Tag Extractive Governance

How investment treaties impact Tanzania’s mining regulatory policy

Photo credit: Mining Review Africa

Author: Joshua Woodend, Associate Researcher and Analyst, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Abstract

Tanzania’s mining sector is central to national economic growth, contributing significantly to GDP and employment. However, the country’s reliance on foreign investment has bound its regulatory space to the constraints of international investment treaties. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), in particular, grant expansive investor protections such as the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard, which often allow companies to challenge legislative reforms through costly arbitration. These mechanisms restrict Tanzania’s ability to implement necessary policies, including reforms aimed at increasing tax revenues, enhancing local employment, and addressing social and environmental concerns.

While reforms since 2010 have boosted government revenues and domestic benefits, they have also triggered arbitration claims, with Tanzania already paying over $100 million in related costs. To regain policy autonomy, Tanzania may consider terminating existing treaties, clarifying regulatory frameworks, and developing a model BIT with targeted carve-outs, thereby balancing investment promotion with sovereign control and sustainable development objectives.

Introduction

Tanzania’s mining sector is a major contributor to the nation’s economic development. Over the past decade, the industry has experienced steady growth, with mining projected to contribute 10% of GDP in 2025 (Ministry of Minerals, 2024). This significance is equally reflected in employment trends. A 2018 UNEP study estimated that the artisanal small-scale mining sector employed over a million Tanzanians, and in 2021, large scale mines were recorded to employ 14,742 people, significant figures for a nation of 60 million (Mutagwaba et al, 2018; Ministry of Minerals, 2024).

Tanzania’s mineral wealth has drawn substantial international investment, a trend actively encouraged by the government given the country’s limited capacity to exploit these resources without external capital. Consequently, as with many African nations, the mining industry is inexorably tied to foreign investment and ownership. The nation’s 2023 investment report on foreign private investments demonstrates this as mining and quarrying dominates FDI, being over 3 times larger than the second highest ranking sector, manufacturing (Bank of Tanzania, 2023).

For Tanzania, attracting international investment in the mining sector is a complex balancing act. On the one hand, the government must provide conditions favourable enough to persuade international mining companies to supply the capital needed to stimulate national growth and drive economic development. On the other hand, it is necessary to ensure these terms are not so generous that they undermine the government’s ability to control the mining sector, or that they provide conditions so favourable for foreign mining firms that there is no incentive to protect local people and retain some profits locally. This challenge is clearly reflected in Tanzania’s investment treaty regime.

What are investment treaties?

Investment treaties are agreements that define how a state treats foreign investors within its territory. Their scope is broad, encompassing a range of formats and parameters. Some are bilateral, covering investment flows between two states, such as the treaty between Tanzania and Finland. Others are multilateral, like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), or regionally focused, such as the African Continental Free Trade Area. At present, Tanzania has 11 bilateral investment treaties in force, 7 treaties with investment provisions, is party to a range of multilateral intergovernmental agreements, and has also entered into an unknown number of privately negotiated investment agreements with large-scale investors (UNCTAD).

Whilst these treaties often succeed in creating favourable conditions for international companies investing in the mining sector, they also limit the government’s power to regulate this sector. This stems from the broad protections such agreements provide and the stringent enforcement mechanisms they enable. In particular, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are especially known for constraining a nation’s ability to enact legislation changes, an especially contentious issue in Tanzania’s mining sector.

This is because the wording of BIT provisions is notoriously vague, leaving room for extremely broad interpretation. For example, all of Tanzania’s BITs include a provision guaranteeing the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ of investments. Whilst this may appear innocuous, it has often been interpreted to protect a business’s legitimate expectation of a stable regulatory environment. As a result, even necessary changes to the mining industry can breach these treaties, as the regulatory environment is no longer stable. This results in a process known as investment treaty arbitration, a legal mechanism that favours investors over governments, allows companies to bypass domestic legal systems, and, on average, costs respondent states $4.7 million USD in legal fees, before any damages are awarded (Hodgson, Kryvoi, and Hrcka, 2021).

The threat of arbitration, combined with the broad scope of BIT provisions, often enables international mining companies to protest any legislative changes, including those aimed at improving the well-being of local communities. For example, in Foresti v. South Africa (2007), an Italian mining company alleged South Africa had breached the FET clause of the South Africa-Italy BIT by introducing affirmative action legislation that required mining license owners to divest a percentage of shareholdings to historically disadvantaged South Africans (Poulsen, 2015). Whilst this legislation was obviously necessary to reduce apartheid era inequalities, was universally applied and non-discriminatory in its implementation, the FET provision presented a huge legislative hurdle and cost in its implementation.

Since the 1960’s Tanzania has signed a long list of Double Taxation Agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaties with different Countries.  Some of these have since been terminated while a number of these continue in force with their corresponding provisions having relative effect on the mining.

Table 1 – Tanzania’s BITs in force (Excluding Investment Related Instruments)
Tanzania’s BIT Obligations
TreatyDate of SignatureTermination ProtocolKey Provisions Relating to MiningStatus (Active/ terminated/ Renegotiated/  
Canada Tanzania BIT2013Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2023) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 15 years after termination.Provides carve outs protecting the regulation of exhaustible natural resources provided such measures are not applied arbitrarilyActive
China Tanzania BIT2013Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2023) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 10 years after termination.Provides carve outs for regulation protecting the environment, provided they are not applied arbitrarily.Active
Turkey Tanzania BIT2011Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2021) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 10 years after termination.Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.Active
Mauritius Tanzania BIT2009Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2019) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 10 years after termination.Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.Active
Switzerland Tanzania BIT2004Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2014) with termination becoming effective six months after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 10 years after termination.Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.Active
Finland Tanzania BIT2001Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2011) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 15 years after termination.Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.Active
Italy Tanzania BIT2001Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2011) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. All articles shall remain in force for 20 years after termination.Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.Active
Denmark Tanzania BIT1999Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2009) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. All articles shall remain in force for 10 years after termination.Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.Active
Sweden Tanzania BIT1999Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2009) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 15 years after termination.Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.Active
United Kingdom Tanzania BIT1996Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (2006) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. All articles shall remain in force for 20 years after termination.Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.Active
Germany Tanzania BIT1968Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 10 years after signing (1978) with termination becoming effective one year after a notice is given. Select articles shall remain in force for 20 years after termination.Whilst the treaty is not explicit on natural resources and mining, it applies to all investment, including mining. FET provisions are included by default and hugely limit domestic capacity to regulate mining.Active
Tanzania’s Treaties with Investment Provisions
TreatyDate of SignatureTermination ProtocolKey Provisions Relating to MiningStatus
African Continental Free Trade Area2018Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated 5 years after entry into force (2023), with termination becoming effective two years after notice is given. Pending rights and obligations shall continue to apply despite termination.No obligations in the treaty prevents the enforcement of measures related to the importations and exportations of gold or silver, the conservation of exhaustible natural resources or exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry  Active
Trade Agreement Between the East African Community and United States of America2008Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated at any point after signing, with termination becoming effective 180 days after notice is given. No survival clauses apply.Does not specify mining but is included under its remitActive
South African Development Community Protocol on Finance and Investment2006Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated at any point, with termination becoming effective 12 months after notice is given. No survival clauses apply.States shall promote the use of their natural resources in a sustainable and an environmentally friendly manner; recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures; Nothing in this Annex shall be construed as preventing a State Party from exercising its right to regulate in the public interestActive
East African Community Treaty2000Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated at any point, with termination becoming effective 12 months after notice is given. No survival clauses apply.Requires integration of environmental management in mining sector and the sustainable use of natural resourcesActive
The Treaty on Southern African Development Community1992Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated at any point, with termination becoming effective 12 months after notice is given. No survival clauses apply.Mandates member states to cooperate in mining and natural resource sectors for purpose of regional developmentActive
Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community1991Contract is active indefinitely but can be terminated at any point, with termination becoming effective 12 months after notice is given. No survival clauses apply.Requires mutual cooperation on policy around natural resourcesActive
Impacts of Investment treaties on Tanzania’s mining sector regulation

The Tanzanian mining sector has been repeatedly constrained by treaty obligations, facing both threats and actual arbitration proceedings in response to reforms aimed at retaining greater value within the country. Notable measures include the Mining (Value Addition) Regulations of 2020, which require the use of local service providers and processing facilities; the Mining (Local Content) Regulations of 2018, which mandate the employment of Tanzanian nationals; and the Mining Act of 2010, which significantly increased royalty rates.

Whilst all these changes may violate investment treaty provisions, such as the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard, due to their radical nature, such efforts for reform are to be expected given the previous unfavourable legislative status quo that disadvantaged Tanzanian people. The scale of this disadvantage is stark: between 1997 and 2005, Tanzania exported over US $2.54 billion worth of gold yet collected merely 10% in tax revenue, a disparity that generated significant social tension (Curtis and Lissu, 2008; Noe, 2006). In 2015 Tanzania instituted significant mining reforms, including changes to the mining fiscal regime, increasing government stake and control of the mining sector.  For comparison, since Tanzania’s mining sector reforms, between 2023/24 alone, Tanzania raised over US $2.5 billion in tax revenue and massively increased the employment of local people (Ministry of Minerals, 2024).  These reforms triggered  investment disputes and led to costly arbitral awards.

Determining the precise financial cost of Tanzania’s mining regulation changes through investment arbitration fees and penalties is challenging. Through ICSID, a widely-used arbitration mechanism, Tanzania had by 2025 already paid over $100 million USD in fees for its legislative changes, specifically for cancelling retention licenses that had granted foreign mining companies pre-emptive rights to specific locations (UNCTAD, 2025).

However, this figure likely represents only a fraction of the total arbitration costs stemming from Tanzania’s mining policy reforms. Many BITs enable arbitration through mechanisms that operate without public disclosure requirements outside of ICSID, meaning the actual financial burden on the Tanzanian government may be substantially higher than publicly reported figures suggest.

Consequently, investment treaties significantly impact Tanzania’s capacity to introduce mining reforms by granting investors broad rights that enable litigation over even minor regulatory changes. The threat of compensation payments, combined with high arbitration costs, at best imposes a substantial financial burden on mining sector reform efforts, and at worst, creates powerful disincentives that discourage the government from proposing or implementing changes that improve local development. This can easily result in a regulatory environment that favours investors and foregoes significant taxation revenue that could benefit the nation at large, including those who are proximate to mining enterprises and it’s damaging effects.

Consequently, investment treaties constrain Tanzania’s capacity to reform its mining sector by granting investors expansive rights that allow them to litigate against even modest regulatory changes. While the immediate impact is the risk of substantial compensation awards and the heavy financial burden of arbitration proceedings, the implications extend further. Bilateral investment treaty provisions can lock in tax concessions or limit fiscal space, resulting in foregone revenues that could otherwise support national development. Equally, non-financial costs emerge: the prospect of diplomatic or political pressure, the withholding of aid, and negative media portrayals of Tanzania as a hostile investment destination. Together, these pressures can deter policymakers from pursuing reforms that prioritise domestic welfare over investor interests. In practice, this often produces a regulatory environment that privileges foreign mining companies at the expense of local communities and the state’s ability to capture taxation revenues.

Policy Recommendations

So, what can Tanzania do to remedy this situation? The most direct step would be to terminate its existing bilateral investment treaties, a move already taken by countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia, South Africa, Indonesia and India (Public Citizen, 2018). Yet this is far from a quick solution. As shown in table one, many of Tanzania’s treaties contain survival clauses that ensures provisions can be in force for up to 20 years after termination, this makes termination a necessary but inevitably long-term measure.

In the meantime, Tanzania must work to reduce perceptions of risk by presenting a clearer and more predictable regulatory environment. While past legal reforms in the mining sector have often appeared erratic, future changes should be grounded in transparent communication with stakeholders and shaped around consistent licensing and tax frameworks. This would build investor trust in the market, despite the lack of BITs, as they can rely on the government to act in rationale, legal manner, with space for negotiation.

Finally, Tanzania may invest in developing its own model BIT, complete with prudential carve-outs that reflect Tanzania’s development priorities. The development of such a treaty would allow the country to reassure investors of fair treatment while avoiding the loss of vital policy space.

Bibliography:

The Bank of Tanzania, The Tanzania Investment Centre and The National Bureau of

Statistics (2023). Tanzania Investment Report 2023 – Foreign Private Investments. Dar

es Salaam: Government of Tanzania.

Curtis, M. and Lissu, T. (2008). How Tanzania is Failing to Benefit from Gold Mining. Dar es Salaam: The Christian Council of Tanzania.

Hodgson, M., Kryvoi, Y. and Hrcka, D. (2021). 2021 Empirical Study: Costs, Damages and Duration in Investor-State Arbitration. London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Allen and Ovary.

Ministry of Minerals (2024). Investor’s Guide Tanzania Mining Sector 2024. Dar es Salaam: The Ministry of Minerals, pp.1–23.

Ministry of Minerals (2024). Ministry of Minerals – Republic of Tanzania. [online] Madini.go.tz. Available at: https://www.madini.go.tz/page/03cef72a-bdd3-41dc-ba84-40954095b835/.

Mutagwaba, W., Bosco Tindyebwa, J., Makanta, V., Kaballega, D. and Maeda, G. (2018). Artisanal and small-scale mining in Tanzania – Evidence to inform an ‘action dialogue’. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.

Noe, C. (2020) Graduated Sovereignty and Tanzania’s Mineral Sector. Utafiti. [Online] 14 (2), 257–280.

Poulsen, L. N. S. (2015) Bounded rationality and economic diplomacy: the politics of

investment treaties in developing countries / Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen (University

College London). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Public Citizen (2018). Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties Has Not Negatively

Affected Countries’ Foreign Direct Investment Inflows. Washington D.C: Public Citizen.

The Bank of Tanzania, The Tanzania Investment Centre and The National Bureau of Statistics (2023). Tanzania Investment Report 2023 – Foreign Private Investments. Dar es Salaam: Government of Tanzania.

UNCTAD (2022). The International Investment Treaty Regime and Climate Action | Publications | UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub. [online] Available at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/publications/1269/the-international-investment-treaty-regime-and-climate-action

UNCTAD (2025). Tanzania, United Republic of | Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator  | UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub. [online] Unctad.org. Available at:

https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/country/222/united-republic-of-tanzania  [Accessed 17 September 2025].
The Petals of Blood: Dissecting the contagion effect of Sudan war on South Sudan and EAC with lessons on governance and state failure

The Sudan war has been raging for almost a year, with catastrophic effects now spreading beyond Sudan’s borders, affecting its neighboring South Sudan and the East Africa Community (EAC) in many ways.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre & James Boboya, Institute of Social Policy and Research (ISCPR), South Sudan

According to the United Nations, since it started, the war has now destabilized the entire region, leading to the deaths of more than 5,000 Sudanese and displacing millions both within the African nation and across seven national borders.[1]  Sudan is now home to the highest number of internally displaced anywhere in the world, with at least 7.1 million uprooted.[2] More than 6 million Sudanese are suffering from famine, and these numbers are growing every day.  The health system has broken down, and more than 1,200 children have died from malnutrition and lack of essential care. [3]The UN now describes the Sudan conflict as a forgotten humanitarian disaster, while the International Crisis Group has warned that Sudan’s future, and much else, is at stake.

Lest we forget, within a short period, the third largest nation in Africa, with a size of more than 1.8886 million square kilometers and at least 46 million people, has no properly functioning government, and all state institutions have collapsed with the effects of its meltdown spilling over to its neighbors, particularly South Sudan.

South Sudan is host to thousands of Sudanese refugees forced across the border into South Sudan, exerting social and economic pressure on an already fragile state that was already sinking under the burden of its own civil war and internal conflicts.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) reports that more than 500,000 people have now fled from the war in Sudan to South Sudan. [1]This means that over 30 percent of all the refugees, asylum seekers, and ethnic South Sudanese were forced to flee Sudan since the war exploded in April 2023 for protection in one of the poorest places on earth. “South Sudan, that has itself recently come out of decades of war, was facing a dire humanitarian situation before the war in Sudan erupted. It already had nine million people in need of humanitarian aid, and almost 60 per cent of the population facing high levels of food insecurity.

As of 28 January 2024, more than 528,000 ethnic South Sudanese, Sudanese refugees, and other third-country nationals had crossed at entry points along the South Sudan border into Abyei Administrative Area, Upper Nile, Unity, Northern, and Western Bahr El Ghazal. The majority, 81 percent, entered at Jodrah before making their way to the transit center in Renk. Ethnic South Sudanese who have crossed the border from Sudan are commonly referred to as “returnees.” Still, in reality, many of them were born in Sudan and have never been in South Sudan, and therefore have no kinship connection in host communities.

The conflict has spilled deeper into other East African countries, with thousands seeking refuge and safety from it. The education system collapsed, sending thousands of learners back home and hundreds who could afford to flee exile to continue their studies. Some of these were admitted to Rwandan and Tanzanian Universities.

The Sudan and South Sudan experiment was a governance disaster in the waiting and perhaps serves as a lesson of how a firm grip on power, corruption, and misgovernance can ultimately lead to catastrophic state failure and collapse.

Donald Kasongi, Executive Director of Governance Links and a former senior officer with the Accord, a regional conflict organization, describes the post-Garang South Sudan and post-Bashir Sudan as a protracted governance failure. The diverse strategic roles of Khartoum, Beijing, and Washington in the Sweet South Sudanese oil are now evident.  So far, none is a victor.

The role of external interests in shaping national discourse has been at play. Sudan is caught between the interests of the West and the Middle East and China, with both interested in controlling access to Sudan’s resources, cultural wealth, and strategic positioning as a buffer between the North and South. Before the war, Sudan identified itself with the Islamic world and pronounced itself as an Islamic state. Despite this alignment, the OIC and the larger Islamic world has not come to its help. Sudan remains an isolated state left to collapse at its fate.

In South Sudan, the Garang vision of a strong independent nation was lost. After his demise most of the post Garang political elites or military war generals became pre-occupied on restoring the lost years at war by amassing wealth through corruption and sharing out of the limited resources from the oil resources. As a consequence, a strong nation is yet to be built. They had won the war but lost their country. The same mistake plays out in Sudan. Perhaps the conflict is a lesson on what it means to lose what is so dear to one- A country.

In short, the transition in both countries (Sudan and South Sudan) were not well managed and what we see are petals of blood from toxic flowers of bad governance which have flourished like a forest planted along the banks of the river Nile.

According to James Boboya, the Executive Director of the South worrisome. The raging war has made South Sudan’s oil exports via Port Sudan difficult. Oil exports have collapsed by more than half from 160,000 barrels per day in 2022 to 140,000 barrels per day in 2023. This was more than half of the previous peak of 350,000 barrels per day before civil war broke out in 2013.[2] The South Sudanese dollar collapsed in value. There is a financial crunch and the South Sudanese government has not paid its public and civil servants for months. There is a risk of insurrection and demonstrations by public servants that will be likely joined by the military. This would plunge South Sudan into chaos and total collapse just like its Northern neighbor.

Moreover, this conflict and its associated effects comes in an election year for South Sudan.  The general elections are viewed as a watershed moment which may see a transition from President Salva Keir to a new cadre of leadership. With the economic crunch, South Sudan may not be able to organize and fund a credible general election. This will be not good for South Sudan’s democracy and desired future.

With the world’s media focused on the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Gaza wars, little is covered about the Sudan conflicts nor the total economic catastrophe that South Sudan faces.

If not addressed, the Sudan war will be soon inside the borders of the EAC. Can the EAC afford to stand by and watch longer as its member state, collapses.  Mediation efforts led by Kenya and Djbouti were postponed last year. Direct talks between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s army chief and de facto head of state, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, head of the RSF paramilitaries remain futile.  What can South Sudan and the EAC do now to avert further catastrophe?

During a joint webinar organized by the Governance and Economic Policy Center (GEPC) and the Institute of Social Policy and Research (ISCR) in South Sudan in April, a distinguished panel of experts discussed and enabled us to understand the contradictions and magnitude of this war with implications and lessons on extractive governance, and state collapse drawn for East Africa and Africa generally, can be taken to avert the situation and its contagion effect on the EAC and Africa generally. The panelists and participants highlighted some key lessons and takeaways that can be drawn from the conflict.

Key lessons and takeaways

Ethnicization of politics and governance can lead to a spiral of violence and catastrophic state collapse, especially when the strong ruling elite and regime finally lose control of power.

A previously united Sudan started getting balkanized when the ruling elites started practicing the politics of ethnicity and religion pitting the largely Muslims in the northern and western parts of the country against their Christian southerners.  The Christians were portrayed as slightly inferior, denied political and economic opportunity, and subjected to forced Islamisation, and inhumane conditions such as slavery. Faced with what was considered unbecoming conditions the Southerners opted for a rebellion and demand for independence. The first and second Sudanese civil war (including the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM/A) were born and the political dynamics in Sudan changed for decades after. New factions such as the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) emerged and Sudan never remained the same.  Sentiments for cessation and independence in Darfur flared and faced with an insurgency, President Omar enlisted militias including the Janjaweed to quell the rebellions. Around 10,000 were killed and over 2.5 million displaced. The balkanisation of Sudan was continuing to play out.

Militarisation of politics erodes democratic values and principles which can take decades to rebuild.

Omar Bashir came to power in 1989 when, as a brigadier general in the Sudanese Army, he led a group of officers in a military coup that ousted the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi after it began negotiations with rebels in the south. Omar Bashir subsequently replaced President Ahmed al-Mirghani as head of state and ruled with the military closely fused into the politics and governance of Sudan.

The military elites elevated to power during President Omar Bashir’s government enjoyed privileged positions.  Even with his overthrow in 2019, these generals maintained a firm grip on the Transition Military Council and the Civil-Military Sovereignty Council.  These are less likely to accept any position below total control of the central authority. The net effect is that the return to full civilian and democratic rule of state governance in an entrenched militarized political environment such as Sudan can or may take decades to be rebuilt.

Vulnerability to geopolitical manipulation and fiddle diddle can be a driver to political instability and eventual weak governance

Both Sudan and South Sudan have been victims of well-orchestrated geopolitical game plans from external powers interested in taking control of the rich natural resources wealth that these countries possess. Sudan and South Sudan have vast oil deposits and forestry products.  With eyes focused on these resources external powers succeeded in playing one community against another and one country against the other and successfully throwing the region into an abyss of endless crisis. Religion was used as a tool to play the North against the South and continues to be used in some segments of the Sudanese and South Sudanese communities.

Key Takeaways

  1. The East African Community (EAC) governments cannot afford to take a wait-and-see attitude. The problems facing Sudan and South Sudan are latently present in several other EAC countries. For this reason, therefore without taking lessons from Sudan and South Sudan other countries can also easily erupt in the future, bringing down the entire EAC. The EAC has therefore an obligation to ramp up support for the resumption of the peace process and finding lasting solutions for peace and tranquility in the two countries. For this to happen there has to be trust and objectivity of the actors to the crisis and the EAC mediators. 
  1. Stop ethnicization and militarization of politics and state governance: The Sudan experience demonstrates this, whereby the collapse of President Omar Bashir’s strong grip on power let loose the lid off a can of worms that had eaten the state to its collapse. Similar conditions of ethnic rivalry in state governance have created uncertainty about guaranteed stability in South Sudan. In some other EAC member states there have been attempts to elevate dominant ethnic groups to power and military influence in state politics built around one strong leader. The Sudan experience demonstrates that the absence of such a strong leader holding the center together can lead to a lacuna, leading to a trail of conflict and instability leading governance to fall apart and eventual state collapse.
  1. The EAC countries must stop viewing at South Sudan as merely a market but as an independent viable state whose stability is good for the entire region. According to the EAC trade statistics, South Sudan was the leading market for goods from Uganda and Kenya. With a total population of 11 million and a collapsed agricultural and industrial base, South Sudan has provided a ready market for agricultural goods and manufactured goods from Uganda and Kenya. According to UN Comtrade Data Uganda exported goods worth USD483.9Mln and Kenya’s exports to South Sudan were worth USD170Mln. Uganda’s exports to Sudan also increased by 154% from around USD48Mln in 2016 to USD123Mln in 2022.  With the eyes largely focused on trade opportunities, there can be a tendency to lose track of the human suffering that the people in these countries face. Also, the jostle for geopolitical control over trade deals can overwhelm the genuine solidarity intentions of good neighbors. The EAC members should focus on the stability of these countries. 
  1. The International Community Must not give up on Sudan and South Sudan. Despite the donor fatigue and reports of corruption, the international community has a moral obligation to continue engaging with the protagonists in the war, facilitating the avenues for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and providing humanitarian aid to the suffering people. The Sudan and South Sudan conflict must be treated with equal measure with the Ukraine-Russia, Israel, and Gaza conflicts. The EAC must scale up diplomatic efforts and be an Anchor in Chief in this process, coordinating and connecting Sudan, South Sudan to the world. 
  1. The EAC media and Civil society must continue highlighting the suffering in Sudan and South Sudan. With the Israel and Gaza war ongoing, the Sudan and South Sudan stories that were largely covered by the Western media have since died out.  There has been little coverage given within the EAC of the recent developments in this war and how it is affecting its neighbors. Moreover, with limited internet connectivity and restrictive conditions, communication advocacy from inside Sudan and South Sudan is quite difficult.  The media and civil society in the EAC therefore must speak loud on behalf of their Sudanese counterparts

 

[1] War in Sudan displaces over 500,000 to South Sudanhttps://www.nrc.no/news/2024/january/sudan-refugees-to-south-sudan/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CMore%20than%20500%2C000%20people%20have,the%20poorest%20places%20on%20earth.

[2] The East African Business Khartoum unable to ensure smooth export of South Sudan oil https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/khartoum-unable-to-ensure-smooth-export-of-south-sudanese-oil-4564064

[1] Sudan conflict: ‘Our lives have become a piece of hell’ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67438018

[2] War in Sudan: more than 7 million displaced – UNhttps://www.africanews.com/2023/12/22/war-in-sudan-more-than-7-million-displaced-un//

[3] More than 1,200 children have died in the past 5 months in conflict-wrecked Sudan, the UN sayshttps://apnews.com/article/sudan-conflict-military-rsf-children-measles-malnutrition-ec7bb2a1f49d74e7b5f01afa12f16d99

Oil and Energy Transition: Why Sudan conflict provides new hope for EACOP

The Sudan conflict is a catastrophe that must be stopped but its unintended consequences provide new optimism for the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP).

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Center

With the constant fighting and insecurity along the pipeline and its pumping stations, the South Sudanese government is now open to exploring new opportunities via EACOP to guarantee its future oil exports.

On March 16th the government of Sudan admitted that it cannot guarantee the smooth export of oil from South Sudan, as a year of war has made it difficult to maintain or even protect the pipeline to Port Sudan.

In a letter to major oil companies involved in the oil production and export, Sudan’s Minister of Energy and Petroleum Dr Mohieldin Nam Mohamed Said admitted that the war had made it difficult to provide any guarantees for safety.

He acknowledged that the conflict was hampering the flow of oil to Port Sudan, as it took time to repair pipelines ruptured during the fighting. In addition, there was a telecommunications breakdown between the pumping stations (PS4) and PS5 in Sudan, which were shut down in the midst of heavy fighting. The area was an active military zone and access for repairs was not guaranteed.

As a response the South Sudanese government had declared a force majeure, making production and export impossible and thereby revamping suggestions to explore new possible safer routes for South Sudan’s oil.

The war in Sudan added to the challenges South Sudan faces in maximizing its only major resource – oil – to fund a financially constrained government and other operations.  As a consequence of the war, South Sudan’s oil production fell from 160,000 barrels per day in 2022 to 140,000 barrels per day in 2023. This is was more than half of the previous peak of 350,000 barrels per day before civil war broke out in 2013.

Talks to have South Sudan pump its oil south wards had all along been explored and presented as part of Uganda’s grand plan to make the EACOP an East African project by connecting and supplying all the EAC member states with oil and gas.

Under this grand plan and initial drawings, the Oil pipeline would radiate from its nerve center in Hoima with an artery of pipelines running northwards to South Sudan, westwards to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), eastwards to connect Kenya’s oil from Turkana and southwards with an arm extended to Rwanda and long route via Tanzania to Tanga port.

Map showing initially considered alternative EACOP routes

But the progress of this was partly hampered by Uganda’s fall out with the Kenyan route and the existing agreements signed between Khartoum and Juba during the independence talks. Provisions in these required among others a concession that Sudan will retain territorial control of some oil rich territories and that South Sudan would continue exporting its oil via Port Sudan. By doing this, the government in Khartoum would maintain some revenues from the oil sector that had been largely lost with South Sudan’s cessation and independence.

I remember in a private conversation with a friend from Sudan some years ago he confided that during one meeting with   Sudanese youth and young professionals, President Omar Bashir, before his overthrow, had admitted that he was not sure about the economic future of Sudan without South Sudan. He clearly predicted a catastrophic economic meltdown leading to chaos and that was why Sudan had to maintain a grip on South Sudan. The oil pipeline was a win-win infrastructure politically and economically anchoring the two countries as good neighbors.

By Sudan admitting that the safety cannot be guaranteed and reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure will take longer than usual provides South Sudan with a legitimate cause to start exploring new safe routes for its oil.

An oil route from Juba southward would be beneficial to South Sudan, the EACOP but also good for the East African Community as a region. South Sudan derives 90% of its revenues from oil exports and would like to have a constant flow of this oil to sustain its economy. EACOP would guarantee that flow. South Sudan would also have access to other EACOP related infrastructure such as the refinery and international airport for other logistical needs.

An extended pipeline from Hoima northwards to connect with the oil from South Sudan would increase volumes of oil pumped out of EACOP by at least 150,000 to 200,000 barrels per day, increasing EACOP’s profitability and attractiveness to investors.

Moreover, with its oil, South Sudan would become a major regional player with a stronger voice in EAC matters perhaps more than it is today. The pipeline would bring Sudan in the north closer to the EAC, increasing its prospects for joining the EAC and thus facilitating the region’s expansion ambitions.

There could be some differences in the chemical composition and technical aspects of the two oils (Uganda and South Sudan) with perhaps one being waxier than the other but these complexities can be handled through technical re-engineering and design of the oil pipeline.

The EACOP has always been a controversial project with environmental activists and anti-oil crusaders campaigning against its construction.  Environmentalists argued that the world’s longest heated pipeline will have serious environmental impacts and contribute to global warming. The future profitability of the pipeline was also questioned given the global push towards a transition away from fossil-based system and uncertainty about the future of oil as an energy source.

None the less, plans for construction of the pipeline are ongoing.  Land compensations in Uganda and Tanzania was completed. An advance consignment of pipes was delivered and a coating and insulating plant for the pipelines was commissioned and already operational in Tanzania, paving way for the pipeline construction and ground laying to commence before end of 2024.

The conflict in Sudan therefore provides more impetus to the project as it opens a new door for possible access and increased volumes from South Sudan’s oil and taping into already existing markets can be guaranteed.

The future of oil as a dominant fuel in the global energy system is a controversial subject and a debate exists whether it makes sense to construct new oil pipelines and infrastructure.  

However, the crisis and the significance of oil in driving South Sudan’s economy comes at a time when there are all indications that major global super powers such as the United States and United Kingdom are backtracking on their commitments to end and move away from fossil or oil as source of energy.

Despite the announcements made at the COP27 and 28, in his maiden speech to Parliament, King Charles in November 2023 announced that the UK government will issue new licensing rounds for exploration and drilling of oil and gas in the North Sea. The rounds will go ahead each year so long as the UK remains a net importer of oil and gas and if emissions from UK-based production remain lower than those associated with imports.

In the US, Republicans have maintained a firm support for oil and Donald Trump, the most preferred Republican nominee for President has vowed to overturn any existing legislation and commitments made by the Democrats against the fossil energy sector, by signing an executive order to issue new rounds oil and gas drilling.  According to Trump this would be his first executive order immediately signed, if he was elected to power in November of 2024. Clearly, the US political will is divided and the future US policy terrain on oil and gas cannot be guaranteed.

Quietly, the leading oil producers are strongly supporting continued pumping of oil. Despite global campaigns, large oil producers are still skeptical that renewables can replace oil in the medium term and by 2050. They believe that the focus should be on decarbonizing oil and not ending its supply and use all together. Ending use of oil would be returning the world to stone age error, one Middle East leader remarked at COP28 before backtracking after coming under intense criticism. The approved language at COP28 was phase down and not phaseout. Oil therefore may have a longer lifetime than earlier anticipated.

Despite the catastrophe that the war has caused, that we all condemn, Uganda and Tanzania should exploit the opportunity it provides to ramp up and conclude talks with South Sudan on the viability of exporting its oil via EACOP.