How Seaweed Farming Empowers Women and Supports Climate Action Along Tanzania’s Swahili Coast

Authors: Gerald Sumari & Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Featured Photo Credit: Loshni Rodhia, Reef Resilience Network

Climate change has severely affected coastal livelihoods through declining fish stocks, ecosystem degradation, and rising ocean temperatures, disproportionately impacting women in fishing communities. Seaweed farming has emerged as an alternative livelihood that provides income stability, enhances gender equity, and delivers ecosystem services such as carbon capture, shoreline protection, and reduced ocean acidification.

  1. Introduction

Global climate change has become one of the most pressing challenges facing coastal communities worldwide, particularly in developing countries where livelihoods are intricately tied to fragile marine ecosystems. Rising sea surface temperatures, ocean acidification, and the destruction of nearshore habitats have significantly affected fisheries productivity and the socioeconomic stability of communities dependent on marine resources (IPCC, 2019). In Tanzania, the Swahili coastline, stretching over 1,424 kilometers and encompassing key regions such as Tanga, Bagamoyo, Lindi, Mtwara, and the Zanzibar Archipelago, is increasingly vulnerable to these climate-related disruptions (FAO, 2020). Fishing communities, long the backbone of coastal economies, face declining fish stocks, irregular seasonal patterns, and ecosystem degradation. These changes have disproportionately impacted women, who are often relegated to secondary roles in fisheries yet bear the primary responsibility for household sustenance and income diversification.

Seaweed farming has emerged as a promising alternative livelihood strategy for coastal women in Tanzania. Beyond providing a supplementary source of income, it has grown into a significant economic activity in Zanzibar, where it ranks as the third largest source of income and accounts for approximately 90 percent of marine exports (Msuya, 2013). This growth highlights the potential of seaweed farming not only as a means of economic empowerment for women but also as an important contributor to climate change mitigation and adaptation. From a climate perspective, seaweed aquaculture contributes to carbon sequestration by absorbing atmospheric carbon dioxide and storing it in biomass and sediments, while also providing ecosystem services such as shoreline protection and reduced ocean acidification (Krause-Jensen & Duarte, 2016).

Despite this potential, seaweed farming in Tanzania has not yet been fully recognized or developed as a sustainable economic sector. Current efforts remain fragmented, largely driven by donor agencies and philanthropic initiatives, with limited strategic integration into national marine and climate change policies. Furthermore, women farmers face barriers such as weak institutional support, limited technical knowledge, and restricted access to markets and finance, which constrain their ability to scale production and maximize climate and economic benefits

This study therefore seeks to explore the nexus between seaweed farming, women’s economic empowerment, and carbon sequestration along Tanzania’s Swahili coast. Specifically, it examines the economic opportunities created for coastal women through seaweed aquaculture, the climate benefits associated with carbon sequestration, and the institutional and policy gaps that hinder the sector’s growth. By situating seaweed farming within both the blue economy and climate resilience frameworks, the study aims to provide evidence-based insights and recommendations for scaling up this sector as a transformative pathway for women’s empowerment and climate change adaptation in Tanzania.

  1. Seaweed Farming and Carbon Sequestration

Seaweed farming refers to the cultivation of marine macroalgae in shallow coastal waters, often using ropes, stakes, or rafts to facilitate growth. Unlike wild harvesting, which can contribute to the depletion of natural stocks, seaweed aquaculture provides a sustainable means of production with both economic and ecological benefits. Globally, seaweed farming has grown into a multi-billion-dollar industry, producing over 35 million tonnes annually and supplying raw materials to food, pharmaceutical, cosmetic, and biofuel industries (FAO, 2022).

From an environmental perspective, seaweed farming is increasingly recognized as an important contributor to the blue carbon framework. Seaweeds, through photosynthesis, absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and the ocean, converting it into biomass. A portion of this captured carbon is sequestered through long-term storage in sediments or through export to deep ocean waters. Krause-Jensen and Duarte (2016) estimate that seaweed ecosystems contribute substantially to global carbon sequestration, with macroalgal forests and farms acting as carbon sinks. Although the exact sequestration potential varies by species and location, emerging evidence suggests that large-scale cultivation could significantly offset greenhouse gas emissions.

Beyond carbon sequestration, seaweed farming provides adaptation benefits to coastal ecosystems and communities. Seaweed farms reduce wave energy, thereby protecting shorelines from erosion. They also elevate local water pH, mitigating ocean acidification, and enhance oxygen levels, which support biodiversity and reduce the risk of hypoxic conditions. These ecosystem services make seaweed farming a nature-based solution that addresses both mitigation and adaptation to climate change.

In Tanzania, seaweed farming particularly in Zanzibar and Pemba has demonstrated the dual benefits of ecological sustainability and socioeconomic empowerment. However, despite its potential to contribute to the country’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, seaweed aquaculture has yet to be fully integrated into climate policy frameworks. With improved recognition, investment, and research into carbon accounting methodologies, seaweed farming could position Tanzania as a regional leader in blue carbon and sustainable aquaculture practices.

  1. Nexus between Climate Change, Seaweed Farming and Carbon Sequestration

The nexus between climate change, seaweed farming, and carbon sequestration represents a crucial intersection of environmental sustainability, economic resilience, and gender empowerment. Climate change has exacerbated challenges faced by coastal communities in Tanzania, including declining fish stocks, saltwater intrusion, and increased vulnerability to storms and coastal erosion (IPCC, 2019). These pressures have heightened the economic and social vulnerabilities of women, who are often responsible for household livelihoods yet face restricted access to productive resources.

Seaweed farming provides an important adaptation pathway, enabling women to diversify income sources away from fisheries and reduce their dependency on diminishing fish stocks. By engaging in seaweed aquaculture, women are not only able to supplement household incomes but also enhance food security, education, and health outcomes within their communities (Msuya, 2013). This diversification strengthens household resilience to climate shocks, while also enhancing women’s agency in economic decision-making.

At the same time, seaweed farming contributes directly to climate change mitigation through carbon sequestration. Seaweeds absorb substantial amounts of carbon dioxide, which can be stored in their biomass or transferred to deep ocean sinks when fragments are detached and transported offshore (Krause-Jensen & Duarte, 2016). In this way, seaweed farms act as localized carbon sinks that help offset greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, seaweed aquaculture improves the ecological health of coastal zones by buffering wave energy, providing habitat for marine species, and maintaining ecosystem functions that are essential for coastal biodiversity.

Therefore, the nexus illustrates a dual dividend: while women benefit from improved economic opportunities and empowerment, communities and ecosystems benefit from enhanced carbon storage and climate adaptation services. Scaling up seaweed farming along the Swahili coast can thus create synergistic gains that address both social equity and environmental sustainability, aligning with Tanzania’s commitments to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 13 (Climate Action), and SDG 14 (Life Below Water).

  1. Seaweed Farming and Economic Empowerment Opportunities for Coastal Women

Seaweed farming has emerged as one of the most significant livelihood opportunities for women along Tanzania’s Swahili coast. Traditionally marginalized within the fisheries sector, women have increasingly turned to seaweed aquaculture as an alternative that offers greater autonomy, income stability, and social recognition. In Zanzibar, where the practice is most developed, women constitute the majority of seaweed farmers and contribute substantially to household incomes (Msuya, 2013).

Economically, seaweed farming provides a relatively low-cost entry point for women, requiring limited capital investment and basic technical knowledge. Once established, seaweed farms generate steady income through the sale of dried seaweed to domestic and international markets. Current estimates suggest that women farmers in Zanzibar can earn between USD 70 and USD 100 per month, depending on yields and market prices (FAO, 2020). While this income is modest, it represents a critical supplement in communities where alternative employment opportunities are scarce.

Beyond income generation, seaweed farming has broader implications for women’s empowerment. Earnings from seaweed sales enable women to invest in children’s education, improve household food security, and access healthcare services. In some communities, women seaweed farmers have reported greater decision-making power within households and community organizations, marking a shift in gender dynamics traditionally dominated by men (Lugomela et al., 2021). Seaweed farming has therefore become a pathway not only for economic resilience but also for advancing gender equity along Tanzania’s coastline.

In addition, the growing global demand for seaweed-derived products including cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and biofuels offers significant potential for value addition. With adequate support in processing, branding, and marketing, Tanzanian women farmers could capture higher value from their produce, moving beyond raw material exports into niche international markets. Such a transition would further enhance women’s economic empowerment and position seaweed farming as a competitive sector within Tanzania’s blue economy framework.

Nevertheless, challenges remain. Price volatility in international markets, limited bargaining power, and the absence of cooperative structures reduce women’s profitability. Furthermore, inadequate access to credit and modern farming technologies constrains productivity. These challenges highlight the need for targeted policy interventions and institutional support to strengthen the role of seaweed farming as a driver of women’s empowerment and sustainable coastal development.

  1. Policy and Practice Gaps

Despite its economic and ecological potential, seaweed farming along Tanzania’s Swahili coast faces significant policy and practice gaps that limit its growth as a sustainable sector. These challenges can be broadly categorized into institutional, technical, financial, and environmental dimensions.

Institutional Gaps: Seaweed farming remains weakly integrated into Tanzania’s broader marine and aquaculture policies. While Zanzibar has made notable progress, the lack of a comprehensive national seaweed strategy undermines efforts to scale the sector. Policy implementation is fragmented, with limited coordination between government agencies, research institutions, and development partners.

Technical Gaps: Women farmers often rely on traditional, low-yield methods and face limited access to improved farming technologies and resilient seed varieties. Rising sea surface temperatures and ocean warming have also affected yields by weakening the productivity of commonly farmed strains such as Eucheuma spinosum and Kappaphycus alvarezii. Without investment in research and innovation, farmers remain vulnerable to climate-induced declines in production.

Financial Gaps: Access to finance remains a major barrier for women farmers, who often lack collateral and financial literacy to secure loans from formal institutions. The sector’s dependence on donor-funded projects has created uncertainty, with few sustainable financing mechanisms available to expand farm acreage, adopt new technologies, or invest in value addition. Limited access to cooperative structures and collective bargaining further weakens women’s market position.

Environmental Gaps: Competition for coastal space with tourism and fishing industries, coupled with environmental degradation, reduces the availability of suitable farming areas. Climate change continues to exacerbate these challenges through rising ocean temperatures, shifting tidal patterns, and increased frequency of extreme weather events, all of which impact seaweed yields and farm stability.

Comparative evidence from Kenya and Madagascar suggests that stronger policy frameworks, investment in seaweed breeding programs, and development of women-led cooperatives can significantly enhance sector resilience. Without similar reforms in Tanzania, however, seaweed farming will remain underdeveloped, leaving coastal women unable to fully harness its economic and climate-related benefits.

  1. Recommendations

To unlock the full potential of seaweed farming for women’s economic empowerment and climate resilience along Tanzania’s Swahili coast, a set of targeted recommendations is necessary. These measures should address institutional, technical, financial, and environmental barriers while aligning with national development priorities and global sustainability goals.

1. Training and Capacity Building: Strengthen technical training for women farmers on modern aquaculture techniques, resilient seed varieties, and farm management practices. Capacity-building programs should also include business management, marketing, and financial literacy to improve income stability and bargaining power.

2. Policy Reform and Institutional Support: Develop a comprehensive National Seaweed Farming Strategy that positions the sector within Tanzania’s Blue Economy framework. Policy reforms should enhance coordination among government agencies, research institutions, private sector actors, and women’s organizations to create an enabling environment for sector growth.

3. Scaling Up Production and Value Addition: Encourage expansion of farm acreage while supporting investments in processing, packaging, and value addition for products such as cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and biofuels. This would enable women to capture greater value beyond raw exports.

4. Financing and Investment Mechanisms: Establish tailored financial products, such as microcredit schemes and women’s cooperative funds, to address the sector’s financing gaps. Access to climate finance and blue carbon credits should also be explored to compensate women for the carbon sequestration benefits of seaweed farming.

5. Research and Development: Invest in research on climate-resilient seaweed species, disease management, and carbon accounting methodologies. Partnerships with universities, international research institutes, and regional organizations should be promoted to build a stronger knowledge base.

6. Environmental Management and Coastal Zoning: Introduce integrated coastal management practices that balance seaweed farming with tourism, fisheries, and conservation needs. Clear zoning and environmental monitoring frameworks would minimize conflicts and protect marine ecosystems.

  1. Strengthen Women seaweed farmers Association, as vehicles for engaging with government policy makers and other stakeholders while protecting the interests of women sea weed farmers. The existing networks are still infant, suffer from nascent resources and internal capacity challenges to into large scale ventures. Moreover, women sea farmers face significant health risks due to poor protection gear and over exposure to salty ocean water. Women complain of skin rushes and other risks due to over exposure.

By implementing these recommendations, Tanzania can transform seaweed farming into a resilient and competitive sector that delivers triple dividends: economic empowerment for women, enhanced climate mitigation through carbon sequestration, and strengthened adaptation for coastal communities. Aligning these efforts with the Sustainable Development Goals—particularly SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 13 (Climate Action), and SDG 14 (Life Below Water)—would further position Tanzania as a leader in inclusive and sustainable blue economy development.

  1. Conclusion

Seaweed farming holds transformative potential for Tanzania’s Swahili coastline, offering a sustainable livelihood for women, a pathway for climate change mitigation, and a contribution to the country’s broader blue economy agenda. As climate change continues to undermine traditional fisheries and coastal ecosystems, seaweed aquaculture provides an alternative that empowers women economically while also delivering critical ecological services such as carbon sequestration, shoreline protection, and improved marine biodiversity.

The evidence presented in this study demonstrates that while seaweed farming already plays a significant role in Zanzibar’s economy accounting for nearly 90 percent of marine exports it remains underdeveloped along the broader Tanzanian coastline. Institutional, technical, financial, and environmental gaps continue to constrain its full potential. Women farmers face challenges such as weak policy support, limited access to technology and finance, and exposure to climate-induced risks. Addressing these barriers is essential if seaweed farming is to deliver its dual dividends of economic empowerment and climate resilience.

Targeted interventions, including stronger policy frameworks, enhanced training, value addition, and innovative financing models, can unlock the sector’s potential. By scaling up seaweed farming and integrating it into national climate and marine strategies, Tanzania can position itself as a leader in sustainable aquaculture and blue carbon initiatives in East Africa.

In conclusion, seaweed farming is more than an economic activity; it is a climate-smart development strategy that empowers women, supports households, and strengthens ecological resilience. Harnessing this potential requires a coordinated effort among government, development partners, research institutions, and coastal communities. If pursued strategically, seaweed farming can significantly contribute to Tanzania’s achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, while building a resilient and inclusive coastal economy.

 

References

FAO. (2020). The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

FAO. (2022). Global production statistics for seaweed farming. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

IPCC. (2019). Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Krause-Jensen, D., & Duarte, C. M. (2016). Substantial role of macroalgae in marine carbon sequestration. Nature Geoscience, 9(10), 737–742.

Lugomela, C., Msuya, F. E., & Kyewalyanga, M. S. (2021). Seaweed farming and gender dynamics in coastal Tanzania. Journal of Applied Phycology, 33, 1457–1468.

Msuya, F. E. (2013). Social and economic dimensions of seaweed farming in Zanzibar. In D. Valiela (Ed.), Aquaculture: Ecological, Economic, and Social Dimensions (pp. 121–138). Springer.

Duarte, C. M., Wu, J., Xiao, X., Bruhn, A., & Krause-Jensen, D. (2021). Can seaweed farming play a role in climate change mitigation and adaptation? Frontiers in Marine Science, 8, 638802.

 

Enhancing the Viability of NDCs in East Africa: Assessing Progress, Gaps and path to net zero

Author: Nader Khalifa, Researcher, Governance and Economic Policy Centre*, December 2025

Introduction: COP30 as the Implementation Milestone

The COP30 in Belém – Brazil marked a critical milestone, being framed as the “Implementation COP,” arriving a decade after the signing of the Paris Agreement and returning to Brazil over 30 years since the landmark 1992 Earth Summit. The COP concluded with some proclamations on Just Transition Mechanism and adoption of Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) indicators, and increased focus on nature and finance but little radical actions to tame the climate crisis under 1.5°C target.

Despite the milestones, global implementation remains off-track, with countries collectively failing to reduce emissions and scale resilience at the pace required. The climate crisis is still treated with suspicion, geopolitical jostling and underfunded, highlighting a clear gap between ambition and action. Only small share around 12–15% of European climate finance is accessible to the poorest and most climate-vulnerable African countries, far below their share of climate risk and need (OECD, 2023). In East Arica, analysis of climate adaptation finance shows that approximately 52.7 % of funds committed for adaptation were actually disbursed between 2009 and 2018 (Savvidou et al., 2021).

This paper assesses the state of global progress on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), with a particular focus on East African countries—Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda. It further compares the level of NDC implementation and financial support needs in these countries against the climate finance commitments and disbursements of selected European nations, evaluating whether NDCs remain viable tools for achieving the Paris Agreement objectives, identifying gaps, and proposes strategic recommendations to strengthen their viability in achieving Paris Agreement goals.

Global NDC Assessment: Are We on Track for Paris Targets?

According to the UNFCCC’s latest NDC Synthesis Report (2023–2024), global emissions remain far above Paris-aligned trajectories. Current NDCs collectively put the world on a 2.4–2.6°C warming path far from the 1.5°C target (UNEP, 2023).

NDC Implementation Gap: Structural Barriers and Evidence of Underperformance

Although East African countries have strengthened their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) since 2015—many increasing mitigations ambition by over 20–30% and expanding adaptation priorities—the region continues to face a widening implementation gap as real-world emission reductions have not followed at the required scale. This gap reflects both systemic constraints and insufficient translation of political commitments into measurable action and raises serious questions about whether NDCs, as currently designed, can deliver the Paris outcomes.

Key Implementation Gaps and Challenges

High dependence on external climate finance

  • Most East African NDCs rely on 70–90% external financing, particularly for adaptation and energy transition.
  • The region collectively requires more than USD 280–300 billion by 2030, yet receives less than 12%–15% of that annually (AfDB, 2023).
  • Adaptation finance alone is underfunded by over USD 2.5 billion per year across the region (GCA, 2023).

Limited progress in translating NDC commitments into sectoral action

  • Updated NDCs include ambitious mitigation targets—such as Kenya’s 32% by 2030, Uganda’s 22%, and Ethiopia’s conditional 68%—yet emissions continue to rise in transport, agriculture, and industry.
  • Only 20–30% of planned mitigation actions are currently being implemented at scale.

Weak MRV systems and institutional capacity

  • More than 70% of East African countries lack fully operational MRV systems across energy, agriculture, and waste sectors.
  • Inadequate data collection and reporting reduce accountability and hinder access to climate finance, which increasingly requires robust tracking frameworks (ICAT, 2022).

Limited domestic integration and mainstreaming

  • NDCs remain insufficiently embedded in national and subnational development plans.
  • Fewer than 40% of sector ministries align annual budgets with NDC priorities, creating fragmentation and slow execution.
  • Local governments—key for adaptation delivery—receive less than 10% of the required climate financing.

Slow and complex climate finance disbursement

  • Global climate funds (e.g., GCF, GEF) take 18–24 months on average from concept to approval.
  • East Africa adaptation finance disbursement ratio (≈52.7 %), considerably below what’s needed and indicating a persistent delivery gap.
  • Private-sector investment remains below USD 4 billion per year, far short of the USD 24–30 billion needed annually.

Limited community participation in planning and delivery

  • NDC implementation often excludes rural and climate-vulnerable communities, despite these groups experiencing more than 70% of climate impacts (floods, droughts, crop failures).
  • This reduces local ownership and increases the risk of maladaptation.

East African NDCs: Ambition, Progress, and Implementation Realities

The second generation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in East Africa demonstrates a clear increase in ambition compared to 2015 submissions. However, implementation continues to lag far behind targets due to systemic financing, institutional, and capacity constraints. This section synthesizes the ambition levels, progress indicators, and the underlying structural barriers limiting effective delivery of NDC commitments in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda.

Ambition Levels and Emission Reduction Targets

All four East African countries have strengthened their 2030 climate commitments, reflecting enhanced sectoral coverage (Kenya: Energy, agriculture, LULUCF, transport, waste, Tanzania: Energy, transport, forestry, waste, Uganda: Energy, forestry, agriculture, Rwanda: Energy, industry, waste, agriculture) and improved quantification of mitigation and adaptation actions.

These targets indicate rising ambition; however, nearly 80–90% of planned mitigation outcomes remain dependent on external finance, highlighting an imbalance between national ambition and the available resource base.

  • Implementation Status: Progress and Performance

Despite strong stated ambition, real implementation remains uneven and significantly below required trajectories. Key observations include:

Positive Developments

  • Kenya continues to lead the region in renewable energy deployment, with geothermal providing over 40% of total power generation, complemented by utility-scale wind and solar.
  • Rwanda operates one of the most advanced MRV systems in Africa, integrating national inventories, sectoral reporting templates, and verification frameworks.
  • Tanzania and Uganda have made notable progress in adaptation planning, particularly in agriculture, water, and disaster risk management.

However, progress falls short of NDC trajectories due to:

  • Delayed and unpredictable international climate finance disbursement, especially for adaptation.
  • Limited mainstreaming of NDCs, with weak integration into national development plans, sectoral strategies, and district-level programs.
  • Technical gaps in MRV, GHG accounting, emissions modeling, and data management.
  • Insufficient private sector participation due to regulatory uncertainty, weak incentives, and few bankable climate projects.

Overall, implementation progress remains slow, fragmented, and insufficient to place the region on a Paris-aligned trajectory.

Climate Finance Needs, Delivery, and the Widening Gap

East African NDCs require substantial financing for both mitigation and adaptation. Country estimates highlight an urgent mismatch between required and delivered resources:

Evidence of the Finance Gap

  • East Africa receives less than 12% of Africa’s total climate finance inflows (CPI, 2024).
  • Adaptation finance remains below 30% of total flows to the region, despite East Africa being among the world’s most climate-vulnerable regions (Brookings Institution, 2022).
  • GCF projects in East Africa face approval timelines averaging 24–36 months, slowing implementation of urgent projects.
  • National institutions struggle to meet stringent fiduciary and documentation requirements of major climate funds.

Institutional, Governance, and Capacity Constraints

Several deep-rooted challenges hinder NDC implementation:

Institutional Challenges

  • Weak MRV systems in several countries limit tracking, reporting, and verification of progress.
  • Fragmented inter-ministerial coordination, especially between energy, finance, agriculture, and environment ministries.
  • Data deficits in key sectors (LULUCF, agriculture, off-grid energy, transport), affecting GHG inventory accuracy.

Governance and Operational Gaps

  • Limited local government engagement, despite significant adaptation actions being subnational.
  • Low public participation, particularly in rural and climate-vulnerable communities.
  • Few mature, bankable projects, leading to under-utilization of available finance windows.
  • Private sector climate investment remains below 15% of total climate finance in East Africa.

Collectively, these challenges reinforce the structural implementation gap, limiting the region’s ability to translate Paris ambition into real, measurable outcomes.

International Climate Finance Support: European Commitments vs. Delivery

    • Pledges vs. Delivered Finance

European countries — led by Germany, France, the EU, and the UK — collectively pledge significant climate finance to Africa. However, the delivery gap remains substantial:

  • OECD data show that while European donors reported USD 34–36 billion in climate finance annually (2019–2022), the actual disbursements to African LDCs were less than USD 9–11 billion.
  • Only around 12–15% of European climate finance is accessible to the poorest and most climate-vulnerable African countries.
  • Adaptation finance remains critically low: in 2022, EU institutions allocated only 27% of their climate finance to adaptation—far below the 50% target encouraged by COP26 and COP27 decisions.
  • The UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance confirms a USD 1.2–1.3 trillion cumulative finance gaps for African NDCs by 2030.
  • According to a report by FSD Africa, the average disbursement ratio for climate finance in Africa is 79%, which includes both mitigation and adaptation flows CPI (2022).
  • According to Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) data, adaptation finance for African countries was disbursed at an average rate of 46%, compared to 56% for mitigation finance.
  • The Landscape of Climate Finance in Africa (2024) report from the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) estimates that adaptation finance flows to Africa rose from USD 11.8 billion in 2019/20 to USD 13.8 billion in 2021/22.

Misalignment with African Priorities

European finance is still mitigation-heavy, although Africa’s most urgent needs relate to adaptation:

  • More than 65–70% of EU climate finance to Africa goes to mitigation sectors (renewables, energy efficiency).
  • Adaptation sectors such as agriculture, water management, early warning systems, and climate-resilient infrastructure receive less than 30%.
  • UNEP’s Adaptation Gap Report indicates that adaptation finance globally is also constrained, Analyses show that a large majority of adaptation actions identified in African NDCs remain unfunded or underfunded, with only around 20–23% of adaptation needs being met by climate finance flows, leaving substantial gaps for implementation. (UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2023).
  • The African Development Bank estimates that Africa needs USD 52–57 billion/year in adaptation finance but currently receives less than USD 11.4 billion/year.
    • Systemic Barriers Limiting Access to European & Multilateral Funds

African LDCs face structural constraints that prevent them from accessing European climate finance effectively:

  • Approval cycles for GCF and GEF projects routinely takes time, delaying implementation.
  • High fiduciary standards, financial reporting requirements, and bankability tests result in rejection or delays for NDC-aligned proposals.
  • Only 14 African national institutions are currently accredited to the GCF, limiting direct access.
  • Less than 5% of readiness funding reaches local MRV institutions, leading to persistent data gaps.
  • Technical assistance for NDC implementation—planning, monitoring, tracking, and verification—remains insufficient for most countries.

This combination makes African NDCs remain “ambitious on paper, underfunded in practice.”

Why NDCs Still Matter

Despite finance and implementation challenges, NDCs remain central to Africa’s climate and development future because they:

  • Define and update national climate ambition every five years;
  • Guide investment pathways in mitigation and adaptation;
  • Anchor national development plans to climate-resilient trajectories;
  • Serve as the main framework for accessing climate finance;
  • Provide structure for reporting under the Enhanced Transparency Framework.

Strengthening NDC design, financing, MRV, and implementation support is fundamental post-COP30, where countries are expected to raise ambition and demonstrate credible progress.

Policy Recommendations

To close the growing implementation gap and ensure that East African NDCs deliver measurable climate outcomes, the following evidence-based policy actions are proposed. These recommendations strengthen institutional capacity, enhance climate finance access, accelerate sectoral mainstreaming, and improve accountability post-COP30.

  • Strengthen Institutional and Technical Capacity
  • Establish Dedicated NDC Implementation Units

Create permanent, inter-ministerial NDC coordination units mandated to align sectoral policies, oversee progress, and engage with development partners.

  • Upgrade MRV Systems and Technical Competencies

Invest in end-to-end MRV systems—GHG inventories, mitigation tracking, adaptation metrics, and digital monitoring tools—while providing continuous training for sector ministries.

  • Develop National Climate Data Repositories

Build centralized climate data platforms for agriculture, energy, transport, and land use to enhance evidence-based policymaking and transparency.

  • Enhance Climate Finance Mobilization and Access
  • Formulate National Climate Finance Strategies:

Align domestic priorities with the eligibility criteria of the GCF, GEF, Adaptation Fund, and bilateral donors to improve approval rates and reduce project rejection.

  • Increase Readiness and Project Preparation Funding

Expand participation in GCF Readiness, NDC Partnership support, and GEF capacity-building programs to address limited pipeline of bankable projects.

  • Promote Blended Finance and Private Sector Mobilization

Introduce policy incentives for green bonds, guarantees, concessional loans, and PPPs to unlock long-term mitigation and adaptation investments.

  • Advocate for Simplified Access Windows for LDCs

The future COPs must negotiate streamlined procedures, reduced documentation requirements, and faster approval timelines for LDC and fragile countries.

  • Mainstream NDCs into National and Local Development Planning
  • Integrate NDC Targets into National Budgets and Sector Plans

Embed climate actions in annual budget cycles, Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks, and district/county development plans.

  • Establish Performance Indicators for Line Ministries

Link ministerial scorecards and KPIs with measurable NDC outcomes to strengthen accountability and accelerate implementation.

  • Embed Adaptation into Core Sectors

Ensure NDC-aligned adaptation actions are systematically integrated into agriculture, water, health, infrastructure, and urban planning frameworks.

  • Scale Up Community and Citizen Participation
  • Adopt Community-Based Adaptation (CBA) Frameworks

Expand participatory adaptation programs in rural and climate-vulnerable regions, supported by local extension systems.

  • Link Rural Development Programs to NDC Outcomes

Prioritize climate-smart agriculture, reforestation, watershed management, and off-grid energy in rural development interventions.

  • Strengthen Gender and Youth Inclusion

Mandate gender-responsive planning and youth representation in NDC committees, local climate governance, and project implementation.

  • Enhance Regional Cooperation and Knowledge Exchange
  • Establish a Regional MRV and Knowledge Platform

Under the East African Community (EAC), create a shared platform for data exchange, methodologies, and best practices on GHG inventories and sectoral MRV.

  • Promote Cross-Border Renewable Energy Corridors

Accelerate regional geothermal, hydro, and solar initiatives, along with power-pool integration and transmission infrastructure.

  • Strengthen Transboundary Ecosystem Management

Improve joint management of critical basins—Lake Victoria, the Nile, and rangeland ecosystems—to enhance resilience and disaster risk reduction.

  • Improve Transparency, Governance, and Accountability
  • Publish Annual NDC Implementation Reports

Introduce open-access dashboards that track emissions, adaptation progress, climate finance flows, and project delivery.

  • Create Independent Oversight Mechanisms

Establish multi-stakeholder oversight bodies involving civil society, academia, and the private sector to review progress and recommend corrective actions.

  • Mandate Public Disclosure of Climate Finance

Require transparent reporting of all international and domestic climate finance flows, including donor commitments, disbursements, and utilization.

About the Author: Nader Khalifa is an engineer and energy professional with over 15 years of expertise in the energy and petroleum sectors. He currently serves with the Ministry of Energy & Petroleum of Sudan, in addition to his role as a Sudan Team Member for the Initiative on Climate Action Transparency (ICAT) project, a collaborative effort involving UNEP, CCC, and HCENR, and a distinguished researcher and a Colosseum Member at the Governance & Economic Policy Centre (GEPC).

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  9. Government of Uganda (2022). Second Nationally Determined Contribution. Kampala: Ministry of Water and Environment.
  10. ICAT (2022). Guidance for Transparency Frameworks in LDCs. Copenhagen: Initiative on Climate Action Transparency.
  11. IPCC (2022). AR6 Working Group III: Mitigation of climate change. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/.
  1. Nature (2025). Reframing climate finance for Africa. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/d44148-025-00353-5
  1. OECD (2023). Climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries in 2013–2021. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/environment/climate-finance-provided-and-mobilised-by-developed-countries.htm.
  2. Savvidou, G., Atteridge, A., Omari-Motsumi, K. and Trisos, C. (2021). Quantifying international public finance for climate change adaptation in Africa. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute. Available at: https://www.sei.org/publications/climate-finance-adaptation-africa/.
  1. Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) (2024). How effective is climate finance in assisting farmers in low- and middle-income countries adapt to climate change? Available at: https://www.sei.org/features/how-effective-is-climate-finance-in-assisting-farmers-in-low-and-middle-income-countries-adapt-to-climate-change/
  2. UNEP (2023). Adaptation Gap Report 2023: Underfinanced, underprepared. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. Available at: https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2023
  3. UNFCCC (2023). Nationally Determined Contributions synthesis report. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Available at: https://unfccc.int/ndc-synthesis-report-2023

 

 

Sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy finance course 2026-Applications open

Gain skills, Accelerate the Energy Transition in Africa!
Join the Sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy Financing Course to gain the knowledge, tools, and skills to shape policies, drive regulatory reforms, and unlock financing for clean, reliable, and equitable energy. Designed for policymakers, civil society leaders, private sector actors, and finance professionals, this course equips you to tackle climate change, expand energy access, and lead a just and inclusive green economy. Take action today and be part of the transformation powering Africa’s sustainable future.

The GEPC sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy Financing Course Equips policy makers, civil society leaders, private sector stakeholders, and financial professional’s with the knowledge and practical skills to drive Africa’s reduction of energy poverty, transition to clean, reliable , and equitable energy system.  Against the backdrop of climate change and persistent energy access challenges, the course addresses critical gaps in policy formulation, regulatory frameworks, advocacy and financing mechanisms.

Participants will gain tools to design and implement sustainable energy policies, promote inclusive governance, mobilise investments for green projects and support a just and resilient energy transition that fosters economic growth, social equity and environmental sustainability.

Course Background and Context

Climate change presents an urgent global challenge, with the most severe impacts disproportionately affecting less developed countries in East Africa and Africa generally. Despite international commitments under the Paris Agreement and subsequent UN Climate Conferences (CoP27 and CoP28), developing countries face significant barriers in accessing technology, finance, and expertise to transition to clean energy. Global climate governance often leaves low-income countries under-resourced and underrepresented, creating complex challenges for equitable and just energy transitions.

In Eastern Africa and Africa generally, policy frameworks and regulatory mechanisms for sustainable energy remain underdeveloped, poorly communicated, and inadequately enforced. This has created critical gaps in governance, technical capacity, and financing, limiting the country’s ability to expand clean energy access, reduce emissions, and achieve its climate commitments. Strengthening national capacity, promoting citizen engagement, and enhancing advocacy for policy reform are therefore essential to support a just and inclusive energy transition.

Sustainable energy is central to meeting these challenges. Defined as clean, reliable, affordable, and equitable, sustainable energy supports national development needs while minimizing environmental harm and fostering long-term economic, social, and environmental sustainability. Integrated sustainable energy systems combine renewable sources—such as solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, and biomass—with modern technologies, smart grids, and storage solutions to deliver energy efficiently, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and expand access to underserved communities.

Continentally, Africa continues to face significant energy access deficits, with approximately 600 million people lacking reliable electricity and 970 million without access to clean cooking solutions. Only about 25% of electricity in the region comes from renewable sources, despite Africa possessing around 60% of the world’s best solar potential. These gaps highlight the urgent need for effective policy, regulation, and financing strategies to mobilize investment, accelerate energy transition, and achieve energy equity.

Efforts and Challenges in Sustainable Energy Access and Financing

Efforts to expand access to sustainable energy, including initiatives like the World Bank Mission 300, have made progress but remain limited. Clean cooking solutions are still expensive and often inaccessible for the poorest and remote households. Expanding energy access and achieving a just transition requires policy reforms such as unbundling existing energy utilities and integrating sustainable energy systems into national, mini, and off-grid networks. Well-designed integrated systems can support public services—solar-powered water, health facilities, small businesses, electrified transport, housing, and modernized agriculture—while reducing reliance on fossil fuels.

Investment in clean energy has grown modestly over the past two years, including multilateral and private sector contributions, yet financing remains far below what is needed. Critical questions persist: how can governments and private sector actors scale investments in sustainable energy systems, and which models are best for advancing clean energy and other renewable technologies in Africa?

Globally, the energy sector is rapidly shifting toward renewables, with record growth in 2023 reaching 3,870 GW of installed capacity (IRENA, 2024). Countries are adopting Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to guide climate adaptation and mitigation at the national level, supported by financing mechanisms like carbon trading, multilateral funds, and private sector investments.

However, in Eastern Africa and Africa generally, limited knowledge and expertise hinder the ability of governments, civil society, and private actors to navigate evolving global energy policies and regulatory frameworks. Accessing climate finance and developing bankable green economy projects remains challenging. Consequently, strengthening skills, policy understanding, regulatory capacity, and financing literacy is critical to accelerate the transition to sustainable clean energy and scale up investment in the green economy, providing jobs and sustainable development.

This course is designed to equip public policymakers, civil society actors, private sector stakeholders, and financial institutions with the knowledge, skills, and tools to shape and implement sustainable energy policies, advance regulatory reforms, and unlock financing for a just and equitable green economy.

Skills Gap Analysis and Justification

The transition to sustainable and clean energy in Eastern Africa and across the Africa region is constrained by a critical shortage of technical knowledge, policy expertise, and institutional capacity. Various engagements between the Governance and Economic Policy Centre (GEPC), civil society organizations, and government institutions have consistently highlighted the need for targeted capacity building to accelerate policy, regulatory, and financing reforms that support the energy transition.

Identified Skills Gaps

In 2022, the Governance and Economic Policy Centre in collaboration with one of its international partners, attempted to form a National Multisector Reference Group on Energy Transition in Tanzania as a bespoke platform for policy dialogue, advocacy, and capacity development.  The feedback and lessons drawn from this process demonstrated an urgent need for renewed capacity-building and leadership in this area. A subsequent short skills gap study commissioned by GEPC in 2024 identified several critical weaknesses among key stakeholder groups:

  • Government officials and legislators lack the technical expertise to design, implement, and monitor effective sustainable energy policies and laws.
  • Civil society organizations have limited knowledge of the global political economy of climate change and energy, limited advocacy, analytical, and policy engagement skills to effectively influence decision-making and accountability mechanisms.
  • Private sector actors struggle to identify, develop, and present bankable renewable energy projects.
  • Financial institutions face challenges in evaluating, matching, and financing sustainable energy investments.
  • Overall political will and coordination for driving sustainable energy transition remain weak and fragmented.

Rationale for the Course

In response to these systemic capacity gaps, GEPC has designed the Sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy Financing Course to strengthen the technical and institutional foundations for an inclusive and just energy transition. The course directly addresses the need for:

  • Enhanced policy and regulatory understanding among public officials and other key stakeholders.
  • Improved advocacy and engagement capacity for civil society and community actors.
  • Strengthened financial literacy and investment readiness within the private and banking sectors.
  • Greater collaboration and coherence among energy sector stakeholders.

This course addresses these gaps by equipping policymakers, civil society actors, private sector professionals, and financial institutions with the knowledge, skills, and tools to shape sustainable energy policies, advance regulatory frameworks, and mobilize financing for a just and inclusive green economy.

Course Approach

The program will be delivered as an extended seven-week modular course.  It will be facilitated by a diverse faculty of experts drawn from GEPC technical ecosystem, global partners and experts, combining practical experience, policy insights, and technical expertise.

Through a blend of lectures, case studies, simulations, and interactive sessions, the course will equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to shape effective policies, foster accountability, and mobilize financing for sustainable and equitable energy development.

Course Objectives

The course aims to:

  1. Enhance understanding of sustainable energy policy, regulatory frameworks, and governance mechanisms relevant to Tanzania and the region.
  2. Develop technical and analytical capacity among policymakers, civil society, and financial sector actors to support the design and implementation of effective energy transition strategies.
  3. Strengthen advocacy and policy engagement skills for civil society to influence public policy and regulatory reform processes.
  4. Improve knowledge of financing mechanisms and models for mobilizing investment in renewable and green economy projects.
  5. Foster collaboration and policy coherence among government, civil society, private sector, and financial institutions in advancing a just and inclusive energy transition.
  6. Promote innovation and leadership in sustainable energy planning, implementation, and financing.

Expected Outcomes

Upon completion of the course, participants will be able to:

  • Demonstrate a clear understanding of the policy, legal, and regulatory dimensions of sustainable energy and green financing.
  • Apply analytical and strategic tools to develop and implement effective energy transition policies and projects.
  • Understand the global political economy of sustainable energy, engage more effectively in policy dialogue, advocacy, and accountability processes related to the energy sector.
  • Identify, design, and evaluate bankable clean energy projects suitable for public and private investment.
  • Strengthen institutional coordination and stakeholder collaboration for integrated and sustainable energy governance.
  • Contribute to building national and regional momentum for a just, inclusive, and climate-resilient energy future.

Course Content and Modules Overview

The Sustainable Energy Policy, Regulation and Green Economy Financing Course is designed to provide participants with both conceptual understanding and practical tools for influencing, designing, and implementing sustainable energy solutions. The course content is structured into seven interlinked modules, each addressing a critical dimension of sustainable energy and the energy transition.

Weekly Modules

Objectives, expected competence

Module 1: Understanding Sustainable Energy and the Global Energy Transition

Objective: To provide a foundational understanding of sustainable energy systems, their global dynamics, and relevance to Eastern Africa and Africa’s development agenda.

Key Topics:

  • Concepts and principles of sustainable energy and just transitions
  • Global energy transition: drivers, trends, challenges
  • Overview of emerging trends in renewables and energy efficiency technologies
  • Global and regional energy transition frameworks (UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, SDGs, NDCs and Agenda 2063)
  • Energy access, poverty, and development linkages
  • Eastern Africa and Africa’s energy context and policy landscape

Expected Competence: Participants will gain an informed understanding of the global and national energy transition landscape and how it aligns with sustainable development goals.

Module 2: Policy, Legal and Regulatory Frameworks for Sustainable Energy

 

Objective: To build participants’ knowledge of the policy and legal frameworks governing sustainable energy.

Key Topics will cover:

  • Global energy policy debates in the context of energy access and transition
  • National and regional policy and legal frameworks in the context of global energy
  • Energy Policy formulation processes and regulatory designs
  • Energy Policy tools: subsidies, tariffs, carbon pricing, auctions
  • Regional integration and power pools (e.g., EAPP, WAPP, SAPP)
  • Institutional coordination and governance mechanisms
  • Role of legislature and local governments in sustainable energy governance
  • Gender, equity, and social inclusion in energy policy

Expected Competence: Participants will be equipped to analyze, interpret, and contribute to policy and regulatory reform in the energy sector.

Module 3: Financing the Green Economy and Renewable Energy Investments, project development & bankability

 

Objective: To enhance understanding of green financing mechanisms, instruments, practical competencies, and strategies for developing financeable projects, mobilizing, manage and analyze green financing.

Key Topics:

  • Global Climate Change and green economy financing terrain
  • Geopolitics of climate financing and energy diplomacy
  • Principles of green economy and sustainable finance
  • Financing models for renewable energy (public, private, PPPs, and blended finance), Green bonds, blue bonds, climate funds, carbon markets, carbon swaps and JTEPs

·        Project feasibility studies, project modeling, preparation, operations and risk management

  • Mobilizing domestic and international finance for energy projects
  • Role of National Capital & Money markets, Green Banks, DFIs and MDBs (World Bank, AfDB, TDB)
  • Clean Energy Financing Contracts

Expected Competence: Participants will understand the clean energy financing terrain, acquire practical skills and tools to analyze clean energy financing texts, developing, and evaluating bankable renewable energy projects and access appropriate financing channels 

Module 4: Governance, Equity & Environmental Safeguards

 

Objective: To understand the governance, equity & environmental safeguard concerns underlying the transition to sustainable energy.

Key Topics:

    • Social and environmental concerns and safeguards
    • Responsible Business Conduct in Energy sector
    • Just Transition: equity, gender, community inclusion
    • Governance and anti-corruption in energy financing

Expected Competence: Participants will gain insights into the advocacy concerns and suitable policy and regulatory responses to just energy transitions and financing of sustainable energy. 

Module 5: Communication, Advocacy, Accountability and Stakeholder Engagement

 

Objective: To strengthen participants’ advocacy, negotiation, and communication skills for influencing policy and ensuring accountability in energy governance.

Key Topics:

  • Communication for sustainable energy
  • Principles and tools of policy advocacy and public engagement
  • Strategies for evidence-based advocacy and coalition building
  • Role of civil society, media, and academia in energy governance
  • Public participation and citizen accountability mechanisms
  • Case studies of successful communication and advocacy in energy transition

Expected Competence: Participants will develop the skills to effectively communicate, advocate for and influence energy policies and reforms that promote transparency, inclusion, and sustainability

Module 6: Leadership, Innovation and the Future of Energy Transition

 

Objective: To inspire leadership and innovation in sustainable energy planning and implementation.

Key Topics:

  • Transformational leadership for the green transition
  • Africa’s leadership and priorities for sustainable energy
  • Innovation, digitalization, AI, and energy governance
  • Africa scenario planning and strategic foresight for future energy systems
  • Integrating climate resilience and just transition principles in policy and regulation

Expected Competence: Participants will gain leadership insights and strategic foresight to drive innovation, partnerships, and sustainable change in the energy sector.

Week 7: Applied Learning & Practicum

 

Objective: To provide participants with practical hands-on experience in operations of sustainable energy projects, designing sustainable energy projects, financeable and bankable projects, developing applicable policy briefs and advocacy communiques for sustainable energy.

  • Activities:
    • Case study presentations: participants analyze a real renewable energy project
    • Group project: draft a financing proposal or policy brief
    • Physical or Virtual Field visit (e.g., solar mini-grid, geothermal plant, wind farm) 

Delivery Methods

The course will employ a blended learning approach, integrating:

  • Expert-led lectures and interactive discussions
  • Practical case studies and simulations
  • Group work and peer-to-peer learning
  • Policy labs and project design sessions
  • Guest lectures from leading practitioners and global experts

Participants will receive digital resources, reading materials, and toolkits to support post-course application of skills in their professional contexts.

Target Participants

The course is designed for junior- to senior-level professionals and practitioners involved in energy, climate, and economic governance who play or aspire to play a role in shaping policy, regulation, and financing for sustainable energy.

It specifically targets:

  • Government officials and legislators involved in energy, environment, finance, infrastructure, and local government sectors.
  • Civil society leaders and policy advocates working on governance, climate justice, and sustainable development issues.
  • Private sector actors and project developers in renewable energy, infrastructure, and related industries.
  • Financial and investment professionals from banks, development finance institutions, and microfinance organizations seeking to understand green financing opportunities.
  • Academics and researchers working on energy policy, economics, and sustainability studies.
  • Development partners and international organizations supporting energy transition and green growth initiatives.

Diversity and Inclusion:
GEPC encourages participation from women, youth, and professionals from underrepresented groups to promote inclusivity and diverse perspectives in the sustainable energy transition discourse.

Admission Requirements

Applicants should meet the following minimum requirements:

  1. Educational Background:
    • At least a bachelor’s degree or equivalent qualification in a relevant field such as social sciences, political science, public policy, economics, law, environmental studies, engineering, communication, finance, or related disciplines.
    • Applicants with significant professional experience in the energy or governance sector will be considered in lieu of academic qualifications.
  2. Professional Experience:
    • At least one year of relevant work experience in government, civil society, academia, or the private sector, preferably in areas related to extractive sector, energy, public policy, climate & environment, media or economic development, banking and green financing
  3. Language Proficiency:
    • Proficiency in English (both written and spoken) is required, as the course will be conducted in English.
  4. Motivation Statement and CV:
    • Applicants must submit a brief statement (300–500 words) explaining their motivation for joining the course and how they plan to apply the knowledge gained in their professional setting. They must attach a short CV or resume plus a Headshot portrait photo
  5. Recommendation:
    • A letter of support from an employer, supervisor, work colleague or institutional head is encouraged but not mandatory.

Course Duration:  7 Weeks (19th January-7th March, 2026)

The course is designed with flexible delivery options to accommodate the varying needs of participants. The seven-week program structured into weekly modules, allowing participants to combine professional responsibilities with learning.

Certification

Upon successful completion of the course requirements, participants will receive a Certificate of Completion from the Governance and Economic Policy Centre (GEPC), jointly endorsed by partnering academic or professional institutions where applicable.

Course Fees: A Subsidized rate of USD 300. Limited scholarships will be available to exceptional and early bird applicants

Course Management:  Virtual & Online

Virtual delivery will be managed through GEPC’s Moodle and Google Classroom digital learning platform.

Essential Timelines

Date

Activity

3rd December

Advertising call for Applications

9th  January 2026

Deadline for Applications

12th January, 2026

Notification of selected participants

19th January 2026

Course Commencement

7th  March  2026

End of Course and Graduation

 

How to apply:

Applications and support documents (Motivation letter, CV and Headshot photo) must be sent as a single PDF or word file by 9th  January 2026 to:  info@gepc.or.tz

Climate Change action at Subnational level: Rationale for Skilling Local Government Authorities for Climate Change Action in Tanzania

By Ng’homange Merkiad James: Researcher, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

*Mr Ng’homange is a senior lecturer at the Local Government Training Institute (LGTI) at Hombolo, Dodoma

Climate change is one of the most pressing challenges facing Tanzania today, threatening livelihoods, infrastructure, and national development. Despite the growing national and global attention to climate policy, Local Government Authorities (LGAs) — the level of government closest to the people — remain inadequately skilled and resourced to respond effectively. This policy paper argues that building the capacity of LGAs is essential for translating Tanzania’s national climate change commitments into local action. It proposes targeted training, institutional support, and resource mobilization to strengthen LGAs’ roles in climate adaptation, mitigation, and energy transition initiatives.

 

  1. Introduction

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) warns that climate change is advancing rapidly, with the poorest communities in developing countries such as Tanzania facing the most severe and irreversible impacts. Prolonged droughts, erratic rainfall, and frequent floods are disrupting food systems, destroying infrastructure, and worsening health outcomes through increased exposure to diseases and air pollution.

In Tanzania, where over 80% of the rural population depends on rain-fed agriculture — a sector contributing more than 60% of the national GDP — the consequences are profound. Yet, despite these local-level vulnerabilities, climate change interventions and decision-making remain concentrated at the global and national levels, leaving LGAs on the periphery of policy and practice. Most local authorities lack the requisite knowledge, skills, and financial capacity to implement climate action plans, integrate adaptation into planning frameworks, or mobilize community-based mitigation measures.

Empowering LGAs through structured and context-relevant climate training can transform Tanzania’s climate governance landscape. Skilled LGAs can lead public education campaigns, enforce green urban planning, promote clean cooking technologies, and even issue municipal green bonds to finance sustainable infrastructure projects.

  1. The Nexus Between Climate Change and Local Governments

Local Government Authorities are semi-autonomous subnational governments mandated under the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982. They are responsible for promoting peace, order, decentralization, and socio-economic development in their jurisdictions.

The OECD defines a local authority as “a decentralized entity elected through universal suffrage and having general responsibilities and some autonomy with respect to budget, staff and assets” (OECD/UCLG, 2016[31]). While countries can be organised as unitary or federal states, they all rely on local authorities as entities for the delivery of various services[1].

The call for local adaptation action stems from the recognition that climate risks first manifest locally, and local communities and local authorities have an innate understanding of how impacts affect them and how they need to be addressed. Their proximity to communities makes them a critical actor in climate governance, as they are well positioned to identify local risks, mobilize citizens, and deliver adaptive responses.

However, low involvement in national climate processes, limited funding, and lack of technical expertise continue to hinder their potential. Without strong LGA engagement, Tanzania’s commitments to climate adaptation, resilience, and clean energy transition risk remaining unfulfilled.

  1. Climate Change Impacts and the Need to Skill Local Governments

Tanzania’s vulnerability to climate change is evident across multiple sectors — agriculture, water, energy, infrastructure, and health. Droughts and floods are already imposing economic losses, reducing productivity, and disrupting livelihoods. According to the National Climate Change Response Strategy (2021–2026), these impacts threaten to derail progress toward the country’s Vision 2025 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG7[2]).

The recent floods demonstrate Tanzania’s vulnerability and yet the, a statement on the Status of Tanzania Climate in 2022 from Tanzania Meteorological Authority revealed that extreme weather conditions such as increased seasonal variation in observed rainfall and temperature have been significant in most parts of Tanzania and this will continue in the foreseeable feature[3].

Global evidence underscores that effective climate action requires localized implementation. Transitioning to clean and renewable energy — such as solar, wind, and hydropower — is vital, but its success depends on local capacity to plan, regulate, and support adoption. LGAs, as the closest link between citizens and the state, must therefore be equipped to manage these transitions.

The OECD in 2023 observed that despite, their competencies and mandates, local governments cannot go alone, they need both national and global level support to fully tackle climate change mitigation and adaption measures.

Capacity building and empowering of local government authorities can be instrumentally transformative in advancing local community public education, municipal urban planning and green zoning, improved regulation and approval of municipal building permits that factor smart and clean energy technologies in new housing plans and settlements. Moreover, local authorities can play a significant role in the public education and distribution of clean cooking energy systems such as affordable gas stoves in rural areas.  Local municipal green bonds issued by local authorities can be a major source of unlocking local financing for green projects such as urban municipal public transportation, clean energy generation and public and private sector projects.

  1. Tanzania’s Climate Policy and Institutional Framework

Tanzania has made significant strides in developing its climate governance architecture. The country is a signatory to the Paris Agreement and aligns its national targets with the African Union Agenda 2063, emphasizing environmental sustainability and climate resilience. Domestically, the government has enacted several policies and frameworks, including:

  • National Environmental Policy (2021)
  • National Climate Change Strategy (2021–2026)
  • Nationally Determined Contributions (2021 & 2023 updates)
  • Environmental Management Act (Cap. 191 of 2004)
  • National Carbon Trading Guidelines (2022)
  • National Clean Cooking Strategy (2024)

Despite this robust framework, implementation remains centralized. Local governments, which are essential to the execution of climate adaptation and mitigation measures, are often excluded from planning and under-resourced for execution. This disconnect has limited the translation of policy commitments into community-level results.

  1. Bridging the Local Government Skills Gap

An  assessment by the Governance and Economic Policy Centre (GEPC) and the Local Government Training Institute (LGTI) at Hombolo identified major capacity and knowledge gaps among local government staff. While some departments offer courses on “Climate Change and Livelihoods,” these remain ad hoc, limited in scope, and inaccessible to most ward, village, and mtaa-level executives.

Climate change work within LGAs is often confined to environmental departments, yet the issue is multisectoral — spanning land use, infrastructure, agriculture, and social services. Many officials lack exposure to the global political economy of climate governance and energy transition. Consequently, LGAs are not effectively advising central government or local communities on context-appropriate climate actions. This skills deficit hinders local-level innovation and weakens citizen engagement. Without building LGA competencies, national adaptation and mitigation strategies risk being poorly implemented or misunderstood at the grassroots level. Moreover, the complex nature of Tanzania’s local government authority structure creates room for overlaps across multiple stakeholders and this creates information and knowledge asymmetries across the LGA structures.

  1. Policy Recommendations

To strengthen Tanzania’s climate resilience and ensure the effective localization of climate policies, this paper recommends the following:

  1. Develop and institutionalize intensive climate training programmes for LGA staff, covering adaptation, mitigation, and energy transition, aligned with national and global frameworks.
  2. Embed climate change modules in induction courses for all new LGA employees to build foundational understanding across departments.
  3. Enhance community engagement and education through LGAs on the benefits of clean energy, forest conservation, and sustainable resource use.
  4. Establish environmental and climate action teams at ward and village levels to coordinate awareness and mobilization campaigns.
  5. Produce and distribute simplified climate training manuals in Kiswahili for use by local officials and community groups.
  6. Support LGAs in action research and local climate data collection to inform evidence-based planning and monitoring.
  7. Facilitate access to local climate finance, including municipal green bonds and partnerships with development actors, to implement local adaptation projects.
  1. Conclusion

Tanzania’s climate response will only be as strong as its local institutions. Building the capacity of Local Government Authorities is not merely an administrative necessity but a strategic investment in sustainable development. Skilled and empowered LGAs can bridge the gap between national climate policy and community action — enabling Tanzania to achieve its commitments to resilience, clean energy, and inclusive green growth.

REFERENCES

Tanzania Meteorological Authority (2023) Statement on the Status of Tanzania climate in 2022, TMA, Dar es Salaam

United Republic of Tanzania (2021) National Environmental Policy 2021, Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2021) National Climate Change Response Strategy (2021-2026), Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2014) National Guidelines for Mainstreaming Gender into Environment, Vice President’s Office, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2021) National Determined Contribution, Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2024) National Clean Cooking Strategy (2024 – 2034), Ministry of Energy, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2022) National Carbon Trading Guidelines, Vice President’s Office, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2010) Guidelines for The Preparation of Environmental Action Plans for Sector Ministries and Local Government Authorities, Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Dar es Salaam

United Republic of Tanzania (2017) National Guidelines for Strategic Environmental Assessment, Vice President’s Office, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2008) The Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania of 1977, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Republic of Tanzania (2004) National Environment Management Act of 2004, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Republic of Tanzania (2002) Local Government (District Authorities) Act, No. 7, (1982), Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Republic of Tanzania (2002) Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, No. 8, (1982), Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Nations (2023) Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report, UN Environment Programme

[1] OECD: Climate adaptation: why local governments cannot do it alone. Environment Policy Paper No. 38

[2] UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 7)

[3] Tanzania Meteorological Authority (2023) Statement on the Status of Tanzania climate in 2022, TMA, Dar es Salaam

Strengthening Local Governments in Climate Action Ahead of COP30

Position paper: Governance and Economic Policy Centre

 Introduction: The Local Nexus of Climate Action

Local Government Authorities (LGAs) are the closest level of governance to communities, charged with delivering essential services and implementing national policies at the grassroots. Their proximity to citizens makes them vital actors in addressing the localized impacts of climate change. However, despite their strategic role in adaptation and resilience-building, LGAs remain underrepresented in global climate policy and under-resourced in implementation.

As the world approaches COP30 in Brazil, which marks the halfway point to achieving the 2030 Paris Agreement goals, recognizing and empowering local governments is critical for translating global climate pledges into tangible local actions.

The Role of Local Governments in Climate Change Response

Climate change impacts—heatwaves, floods, droughts, and food insecurity—are experienced most acutely at the local level. Local governments possess unique knowledge of territorial vulnerabilities, socioeconomic conditions, and local adaptive capacities. They influence resilience through land-use planning, infrastructure regulation, and enforcement of environmental standards.

Local authorities play three major roles in climate response:

  1. Mitigation: Regulating emissions through energy efficiency programs, green building codes, and sustainable mobility initiatives.
  2. Adaptation: Managing land use, disaster risk reduction, and climate-sensitive infrastructure planning.
  3. Transition to Clean Energy: Promoting renewable energy solutions and expanding access to clean cooking and off-grid energy, especially in rural communities.

Yet, their contributions are constrained by limited funding, inadequate technical skills, and weak institutional mandates.

Local Governments and Global Climate Negotiations

At global forums such as the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COPs), local governments participate only through observer status—primarily via the Local Governments and Municipal Authorities (LGMA) constituency. While they have organized town hall dialogues and local “Mini-COPs,” their influence on formal decision-making remains minimal.

The exclusion of local voices from climate negotiations undermines policy coherence and weakens implementation. National commitments under the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) often fail to integrate the realities and priorities of subnational actors, leading to a persistent gap between global ambition and local action.

Barriers Limiting Local Government Engagement

  1. Political and Institutional Constraints
  • Lack of formal recognition: LGAs are treated as observers, not negotiators.
  • Weak mandates: National frameworks often omit explicit roles for local actors in international climate commitments.
  • Competing priorities: Service delivery demands (water, housing, education) often overshadow climate action.
  • Policy incoherence: Disjointed national and local strategies lead to fragmented implementation.
  1. Resource and Capacity Constraints
  • Insufficient funding: Local budgets rarely allocate funds for climate adaptation or international engagement.
  • Limited technical expertise: Few LGAs have staff capable of climate risk assessment or data-driven planning.
  • High participation costs: Travel and registration fees hinder participation in COPs, especially for developing countries.
  • Data gaps: Lack of localized climate data weakens evidence-based planning.
  1. Knowledge and Communication Gaps
  • Limited access to negotiation information and technical guidance.
  • Language barriers and lack of translation support at COP sessions.
  • Low public awareness of how global climate policy connects to local priorities.

Why Local Governments Must Be Supported

Climate change impacts are inherently territorial. Local authorities possess the contextual understanding necessary for effective adaptation and resilience-building. However, without adequate fiscal space, skills, and institutional backing, they cannot translate national and global goals into local implementation.

National governments must therefore create an enabling environment that empowers LGAs through:

  • Regulatory and fiscal reforms that integrate local adaptation priorities into national plans.
  • Technical capacity-building, including downscaled climate data and specialized training.
  • Coordinated planning mechanisms that involve LGAs in the design and implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and NDCs.
  • Targeted financing mechanisms, such as climate-resilient municipal grants and performance-based green budgeting.

Effective collaboration between national and local levels will ensure that adaptation is not only nationally planned but also locally delivered.

COP30: A Turning Point for Multilevel Climate Action

COP30 presents a pivotal opportunity to reframe climate governance through multilevel action. It comes at a critical juncture:

  • 2025 marks the deadline for countries to submit their updated NDCs under the Paris Agreement.
  • It will be the first COP in Brazil since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, symbolizing a return to the origins of the UNFCCC.
  • It represents the midpoint to 2030, demanding acceleration in implementation rather than new pledges alone.

Positioning local governments at the heart of COP30 discussions will help bridge the implementation gap between national commitments and local realities.

Policy Recommendations

  1. Elevate Local Governments in Global Climate Governance
    • Grant LGAs a formal role in negotiation processes and multilevel implementation frameworks.
    • Institutionalize the Local Governments and Municipal Authorities (LGMA) constituency within COP structures.
  2. Reassess Support Frameworks for LGAs
    • Review past support mechanisms to identify lessons and scale up successful local adaptation and mitigation models.
  3. Develop Scalable Local Climate Models
    • Document and share proven municipal adaptation and energy transition initiatives to inform peer learning.
  4. Establish Dedicated Local Climate Finance Channels
    • Create financing pipelines suitable for subnational authorities, including grants and concessional funds for green infrastructure and renewable energy projects.
  5. Promote Local Green Transitions
    • Support local greening programs, expansion of renewable energy, and universal access to clean cooking solutions.
  6. Invest in Capacity and Skills Development
    • Build technical, financial, and negotiation capacities of LGAs through training programs, partnerships, and regional knowledge hubs.

Conclusion

Achieving the Paris Agreement targets requires action at every level of government. Local governments are not just implementers—they are innovation laboratories for resilience, equity, and sustainability. Empowering them through recognition, financing, and capacity support will be key to transforming global climate commitments into grounded results.

COP30 must therefore be the moment to bring local governments from the margins to the center of the climate agenda.

 

Geopolitics of Critical Minerals: An Analysis of the strategic gains and risks offered by the EU Strategic Partnership, Lobito Corridor and Minerals for Security deals on East and Southern Africa’s Critical Transition Minerals
 

Featured photo credit: Sipa photo by Graeme Sloan via AP).

Authors: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre and Robert Letsatsi, Botswana Watch Organization

Background

The surging demand for minerals critical to green transition offers potential economic benefits for mineral rich countries however the dash to secure their supply chain has kicked off geopolitical interests, competition and realignments whose outcomes could have long lasting relationship with divergent unforeseen impacts. With the Eastern and Southern Africa combined as a single economic bloc, the region has the highest concentration of critical green transition minerals such as cobalt, coltan, nickel, graphite, tungsten, tantalum, copper in the world. Yet the history of governance and management of the mineral sector has never yielded very positive dividends for mineral-rich countries in the region. Minerals have fueled conflicts in the DRC and Mozambique, Debt traps in Zambia, political patronage and environmental concerns in Zimbabwe and economic inequalities in South Africa and Botswana.

So far, the EU has signed Critical Minerals Strategic Partnerships with 5 Africa green minerals rich countries and the US led Lobito Mineral Corridor partnership plan to connect the Democratic Republic Congo’s mineral rich Katanga region and Zambia with a railway line to the Angolan Port of Lobito.  Moreover, in recent months we witnessed the emergence of minerals for security deals signed between the US and Ukraine and the US with the DRC and Rwanda.  These developments offer a new geopolitical twist in this global race to secure the critical green transition minerals, pitting the developed western economic superpowers against China in the dash for Africa’s critical mineral resources. Amidst this mineral dash and geopolitical balkanization, it is feared that without strategic positioning, the Eastern and Southern Africa critical minerals rich countries could again miss out from this mineral boom.

Overview of Critical Minerals in Eastern and Southern Africa

East Africa is vastly endowed with critical minerals with Tanzania having the 5th largest graphite reserves globally (18million tons) and 1.52 million tons of high-grade nickel. With the DRC combined, the East Africa has accounts for more than 50% of Africa’s critical minerals output of graphite, copper, cobalt, coltan and nickel. The DRC holds the world’s largest cobalt reserves, accounting for about 70% global output and ranks as Africa’s largest and the world’s second-largest copper producer. The DRC government is working on policies to improve governance, local beneficiation, and attract ethical investment while reducing dependency on Chinese processing.

Despite this potential, EAC as a block has not yet maximized benefits from its mineral wealth and member states have been working on competing policies to improve governance, attract ethical investments and increase local beneficiation.

Mineral Resources in EAC

Country

Precious metal, Gemstones & Semi-Precious Metal

Metallic Minerals

Industrial minerals

Burundi

Gold

Tin, Nickel, copper, cobalt, niobium, coltan, vanadium, tungsten

Phosphate, Peat

Kenya

Gemstones, gold

Lead, zircon, iron, titanium

Soda ash, flour spar, salt, mica, chaum, oil, coal, diatomite, gypsum, meers, kaolin, rear earth

Rwanda

Gold, gemstones

Tin, tungsten, tantalum, niobium, columbium

pozzolana

Tanzania

Gold, diamond, gemstones, silver, PGMs

Nickel, bauxite, copper, cobalt, uranium, graphite

Coal, phosphate, gypsum, pozzolana, soda ash, gas

Uganda

Gold, diamond

Copper, tin, lead, nickel, cobalt, tungsten, uranium, niobium, tantalum, iron

Gypsum, kaolin, salt, vermiculite, pozzolana, marble, soapstone, rear earth, oil

Source: EAC Vision 2050 and South Sudan Development Strategy

Southern Africa holds vast deposits of the world’s critical minerals. For example, South Africa holds the largest (90%) reserves of Platinum Group Minerals (PGMs) globally[1]. South Africa and Zimbabwe account for 92% of global reserves of PGM and produced 82% of platinum globally in 2022[2].  Zambia has large Copper deposits accounting for 70% of Africa’s exports while Zimbabwe has the largest lithium reserves globally (estimated at 11 metric tons in Masvingo Province). Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia and Angola have some of the largest deposits of diamond. Angola has been diversifying beyond oil and diamonds, promoting critical minerals exploration and processing. The government is enhancing mining regulations, attracting foreign investment, and seeking strategic partnerships to develop local value chains. As one of the world’s top ten largest copper producers, Zambia is strengthening policies to boost value addition, encourage local smelting and refining, and attract Western investment. Zambia is Africa’s second-largest copper producer after Democratic Republic of Congo and the country is positioning itself as a major supplier in clean energy and EV industries.

From the above data, the Eastern and Southern Africa combined accounts for more than half of the global supply of critical minerals such as copper, coltan, platinum, graphite, manganese, nickel and lithium. In recent years there has been an increasing focus towards critical minerals with global mining exploration budgets for minerals such as lithium, copper and nickel rapidly spiking up since 2022.  This places the East and Southern Africa region at the heart of competing geopolitical interest in race for the control of critical minerals supply chains. In the midst of this rush, the Eastern and Southern Africa region countries have been competing amongst themselves and undercutting each other to attract key large-scale players in the mining sector. This race has both socio-economic, human rights and geopolitical risks and concerns.

What are the key socio-economic justice concerns in the mining sector

The history of mining in the region has not been perfect. Like in previous mining experiences generally, increased extraction of critical minerals raises serious key socio-economic justice concerns like environmental injustice, gross violation of human rights, climate change, community displacement and land grabbing, lack of transparency and accountability, corruption and unequal distribution of benefits. Such concerns have been put in even greater spotlight, where demand for these minerals worldwide began to rise and will surge over the next 20 years in support of the energy transition and technological advancements.

Mining of critical minerals is happening in new land frontiers never explored or exposed to large scale mining before. This contributes to significant environment impacts around villages and communities where they are found. Their effects range from land rights violations via new evictions to destruction of social infrastructures such as schools, hospitals and residential homes due to blasting for minerals[1]. Land degradation, dust pollution and loss of arable agricultural land through clearances for new mines affects health and livelihoods. Processing of minerals such as Lithium and Nickel requires a lot of water and this is contributing to water shortages and pollution of water sources around the mining communities[2].   

Moreover, critical minerals are driving existing and new conflicts in many African countries such as the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Mozambique. According to UN reports, the desire to control exploitation of critical minerals are a major driver for the ongoing conflict in DRC[1].

Geopolitics of Critical Minerals

The increasing demand and competition for critical minerals is driving unending geopolitical tensions over which countries can gain access to these resources and how best to manage them.  As the geopolitical competition amongst global economic superpowers; China, US, EU, Russia, United Kingdom and new emerging powers such as Australia, UAE and India has increased in recent years. The strategic partnerships and infrastructure partnerships such as the Lobito corridor have been signed.  Recently, we have witnessed the emergence of ‘Mineral for Security deals’ such as the ones signed between the US- Ukraine and the US- DRC aimed at transferring control of a portion of critical mineral supplies in exchange for security guarantees and protection. There are many geopolitical interests and tools used at play but these are the noticeable physical manifestations of this geopolitical competition for critical minerals.

The consequences of these new geopolitical realignments are diverse but alignments and signed deals force smaller countries to surrender sovereignty of their mineral natural resources by attach their political interest to the supply of critical minerals. There has been a surge in the use of counter friendshoring measures by importing countries establishing direct partnerships with exporting countries for raw critical minerals. While this may be viewed as a positive development for minerals and commodities trade, the tilted partnerships reinforce the underdevelopment of the downstream supply chain capacity for critical minerals, especially as developed countries secure the Just Energy Transition (JET) technologies. And are not willing yet to transfer this technology to the minerals source countries. The complex dynamics and intricate geopolitical forces surrounding critical minerals therefore demands a comprehensive and forward-thinking strategy to effectively navigate the evolving global landscape[2]. Without this, the risk of securing little benefits from the critical mineral wealth for Eastern and Southern Africa is real.

The EU Strategic Minerals Partnerships and implications on Africa’s critical Minerals

Amid global geopolitical tensions, the EU has been ramping up efforts to diversify its mineral value chains. The EU has forged strategic partnerships with critical minerals resource-rich African nations like Tanzania, Namibia, DRC, Zambia and Rwanda. To date the EU has established partnerships for critical raw materials with at least 14 countries[3]. These partnerships are designed to secure access to critical minerals at various stages of the value chain, strengthen European industrial resilience and accelerate the green transition of its economies while supporting Africa’s own industrialization ambitions. The EU has further established a multistakeholder partnership with the US to develop the Lobito corridor project[4]. While these partnerships are considered vital in ensuring improved mineral governance and securing investment inflows into Africa’s mining sector, on the flipside they are viewed controversially as a strategic path for continued EU dominance by tightly tying Africa as a source of raw critical materials to feed Europe’s industrial base.

The EU strategic minerals partnerships have a prospect of placing Africa as a global player in the critical minerals space and potentially securing Africa’s contributing towards a net zero future. According to the EU, the strategic partnerships will involve cooperation on supply chain integration, infrastructure financing, research and innovation, capacity building, and sustainable sourcing of minerals. With strategic leverage and tactful negotiation, Africa can potentially wean itself off the largely exploitative contracts previously signed with mining companies that were economically biased, had disregard for human rights and responsible sourcing. Without tearing the existing contracts apart, Africa can establish a new progressive framework to guide its mining

However, the EU mineral partnerships are viewed as inherently biased and pursued with less consideration of socio-economic and environmental considerations. According to SOMO, the EU strategic partnerships are not good for addressing climate change and net zero. Despite the green tint, the EU is focused on the minerals and less on the effects. Europe is ultimately pursuing a resource-intensive growth strategy to bolster its industries in profiting from low-emission technologies. This prioritization of growth neglects that affluent countries’ overconsumption of resources is the root cause of climate change and the major driver of biodiversity loss, pollution, and waste. Worse, the unfavorable trade regimes [secured under the partnerships] can prevent poor resource-rich countries from climbing up global value chains

The Lobito Corridor Initiative and its implications

The Lobito Corridor is a 1 300 km rail and infrastructure project stretching from the Angolan port of Lobito to mining regions of Kolwezi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia. Financed by the US and its EU allies, the project provides an alternative route to transport minerals such as cobalt and copper, helping to diversify mineral supply chains in the region.

According to the US Department for Finance Corporation (DFC), the Lobito corridor initiative is not just any traditional development aid project but a strategic initiative aimed at strengthening critical mineral supply chains by countering China’s dominance[1]

Justification for the Lobito Corridor Project

According to the US Department for Finance Corporation (DFC) the Lobito Corridor project is poised to spur trade, industrialization, and regional integration across Southern Africa. The advanced technologies required for the industries of the future depend on reliable access to copper and cobalt. These minerals are essential for batteries, wind farms, electric vehicles, as well as energy transmission and distribution.

But critical mineral supply chains are threatened by Chinese dominance. Companies based in China own or operate as much as 80 percent of the critical mineral production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), much of which is sent to China for processing. And China is pushing new projects to further secure its dominance, adding to the estimated $1 trillion it has spent on its global infrastructure initiative known as its Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI. 

Additionally, many of the world’s most mineral-rich countries such as the DRC lack the infrastructure to transport growing volumes of these materials to major coastal ports where they can be exported to markets around the world. DRC is the second-largest global producer of copper, and the largest producer of cobalt with a 70 percent global market share[2].

Key gains from Lobito Corridor Initiative

Offers an opportunity of revitalizing defunct infrastructure in a region severely affected by war. A railway built more than 100 years ago connecting mining sites in the DRC to the Lobito port in Angola was largely destroyed during the Angolan civil war. A reconstructed railway suffered from poor construction and upkeep. As a result, these critical minerals are currently transported by heavy-duty trucks to ports in South Africa and Tanzania over roads that can take months to travel. Growing demand for critical minerals threatens to exacerbate the problem. Analysts predict that cobalt demand will exceed the pace of production before the end of 2024 and thereby justifying the construction of new infrastructure projects such as the Lobito Corridor project[3].

The Lobito corridor project provides an opportunity for opening up new investments into the region.  According to the initial plans the US Finance Cooperation would provide a $553 million loan to the Lobito Atlantic Railway to finance the upgrade and rehabilitation of more than 800 miles (1,300 km) of the rail connecting the city of Luau on the border of the DRC to the port city of Lobito in Angola, as well as the upgrade and rehabilitation of the mineral port in Lobito.

The investment is intended to improve the cost-effectiveness, speed, and resilience of global supply chains by upgrading and rehabilitating the railway in Angola that increases the efficiency and reliability of transportation out of the DRC’s mines. And it ensures China will not secure a monopoly on critical minerals access and transit routes in this key region.  

Over the last decade, China had subsidized new construction and upgrades to rail systems in the region, including in Angola, DFC’s neighbor to the west and home to several key coastal transportation hubs, such as the Port of Lobito and the Benguela Railway that extends eastward from it into the DRC. Chinese companies and China-linked entities have worked to control regional transportation systems and restrict access to U.S. and allied businesses, creating challenges to investments in markets like the DRC. However, those projects have suffered from what The Wall Street Journal described as “poor construction and upkeep,” leading to “rundown stations, malfunctioning safety systems offline servers and frequent derailments on the train line.”

DFC’s investment will diversify away from Chinese-controlled economic corridors. It will reinforce railway tracks and bridges along the route and add containers, trains, and equipment such as mobile cranes and forklifts. These investments are expected to increase Lobito’s transportation capacity from 0.4 million metric tons per year as of the end of 2024 to 4.6 million metric tons. It will also benefit the local economy, where minerals make up 90 percent of the DRC’s total exports, accounting for 40 percent of its GDP and $30 billion in value as of last year.

 Through the upgraded railway, port, and corresponding sea routes, exports for these critical minerals to global markets are expected on average to cost 30 percent less and take 29 fewer days. Lobito and projects like will bolster trade access in and around Angola. The coordination led by DFC—which is poised to expand to new projects— presents a boom for U.S. industries, with Angolan organizations already looking to source equipment from the United States for mining, storage, and other integral elements of the project. 

More broadly, the Lobito project strengthens Angola’s role as a key security and economic partner of the United States and as a leader in Sub-Saharan Africa working to resolve issues—including those that affect American interests such as the peace process in eastern DRC. Angolan President João Lourenço also recently assumed the role of chairman of the African Union, and the Lobito project is considered as a potential lever for influencing positions and securing other strategic projects across Africa.  

According to the US DFC, within Angola, the project will upgrade critical infrastructure to international standards and will ensure that access to rail remains open to all paying customers. It is expected to create a 30% reduction in shipping costs and 29 day reduction in shipping time as a result of the DFC’s investment in the Lobito Atlantic Railway. Moreover, it is expected to generate significant local income there, with total local procurement of goods and services expected to reach more than $350 million within the first five years.  

And it is expected to create more than 1,000 new full-time jobs for Angolans, growing the existing workforce from 434 to more than 1,500. Other support projects will benefit from the investments in the Lobito Corridor.   For example, a $10 million loan from DFC to Seba Foods Zambia Ltd. is designed to support the expansion of its food production and storage capacity for maize-based, soya-based, and other nutritious and affordable consumer food products, strengthening the food value chain in Zambia, which is on the eastern end of the Lobito Corridor. Seba Foods was the first U.S. Government-financed food security and agribusiness-focused investment following the announcement of the vision for the Lobito Corridor. 

The Lobito Corridor initiative exemplifies the competition, with the US and EU aligning efforts to establish stronger supply chains. China, already investing heavily, aims to enhance its Belt and Road Initiative along the corridor. The US has indicated that China can still utilize the railway for its exports. The US-China cooperation on this project may create new avenues for sustainable development in Africa. If the two superpowers align their Lobito strategies, it could accelerate Africa’s green industrialization. Jointly-driven investments would align with Africa’s broader economic growth and sustainable development goals. Africa’s potential for growth will attract both powers, as both seek competitive positions within the Lobito Corridor. China has already recently signed a $1 billion deal to restore the TAZARA railway[4].

Key concerns of the Lobito Corridor Initiative
CSOs are concerned the Lobito Corridor project exemplifies the geopolitical interests to serve the US and EU interests rather than Africa (Zambia Angola & DRC’s) interests. As clearly stated by the US and the EU, the Lobito corridor initiative is intended to strategically increase the US and EU’s dominance and security of access to Africa’s critical minerals supply chains and diversifying Africa away from Chinese-controlled economic corridors. This project is therefore largely driven by external interests and Africa finds itself in the middle of these competing geopolitical interests.

The project exacerbates the colonial hinterland to port extractive infrastructure, designed with a major purpose of extracting and transporting Africa’s resources as raw materials from the hinterland to the port ready for export to benefit elsewhere. The Lobito initiative railway project has no interconnection with other transport nodes to facilitate in country mobility and connectivity to other economic sectors. It is therefore designed with an exploitative lens driven with an ‘extract and take away’ mindset, with less beneficial considerations to the broader national public concerns. Financing of arteries linking the railway to other transport infrastructures would address significant infrastructure problems affecting millions of people across the countries in the corridor. For example, an East-West railway connection could link Lobito and TAZARA routes, creating Africa’s first transcontinental railway. Such a corridor could bridge the Atlantic and Indian ocean[1].

The project will be financed with loans acquired from the US and EU, whose payment will be recouped from revenues from the operations and sale of the critical minerals. This is ironical as the lenders will be the major beneficiaries from the mineral export. The long-term net effect or benefit from these may be negligible as the debt burden for the corridor countries (Angola, DRC and Zambia) will increase and they may be forced to pay using their minerals resources.

The strategic partnerships and Lobito corridor project have no plans to investment in critical minerals value addition with in the participating countries. As a consequence, the project may consolidate Africa’s exclusion from the critical minerals global value chain, locking Africa to lower tier of the value chain as a supplier of critical raw materials.   Current studies and evidence show that Africa integration in the Global Value Chain is largely through forward linkages whereby it primarily provides unprocessed raw materials to feed the industrial development and economic prosperity elsewhere.

For example , the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and UNCTAD data shows that the DRC and Zambia refine only about 7% and 3.5% of all the copper produced, which is far much lower than their share in the global production.[2] In recent years China has emerged as the leading processor of critical minerals (Lithium, Copper, Nickel & Cobalt) implying that Africa’s minerals are exported raw, processed and re-exported back to Africa as intermediary or finished goods.

Moreover, the Lobito corridor does not promote intra Africa trade in minerals and therefore runs contrary to Africa’s mineral and economic development ambitions as articulated in the various propositions of the Africa Unions Agenda 2063 and the Africa Mining Vision particularly in regards to regional cooperation and beneficiation. The USGS report for 2023 shows that African Minerals are largely traded with countries outside Africa. For instance, the DRC accounts for 77% of Africa’s cobalt exports, however, its intra Africa links are few. This suggests its trade is largely more with countries outside the continent. Several countries with insignificant cobalt reserves and production re-export more beneficiated cobalt through regional networks as indicated in the table below, reaping bigger economic benefits from added value. 

Table showing Africa Major Critical Minerals Export Destination, Intra Africa Trade and Linkages

Africa Critical Mineral

Top Five Global Export Destinations

Africa trading partners

Intra Africa trade share

Implication

Cobalt

China (72%), Belgium (2%), Malaysia (2%), Switzerland (2%)

Zambia, Namibia, Morocco, Congo, Madagascar, South Africa, DR Congo, Mali, Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, and Kenya.

South Africa (1%), DRC (89% to Zambia, Namibia and Morocco), Congo (4.4%), Zambia (3.5%)

The top five global destinations consume 80% of Africa’s cobalt

More of DRC’s cobalt is re-exported by other countries.

Graphite

China (28%), Germany (15%), India (9%), USA (7%) and Malaysia (7%)

Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Niger, Guinea, Tanzania, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Sudan, Namibia, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, Mozambique, Cameroon, Egypt, 30 Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mauritius, Ghana, Botswana, Libya, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, and Mali.

South Africa (51%), Tanzania (14%), Seychelle (12%), Kenya & Morocco (3%).

The top five global destinations account for 64% of Africa’s Graphite export

These countries export to fewer African countries. Tanzania only has eight intra-Africa graphite export links (Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, DR Congo, Burundi, Comoros and Madagascar, while Seychelles has one (South Africa)

Lithium

France (7%), USA (5%), Russia (1%) Germany & China (2%)

36 African Countries

DRC (77%), South Africa (15%), Morocco (1%), Tanzania (1%)

The top five consume 15% of Africa total lithium exports from at 36 countries

DRC has the lowest intra exports links to Africa while South Africa, Kenya and Morrocco lead in number of intra Africa export links.

Managanese

China (58%), India (10%), Norway (5%), Japan (4%), and Russia (3%)

31 African Countries

Morocco (42%), Zambia (11%), South Africa (20%), Ghana (1%)

These countries account for about 80% of Africa’s Manganese exports outside Africa.

Morocco, South Africa, and Zambia (in consecutive order) emerge as countries with the highest intra-Africa export shares for Manganese.

South Africa and Kenya have the highest intra-Africa export links.

Platinum Group of Metals (PGM)

United Kingdom accounting for about 28%, Japan 17%, Belgium about 15%, United States of America 12% and Germany 9%.

45 Countries

Zimbabwe (86%), Ghana and DRC (3%),

These countries account for about 89% of Africa’s PGM export outside the region

South Africa has the highest intra-Africa export links to thirteen countries, followed by Swaziland and Malawi

 

In the long run, the Lobito corridor project will potentially weaken further existing limited intra Africa linkages and collaborative projects by setting up or creating an unfavorable competition for already existing infrastructure such as the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) and the Ports of Dar es Salaam, Beira in Mozambique and Durban, which have recently received major uplifts with costly loans from China and other global financial institutions such as the World Bank.

The Lobito Corridor project excludes itself from other major problems facing mining in the region, including addressing previous economic injustices and human rights related issues, the long-term effects of war and climate change. Because of the fear of being edged out by China, the Lobito corridor project does not come with stringent requirements and expectation for adherence to high human rights standards by the partner countries.

Mineral for Security Deals and implications on Africa’s critical minerals.

Amidst the ongoing geopolitical interest for critical minerals, recently we have witnessed the emergence of Minerals for Security Guarantee deals as a tool for control of access to critical minerals supply chains. On 30th April 2025 the US signed a Minerals for security deal with Ukraine and in June, the US signed a Mineral for Security deal with the DRC and Rwanda. The deals provide access to critical minerals in return for security guarantees from the US. Although the deals have been covered with a peace and conflict resolution imperative, they are essentially aimed at securing the US’s access to critical minerals.

According to Global witness, the deals like the extraction and trade of some critical minerals intensify new geopolitical tensions, reinforcing long-standing patterns of exploitation[3] including conflicts. The Trump Ukraine deal revealed a connection of critical minerals to the Russia and Ukraine war and how critical mineral natural resources in Ukraine have become a key bargaining chip in international diplomacy between the US and Russia.

In fact, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo reached out to the Donald Trump administration with a Ukrainian-style proposal in February 2025 in response to the rapid advance of the M23 rebel group in the east of the country. At stake are the mineral riches of North and South Kivu provinces, a major but highly problematic source of metals such as tin, tungsten and coltan[4].

According to different sources, this deal was presented as a pacification tool for eastern DRC and once signed could boost Rwanda’s processing of Congo minerals while providing the US with an assured source of processed critical minerals required to support its industrial technology and security needs.

The full contents of deal are not readily available to the public but leaked versions mentioned requirements for withdrawal of Rwandan Forces from the Eastern DRC and integration of the M23 belligerent factions into the DRC’s forces.

The mineral deals essentially consolidate a firm grip of the US on access to DRC’s critical minerals, closing off competition against other potential rival countries such as China and Russia, there by exacerbating grounds for economic injustice, opacity, lack of transparency and potential for unfair mining deals, biased in favour of the security guarantors. Mineral deals are tainted with opacity, designed with a biased exploitative and a perceived neocolonial mindset aimed at rewarding the dominant superpower and the aggressor against the victim. They are negotiated behind closed doors and their full terms are not availed neither to the public nor the citizens of the mineral rich country.

According to Kambale Musavuli of the Centre for Research on Congo-Kinshasa, the US brokered deal between the DRC and Rwanda is wild. The US is getting access to $2 trillion of worth of DRC minerals in exchange for forcing the withdrawal of Rwandan backed M23 militias. That is one tenth of the DRC’s total mineral wealth, more than any single foreign country claims. This is strange because analysts of the region have long argued that the US effectively enabled Rwandan support for the M23 in order to destabilise the DRC, prevent a functional state from arising and achieving sovereignty over its mineral wealth, and thus ensure minerals stay cheaply available for US firms. If this analysis is correct then the US has just acquired $2 trillion mineral rights in exchange for stopping a conflict that it has effectively supported. Consider also how medi discourse is playing out. Remember that in 2008 Chinese firms signed a deal with the DRC to obtain $9billion in minerals in exchange for infrastructure development. Western media went wild with narratives of “Chinese colonization”. Now the US has secured minerals deal 200x larger and the media narrative is all about how the US brings “peace”

The mining security deals were negotiated in secrecy led by political elites and diplomats. As such citizens are disempowered from having a say in the future management of a vital sector, whose benefits are signed off to another country by a few, dashing hopes for citizens stake into a better future.

The minimum threshold of minerals signed off in the form of US mining companies investing in the critical minerals sector is not clear and whether the DRC has any stake at what percentage in the minerals extracted by the US companies is largely unknown.

The deals potentially open up a can of worms for future similar deals, covering natural resources such as forestry, wild life management and critical infrastructure such as ports, airports, water ways and food supply chains.

Moreover, the deals may not be a permanent solution to ongoing conflicts. The mineral for security deals largely covers security guarantees against ‘external aggression’ and may not be fitted for dealing with internal political and socio-economic drivers for conflict such as historical injustices, land and citizenship rights, regional economic imbalances, bad governance and banditry. Local insurgent rebel groups and militias may continue to pursue their political and economic ends outside the ambits of the security deal. For example, on the very day that the US-DRC and Rwanda deal was signed, one of the rebel groups, Codeco militia attacked and killed at least 10 people at a displaced people’s camp in Ituri province.  There are more than 100 rebel groups in Eastern DRC. The M23 which was largely mentioned in the US deal has already described it as a tiny part’ of a solution to the conflict.

Further, the security guarantees provided under the deal are not clear. It is not clear what these mean and when and how such guarantees can be deployed. For instance, does security guarantee mean supply of arms or armed mercenaries, military intervention or alliances with US soldiers fighting alongside or against the aggressor. Moreover, it is not clear whether the US can be directly involved in fighting internal rebel groups and insurgents without triggering nationalistic and constitutional challenges, driving internal political conflicts further.

By nature, deals of this nature are long term and cannot easily be breached without consequences. The terms and consequences for such breach are less known to the public. The conditions for termination or renegotiation are equally not known.  Therefore, the mineral security agreement essentially locks countries towards dealing with one major economic superpower whose primary interest is access to the country’s critical mineral wealth.

Conclusion

The EU strategic partnerships, the mineral security guarantee deals and the Lobito project may entirely not be a bad idea, however their implicit risks cast shadows about their potential in advancing Africa’s critical minerals and economic development goals. The key concerns around these strategic mineral alliances and the Lobito Corrido are embedded within the broader critical development discourse of recolonization and recolonization, sovereignty, security and resource nationalism, state capture, perpetration of socio-economic injustices by dominant global capital and Africa’s wealth transfer. Specific concerns include risks for increasing mineral bad governance and economic injustices and vulnerabilities, geopolitical tension, and the need to pursue sustainable mining practices.

With these strategic partnerships, mineral for security deals and the Lobito railway in place, these countries are locked into long-term commitments to ensure the supply of metals. Without good governance and value addition,  Africa’s critical minerals will benefit others elsewhere. Over dependence on certain countries can pose risks when such countries face political instability or become embroiled in geopolitical disputes drawing in Africa’s mineral rich countries in their midst. For these alliances to be mutually beneficial, they must ensure that the resources are accessed equitably, that benefits are fairly distributed, and that environmental impacts are kept to a minimum for their sustainability in the long run.

Recommendations
  1. The strategic partnerships must go beyond critical minerals exploitation but venture into addressing broader social economic development concerns of the people in the mineral rich countries.
  2. The Lobito Corridor initiative must avoid the ‘hinterland to port’ colonial legacy by establishing railway transport interconnection nodes to other existing railway infrastructure so as to improve connectivity across the project countries to ease the bigger infrastructure challenges that these countries face.
  3. The strategic partnership and Lobito Corridor must encourage value addition by investing in processing and exporting of value-added products, so as to generate wealth at source.
  4. Africa Mineral rich countries must explore and establish south to south partnerships, thereby increasing their leverage and power to negotiate with external partners and mining companies
  5. The EU strategic partnerships and the Lobito Corridor project must not exacerbate the role of minerals as drivers of conflict by supporting and buying minerals from conflict zones.
  6. Moreover, these alliances must ensure that the resources are accessed equitably, that benefits are fairly distributed, and that environmental impacts are kept to a minimum for their sustainability in the long run.
  7. The Minerals for security deals must be transparent and not biased exclusively in favour of the dominant economic super power.
  8. The Minerals for Security deals must avoid advancing human rights abuses by US mining companies under the US government protection
  9. The strategic partnerships, security deals and their associated projects must promote national dialogues and citizens participation in governance of critical minerals and mitigation of harm from mining
Selected References

Andreoni et al., (2023) Critical Minerals and routes to diversification in Africa: Linkages, pulling dynamics and Opportunities in medium-high tech supply chains; Backup paper commissioned by the UNCTAD Secretariate for the 2023 edition of the Economic Development in Africa Reports

Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

EITI; Using Transparence Benefits EU Mineral Partnerships; Accessed via https://eiti.org/blog-post/using-transparency-benefit-eus-mineral-partnerships

Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via  https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025

IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[1] https://www.railway.supply/en/us-china-lobito-corridor-investments-drive-africas-economic-and-sustainable-growth/

[2] Andreoni et al., (2023) Critical Minerals and routes to diversification in Africa: Linkages, pulling dynamics and Opportunities in medium-high tech supply chains; Backup paper commissioned by the UNCTAD Secretariate for the 2023 edition of the Economic Development in Africa Reports

[3] Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via  https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025

[4] Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

[1] US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.

[2] ibid

[3] ibid

[4] https://www.railway.supply/en/us-china-lobito-corridor-investments-drive-africas-economic-and-sustainable-growth/

[1] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[2] ibid

[3] https://eiti.org/blog-post/using-transparency-benefit-eus-mineral-partnerships

[4] https://ecfr.eu/event/critical-minerals-and-eu-africa-strategic-partnerships-where-do-we-stand/

[1] BHRT: Briefing on “Human Rights Incidents in Transition Minerals; Quarter 1: January-March 2025

[2] Emerging Human Rights Implications of Transition Minerals Extraction and processing: Case Studies from Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Zimbabwe

[1] https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202505/critical-minerals-and-metals-strategy-south-africa-2025.pdf

[2] https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/edar2023_BP1_en.pdf

Webinar on Geopolitics of Critical Minerals and implications for Eastern and Southern Africa

Topic: An Analysis of the strategic gains and risks offered by the EU Strategic Partnership, Lobito Corridor and Minerals for Security deals on East and Southern Africa’s Critical Transition Minerals

The surging demand for minerals critical to green transition offers potential economic benefits for mineral rich countries however the dash to secure their supply chain has kicked off geopolitical interests, competition and realignments whose outcomes could have long lasting relationship with divergent unforeseen impacts.

With the Eastern and Southern Africa combined as a single economic bloc, the region has the highest concentration of critical green transition minerals such as cobalt, coltan, nickel, graphite, tungsten, tantalum, copper in the world. Yet the history of governance and management of the mineral sector has never yielded very positive dividends for mineral-rich countries in the region. Minerals have fueled conflicts in the DRC and Mozambique, Debt traps in Zambia, political patronage and environmental concerns in Zimbabwe and economic inequalities in South Africa and Botswana.

This webinar will provide an overview of the critical mineral wealth in Eastern and Southern Africa with a particular focus on the strategic gains and risks that geopolitical initiatives such as the EU Strategic Minerals Partnerships, the Lobito Corridor and emerging minerals for security deals offer. It is estimated that the mining industry needs to invest $1.7 trillion over the next 15 years to extract and supply enough metals for renewable energy and Africa possess almost half of these.   

The webinar will discuss the geostrategic machinations at play by superpowers such as the US, Europe, Russia and China in the context of the dash for control of critical minerals for the green transition and the current extractive governance challenges facing the region. While strategic alliances may not entirely be a bad idea, there are concerns over the underlying possible geopolitical, security and perceived neocolonial undertones that may come with these initiatives.

And how the historical socio-economic justice concerns of similar geopolitical jostling, security guarantees at the Berlin conference and hinterland to port initiatives contributed to the colonial exploitation of Africa’s resources for benefits elsewhere. Moreover, the mineral for security deals are tainted with opacity, designed with a biased potentially exploitative and a perceived neocolonial mindset aimed at rewarding the dominant superpower and the aggressor against the victim in exchange for its resource. The minerals for security deals are negotiated behind closed doors and their full terms are not availed neither to the public nor the citizens of the mineral rich country.

Amidst this mineral dash and possible geopolitical balkanization, it is feared that without strategic positioning, the Eastern and Southern Africa critical minerals rich countries could again miss out from this mineral boom.

Our expert speakers at this webinar will delve deeper into this topic, highlighting on the possible risks and benefits that the region can garner from these initiatives and measures the region can take so as to avert the risks and maximize benefits from these partnerships. This webinar is organized by the Governance and Economic Policy Centre in Collaboration with Botswana Watch Organisation. 

Our distinguished speakers will be

  1. Ketakandriana Rafitoson, Executive Director, Resource Justice Network (formerly PWYP): Key concerns for critical minerals Governance and our desired sustainable future. Dr Ketakandriana is a political scientist, researcher, activist, and human rights defender with distinguished career in anti-corruption, where she served as leader of Transparency International Chapter in Madagascar. Her work mainly focuses on issues of resource governance, anti-corruption, citizens’ participation, good governance and democracy.

 

  1. Adriano Nuvunga, Executive Director, Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (CDD), Mozambique: The Geopolitics of critical minerals, neocolonial extractivism and conflict. Prof Adriano Nuvunga is a Mozambican scholar, anti-corruption advocate and human rights defender. He is the director of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CDD), an organization that promotes democracy and protects human rights in Mozambique and Professor of professor of political science and governance at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. He has widely published on resource governance and violence in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province.

 

  1. Mr Robert Lestatsi, Executive Director, Botswana Watch Organisation; Assessing the Lobito corridor project and Africa’s desired benefits from critical mineral wealth. Robert Letsatsi is the Executive Director of Botswana Watch (BW), an organization focused on promoting transparency and accountability in Botswana. He is also involved with the PWYP coalition in Botswana and the UNCAC Coalition, an international anti-corruption network. Additionally, he has been involved in advocacy of mineral resource governance and training on human rights violations, in collaboration with Ditshwanelo – The Botswana Centre for Human Rights.
  1. Moses Kulaba, Executive Director, Governance and Economic Policy Centre, Moderator. Mr Moses Kulaba is a Governance and political economist, tax law expert and economic diplomat with more than 20 years of active service in international public, private and civil society sector.  Prior to joining GEPC he served as the East Africa Regional Manager for the Natural Resources Governance Institute, where he worked with various stakeholders including governments to advance governance of the extractive sector. Has served on the international board of the EITI and in consultancy roles for DFID , the EU and the UN on governance, extractives and peace processes in Eastern and Africa Great Lakes region.

 Date: 30th July, 2025

Time: 12pm EAT, 11 AM Gaborone (CAT) and 9 AM Lagos

Login:  https://us05web.zoom.us/j/84450912293?pwd=lwabYIwsvJ27A8bP0v8hVQpaUOaYQ3.1

Meeting ID: 844 5091 2293

Passcode: 7XFcHc

Critical Minerals Certification: Do Mineral Certification Mechanisms Reduce harm? A Look at the Kimberley Process, ICGLR, RMI, and OECD”

Authors:  Moses Kulaba and Roger Vutsoro, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

 

This short analytical study explores the existing   national, regional and global certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly Process, ICGLR, OECD Due diligence measures, Responsible Mining Initiatives in the quagmire of improving of minerals governance. It entangles and assesses the increasing perceptions (based on evidence from countries such as the DRC) that the current certification regime is running dangerously obsolete, not designed for critical minerals and thus needs a review and realignment for new purpose, including proposing measures that go beyond the current regional certification.

Decades ago, mineral certification was mooted as a solution to addressing the chronic problems of illegal mining, mineral smuggling and mineral driven conflicts, economic injustices and impunity in mineral rich countries.  To this regard, regional and global mineral certification mechanisms were developed with countries and mining companies required to sign up to these new certification principle and mechanisms. However, decades after, minerals continue to be drivers of conflict and harm in many countries.

As the appetite for Critical or Transitional minerals required for the green and clean energy industrial technology gains gusto momentum, there are concerns that this new mineral dash may exacerbate corruption, conflict and suffering in critical minerals rich countries. Apart from calls to establish regional value chains, there is evidence to suggest that a proper global certification mechanism should be put in place to ensure responsive sourcing of critical minerals and that their extraction does not lead to further harm.

What is mineral certification

 

Mineral certification is a process that verifies the origin and legitimacy of minerals, ensuring they are not associated with conflict or human rights abuses. It involves tracing minerals from the mine site to the final point of export and confirming they are free from illegal activities. This helps to prevent the financing of armed groups and other illicit activities linked to mineral extraction. This certification involves a thorough verification process to trace the minerals’ origin and verify they are free from illegal financing, armed group involvement, and human rights abuses.

At face value, this sounds like a good measure, however existing mechanisms of a similar nature such as the Kimberly process, ICGLR certification initiative and the OECD Due diligence measures have not succeeded in fully addressing the issue of conflict minerals and mineral smuggling. In Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, minerals continue to be a driver of conflict and mineral smuggling to neighboring countries is still rife.  This therefore puts to question the efficacy of the existing global certification mechanism in strengthening governance, regulating supply, improving ethical mining business conduct and reducing harm from extractive resources.

Existing major Regional and Global Mineral Certification regimes

 

The Kimberly Process Certification System (KPCS)

The Kimberly Process (KPCS) is a global standard certification process established in 2003 by the United Nations General Assembly (Under resolution 55/56) to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the mainstream diamond market.  KPCS was set up to ensure that diamonds as precious minerals are sourced and traded in a responsible manner, reducing financing conflicts and human rights violation. KPCS has laid out requirements for participating member countries to comply including[1]

  1. Enforcement of regulatory standards to control export and import of rough diamonds
  2. Principles of transparent practices to ensure integrity of the diamond supply chains
  3. Selective trading with only KP certified and compliant members
  4. Verification of exports to ensure every traded diamond is accompanied by a conflict free certificate.

Member countries are obliged to enforce these standards. To date 60 participants (representing 86 countries) are signatory members to the Kimberley process and have committed to applying KP principles in the certification of its traded diamonds. The standards require that;

  • Participant countries must enforce stringent legal and regulatory standards to control the import and export of rough diamonds and ensure adherence to KP requirements.
  • Participants commit to transparent practices, which are crucial for the integrity of the diamond supply chain, by exchanging accurate and timely statistical data.
  • Trade is permitted only between certified KP members who comply fully with these international standards, safeguarding the legitimacy of the diamond trade.
  • Every diamond export is closely inspected and must be accompanied by a valid KP certificate, certifying that the diamonds are conflict-free to prevent the entry of illicit stones into the market.
National Level Governance and Implementation of the Kimberly Process; A case of Tanzania

 

In Tanzania the Kimberly Process Office is situated in the Mining Commission, an Institution within the Ministry of Minerals. This office is responsible for the implementation of the KPCS activities, import and export of rough diamond; the office is under the authority of the Executive Secretary. The Mining Commission works closely with the Tanzania Revenue Authority’s Customs Department, Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service and the Police Force for strengthening internal control. The Kimberley Process Office forms a part of the Mineral Audit and Trade Department, which is under the Director for Mineral Audit and Trade who assists the Executive Secretary in administering the KPCS activities. The office issues Annual reports.

Before the issuance of Kimberley Process Certificate, the exporter of rough diamonds must submit a valid Dealer’s license/Mining license, which allows him to export minerals outside Tanzania. The Dealer’s license indicates full address, type of minerals, the premises and signature of Executive Secretary or a person authorized to sign. The exporter fills the application form which indicates license type, license number, weight, value, source of diamonds to confirm that diamonds are conflict free, place of export and declaration of exporter by putting his/her signature, name and qualification to apply for a certificate and pays to the government USD 100 as an application fee for Kimberley Process certificate. Post to the valuation process, the exporter is required to pay royalty (6% of a value) and inspection fee (1% of value) to the Government.

Any person who contravenes any of the provision in Diamond trading regulation commits an offence and liable:  In case of an individual to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine not exceeding US dollar twenty thousand (US$ 20,000) or to both. In case of body corporate, to a fine not exceeding US dollar one hundred thousand (US$ 100,000), or c. Cancelation of his license and permanently be disqualified from prospecting, mining or dealing in diamond and any other minerals.  Any rough diamonds obtained contrary to the provisions of Diamond trading regulations shall be forfeited in addition to other penalties[2].

The International Conference on Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Mineral Certification Measures

 

The ICGLR Certification mechanism was developed to address the persistent of mineral driven conflicts in the Africa Great Lakes region. It aims to create a conducive environment for cooperation among member states while also ensuring the protection and well-being of the people living in the Africa Great Lakes region.

The ICGLR Certificate confirms a mineral shipment is conflict-free and meets the ICGLR’s ethical sourcing standards, ensuring it’s free from illegal influence and responsibly traced from mine to market. This certification involves a thorough verification process to trace the minerals’ origin and verify they are free from illegal financing, armed group involvement, and human rights abuses. It provides buyers with the assurance that the minerals meet ICGLR requirements for transparency, legality, and responsible sourcing, supporting ethical supply chains in the region[3].

Currently the DRC, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi are members to the ICGLR’s certification mechanism. Mineral flows are analyzed via an ICGLR Regional Database, using the data on individual shipments collected and transmitted to the ICGLR by each Member States.  The database is verified annually via ICGLR Third Party Audits. The mechanism is viewed as an important regional standard and tool for enhancing collaboration, transparency, and development in Africa’s Great Lakes region, promoting accountability and encouraging businesses to pursue certification for adherence.  
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Mineral Supply Chain

Requires that company supply chains of all minerals from conflict affected and high-risk areas, must respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral or metal purchasing decisions and practices. Recognizes that trade and investment in natural mineral resources hold great potential for generating income, growth and prosperity, sustaining livelihoods and fostering local development. However, a large share of these resources is located in conflict affected and high-risk areas. In these areas, exploitation of natural mineral resources is significant and may contribute, directly or indirectly, to armed conflict, gross human rights violations and hinder economic and social development[4].

The OECD Due Diligence Guidance is considered as the first example of a collaborative government-backed multi-stakeholder initiative on responsible supply chain management of minerals from conflict-affected areas. Its objective is to help companies respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral sourcing practices[5].

The Guidance is also intended to cultivate transparent mineral supply chains and sustainable corporate engagement in the mineral sector with a view to enabling countries to benefit from their mineral resources and preventing the extraction and trade of minerals from becoming a source of conflict, human rights abuses, and insecurity. With its Supplements on Tin, Tantalum, Tungsten and Gold, the OECD Guidance provides companies with a complete package to source minerals responsibly in order for trade in those minerals to support peace and development and not conflict[6]

Responsible Minerals Initiative

 

The Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) is a voluntary membership body of companies and industry players with a vision to ensure that mineral supply chains contribute positively to social economic development globally. It seeks to promote the common goal of understanding and contributing to mitigating the salient social and environmental impacts of extraction and processing of minerals in supply chains. It leverages partnerships and use of international standards such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights or the OECD Due Diligence Guidance as our guideposts[7].

Comprised of more than 500 member companies; the Responsible Minerals Initiative is considered one of the most utilized and respected resources for companies from a range of industries addressing responsible mineral sourcing issues in their supply chains. RMI provides companies with tools and resources to make sourcing decisions that improve regulatory compliance and support responsible sourcing of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. RMI undertakes due diligence, assurance and reporting templates for cobalt, gold, tin, tungsten, tin, tantalum and other minerals.

The Nexus between Critical Minerals, Conflict and Harm

 

There is a strong connection between the extraction and trade of certain minerals and the exacerbation of armed conflicts and instability in various regions, particularly in developing countries. Globally, critical minerals fueling Green Tech are also fueling conflict[8] Armed groups often exploit the demand for these minerals (like tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold, collectively known as “conflict minerals”) to fund their operations, including the purchase of weapons[9]. This reliance on minerals to fuel conflict can lead to human rights abuses environmental degradation, and social unrest, hindering sustainable development. 

Critical minerals such as bauxite, manganese cobalt, lithium and uranium have fuelled conflicts in the DRC, Guinea, Niger, Mali, Chad and Central Africa Republic[10] Myanmar has also experienced a post-coup rush for control over its rare earth minerals, while Latin American countries like Chile and Colombia are grappling with how to ensure that their lithium wealth benefits local economies rather than multinational corporations[11].

Critical Minerals and conflict; A case for DRC

 

Multiple reports produced by UN and Civil society show that the ongoing violence in the DRC is linked to mineral extraction, with rebel insurgents motivated by a desire to extract from the region’s vast cobalt and coltan reserves. Since the onset of the infamous second Congo War in 1998, control over the DRC’s vast mineral resources has fuelled conflict between armed groups and militias. These factions fight over mining territories, using profits from the illegal extraction and smuggling of conflict minerals to finance their operations and purchase weapons. The struggle for control over mineral-rich areas has led to prolonged violence, contributing to the deaths of millions and leaving entire regions destabilized[12]. 

In the DRC, according to the UN Group of Experts, the M23 established control over the mineral-rich area and created a new transportation route to Rwanda. Through taxation and smuggling of minerals, the armed group is financially benefiting from DRC’s mineral resources. It’s estimated that the group is receiving approximately $800,000 USD monthly from the production and trade of minerals at Rubaya.

While some mine sites in eastern DRC may not be directly affected by the conflict, early 2025started with violence in Goma (a major mineral export and transit hub), as well as insecurity moving towards South Kivu with recent clashes in in Nyabibwe, a mineral rich area known for 3Ts and gold, located halfway between Goma and Bukavu. As of mid-February, the M23 had occupied Bukavu, another major mineral export and transit hub in the region.

Recent reports also indicate armed groups in Ituri Province are forming alliances with the M23, while new violence in the province has sparked worries of a larger regional conflict. The UN Group of Experts estimated that armed groups based in Ituri Province generated approximately $140 million USD in 2024, dwarfing the illicit revenue generated by 3Ts[13] Other armed militias and groups such as Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are equally benefiting from the loot.

In light of this reality, the abundance of critical minerals offers a potential opportunity for economic wellbeing but the geopolitics and the dash for their control and extraction has potential of increasing conflicts in Africa[14]  According to Global witness, the extraction and trade of some critical minerals is intensifying new geopolitical tensions and reinforcing long-standing patterns of exploitation[15] including conflicts.

The Trump Ukraine deal revealed a connection of critical minerals to the Russia and Ukraine war and how natural resources in Ukraine have become a key bargaining chip in international diplomacy between the US and Russia. In the same perspective, the US and the Democratic Republic of Congo are close to sign a minerals-for-security deal, highlighting the increase role of critical minerals in geopolitics and conflict.

In fact, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo reached out to the Donald Trump administration with a Ukrainian-style proposal in February 2025 in response to the rapid advance of the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group in the east of the country. The U.S. government has responded enthusiastically with a flurry of negotiations aimed at ending a decades-long conflict born out of the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

The political momentum is building towards a potential peace deal between Congo and Rwanda to be accompanied by bilateral minerals deals between both countries and the United States.  At stake are the mineral riches of North and South Kivu provinces, a major but highly problematic source of metals such as tin, tungsten and coltan[16].

According to different sources, this deal once signed could boost Rwanda processing of Congo minerals and provide the US with an assured source of processed critical minerals required to support its industrial technology and security needs.

 Gaps and why a new regime for mineral certification is required

 

The existing major regional and global mineral certification regimes have significant gaps that necessitate that a new regime is developed.

  • Narrowness in focus and scope: Existing certification mechanisms such KP are narrow in scope largely target diamonds and were not designed to cover a broader mining sector. The ICGLR covers the 3Ts and gold. The emergency of a wider list of critical minerals adds a new context which the KP and ICGLR certification mechanisms were not designed for.
  • Voluntary mechanisms; The existing mechanisms are largely voluntary and member states companies encouraged to join and comply with the standards. For instance, the 21st meeting of the CIRGL Regional Committee on the fight against the illegal exploitation of natural resources recommended CIRGL Secretariat to compile a comprehensive report on the status of implementation of the six tools of the regional certification mechanism. This report revealed that the Republic of Rwanda has not yet established the traceability chain for gold. Instead, Rwanda controls gold extraction and trade using conventional methods and does not issue ICGLR certificates for gold exports[17].”
  • Limited in geographical and legal scope: For instance, the OECD Due diligence Guidance is largely applicable to companies from OECD member countries but with limited enforcement mechanisms in non-OECD countries. Yet mining companies from non-OECD Countries such as China are emerging as the leading exploiters of Africa’s critical minerals according to WTO reports[18]. from the DRC. Chinese based companies own or operate 80 percent of the critical mineral production in the DRC, much of which is sent to China for processing for export via the global supply chain[19] Moreover the ICGLR is confined to its member states while the RMI covers only its 500 members.
  •  
  • Illicit smuggling and trading in conflict minerals continue despite the presence of current certification mechanisms. For instance, despite its membership to the Kimberley Process (KP) and ICGLR commitments, Tanzania’s diamond sector is reported as facing entrenched governance challenges: opaque supply chains, smuggling, and minimal community benefits. Tanzania’s diamonds have suffered from environmental concerns, price volatility from synthetics and smuggled diamonds from regional conflicts areas[20].

Moreover, critical minerals including diamonds are smuggled across borders, transacted in established commercial capitals and hubs such as Kigali, Kampala, Nairobi and Dubai. For instance, a Global Witness investigation report indicates that an international commodities trader Traxys bought conflict coltan smuggled from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Rwanda[21] The investigation revealed that the multibillion-dollar company headquartered in Luxembourg bought 280 tonnes of coltan from Rwanda in 2024 based on customs documents seen by Global Witness.

Analysis by Global Witness of trade data and testimonies from two coltan smugglers suggested that a big share of the coltan Traxys bought from Rwanda was connected to the ongoing war in the east of DRC. African Panther’s coltan exports soared to unprecedented volumes in 2024, exceeding the combined total of the export volumes recorded over the previous four years. This increase in exports coincided with the escalation of the war in North Kivu and increased smuggling of conflict coltan from Rubaya, further suggesting that an important share of African Panther’s 2024 exports was smuggled from conflict zones in DRC[22].

Despite having limited or no known deposits and operational mines, some countries in East Africa and the Middle East have emerged as leading exporters of critical minerals such as cobalt, lithium and coltan.  Study reports show large volumes of critical minerals transacted via East Africa to foreign markets such as the UAE and China[23].  For instance, in 2025 Kenyan authorities intercepted 10 containers of suspected smuggled copper at the port of Mombasa[24]  These illicitly acquired, smuggled and transacted minerals have found market into the UAE and Western capitals in Switzerland and New York. In 2023 alone, Kenya’s exports of copper to the United Arab Emirates were valued at US$22.27 million. The UAE exports mineral products, including critical minerals, in significant quantities, primarily to Japan, China, and India.

  • Ongoing critical minerals driven conflicts and the rise of new geopolitical conflicts in producer countries: The ongoing mineral driven conflicts have already been documented in the cobalt, coltan mineral rich Eastern DRC and elsewhere but the rush for securing access and control of mineral supply chains by superpowers is reviving geopolitical interests and may result in new geopolitical conflicts.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for instance, since the revision of its mining law in 2018, the country has attracted no responsible Western investors in the mining industry. Meanwhile, China has come to dominate the production of cobalt and copper, primarily mined in the Katanga and Lualaba regions. The recent re-negotiation by the Tshisekedi Administration of the imbalanced minerals-against infrastructure deal signed in 2008 under the Kabila administration between the DRC and China was perceived by China as triggered by the United State of America.

Aware of the security and economic implications of China’s control over the DRC’s critical minerals supply chain, the United States has signaled its return to the DRC mining sector through the recent acquisition of Australian AVZ Minerals’ assets in the Manono Lithium Project by KoBold Metals. In addition, the U.S. is committed to funding the Lobito Corridor—a strategic railway project essential for transporting critical minerals from the Central African Copperbelt to Western markets.

Through its International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the U.S. has pledged a $550 million loan to support the Lobito Corridor. This project is considered vital in countering Chinese influence in the region by providing an alternative route for exporting critical minerals. This plea was reiterated in Luanda/Angola in January 2024 by the former US President, John Biden, during his last visit to Africa as an US President, in presence of both Angola and DR Congo Presidents.

The corridor is viewed as part of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, a G7 initiative aimed at competing with China’s growing presence on the continent. While the Lobito project is designed to challenge Chinese dominance, both Western and Chinese firms will be allowed to use the infrastructure it provides. This dual-access approach raises questions about its strategic value, particularly under a US administration led by President Donald Trump, whose priority is   competition with Beijing. The Lobito Corridor railway could be a physical indicator of the resuscitated geopolitical rivalry and convergence of global superpowers on the African continent as a source for critical mineral resources.

Failure to implement due diligence and traceability mechanisms

 

During the OECD conference on responsible minerals supply chain held in May 2024 in Paris, many Congolese civil society organizations raised concern over the increasing failure in the implementation of due diligence standards in the DRC. CSO mentioned that private sector actors have failed to fully implement supply chain due diligence in alignment with international standards, most notably the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Minerals Supply Chains from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Area. IMPACT added that companies are either turning a blind eye, preferring not to ask questions about the source of their purchases, or have been complicit by over relying on industry schemes despite red flags being raised in UN Group of Experts reports.

The concern around ITSCI—the sole traceability and due diligence provider for 3Ts in DRC—has been so great that in 2024 it lost its recognition with the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI), with RMI noting that important gaps remained in the scheme’s fulfilment of recognition terms. Despite this move, the UN Group of Experts has expressed concern that many private sector actors still rely on the scheme to conduct due diligence without carrying out additional independent quality controls required by international standards[25].

Civil Society Call for reforms

 

Because of these gaps civil society organisations have constantly urged for a review and development of a new certification mechanism regime, expanded and aligned to emerging context of transition minerals. For instance, at the start of the 2025 KP plenary in Dubai the Civil Society Coalition pointed out the gaps of the KP in addressing the challenges of diamond mining, smuggling and poverty in the Central African Republic[26].  CSO observed that the KP was narrow in focus, limited to diamonds and the imposed conflict diamond embargos had targeted smugglers without protecting the diamond mining communities.

The KP does not—and likely will not soon—prevent diamonds from being associated with issues outside the narrow conflict diamond definition, including human rights abuses, violence by public and private security forces, forced labour, and environmental degradation. Rigorous due diligence is essential, yet it remains insufficiently addressed.

For instance the KP in Central Africa Republic’s (CAR) experience demonstrated that the sole existence of the certification scheme does not make diamond governance exemplary. Though diamonds share similar governance challenges with other minerals, the Kimberley Process has largely remained isolated from broader dialogues on mineral-related due diligence.

Civil society demanded for the need to bridge the gaps in the KP certification mechanism by inter alia increasing transparency and engagement with mining communities.  CSOs argued that without transparency, the KP will never effectively achieve its mandate of conflict prevention.

Moreover, the existing certification mechanisms are criticized as elitist, disconnected from the community needs and blind to social economic injustices. For example, the KP certification mechanism does not cover the extent to which the mining of the diamond minerals has benefited the communities from where they are sourced.

Investigations by the Kimberly Process Civil Society Coalition of mining operations in Sierra Leone, Lesotho, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, reveals the often-ignored consequences of large-scale diamond mining on local communities in African countries[27].

In Tanzania, despite mining diamonds for more than 100 years, Shyinyanga remains amongst the poorest remains the poorest region in the country[28]. The critical minerals rich Eastern DRC provinces of Kasai Oriental, Kasai Central, North and South Kivu are among the poorest and least developed in the world. 

For diamond resources to truly benefit communities, the documentary identifies greater transparency and independent monitoring as key elements to enhance corporate accountability. Mining companies, industry actors and states all have a role to play to protect community rights and improve both mining and sourcing practices[29].

Further, certification mechanisms do not sufficiently cover or protect citizen against state excesses and inspired violence. Yet the very atrocities committed by rebel groups, which led to the KP’s creation in 2003, are now mirrored by certain governments and their security forces. Top ranking government officials and security forces in the Eastern DRC have been accused of being complacent to illicit mineral trade. The military junta in Myanmar is accused of widespread human rights violations including killings of civilians in critical mineral rich village areas in Kayah state closer to the Thailand border[30].

Conclusion

 

While certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly process were established for a major purpose of controlling blood diamonds over the years, they have this role to an extent but equally shown inherent gaps and shortcomings. Their limitation in scope, involuntary membership nature and poor implementation is a major limitation. They were set up when diamond was among the top most traded commodity and driver of conflicts in countries such as Angola, Liberia and Siera Leone. With the increasing surge in demand for critical minerals such as Nickel, Cobalt, Coltan, Graphite, Lithium, Tin Tungsten and Rare Earth Elements, the new frontiers mineral driven conflicts have expanded and cannot continue to remain on diamonds.  In the current and future context, it will be untenable for critical minerals to remain outside the purview of mineral certification. For the existing certification mechanisms to be relevant and fitted for the changing context and era of energy of transition, substantive reviews and reforms are required.

Recommendations for future certification mechanisms
  1. Expand the KPI and ICGLR certification to cover a broad range of  critical minerals or develop a new commensurate certification measure for critical minerals, with a focus on ethical sourcing, conflict and governance.
  2. Pay attention to the ongoing problems in mining such as the environmental concerns in critical minerals mining operations and their contribution to social and ecological harm to communities and countries from where they are sourced.
  3. Pay close attention to ongoing issues within critical minerals supply chains, including human rights abuses, armed conflicts, the fair distribution of benefits to local communities, and compliance with national labor laws
  4. Review the existing mineral audit  standards, blend constitution of  audit teams with experts, civil society and community representatives to increase transparency and integrity in certification
  5. Require exporting countries to demonstrate significant economic presence of the critical mineral commensurate with export volumes.
  6. Impose export embargoes and critical mineral trading sanctions on countries or companies involved in perpetrating smuggling and export of illicitly acquired and conflict critical minerals.
  7. Expand the scope of existing certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly process to capture community benefits from diamonds and critical minerals.
  8. Demand that membership to regional and global certification and tracking mechanism must be mandatory for all critical minerals producing and exporting countries
  1. Countries that produce critical minerals should diversify their investors and pursue win-win partnerships to prevent their territories from becoming geopolitical battlegrounds for superpowers competing for access to these resources in the era of energy transition
  2. Enhance public database and reconciliation system for tracking mineral flows to better balance production, purchases, and exports at various levels (exporters, mines, mining regions, and Member States). 
  3. To maximize the benefits from critical mineral supply chains, producer countries should prioritize investments that add value to minerals and promote local content. This approach will generate more jobs for millions of unemployed youths, stimulate economic growth, and facilitate technology transfer and reduce susceptibility to conflict

References

Aikael Etal (2021) Understanding poverty dynamics and vulnerability in Tanzania: 2012–2018 available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rode.12829  accessed on 15 May 2025

Martin A, etal (2014), All that Glitters is not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the illicit trade of critical minerals, Partnership Africa Canada, May 2014

Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

Global Witness (2025) available at https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/new-investigation-suggests-eu-trader-traxys-buys-conflict-minerals-from-drc/ accessed on 15 May 2025

IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

ICGLR, Report on the Status of Implementation of the Six Tools of the ICGLR Regional Initiative on Natural Resources in Member States, P14

ISSD (2018) Green Conflict Minerals; The Fuels of conflict in the transition to a low carbon economy;  available at https://www.iisd.org/story/green-conflict-minerals/ accessed on 15 May 2025

Panzi Foundation available via https://panzifoundation.org/conflict-minerals-and-sexual-violence-in-the-drc/# accessed on 15 May 2025

The African Climate Foundation Report; Geopolitics of Critical Minerals in Renewable Supply Chains  available at https://africanclimatefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/800644-ACF-03_Geopolitics-of-critical-minerals-R_WEB.pdf  accessed on 15 May 2025

The Eastleigh Voice (2025); Police launch investigation into suspected copper smuggling at Mombasa port; available at https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/business/112007/police-probe-suspected-copper-smuggling-at-mombasa-port accessed on 15 May 2025

US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.

WTO (2024): High demand for energy-related critical minerals creates supply chain pressures; available at

Online sources

[1] https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/about/what-is-kp

[2] The United Republic of Tanzania: Mining Commission; A Report on implementation of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme for Tanzania Year 2023

[3]ICGLR; available via https://icglrcertification.com/ accessed 13 May 2025

[4]OECD Report (2016) available via https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-supply-chains-of-minerals-from-conflict-affected-and-high-risk-areas_9789264252479-en.html, accessed on 13 May 2025

[5] OECD (2016), OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas: Third Edition, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264252479-en.

[6] ibid

[7] https://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/

[8] https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/critical-minerals-conflict-eu/

[9] European Commission: Trade and Economic Security, Conflict Minerals regulation available at https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/conflict-minerals-regulation_en#:~:text=In%20politically%20unstable%20areas%2C%20armed,mobile%20phones%2C%20cars%20and%20jewellery. Accessed on 15 May 2025

[10] ISSD (2018) Green Conflict Minerals; The Fuels of conflict in the transition to a low carbon economy;  available at https://www.iisd.org/story/green-conflict-minerals/ accessed on 15 May 2025

[11] ibid

[12] Panzi Foundation available via https://panzifoundation.org/conflict-minerals-and-sexual-violence-in-the-drc/# accessed on 15 May 2025

[13] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[14] The African Climate Foundation Report; Geopolitics of Critical Minerals in Renewable Supply Chains  available at https://africanclimatefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/800644-ACF-03_Geopolitics-of-critical-minerals-R_WEB.pdf  accessed on 15 May 2025

[15] Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via  https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025

[16] Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

[17] ICGLR, Report on the Status of Implementation of the Six Tools of the ICGLR Regional Initiative on Natural Resources in Member States, P14

[18] WTO (2024): High demand for energy-related critical minerals creates supply chain pressures; available at https://www.wto.org/english/blogs_e/data_blog_e/blog_dta_10jan24_e.htm#:~:text=Exports,all%20at%206%20per%20cent). Accessed on 15 May 2025

[19] US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.

[20] URT:  Ministry of Minerals, Mining Commission; A Report on implementation of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme for Tanzania Year 2023

[21]Global Witness (2025) available at https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/new-investigation-suggests-eu-trader-traxys-buys-conflict-minerals-from-drc/ accessed on 15 May 2025

[22] ibid

[23] Martin A, etal (2014), All that Glitters is not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the illicit trade of critical minerals, Partnership Africa Canada, May 2014

[24] The Eastleigh Voice (2025); Police launch investigation into suspected copper smuggling at Mombasa port; available at https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/business/112007/police-probe-suspected-copper-smuggling-at-mombasa-port accessed on 15 May 2025

[25] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[26] https://www.kpcivilsociety.org/activity/kimberley-process-lifts-ineffective-embargo-end-of-an-era-for-the-central-african-republic-and-another-clear-signal-that-conflict-diamond-scheme-needs-serious-fixing/

[27] Kimberly Civil Society Coalition (2025); BEYOND SHINING ILLUSIONS: New documentary exposes the unspoken realities of large-scale diamond mining available at https://www.kpcivilsociety.org/press/beyond-shining-illusions-new-documentary-exposes-the-unspoken-realities-of-diamond-mining-in-african-countries/ accessed 15 May 2025

[28] Aikael Etal (2021) Understanding poverty dynamics and vulnerability in Tanzania: 2012–2018 available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rode.12829  accessed on 15 May 2025

[29] ibid

[30] https://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-land-mine-use-amounts-to-war-crimes-amnesty-report/a-62533770

Assessing Implications of Trumps Tariffs on Intra East Africa’s Regional and International Trade

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Effective 5th April 2025 (with a pause of 90 days) the US President Donald Trump slapped a global tariff of 10% on all exports to the US. The US tariffs has caused a lot of turbulence and uncertainty about the future of the WTO rules based global trade as we knew it. The future of EAC -US trade is unknown and during this period loses will be counted particularly in the agriculture, textiles, apparel and handcrafts sector. However, in the midst of turbulence, the EAC has an opportunity of re-inventing its intra-regional and international trade, and perhaps emerging stronger.  This policy brief analyses the implications of the US tariffs on EAC intra-regional trade and what options the member states can take.

Background on EAC -US Trade Relations and Trade Flows

The East African Community (EAC) and Sub-Saharan Africa generally have been major trading partners with the United States for decades and so far, the fastest growing markets in the world according to the International Monetary Fund.  The US has signed multiple trade agreements allowing smooth trade flows across the two regions, with the US enjoying an overwhelming trade surplus for decades. In 2008 the U.S. signed Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFA) with the EAC regional economic block in 2008.

The purpose of the TIFA was to strengthen the United States-EAC trade and investment relationship, expand and diversify bilateral trade, and improve the climate for business between U.S. and East African firms. Earlier in 2000 the US had passed the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA), a trade preference program that allowed selected goods from EAC duty free market entrance into the United States. AGOA had helped expand and diversify African exports to the United States, while at the same time fostering an improved business environment in many African countries through the application of eligibility requirements.  In 2015, the U.S. Congress extended AGOA through 2025. 

According to the Office of US Trade Representative data the U.S. goods exports to East African Community in 2022 were $1.1 billion, up 2.0 percent ($22 million) from 2021 and up 15 percent from 2012. U.S. goods imports from East African Community totaled $1.3 billion in 2022, up 40.4 percent ($367 million) from 2021, and up 121 percent from 2012. The U.S. trade balance with East African Community shifted from a goods trade surplus of $211 million in 2021 to a goods trade deficit of $135 million in 2022[1].Although the US suffered a goods trade deficit in 2022, it has continued to enjoy trade surpluses with individual EAC member Countries as reported by the US trade Administration.

Table of US-EAC Trade flows and Surplus for 2023-2024

Country

Total Goods Trade with US 2024 (USD)

US Exports

(2024)

US Imports

(2024)

Surplus (2024)

% Increase in Surplus compared to 2023

Kenya

1.5Bln

782.5Mln

737.3Mln

45.2Mln

110 (454.6Mln)

Tanzania

778.1Mln

573.4Mln

204.7Mln

368.7Mln

45.8 (115.8Mln)

Uganda

238.9 Mln

106.3 Mln

132.6 Mln

26.3Mln

574.3 ($31.9Mln)

Rwanda

75.0Mln

44.8Mln

30.2Mln

14.5Mln

4,060 (($14.2Mln)

Democratic Republic of Congo

576.4Mln

253.3Mln

323.1Mln

69.8M

20.9 ($18.4 Mln)

Burundi

$10.4Mln

$6.6Mln

$3.7Mln

$2.9Mln

224.3 (5.2Mln)

South Sudan

$60.1Mln

$59.3 Mln

$0.8Mln

$58.5 Mln

16.0(8.1Mln)

Somalia

$51.6Mln

$49.1 Mln

$2.5 Mln

$46.6Mln

0

Source: Office of US Trade Representative data analyzed and presented by GEPC researcher

Over the years, through its trade diplomacy, the US had cemented long lasting relations paving way for other strategic economic, political and security relations, with the EAC member states including defense. With the new tariff wall, if not changed, this long-term relationship could be bound for a new trajectory.

Knock-on Effects of Tariffs

Tariffs have knock offs whose effects can trickle down the goods and services value chain in many ways, affecting both producers, exporters and consumers down the trade supply chain.

A tariff is a duty imposed by a national government, customs territory, or supranational union on imports of goods. Besides being a source of revenue, import duties can also be a form of regulation of foreign trade and policy that burden foreign products to encourage or safeguard domestic industry[1]. At their core, tariffs are simple: they raise the domestic price of imported goods. But their effects ripple through the economy in complex ways – altering prices, wages, exchange rates and trade patterns.

Simply put, a tariff is a tax on imported products. It creates a difference between the world price and the domestic price of a product. Tariffs raise the price of imported goods relative to domestic goods (good produced at home).  For example, if a US Tarif of 10% is applied on world price of coffee of USD200, the domestic price of coffee in the US market becomes USD 220 per kilogram. The government collects the difference of USD20 dollar as tariff revenue to finance other public expenditures.

Tariffs can also affect the world price of a product, particularly when they are imposed by a large economy. The logic is that higher domestic prices reduce domestic demand, which in turn lowers world demand, and thus world prices. In our example, the world price might fall to $150 after the tariff is imposed, resulting in a domestic price of $165. In this case, part of the tariff is effectively paid by foreign producers[2].

This cost-shifting creates incentives for large economies to unilaterally impose tariffs. However, this so-called optimal tariff argument overlooks the possibility of retaliation. If country A imposes tariffs on country B, country B has an incentive to respond in kind. The end result is a trade war that leaves both sides worse off[3].

With the current US tariffs, the prices of goods entering into the US market will increase by 10%. For example, the price of coffee will increase by 10% making it more expensive for Americans to afford. Similarly, the costs for other agricultural products, textiles and handcrafts will suffer the same fate. The resultant effect of this will be a low demand for these goods in the US markets affecting EAC farmers and exporters. We can further illustrate this with a simple of the effects of the tariffs on handicrafts from the EAC. 

Because of increased tariffs and a decline in demand for the Makonde carvings, the exporter of Makonde Carvings and paintings will buy less. The Makonde carver and painter in Mtwara and Mwenge will lose business and sell less. The transporter of Makonde carvings will have little business and therefore send a few trucks to collect and deliver the carvings to Dar es Salaam. The exporter will send a few containers and therefore the port handlers and clearing firms will have no business. The Makonde artist may completely close and ultimately the transporter and port handler may lay off staff. A similar experience can be the same for the Coffee producer in Uganda and Kenya, whose knock off effect of the US tariffs will trickle down the supply chain in a similar manner.

Tariffs in the Context of WTO and GATT rules

In the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules-based system, when countries agree to open their markets for goods or services, they “bind” their commitments. A country can change its bindings, but only after negotiating with its trading partners, which could mean compensating them for loss of trade[1].

Under the WTO (GATTs, GAT and TRIPs agreements) international trade and commerce is run based on a rule-based system and principles. These include;

  1. Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN), which requires treating other people equally. Under the WTO agreements, countries cannot normally discriminate between their trading partners. Grant someone a special favour (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of their products) and you have to do the same for all other WTO members[2]
  2. National Treatment of foreigners and locals equally where by imported and locally-produced goods should be treated equally — at least after the foreign goods have entered the market. This also applies to services, trademarks, copyrights and patents. (Article 3 of GATT, Article 17 of GATS and Article 3 of TRIPS) although there can be some variations in applications depending on an existing arrangement such as a Regional Economic block or once a product, service or item of intellectual property has entered the market can be a subject to customs duty or any other applicable duties.
  3. National treatment only applies once a product, service or item of intellectual property has entered the market. Therefore, charging customs duty on an import is not a violation of national treatment even if locally-produced products are not charged an equivalent tax.
  4. Freer trade gradually through negotiations and reducing of trade barriers such customs duties (tariffs), import bans or quotas, selective restriction on quantities, bureaucracy and exchange rate policies.
  5. Predictability of trade through binding commitments and transparency. This encourages investment, job creation and consumers can enjoy the benefits of competition
  6. Promotion of fair competition, with an allowance of a limited. number of tariffs for limited protection, allowing thriving of domestic industry and protection against entry of harmful products.
  7. Generally, encouraging development and economic reforms aimed at increasing global trade flows and particularly allowing less developed countries to equally enjoy benefits of the global trade system.
    Tariffs as Tools for Trade Policy and Geopolitical Statecraft

    Tariffs are not universally banned from trade policy. Tariffs can be a useful tool for protecting domestic industries, generating revenue, and supporting economic development, especially in developing countries. They can equally be used as a foreign policy instrument to advance economic diplomatic ties between nations.

    According to the WTO, tariffs must not be used as weapon for trade distortion, carry the risk of increased costs for businesses and consumers, potentially stifling economic growth and competitiveness. However, the recent US Trump measures reorganize the rules on International Trade. Tariffs are now used as a political tool for advancing geopolitical and national security interests, including cajoling other trading partners and WTO member states into curving in to pressure aimed at achieving domestic political gains.

    There are contending views (including from the US Council on Foreign Relations) that according to the WTO rules, the US Trump tariffs are illegal, arbitrary, based on a wrong formular, not reciprocal, distortionary[1] and must be fought either at the WTO or through reciprocal measures taken by affected Countries. Poor application of tariffs can spark a contagion effect of tariffs wars across nations.

    Implications on EAC Trade and economic growth
    1. Rise in prices of EAC Export products in the US market by a commensurate percentage in response to the tariff charges unless the EAC exporters absorb or the US government cushions the consumers in someways
    2. Decline in export volumes EAC goods to the US by a commensurate percentage decline, depending on the tariff elasticity of the good affected by the US imposed tariffs
    3. Increase in import driven inflationary pressures in the EAC causing on the already current inflationary pressures in the EAC region
    4. Potential slow down in the regional economic growth in line with the IMF projected global economic slowdown of 2.8% in 2025 due to disruptions in global trade
    5. Shortage in supply of US dollars due to declining inflow from trade with the US. This could exert some depreciation of domestic currencies, as the dollar demand to purchase imports increases.
    6. Incentivize the rise in the use of Tariffs and blockades by countries in the region as tools for trade policy and coercion to achieve specific strategic interests, as countries mimic US behavior
    EAC Response options for Trade Creation and Diversion to new markets

    To date the EAC as a regional block has remained silent while its respective member states have decided to individually not to retaliate.  Uganda’s Ministry of Finance, clearly stated that it had taken a decision not to retaliate[2].  Similar statements were made by Kenya’s Ministry of Trade[3].

    Uganda’s trade volumes with the US were small and the US was a major beneficiary of this trade relationship, enjoying a goods trade surplus, while its nationals enjoyed cheap high quality agricultural exports such as coffee, tea, fruits and handcrafts from the EAC.

    The AGOA partnership agreement was bound to expire at the end of 2025 and the US and EAC were already on the road towards negotiating new trade arrangements, if AGOA was not extended. Moreover, some Countries such as Uganda, Burundi, South Sudan and Somalia were not eligible for AGOA in 2024 due to among others sanctions imposed by the US for various reasons (including conflicts, human and political rights violations) and were already searching for markets elsewhere.

    The EAC as a regional block was pushing for increased intra-regional trade. The East African Business Council, an apex body of businesses and companies, has always been concerned with low volumes of intra EAC trade as compared to other economic regions. 

    This has been widely linked to existence of tariff and non-tariff barriers, including stringent rules of origin, Stay of Applications which allows member states to charge or exempt different tariffs on some specific goods different from the Common External Tariff, differences in taxes such VAT, Income Taxes and Exercise duties. It was further concerned with the bilateral negotiations of trade deals with third parties. The East African Business Council (EABC) advocated and has been pushing the EAC to continue negotiating the EAC-EU Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) and the EAC-UK EPA as a region to avoid creating mistrust and distortion of the EAC Common External Tariff (CET)[4]

    The new US tariffs therefore offer the EAC and Sub-Saharan Africa region with a window of an opportunity to disconnect itself from the US markets by deepening intra-regional trade, diversifying and diverting its trade to other regions such as Africa via Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the EU, the Middle East and China.

    AFCTA offers flexible rules and unfettered free access to a market population of about 1.3 billion people and a combined GDP of approximately US$ 3.4 trillion[5]. The AfCFTA aims to eliminate trade barriers and boost intra-Africa trade. In particular, it is to advance trade in value-added production across all service sectors of the African Economy[6]. There are a lot of opportunities in the AfCFTA for the Private sector in the EAC as it offers a larger and diversified market for goods and services. According to President Museveni Uganda will now focus on African markets[7]

    The EU has been a major trading partner and EU trade in goods (imports and exports) with the EAC has risen steadily comparatively to 2007 volumes[8]  In 2023 the EU trade in goods and services with the EAC region amounted to EUR106Bln. The EU trade in services amounted to EUR 5.9bln. If compared to 2022 the EU trade in goods with the EAC region reached EUR 5.7bln while imports from the EAC were EUR4.9bln. Exports in services were valued at EUR3.0Bln compared to EUR2.9 bln imported from the EAC[9]. The major exports to the EU from the East African Community are mainly coffee, cut flowers, tea, tobacco, fish and vegetables. Imports from the EU into the region are dominated by machinery and mechanical appliances, equipment and parts, vehicles and pharmaceutical products[10].  Kenya and Tanzania were the leading EU trade partners.

    China is already a major trading partner with the EAC and had surpassed the EU and the US. In 2023, China was the largest source of imports for the East African Community (EAC), with imports valued at $11 billion. The EAC’s exports to China in the same year were valued at $15.8 billion. China is closely followed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at US$6.4 billion in 2023[11].

    From the statistics, the EAC already enjoys a trade surplus with China. Although there are concerns over unethical business conducts, including the risk of stifling industrial growth by flooding the EAC with cheap substandard goods, China remains a huge market of about 1billion people, it is the second largest economy in the world and the largest one in RCEP with a GDP of 16,325 billion USD in 2022 (World Bank, 2023).  Chinese demand for EAC products is enormous and projected to grow.

    The EAC also has an opportunity of benefiting from arbitrage practices, whereby producers from highly US tariffed countries set up business to produce, buy, sell or reroute their products via the EAC to take advantage of the tax and price differences. In this case highly taxed countries such as China and Lesotho would be interested in setting up business in EAC.  Kenya has already made a move with President Ruto’s visit to Beijing to attract Chinese businesses to set business in Nairobi.

    Recommendations

    For this to happen, the EAC and its member states will have to

    1. Diversify, Divert and Create trade. This happens when new or existing regional economic grouping (Free Trade Areas or Customs Unions) leads to creation of new trade that never existed before or leads to shifts in trade flows from efficient nonmember exporters to non-efficient member exporters among others due to preferential tariffs charged amongst member states.
    2. Invest in processing and industrial production of agricultural products and raw materials into finished products that can be sold or consumed locally and in the new markets
    3. Address existing tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade such as VAT, Excise duties, income taxes, bureaucracy and infrastructure which have been an obstacle to intra-regional trade.
    4. Revive old economic partnerships with the EU and explore new partnerships with the EU, South America, Middle East and China
    5. Establish linkages between the farmers and manufacturer so as to create value and sustainable supply chains of quality products for the market
    6. Address political differences, instability and conflicts affecting cordial economic cooperation and free flow of goods across EAC and African borders.

     References 

    European Commission: Trade and Security available at https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/east-african-community-eac_en

    Ralph Ossa; Views of the Chief Economist, World Trade Organisation, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/blogs_e/ce_ralph_ossa_e/blog_ro_11apr25_e.htm accessed 14 April 2025

    The New Times (May 02, 2025) available at https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/21152/news/africa/eabcs-adrian-raphael-njau-advocates-for-stronger-eac-market

    WTO; Principles of the Trading system available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm#:~:text=In%20the%20WTO%2C%20when%20countries,the%20case%20in%20developing%20countries.

    [1] https://www.cfr.org/blog/five-things-know-about-trumps-tariffs

    [2] Mr Ramadhan Ggobi , Permanent Secretary for Treasury made these remarks while addressing a press conference at the Ministry of Finance

    [3] Mr Lee Kinyanjui, PS for Trade, Kenya in an Interview with  Citizen TV available on Citizen digital via https://www.citizen.digital/news/what-it-means-for-kenya-after-us-imposes-10-export-tariff-trade-cs-kinyanjui-n360379

    [4] https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/21152/news/africa/eabcs-adrian-raphael-njau-advocates-for-stronger-eac-market

    [5] https://au-afcfta.org/about/

    [6] ibid

    [7] https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/african%20markets/140091/museveni-says-uganda-to-focus-on-african-markets-amid-us-tariff-hike

    [8] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/766228/EPRS_BRI(2024)766228_EN.pdf

    [9] ibid

    [10] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/east-african-community-eac_en

    [11] https://www.eac.int/trade/79-sector/trade#:~:text=China%20is%20the%20dominant%20source,US%246.4%20billion%20in%2020

How Tanzania Government plans to leap jump mining to the future

 

Tanzania’s mining sector has been a mix of sweet and sour, with of economic progress and injustices at the same time. In an earlier brief that we published, we traced, from an investors perspective, Tanzania’s mining history, the key reforms and pitfalls that have befallen this remarkable sector making it the most loved and hated at the same time, with a conclusion, that despite the progress made, government needs to do more to restore its past glory. In this article the government of Tanzania responds to stakeholders, reassuring confidence that the mining sector is destined for the better.

By Tanzania Ministry of Minerals

The mining sector is one of the key sectors in Tanzania, contributing significantly to the country’s GDP, employment, and social development. The minerals available in Tanzania include Metal Minerals such as Gold, Copper, Iron, Silver, Nickel; Industrial Minerals such as Graphite, Gypsum.

Other Minerals include Energy Minerals such as Coal, Uranium; Gemstones such as Diamond, Ruby, Emerald, and the unique Tanzanite found only in Tanzania; Rare Earth Elements such as Neodymium, Lanthanum, Cerium; and Construction Minerals such as gravel, sand, marble, and limestone.

Therefore, the government has been implementing various strategies to ensure these abundantly available resources benefit the nation and its citizens as a whole.

We will continue to improve our legislation and business environment to make sure that the available mineral resource trajnhmki0nsform Tanzania to a developed country while proactively minimizing constraints and challenges that might affect the investment- President Samia Suluhu Hassan while speaking at the Ming Conference 2024

Contribution of the Mining Sector to GDP

According to the 2023/2024 financial year report released by the Ministry of Minerals, the mining sector contributed approximately 9.1% of Tanzania’s GDP by 2022. In the 2023/2024 financial year, the mining sector’s contribution reached TZS 6.4 trillion, showing rapid growth due to the government’s efforts to enhance revenue collection and improve the investment environment.

Employment in the Mining Sector

Employment is one of the crucial areas where the mining sector has brought significant changes. By March 2024, the mining sector had created approximately 19,356 jobs, with 97% of these jobs going to Tanzanians. This equates to 18,853 jobs for Tanzanians and 505 jobs for foreigners. The government has established laws and regulations prioritizing Tanzanians in job opportunities arising from mining activities to ensure citizens gain employment and income.

Investment and Mining Economy

Investment in the mining sector has continued to grow rapidly, with the government encouraging both local and foreign companies to invest in exploration, mining, and value addition. In 2023, Tanzanian companies sold goods and services worth USD 1.48 billion (over TZS 3.75 trillion) to mines, accounting for 90% of all sales made to mines. This demonstrates the importance of the private sector in boosting the mining sector and the economy overall.

The United States International Trade Administration estimates that the sector will reach $6.6 billion in value in Tanzania by 2027[1].   In addition to mining the minerals, this emerging sector provides opportunities to capture more value from critical minerals before exporting, by establishing mineral processing centres within the country

Government Strategies

Given the sector’s importance, the Tanzanian government has implemented various strategies to enhance the mining sector to increase productivity and growth through Vision 2030: Minerals are Life and Wealth. The government plans to conduct comprehensive geoscientific surveys (High-Resolution Airborne Geophysical Survey) for at least 50% of the country, up from the current 16%, by 2030. This survey aims to identify new mineral-rich areas and encourage further investment. Other strategies include:

  1.  Improving Infrastructure: The government has invested in improving road and electricity infrastructure in mining areas to facilitate the provision of essential services and attract investment.
     
    2.    Training Small-Scale Miners: The government, in collaboration with educational and training institutions, has initiated training programs for small-scale miners to enable them to use better technology and improve production.

  2.  Promoting Value Addition: The government encourages companies to establish value addition industries for minerals within the country rather than exporting raw minerals. This includes the production of refined gemstones and other valuable products.
  3.  Technology Support for Small-Scale Mining: Through the State Mining Corporation (STAMICO), the government has acquired five rig machines to assist small-scale miners, saving them time and production costs. Another 10 machines are expected to arrive soon, bringing the total to 15.

  4.  Addressing Capital Challenges for Small-Scale Miners: Through the Ministry of Minerals and STAMICO, the government has facilitated access to loans and capital for small-scale miners in collaboration with financial institutions. Banks like CRDB, KCB, and NMB have started offering low-interest loans to these miners, enabling them to purchase modern equipment and conduct their activities more efficiently. From July 2023 to March 2024, TZS 187 billion was loaned to small-scale miners.

Success Stories

  1.  Buckreef Gold Mine: Located in Geita region and owned jointly by STAMICO and TANZAM2000, this mine produced 13,577.43 ounces of gold from July 2023 to March 2024, contributing USD 1,943,180.94 in royalties, inspection fees, and taxes.
  2.  Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Projects: Various mining companies in the country have invested TZS 17,084,055,359.58 in community development projects around their mining sites, including the construction of schools, hospitals, roads, and water infrastructure.

Future of the Mining Sector

Courtesy Photo: Clean Nickel

The future of the mining sector in Tanzania looks promising due to the strategies set by the government in collaboration with stakeholders and ongoing investments. Key areas showing great potential include Strategic and Critical Minerals such as lithium, nickel, graphite, and cobalt, essential for producing electric vehicle batteries and other modern technology devices.

Conclusion

Overall, the mining sector in Tanzania has significantly contributed to economic and social development. The achievements of recent years highlight the sector’s considerable potential in increasing the national GDP, providing employment, and improving citizens’ livelihoods. However, the government, through the Ministry of Minerals, continues to establish sustainable strategies and foster partnerships with the private sector and other stakeholders. These strategies will enable Tanzania to continue reaping more benefits from its mineral resources and ensure sustainable development for future generations.

[1] https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/tanzania-rare-earth-and-critical-minerals#:~:text=It%20is%20estimated%20that%20the,processing%20centers%20within%20the%20country.