringent fiduciary and documentation requirements of major climate funds.

Institutional, Governance, and Capacity Constraints

Several deep-rooted challenges hinder NDC implementation:

Institutional Challenges

  • Weak MRV systems in several countries limit tracking, reporting, and verification of progress.
  • Fragmented inter-ministerial coordination, especially between energy, finance, agriculture, and environment ministries.
  • Data deficits in key sectors (LULUCF, agriculture, off-grid energy, transport), affecting GHG inventory accuracy.

Governance and Operational Gaps

  • Limited local government engagement, despite significant adaptation actions being subnational.
  • Low public participation, particularly in rural and climate-vulnerable communities.
  • Few mature, bankable projects, leading to under-utilization of available finance windows.
  • Private sector climate investment remains below 15% of total climate finance in East Africa.

Collectively, these challenges reinforce the structural implementation gap, limiting the region’s ability to translate Paris ambition into real, measurable outcomes.

International Climate Finance Support: European Commitments vs. Delivery

    • Pledges vs. Delivered Finance

European countries — led by Germany, France, the EU, and the UK — collectively pledge significant climate finance to Africa. However, the delivery gap remains substantial:

  • OECD data show that while European donors reported USD 34–36 billion in climate finance annually (2019–2022), the actual disbursements to African LDCs were less than USD 9–11 billion.
  • Only around 12–15% of European climate finance is accessible to the poorest and most climate-vulnerable African countries.
  • Adaptation finance remains critically low: in 2022, EU institutions allocated only 27% of their climate finance to adaptation—far below the 50% target encouraged by COP26 and COP27 decisions.
  • The UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance confirms a USD 1.2–1.3 trillion cumulative finance gaps for African NDCs by 2030.
  • According to a report by FSD Africa, the average disbursement ratio for climate finance in Africa is 79%, which includes both mitigation and adaptation flows CPI (2022).
  • According to Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) data, adaptation finance for African countries was disbursed at an average rate of 46%, compared to 56% for mitigation finance.
  • The Landscape of Climate Finance in Africa (2024) report from the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) estimates that adaptation finance flows to Africa rose from USD 11.8 billion in 2019/20 to USD 13.8 billion in 2021/22.

Misalignment with African Priorities

European finance is still mitigation-heavy, although Africa’s most urgent needs relate to adaptation:

  • More than 65–70% of EU climate finance to Africa goes to mitigation sectors (renewables, energy efficiency).
  • Adaptation sectors such as agriculture, water management, early warning systems, and climate-resilient infrastructure receive less than 30%.
  • UNEP’s Adaptation Gap Report indicates that adaptation finance globally is also constrained, Analyses show that a large majority of adaptation actions identified in African NDCs remain unfunded or underfunded, with only around 20–23% of adaptation needs being met by climate finance flows, leaving substantial gaps for implementation. (UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2023).
  • The African Development Bank estimates that Africa needs USD 52–57 billion/year in adaptation finance but currently receives less than USD 11.4 billion/year.
    • Systemic Barriers Limiting Access to European & Multilateral Funds

African LDCs face structural constraints that prevent them from accessing European climate finance effectively:

  • Approval cycles for GCF and GEF projects routinely takes time, delaying implementation.
  • High fiduciary standards, financial reporting requirements, and bankability tests result in rejection or delays for NDC-aligned proposals.
  • Only 14 African national institutions are currently accredited to the GCF, limiting direct access.
  • Less than 5% of readiness funding reaches local MRV institutions, leading to persistent data gaps.
  • Technical assistance for NDC implementation—planning, monitoring, tracking, and verification—remains insufficient for most countries.

This combination makes African NDCs remain “ambitious on paper, underfunded in practice.”

Why NDCs Still Matter

Despite finance and implementation challenges, NDCs remain central to Africa’s climate and development future because they:

  • Define and update national climate ambition every five years;
  • Guide investment pathways in mitigation and adaptation;
  • Anchor national development plans to climate-resilient trajectories;
  • Serve as the main framework for accessing climate finance;
  • Provide structure for reporting under the Enhanced Transparency Framework.

Strengthening NDC design, financing, MRV, and implementation support is fundamental post-COP30, where countries are expected to raise ambition and demonstrate credible progress.

Policy Recommendations

To close the growing implementation gap and ensure that East African NDCs deliver measurable climate outcomes, the following evidence-based policy actions are proposed. These recommendations strengthen institutional capacity, enhance climate finance access, accelerate sectoral mainstreaming, and improve accountability post-COP30.

  • Strengthen Institutional and Technical Capacity
  • Establish Dedicated NDC Implementation Units

Create permanent, inter-ministerial NDC coordination units mandated to align sectoral policies, oversee progress, and engage with development partners.

  • Upgrade MRV Systems and Technical Competencies

Invest in end-to-end MRV systems—GHG inventories, mitigation tracking, adaptation metrics, and digital monitoring tools—while providing continuous training for sector ministries.

  • Develop National Climate Data Repositories

Build centralized climate data platforms for agriculture, energy, transport, and land use to enhance evidence-based policymaking and transparency.

  • Enhance Climate Finance Mobilization and Access
  • Formulate National Climate Finance Strategies:

Align domestic priorities with the eligibility criteria of the GCF, GEF, Adaptation Fund, and bilateral donors to improve approval rates and reduce project rejection.

  • Increase Readiness and Project Preparation Funding

Expand participation in GCF Readiness, NDC Partnership support, and GEF capacity-building programs to address limited pipeline of bankable projects.

  • Promote Blended Finance and Private Sector Mobilization

Introduce policy incentives for green bonds, guarantees, concessional loans, and PPPs to unlock long-term mitigation and adaptation investments.

  • Advocate for Simplified Access Windows for LDCs

The future COPs must negotiate streamlined procedures, reduced documentation requirements, and faster approval timelines for LDC and fragile countries.

  • Mainstream NDCs into National and Local Development Planning
  • Integrate NDC Targets into National Budgets and Sector Plans

Embed climate actions in annual budget cycles, Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks, and district/county development plans.

  • Establish Performance Indicators for Line Ministries

Link ministerial scorecards and KPIs with measurable NDC outcomes to strengthen accountability and accelerate implementation.

  • Embed Adaptation into Core Sectors

Ensure NDC-aligned adaptation actions are systematically integrated into agriculture, water, health, infrastructure, and urban planning frameworks.

  • Scale Up Community and Citizen Participation
  • Adopt Community-Based Adaptation (CBA) Frameworks

Expand participatory adaptation programs in rural and climate-vulnerable regions, supported by local extension systems.

  • Link Rural Development Programs to NDC Outcomes

Prioritize climate-smart agriculture, reforestation, watershed management, and off-grid energy in rural development interventions.

  • Strengthen Gender and Youth Inclusion

Mandate gender-responsive planning and youth representation in NDC committees, local climate governance, and project implementation.

  • Enhance Regional Cooperation and Knowledge Exchange
  • Establish a Regional MRV and Knowledge Platform

Under the East African Community (EAC), create a shared platform for data exchange, methodologies, and best practices on GHG inventories and sectoral MRV.

  • Promote Cross-Border Renewable Energy Corridors

Accelerate regional geothermal, hydro, and solar initiatives, along with power-pool integration and transmission infrastructure.

  • Strengthen Transboundary Ecosystem Management

Improve joint management of critical basins—Lake Victoria, the Nile, and rangeland ecosystems—to enhance resilience and disaster risk reduction.

  • Improve Transparency, Governance, and Accountability
  • Publish Annual NDC Implementation Reports

Introduce open-access dashboards that track emissions, adaptation progress, climate finance flows, and project delivery.

  • Create Independent Oversight Mechanisms

Establish multi-stakeholder oversight bodies involving civil society, academia, and the private sector to review progress and recommend corrective actions.

  • Mandate Public Disclosure of Climate Finance

Require transparent reporting of all international and domestic climate finance flows, including donor commitments, disbursements, and utilization.

About the Author: Nader Khalifa is an engineer and energy professional with over 15 years of expertise in the energy and petroleum sectors. He currently serves with the Ministry of Energy & Petroleum of Sudan, in addition to his role as a Sudan Team Member for the Initiative on Climate Action Transparency (ICAT) project, a collaborative effort involving UNEP, CCC, and HCENR, and a distinguished researcher and a Colosseum Member at the Governance & Economic Policy Centre (GEPC).

References

  1. African Development Bank (AfDB) (2023). Climate finance in Africa: Overview and outlook. Abidjan: African Development Bank Group.
  2. Brookings Institution (2022). Finance for climate adaptation in Africa: Still insufficient and losing ground. Brookings Global Economy and Development Program. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/finance-for-climate-adaptation-in-africa-still-insufficient-and-losing-ground/.
  3. Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) (2024). Landscape of climate finance in Africa. London: Climate Policy Initiative. Available at: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/landscape-of-climate-finance-in-africa-2024/.
  4. FSD Africa & Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) (2022). Landscape of climate finance in Africa. Nairobi: FSD Africa. Available at: https://fsdafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/1.-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-in-Africa-l-Full-report.pdf 
  5. Global Center on Adaptation (GCA) (2023). Africa’s adaptation gap: Climate finance needs and priorities. Rotterdam: Global Center on Adaptation. Available at: https://gca.org/reports/state-and-trends-in-adaptation/.
  6. Government of Kenya (2020). Updated Nationally Determined Contribution. Nairobi: Ministry of Environment and Forestry.
  7. Government of Rwanda (2020). Updated NDC Submission. Kigali: Ministry of Environment.
  8. Government of Tanzania (2021). Updated Nationally Determined Contribution. Dodoma: Vice President’s Office.
  9. Government of Uganda (2022). Second Nationally Determined Contribution. Kampala: Ministry of Water and Environment.
  10. ICAT (2022). Guidance for Transparency Frameworks in LDCs. Copenhagen: Initiative on Climate Action Transparency.
  11. IPCC (2022). AR6 Working Group III: Mitigation of climate change. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/.
  1. Nature (2025). Reframing climate finance for Africa. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/d44148-025-00353-5
  1. OECD (2023). Climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries in 2013–2021. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/environment/climate-finance-provided-and-mobilised-by-developed-countries.htm.
  2. Savvidou, G., Atteridge, A., Omari-Motsumi, K. and Trisos, C. (2021). Quantifying international public finance for climate change adaptation in Africa. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute. Available at: https://www.sei.org/publications/climate-finance-adaptation-africa/.
  1. Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) (2024). How effective is climate finance in assisting farmers in low- and middle-income countries adapt to climate change? Available at: https://www.sei.org/features/how-effective-is-climate-finance-in-assisting-farmers-in-low-and-middle-income-countries-adapt-to-climate-change/
  2. UNEP (2023). Adaptation Gap Report 2023: Underfinanced, underprepared. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. Available at: https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2023
  3. UNFCCC (2023). Nationally Determined Contributions synthesis report. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Available at: https://unfccc.int/ndc-synthesis-report-2023

 

 

Sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy finance course 2026-Applications open

Gain skills, Accelerate the Energy Transition in Africa!
Join the Sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy Financing Course to gain the knowledge, tools, and skills to shape policies, drive regulatory reforms, and unlock financing for clean, reliable, and equitable energy. Designed for policymakers, civil society leaders, private sector actors, and finance professionals, this course equips you to tackle climate change, expand energy access, and lead a just and inclusive green economy. Take action today and be part of the transformation powering Africa’s sustainable future.

The GEPC sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy Financing Course Equips policy makers, civil society leaders, private sector stakeholders, and financial professional’s with the knowledge and practical skills to drive Africa’s reduction of energy poverty, transition to clean, reliable , and equitable energy system.  Against the backdrop of climate change and persistent energy access challenges, the course addresses critical gaps in policy formulation, regulatory frameworks, advocacy and financing mechanisms.

Participants will gain tools to design and implement sustainable energy policies, promote inclusive governance, mobilise investments for green projects and support a just and resilient energy transition that fosters economic growth, social equity and environmental sustainability.

Course Background and Context

Climate change presents an urgent global challenge, with the most severe impacts disproportionately affecting less developed countries in East Africa and Africa generally. Despite international commitments under the Paris Agreement and subsequent UN Climate Conferences (CoP27 and CoP28), developing countries face significant barriers in accessing technology, finance, and expertise to transition to clean energy. Global climate governance often leaves low-income countries under-resourced and underrepresented, creating complex challenges for equitable and just energy transitions.

In Eastern Africa and Africa generally, policy frameworks and regulatory mechanisms for sustainable energy remain underdeveloped, poorly communicated, and inadequately enforced. This has created critical gaps in governance, technical capacity, and financing, limiting the country’s ability to expand clean energy access, reduce emissions, and achieve its climate commitments. Strengthening national capacity, promoting citizen engagement, and enhancing advocacy for policy reform are therefore essential to support a just and inclusive energy transition.

Sustainable energy is central to meeting these challenges. Defined as clean, reliable, affordable, and equitable, sustainable energy supports national development needs while minimizing environmental harm and fostering long-term economic, social, and environmental sustainability. Integrated sustainable energy systems combine renewable sources—such as solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, and biomass—with modern technologies, smart grids, and storage solutions to deliver energy efficiently, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and expand access to underserved communities.

Continentally, Africa continues to face significant energy access deficits, with approximately 600 million people lacking reliable electricity and 970 million without access to clean cooking solutions. Only about 25% of electricity in the region comes from renewable sources, despite Africa possessing around 60% of the world’s best solar potential. These gaps highlight the urgent need for effective policy, regulation, and financing strategies to mobilize investment, accelerate energy transition, and achieve energy equity.

Efforts and Challenges in Sustainable Energy Access and Financing

Efforts to expand access to sustainable energy, including initiatives like the World Bank Mission 300, have made progress but remain limited. Clean cooking solutions are still expensive and often inaccessible for the poorest and remote households. Expanding energy access and achieving a just transition requires policy reforms such as unbundling existing energy utilities and integrating sustainable energy systems into national, mini, and off-grid networks. Well-designed integrated systems can support public services—solar-powered water, health facilities, small businesses, electrified transport, housing, and modernized agriculture—while reducing reliance on fossil fuels.

Investment in clean energy has grown modestly over the past two years, including multilateral and private sector contributions, yet financing remains far below what is needed. Critical questions persist: how can governments and private sector actors scale investments in sustainable energy systems, and which models are best for advancing clean energy and other renewable technologies in Africa?

Globally, the energy sector is rapidly shifting toward renewables, with record growth in 2023 reaching 3,870 GW of installed capacity (IRENA, 2024). Countries are adopting Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to guide climate adaptation and mitigation at the national level, supported by financing mechanisms like carbon trading, multilateral funds, and private sector investments.

However, in Eastern Africa and Africa generally, limited knowledge and expertise hinder the ability of governments, civil society, and private actors to navigate evolving global energy policies and regulatory frameworks. Accessing climate finance and developing bankable green economy projects remains challenging. Consequently, strengthening skills, policy understanding, regulatory capacity, and financing literacy is critical to accelerate the transition to sustainable clean energy and scale up investment in the green economy, providing jobs and sustainable development.

This course is designed to equip public policymakers, civil society actors, private sector stakeholders, and financial institutions with the knowledge, skills, and tools to shape and implement sustainable energy policies, advance regulatory reforms, and unlock financing for a just and equitable green economy.

Skills Gap Analysis and Justification

The transition to sustainable and clean energy in Eastern Africa and across the Africa region is constrained by a critical shortage of technical knowledge, policy expertise, and institutional capacity. Various engagements between the Governance and Economic Policy Centre (GEPC), civil society organizations, and government institutions have consistently highlighted the need for targeted capacity building to accelerate policy, regulatory, and financing reforms that support the energy transition.

Identified Skills Gaps

In 2022, the Governance and Economic Policy Centre in collaboration with one of its international partners, attempted to form a National Multisector Reference Group on Energy Transition in Tanzania as a bespoke platform for policy dialogue, advocacy, and capacity development.  The feedback and lessons drawn from this process demonstrated an urgent need for renewed capacity-building and leadership in this area. A subsequent short skills gap study commissioned by GEPC in 2024 identified several critical weaknesses among key stakeholder groups:

  • Government officials and legislators lack the technical expertise to design, implement, and monitor effective sustainable energy policies and laws.
  • Civil society organizations have limited knowledge of the global political economy of climate change and energy, limited advocacy, analytical, and policy engagement skills to effectively influence decision-making and accountability mechanisms.
  • Private sector actors struggle to identify, develop, and present bankable renewable energy projects.
  • Financial institutions face challenges in evaluating, matching, and financing sustainable energy investments.
  • Overall political will and coordination for driving sustainable energy transition remain weak and fragmented.

Rationale for the Course

In response to these systemic capacity gaps, GEPC has designed the Sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy Financing Course to strengthen the technical and institutional foundations for an inclusive and just energy transition. The course directly addresses the need for:

  • Enhanced policy and regulatory understanding among public officials and other key stakeholders.
  • Improved advocacy and engagement capacity for civil society and community actors.
  • Strengthened financial literacy and investment readiness within the private and banking sectors.
  • Greater collaboration and coherence among energy sector stakeholders.

This course addresses these gaps by equipping policymakers, civil society actors, private sector professionals, and financial institutions with the knowledge, skills, and tools to shape sustainable energy policies, advance regulatory frameworks, and mobilize financing for a just and inclusive green economy.

Course Approach

The program will be delivered as an extended seven-week modular course.  It will be facilitated by a diverse faculty of experts drawn from GEPC technical ecosystem, global partners and experts, combining practical experience, policy insights, and technical expertise.

Through a blend of lectures, case studies, simulations, and interactive sessions, the course will equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to shape effective policies, foster accountability, and mobilize financing for sustainable and equitable energy development.

Course Objectives

The course aims to:

  1. Enhance understanding of sustainable energy policy, regulatory frameworks, and governance mechanisms relevant to Tanzania and the region.
  2. Develop technical and analytical capacity among policymakers, civil society, and financial sector actors to support the design and implementation of effective energy transition strategies.
  3. Strengthen advocacy and policy engagement skills for civil society to influence public policy and regulatory reform processes.
  4. Improve knowledge of financing mechanisms and models for mobilizing investment in renewable and green economy projects.
  5. Foster collaboration and policy coherence among government, civil society, private sector, and financial institutions in advancing a just and inclusive energy transition.
  6. Promote innovation and leadership in sustainable energy planning, implementation, and financing.

Expected Outcomes

Upon completion of the course, participants will be able to:

  • Demonstrate a clear understanding of the policy, legal, and regulatory dimensions of sustainable energy and green financing.
  • Apply analytical and strategic tools to develop and implement effective energy transition policies and projects.
  • Understand the global political economy of sustainable energy, engage more effectively in policy dialogue, advocacy, and accountability processes related to the energy sector.
  • Identify, design, and evaluate bankable clean energy projects suitable for public and private investment.
  • Strengthen institutional coordination and stakeholder collaboration for integrated and sustainable energy governance.
  • Contribute to building national and regional momentum for a just, inclusive, and climate-resilient energy future.

Course Content and Modules Overview

The Sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy Financing Course is designed to provide participants with both conceptual understanding and practical tools for influencing, designing, and implementing sustainable energy solutions. The course content is structured into seven interlinked modules, each addressing a critical dimension of sustainable energy and the energy transition.

Weekly Modules

Objectives, expected competence

Module 1: Understanding Sustainable Energy and the Global Energy Transition

Objective: To provide a foundational understanding of sustainable energy systems, their global dynamics, and relevance to Eastern Africa and Africa’s development agenda.

Key Topics:

  • Concepts and principles of sustainable energy and just transitions
  • Global energy transition: drivers, trends, challenges
  • Overview of emerging trends in renewables and energy efficiency technologies
  • Global and regional energy transition frameworks (UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, SDGs, NDCs and Agenda 2063)
  • Energy access, poverty, and development linkages
  • Eastern Africa and Africa’s energy context and policy landscape

Expected Competence: Participants will gain an informed understanding of the global and national energy transition landscape and how it aligns with sustainable development goals.

Module 2: Policy, Legal and Regulatory Frameworks for Sustainable Energy

 

Objective: To build participants’ knowledge of the policy and legal frameworks governing sustainable energy.

Key Topics will cover:

  • Global energy policy debates in the context of energy access and transition
  • National and regional policy and legal frameworks in the context of global energy
  • Energy Policy formulation processes and regulatory designs
  • Energy Policy tools: subsidies, tariffs, carbon pricing, auctions
  • Regional integration and power pools (e.g., EAPP, WAPP, SAPP)
  • Institutional coordination and governance mechanisms
  • Role of legislature and local governments in sustainable energy governance
  • Gender, equity, and social inclusion in energy policy

Expected Competence: Participants will be equipped to analyze, interpret, and contribute to policy and regulatory reform in the energy sector.

Module 3: Financing the Green Economy and Renewable Energy Investments, project development & bankability

 

Objective: To enhance understanding of green financing mechanisms, instruments, practical competencies, and strategies for developing financeable projects, mobilizing, manage and analyze green financing.

Key Topics:

  • Global Climate Change and green economy financing terrain
  • Geopolitics of climate financing and energy diplomacy
  • Principles of green economy and sustainable finance
  • Financing models for renewable energy (public, private, PPPs, and blended finance), Green bonds, blue bonds, climate funds, carbon markets, carbon swaps and JTEPs

·        Project feasibility studies, project modeling, preparation, operations and risk management

  • Mobilizing domestic and international finance for energy projects
  • Role of National Capital & Money markets, Green Banks, DFIs and MDBs (World Bank, AfDB, TDB)
  • Clean Energy Financing Contracts

Expected Competence: Participants will understand the clean energy financing terrain, acquire practical skills and tools to analyze clean energy financing texts, developing, and evaluating bankable renewable energy projects and access appropriate financing channels 

Module 4: Governance, Equity & Environmental Safeguards

 

Objective: To understand the governance, equity & environmental safeguard concerns underlying the transition to sustainable energy.

Key Topics:

    • Social and environmental concerns and safeguards
    • Responsible Business Conduct in Energy sector
    • Just Transition: equity, gender, community inclusion
    • Governance and anti-corruption in energy financing

Expected Competence: Participants will gain insights into the advocacy concerns and suitable policy and regulatory responses to just energy transitions and financing of sustainable energy. 

Module 5: Communication, Advocacy, Accountability and Stakeholder Engagement

 

Objective: To strengthen participants’ advocacy, negotiation, and communication skills for influencing policy and ensuring accountability in energy governance.

Key Topics:

  • Communication for sustainable energy
  • Principles and tools of policy advocacy and public engagement
  • Strategies for evidence-based advocacy and coalition building
  • Role of civil society, media, and academia in energy governance
  • Public participation and citizen accountability mechanisms
  • Case studies of successful communication and advocacy in energy transition

Expected Competence: Participants will develop the skills to effectively communicate, advocate for and influence energy policies and reforms that promote transparency, inclusion, and sustainability

Module 6: Leadership, Innovation and the Future of Energy Transition

 

Objective: To inspire leadership and innovation in sustainable energy planning and implementation.

Key Topics:

  • Transformational leadership for the green transition
  • Africa’s leadership and priorities for sustainable energy
  • Innovation, digitalization, AI, and energy governance
  • Africa scenario planning and strategic foresight for future energy systems
  • Integrating climate resilience and just transition principles in policy and regulation

Expected Competence: Participants will gain leadership insights and strategic foresight to drive innovation, partnerships, and sustainable change in the energy sector.

Week 7: Applied Learning & Practicum

 

Objective: To provide participants with practical hands-on experience in operations of sustainable energy projects, designing sustainable energy projects, financeable and bankable projects, developing applicable policy briefs and advocacy communiques for sustainable energy.

  • Activities:
    • Case study presentations: participants analyze a real renewable energy project
    • Group project: draft a financing proposal or policy brief
    • Physical or Virtual Field visit (e.g., solar mini-grid, geothermal plant, wind farm) 

Delivery Methods

The course will employ a blended learning approach, integrating:

  • Expert-led lectures and interactive discussions
  • Practical case studies and simulations
  • Group work and peer-to-peer learning
  • Policy labs and project design sessions
  • Guest lectures from leading practitioners and global experts

Participants will receive digital resources, reading materials, and toolkits to support post-course application of skills in their professional contexts.

Target Participants

The course is designed for junior- to senior-level professionals and practitioners involved in energy, climate, and economic governance who play or aspire to play a role in shaping policy, regulation, and financing for sustainable energy.

It specifically targets:

  • Government officials and legislators involved in energy, environment, finance, infrastructure, and local government sectors.
  • Civil society leaders and policy advocates working on governance, climate justice, and sustainable development issues.
  • Private sector actors and project developers in renewable energy, infrastructure, and related industries.
  • Financial and investment professionals from banks, development finance institutions, and microfinance organizations seeking to understand green financing opportunities.
  • Academics and researchers working on energy policy, economics, and sustainability studies.
  • Development partners and international organizations supporting energy transition and green growth initiatives.

Diversity and Inclusion:
GEPC encourages participation from women, youth, and professionals from underrepresented groups to promote inclusivity and diverse perspectives in the sustainable energy transition discourse.

Admission Requirements

Applicants should meet the following minimum requirements:

  1. Educational Background:
    • At least a bachelor’s degree or equivalent qualification in a relevant field such as social sciences, political science, public policy, economics, law, environmental studies, engineering, communication, finance, or related disciplines.
    • Applicants with significant professional experience in the energy or governance sector will be considered in lieu of academic qualifications.
  2. Professional Experience:
    • At least one year of relevant work experience in government, civil society, academia, or the private sector, preferably in areas related to extractive sector, energy, public policy, climate & environment, media or economic development, banking and green financing
  3. Language Proficiency:
    • Proficiency in English (both written and spoken) is required, as the course will be conducted in English.
  4. Motivation Statement and CV:
    • Applicants must submit a brief statement (300–500 words) explaining their motivation for joining the course and how they plan to apply the knowledge gained in their professional setting. They must attach a short CV or resume plus a Headshot portrait photo
  5. Recommendation:
    • A letter of support from an employer, supervisor, work colleague or institutional head is encouraged but not mandatory.

Course Duration:  7 Weeks (19th January-7th March, 2026)

The course is designed with flexible delivery options to accommodate the varying needs of participants. The seven-week program structured into weekly modules, allowing participants to combine professional responsibilities with learning.

Certification

Upon successful completion of the course requirements, participants will receive a Certificate of Completion from the Governance and Economic Policy Centre (GEPC), jointly endorsed by partnering academic or professional institutions where applicable.

Course Fees: A Subsidized rate of USD 300. Limited scholarships will be available to exceptional and early bird applicants

Course Management:  Virtual & Online

Virtual delivery will be managed through GEPC’s Moodle and Google Classroom digital learning platform.

Essential Timelines

Date

Activity

3rd December

Advertising call for Applications

9th  January 2026

Deadline for Applications

12th January, 2026

Notification of selected participants

19th January 2026

Course Commencement

7th  March  2026

End of Course and Graduation

 

How to apply:

Applications and support documents (Motivation letter, CV and Headshot photo) must be sent as a single PDF or word file by 9th  January 2026 to:  info@gepc.or.tz

Climate Change action at Subnational level: Rationale for Skilling Local Government Authorities for Climate Change Action in Tanzania

By Ng’homange Merkiad James: Researcher, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

*Mr Ng’homange is a senior lecturer at the Local Government Training Institute (LGTI) at Hombolo, Dodoma

Climate change is one of the most pressing challenges facing Tanzania today, threatening livelihoods, infrastructure, and national development. Despite the growing national and global attention to climate policy, Local Government Authorities (LGAs) — the level of government closest to the people — remain inadequately skilled and resourced to respond effectively. This policy paper argues that building the capacity of LGAs is essential for translating Tanzania’s national climate change commitments into local action. It proposes targeted training, institutional support, and resource mobilization to strengthen LGAs’ roles in climate adaptation, mitigation, and energy transition initiatives.

 

  1. Introduction

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) warns that climate change is advancing rapidly, with the poorest communities in developing countries such as Tanzania facing the most severe and irreversible impacts. Prolonged droughts, erratic rainfall, and frequent floods are disrupting food systems, destroying infrastructure, and worsening health outcomes through increased exposure to diseases and air pollution.

In Tanzania, where over 80% of the rural population depends on rain-fed agriculture — a sector contributing more than 60% of the national GDP — the consequences are profound. Yet, despite these local-level vulnerabilities, climate change interventions and decision-making remain concentrated at the global and national levels, leaving LGAs on the periphery of policy and practice. Most local authorities lack the requisite knowledge, skills, and financial capacity to implement climate action plans, integrate adaptation into planning frameworks, or mobilize community-based mitigation measures.

Empowering LGAs through structured and context-relevant climate training can transform Tanzania’s climate governance landscape. Skilled LGAs can lead public education campaigns, enforce green urban planning, promote clean cooking technologies, and even issue municipal green bonds to finance sustainable infrastructure projects.

  1. The Nexus Between Climate Change and Local Governments

Local Government Authorities are semi-autonomous subnational governments mandated under the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982. They are responsible for promoting peace, order, decentralization, and socio-economic development in their jurisdictions.

The OECD defines a local authority as “a decentralized entity elected through universal suffrage and having general responsibilities and some autonomy with respect to budget, staff and assets” (OECD/UCLG, 2016[31]). While countries can be organised as unitary or federal states, they all rely on local authorities as entities for the delivery of various services[1].

The call for local adaptation action stems from the recognition that climate risks first manifest locally, and local communities and local authorities have an innate understanding of how impacts affect them and how they need to be addressed. Their proximity to communities makes them a critical actor in climate governance, as they are well positioned to identify local risks, mobilize citizens, and deliver adaptive responses.

However, low involvement in national climate processes, limited funding, and lack of technical expertise continue to hinder their potential. Without strong LGA engagement, Tanzania’s commitments to climate adaptation, resilience, and clean energy transition risk remaining unfulfilled.

  1. Climate Change Impacts and the Need to Skill Local Governments

Tanzania’s vulnerability to climate change is evident across multiple sectors — agriculture, water, energy, infrastructure, and health. Droughts and floods are already imposing economic losses, reducing productivity, and disrupting livelihoods. According to the National Climate Change Response Strategy (2021–2026), these impacts threaten to derail progress toward the country’s Vision 2025 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG7[2]).

The recent floods demonstrate Tanzania’s vulnerability and yet the, a statement on the Status of Tanzania Climate in 2022 from Tanzania Meteorological Authority revealed that extreme weather conditions such as increased seasonal variation in observed rainfall and temperature have been significant in most parts of Tanzania and this will continue in the foreseeable feature[3].

Global evidence underscores that effective climate action requires localized implementation. Transitioning to clean and renewable energy — such as solar, wind, and hydropower — is vital, but its success depends on local capacity to plan, regulate, and support adoption. LGAs, as the closest link between citizens and the state, must therefore be equipped to manage these transitions.

The OECD in 2023 observed that despite, their competencies and mandates, local governments cannot go alone, they need both national and global level support to fully tackle climate change mitigation and adaption measures.

Capacity building and empowering of local government authorities can be instrumentally transformative in advancing local community public education, municipal urban planning and green zoning, improved regulation and approval of municipal building permits that factor smart and clean energy technologies in new housing plans and settlements. Moreover, local authorities can play a significant role in the public education and distribution of clean cooking energy systems such as affordable gas stoves in rural areas.  Local municipal green bonds issued by local authorities can be a major source of unlocking local financing for green projects such as urban municipal public transportation, clean energy generation and public and private sector projects.

  1. Tanzania’s Climate Policy and Institutional Framework

Tanzania has made significant strides in developing its climate governance architecture. The country is a signatory to the Paris Agreement and aligns its national targets with the African Union Agenda 2063, emphasizing environmental sustainability and climate resilience. Domestically, the government has enacted several policies and frameworks, including:

  • National Environmental Policy (2021)
  • National Climate Change Strategy (2021–2026)
  • Nationally Determined Contributions (2021 & 2023 updates)
  • Environmental Management Act (Cap. 191 of 2004)
  • National Carbon Trading Guidelines (2022)
  • National Clean Cooking Strategy (2024)

Despite this robust framework, implementation remains centralized. Local governments, which are essential to the execution of climate adaptation and mitigation measures, are often excluded from planning and under-resourced for execution. This disconnect has limited the translation of policy commitments into community-level results.

  1. Bridging the Local Government Skills Gap

An  assessment by the Governance and Economic Policy Centre (GEPC) and the Local Government Training Institute (LGTI) at Hombolo identified major capacity and knowledge gaps among local government staff. While some departments offer courses on “Climate Change and Livelihoods,” these remain ad hoc, limited in scope, and inaccessible to most ward, village, and mtaa-level executives.

Climate change work within LGAs is often confined to environmental departments, yet the issue is multisectoral — spanning land use, infrastructure, agriculture, and social services. Many officials lack exposure to the global political economy of climate governance and energy transition. Consequently, LGAs are not effectively advising central government or local communities on context-appropriate climate actions. This skills deficit hinders local-level innovation and weakens citizen engagement. Without building LGA competencies, national adaptation and mitigation strategies risk being poorly implemented or misunderstood at the grassroots level. Moreover, the complex nature of Tanzania’s local government authority structure creates room for overlaps across multiple stakeholders and this creates information and knowledge asymmetries across the LGA structures.

  1. Policy Recommendations

To strengthen Tanzania’s climate resilience and ensure the effective localization of climate policies, this paper recommends the following:

  1. Develop and institutionalize intensive climate training programmes for LGA staff, covering adaptation, mitigation, and energy transition, aligned with national and global frameworks.
  2. Embed climate change modules in induction courses for all new LGA employees to build foundational understanding across departments.
  3. Enhance community engagement and education through LGAs on the benefits of clean energy, forest conservation, and sustainable resource use.
  4. Establish environmental and climate action teams at ward and village levels to coordinate awareness and mobilization campaigns.
  5. Produce and distribute simplified climate training manuals in Kiswahili for use by local officials and community groups.
  6. Support LGAs in action research and local climate data collection to inform evidence-based planning and monitoring.
  7. Facilitate access to local climate finance, including municipal green bonds and partnerships with development actors, to implement local adaptation projects.
  1. Conclusion

Tanzania’s climate response will only be as strong as its local institutions. Building the capacity of Local Government Authorities is not merely an administrative necessity but a strategic investment in sustainable development. Skilled and empowered LGAs can bridge the gap between national climate policy and community action — enabling Tanzania to achieve its commitments to resilience, clean energy, and inclusive green growth.

REFERENCES

Tanzania Meteorological Authority (2023) Statement on the Status of Tanzania climate in 2022, TMA, Dar es Salaam

United Republic of Tanzania (2021) National Environmental Policy 2021, Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2021) National Climate Change Response Strategy (2021-2026), Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2014) National Guidelines for Mainstreaming Gender into Environment, Vice President’s Office, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2021) National Determined Contribution, Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2024) National Clean Cooking Strategy (2024 – 2034), Ministry of Energy, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2022) National Carbon Trading Guidelines, Vice President’s Office, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2010) Guidelines for The Preparation of Environmental Action Plans for Sector Ministries and Local Government Authorities, Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Dar es Salaam

United Republic of Tanzania (2017) National Guidelines for Strategic Environmental Assessment, Vice President’s Office, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2008) The Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania of 1977, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Republic of Tanzania (2004) National Environment Management Act of 2004, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Republic of Tanzania (2002) Local Government (District Authorities) Act, No. 7, (1982), Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Republic of Tanzania (2002) Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, No. 8, (1982), Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Nations (2023) Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report, UN Environment Programme

[1] OECD: Climate adaptation: why local governments cannot do it alone. Environment Policy Paper No. 38

[2] UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 7)

[3] Tanzania Meteorological Authority (2023) Statement on the Status of Tanzania climate in 2022, TMA, Dar es Salaam

Strengthening Local Governments in Climate Action Ahead of COP30

Position paper: Governance and Economic Policy Centre

 Introduction: The Local Nexus of Climate Action

Local Government Authorities (LGAs) are the closest level of governance to communities, charged with delivering essential services and implementing national policies at the grassroots. Their proximity to citizens makes them vital actors in addressing the localized impacts of climate change. However, despite their strategic role in adaptation and resilience-building, LGAs remain underrepresented in global climate policy and under-resourced in implementation.

As the world approaches COP30 in Brazil, which marks the halfway point to achieving the 2030 Paris Agreement goals, recognizing and empowering local governments is critical for translating global climate pledges into tangible local actions.

The Role of Local Governments in Climate Change Response

Climate change impacts—heatwaves, floods, droughts, and food insecurity—are experienced most acutely at the local level. Local governments possess unique knowledge of territorial vulnerabilities, socioeconomic conditions, and local adaptive capacities. They influence resilience through land-use planning, infrastructure regulation, and enforcement of environmental standards.

Local authorities play three major roles in climate response:

  1. Mitigation: Regulating emissions through energy efficiency programs, green building codes, and sustainable mobility initiatives.
  2. Adaptation: Managing land use, disaster risk reduction, and climate-sensitive infrastructure planning.
  3. Transition to Clean Energy: Promoting renewable energy solutions and expanding access to clean cooking and off-grid energy, especially in rural communities.

Yet, their contributions are constrained by limited funding, inadequate technical skills, and weak institutional mandates.

Local Governments and Global Climate Negotiations

At global forums such as the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COPs), local governments participate only through observer status—primarily via the Local Governments and Municipal Authorities (LGMA) constituency. While they have organized town hall dialogues and local “Mini-COPs,” their influence on formal decision-making remains minimal.

The exclusion of local voices from climate negotiations undermines policy coherence and weakens implementation. National commitments under the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) often fail to integrate the realities and priorities of subnational actors, leading to a persistent gap between global ambition and local action.

Barriers Limiting Local Government Engagement

  1. Political and Institutional Constraints
  • Lack of formal recognition: LGAs are treated as observers, not negotiators.
  • Weak mandates: National frameworks often omit explicit roles for local actors in international climate commitments.
  • Competing priorities: Service delivery demands (water, housing, education) often overshadow climate action.
  • Policy incoherence: Disjointed national and local strategies lead to fragmented implementation.
  1. Resource and Capacity Constraints
  • Insufficient funding: Local budgets rarely allocate funds for climate adaptation or international engagement.
  • Limited technical expertise: Few LGAs have staff capable of climate risk assessment or data-driven planning.
  • High participation costs: Travel and registration fees hinder participation in COPs, especially for developing countries.
  • Data gaps: Lack of localized climate data weakens evidence-based planning.
  1. Knowledge and Communication Gaps
  • Limited access to negotiation information and technical guidance.
  • Language barriers and lack of translation support at COP sessions.
  • Low public awareness of how global climate policy connects to local priorities.

Why Local Governments Must Be Supported

Climate change impacts are inherently territorial. Local authorities possess the contextual understanding necessary for effective adaptation and resilience-building. However, without adequate fiscal space, skills, and institutional backing, they cannot translate national and global goals into local implementation.

National governments must therefore create an enabling environment that empowers LGAs through:

  • Regulatory and fiscal reforms that integrate local adaptation priorities into national plans.
  • Technical capacity-building, including downscaled climate data and specialized training.
  • Coordinated planning mechanisms that involve LGAs in the design and implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and NDCs.
  • Targeted financing mechanisms, such as climate-resilient municipal grants and performance-based green budgeting.

Effective collaboration between national and local levels will ensure that adaptation is not only nationally planned but also locally delivered.

COP30: A Turning Point for Multilevel Climate Action

COP30 presents a pivotal opportunity to reframe climate governance through multilevel action. It comes at a critical juncture:

  • 2025 marks the deadline for countries to submit their updated NDCs under the Paris Agreement.
  • It will be the first COP in Brazil since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, symbolizing a return to the origins of the UNFCCC.
  • It represents the midpoint to 2030, demanding acceleration in implementation rather than new pledges alone.

Positioning local governments at the heart of COP30 discussions will help bridge the implementation gap between national commitments and local realities.

Policy Recommendations

  1. Elevate Local Governments in Global Climate Governance
    • Grant LGAs a formal role in negotiation processes and multilevel implementation frameworks.
    • Institutionalize the Local Governments and Municipal Authorities (LGMA) constituency within COP structures.
  2. Reassess Support Frameworks for LGAs
    • Review past support mechanisms to identify lessons and scale up successful local adaptation and mitigation models.
  3. Develop Scalable Local Climate Models
    • Document and share proven municipal adaptation and energy transition initiatives to inform peer learning.
  4. Establish Dedicated Local Climate Finance Channels
    • Create financing pipelines suitable for subnational authorities, including grants and concessional funds for green infrastructure and renewable energy projects.
  5. Promote Local Green Transitions
    • Support local greening programs, expansion of renewable energy, and universal access to clean cooking solutions.
  6. Invest in Capacity and Skills Development
    • Build technical, financial, and negotiation capacities of LGAs through training programs, partnerships, and regional knowledge hubs.

Conclusion

Achieving the Paris Agreement targets requires action at every level of government. Local governments are not just implementers—they are innovation laboratories for resilience, equity, and sustainability. Empowering them through recognition, financing, and capacity support will be key to transforming global climate commitments into grounded results.

COP30 must therefore be the moment to bring local governments from the margins to the center of the climate agenda.

 

We wish Tanzania a peaceful election and stability thereafter

As Tanzanians go to the polls today, 29th October, 2025, we wish Tanzania a peaceful election and tranquility must prevail during and after election !

The Africa Great Lakes Region Civil Society Platform (AGLR), is a network of Civil society organizations and conflict professionals working to promote  human rights, peace and security in the Great Lakes Region.

*AGLR  regrets the violence and death of civilians during the recently held elections in Tanzania and remains committed to supporting any national or regional dialogue and reform efforts aimed at restoring lasting peace in Tanzania.

Electoral democracy must work: How 2025 General elections can reclaim Tanzania’s peaceful electoral glory.

Author: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic policy Centre

Ahead of the 2025 general elections, the electoral violence that first manifested itself in 1995 and 2000 in Zanzibar with the CUF as a player appears to be taking grip on mainland Tanzania. Religious leaders and experts warn that the drums of violence are being sounded.  A new consensus to peace must be pursued.

From our historical analysis (as presented in the previous briefs), Tanzania’s electoral democracy that started in 1995 has suffered some contradictions and setbacks.  Throughout this period Tanzania has witnessed episodes of electoral violence which climaxed with extreme violence during the Zanzibar 2000 general elections. Although in the first ten years of multiparty electoral democracy the level of electoral violence was centred in Zanzibar, after the two political accords ( Muafaka 1 & Muafaka II) this unpleasant violence gradually shifted to Tanzania Mainland.

With advent of new emerging opposition political parties such as CHADEMA, the contours of electoral violence were remapped and have continued to manifest themselves in different forms and at different levels. Over the past electoral cycles people have been reported killed and many more injured in electoral related violence.  Perhaps this is not what was contemplated by Mwl Nyerere when Tanzania adopted multiparty democracy in 1995.

Lessons from neighboring countries reveal that democracy is fragile and peace can be raptured. Moreover, the persistent and excessive violent oppression of the opposition makes its cause and leaders more popular. The perceived sense of unfairness and injustice endears the public to the opposition and can lead to a sympathy vote.

As Tanzania goes to the 2025 general elections and more future to electoral cycles come, the government and political actors can perform better.  Preventing violent electoral conflicts should be a key priority for safeguarding the democratic and development achievements so far. The economic effects of violent elections often last well beyond the election period and can spill over to other sectors. In Kenya the manufacturing sectors were affected while in Zanzibar the tourism sector suffered significant loses. Moreover, in the aftermath of an electoral conflict, restoring investor confidence and rebuilding trust can take long time to bounce back to its pre violence period. Conducting a free, fair and peaceful election and securing its outcome must always be priority.

The arrest and detention of opposition leaders such as Tundu Lissu, alongside the disqualification of opposition candidates such as CHADEMA party from the 2025 general elections signals a disturbing development and potential regression in political freedoms and democratic governance.  The disappearance of vocal government critics such as Amb Humphrey Pole Pole and threats for a nationwide demonstration ahead of the general election further complicates the state of our democracy.

Such perceived repression undermines fundamental democratic principles and freedoms to choose leaders. Criminalizing peaceful protests and political participation, especially in an election year, has far-reaching implications for the legitimacy of the entire electoral process and the need to uphold democratic principles. A democracy cannot thrive if political actors are excluded, intimidated or arbitrarily detained[1]. Political consensus and solutions to the root causes of this emerging trend must be addressed. Elections can be held without an aura of fear, violence and Tanzania can reclaim its glory as the stablishing variable in the region.

A man casts his ballot at a polling station of Stone Town, in Zanzibar, on March 20, 2016. – Voters go to the polls in Tanzania for presidential and legislative elections, with the main opposition party expected to boycott the controversial re-run of October’s vote. (Photo by DANIEL HAYDUK / AFP)

Key recommendations for addressing electoral violence in Tanzania

For Tanzania and East Africa generally to enjoy peaceful elections, electoral reforms must be undertaken and respected. These must include some tweaks to electoral systems, particularly a re-examination whether the current First Past the Post System is fitted for purpose and context. Managing the power of the incumbency, demonetizing electoral processes, reducing the role of security agencies and strengthening the role of independent electoral management bodies in delivering a free, fair and peaceful election are other areas that must be addressed.

Moreover, the following specific actions can be taken.

  1. Release and accounting for all detained and missing opposition political leaders and lifting the ban on political mobilisation and freedoms to campaign during electoral seasons
  2. Implementation of key electoral and political reforms to promote inclusion-Example of the Muafaka I&II and Zanzibar electoral reforms for political inclusivity that have generated some level of stability in Zanzibar can be replicated on the mainland Tanzania
  3. Total de-escalation, de-militarization and reduction of the role of security agencies in elections- This includes among others delivering civic education to the security agencies on elections, the roles of the security agencies in elections and electoral management in a multiparty dispensation.
  4. Avoiding militant like sloganeering and aggressive posture by political actors which can incite their supporters and the public, drawing in the attention and wrath of security organs into an electoral process.
  5. Increased free Civic Education of the masses, and allowing civil society and other independent actors to fully participate in civic education, election monitoring and observation. This is important in bolstering trust and integrity of the electoral processes and their outcomes.
  6. Review the existing electoral laws, invest in transparent election systems including declaration of results so as to increase trust in electoral outcomes. Chances of a peaceful election are higher if every vote is counted and secured in transparent manner.
  7. Demonetization of electoral processes by reduction or total elimination of money in elections.  Control of the use of money for electoral campaigns and limiting monetary rewards for electoral positions can reduce political contestation and agitation for power, vested interests, susceptibility to corruption, vote buying and the role of criminal gangs for hire in electoral processes.
  8. Addressing the core concerns of the citizenry such as economic marginalization and the failure of the state to deliver better social services, and the ruling political elites to deliver on their promises. These serve as key drivers for electoral violence as citizens get easily duped to back those who bribe more or present themselves with false promises for a better future.
  9. Let diversity of political opinions and electoral democracy shrive.

References

Aley Soud Nassor & Jim Jose (2014) Power-Sharing in Zanzibar: From Zero-Sum Politics to Democratic Consensus? Available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2014.896719; Accessed on 17 April 2025

Hassan Kaya (2004)  Electoral Violence, Political Stability and the Union in Tanzania, available at https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/electoral-violence-political-stability-and-the-union-in-tanzania/ accessed on 17 April 2025

Human Rights Watch (2001) Uganda’s Presidential and Parliamentary polls available at https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/uganda0206/3.htm accessed 22 April 2025

Human Rights Watch (2017) Kenya: Post-Election Killings, Abuse available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/27/kenya-post-election-killings-abuse; accessed on 22 April 2025

Human Rights Watch (2021) Uganda: Elections Marred by Violence available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence , accessed on 22 April 2025

Kituo Cha Katiba (2003) CONSTITUTIONALISM AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN ZANZIBAR: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW VISION; A Report of the Fact-Finding Mission Organised under the Auspices of Kituo Cha Katiba; available at https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/tanzania/02112.pdf accessed on 17 April 2025

National Crimes Research Centre (2019) available at https://crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Issue-Brief-on-State-of-Organized-Criminal-Gangs-in-Kenya.pdf

Okech Achieng Matilda. The Impact of Electoral Violence on Economic Development: A Case of Kenya. Journal of Political Science and International Relations. Vol. 1, No. 3, 2018, pp. 55-71. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20180103.11, available at https://www.sciencepublishinggroup.com/article/10.11648/j.jpsir.20180103.11 accessed on 17 April 2025

OWP: The Organisation for World Peace (2024) Brutal Violence Against the Opposing Party in Tanzania https://theowp.org/brutal-violence-against-the-opposing-party-in-tanzania/ accessed on 17 April 2025

TEMCO (1997) The 1995 General Elections in Tanzania; Report of Tanzania Elections Monitoring Committee available at https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/the-1995-general-elections-in-tanzania Accessed on 17 April 2025

[1] https://www.chr.up.ac.za/latest-news/4007-press-statement-democracy-and-elections-under-threat-in-tanzania-centre-for-human-rights-calls-for-the-release-of-opposition-leader-tundu-lissu-and-demands-restoration-of-political-freedoms