Enhancing the Viability of NDCs in East Africa: Assessing Progress, Gaps and path to net zero

Author: Nader Khalifa, Researcher, Governance and Economic Policy Centre*, December 2025

Introduction: COP30 as the Implementation Milestone

The COP30 in Belém – Brazil marked a critical milestone, being framed as the “Implementation COP,” arriving a decade after the signing of the Paris Agreement and returning to Brazil over 30 years since the landmark 1992 Earth Summit. The COP concluded with some proclamations on Just Transition Mechanism and adoption of Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) indicators, and increased focus on nature and finance but little radical actions to tame the climate crisis under 1.5°C target.

Despite the milestones, global implementation remains off-track, with countries collectively failing to reduce emissions and scale resilience at the pace required. The climate crisis is still treated with suspicion, geopolitical jostling and underfunded, highlighting a clear gap between ambition and action. Only small share around 12–15% of European climate finance is accessible to the poorest and most climate-vulnerable African countries, far below their share of climate risk and need (OECD, 2023). In East Arica, analysis of climate adaptation finance shows that approximately 52.7 % of funds committed for adaptation were actually disbursed between 2009 and 2018 (Savvidou et al., 2021).

This paper assesses the state of global progress on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), with a particular focus on East African countries—Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda. It further compares the level of NDC implementation and financial support needs in these countries against the climate finance commitments and disbursements of selected European nations, evaluating whether NDCs remain viable tools for achieving the Paris Agreement objectives, identifying gaps, and proposes strategic recommendations to strengthen their viability in achieving Paris Agreement goals.

Global NDC Assessment: Are We on Track for Paris Targets?

According to the UNFCCC’s latest NDC Synthesis Report (2023–2024), global emissions remain far above Paris-aligned trajectories. Current NDCs collectively put the world on a 2.4–2.6°C warming path far from the 1.5°C target (UNEP, 2023).

NDC Implementation Gap: Structural Barriers and Evidence of Underperformance

Although East African countries have strengthened their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) since 2015—many increasing mitigations ambition by over 20–30% and expanding adaptation priorities—the region continues to face a widening implementation gap as real-world emission reductions have not followed at the required scale. This gap reflects both systemic constraints and insufficient translation of political commitments into measurable action and raises serious questions about whether NDCs, as currently designed, can deliver the Paris outcomes.

Key Implementation Gaps and Challenges

High dependence on external climate finance

  • Most East African NDCs rely on 70–90% external financing, particularly for adaptation and energy transition.
  • The region collectively requires more than USD 280–300 billion by 2030, yet receives less than 12%–15% of that annually (AfDB, 2023).
  • Adaptation finance alone is underfunded by over USD 2.5 billion per year across the region (GCA, 2023).

Limited progress in translating NDC commitments into sectoral action

  • Updated NDCs include ambitious mitigation targets—such as Kenya’s 32% by 2030, Uganda’s 22%, and Ethiopia’s conditional 68%—yet emissions continue to rise in transport, agriculture, and industry.
  • Only 20–30% of planned mitigation actions are currently being implemented at scale.

Weak MRV systems and institutional capacity

  • More than 70% of East African countries lack fully operational MRV systems across energy, agriculture, and waste sectors.
  • Inadequate data collection and reporting reduce accountability and hinder access to climate finance, which increasingly requires robust tracking frameworks (ICAT, 2022).

Limited domestic integration and mainstreaming

  • NDCs remain insufficiently embedded in national and subnational development plans.
  • Fewer than 40% of sector ministries align annual budgets with NDC priorities, creating fragmentation and slow execution.
  • Local governments—key for adaptation delivery—receive less than 10% of the required climate financing.

Slow and complex climate finance disbursement

  • Global climate funds (e.g., GCF, GEF) take 18–24 months on average from concept to approval.
  • East Africa adaptation finance disbursement ratio (≈52.7 %), considerably below what’s needed and indicating a persistent delivery gap.
  • Private-sector investment remains below USD 4 billion per year, far short of the USD 24–30 billion needed annually.

Limited community participation in planning and delivery

  • NDC implementation often excludes rural and climate-vulnerable communities, despite these groups experiencing more than 70% of climate impacts (floods, droughts, crop failures).
  • This reduces local ownership and increases the risk of maladaptation.

East African NDCs: Ambition, Progress, and Implementation Realities

The second generation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in East Africa demonstrates a clear increase in ambition compared to 2015 submissions. However, implementation continues to lag far behind targets due to systemic financing, institutional, and capacity constraints. This section synthesizes the ambition levels, progress indicators, and the underlying structural barriers limiting effective delivery of NDC commitments in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda.

Ambition Levels and Emission Reduction Targets

All four East African countries have strengthened their 2030 climate commitments, reflecting enhanced sectoral coverage (Kenya: Energy, agriculture, LULUCF, transport, waste, Tanzania: Energy, transport, forestry, waste, Uganda: Energy, forestry, agriculture, Rwanda: Energy, industry, waste, agriculture) and improved quantification of mitigation and adaptation actions.

These targets indicate rising ambition; however, nearly 80–90% of planned mitigation outcomes remain dependent on external finance, highlighting an imbalance between national ambition and the available resource base.

  • Implementation Status: Progress and Performance

Despite strong stated ambition, real implementation remains uneven and significantly below required trajectories. Key observations include:

Positive Developments

  • Kenya continues to lead the region in renewable energy deployment, with geothermal providing over 40% of total power generation, complemented by utility-scale wind and solar.
  • Rwanda operates one of the most advanced MRV systems in Africa, integrating national inventories, sectoral reporting templates, and verification frameworks.
  • Tanzania and Uganda have made notable progress in adaptation planning, particularly in agriculture, water, and disaster risk management.

However, progress falls short of NDC trajectories due to:

  • Delayed and unpredictable international climate finance disbursement, especially for adaptation.
  • Limited mainstreaming of NDCs, with weak integration into national development plans, sectoral strategies, and district-level programs.
  • Technical gaps in MRV, GHG accounting, emissions modeling, and data management.
  • Insufficient private sector participation due to regulatory uncertainty, weak incentives, and few bankable climate projects.

Overall, implementation progress remains slow, fragmented, and insufficient to place the region on a Paris-aligned trajectory.

Climate Finance Needs, Delivery, and the Widening Gap

East African NDCs require substantial financing for both mitigation and adaptation. Country estimates highlight an urgent mismatch between required and delivered resources:

Evidence of the Finance Gap

  • East Africa receives less than 12% of Africa’s total climate finance inflows (CPI, 2024).
  • Adaptation finance remains below 30% of total flows to the region, despite East Africa being among the world’s most climate-vulnerable regions (Brookings Institution, 2022).
  • GCF projects in East Africa face approval timelines averaging 24–36 months, slowing implementation of urgent projects.
  • National institutions struggle to meet stringent fiduciary and documentation requirements of major climate funds.

Institutional, Governance, and Capacity Constraints

Several deep-rooted challenges hinder NDC implementation:

Institutional Challenges

  • Weak MRV systems in several countries limit tracking, reporting, and verification of progress.
  • Fragmented inter-ministerial coordination, especially between energy, finance, agriculture, and environment ministries.
  • Data deficits in key sectors (LULUCF, agriculture, off-grid energy, transport), affecting GHG inventory accuracy.

Governance and Operational Gaps

  • Limited local government engagement, despite significant adaptation actions being subnational.
  • Low public participation, particularly in rural and climate-vulnerable communities.
  • Few mature, bankable projects, leading to under-utilization of available finance windows.
  • Private sector climate investment remains below 15% of total climate finance in East Africa.

Collectively, these challenges reinforce the structural implementation gap, limiting the region’s ability to translate Paris ambition into real, measurable outcomes.

International Climate Finance Support: European Commitments vs. Delivery

    • Pledges vs. Delivered Finance

European countries — led by Germany, France, the EU, and the UK — collectively pledge significant climate finance to Africa. However, the delivery gap remains substantial:

  • OECD data show that while European donors reported USD 34–36 billion in climate finance annually (2019–2022), the actual disbursements to African LDCs were less than USD 9–11 billion.
  • Only around 12–15% of European climate finance is accessible to the poorest and most climate-vulnerable African countries.
  • Adaptation finance remains critically low: in 2022, EU institutions allocated only 27% of their climate finance to adaptation—far below the 50% target encouraged by COP26 and COP27 decisions.
  • The UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance confirms a USD 1.2–1.3 trillion cumulative finance gaps for African NDCs by 2030.
  • According to a report by FSD Africa, the average disbursement ratio for climate finance in Africa is 79%, which includes both mitigation and adaptation flows CPI (2022).
  • According to Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) data, adaptation finance for African countries was disbursed at an average rate of 46%, compared to 56% for mitigation finance.
  • The Landscape of Climate Finance in Africa (2024) report from the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) estimates that adaptation finance flows to Africa rose from USD 11.8 billion in 2019/20 to USD 13.8 billion in 2021/22.

Misalignment with African Priorities

European finance is still mitigation-heavy, although Africa’s most urgent needs relate to adaptation:

  • More than 65–70% of EU climate finance to Africa goes to mitigation sectors (renewables, energy efficiency).
  • Adaptation sectors such as agriculture, water management, early warning systems, and climate-resilient infrastructure receive less than 30%.
  • UNEP’s Adaptation Gap Report indicates that adaptation finance globally is also constrained, Analyses show that a large majority of adaptation actions identified in African NDCs remain unfunded or underfunded, with only around 20–23% of adaptation needs being met by climate finance flows, leaving substantial gaps for implementation. (UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2023).
  • The African Development Bank estimates that Africa needs USD 52–57 billion/year in adaptation finance but currently receives less than USD 11.4 billion/year.
    • Systemic Barriers Limiting Access to European & Multilateral Funds

African LDCs face structural constraints that prevent them from accessing European climate finance effectively:

  • Approval cycles for GCF and GEF projects routinely takes time, delaying implementation.
  • High fiduciary standards, financial reporting requirements, and bankability tests result in rejection or delays for NDC-aligned proposals.
  • Only 14 African national institutions are currently accredited to the GCF, limiting direct access.
  • Less than 5% of readiness funding reaches local MRV institutions, leading to persistent data gaps.
  • Technical assistance for NDC implementation—planning, monitoring, tracking, and verification—remains insufficient for most countries.

This combination makes African NDCs remain “ambitious on paper, underfunded in practice.”

Why NDCs Still Matter

Despite finance and implementation challenges, NDCs remain central to Africa’s climate and development future because they:

  • Define and update national climate ambition every five years;
  • Guide investment pathways in mitigation and adaptation;
  • Anchor national development plans to climate-resilient trajectories;
  • Serve as the main framework for accessing climate finance;
  • Provide structure for reporting under the Enhanced Transparency Framework.

Strengthening NDC design, financing, MRV, and implementation support is fundamental post-COP30, where countries are expected to raise ambition and demonstrate credible progress.

Policy Recommendations

To close the growing implementation gap and ensure that East African NDCs deliver measurable climate outcomes, the following evidence-based policy actions are proposed. These recommendations strengthen institutional capacity, enhance climate finance access, accelerate sectoral mainstreaming, and improve accountability post-COP30.

  • Strengthen Institutional and Technical Capacity
  • Establish Dedicated NDC Implementation Units

Create permanent, inter-ministerial NDC coordination units mandated to align sectoral policies, oversee progress, and engage with development partners.

  • Upgrade MRV Systems and Technical Competencies

Invest in end-to-end MRV systems—GHG inventories, mitigation tracking, adaptation metrics, and digital monitoring tools—while providing continuous training for sector ministries.

  • Develop National Climate Data Repositories

Build centralized climate data platforms for agriculture, energy, transport, and land use to enhance evidence-based policymaking and transparency.

  • Enhance Climate Finance Mobilization and Access
  • Formulate National Climate Finance Strategies:

Align domestic priorities with the eligibility criteria of the GCF, GEF, Adaptation Fund, and bilateral donors to improve approval rates and reduce project rejection.

  • Increase Readiness and Project Preparation Funding

Expand participation in GCF Readiness, NDC Partnership support, and GEF capacity-building programs to address limited pipeline of bankable projects.

  • Promote Blended Finance and Private Sector Mobilization

Introduce policy incentives for green bonds, guarantees, concessional loans, and PPPs to unlock long-term mitigation and adaptation investments.

  • Advocate for Simplified Access Windows for LDCs

The future COPs must negotiate streamlined procedures, reduced documentation requirements, and faster approval timelines for LDC and fragile countries.

  • Mainstream NDCs into National and Local Development Planning
  • Integrate NDC Targets into National Budgets and Sector Plans

Embed climate actions in annual budget cycles, Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks, and district/county development plans.

  • Establish Performance Indicators for Line Ministries

Link ministerial scorecards and KPIs with measurable NDC outcomes to strengthen accountability and accelerate implementation.

  • Embed Adaptation into Core Sectors

Ensure NDC-aligned adaptation actions are systematically integrated into agriculture, water, health, infrastructure, and urban planning frameworks.

  • Scale Up Community and Citizen Participation
  • Adopt Community-Based Adaptation (CBA) Frameworks

Expand participatory adaptation programs in rural and climate-vulnerable regions, supported by local extension systems.

  • Link Rural Development Programs to NDC Outcomes

Prioritize climate-smart agriculture, reforestation, watershed management, and off-grid energy in rural development interventions.

  • Strengthen Gender and Youth Inclusion

Mandate gender-responsive planning and youth representation in NDC committees, local climate governance, and project implementation.

  • Enhance Regional Cooperation and Knowledge Exchange
  • Establish a Regional MRV and Knowledge Platform

Under the East African Community (EAC), create a shared platform for data exchange, methodologies, and best practices on GHG inventories and sectoral MRV.

  • Promote Cross-Border Renewable Energy Corridors

Accelerate regional geothermal, hydro, and solar initiatives, along with power-pool integration and transmission infrastructure.

  • Strengthen Transboundary Ecosystem Management

Improve joint management of critical basins—Lake Victoria, the Nile, and rangeland ecosystems—to enhance resilience and disaster risk reduction.

  • Improve Transparency, Governance, and Accountability
  • Publish Annual NDC Implementation Reports

Introduce open-access dashboards that track emissions, adaptation progress, climate finance flows, and project delivery.

  • Create Independent Oversight Mechanisms

Establish multi-stakeholder oversight bodies involving civil society, academia, and the private sector to review progress and recommend corrective actions.

  • Mandate Public Disclosure of Climate Finance

Require transparent reporting of all international and domestic climate finance flows, including donor commitments, disbursements, and utilization.

About the Author: Nader Khalifa is an engineer and energy professional with over 15 years of expertise in the energy and petroleum sectors. He currently serves with the Ministry of Energy & Petroleum of Sudan, in addition to his role as a Sudan Team Member for the Initiative on Climate Action Transparency (ICAT) project, a collaborative effort involving UNEP, CCC, and HCENR, and a distinguished researcher and a Colosseum Member at the Governance & Economic Policy Centre (GEPC).

References

  1. African Development Bank (AfDB) (2023). Climate finance in Africa: Overview and outlook. Abidjan: African Development Bank Group.
  2. Brookings Institution (2022). Finance for climate adaptation in Africa: Still insufficient and losing ground. Brookings Global Economy and Development Program. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/finance-for-climate-adaptation-in-africa-still-insufficient-and-losing-ground/.
  3. Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) (2024). Landscape of climate finance in Africa. London: Climate Policy Initiative. Available at: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/landscape-of-climate-finance-in-africa-2024/.
  4. FSD Africa & Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) (2022). Landscape of climate finance in Africa. Nairobi: FSD Africa. Available at: https://fsdafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/1.-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-in-Africa-l-Full-report.pdf 
  5. Global Center on Adaptation (GCA) (2023). Africa’s adaptation gap: Climate finance needs and priorities. Rotterdam: Global Center on Adaptation. Available at: https://gca.org/reports/state-and-trends-in-adaptation/.
  6. Government of Kenya (2020). Updated Nationally Determined Contribution. Nairobi: Ministry of Environment and Forestry.
  7. Government of Rwanda (2020). Updated NDC Submission. Kigali: Ministry of Environment.
  8. Government of Tanzania (2021). Updated Nationally Determined Contribution. Dodoma: Vice President’s Office.
  9. Government of Uganda (2022). Second Nationally Determined Contribution. Kampala: Ministry of Water and Environment.
  10. ICAT (2022). Guidance for Transparency Frameworks in LDCs. Copenhagen: Initiative on Climate Action Transparency.
  11. IPCC (2022). AR6 Working Group III: Mitigation of climate change. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/.
  1. Nature (2025). Reframing climate finance for Africa. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/d44148-025-00353-5
  1. OECD (2023). Climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries in 2013–2021. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/environment/climate-finance-provided-and-mobilised-by-developed-countries.htm.
  2. Savvidou, G., Atteridge, A., Omari-Motsumi, K. and Trisos, C. (2021). Quantifying international public finance for climate change adaptation in Africa. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute. Available at: https://www.sei.org/publications/climate-finance-adaptation-africa/.
  1. Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) (2024). How effective is climate finance in assisting farmers in low- and middle-income countries adapt to climate change? Available at: https://www.sei.org/features/how-effective-is-climate-finance-in-assisting-farmers-in-low-and-middle-income-countries-adapt-to-climate-change/
  2. UNEP (2023). Adaptation Gap Report 2023: Underfinanced, underprepared. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. Available at: https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2023
  3. UNFCCC (2023). Nationally Determined Contributions synthesis report. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Available at: https://unfccc.int/ndc-synthesis-report-2023

 

 

Sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy finance course 2026-Applications open

Gain skills, Accelerate the Energy Transition in Africa!
Join the Sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy Financing Course to gain the knowledge, tools, and skills to shape policies, drive regulatory reforms, and unlock financing for clean, reliable, and equitable energy. Designed for policymakers, civil society leaders, private sector actors, and finance professionals, this course equips you to tackle climate change, expand energy access, and lead a just and inclusive green economy. Take action today and be part of the transformation powering Africa’s sustainable future.

The GEPC sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy Financing Course Equips policy makers, civil society leaders, private sector stakeholders, and financial professional’s with the knowledge and practical skills to drive Africa’s reduction of energy poverty, transition to clean, reliable , and equitable energy system.  Against the backdrop of climate change and persistent energy access challenges, the course addresses critical gaps in policy formulation, regulatory frameworks, advocacy and financing mechanisms.

Participants will gain tools to design and implement sustainable energy policies, promote inclusive governance, mobilise investments for green projects and support a just and resilient energy transition that fosters economic growth, social equity and environmental sustainability.

Course Background and Context

Climate change presents an urgent global challenge, with the most severe impacts disproportionately affecting less developed countries in East Africa and Africa generally. Despite international commitments under the Paris Agreement and subsequent UN Climate Conferences (CoP27 and CoP28), developing countries face significant barriers in accessing technology, finance, and expertise to transition to clean energy. Global climate governance often leaves low-income countries under-resourced and underrepresented, creating complex challenges for equitable and just energy transitions.

In Eastern Africa and Africa generally, policy frameworks and regulatory mechanisms for sustainable energy remain underdeveloped, poorly communicated, and inadequately enforced. This has created critical gaps in governance, technical capacity, and financing, limiting the country’s ability to expand clean energy access, reduce emissions, and achieve its climate commitments. Strengthening national capacity, promoting citizen engagement, and enhancing advocacy for policy reform are therefore essential to support a just and inclusive energy transition.

Sustainable energy is central to meeting these challenges. Defined as clean, reliable, affordable, and equitable, sustainable energy supports national development needs while minimizing environmental harm and fostering long-term economic, social, and environmental sustainability. Integrated sustainable energy systems combine renewable sources—such as solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, and biomass—with modern technologies, smart grids, and storage solutions to deliver energy efficiently, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and expand access to underserved communities.

Continentally, Africa continues to face significant energy access deficits, with approximately 600 million people lacking reliable electricity and 970 million without access to clean cooking solutions. Only about 25% of electricity in the region comes from renewable sources, despite Africa possessing around 60% of the world’s best solar potential. These gaps highlight the urgent need for effective policy, regulation, and financing strategies to mobilize investment, accelerate energy transition, and achieve energy equity.

Efforts and Challenges in Sustainable Energy Access and Financing

Efforts to expand access to sustainable energy, including initiatives like the World Bank Mission 300, have made progress but remain limited. Clean cooking solutions are still expensive and often inaccessible for the poorest and remote households. Expanding energy access and achieving a just transition requires policy reforms such as unbundling existing energy utilities and integrating sustainable energy systems into national, mini, and off-grid networks. Well-designed integrated systems can support public services—solar-powered water, health facilities, small businesses, electrified transport, housing, and modernized agriculture—while reducing reliance on fossil fuels.

Investment in clean energy has grown modestly over the past two years, including multilateral and private sector contributions, yet financing remains far below what is needed. Critical questions persist: how can governments and private sector actors scale investments in sustainable energy systems, and which models are best for advancing clean energy and other renewable technologies in Africa?

Globally, the energy sector is rapidly shifting toward renewables, with record growth in 2023 reaching 3,870 GW of installed capacity (IRENA, 2024). Countries are adopting Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to guide climate adaptation and mitigation at the national level, supported by financing mechanisms like carbon trading, multilateral funds, and private sector investments.

However, in Eastern Africa and Africa generally, limited knowledge and expertise hinder the ability of governments, civil society, and private actors to navigate evolving global energy policies and regulatory frameworks. Accessing climate finance and developing bankable green economy projects remains challenging. Consequently, strengthening skills, policy understanding, regulatory capacity, and financing literacy is critical to accelerate the transition to sustainable clean energy and scale up investment in the green economy, providing jobs and sustainable development.

This course is designed to equip public policymakers, civil society actors, private sector stakeholders, and financial institutions with the knowledge, skills, and tools to shape and implement sustainable energy policies, advance regulatory reforms, and unlock financing for a just and equitable green economy.

Skills Gap Analysis and Justification

The transition to sustainable and clean energy in Eastern Africa and across the Africa region is constrained by a critical shortage of technical knowledge, policy expertise, and institutional capacity. Various engagements between the Governance and Economic Policy Centre (GEPC), civil society organizations, and government institutions have consistently highlighted the need for targeted capacity building to accelerate policy, regulatory, and financing reforms that support the energy transition.

Identified Skills Gaps

In 2022, the Governance and Economic Policy Centre in collaboration with one of its international partners, attempted to form a National Multisector Reference Group on Energy Transition in Tanzania as a bespoke platform for policy dialogue, advocacy, and capacity development.  The feedback and lessons drawn from this process demonstrated an urgent need for renewed capacity-building and leadership in this area. A subsequent short skills gap study commissioned by GEPC in 2024 identified several critical weaknesses among key stakeholder groups:

  • Government officials and legislators lack the technical expertise to design, implement, and monitor effective sustainable energy policies and laws.
  • Civil society organizations have limited knowledge of the global political economy of climate change and energy, limited advocacy, analytical, and policy engagement skills to effectively influence decision-making and accountability mechanisms.
  • Private sector actors struggle to identify, develop, and present bankable renewable energy projects.
  • Financial institutions face challenges in evaluating, matching, and financing sustainable energy investments.
  • Overall political will and coordination for driving sustainable energy transition remain weak and fragmented.

Rationale for the Course

In response to these systemic capacity gaps, GEPC has designed the Sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy Financing Course to strengthen the technical and institutional foundations for an inclusive and just energy transition. The course directly addresses the need for:

  • Enhanced policy and regulatory understanding among public officials and other key stakeholders.
  • Improved advocacy and engagement capacity for civil society and community actors.
  • Strengthened financial literacy and investment readiness within the private and banking sectors.
  • Greater collaboration and coherence among energy sector stakeholders.

This course addresses these gaps by equipping policymakers, civil society actors, private sector professionals, and financial institutions with the knowledge, skills, and tools to shape sustainable energy policies, advance regulatory frameworks, and mobilize financing for a just and inclusive green economy.

Course Approach

The program will be delivered as an extended seven-week modular course.  It will be facilitated by a diverse faculty of experts drawn from GEPC technical ecosystem, global partners and experts, combining practical experience, policy insights, and technical expertise.

Through a blend of lectures, case studies, simulations, and interactive sessions, the course will equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to shape effective policies, foster accountability, and mobilize financing for sustainable and equitable energy development.

Course Objectives

The course aims to:

  1. Enhance understanding of sustainable energy policy, regulatory frameworks, and governance mechanisms relevant to Tanzania and the region.
  2. Develop technical and analytical capacity among policymakers, civil society, and financial sector actors to support the design and implementation of effective energy transition strategies.
  3. Strengthen advocacy and policy engagement skills for civil society to influence public policy and regulatory reform processes.
  4. Improve knowledge of financing mechanisms and models for mobilizing investment in renewable and green economy projects.
  5. Foster collaboration and policy coherence among government, civil society, private sector, and financial institutions in advancing a just and inclusive energy transition.
  6. Promote innovation and leadership in sustainable energy planning, implementation, and financing.

Expected Outcomes

Upon completion of the course, participants will be able to:

  • Demonstrate a clear understanding of the policy, legal, and regulatory dimensions of sustainable energy and green financing.
  • Apply analytical and strategic tools to develop and implement effective energy transition policies and projects.
  • Understand the global political economy of sustainable energy, engage more effectively in policy dialogue, advocacy, and accountability processes related to the energy sector.
  • Identify, design, and evaluate bankable clean energy projects suitable for public and private investment.
  • Strengthen institutional coordination and stakeholder collaboration for integrated and sustainable energy governance.
  • Contribute to building national and regional momentum for a just, inclusive, and climate-resilient energy future.

Course Content and Modules Overview

The Sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy Financing Course is designed to provide participants with both conceptual understanding and practical tools for influencing, designing, and implementing sustainable energy solutions. The course content is structured into seven interlinked modules, each addressing a critical dimension of sustainable energy and the energy transition.

Weekly Modules

Objectives, expected competence

Module 1: Understanding Sustainable Energy and the Global Energy Transition

Objective: To provide a foundational understanding of sustainable energy systems, their global dynamics, and relevance to Eastern Africa and Africa’s development agenda.

Key Topics:

  • Concepts and principles of sustainable energy and just transitions
  • Global energy transition: drivers, trends, challenges
  • Overview of emerging trends in renewables and energy efficiency technologies
  • Global and regional energy transition frameworks (UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, SDGs, NDCs and Agenda 2063)
  • Energy access, poverty, and development linkages
  • Eastern Africa and Africa’s energy context and policy landscape

Expected Competence: Participants will gain an informed understanding of the global and national energy transition landscape and how it aligns with sustainable development goals.

Module 2: Policy, Legal and Regulatory Frameworks for Sustainable Energy

 

Objective: To build participants’ knowledge of the policy and legal frameworks governing sustainable energy.

Key Topics will cover:

  • Global energy policy debates in the context of energy access and transition
  • National and regional policy and legal frameworks in the context of global energy
  • Energy Policy formulation processes and regulatory designs
  • Energy Policy tools: subsidies, tariffs, carbon pricing, auctions
  • Regional integration and power pools (e.g., EAPP, WAPP, SAPP)
  • Institutional coordination and governance mechanisms
  • Role of legislature and local governments in sustainable energy governance
  • Gender, equity, and social inclusion in energy policy

Expected Competence: Participants will be equipped to analyze, interpret, and contribute to policy and regulatory reform in the energy sector.

Module 3: Financing the Green Economy and Renewable Energy Investments, project development & bankability

 

Objective: To enhance understanding of green financing mechanisms, instruments, practical competencies, and strategies for developing financeable projects, mobilizing, manage and analyze green financing.

Key Topics:

  • Global Climate Change and green economy financing terrain
  • Geopolitics of climate financing and energy diplomacy
  • Principles of green economy and sustainable finance
  • Financing models for renewable energy (public, private, PPPs, and blended finance), Green bonds, blue bonds, climate funds, carbon markets, carbon swaps and JTEPs

·        Project feasibility studies, project modeling, preparation, operations and risk management

  • Mobilizing domestic and international finance for energy projects
  • Role of National Capital & Money markets, Green Banks, DFIs and MDBs (World Bank, AfDB, TDB)
  • Clean Energy Financing Contracts

Expected Competence: Participants will understand the clean energy financing terrain, acquire practical skills and tools to analyze clean energy financing texts, developing, and evaluating bankable renewable energy projects and access appropriate financing channels 

Module 4: Governance, Equity & Environmental Safeguards

 

Objective: To understand the governance, equity & environmental safeguard concerns underlying the transition to sustainable energy.

Key Topics:

    • Social and environmental concerns and safeguards
    • Responsible Business Conduct in Energy sector
    • Just Transition: equity, gender, community inclusion
    • Governance and anti-corruption in energy financing

Expected Competence: Participants will gain insights into the advocacy concerns and suitable policy and regulatory responses to just energy transitions and financing of sustainable energy. 

Module 5: Communication, Advocacy, Accountability and Stakeholder Engagement

 

Objective: To strengthen participants’ advocacy, negotiation, and communication skills for influencing policy and ensuring accountability in energy governance.

Key Topics:

  • Communication for sustainable energy
  • Principles and tools of policy advocacy and public engagement
  • Strategies for evidence-based advocacy and coalition building
  • Role of civil society, media, and academia in energy governance
  • Public participation and citizen accountability mechanisms
  • Case studies of successful communication and advocacy in energy transition

Expected Competence: Participants will develop the skills to effectively communicate, advocate for and influence energy policies and reforms that promote transparency, inclusion, and sustainability

Module 6: Leadership, Innovation and the Future of Energy Transition

 

Objective: To inspire leadership and innovation in sustainable energy planning and implementation.

Key Topics:

  • Transformational leadership for the green transition
  • Africa’s leadership and priorities for sustainable energy
  • Innovation, digitalization, AI, and energy governance
  • Africa scenario planning and strategic foresight for future energy systems
  • Integrating climate resilience and just transition principles in policy and regulation

Expected Competence: Participants will gain leadership insights and strategic foresight to drive innovation, partnerships, and sustainable change in the energy sector.

Week 7: Applied Learning & Practicum

 

Objective: To provide participants with practical hands-on experience in operations of sustainable energy projects, designing sustainable energy projects, financeable and bankable projects, developing applicable policy briefs and advocacy communiques for sustainable energy.

  • Activities:
    • Case study presentations: participants analyze a real renewable energy project
    • Group project: draft a financing proposal or policy brief
    • Physical or Virtual Field visit (e.g., solar mini-grid, geothermal plant, wind farm) 

Delivery Methods

The course will employ a blended learning approach, integrating:

  • Expert-led lectures and interactive discussions
  • Practical case studies and simulations
  • Group work and peer-to-peer learning
  • Policy labs and project design sessions
  • Guest lectures from leading practitioners and global experts

Participants will receive digital resources, reading materials, and toolkits to support post-course application of skills in their professional contexts.

Target Participants

The course is designed for junior- to senior-level professionals and practitioners involved in energy, climate, and economic governance who play or aspire to play a role in shaping policy, regulation, and financing for sustainable energy.

It specifically targets:

  • Government officials and legislators involved in energy, environment, finance, infrastructure, and local government sectors.
  • Civil society leaders and policy advocates working on governance, climate justice, and sustainable development issues.
  • Private sector actors and project developers in renewable energy, infrastructure, and related industries.
  • Financial and investment professionals from banks, development finance institutions, and microfinance organizations seeking to understand green financing opportunities.
  • Academics and researchers working on energy policy, economics, and sustainability studies.
  • Development partners and international organizations supporting energy transition and green growth initiatives.

Diversity and Inclusion:
GEPC encourages participation from women, youth, and professionals from underrepresented groups to promote inclusivity and diverse perspectives in the sustainable energy transition discourse.

Admission Requirements

Applicants should meet the following minimum requirements:

  1. Educational Background:
    • At least a bachelor’s degree or equivalent qualification in a relevant field such as social sciences, political science, public policy, economics, law, environmental studies, engineering, communication, finance, or related disciplines.
    • Applicants with significant professional experience in the energy or governance sector will be considered in lieu of academic qualifications.
  2. Professional Experience:
    • At least one year of relevant work experience in government, civil society, academia, or the private sector, preferably in areas related to extractive sector, energy, public policy, climate & environment, media or economic development, banking and green financing
  3. Language Proficiency:
    • Proficiency in English (both written and spoken) is required, as the course will be conducted in English.
  4. Motivation Statement and CV:
    • Applicants must submit a brief statement (300–500 words) explaining their motivation for joining the course and how they plan to apply the knowledge gained in their professional setting. They must attach a short CV or resume plus a Headshot portrait photo
  5. Recommendation:
    • A letter of support from an employer, supervisor, work colleague or institutional head is encouraged but not mandatory.

Course Duration:  7 Weeks (12th January-27th February, 2026)

The course is designed with flexible delivery options to accommodate the varying needs of participants. The seven-week program structured into weekly modules, allowing participants to combine professional responsibilities with learning.

Certification

Upon successful completion of the course requirements, participants will receive a Certificate of Completion from the Governance and Economic Policy Centre (GEPC), jointly endorsed by partnering academic or professional institutions where applicable.

Course Fees: A Subsidized rate of USD 300. Limited scholarships will be available to exceptional and early bird applicants

Course Management:  Virtual & Online

Virtual delivery will be managed through GEPC’s Moodle and Google Classroom digital learning platform.

Essential Timelines

Date

Activity

3rd December

Advertising call for Applications

3rd January 2026

Deadline for Applications

7th January, 2026

Notification of selected participants

12th January 2026

Course Commencement

27th February 2026

End of Course and Graduation

 

How to apply:

Applications and support documents (Motivation letter, CV and Headshot photo) must be sent as a single PDF or word file by 3rd January 2026 to:  info@gepc.ortz

Climate Change action at Subnational level: Rationale for Skilling Local Government Authorities for Climate Change Action in Tanzania

By Ng’homange Merkiad James: Researcher, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

*Mr Ng’homange is a senior lecturer at the Local Government Training Institute (LGTI) at Hombolo, Dodoma

Climate change is one of the most pressing challenges facing Tanzania today, threatening livelihoods, infrastructure, and national development. Despite the growing national and global attention to climate policy, Local Government Authorities (LGAs) — the level of government closest to the people — remain inadequately skilled and resourced to respond effectively. This policy paper argues that building the capacity of LGAs is essential for translating Tanzania’s national climate change commitments into local action. It proposes targeted training, institutional support, and resource mobilization to strengthen LGAs’ roles in climate adaptation, mitigation, and energy transition initiatives.

 

  1. Introduction

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) warns that climate change is advancing rapidly, with the poorest communities in developing countries such as Tanzania facing the most severe and irreversible impacts. Prolonged droughts, erratic rainfall, and frequent floods are disrupting food systems, destroying infrastructure, and worsening health outcomes through increased exposure to diseases and air pollution.

In Tanzania, where over 80% of the rural population depends on rain-fed agriculture — a sector contributing more than 60% of the national GDP — the consequences are profound. Yet, despite these local-level vulnerabilities, climate change interventions and decision-making remain concentrated at the global and national levels, leaving LGAs on the periphery of policy and practice. Most local authorities lack the requisite knowledge, skills, and financial capacity to implement climate action plans, integrate adaptation into planning frameworks, or mobilize community-based mitigation measures.

Empowering LGAs through structured and context-relevant climate training can transform Tanzania’s climate governance landscape. Skilled LGAs can lead public education campaigns, enforce green urban planning, promote clean cooking technologies, and even issue municipal green bonds to finance sustainable infrastructure projects.

  1. The Nexus Between Climate Change and Local Governments

Local Government Authorities are semi-autonomous subnational governments mandated under the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982. They are responsible for promoting peace, order, decentralization, and socio-economic development in their jurisdictions.

The OECD defines a local authority as “a decentralized entity elected through universal suffrage and having general responsibilities and some autonomy with respect to budget, staff and assets” (OECD/UCLG, 2016[31]). While countries can be organised as unitary or federal states, they all rely on local authorities as entities for the delivery of various services[1].

The call for local adaptation action stems from the recognition that climate risks first manifest locally, and local communities and local authorities have an innate understanding of how impacts affect them and how they need to be addressed. Their proximity to communities makes them a critical actor in climate governance, as they are well positioned to identify local risks, mobilize citizens, and deliver adaptive responses.

However, low involvement in national climate processes, limited funding, and lack of technical expertise continue to hinder their potential. Without strong LGA engagement, Tanzania’s commitments to climate adaptation, resilience, and clean energy transition risk remaining unfulfilled.

  1. Climate Change Impacts and the Need to Skill Local Governments

Tanzania’s vulnerability to climate change is evident across multiple sectors — agriculture, water, energy, infrastructure, and health. Droughts and floods are already imposing economic losses, reducing productivity, and disrupting livelihoods. According to the National Climate Change Response Strategy (2021–2026), these impacts threaten to derail progress toward the country’s Vision 2025 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG7[2]).

The recent floods demonstrate Tanzania’s vulnerability and yet the, a statement on the Status of Tanzania Climate in 2022 from Tanzania Meteorological Authority revealed that extreme weather conditions such as increased seasonal variation in observed rainfall and temperature have been significant in most parts of Tanzania and this will continue in the foreseeable feature[3].

Global evidence underscores that effective climate action requires localized implementation. Transitioning to clean and renewable energy — such as solar, wind, and hydropower — is vital, but its success depends on local capacity to plan, regulate, and support adoption. LGAs, as the closest link between citizens and the state, must therefore be equipped to manage these transitions.

The OECD in 2023 observed that despite, their competencies and mandates, local governments cannot go alone, they need both national and global level support to fully tackle climate change mitigation and adaption measures.

Capacity building and empowering of local government authorities can be instrumentally transformative in advancing local community public education, municipal urban planning and green zoning, improved regulation and approval of municipal building permits that factor smart and clean energy technologies in new housing plans and settlements. Moreover, local authorities can play a significant role in the public education and distribution of clean cooking energy systems such as affordable gas stoves in rural areas.  Local municipal green bonds issued by local authorities can be a major source of unlocking local financing for green projects such as urban municipal public transportation, clean energy generation and public and private sector projects.

  1. Tanzania’s Climate Policy and Institutional Framework

Tanzania has made significant strides in developing its climate governance architecture. The country is a signatory to the Paris Agreement and aligns its national targets with the African Union Agenda 2063, emphasizing environmental sustainability and climate resilience. Domestically, the government has enacted several policies and frameworks, including:

  • National Environmental Policy (2021)
  • National Climate Change Strategy (2021–2026)
  • Nationally Determined Contributions (2021 & 2023 updates)
  • Environmental Management Act (Cap. 191 of 2004)
  • National Carbon Trading Guidelines (2022)
  • National Clean Cooking Strategy (2024)

Despite this robust framework, implementation remains centralized. Local governments, which are essential to the execution of climate adaptation and mitigation measures, are often excluded from planning and under-resourced for execution. This disconnect has limited the translation of policy commitments into community-level results.

  1. Bridging the Local Government Skills Gap

An  assessment by the Governance and Economic Policy Centre (GEPC) and the Local Government Training Institute (LGTI) at Hombolo identified major capacity and knowledge gaps among local government staff. While some departments offer courses on “Climate Change and Livelihoods,” these remain ad hoc, limited in scope, and inaccessible to most ward, village, and mtaa-level executives.

Climate change work within LGAs is often confined to environmental departments, yet the issue is multisectoral — spanning land use, infrastructure, agriculture, and social services. Many officials lack exposure to the global political economy of climate governance and energy transition. Consequently, LGAs are not effectively advising central government or local communities on context-appropriate climate actions. This skills deficit hinders local-level innovation and weakens citizen engagement. Without building LGA competencies, national adaptation and mitigation strategies risk being poorly implemented or misunderstood at the grassroots level. Moreover, the complex nature of Tanzania’s local government authority structure creates room for overlaps across multiple stakeholders and this creates information and knowledge asymmetries across the LGA structures.

  1. Policy Recommendations

To strengthen Tanzania’s climate resilience and ensure the effective localization of climate policies, this paper recommends the following:

  1. Develop and institutionalize intensive climate training programmes for LGA staff, covering adaptation, mitigation, and energy transition, aligned with national and global frameworks.
  2. Embed climate change modules in induction courses for all new LGA employees to build foundational understanding across departments.
  3. Enhance community engagement and education through LGAs on the benefits of clean energy, forest conservation, and sustainable resource use.
  4. Establish environmental and climate action teams at ward and village levels to coordinate awareness and mobilization campaigns.
  5. Produce and distribute simplified climate training manuals in Kiswahili for use by local officials and community groups.
  6. Support LGAs in action research and local climate data collection to inform evidence-based planning and monitoring.
  7. Facilitate access to local climate finance, including municipal green bonds and partnerships with development actors, to implement local adaptation projects.
  1. Conclusion

Tanzania’s climate response will only be as strong as its local institutions. Building the capacity of Local Government Authorities is not merely an administrative necessity but a strategic investment in sustainable development. Skilled and empowered LGAs can bridge the gap between national climate policy and community action — enabling Tanzania to achieve its commitments to resilience, clean energy, and inclusive green growth.

REFERENCES

Tanzania Meteorological Authority (2023) Statement on the Status of Tanzania climate in 2022, TMA, Dar es Salaam

United Republic of Tanzania (2021) National Environmental Policy 2021, Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2021) National Climate Change Response Strategy (2021-2026), Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2014) National Guidelines for Mainstreaming Gender into Environment, Vice President’s Office, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2021) National Determined Contribution, Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2024) National Clean Cooking Strategy (2024 – 2034), Ministry of Energy, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2022) National Carbon Trading Guidelines, Vice President’s Office, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2010) Guidelines for The Preparation of Environmental Action Plans for Sector Ministries and Local Government Authorities, Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Dar es Salaam

United Republic of Tanzania (2017) National Guidelines for Strategic Environmental Assessment, Vice President’s Office, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2008) The Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania of 1977, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Republic of Tanzania (2004) National Environment Management Act of 2004, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Republic of Tanzania (2002) Local Government (District Authorities) Act, No. 7, (1982), Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Republic of Tanzania (2002) Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, No. 8, (1982), Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Nations (2023) Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report, UN Environment Programme

[1] OECD: Climate adaptation: why local governments cannot do it alone. Environment Policy Paper No. 38

[2] UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 7)

[3] Tanzania Meteorological Authority (2023) Statement on the Status of Tanzania climate in 2022, TMA, Dar es Salaam

Strengthening Local Governments in Climate Action Ahead of COP30

Position paper: Governance and Economic Policy Centre

 Introduction: The Local Nexus of Climate Action

Local Government Authorities (LGAs) are the closest level of governance to communities, charged with delivering essential services and implementing national policies at the grassroots. Their proximity to citizens makes them vital actors in addressing the localized impacts of climate change. However, despite their strategic role in adaptation and resilience-building, LGAs remain underrepresented in global climate policy and under-resourced in implementation.

As the world approaches COP30 in Brazil, which marks the halfway point to achieving the 2030 Paris Agreement goals, recognizing and empowering local governments is critical for translating global climate pledges into tangible local actions.

The Role of Local Governments in Climate Change Response

Climate change impacts—heatwaves, floods, droughts, and food insecurity—are experienced most acutely at the local level. Local governments possess unique knowledge of territorial vulnerabilities, socioeconomic conditions, and local adaptive capacities. They influence resilience through land-use planning, infrastructure regulation, and enforcement of environmental standards.

Local authorities play three major roles in climate response:

  1. Mitigation: Regulating emissions through energy efficiency programs, green building codes, and sustainable mobility initiatives.
  2. Adaptation: Managing land use, disaster risk reduction, and climate-sensitive infrastructure planning.
  3. Transition to Clean Energy: Promoting renewable energy solutions and expanding access to clean cooking and off-grid energy, especially in rural communities.

Yet, their contributions are constrained by limited funding, inadequate technical skills, and weak institutional mandates.

Local Governments and Global Climate Negotiations

At global forums such as the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COPs), local governments participate only through observer status—primarily via the Local Governments and Municipal Authorities (LGMA) constituency. While they have organized town hall dialogues and local “Mini-COPs,” their influence on formal decision-making remains minimal.

The exclusion of local voices from climate negotiations undermines policy coherence and weakens implementation. National commitments under the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) often fail to integrate the realities and priorities of subnational actors, leading to a persistent gap between global ambition and local action.

Barriers Limiting Local Government Engagement

  1. Political and Institutional Constraints
  • Lack of formal recognition: LGAs are treated as observers, not negotiators.
  • Weak mandates: National frameworks often omit explicit roles for local actors in international climate commitments.
  • Competing priorities: Service delivery demands (water, housing, education) often overshadow climate action.
  • Policy incoherence: Disjointed national and local strategies lead to fragmented implementation.
  1. Resource and Capacity Constraints
  • Insufficient funding: Local budgets rarely allocate funds for climate adaptation or international engagement.
  • Limited technical expertise: Few LGAs have staff capable of climate risk assessment or data-driven planning.
  • High participation costs: Travel and registration fees hinder participation in COPs, especially for developing countries.
  • Data gaps: Lack of localized climate data weakens evidence-based planning.
  1. Knowledge and Communication Gaps
  • Limited access to negotiation information and technical guidance.
  • Language barriers and lack of translation support at COP sessions.
  • Low public awareness of how global climate policy connects to local priorities.

Why Local Governments Must Be Supported

Climate change impacts are inherently territorial. Local authorities possess the contextual understanding necessary for effective adaptation and resilience-building. However, without adequate fiscal space, skills, and institutional backing, they cannot translate national and global goals into local implementation.

National governments must therefore create an enabling environment that empowers LGAs through:

  • Regulatory and fiscal reforms that integrate local adaptation priorities into national plans.
  • Technical capacity-building, including downscaled climate data and specialized training.
  • Coordinated planning mechanisms that involve LGAs in the design and implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and NDCs.
  • Targeted financing mechanisms, such as climate-resilient municipal grants and performance-based green budgeting.

Effective collaboration between national and local levels will ensure that adaptation is not only nationally planned but also locally delivered.

COP30: A Turning Point for Multilevel Climate Action

COP30 presents a pivotal opportunity to reframe climate governance through multilevel action. It comes at a critical juncture:

  • 2025 marks the deadline for countries to submit their updated NDCs under the Paris Agreement.
  • It will be the first COP in Brazil since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, symbolizing a return to the origins of the UNFCCC.
  • It represents the midpoint to 2030, demanding acceleration in implementation rather than new pledges alone.

Positioning local governments at the heart of COP30 discussions will help bridge the implementation gap between national commitments and local realities.

Policy Recommendations

  1. Elevate Local Governments in Global Climate Governance
    • Grant LGAs a formal role in negotiation processes and multilevel implementation frameworks.
    • Institutionalize the Local Governments and Municipal Authorities (LGMA) constituency within COP structures.
  2. Reassess Support Frameworks for LGAs
    • Review past support mechanisms to identify lessons and scale up successful local adaptation and mitigation models.
  3. Develop Scalable Local Climate Models
    • Document and share proven municipal adaptation and energy transition initiatives to inform peer learning.
  4. Establish Dedicated Local Climate Finance Channels
    • Create financing pipelines suitable for subnational authorities, including grants and concessional funds for green infrastructure and renewable energy projects.
  5. Promote Local Green Transitions
    • Support local greening programs, expansion of renewable energy, and universal access to clean cooking solutions.
  6. Invest in Capacity and Skills Development
    • Build technical, financial, and negotiation capacities of LGAs through training programs, partnerships, and regional knowledge hubs.

Conclusion

Achieving the Paris Agreement targets requires action at every level of government. Local governments are not just implementers—they are innovation laboratories for resilience, equity, and sustainability. Empowering them through recognition, financing, and capacity support will be key to transforming global climate commitments into grounded results.

COP30 must therefore be the moment to bring local governments from the margins to the center of the climate agenda.

 

We wish Tanzania a peaceful election and stability thereafter

As Tanzanians go to the polls today, 29th October, 2025, we wish Tanzania a peaceful election and tranquility must prevail during and after election !

The Africa Great Lakes Region Civil Society Platform (AGLR), is a network of Civil society organizations and conflict professionals working to promote  human rights, peace and security in the Great Lakes Region.

*AGLR  regrets the violence and death of civilians during the recently held elections in Tanzania and remains committed to supporting any national or regional dialogue and reform efforts aimed at restoring lasting peace in Tanzania.

Electoral democracy must work: How 2025 General elections can reclaim Tanzania’s peaceful electoral glory.

Author: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic policy Centre

Ahead of the 2025 general elections, the electoral violence that first manifested itself in 1995 and 2000 in Zanzibar with the CUF as a player appears to be taking grip on mainland Tanzania. Religious leaders and experts warn that the drums of violence are being sounded.  A new consensus to peace must be pursued.

From our historical analysis (as presented in the previous briefs), Tanzania’s electoral democracy that started in 1995 has suffered some contradictions and setbacks.  Throughout this period Tanzania has witnessed episodes of electoral violence which climaxed with extreme violence during the Zanzibar 2000 general elections. Although in the first ten years of multiparty electoral democracy the level of electoral violence was centred in Zanzibar, after the two political accords ( Muafaka 1 & Muafaka II) this unpleasant violence gradually shifted to Tanzania Mainland.

With advent of new emerging opposition political parties such as CHADEMA, the contours of electoral violence were remapped and have continued to manifest themselves in different forms and at different levels. Over the past electoral cycles people have been reported killed and many more injured in electoral related violence.  Perhaps this is not what was contemplated by Mwl Nyerere when Tanzania adopted multiparty democracy in 1995.

Lessons from neighboring countries reveal that democracy is fragile and peace can be raptured. Moreover, the persistent and excessive violent oppression of the opposition makes its cause and leaders more popular. The perceived sense of unfairness and injustice endears the public to the opposition and can lead to a sympathy vote.

As Tanzania goes to the 2025 general elections and more future to electoral cycles come, the government and political actors can perform better.  Preventing violent electoral conflicts should be a key priority for safeguarding the democratic and development achievements so far. The economic effects of violent elections often last well beyond the election period and can spill over to other sectors. In Kenya the manufacturing sectors were affected while in Zanzibar the tourism sector suffered significant loses. Moreover, in the aftermath of an electoral conflict, restoring investor confidence and rebuilding trust can take long time to bounce back to its pre violence period. Conducting a free, fair and peaceful election and securing its outcome must always be priority.

The arrest and detention of opposition leaders such as Tundu Lissu, alongside the disqualification of opposition candidates such as CHADEMA party from the 2025 general elections signals a disturbing development and potential regression in political freedoms and democratic governance.  The disappearance of vocal government critics such as Amb Humphrey Pole Pole and threats for a nationwide demonstration ahead of the general election further complicates the state of our democracy.

Such perceived repression undermines fundamental democratic principles and freedoms to choose leaders. Criminalizing peaceful protests and political participation, especially in an election year, has far-reaching implications for the legitimacy of the entire electoral process and the need to uphold democratic principles. A democracy cannot thrive if political actors are excluded, intimidated or arbitrarily detained[1]. Political consensus and solutions to the root causes of this emerging trend must be addressed. Elections can be held without an aura of fear, violence and Tanzania can reclaim its glory as the stablishing variable in the region.

A man casts his ballot at a polling station of Stone Town, in Zanzibar, on March 20, 2016. – Voters go to the polls in Tanzania for presidential and legislative elections, with the main opposition party expected to boycott the controversial re-run of October’s vote. (Photo by DANIEL HAYDUK / AFP)

Key recommendations for addressing electoral violence in Tanzania

For Tanzania and East Africa generally to enjoy peaceful elections, electoral reforms must be undertaken and respected. These must include some tweaks to electoral systems, particularly a re-examination whether the current First Past the Post System is fitted for purpose and context. Managing the power of the incumbency, demonetizing electoral processes, reducing the role of security agencies and strengthening the role of independent electoral management bodies in delivering a free, fair and peaceful election are other areas that must be addressed.

Moreover, the following specific actions can be taken.

  1. Release and accounting for all detained and missing opposition political leaders and lifting the ban on political mobilisation and freedoms to campaign during electoral seasons
  2. Implementation of key electoral and political reforms to promote inclusion-Example of the Muafaka I&II and Zanzibar electoral reforms for political inclusivity that have generated some level of stability in Zanzibar can be replicated on the mainland Tanzania
  3. Total de-escalation, de-militarization and reduction of the role of security agencies in elections- This includes among others delivering civic education to the security agencies on elections, the roles of the security agencies in elections and electoral management in a multiparty dispensation.
  4. Avoiding militant like sloganeering and aggressive posture by political actors which can incite their supporters and the public, drawing in the attention and wrath of security organs into an electoral process.
  5. Increased free Civic Education of the masses, and allowing civil society and other independent actors to fully participate in civic education, election monitoring and observation. This is important in bolstering trust and integrity of the electoral processes and their outcomes.
  6. Review the existing electoral laws, invest in transparent election systems including declaration of results so as to increase trust in electoral outcomes. Chances of a peaceful election are higher if every vote is counted and secured in transparent manner.
  7. Demonetization of electoral processes by reduction or total elimination of money in elections.  Control of the use of money for electoral campaigns and limiting monetary rewards for electoral positions can reduce political contestation and agitation for power, vested interests, susceptibility to corruption, vote buying and the role of criminal gangs for hire in electoral processes.
  8. Addressing the core concerns of the citizenry such as economic marginalization and the failure of the state to deliver better social services, and the ruling political elites to deliver on their promises. These serve as key drivers for electoral violence as citizens get easily duped to back those who bribe more or present themselves with false promises for a better future.
  9. Let diversity of political opinions and electoral democracy shrive.

References

Aley Soud Nassor & Jim Jose (2014) Power-Sharing in Zanzibar: From Zero-Sum Politics to Democratic Consensus? Available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2014.896719; Accessed on 17 April 2025

Hassan Kaya (2004)  Electoral Violence, Political Stability and the Union in Tanzania, available at https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/electoral-violence-political-stability-and-the-union-in-tanzania/ accessed on 17 April 2025

Human Rights Watch (2001) Uganda’s Presidential and Parliamentary polls available at https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/uganda0206/3.htm accessed 22 April 2025

Human Rights Watch (2017) Kenya: Post-Election Killings, Abuse available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/27/kenya-post-election-killings-abuse; accessed on 22 April 2025

Human Rights Watch (2021) Uganda: Elections Marred by Violence available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence , accessed on 22 April 2025

Kituo Cha Katiba (2003) CONSTITUTIONALISM AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN ZANZIBAR: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW VISION; A Report of the Fact-Finding Mission Organised under the Auspices of Kituo Cha Katiba; available at https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/tanzania/02112.pdf accessed on 17 April 2025

National Crimes Research Centre (2019) available at https://crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Issue-Brief-on-State-of-Organized-Criminal-Gangs-in-Kenya.pdf

Okech Achieng Matilda. The Impact of Electoral Violence on Economic Development: A Case of Kenya. Journal of Political Science and International Relations. Vol. 1, No. 3, 2018, pp. 55-71. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20180103.11, available at https://www.sciencepublishinggroup.com/article/10.11648/j.jpsir.20180103.11 accessed on 17 April 2025

OWP: The Organisation for World Peace (2024) Brutal Violence Against the Opposing Party in Tanzania https://theowp.org/brutal-violence-against-the-opposing-party-in-tanzania/ accessed on 17 April 2025

TEMCO (1997) The 1995 General Elections in Tanzania; Report of Tanzania Elections Monitoring Committee available at https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/the-1995-general-elections-in-tanzania Accessed on 17 April 2025

[1] https://www.chr.up.ac.za/latest-news/4007-press-statement-democracy-and-elections-under-threat-in-tanzania-centre-for-human-rights-calls-for-the-release-of-opposition-leader-tundu-lissu-and-demands-restoration-of-political-freedoms

Electoral Violence and rise of opposition in Tanzania: Lessons from Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique

Authors: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Featured photo credit: AP

Experiences from electoral violence and suppression in neighboring countries have not been good. In a separate brief (Addressing Electoral violence and impunity in East Africa) we delved deeper into this subject. Lessons from Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique show that uncontrolled electoral violence have a tendency of degenerating into a contagious cycle of violence that can engulf a country with extensive catastrophic effect. Moreover, excessive suppression of the opposition enders it to the public, making it more popular and can ultimately lead to a sympathy vote, including the collapse of a large ruling political party.

For years after the introduction of multiparty democracy, CHADEMA had remained a small political party, largely confined with support in some limited regions of the country, with few (5) seats in the Union parliament. It had no significant presence and representation in Zanzibar and had pockets of support on mainland Tanzania.

However, the consistent suppression and violent attacks against the opposition between 2000 and 2005 worked contrary to intentions of the state and popularity of the ruling party. Television images and newspaper reportage of bleeding, heavily bandaged opposition leaders and their supporters being arrested or dispersed by heavily armed police field force units portrayed them as heroes, and a true face of the cause for change. The violent actions generated sympathy from the public, endearing many young people and professionals towards the opposition. The opposition CHADEMA was gradually catapulted to popularity, and gained strength in the 2005 general elections. It increased the number of its seats in parliament from 5 in 2000 to 11 in 2005.

Despite the success of the Muafaka II in Zanzibar, the resurgence of excessive suppression of political opposition and dissent on the Main land Tanzania led to the rise and galvanization of Chama Cha Demokrasia na Mandeleo (CHADEMA) as a political party, catapulting it to prominence and redefinition of Tanzania’s political terrain and electoral democracy.

Its political limelight shone brighter in the 2010 general elections when CHADEMA emerged as the second largest political party on the mainland Tanzania. In a surge show of popularity CHADEMA’s Presidential candidate, Wilbrod Slaa garnered 27.05% (2,271,491) of the Presidential vote and the party bagged 48 seats in parliament.  Although CCM’s candidate Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete won the elections with 62.83% of the vote, this was however a decline from 80% of the vote that he had polled in 2005.

More political fortune followed in 2015 when CHADEMA’s Presidential Candidate Edward Lowasa scooped 39.97% of the total Presidential vote and 73 Members of parliament. Over a short ten-year period, CHADEMA’s prominence was effectively growing in leaps and bounds during every electoral cycle. The political power balance and focus had tilted away from CCM and the CUF towards CHADEMA.

Much as this success set CHADEMA on a new trajectory, it did not come lightly. Its mass mobilization around the slogan of ‘People power’ and ‘Movement for Change’ drew it closer to a younger energized generation. Emboldened with a troop of firebrand political youngsters and increased support base, CHADEMA saw itself as heartbeat away from dislodging CCM from power. Its political militancy and confrontations with security organs increased. 

As its strength surged, the level of electoral violence involving CHADEMA also increased.  During this period, leaders and supporters were reportedly either arrested, abducted or killed under mysterious circumstances. Barely two years after the 2015 elections there was an assassination attempt on one of its leaders and firebrand members of Parliament; Hon Tundu Lissu in 2017. The level of violence against the opposition sent shockwaves across CHADEMA, causing many to flee the country in fear of their lives.

The electoral violence followed into the next electoral cycle of 2020. Political party mobilization was restricted.  The elections were marred with what the opposition claimed was direct interference, malpractices, fraud and suppression. CHADEMA’s top leaders were arrested while others were disqualified from contesting and eventually lost their seats (Aljazeera, 2015) As a consequence its numbers in parliament dropped from 73 to a mere 1 elected constituency MP.

In the run-up to the polls, opposition parties had complained of threats and repression. Rights groups equally accused the government of curtailing free expression and press freedom (Aljazeera, 2020)  The government rejected such accusations but human rights groups such as Amnesty International reported that government had built up a formidable arsenal of laws to stifle all forms of dissent, effectively clamping down on the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly (ibid)

According to Tundu Lissu, CHADEMA’s presidential candidate, the process of 2020 general election was like ‘spitting in the face of democracy’, as he warned of brewing unrest. “Whatever happened…was not an election, and thus we do not recognize it. We do not accept the result,” Lissu told reporters in Dar es Salaam, saying opposition election monitors had been barred from entering polling stations and faced other interference (Aljazeera, 2020) CHADEMA declared the results as “illegitimate” and urged his supporters to demonstrate peacefully while asking the international community not to recognize the outcome.

These assertions were collaborated by other independent researchers and electoral observers. According to Nicodemus Minde, a researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, elections in 2020 took place amid intimidation, censorship, and overt violence against the opposition, disregarding democratic norms that ensure civil rights, political freedoms, and participation. The ruling party CCM was accused of determining to win at all costs.

Tanzania Mainland Presidential Election Results 2005-2020

Year

 Candidate

Political Party

Votes

%of the vote

2005

Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete

CCM

9,123,952

80.28%

Prof. Ibrahim Lipumba

CUF

1,327,125

11.68%

2010

Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete

CCM

5,276,827

62.83%

Wilbrod Slaa

CHADEMA

2,271,491

27.05%

2015

John Pombe Magufuli

CCM

8,882,935

58.46%

Edward Lowasa

CHADEMA

6,072,848

39.97%

2020

John Pombe Magufuli

CCM

12,516,252

84.40%

Tundu Lissu

CHADEMA

1,933,271

13.04%

Source: Computed Elections results data by GEPC researchers from different publicly available data

Tanzania 2024 Local Government elections and the continuum of electoral violence

In Tanzania, local government leaders are major political anchor between the local and national political establishments. Local government leaders control vital access to resources and tools for grassroot political mobilization and therefore a vital factor in electoral success.  Local government elections are heavily contentious as they are commonly used as a test of a political party’s popularity ahead of the general elections.

As 2024 local government elections came up, the government was yet to fully address the concerns raised by CHADEMA during the 2020 general elections and political violence was apparent (Aljazeera, 2020) .

Indeed, as predicted by various commentators, a similar wave of electoral violence witnessed in 2015 followed in the 2024 local government elections. The wave of violence was directed towards politicians, independent media houses and vocal commentators. For instance, CHADEMA reported that three of its members were killed in incidents linked to local elections and accused the authorities of rigging the vote (France, 2024)

AFP journalists in the western town of Kigoma reported seeing voters clashing over alleged fake ballots, leading to arrests. Several of its leaders were reportedly abducted, severely beaten and left for dead by unidentified assailants (OWP, 2024) Local observers documented and condemned the widespread electoral malpractices and treatment of opposition candidates.  The continuum of electoral violence started more than a decade before was persisting. 

In short, despite the success recorded by the Muafaka accords, the consensual approach to settling political differences did not percolate across Tanzania’s political fiber.  As a consequence, Tanzania’s electoral violence as witnessed between 1995 and 2000 resurfaced and was directed beyond the Civic United Front and its supporters in Zanzibar. The violence was expanded and targeted to other political parties, escalating over the years.  Between 2010 and 2024 Tanzania witnessed waves of violent elections with CHADEMA bearing the heaviest brunt.  Amidst this CHADEMA’s popularity increased has remained a major variable at the heart of Tanzania’s election politics to date. However, the suppression and violence that surrounds its political environment points to challenges that face the state of Tanzania’s electoral democracy.

Key causes of electoral violence in Tanzania

Having traced the history and highlights of electoral democracy in Tanzania, the following pattern and causal factors emerge across all the waves of electoral violence that Tanzania has undergone. Perhaps by addressing these, an elusive search for electoral consensus and peaceful elections can be achieved.

  1. The dominance of the incumbency and use of state resources for political and electoral advantage.
  2. Perceived mistreatment or unfair treatment and unequitable share of resources, particularly between the mainland and Zanzibar, and in Zanzibar between Ugunja and Pemba
  3. Disputes over electoral processes and results- Electoral laws and role of public servants and political appointees such as district and regional commissioners, Independence of the National Electoral Commission and Zanzibar Electoral Commissions, the selection process of commissioners, returning officers and their independency, electoral disputes and grievance settlement mechanisms, including the lack of avenues to challenge presidential results in court, constrained political space and lack of opportunities for independent candidates.
  4. Gradual decline in the values of unity as cultivated and inspired by the founding father of the Nation, Mwl Julius Kambarage Nyerere under his philosophy of Ujama. These had addressed the issue and use of economic power, religion, tribe or ethnicity as levers for political power. Presently, whenever elections approach, people retreat to their ethnic origins, and the population is coming to slowly accept looking at things through their ethnic and religious perspectives[1].
  5. Excessive force by security agencies during electoral processes and against opposition parties- particularly the police and militias such as KMKM, Valantia etc in quelling protestors and opposition members, opposition leaders, restraining vocal media and those perceived to be a threat to the state.
  6. Overzealous and provocative posture and sloganeering taken by political parties such as ‘Haki’, ‘Ngangari’ by CUF, People Power and Movement for Change (CHADEMA). Baptizing political party youth wings and branches with names associated to militants and global conflict hots such as, Komando Yoso, Kosovo,  Checheniya etc.  These were interpreted by security agencies as ‘drums of war’ a threat to national security, stability and cohesion, militancy in electoral processes and mobilization of masses for political violence and not meaningful participation.  For example, in 2000, the police counter responded to CUF’s Ngangari slogan with their own ‘Ngunguri’ slogan which was an imitation of the police bullets and tear gas that were ready for use against violent opposition.

Electoral violence and lessons from Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique

A young girl runs for safety during the Kenya violent electoral protests: Photo credit: Daily Nation

Experiences from neighboring Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique show that even a country perceived as peaceful can explode into cyclic violence, bringing down the politics and fundamentals of the state. Uncontrolled electoral violence has a tendency of degenerating into a contagious cycle of violence that can gradually engulf a country with extensive catastrophic effect.  This was the case in Kenya in 2007 and 2013.  A violent election aftermath that ensued in 2007 left thousands of people dead, more than a million displaced Homes and property worth billions of was destroyed and Kenya’s history was never the same (Oketch A Matilda, 2018 and Human Rights Watch 2017).

Moreover, excessive and violent suppression of the opposition works contrary to the of the state and the ruling party.  The excessive and perceived injustice against the opposition makes it more popular with the public and can lead to the eventual collapse of a large political party. This was the case in Kenya in 1990s when a violent crackdown on the opposition galvanized their agitation and support for multiparty democracy and in 2000s when the national support for NARC coalition of political parties culminated with the collapse of the ruling party KANU under President Moi in 2002 (The Guardian, 29 December, 2002)  

Further, excessive use of force or weaponization of state agencies such as the police, military, judiciary or the electoral commission as instruments of political coercion enders the opposition to the public. The experiences in Uganda have demonstrated this fact over last 20 years.  

In a period of less than five years of its formation, a nonexistent politician, Robert Kyagulanyi aka Bobi Wine and his political party, the National Unity Platform was catapulted to prominence, emerging as the second largest opposition party in Uganda by 2025. Similar experiences in the early 2000’s brought Dr Kizza Besigye and the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) to political limelight, emerging as top political contender against the ruling National Resistance movement party.

Additionally, lessons from both Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique show that there are common factors that drive electoral violence, these include perceived dominancy of the ruling party, weak electoral systems, ethnicization, monetization and militarization of electoral democracy and the use of criminal gangs for political expediency in elections. This was clearly demonstrated in the 2024 general elections in Mozambique when citizens erupted with anger and violence against what was conceived as a fraudulent electoral processes, militarization and imposition of unpopular candidate and in favour of the ruling Frelimo party (Ohchr, November 2024) Kenya and Uganda had shown similar patterns. The use of gangs for hire was evident in Kenya (National Crimes Report 2019) and while the level of discontent recorded in Uganda (Human Rights Watch 2021).

Significantly, lessons show that electoral violence can taint the democratic credentials of any given state. Even previously peaceful countries such as Kenya before 1992 and 2007 can gradually degenerate into a cycle of electoral violence as ethnic divisions, political entrepreneurs, criminal gangs and repressive security organs of the state take center of the democratic processes. In the long run the citizens lose interest in democratic electoral processes and ultimately the essence of elections as a tool for delivering a democratic outcome become eroded.

Broadly, consequences related to electoral violence include; undermined civil and political rights, human suffering, diminished trust in democratic processes and institutions, reproduction of repressive and on nonproductive structures, including institutions or agents of repression, reduced legitimacy in the incumbency and elected leaders. Investor confidence can be lost and take long to regain. The economic implications and financial burden on the country can be immense (a.c.e project reports) .

Conclusively, although there are multiple factors that drive electoral violence, causes ranging from ethnicity, perceived political repression and lack of opportunity appear to be dominant factors. Moreover, the increasing militarization of electoral processes, curtailment of free electoral campaigns and rejection of electoral outcomes are becoming a major factor for the surge of the new opposition in East Africa.

References

ACE reports available via https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ev/Electoral%20violence/consequences-of-electoral-violence/mobile_browsing/onePag

Aljazeera (2015) Tanzania opposition loses key seats in vote marred by fraud claim, Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/29/tanzania-opposition-loses-key-seats-in-vote-marred-by-fraud-claim; Accessed on 22 April 2025

Aljazeera (2020) Opposition complains of repression as Tanzania heads to the polls; Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/21/tanzania-heads-to-the-polls-opposition-complain-of-repression Accessed 22 April 2025

Aljazeera (2020) Fear of violence grows as Tanzania opposition denounces  election available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/29/fears-of-violence-grows-as-tanzania-opposition-denounces; accessed on 17 April 2025

France 24 (2024) Opposition candidates killed in Tanzania local electionhttps://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241127-opposition-figures-killed-as-tanzania-holds-local-election; Accessed on 17April 2025

Human Rights Watch (2017) Kenya: Post-Election Killings, Abuse available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/27/kenya-post-election-killings-abuse; accessed on 22 April 2025

Human Rights Watch (2021) Uganda: Elections Marred by Violence available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence , accessed on 22 April 2025

National Crimes Research Centre (2019) available at https://crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Issue-Brief-on-State-of-Organized-Criminal-Gangs-in-Kenya.pdf

Okech Achieng Matilda. The Impact of Electoral Violence on Economic Development: A Case of Kenya. Journal of Political Science and International Relations. Vol. 1, No. 3, 2018, pp. 55-71. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20180103.11, available at https://www.sciencepublishinggroup.com/article/10.11648/j.jpsir.20180103.11 accessed on 17 April 2025

OWP: The Organisation for World Peace (2024) Brutal Violence Against the Opposing Party in Tanzania https://theowp.org/brutal-violence-against-the-opposing-party-in-tanzania/ accessed on 17 April 2025

The Guardian (29 December, 2002); Kenya sweeps corrupt ruler out of power available  via: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/29/kenya.jamesastill, accessed on 15 October, 2025

 

Electoral democracy and the elusive search for a new peaceful electoral consensus in Tanzania

 

Authors: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Electoral consensus has been elusive in many African countries. This short study brief attempts to trace, document and discuss the electoral democracy environment in Tanzania since 1995,  experiences from  the Muafaka in delivering  a semblance of peace in a polarised political environment. Perhaps by looking back in history, we can shape the future of electoral democracy in Tanzania and Africa generally.

Introduction

Tanzania has always been lauded as model of electoral democracy however over the past few years there seems to be some pointers towards a potential stagnation and regression largely caused particularly by contradictions over electoral processes. While Tanzania has gone to elections since 1995 and remained a good exemplar of peaceful power transition in a region where peaceful transitions are scarce, the general electoral processes that underlie these transitions have constantly faced contestations, with some tuning violent.  For instance, the last general elections in 2021 were marked by some electoral concerns and judged by both local and international observers as not free and fair. The electoral outcomes and the political environment thereafter became polarized, political and civic spaces was constrained, forcing some opposition politicians to seek political asylum outside Tanzania.

After the sudden death of President John Pombe Magufuli in 2022, the new President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s government in 2023 made some electoral reforms with partial amendments to three major laws governing elections (The National Election Commission Act 2023, Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Government Elections Bill (2023), The Political Parties Affairs Laws (Amendment) Bill (Amending the Political Parties Act RE 2019 and the Elections Expenses Act, 2010).

The government lifted a ban on political mobilization, granted amnesty to all opposition political leaders in exile, called for dialogue and committed to fostering a new culture of competitive democracy. However, this hiatus of political serenity appears to have been short lived. Local government elections held in November 2024 were marred with reports of political violence, kidnaps and death (Aljazeera, 2020). And in a dramatic turn of events, in April the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) banned the leading opposition political party CHADEMA from participating in General elections for five years. This trend, irrespective of its intentions and underlying legal justification, tainted Tanzania’s democratic credentials and potentially threatens the future of democracy in Tanzania.  For these acts and the noticeable trend, Tanzania has come under increasing scrutiny and pressure from both internal, regional and international human rights and democracy advocates with calls for reforms and peaceful resolution of the long-standing political grievances (IDU, May 2025). 

Ahead of the 2025 General Elections and thereafter, multiple questions are raised whether the current political context can guarantee Tanzania’s past glory as the haven of peace and beacon of democracy in East Africa and Africa generally? How can government secure peaceful elections and restore confidence in electoral democracy in 2025?  These questions are legitimate given that Tanzania has for decades remained peaceful and played a major role as a stabilizing variable in the East and Great Lakes region which is embroiled with conflicts and regalia of collapsed states.

To attempt and dissect these questions, we look at Tanzania’s electoral democracy history and the turbulent electoral cycles it has gone through and how it has navigated around these political currents of a multiparty dispensation towards the state that it is today. The lessons from these episodes are quite relevant in helping Tanzania forge its current and future electoral trajectory.

Overview of Electoral Democracy in Tanzania (1980-2021)

The concept of electoral democracy is not alien to Tanzania. Until 1995 internal party electoral democracy was a present concept in Tanzania’s political dispensation. Contrary to what some naysayers may widely hold, Mwl Julius Nyerere, within the ambits of his socialist values believed and practiced a level of internal party democracy. Even under the socialist single party era in the 1960s to the 1980s, TANU and later Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), political party delegates contested internally as candidates and were voted for electoral positions. Party members vied for electoral positions such as members of the local party branch leadership, the National Executive Committee (NEC), the Central Executive Committee (CEC) and for parliamentary seats. The records of intra-party elections held between 1980-85 are available and show some rigorous internal political dynamics ahead of intra party elections.

The October 1995 Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Tanzania were the climax of this single intra party democracy that had been practiced since the 1960s. The general elections marked an important milestone in the country’s transition to multi- party electoral democracy. They were the first multiparty general elections after the lifting of the ban on political parties that had seen Chama Cha Mapinduzi rule as single party for more than 20 years.  The elections brought to an end the intense debates about the role of multi-partyism in democracy and governance. Prior to the elections, there were contestations as to whether Tanzania must adopt democracy or remain a single party state. Fundamentally, there were intra-party debates during the preparation for the elections on who was best suited to lead Tanzania in a new evolving political context.   Significantly, these elections marked a termination to the Mwl Julius Nyerere single party era (TEMCO, 1997) and repositioning of Tanzania as a new fountain of democracy in the East African region.

The political rallies and debates in 1995 were contentious and exciting to attend for the citizens and a country that had been ruled under a single party. As the political space opened, new centers of opposition political power and leadership emerged. The opinions coming from these were diverse and the candidates quite combative in asserting the new direction that Tanzania would take as a multiparty democracy.  Some of these described themselves as reformers (Wanamageuzi) and political parties such as NCCR-Mageuzi were born.  Tanzania had changed and moving into a new political future. An era of electoral democracy had been ushered in. However, this excitement did not take long before the tenets of electoral democracy in a multiparty dispensation were strained and tested.

The 1995 election outcomes on Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar

The 1995 election results gave a resounding victory for CCM on the mainland Tanzania. After the election results were announced, CCM’s candidate Benjamin Mkapa won the presidential election with 61.82% (4,026,422 votes) and 186 of the 232 electoral constituencies.  Augustino Mrema of NCCR-M came second with 27.77% (1,808,616 votes), Professor Ibrahim Lipumba of the Civic United Front secured 6.43% (418,973 votes) while John Momose Cheyo of United Democratic Party (UDP) came fourth with 3% (258,734). Overall CCM won 182 constituencies on the mainland, and 50 in Zanzibar.

After the election, 37 additional seats for women MPs were awarded to the parties based on the proportion of seats in the National Assembly, while five members were elected by the House of Representatives of Zanzibar and ten members nominated by the President. The Attorney General was also an ex-officio member, resulting in a total of 285 MPs in the legislature. Electoral democracy had delivered its verdict. The electoral land scape had changed but CCM was still a dominant party in power.

The test of electoral democracy and contestations of the 1995’s elections aftermath

Despite being highly competitive, the elections were a judged by both national and international observers as largely peaceful, free and fair on the mainland Tanzania. However, the elections in Zanzibar were widely disputed.  Neither the local nor the international observers endorsed the elections (ibid). The CUF Presidential Candidate in Zanzibar, Seif Sharif Hamad disputed the election results announced by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission, declared self-victory, refused to recognize the CCM led government in Zanzibar and ordered elected all CUF legislators to boycott parliamentary sessions. Protests broke out in Zanzibar and there was a clamp down on the new emerging media such as DTV that had announced the results before ZEC’s declaration. The International Foundation on Electoral Systems (IFES) reported that inadequate administration, inappropriate secrecy, and general inefficiency marred the process and cast doubt and mistrust over much of the outcome. Neither the National Electoral Commission of Tanzania nor the Zanzibar Electoral Commission was able to win the trust of the electorate (IEFS, 1995). Tanzania’s new exercise in democracy had started on a wobbly foot and was under an early test.

The implications on the future electoral democracy

The general elections showed the nation was divided between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, with CCM as a dominant party on the mainland and the Civic United Front (CUF) as a dominant opposition party to reckon with in Zanzibar. In Zanzibar the country was split right in the middle, along geographical lines. One of the parties (CUF) was dominant in the island of Pemba, while the ruling party (CCM) held sway in the island of Zanzibar. What this meant in the Zanzibar context was that neither of the parties was a ‘national’ party.

The elections exposed fundamental constitutional and political questions that would later become a nemesis of Tanzania’s young democracy for decades to come. For example, the position of Zanzibar as a political entity in Tanzania’s politics was redefined with emergence of a new political force based on the island. Questions lingered as to what would be the appropriate system of political participation, choice and governance moving forward. Would Tanzania’s political union between Zanzibar and Tanzania mainland hold? How would the emerging political dynamics between the Islands of Unguja and Pemba be handled?

Fundamentally, the electoral systems and electoral management were equally tested and gaps exposed.  While the elections for the presidency were plebiscitary (voters could only vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a single candidate), elections for parliament were classified- This showed that there was still ground for future electoral reforms to improve electoral transparency and democratic consolidation.

Moreover, the elections showed that CCM was still fused with the state. Despite protests and condemnation from the international community, CCM ruled in Zanzibar, was supported by all institutions of the state.  An examination by political analysts of the question as to whether the competition that emerged during the switch to multiparty and during the first general election represented an expansion of political choice for citizens and a broader representation of societal forces concluded that the legal and institutional framework after 1995 strongly favored the ruling party. The difference between the state and CCM was still blurred (Hassan Kaya, 2004).

Even after the introduction of the multi-party system the electoral process and election system was still dominated by the ruling party. The conduct of elections remained a major source of discontent for the opposition. The underlying political currents and unanswered questions led to contentious elections and a spiral of electoral violence which re-occurred during next electoral cycles and have remained a common feature up to date. While electoral democracy had been well introduced, the state was yet to learn how to avoid or manage the electoral violence that emanated from the contradictions and contestations of an electoral process. Tanzania would soon witness violent elections in 2000.

Chronology of Electoral Violence in Tanzania 2000-2024

The expectations of Zanzibaris prior to the 1995 elections, like their compatriots on the mainland, were that they would enjoy greater democracy and have more human rights synonymous to an autonomous state. But, in their view, this was not how it turned out in Zanzibar. Instead, even the small gains that had been won before the elections were lost (Ibid).

After the disputed 1995 elections, the international community brokered some form of consensus (Muafaka 1) between the CCM and CUF. Some of the concessions included granting of some political privileges extended to CUF and its leader, Seif Sharif Hamad. The political grievances however did not go away.  The opposition CUF felt that its victory had been usurped, and that its candidate who won the Presidency, in their view had been denied a legitimate chance to rule. The Zanzibar ‘issues’ which among others included concerns over the autonomy of Zanzibar and its fair share of the Union national cake had not been addressed.

The political will to support the Muafaka from both political parties was lacking and Zanzibar was destined for a violent election in 2000 and registering a wave of Tanzania’s first export of refugees to Kenya. Violence was gradually becoming a feature in Tanzania’s elections.

The Civic United Front and violence in Zanzibar elections -2000- 2003

The simmering political tensions and anger of the 1995 elections had persisted and ultimately exploded in violence after the 2000 election results were announced by the Zanzibar electoral commission. During these elections, the ZEC announced that the CCM Presidential candidate, Amani Abeid Karume had garnered 248,095 votes (67.04%) against CUF’s Presidential Candidate, Seif Sharif Hamad’s 122,000 (32.96%). Election results in some constituencies were cancelled for reported irregularities.

While all observers commended the way the elections were conducted on the Mainland, the Zanzibar elections were characterized by the Commonwealth Observer Team as a shambles. In fact, all observers were more critical this time of the way the elections were run, and they all demanded fresh elections (Ibid).

This time the opposition CUF did not recognize both the Union and Zanzibar Presidents, and they demanded their members of the Union Parliament and those of the House of Representatives to boycott both legislative bodies. The two bodies using the House Rules, decided to throw out all CUF representatives from both Houses. The result of this was that Zanzibar had a one-party House of Representatives. The exercise of electoral multiparty democracy was being tested once again.

What followed was an insurrection of mass protests and confrontation with the police and other security organs. It was estimated that 40 Zanzibaris were shot dead and a further 600 injured when the Tanzanian army and police opened fire on a crowd of CUF supporters who were protesting against the results of the ballot. The violence was more pronounced in the Island of Pemba.  In the days following the 2000 elections, Tanzanian security forces and militias conducted a house-to house operation arresting and beating defiant residents. During that period, property was destroyed and an estimated 2,000 Zanzibaris fled to Kenya (Relief Web, 2005)

The 2000 General elections were the most violent elections in Zanzibar.  The violent protests and police killings in Zanzibar in January 2001 dented Tanzania’s political electoral history and democratic aspirations as a young multiparty state. What was very clear (from this aftermath) was that the country during this period lost political leadership of the security forces and that the security forces lacked technical means (at the time), to do their professional work in an evolving and highly charged multiparty setting. There was both local and international pressure for the Tanzania’s government to form an independent commission of inquiry to investigate what happened. CCM as the victorious and ruling party was compelled to negotiate another consensus political Accord (Muafaka 11) which provided substantive concessions. These included undertaking electoral and political reforms and to a power sharing formular for government positions.

 Zanzibar Elections and Political Consensus (Muafaka 11) reforms 2003 and 2010

The political and electoral reforms consensus under Muafaka II included the promulgation of the 8th and the 9th constitutional amendments; reconstitution of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) to include two members of the official opposition; establishment of the office of Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP); development of a cordial relationship between the leaderships of Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF), and enhanced access to the grassroots by the opposition (Kituo cha Katiba, 2003). It concluded with  a by election held in the disputed constituencies in 2003. Zanzibar was attempting to master electoral democracy and address the root causes of electoral violence.

The main objective of the Muafaka Accord was to create a level playing field and a conducive atmosphere for 2005 elections (Ibid).  The Zanzibar Electoral Commission would be managed with representatives from both political parties. Moreover, the opposition parties would be granted unfettered access to their grass root structures.

Significance of Political consensus (Muafaka)

While Muafaka I had died for a lack of political goodwill, the 2nd Muafaka registered considerable success. The Muafaka II did not fully eliminate electoral violence in Zanzibar, as this was to happen again in 2005, albeit at a lower level compared 2000.  But and significantly, the Muafaka II laid ground for wider constitutional and electoral reforms which led to a powers sharing approach adopted in 2010. Since the adoption of Muafaka II, Zanzibar elections have remained contentious but with minimal violence. For instance, the October 2015 elections were annulled by the Chairperson of ZEC for not being free and fair (BBC, 2015) .  However, the power sharing approach adopted in 2010 held Zanzibar together with the opposition CUF taking up the seat of the First Vice President in the government led by CCM.

To date Muafaka II still with stands, pointing to a positive democratic development on the Islands and Tanzania generally. Zanzibar’s power-sharing strategy appears to have ended the zero-sum nature of Zanzibari politics, as it ushered in a more consensus-based approach reminiscent of Julius Nyerere’s concept of ujamaa (unity). Government (Aley Soud Nassor & Jim Jose, 2014) For Nyerere, Ujamaa was a specifically African alternative to the institutionalized oppositional politics of western liberal democracy. Nyerere emphasized a system of people governance driven by a common national ideology and cause traversing tribe, economic and social status.

Moreover, the success so far achieved through Muafaka II and the power sharing structure demonstrates the usefulness and feasibility of consensus where even adversarial political parties such as CUF and CCM can work together. The Zanzibar’s experiment in power-sharing demonstrates that a multi-party-political system need not be structured according to a two-party oppositional model in order to achieve stable and functional democratic government (Ibid).  Political consensus on contentious issues and openness to continuous reforms can be a guarantor against electoral violence and elusive peace.  This experiment has given Zanzibar a semblance of relative peace, despite the historical political differences.

Moreover, the Muafaka dismantled the awkward label on CUF as a violent political party, increased its presence and role in running Zanzibar government, although its political influence and dominance in Zanzibar has dwindled significantly due its own internal party dynamics.

By 2021 AcT Wazalendo had emerged as the new strongest opposition political contender in Zanzibar after CUF’s founding leade, Seif Sharif Hamad, defected from CUF, carrying along with him multitudes of former CUF supporters.

Zanzibar Presidential Election Results 1995-2020

Year

 Candidate

Political Party

Votes

%of the vote

1995

Salim Amour

CCM

165, 271

50.27%

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

163,706

49.76%

2000

Amani Abeid Karume

CCM

248,095

67.04%

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

122,000

32.96%

2005

Amani Abeid Karume

CCM

239,832

53.18%

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

207,733

46.06%

2010

Mohamed Shein

CCM

179,809

50.11%

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

176,338

49.14%

2015

Mohamed Shein

CCM

–

–

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

–

–

2020

Dr Hussein Mwinyi

CCM

380,402

77.9%

Seif Sharif Hamad

AcT- Wazalendo

99,103

20.31%

Source: Computed Elections results data by GEPC researchers from different publicly available data

Despite starting on a wobbly footing with electoral violence in Zanzibar,  the Muafaka experience had delivered a perfect template of managing political differences in a polarized political and electoral context. However, this hiatus  faded away, with a resurgence of electoral violence, targeting a section of political parties and a brutal ‘panda gari’ culture that threatens peace. In  the next part of this study we will evaluate the resurgence and chronology of political and electoral violence, with lessons from neighboring countries and how the 2025 general elections must and can reclaim Tanzania’s electoral glory.

Addressing Electoral Democracy and the Challenge of Violence and Impunity in East Africa
Featured photo credit: Daily Monitor, Arrest of Uganda’s Opposition  election protestors 

Authors:  Don Bosco Malish and Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Introduction

East Africa stands at a critical crossroads, where the promise of electoral democracy is being eroded by a surge in violence, shrinking civic space, and the manipulation of political and legal institutions. This policy brief exposes the complex interplay of corruption, commercialization of politics, and state-sponsored repression that has transformed elections from peaceful contests into battlegrounds of fear and exclusion. Through in-depth analysis of Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, the article reveals how entrenched power structures, weak institutions, and socioeconomic inequalities fuel cycles of violence and disillusionment, threatening the very foundations of democratic governance. Yet, amid these challenges, new dynamics-such as the activism of digitally connected youth-offer glimmers of hope for democratic renewal. By unpacking the root causes and far-reaching impacts of electoral violence, this brief provides actionable, evidence-based recommendations to restore public trust, strengthen institutions, and foster inclusive, resilient democracies in East Africa. The article delves further to discover not only the urgent risks facing the region’s electoral future, but also the pathways to reclaiming the ballot as a tool for peace, justice, and genuine political transformation.

Electoral Violence in East Africa: Issues and Stakeholder Impact

  1. Overview of electoral violence

East Africa is experiencing a worrying rise in electoral violence, which is undermining democracy and creating fear among citizens. Elections, which should be peaceful opportunities for people to choose their leaders, are increasingly marred by violence, intimidation, and manipulation. Electoral violence in East Africa is not a random or isolated phenomenon; rather, it stems from a complex web of interconnected issues that collectively undermine democratic processes in the region. Understanding these root causes is essential for anyone committed to promoting peaceful, credible, and inclusive elections.

One of the most significant drivers of electoral violence is the widespread corruption and commercialization of politics. Elections have increasingly become contests dominated by financial power rather than the strength of ideas or policy proposals. Candidates often resort to vote-buying and other corrupt practices to secure victory, transforming elections into costly transactions instead of genuine democratic competitions. This commercialization distorts fair competition, discourages honest candidates, and deepens public cynicism. When voters perceive that money, not merit, determines electoral outcomes, their trust in both the electoral process and democracy itself erodes, creating fertile ground for conflict.

Another critical factor is the weaponization of legal and security institutions by ruling elites. Courts, police, and the military are frequently manipulated to suppress opposition voices, intimidate civil society, and curtail media freedom. This deliberate use of state institutions to enforce the interests of those in power shrinks the space for dissent and civic engagement, fostering an atmosphere of fear and instability. Opposition parties, activists, and journalists often become targets, making it dangerous to participate in or report on political processes. Such repression undermines the foundations of democracy and escalates tensions during election periods.

The weakness of key democratic institutions further exacerbates electoral violence. The credibility of elections depends heavily on the independence and strength of electoral management bodies (EMBs) and the judiciary. In many East African countries, these institutions are either fragile or subject to manipulation by those in power. When electoral bodies are perceived as biased, or when courts fail to adjudicate electoral disputes fairly, public confidence in the electoral process collapses. This distrust often leads to violence, as losing parties and their supporters may feel that peaceful legal avenues for redress are unavailable or ineffective.

Systematic marginalization of vulnerable groups also plays a significant role in fueling electoral violence. Women, rural populations, and ethnic minorities are frequently excluded from meaningful political participation and are more vulnerable to violence. Women face entrenched cultural barriers, political intimidation, and exclusion from decision-making spaces despite legal frameworks promoting gender equality. Rural communities often lack access to information and political networks, making them susceptible to manipulation and patronage. Ethnic minorities are disproportionately affected by election-related violence, especially when politicians exploit ethnic divisions to consolidate power. This exclusion not only violates the principle of inclusive democracy but also perpetuates cycles of violence and political instability.

Finally, a pervasive culture of impunity sustains ongoing electoral violence. Perpetrators-including state actors, political party supporters, and security personnel-are rarely held accountable for their actions. This lack of consequences emboldens those who use violence as a political tool, as they face little fear of prosecution or punishment. Over time, violence becomes normalized as an acceptable means of political competition, making it increasingly difficult to break the cycle and restore faith in peaceful democratic processes.

These issues are deeply interconnected and mutually reinforcing. For example, corruption weakens institutions, which in turn facilitates the weaponization of law and security. Marginalization both results from and contributes to weak institutions and impunity. To effectively address electoral violence, it is crucial to understand not only each factor individually but also how they interact to create a challenging environment for democracy in East Africa.

For policymakers, civil society, and international partners, recognizing these root causes is the first step toward designing effective interventions. Supporting institutional reforms, protecting vulnerable groups, promoting transparency, and ensuring accountability for perpetrators are all essential. Only by tackling these underlying problems can East Africa hope to build more peaceful, credible, and resilient electoral systems that truly reflect the will of the people.

II. Trends in Electoral Violence in Select East Africa Countries

Case Study: Uganda

Electoral violence in Uganda is marked by systematic, state-sponsored repression designed to maintain the ruling National Resistance Movement’s (NRM) hold on power. Under President Yoweri Museveni, security forces-including the police, military, and specialized units such as the Joint Anti-Terrorism Taskforce (JATT)-are routinely deployed to intimidate, harass, and violently suppress opposition candidates and their supporters. This repression includes brutal crackdowns on opposition rallies, arbitrary arrests, beatings, and even killings, as witnessed in recent elections and by-elections like Kawempe North, where opposition teams faced targeted disruption and physical assaults.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) in Uganda operate in a highly constrained environment. Human rights defenders and election monitors face harassment, threats, and legal restrictions, especially during electoral periods. The shrinking civic space limits their ability to hold authorities accountable or mobilize citizens for peaceful participation. International and local election observers often encounter restricted access and intimidation, undermining their capacity to provide independent assessments of electoral integrity.

Women, youth, rural populations, and ethnic minorities continue to face exclusion and heightened vulnerability to electoral violence. Women candidates and activists are often targets of gender-based intimidation and violence. Youth, particularly politically active young people, face arrests and harassment, while rural voters are frequently manipulated through patronage or coerced by security forces. Ethnic minorities remain marginalized politically and are sometimes caught in violent clashes fuelled by political rivalries.

Independent media and journalists are aggressively targeted. Reporters covering opposition activities or electoral irregularities face physical attacks, arbitrary arrests, forced deletion of footage documenting state violence, and media shutdowns. This has led to widespread self-censorship, severely undermining press freedom and the public’s right to information. The suppression of media transparency fosters an atmosphere of fear that discourages political participation.

Opposition groups face continuous repression, including arrests of leaders and supporters, disruption of rallies, and legal harassment. The extraordinary rendition and terrorism charges against members of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) exemplify the state’s use of security apparatus to criminalize dissent. Opposition candidates face unfair disqualifications and intimidation, limiting genuine political competition.

Electoral institutions in Uganda are often perceived as lacking independence and being influenced by the ruling party. This perception undermines public confidence in the fairness of elections and contributes to disputes that can escalate into violence.

Uganda’s youth, a large and politically aware demographic, face significant challenges including unemployment, repression, and limited political space. Despite this, they remain a critical force for political change, often mobilizing through digital platforms. The general public’s participation is dampened by fear of violence and scepticism about electoral fairness, leading to political alienation.

Case Study: Tanzania

In Tanzania, electoral violence is closely linked to state-sponsored repression and sloganeering that overwhelmingly benefits the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party. The government blurs the line between state and party, with regional and local officials-including police-aligned with CCM and actively disrupting opposition activities. Opposition parties and pro-reform civil society groups face bans on rallies, restrictions on political association, and denial of media access, severely limiting their ability to operate.

Pro-reform civil society groups are subjected to harassment and legal restrictions, particularly during election periods. Election observers, both domestic and international, face obstacles including limited access and intimidation, which reduce their effectiveness in promoting electoral transparency. Civic education is closely guarded and restricted to follow predetermined procedures and syllabus approved by the electoral management body.

Women in Tanzania experience barriers and exclusion from political processes and are vulnerable to intimidation, and violence.  Women face economic, social and gender-based hurdles to fully engage in political processes and electoral contest.  Poor rural women are susceptible to voter bribery, by way of T-shirts, kangas and basic household items such as salt, soap and sugar, manipulating their independence to make informed political choices. Illiteracy amongst women compared to men exacerbates this factor yet rural populations often have limited access to unbiased information and are susceptible to manipulation.

Tanzania’s youth face high unemployment, low civic competence and limited political space, which fuels frustration and disengagement. The general public’s political participation is constrained by fear of repression and scepticism about electoral fairness.

In Zanzibar, opposition supporters face frequent crackdowns, exacerbating political tensions in the semi-autonomous region. In 2015 the Chair of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission unilaterally annulled general election results drawing wide spread condemnation from the opposition and international community. Since 2000 Zanzibar has witnessed more than one violent election, whose results were heavily disputed.

Independent vocal civil society and media outlets suffer from state harassment, including suspensions, censorship, and intimidation, especially when reporting critically on CCM or electoral irregularities. This suppression fosters a climate of fear and self-censorship, restricting transparency and public scrutiny.

Opposition parties face systemic obstacles such as disqualification of candidates under dubious pretexts, arrests, and intimidation. Ahead of the 2024 local elections, hundreds of opposition supporters were detained, and opposition candidates were disqualified, resulting in implausibly high victories for CCM. A head of the 2025 general election, the opposition leader, Tundu Lissu was detained and charged with treason. His political party, Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) was banned from engaging in political mobilization, remains operationally tattered and struggling to survive.

The opposition parties too contribute towards a violent election season by militant sloganeering, defying police orders for peaceful assembly and engaging in sensationalism.

Electoral commissions are widely perceived as biased in favour of CCM, undermining trust in electoral outcomes and fueling tensions. Calls to reform the electoral management body, including legal challenges in Tanzania’s court systems, against its operational structure and the use of presidential appointees as returning officers were unsuccessful.

According to Tanzania’s electoral experts such as Dr Deus Kibamba of Jukwa la Katiba, an independent network of CSOs engaged in electoral process, Tanzania’s constitutional dispensation on election is weak, and suffers from a catastrophic capture from a strong state and political elites. For elections to be sound and credible the constitutional reforms are required.

Case Study: Kenya

Kenya’s electoral violence has historically been shaped by a combination of state-sponsored repression, ethnic tensions, and suppression of opposition and media. The 2007-2008 post-election violence remains a stark reminder of the devastating consequences of disputed elections, where state security forces and pro-government militias targeted opposition supporters along ethnic lines. Militarized police tactics to intimidate protesters and opposition figures persist, contributing to a climate of fear and mistrust.

Civil society organizations and election observers play a vital role in monitoring elections and promoting transparency. However, they often face harassment and threats, particularly when exposing irregularities or human rights abuses. Despite these challenges, their work has contributed to gradual institutional improvements.

Women, youth, ethnic minorities, and rural populations face varying degrees of exclusion and vulnerability. Gender-based violence and discrimination limit women’s political participation. Ethnic mobilization remains a significant factor in electoral violence, with marginalized communities often caught in inter-ethnic conflicts. Rural voters sometimes face manipulation and intimidation.

Journalists covering elections and political dissent frequently encounter harassment, censorship, and violence, undermining media freedom and restricting transparent reporting. Despite these risks, the media remains a critical actor in informing the public and exposing abuses.

Opposition leaders and activists face arbitrary arrests, intimidation, and legal challenges. The judiciary, while making strides toward independence, still faces pressure and intimidation aimed at deterring constitutional challenges to election results.

Kenya’s electoral institutions have shown signs of maturation, with efforts to improve transparency and credibility. However, the winner-takes-all electoral system and ethnic-based political mobilization continue to fuel tensions and risks of violence. The general public remains divided, with some hopeful about reforms and others wary due to past violence.

The emergence of Generation Z (roughly ages 18 to 28) and their agitation for reforms in governance and respect to youth’s concerns has introduced new dynamics. Digitally connected and politically aware, this youth cohort actively organizes protests and demands accountability through social media. Their activism challenges traditional patronage networks but has also provoked harsher state responses. Protesting youth were violently dispersed by the police, some were killed, kidnapped and other have disappeared to date without trace. A significant percentage of youth remain unemployed, poor and vulnerable to manipulation by the political elites into perpetrating violence against opponents.

In summary, across Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, electoral violence is driven by state repression, weak institutions, and exclusion of marginalized groups. Civil society and election observers face shrinking space and intimidation, while media and opposition parties are targeted to stifle dissent. Youth activism offers potential for democratic renewal but also faces risks. The general public’s political participation is often constrained by fear and distrust, underscoring the urgent need for reforms that promote inclusion, transparency, and accountability.

Comparative Analysis of Electoral Violence in Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya

Similarities

Differences

Crosscutting Issues

– State-sponsored repression: Security forces intimidate opposition, disrupt rallies, and suppress dissent.

Uganda: Heavy militarization of elections; opposition leaders face terrorism charges and rendition.

Institutional Weakness: Electoral bodies perceived as biased; judiciary often co-opted or intimidated.

– Media suppression: Independent journalists face harassment, censorship, and violence.

Tanzania: Blurring of party (CCM) and state institutions; severe restrictions in Zanzibar.

Marginalized Groups: Women, youth, ethnic minorities, and rural populations face systemic exclusion and violence.

– Media suppression: Independent journalists face harassment, censorship, and violence.

Tanzania: Blurring of party (CCM) and state institutions; severe restrictions in Zanzibar.

Marginalized Groups: Women, youth, ethnic minorities, and rural populations face systemic exclusion and violence.

– Civil society under siege: Election observers and CSOs encounter legal restrictions, threats, and limited access.

Kenya: Emerging judicial independence; Gen Z digital activism challenges patronage systems.

Media Freedom: Widespread self-censorship due to state intimidation.

– Ethnic and socioeconomic divisions: Politicized ethnicity and economic inequality fuel violence.

Tanzania/Kenya: Rural voters manipulated via patronage; Uganda relies more on overt militarized coercion.

Regional Dynamics: AU/EAC’s limited capacity to enforce electoral standards.

– Youth disenfranchisement: High unemployment and repression limit political participation.

Kenya: History of ethnic-based electoral violence (e.g., 2007–08); Uganda/Tanzania focus on state-led repression.

Emerging Opportunities: Youth digital mobilization (Kenya) offers pathways for accountability.

 

  1. Summary Table: Stakeholder Impacts

Stakeholder

Role

How They Are Affected by Electoral Violence

Civil Society

Watchdog, advocate, educator

Harassed, restricted, silenced, limited impact

Election Observers

Transparency, reporting

Restricted access, hostility, limited enforcement power

Marginalized Groups

Voters, candidates

Targeted, excluded, manipulated, vulnerable to violence

Media/Journalists

Information, transparency

Harassed, censored, attacked, self-censorship

Opposition Parties

Alternative leadership

Intimidated, attacked, unfair competition

EMBs

Election management

Manipulated, distrusted, weak oversight

General Public

Voters

Fear, low turnout, disillusionment

Youth

Activists, mobilizers

Targeted for activism, hope for change, risk of repression

Policy Recommendations: Pathways to Peaceful and Inclusive Elections in East Africa

Electoral violence remains a major obstacle to democratic governance and political stability across East Africa. To overcome this challenge, we need a thoughtful, multi-layered approach that addresses both the deep-rooted causes and the immediate sparks of violence. The following recommendations invite all stakeholders to explore practical, innovative strategies that can transform elections into truly peaceful, credible, and inclusive processes.

  1. Governments and State Actors: Building Trust and Accountability

Governments hold a unique responsibility to create an environment where elections are safe and fair. Imagine a system where justice is swift and impartial-where those who use violence to win lose their power instead. To move toward this vision:

  • Enforce accountability without delay. Independent courts should be empowered to investigate and prosecute anyone involved in electoral violence, from political figures to security personnel and financiers. Transparent trials can break the cycle of impunity and send a clear message that violence will not be tolerated.
  • Clarify and humanize security roles during elections. Police and military forces need clear guidelines emphasizing respect for human rights and crowd management. Training security personnel to act professionally and peacefully can reduce tensions and build public confidence.
  • Invest in election management bodies (EMBs). Governments should prioritize funding EMBs so they can organize elections efficiently, transparently, and on time. Strong EMBs are the backbone of credible elections.

Looking ahead, governments can embrace technology to enhance electoral integrity. Biometric voter registration and electronic transmission of results, paired with independent audits, can reduce fraud and increase transparency. However, these technologies should be introduced thoughtfully, considering local capacities and resources.

Legal reforms are also essential. Laws must protect freedom of expression, assembly, and media independence. Harmonizing electoral laws with constitutional guarantees will ensure elections are inclusive and disputes are resolved fairly.

Finally, governments should actively promote inclusive governance by adopting gender quotas and affirmative action to empower women, rural communities, and ethnic minorities. Digital government services, equipped with strong privacy protections, can further enhance participation while bridging digital divides.

  1. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs): Catalysts for Dialogue and Inclusion

CSOs play a vital role in nurturing democracy from the grassroots up. Their work sparks curiosity and empowers citizens to claim their rights peacefully.

  • Facilitate inclusive dialogue. By regularly bringing together election officials, political parties, security agencies, community leaders, and marginalized groups, CSOs can help resolve conflicts before they escalate and build trust among stakeholders.
  • Expand civic education. Targeted campaigns, especially in rural and marginalized communities, can raise awareness about voting rights and the importance of peaceful participation, reducing vulnerability to manipulation.
  • Protect civic space. Collaborating regionally and internationally, CSOs can advocate for the repeal of restrictive laws and defend activists from harassment.

Over time, CSOs can strengthen their capacity for election monitoring and advocacy by partnering with international bodies and adopting new technologies. Programs that empower women, youth, ethnic minorities, and rural populations in governance and peacebuilding will foster more inclusive democracies.

Community-based peacebuilding initiatives, including rapid response teams, can intervene early in electoral conflicts, engaging diverse actors to prevent violence. Publicly naming those responsible for electoral violence, in partnership with media outlets, can increase accountability and deter future offenses.

  1. Election Observers: Guardians of Transparency and Reform

Election observers-both local and international-serve as impartial witnesses whose presence can deter malpractice and violence.

  • Secure full access and maintain impartiality. Observers should be granted unhindered entry to all stages of the electoral process, ensuring their reports are unbiased and credible.
  • Harness technology for real-time monitoring. Digital tools like mobile apps and biometric verification can help detect irregularities quickly, allowing timely interventions.

Beyond election day, observers can facilitate post-election dialogues to address grievances and advocate for reforms that strengthen future electoral integrity. Close collaboration with civil society and independent media can amplify findings and support civic education, nurturing democratic resilience.

  1. Regional Bodies: Architects of Peace and Standards

Regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) , East African Community (EAC) and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) have a pivotal role in preventing electoral violence and promoting democracy.

  • Enhance early warning and monitoring systems. Joint observer missions and early warning mechanisms can identify emerging threats, enabling rapid, coordinated responses.
  • Support national institutions. Providing technical assistance and training to EMBs, judiciaries, and security forces builds local capacity to manage elections peacefully.

Long-term, regional bodies can establish binding electoral standards and enforce protocols for free, fair, and transparent elections, including sanctions for violations. By creating inclusive platforms for dialogue among governments, opposition, civil society, and marginalized groups, they can foster consensus and prevent conflicts.

Championing digital governance innovations with strong human rights safeguards will help member states modernize election processes while protecting citizens’ privacy and inclusion.

  1. Donors and International Partners: Enablers of Democratic Resilience

International support can empower local actors and strengthen democratic institutions.

  • Prioritize funding for civic space and inclusion. Donors should invest in CSOs working on election monitoring, civic education, and empowerment of marginalized groups, ensuring resources reach those fostering peaceful participation.
  • Support responsible technology deployment. Funding electoral technologies and capacity-building initiatives, with safeguards against misuse or exclusion, can enhance transparency and trust.

Looking ahead, donors can facilitate cross-sector collaborations that unite governments, civil society, youth, and other stakeholders to address democracy and development holistically. Using diplomatic channels and aid conditionality, they can encourage respect for democratic principles and push for meaningful electoral reforms.

Invitation to Action and Learning

These recommendations are more than policies-they are invitations to explore, innovate, and collaborate. Each stakeholder has a role in shaping elections that reflect the true will of the people, free from fear and violence. By embracing transparency, inclusion, and accountability, East Africa can transform electoral contests into celebrations of democracy.

The journey is challenging but full of promise. What new ideas can you bring to strengthen peace during elections? How can your community or organization contribute to building trust and preventing violence? Together, by learning from experience and acting decisively, we can reclaim the ballot box as a powerful tool for justice, peace, and genuine political transformation.

This approach encourages stakeholders to reflect on their roles, inspires curiosity about innovative solutions, and motivates collective action toward democratic renewal.

 

INVITATION TO A WEBINAR ON ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY-ADDRESSING MONEYOCRACY VIOLENCE AND IMPUNITY IN EAST AND AFRICA GREAT LAKES REGION

You are invited to our next webinar on Elections and Democracy: Addressing the challenge of Moneyocracy, Violence and Impunity in East and Africa Great Lakes Region

As you may be aware the East and Africa Great Lakes region is going through another electoral cycle yet the region stands at a critical crossroads, where the promise of electoral democracy is being challenged and potentially eroded by a surge in moneyocracy, violence, shrinking civic space, and the manipulation of political and legal institutions. This webinar will expose the complex interplay of corruption, commercialization of politics, and state-sponsored repression that has transformed elections from peaceful contests into battlegrounds of titanic fear and exclusion.

Our distinguished Speakers will be:

  1. Mr Don Malish, Researcher, Human Rights Expert and Colosseum Member, Governance and Economic Policy Center

Mr Don Bosco Malish is a seasoned professional with over 20 years of experience in human rights, democracy promotion, and social justice. Before venturing into private practice, Don worked as a Senior Executive for the Open Society Foundations, where he  managed a substantial grant portfolio and supported initiatives focusing on governance, rule of law, and human rights across Eastern Africa, with a significant focus on South Sudan. He has a deep understanding of the local human rights, governance and elections contextual  challenges facing East Africa. Don is currently a distinguished independent researcher, consultant and Colosseum (Advisory Council) member of the Governance and Economic Policy Centre

  1. Mr Mulle Musau, Regional Coordinator Elections Observer Group (ELOG), Kenya

Mr Musau is an elections expert with over 20 years experience in electoral democracy, with special interest in Elections and Ethics in governance. He has been involved in Elections observation both domestic and international from 2007. Currently the national coordinator for the Elections Observation Group (ELOG) in Kenya and the regional coordinator for the East and Horn of Africa Election Observers Network (E-HORN).

  1. Deus Kibamba, Executive Director Tanzania Information Bureau & Jukwa la Katiba, Elections Expert, and Lecture in International Relations

Mr Kibamba is an experienced political and governance expert, researcher and analyst with over 20 years’ experience in international development. He trained in Political Science and Public Administration, with an international relations major. He has been actively involved in electoral processes in Tanzania and served as an international observer in a number of missions across Africa. His research interests have focused on the Constitutional aspects of the electoral democracy. He is the founding Director of Tanzania Information Bureau (TIB) and a Board member of Jukwaa la Katiba Tanzania, an independent organisation focusing on promoting constitutionalism and elections in Tanzania. Deus is currently a distinguished  lecturer in International Relations and Diplomacy at the Tanzania – Dr Salim Ahmed Salim Centre for Foreign Relations, Kurasini, Dar es Salaam. 

  1. Moses Kulaba, Executive Director Governance and Economic Policy Center, Moderator

Moses Kulaba is a political economist, Governance, policy and tax law expert, and trained as an economic diplomat with over 20 years of experience in the public and civil society sector.  Has researched and written on the subjects of  elections and governance, including the Ten Principles for free and fair elections in Tanzania. He is currently the Executive Director of Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Date: Friday, 29th August, 2025

Time:  15:00 (3PM) Nairobi Time, 14hrs (CAT), 12pm Lagos

Register in advance for this webinar via: https://us06web.zoom.us/meeting/register/A-yOjAcRStCEn2Y3U3B97Q


After registering, you will receive a confirmation email containing information about joining the meeting.