Tragedy of Conflict, Economic Exclusion, and Meeting Public Economic Expectations in Times of Crisis: The Case of South Sudan

 

Authors: Boboya James Edimond,  Institute of Social Policy Research, South Sudan & Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

South Sudan continues to face profound economic and governance challenges rooted in prolonged conflict, institutional fragility, and structural economic exclusion. Despite abundant natural resources, particularly oil, the country has struggled to convert this wealth into broad-based economic development and improved social welfare. Persistent instability, weak public institutions, and economic mismanagement have exacerbated poverty and constrained the state’s capacity to meet public expectations for economic opportunity and effective service delivery.

This paper examines the interplay between conflict, economic exclusion, and public expectations during periods of crisis in South Sudan. Drawing on recent economic assessments and development literature, it argues that sustainable recovery requires comprehensive institutional reforms, economic diversification, and inclusive governance capable of addressing structural inequalities and restoring public trust.

Furthermore, the analysis contributes to ongoing regional debates on East African Community (EAC) national budget plans and the broader implications of the US–Israel–Iran war on energy and economic outlooks in the region. The conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran has caused major disruptions in global energy markets, including sharp rises in oil prices and risks to key chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, which carries roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply (2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis). These external shocks underscore the need for prudent, timely resource allocation and resilient fiscal frameworks to support post‑conflict reconstruction and strengthen regional economic resilience.

  1. Introduction

South Sudan gained independence in 2011 amid widespread optimism about the prospects for peace, political stability, and economic transformation. However, the country soon experienced severe political instability and violent conflicts that undermined its development trajectory. The outbreak of civil war in 2013 and recurring localized conflicts since then have significantly weakened the economy, damaged infrastructure, and displaced millions of citizens.

Conflict has had devastating effects on economic activity, reducing agricultural production, disrupting trade networks, and discouraging private investment. As a result, economic growth has remained fragile and heavily dependent on oil revenues. The country’s economic structure is highly vulnerable to external shocks, particularly fluctuations in global oil prices and disruptions to export infrastructure.

Recent economic assessments indicate that South Sudan’s economy has experienced sustained decline over several consecutive years. The economy was projected to contract by approximately 30 % in the 2024/25 fiscal year, largely due to disruptions in oil production and declining export revenues (World Bank, 2025). Resources mobilized or provided by development partners for post-conflict reconstruction have often been misused, while the country’s narrow tax base further constrains domestic revenue generation. In addition, annual national budgets have frequently been delayed or left unpassed before the National Assembly, undermining fiscal planning and disrupting efforts toward post-conflict reconstruction and development.

At the same time, citizens continue to expect the government to deliver economic stability, employment opportunities, and improved public services. This growing mismatch between public expectations and state capacity has emerged as one of the defining governance challenges in South Sudan, exacerbating public dissatisfaction and weakening trust in state institutions.

Contribution to the Ongoing Debate: EAC Budgets and the Implications of the US, Isreal and Iran War.

The analysis presented in this paper also contributes to broader discussions in regional dialogues, such as webinars and policy forums, on the East African Community (EAC) national budget plans and the implications of the US-Israel-Iran war for the region’s energy and economic outlooks. The EAC’s collective capacity to plan and implement effective national budgets is increasingly strained by both internal fiscal weaknesses and external shocks. As of the 2023–24 fiscal year, multiple EAC member states — including South Sudan — have experienced significant budget shortfalls and delayed remittances to the regional budget, impeding the bloc’s ability to fund operations and coordinate shared developmental priorities (EAC Secretariat, 2025).

The recent Middle East conflict between the United States and Iran — especially disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz — has major implications for global energy markets and regional economic stability. Roughly 20% of the world’s oil and natural gas trade flows through this strait, so prolonged tensions have driven up global oil prices and heightened supply chain risks, with ripple effects across Africa, including East Africa (Arita, S., Chakravorty, R., Kim, J., Lwin, W. Y., & Steinbach, S., 2026).

For EAC economies that are net importers of energy, the surge in crude oil prices increases the cost of fuel, transportation, and basic commodities, complicating fiscal planning and national budget implementation. Analysts have already warned that East African countries may face rising inflationary pressures, depreciating currencies, and widened current account deficits as a result of these disruptions. This trend makes it more difficult for governments to allocate resources toward development priorities while managing macroeconomic stability.

These regional debates underscore the interconnectedness of domestic fiscal policies and global geopolitical dynamics. They highlight the importance of strengthening EAC fiscal frameworks and diversifying energy sources to mitigate the economic fallout from international conflicts — a theme that aligns closely with the findings of this study on South Sudan’s economic vulnerabilities and the broader institutional challenges facing fragile economies in East Africa.

  1. Conflict and Economic Disruption

Armed conflict has been one of the most significant obstacles to economic development in South Sudan. The destruction of infrastructure, displacement of populations, and disruption of productive activities have severely constrained economic growth. Research indicates that conflict has destroyed key infrastructure, including roads, bridges, hospitals, and schools, while also disrupting agricultural production and supply chains (Journal of Developing Country Studies, 2024; Acheampong & Enders, 2024). The displacement of more than 3.8 million people has weakened the labor force, reduced productivity across multiple sectors of the economy, and increased dependency on humanitarian assistance (Journal of Developing Country Studies, 2024; UNHCR, 2025).

Photo Credits: UN News

The economic losses associated with conflict are substantial. Multiple studies estimate that armed conflict has resulted in billions of dollars in economic losses due to reduced productivity, destruction of physical assets, and declining investment flows (Zhou & Hsiao, 2025; Akol, 2024). The destruction of economic infrastructure raises the cost of reconstruction and slows the pace of post‑conflict recovery, placing an additional burden on already fragile public finances (Collier et al., 2024).

Furthermore, persistent instability has significantly discouraged both domestic and foreign investment. In the absence of a stable political and security environment, businesses face heightened risks that constrain economic expansion and limit job creation. Post‑conflict countries such as South Sudan, characterized by weak governance structures and fragile economic fundamentals, are particularly vulnerable to external regional and global shocks (IMF, 2024). Disruptions in key sectors—such as energy and trade—have had severe consequences; for instance, interruptions in oil production have resulted in estimated revenue losses of approximately $7 million per day, further straining government finances and fiscal sustainability (World Bank, 2025b).

  1. Fiscal Policy, Taxation, and National Budgets

An examination of South Sudan’s fiscal framework reveals deep structural weaknesses in revenue generation and public financial management. Government revenue remains overwhelmingly dependent on oil, which accounts for around 90% of total government revenue and approximately 95% of exports (African Development Bank, 2023; IMF, 2024). This high dependence exposes the economy to external shocks, particularly fluctuations in global oil prices and regional disruptions affecting production and export routes.

Domestic revenue mobilization remains extremely limited. South Sudan’s tax-to-GDP ratio was estimated at approximately 4.1% in FY2022/23, with projections of about 5.8% in FY2023/24, making it one of the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa (IMF, 2024). Moreover, non-oil revenues contribute less than 20% of the national budget, reflecting a narrow tax base and weak capacity for tax administration (World Bank, 2023). Key tax instruments such as value-added tax (VAT) contribute minimally, further highlighting structural inefficiencies in revenue collection.

On the expenditure side, fiscal data indicate volatility and weak budget credibility. Total government revenue declined from 34.7% of GDP in 2022/23 to about 26.5% in 2024/25, largely due to falling oil revenues, while expenditures remained relatively high at around 28–36% of GDP over the same period (IMF, 2024). This imbalance has contributed to recurring fiscal deficits and rising public debt, which is projected to reach approximately 48.6% of GDP in 2024/25 (IMF, 2024).

In addition to these structural constraints, persistent delays in the preparation and approval of national budgets have undermined fiscal discipline and effective public expenditure management. Weak transparency and governance challenges have further compounded the problem, with reports highlighting the mismanagement of significant public resources, including oil-backed financing arrangements (World Bank, 2025). These challenges disrupt service delivery, weaken development planning, and limit the government’s capacity to respond effectively to post-conflict reconstruction needs.

  1. Economic Exclusion and Persistent Poverty

Despite its natural resource wealth, South Sudan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Poverty levels remain extremely high, reflecting deep structural inequalities and limited economic opportunities.

According to the South Sudan Poverty and Equity Assessment, approximately 92% of South Sudanese live below the national poverty line, while extreme poverty affects more than two-thirds of the population (World Bank, 2024). Poverty is particularly severe in rural areas, where most households depend on subsistence agriculture. Limited access to markets, poor infrastructure, climate shocks, and ongoing insecurity severely restrict agricultural productivity and household income (World Bank, 2024; ISS Africa, 2026).

Economic exclusion in South Sudan is also evident in limited access to education, healthcare, financial services, and formal employment opportunities (World Bank, 2025; Journal of Developing Country Studies, 2024). Weak institutions, governance challenges, and mismanagement of public resources have further constrained the equitable distribution of economic opportunities, entrenching inequality (World Bank, 2023; IMF, 2024).

Additionally, inequality in access to economic opportunities fuels social grievances and undermines national cohesion. Large segments of the population remain excluded from economic growth, increasing the risk of conflict and political instability (Radio Tamazuj, 2025; ISS Africa, 2026). External shocks—such as regional instability, disruptions in oil exports due to conflict in Sudan, or global geopolitical tensions affecting energy markets—further exacerbate vulnerability, limiting South Sudan’s capacity to achieve sustainable economic resilience (World Bank, 2025a; African Development Bank, 2023).

Addressing these challenges requires inclusive governance, strengthened institutions, and targeted investments in social services and rural development. Without these interventions, structural poverty, economic exclusion, and inequality are likely to persist, continuing to undermine South Sudan’s long-term development and stability (World Bank, 2024; ISS Africa, 2026).

  1. Public Expectations and Governance Challenges

While economic conditions remain difficult, public expectations for economic improvement continue to grow. Citizens expect the government to provide employment opportunities, infrastructure development, and access to essential services such as healthcare and education.

However, the government faces severe fiscal constraints that limit its ability to meet these expectations. South Sudan’s economy remains heavily dependent on oil revenues, which account for over 90 % of government revenue and the majority of export earnings (World Bank, 2021).

This heavy dependence on a single resource exposes the country to significant economic volatility. When oil production declines or prices fall, government revenues drop sharply, resulting in reduced public spending and delayed salary payments for public servants.

External shocks have also worsened economic conditions. For example, disruptions in oil export infrastructure linked to regional conflicts have led to significant fiscal crises and foreign exchange shortages. These challenges have contributed to inflation, food insecurity, and declining purchasing power among households (IMF, 2024).  The gap between public expectations and government capacity to deliver services, therefore, continues to widen.

Photo Credit: FAO

  1. Structural Economic Vulnerabilities

South Sudan’s economic challenges are deeply rooted in structural vulnerabilities that limit long-term development.

First, the economy remains highly dependent on oil exports. Oil revenues constitute the majority of government income, making the country vulnerable to fluctuations in global commodity markets and geopolitical disruptions.

Second, economic diversification remains limited. Key sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and services remain underdeveloped due to insecurity, poor infrastructure, and limited access to capital.

Third, the country faces recurring humanitarian crises driven by climate shocks, flooding, and food insecurity. These crises place additional pressure on government resources and undermine household resilience.

Fourth, institutional weaknesses limit effective economic governance. Weak public financial management systems, corruption, and limited administrative capacity reduce the effectiveness of development policies.

Addressing these structural challenges is essential for building a resilient and inclusive economy.

  1. Conflicts and Regional Integration

South Sudan has gradually increased its economic integration with regional and international partners, thereby expanding trade opportunities but heightening its vulnerability to external shocks. As a member of the East African Community (EAC), South Sudan is economically linked with neighboring countries such as Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan. While regional integration enhances market access and trade flows, it also exposes the country to the spillover effects of regional instability.

The ongoing conflict in Sudan has had particularly severe consequences for South Sudan’s economy. Since South Sudan relies on pipelines that run through Sudan to export its oil, the conflict has disrupted production and transportation, leading to significant declines in oil export revenues. Given that oil accounts for the bulk of government income, these disruptions have constrained the government’s ability to finance its national budget and deliver essential public services.

Beyond the region, South Sudan has in recent years strengthened its economic and strategic ties with Middle Eastern countries, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, particularly in the energy and investment sectors. While these partnerships provide important sources of capital and market access, they also increase the country’s exposure to global geopolitical dynamics.

In this context, conflicts in the Middle East—especially tensions involving the United States and Iran—could have significant economic implications for South Sudan. Such conflicts may trigger volatility in global oil prices, disrupt energy markets, and affect investment flows. For a fragile, oil-dependent economy like South Sudan, these external shocks could undermine economic resilience, exacerbate fiscal pressures, and negatively influence the country’s economic outlook for 2026.

  1. Policy Pathways for Inclusive Economic Recovery and Outlook

Achieving sustainable economic recovery in South Sudan requires a coordinated approach that integrates peacebuilding, economic reforms, and institutional strengthening. The following policy pathways are critical:

Durable Peace and Political Stability – Ensuring lasting peace and political stability must remain a top priority. Without a secure environment, key economic activities such as trade, agriculture, and investment cannot thrive, and public confidence in the state will remain low. Stability provides the foundation for rebuilding infrastructure, attracting investment, and enabling productive livelihoods.

Economic Diversification – Reducing dependence on oil revenue is essential. Investments in agriculture, infrastructure, and small-scale enterprises can broaden the economic base, enhance resilience, and generate employment. Improving agricultural productivity, in particular, can strengthen food security and provide income opportunities for rural populations, who represent the majority of South Sudanese households.

Transparency and Accountability in Resource Management – Effective and transparent management of natural resources, especially oil revenues, is critical. Prudent resource allocation can finance development programs, expand public services, and reduce opportunities for corruption that undermine public trust and fiscal stability.

Human Capital Development – Investment in education, healthcare, and vocational training is necessary to cultivate a skilled and healthy workforce capable of supporting long-term economic transformation. Strengthening human capital also enhances innovation and productivity across all sectors of the economy.

Institutional and Public Financial Management Strengthening – Strengthening public institutions, including fiscal management systems, enhances government capacity to plan, implement, and monitor policies effectively. Strong institutions are necessary for efficient service delivery, improved budget execution, and the creation of an enabling environment for private sector development.

By pursuing these interconnected policy pathways, South Sudan can foster inclusive economic recovery, build resilience to internal and external shocks, and create conditions for sustainable development and long-term stability.

  1. Conclusion

South Sudan’s economic and governance challenges are deeply intertwined with its history of conflict, institutional fragility, and structural economic dependence on oil. Despite significant natural resource endowments, the country has struggled to translate its wealth into inclusive growth, poverty reduction, and effective public service delivery. Persistent instability, weak fiscal management, and limited domestic revenue mobilization have further constrained the state’s capacity to meet growing public expectations.

This paper has shown that the interplay between conflict, economic exclusion, and governance deficits continues to undermine development efforts. Declining oil revenues, a narrow tax base, and recurrent delays in national budget processes have weakened fiscal stability and disrupted post-conflict reconstruction. At the same time, increasing regional and global economic integration—through membership in the East African Community and expanding ties with countries such as United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia—has exposed South Sudan to external shocks, including the spillover effects of conflict in Sudan and geopolitical tensions in the Middle East.

Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive and sustained reform agenda. Strengthening public institutions, improving transparency and accountability in resource management, and broadening the domestic tax base are critical steps toward enhancing state capacity. Equally important is the need for economic diversification to reduce overreliance on oil and build resilience against external shocks. Moreover, ensuring that scarce public resources are allocated efficiently, transparently, and in a timely manner will be essential for restoring public trust and supporting long-term development.

Ultimately, sustainable peace and economic recovery in South Sudan will depend on the government’s ability to align public expectations with institutional capacity, foster inclusive governance, and create an enabling environment for investment and growth. Without these reforms, the cycle of fragility, economic decline, and unmet expectations is likely to persist, undermining the country’s prospects for stability and prosperity.

 

  1. References

Acheampong, T., & Enders, W. (2024). Conflict, infrastructure loss, and economic trajectories in fragile states. Journal of Peace Economics and Development.

Akol, L. (2024). Economic cost of conflict in South Sudan: Infrastructure, productivity, and investment. African Journal of Development Studies.

African Development Bank. (2023). South Sudan economic outlook 2023. African Development Bank Group.

Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2024). Post conflict reconstruction and the economics of rebuilding. Oxford University Press.

EAC Secretariat. (2025). East African Community budget and fiscal reports 2023–24. EAC Secretariat.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2024). South Sudan: Staff-monitored program review and economic outlook. IMF.

Journal of Developing Country Studies. (2024). The impact of armed conflict on economic growth and sustainability in South Sudan.

Radio Tamazuj. (2025). 11 million South Sudanese faced extreme poverty in 2024 – report. Retrieved from https://www.radiotamazuj.org

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2025). South Sudan displacement report 2025. UNHCR.

World Bank. (2021). South Sudan economic update: Pathways to sustainable food security. World Bank.

World Bank. (2023). South Sudan economic monitor: Enhancing domestic revenue mobilization. World Bank.

World Bank. (2024). South Sudan poverty and equity assessment. World Bank.

World Bank. (2025a). South Sudan economic monitor: A pathway to overcome the crisis. World Bank.

World Bank. (2025b). South Sudan economic update: Urgent reforms for stability and growth. World Bank.

Zhou, X., & Hsiao, C. (2025). Conflict-driven economic losses in fragile economies. Journal of Conflict and Development.

Arita, S., Chakravorty, R., Kim, J., Lwin, W. Y., & Steinbach, S. (2026). Strait of Hormuz Closure and Global Fertilizer Trade Disruptions. NDSU Agricultural Trade Monitor, 2026(3), 1–26.

Reuters. (2026). Egypt’s energy import bill more than doubles as global prices surge. Retrieved March 18, 2026, from https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/egypts-energy-import-bill-more-than-doubles-global-prices-surge-2026-03-18/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

ISS Africa. (2026). South Sudan country profile — Poverty and inequality analysis. Retrieved from https://futures.issafrica.org/geographic/countries/south-sudan/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

 

 

East Africa’s 2026/27 Budget plans and implications of US-Iran war on energy and economic outlook

Author: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

In February the major East Africa Communities Countries (Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi) presented to their budget expenditure framework papers and plans in which governments outlined their tax budget proposals and priorities for 2026/27 financial years. The plans are now tabled before their country’s respective parliamentary committees for scrutiny and deliberation.

This paper reflects on the East African Community (EAC) countries budget and tax proposals in the context of economic and tax justice, equity and fairness and the implications of the US, Israel and Iran war on East Africa’s economic outlook for 2026/27. The paper finds that economic benefits from increased budgetary expenditures have been uneven and the US, Israel and Iran war has adverse implications on the region’s economic performance

According to the framework papers, Kenya plans to spend Ksh 4.7 Trln, Uganda UGx78.24 Trln (U$ 21.78 bln) which is about 12.7% increase and Tanzania will spend a record Tsh61.9Trln representing 9.7 % increase compared to previous budget. The governments will raise from tax and non-tax measures with Tanzania focusing more on domestic tax mobilization strategies due to donor aid restraints arising after the violent 2025 general elections. The countries have laid out key expenditure priorities with Education, security, health, infrastructure ranging among the top.

Country

2025/26 budget

2026/27 plans

+/-

Key Priority areas

Uganda

UGX 72.4 Tln

($20 B)

UGX 78.24 Tln

($21.78 B)

+12.7%

Econ transformation, Infrastructure, Fiscal Strategy, Infrastructure (EACOP)

Kenya

Ksh 4.2 T to 4.3 T ( $32-33 Bln)

Ks4.7Tln

+173bln

Education, Security, Health and Agriculture

Tanzania

Tsh56.49 Trln ($21.7–$22.07 Bln)

Tsh 61.9 Trln

+9.7%

Energy, Health, Education, Domestic Revenue Mobilization

Rwanda

Rwf 6,952.1 Bln

 

(US$57.5 Mln)

–

– 27.8% (GDP)

Infrastructure (Bugesera Intl Airport, Recurrent expenditure cuts

Burundi

Bf 5.2 trln

( $1.77 billion).

–

–

Infrastructure, Agriculture, Social development projects

South Sudan

SSP 7.00 Trln

–

–

Wages, debt servicing, and infrastructure development.

Dem Republic Congo

Cf 49,846.8 bln ($17.5 bln to $17.6 bln)

–

–

Security, infrastructure, agriculture, and social services

 

Despite the grandeur of the plans, experiences from the past budgets and analysis of their implementation outcome and economic impacts on ordinary citizens shows that the devil lies in the details. Increasingly, the budgets and their tax plans have been not equitable, just and fair.

Over the last three years, the EAC Countries have increased budgetary expenditures, increased taxes and suppressed inflationary pressures but recorded unevenly distributed economic prosperity. Unemployment, income and food poverty are still persistent.

The World Bank reports poverty rates in East Africa are generally high, with significant variations by country and region. In 2022, approximately 39.8% of Kenya’s population lived below the national poverty line. Other estimates for 2022 indicate international poverty rates (at a day) of 42.3% for both Uganda and Rwanda, and 32.4% for Sudan, with rates often higher in rural, arid, and semi-arid areas. Data indicates that while some countries have made progress, substantial challenges remain, with high debt servicing and vulnerability to external shocks affecting poverty reduction efforts

For instance, according to a study by Kenya’s National Bureau of Statistics household food poverty rates have increased and about 65% families in Nairobi barely afford two meals a day over lack of money. As of 2024, approximately 70% of households in Nairobi experienced food insecurity, ranging from moderate to severe. The conditions are worsening with recent reports in 2025 indicated that the majority of residents can no longer afford three meals a day, and many are skipping meals or stopping cooking altogether due to high costs together[i] The situation is worse in the informal settlements where over 65% of Nairobi residents live (The Standard times)

Further reports indicate widening income inequality and impacts in Kenya. While around 25% of Nairobi households fall into the middle-income group, only a small minority (about 3.54% or 58,818 households) belong to the upper-income group, suggesting that for a large portion of the population, purchasing two proper meals daily is a financial challenges

The poverty rates in Tanzania and Uganda remain high and have remained stagnated or declined at very modest rates over the last five years.

Tanzania’s poverty rate remains high, with approximately 49% of the population living below the international extreme poverty line of $1.90 per day, a figure that remained stagnant between 2011/12 and 2018. While economic growth has been steady, about 27% of the population still lives below the national basic need’s poverty line. Poverty is heavily concentrated in rural areas, where over 57% of inhabitants are considered multidimensionally poor[i]

Uganda’s national poverty rate has shown improvement, declining to 16.1% in 2023/24 from 20.3% in 2019/20, according to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Despite this, a significant portion of the population remains vulnerable, with 57.2% experiencing multidimensional poverty based on 2016-2022 data. Rural areas, where poverty is concentrated, have seen slight improvements, with poor individuals decreasing to 5.3 million in 2023-2024

Graph showing Budget Expenditure growth, population, economic growth and Poverty reduction trends

Figure 1:  GEPC Research Data analysis

Despite what looks like well-structured priority sectors, the expanded budgetary expenditures are yet to be reflected in the pockets of ordinary citizens.

What is ideal budget and economic growth rates to cut poverty

Based on the World Bank and Africa Development bank projections, the national budget are ‘modest’ and insufficient to cut poverty. To put a dent in the poverty rates at the current population growth rates, the economic growth would need to be sustained between 7-10% for a period of about 5 years.  To achieve that level of sustained growth the budget expansion rates would require to consistently remain between 15-30%. The governments would require to target high fiscal multiplier efficiency.

With the current budget proposals, projected revenue collections and expenditure priorities characterized by significant portions of the national budgets spent on recurrent expenditure (salaries) and debt serving, achieving poverty reduction and economic justice targets in the EAC countries are unattainable.

Limitations to achieve ideal budget expansions and equitable economic growth for poverty reduction

Moreover, EAC countries’ economies and tax plans are still exposed to large external debts and vulnerable to internal and external shocks.  In 2023 Kenya and Uganda experienced violent tax protests. The DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan are still affected by conflicts that have stagnated their economic progress.

Rwanda plans to on fiscal consolidation with a reduction from 28.7% of GDP in 2025/26 to 27.8% of GDP in 2026/27 and projected economic growth of approximately 7.1% to 7.5% in 2026, driven by strong performance in services, industry, and continued public investment. However, these plans and growth trajectories are negatively affected by an ongoing conflict in the Eastern DRC which has adverse effects on Rwanda mining and tourism sector.

The DRC and South Sudan struggled to pass their last budgets on time while Burundi has struggled to service a huge external debt burden. The country heavily relies on domestic revenue (including occasion tax hikes on imports and services) and borrowing from domestic banks due to fiscal constraints and lack of external support. The Burundi, DRC and South Sudan experience demonstrate the tragedy of conflict, economic exclusion and meeting public economic expectations in time of crisis.

The high poverty rates, persistent conflicts and failure or delayed passing of the national budgets in our conceptualization constitutes a breach in public expectations, exacerbates the distance between the state and the public, creates further civil apathy and failure to deliver economic outcomes, which can lead to a vicious cycle of poverty economic exclusion, more conflicts and eventual state collapse.

Implications of US, Israel and Iran war on budget and regional economic outlook

The ongoing US, Isreal and Iran war characterized with a spike in oil and gas prices and logistics supply chain disruptions in its first days, will affect energy outlook, may thwart economic growth projections and budget plans in the short and midterm. The impacts will be worse if the war continues for more than six months.

Photo credit: Los Angles Times

The EAC and Middle East economic nexus

The EAC economy has been increasingly integrated with the Middle East, particularly, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) like the UAE and Saudi Arabia through a combination of high-volume trade, strategic infrastructure and financial aid. Since 2015 the Middle East has become to the top logistical hub and EAC’s export partners and The EAC is energy import reliant on the Middle East for petroleum products and Uganda and Kenya have signed fuel agreements to manage supply for potential disruptions. The GCC countries provide aid, infrastructure investment and currency stabilization facilities as was the case with the Kenya-UAE loan in 2025.

EAC countries have struck strategic partnerships beyond commerce. Gulf capital is present in infrastructure investments such as modernization of ports roads and sovereign investments focusing of mining, agriculture, forestry and tourism. This has increased aid dependence and debt exposure to gulf financing. Moreover, the over reliance on Gulf petroleum imports leaves EAC countries’ economies industrial production and transport sectors locked to the gulf and vulnerable to any shocks from the region.

Various models indicate there is a positive correlation of GDP elasticity with respect to world oil prices (i.e the ratio between percentage change in GDP and percentage change in World oil prices).  Prolonged high oil prices test global resilience, raising risks for growth, inflation and monetary policy. A 10% increase in oil prices, if sustained for most of the year, is estimated to reduce global economic output by approximately 0.2% and increase global inflation by about 0.4%. This acts as a tax on consumers and increases business production costs, slowing down growth in oil-importing economies.

An increase of 25% would lead to 0.5% loss in GDP and an increase by 50% will lead to 1% of loss of GDP. A doubling of oil prices can cause up to 14% of loss of economic outputs in countries over the years. In less developed countries like those in the EAC, where agriculture sector is the key contributor to GDP and the sector Is relatively less oil intensive due to less developed countries. However, the percentage of GDP loses in these countries are still higher compared to those of developed countries.

Based on these projections, we can the following risks and implications.

Key risks and implications

  1. Higher energy costs and disrupted logistics and generalized economic confidence shocks that will constitute meaningful drag on economic growth projects to slow down in Q4 of the 2025/26 budgets and Q1 and Q2 of the 2026/27 budgets and generally a gloomy economic outlook if the war continues for more than six months.
  1. Middle East export and import market disruptions affecting largely EAC’s agriculture sector, which is the major economic growth driver. The war has affected exports from the middle east of Ammonia and Sulphur, which are vital ingredients for the production of fertilizers, a vital product supporting the agricultural sector.
  1. Potential decline in aid, infrastructure investments and budget support from the Middle East as the GCC look inwards to finance their defence and war efforts. This will also trigger an aid squeeze from other regional blocks such as the EU as they focus on protecting Europe.
  1. Geopolitical pressures for realignment as the major contending powers the US and Isreal pressure EAC countries to choose sides, given some of their historical strategic and cultural relationships with Iran as a source of energy.
  1. The war represents in my theoretical construction a parody of the ‘Economic Big Boss and the Babies’, in international relations where the larger economic powers dictate the terms and the ‘babies’ deal with the negative consequences irrespective of their will, choice, location and contribution. In this construction of international relations one dominant state or group of states acting in consent and consort and through various means including state craft create an asymmetrical power relation with others analogous to a ‘Parent and baby relationship, where the stronger power exerts its spere of dominance beyond the physical and juristic territorial boundaries as recognized under international law, compelling the weaker states to act and respond to demands, desires, actions and geopolitical effects  of the bigger state.
  1. The world is yet to fully recover from the loss of markets and inflationary pressures the US global tariffs and were working towards realignment of new trading partners in the middle east. This war will add uncertainty to this economic quagmire. As the global economy snarls and slags, the EAC economies could follow too, albeit with levels and pace.
  2. The success of the US and its allies in the middle could increase appetite for it to attack elsewhere setting in motion a spiral of violence, war and economic disruptions around the world. It is widely believed that the US’s success in Venezuela and Isreal’s success in Palestine and Lebanon could have motivated its attack of Iran.

Key recommendations

Tax and budgetary actions.

Reclaim public trust and social contracts to serve via a just, fair and equitable taxes and redistributive budgetary policies.

To mitigate the unequitable distributed economic growth and achieve East Africa’s budget trajectory and economic outlook will require something beyond the traditional ‘invisible hand’ economic theory approach to correct.  The traditional approach suggests free markets naturally achieve optimal efficiency.

Keynesian economics fundamentally challenges the traditional “invisible hand” concept, arguing instead that economies can get stuck in prolonged recessions. Keynes believed the “hand” is not self-regulating during crises, necessitating active government intervention (fiscal policy and other interventions) to manage booms and busts or serious economic disruption.

Strategic recommendations

  • Pursue intra Africa regional trade so as to shelter against external shocks in the middle east
  • Increase investment in renewable energy sources to reduce over reliance from Middle East fossil petroleum
  • Pursue new geopolitical realignments to hedge against the potential fall out and of the middle east and other turbulent blocks

[i] World Bank Group: Poverty and Equity brief, Sub-Saharan Africa, Tanzania April, 2020 available at : https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_TZA.pdf#:~:text=Using%20the%20international%20extreme%20poverty%20rate%20of,people%20are%20considered%20poor%20along%20this%20line.

[i] The Standard Newspaper; Why majority of Nairobi residents can no longer afford to eat,  February, 08, 2025, available, at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001511317/why-majority-of-nairobi-residents-can-no-longer-afford-to-eat

 

[ii] Apolo Rosabella, Strengthening food and nutrition security in Nairobi’s informal settlements, Africa Cities Research Consortium (ARC), February, 2024 available: https://www.african-cities.org/new-paper-strengthening-food-and-nutrition-security-in-nairobis-informal-settlements/#:~:text=New%20paper:%20Strengthening%20food%20and%20nutrition%20security%20in%20Nairobi’s%20informal%20settlements,-Feb%208%2C%202024&text=Since%20independence%2C%20Kenya%20has%20grappled,residents%20of%20low%2Dincome%20households.

 

Electoral democracy and the elusive search for a new peaceful electoral consensus in Tanzania

 

Authors: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Electoral consensus has been elusive in many African countries. This short study brief attempts to trace, document and discuss the electoral democracy environment in Tanzania since 1995,  experiences from  the Muafaka in delivering  a semblance of peace in a polarised political environment. Perhaps by looking back in history, we can shape the future of electoral democracy in Tanzania and Africa generally.

Introduction

Tanzania has always been lauded as model of electoral democracy however over the past few years there seems to be some pointers towards a potential stagnation and regression largely caused particularly by contradictions over electoral processes. While Tanzania has gone to elections since 1995 and remained a good exemplar of peaceful power transition in a region where peaceful transitions are scarce, the general electoral processes that underlie these transitions have constantly faced contestations, with some tuning violent.  For instance, the last general elections in 2021 were marked by some electoral concerns and judged by both local and international observers as not free and fair. The electoral outcomes and the political environment thereafter became polarized, political and civic spaces was constrained, forcing some opposition politicians to seek political asylum outside Tanzania.

After the sudden death of President John Pombe Magufuli in 2022, the new President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s government in 2023 made some electoral reforms with partial amendments to three major laws governing elections (The National Election Commission Act 2023, Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Government Elections Bill (2023), The Political Parties Affairs Laws (Amendment) Bill (Amending the Political Parties Act RE 2019 and the Elections Expenses Act, 2010).

The government lifted a ban on political mobilization, granted amnesty to all opposition political leaders in exile, called for dialogue and committed to fostering a new culture of competitive democracy. However, this hiatus of political serenity appears to have been short lived. Local government elections held in November 2024 were marred with reports of political violence, kidnaps and death (Aljazeera, 2020). And in a dramatic turn of events, in April the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) banned the leading opposition political party CHADEMA from participating in General elections for five years. This trend, irrespective of its intentions and underlying legal justification, tainted Tanzania’s democratic credentials and potentially threatens the future of democracy in Tanzania.  For these acts and the noticeable trend, Tanzania has come under increasing scrutiny and pressure from both internal, regional and international human rights and democracy advocates with calls for reforms and peaceful resolution of the long-standing political grievances (IDU, May 2025). 

Ahead of the 2025 General Elections and thereafter, multiple questions are raised whether the current political context can guarantee Tanzania’s past glory as the haven of peace and beacon of democracy in East Africa and Africa generally? How can government secure peaceful elections and restore confidence in electoral democracy in 2025?  These questions are legitimate given that Tanzania has for decades remained peaceful and played a major role as a stabilizing variable in the East and Great Lakes region which is embroiled with conflicts and regalia of collapsed states.

To attempt and dissect these questions, we look at Tanzania’s electoral democracy history and the turbulent electoral cycles it has gone through and how it has navigated around these political currents of a multiparty dispensation towards the state that it is today. The lessons from these episodes are quite relevant in helping Tanzania forge its current and future electoral trajectory.

Overview of Electoral Democracy in Tanzania (1980-2021)

The concept of electoral democracy is not alien to Tanzania. Until 1995 internal party electoral democracy was a present concept in Tanzania’s political dispensation. Contrary to what some naysayers may widely hold, Mwl Julius Nyerere, within the ambits of his socialist values believed and practiced a level of internal party democracy. Even under the socialist single party era in the 1960s to the 1980s, TANU and later Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), political party delegates contested internally as candidates and were voted for electoral positions. Party members vied for electoral positions such as members of the local party branch leadership, the National Executive Committee (NEC), the Central Executive Committee (CEC) and for parliamentary seats. The records of intra-party elections held between 1980-85 are available and show some rigorous internal political dynamics ahead of intra party elections.

The October 1995 Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Tanzania were the climax of this single intra party democracy that had been practiced since the 1960s. The general elections marked an important milestone in the country’s transition to multi- party electoral democracy. They were the first multiparty general elections after the lifting of the ban on political parties that had seen Chama Cha Mapinduzi rule as single party for more than 20 years.  The elections brought to an end the intense debates about the role of multi-partyism in democracy and governance. Prior to the elections, there were contestations as to whether Tanzania must adopt democracy or remain a single party state. Fundamentally, there were intra-party debates during the preparation for the elections on who was best suited to lead Tanzania in a new evolving political context.   Significantly, these elections marked a termination to the Mwl Julius Nyerere single party era (TEMCO, 1997) and repositioning of Tanzania as a new fountain of democracy in the East African region.

The political rallies and debates in 1995 were contentious and exciting to attend for the citizens and a country that had been ruled under a single party. As the political space opened, new centers of opposition political power and leadership emerged. The opinions coming from these were diverse and the candidates quite combative in asserting the new direction that Tanzania would take as a multiparty democracy.  Some of these described themselves as reformers (Wanamageuzi) and political parties such as NCCR-Mageuzi were born.  Tanzania had changed and moving into a new political future. An era of electoral democracy had been ushered in. However, this excitement did not take long before the tenets of electoral democracy in a multiparty dispensation were strained and tested.

The 1995 election outcomes on Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar

The 1995 election results gave a resounding victory for CCM on the mainland Tanzania. After the election results were announced, CCM’s candidate Benjamin Mkapa won the presidential election with 61.82% (4,026,422 votes) and 186 of the 232 electoral constituencies.  Augustino Mrema of NCCR-M came second with 27.77% (1,808,616 votes), Professor Ibrahim Lipumba of the Civic United Front secured 6.43% (418,973 votes) while John Momose Cheyo of United Democratic Party (UDP) came fourth with 3% (258,734). Overall CCM won 182 constituencies on the mainland, and 50 in Zanzibar.

After the election, 37 additional seats for women MPs were awarded to the parties based on the proportion of seats in the National Assembly, while five members were elected by the House of Representatives of Zanzibar and ten members nominated by the President. The Attorney General was also an ex-officio member, resulting in a total of 285 MPs in the legislature. Electoral democracy had delivered its verdict. The electoral land scape had changed but CCM was still a dominant party in power.

The test of electoral democracy and contestations of the 1995’s elections aftermath

Despite being highly competitive, the elections were a judged by both national and international observers as largely peaceful, free and fair on the mainland Tanzania. However, the elections in Zanzibar were widely disputed.  Neither the local nor the international observers endorsed the elections (ibid). The CUF Presidential Candidate in Zanzibar, Seif Sharif Hamad disputed the election results announced by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission, declared self-victory, refused to recognize the CCM led government in Zanzibar and ordered elected all CUF legislators to boycott parliamentary sessions. Protests broke out in Zanzibar and there was a clamp down on the new emerging media such as DTV that had announced the results before ZEC’s declaration. The International Foundation on Electoral Systems (IFES) reported that inadequate administration, inappropriate secrecy, and general inefficiency marred the process and cast doubt and mistrust over much of the outcome. Neither the National Electoral Commission of Tanzania nor the Zanzibar Electoral Commission was able to win the trust of the electorate (IEFS, 1995). Tanzania’s new exercise in democracy had started on a wobbly foot and was under an early test.

The implications on the future electoral democracy

The general elections showed the nation was divided between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, with CCM as a dominant party on the mainland and the Civic United Front (CUF) as a dominant opposition party to reckon with in Zanzibar. In Zanzibar the country was split right in the middle, along geographical lines. One of the parties (CUF) was dominant in the island of Pemba, while the ruling party (CCM) held sway in the island of Zanzibar. What this meant in the Zanzibar context was that neither of the parties was a ‘national’ party.

The elections exposed fundamental constitutional and political questions that would later become a nemesis of Tanzania’s young democracy for decades to come. For example, the position of Zanzibar as a political entity in Tanzania’s politics was redefined with emergence of a new political force based on the island. Questions lingered as to what would be the appropriate system of political participation, choice and governance moving forward. Would Tanzania’s political union between Zanzibar and Tanzania mainland hold? How would the emerging political dynamics between the Islands of Unguja and Pemba be handled?

Fundamentally, the electoral systems and electoral management were equally tested and gaps exposed.  While the elections for the presidency were plebiscitary (voters could only vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a single candidate), elections for parliament were classified- This showed that there was still ground for future electoral reforms to improve electoral transparency and democratic consolidation.

Moreover, the elections showed that CCM was still fused with the state. Despite protests and condemnation from the international community, CCM ruled in Zanzibar, was supported by all institutions of the state.  An examination by political analysts of the question as to whether the competition that emerged during the switch to multiparty and during the first general election represented an expansion of political choice for citizens and a broader representation of societal forces concluded that the legal and institutional framework after 1995 strongly favored the ruling party. The difference between the state and CCM was still blurred (Hassan Kaya, 2004).

Even after the introduction of the multi-party system the electoral process and election system was still dominated by the ruling party. The conduct of elections remained a major source of discontent for the opposition. The underlying political currents and unanswered questions led to contentious elections and a spiral of electoral violence which re-occurred during next electoral cycles and have remained a common feature up to date. While electoral democracy had been well introduced, the state was yet to learn how to avoid or manage the electoral violence that emanated from the contradictions and contestations of an electoral process. Tanzania would soon witness violent elections in 2000.

Chronology of Electoral Violence in Tanzania 2000-2024

The expectations of Zanzibaris prior to the 1995 elections, like their compatriots on the mainland, were that they would enjoy greater democracy and have more human rights synonymous to an autonomous state. But, in their view, this was not how it turned out in Zanzibar. Instead, even the small gains that had been won before the elections were lost (Ibid).

After the disputed 1995 elections, the international community brokered some form of consensus (Muafaka 1) between the CCM and CUF. Some of the concessions included granting of some political privileges extended to CUF and its leader, Seif Sharif Hamad. The political grievances however did not go away.  The opposition CUF felt that its victory had been usurped, and that its candidate who won the Presidency, in their view had been denied a legitimate chance to rule. The Zanzibar ‘issues’ which among others included concerns over the autonomy of Zanzibar and its fair share of the Union national cake had not been addressed.

The political will to support the Muafaka from both political parties was lacking and Zanzibar was destined for a violent election in 2000 and registering a wave of Tanzania’s first export of refugees to Kenya. Violence was gradually becoming a feature in Tanzania’s elections.

The Civic United Front and violence in Zanzibar elections -2000- 2003

The simmering political tensions and anger of the 1995 elections had persisted and ultimately exploded in violence after the 2000 election results were announced by the Zanzibar electoral commission. During these elections, the ZEC announced that the CCM Presidential candidate, Amani Abeid Karume had garnered 248,095 votes (67.04%) against CUF’s Presidential Candidate, Seif Sharif Hamad’s 122,000 (32.96%). Election results in some constituencies were cancelled for reported irregularities.

While all observers commended the way the elections were conducted on the Mainland, the Zanzibar elections were characterized by the Commonwealth Observer Team as a shambles. In fact, all observers were more critical this time of the way the elections were run, and they all demanded fresh elections (Ibid).

This time the opposition CUF did not recognize both the Union and Zanzibar Presidents, and they demanded their members of the Union Parliament and those of the House of Representatives to boycott both legislative bodies. The two bodies using the House Rules, decided to throw out all CUF representatives from both Houses. The result of this was that Zanzibar had a one-party House of Representatives. The exercise of electoral multiparty democracy was being tested once again.

What followed was an insurrection of mass protests and confrontation with the police and other security organs. It was estimated that 40 Zanzibaris were shot dead and a further 600 injured when the Tanzanian army and police opened fire on a crowd of CUF supporters who were protesting against the results of the ballot. The violence was more pronounced in the Island of Pemba.  In the days following the 2000 elections, Tanzanian security forces and militias conducted a house-to house operation arresting and beating defiant residents. During that period, property was destroyed and an estimated 2,000 Zanzibaris fled to Kenya (Relief Web, 2005)

The 2000 General elections were the most violent elections in Zanzibar.  The violent protests and police killings in Zanzibar in January 2001 dented Tanzania’s political electoral history and democratic aspirations as a young multiparty state. What was very clear (from this aftermath) was that the country during this period lost political leadership of the security forces and that the security forces lacked technical means (at the time), to do their professional work in an evolving and highly charged multiparty setting. There was both local and international pressure for the Tanzania’s government to form an independent commission of inquiry to investigate what happened. CCM as the victorious and ruling party was compelled to negotiate another consensus political Accord (Muafaka 11) which provided substantive concessions. These included undertaking electoral and political reforms and to a power sharing formular for government positions.

 Zanzibar Elections and Political Consensus (Muafaka 11) reforms 2003 and 2010

The political and electoral reforms consensus under Muafaka II included the promulgation of the 8th and the 9th constitutional amendments; reconstitution of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) to include two members of the official opposition; establishment of the office of Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP); development of a cordial relationship between the leaderships of Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF), and enhanced access to the grassroots by the opposition (Kituo cha Katiba, 2003). It concluded with  a by election held in the disputed constituencies in 2003. Zanzibar was attempting to master electoral democracy and address the root causes of electoral violence.

The main objective of the Muafaka Accord was to create a level playing field and a conducive atmosphere for 2005 elections (Ibid).  The Zanzibar Electoral Commission would be managed with representatives from both political parties. Moreover, the opposition parties would be granted unfettered access to their grass root structures.

Significance of Political consensus (Muafaka)

While Muafaka I had died for a lack of political goodwill, the 2nd Muafaka registered considerable success. The Muafaka II did not fully eliminate electoral violence in Zanzibar, as this was to happen again in 2005, albeit at a lower level compared 2000.  But and significantly, the Muafaka II laid ground for wider constitutional and electoral reforms which led to a powers sharing approach adopted in 2010. Since the adoption of Muafaka II, Zanzibar elections have remained contentious but with minimal violence. For instance, the October 2015 elections were annulled by the Chairperson of ZEC for not being free and fair (BBC, 2015) .  However, the power sharing approach adopted in 2010 held Zanzibar together with the opposition CUF taking up the seat of the First Vice President in the government led by CCM.

To date Muafaka II still with stands, pointing to a positive democratic development on the Islands and Tanzania generally. Zanzibar’s power-sharing strategy appears to have ended the zero-sum nature of Zanzibari politics, as it ushered in a more consensus-based approach reminiscent of Julius Nyerere’s concept of ujamaa (unity). Government (Aley Soud Nassor & Jim Jose, 2014) For Nyerere, Ujamaa was a specifically African alternative to the institutionalized oppositional politics of western liberal democracy. Nyerere emphasized a system of people governance driven by a common national ideology and cause traversing tribe, economic and social status.

Moreover, the success so far achieved through Muafaka II and the power sharing structure demonstrates the usefulness and feasibility of consensus where even adversarial political parties such as CUF and CCM can work together. The Zanzibar’s experiment in power-sharing demonstrates that a multi-party-political system need not be structured according to a two-party oppositional model in order to achieve stable and functional democratic government (Ibid).  Political consensus on contentious issues and openness to continuous reforms can be a guarantor against electoral violence and elusive peace.  This experiment has given Zanzibar a semblance of relative peace, despite the historical political differences.

Moreover, the Muafaka dismantled the awkward label on CUF as a violent political party, increased its presence and role in running Zanzibar government, although its political influence and dominance in Zanzibar has dwindled significantly due its own internal party dynamics.

By 2021 AcT Wazalendo had emerged as the new strongest opposition political contender in Zanzibar after CUF’s founding leade, Seif Sharif Hamad, defected from CUF, carrying along with him multitudes of former CUF supporters.

Zanzibar Presidential Election Results 1995-2020

Year

 Candidate

Political Party

Votes

%of the vote

1995

Salim Amour

CCM

165, 271

50.27%

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

163,706

49.76%

2000

Amani Abeid Karume

CCM

248,095

67.04%

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

122,000

32.96%

2005

Amani Abeid Karume

CCM

239,832

53.18%

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

207,733

46.06%

2010

Mohamed Shein

CCM

179,809

50.11%

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

176,338

49.14%

2015

Mohamed Shein

CCM

–

–

Seif Sharif Hamad

CUF

–

–

2020

Dr Hussein Mwinyi

CCM

380,402

77.9%

Seif Sharif Hamad

AcT- Wazalendo

99,103

20.31%

Source: Computed Elections results data by GEPC researchers from different publicly available data

Despite starting on a wobbly footing with electoral violence in Zanzibar,  the Muafaka experience had delivered a perfect template of managing political differences in a polarized political and electoral context. However, this hiatus  faded away, with a resurgence of electoral violence, targeting a section of political parties and a brutal ‘panda gari’ culture that threatens peace. In  the next part of this study we will evaluate the resurgence and chronology of political and electoral violence, with lessons from neighboring countries and how the 2025 general elections must and can reclaim Tanzania’s electoral glory.

Addressing Electoral Democracy and the Challenge of Violence and Impunity in East Africa
Featured photo credit: Daily Monitor, Arrest of Uganda’s Opposition  election protestors 

Authors:  Don Bosco Malish and Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Introduction

East Africa stands at a critical crossroads, where the promise of electoral democracy is being eroded by a surge in violence, shrinking civic space, and the manipulation of political and legal institutions. This policy brief exposes the complex interplay of corruption, commercialization of politics, and state-sponsored repression that has transformed elections from peaceful contests into battlegrounds of fear and exclusion. Through in-depth analysis of Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, the article reveals how entrenched power structures, weak institutions, and socioeconomic inequalities fuel cycles of violence and disillusionment, threatening the very foundations of democratic governance. Yet, amid these challenges, new dynamics-such as the activism of digitally connected youth-offer glimmers of hope for democratic renewal. By unpacking the root causes and far-reaching impacts of electoral violence, this brief provides actionable, evidence-based recommendations to restore public trust, strengthen institutions, and foster inclusive, resilient democracies in East Africa. The article delves further to discover not only the urgent risks facing the region’s electoral future, but also the pathways to reclaiming the ballot as a tool for peace, justice, and genuine political transformation.

Electoral Violence in East Africa: Issues and Stakeholder Impact

  1. Overview of electoral violence

East Africa is experiencing a worrying rise in electoral violence, which is undermining democracy and creating fear among citizens. Elections, which should be peaceful opportunities for people to choose their leaders, are increasingly marred by violence, intimidation, and manipulation. Electoral violence in East Africa is not a random or isolated phenomenon; rather, it stems from a complex web of interconnected issues that collectively undermine democratic processes in the region. Understanding these root causes is essential for anyone committed to promoting peaceful, credible, and inclusive elections.

One of the most significant drivers of electoral violence is the widespread corruption and commercialization of politics. Elections have increasingly become contests dominated by financial power rather than the strength of ideas or policy proposals. Candidates often resort to vote-buying and other corrupt practices to secure victory, transforming elections into costly transactions instead of genuine democratic competitions. This commercialization distorts fair competition, discourages honest candidates, and deepens public cynicism. When voters perceive that money, not merit, determines electoral outcomes, their trust in both the electoral process and democracy itself erodes, creating fertile ground for conflict.

Another critical factor is the weaponization of legal and security institutions by ruling elites. Courts, police, and the military are frequently manipulated to suppress opposition voices, intimidate civil society, and curtail media freedom. This deliberate use of state institutions to enforce the interests of those in power shrinks the space for dissent and civic engagement, fostering an atmosphere of fear and instability. Opposition parties, activists, and journalists often become targets, making it dangerous to participate in or report on political processes. Such repression undermines the foundations of democracy and escalates tensions during election periods.

The weakness of key democratic institutions further exacerbates electoral violence. The credibility of elections depends heavily on the independence and strength of electoral management bodies (EMBs) and the judiciary. In many East African countries, these institutions are either fragile or subject to manipulation by those in power. When electoral bodies are perceived as biased, or when courts fail to adjudicate electoral disputes fairly, public confidence in the electoral process collapses. This distrust often leads to violence, as losing parties and their supporters may feel that peaceful legal avenues for redress are unavailable or ineffective.

Systematic marginalization of vulnerable groups also plays a significant role in fueling electoral violence. Women, rural populations, and ethnic minorities are frequently excluded from meaningful political participation and are more vulnerable to violence. Women face entrenched cultural barriers, political intimidation, and exclusion from decision-making spaces despite legal frameworks promoting gender equality. Rural communities often lack access to information and political networks, making them susceptible to manipulation and patronage. Ethnic minorities are disproportionately affected by election-related violence, especially when politicians exploit ethnic divisions to consolidate power. This exclusion not only violates the principle of inclusive democracy but also perpetuates cycles of violence and political instability.

Finally, a pervasive culture of impunity sustains ongoing electoral violence. Perpetrators-including state actors, political party supporters, and security personnel-are rarely held accountable for their actions. This lack of consequences emboldens those who use violence as a political tool, as they face little fear of prosecution or punishment. Over time, violence becomes normalized as an acceptable means of political competition, making it increasingly difficult to break the cycle and restore faith in peaceful democratic processes.

These issues are deeply interconnected and mutually reinforcing. For example, corruption weakens institutions, which in turn facilitates the weaponization of law and security. Marginalization both results from and contributes to weak institutions and impunity. To effectively address electoral violence, it is crucial to understand not only each factor individually but also how they interact to create a challenging environment for democracy in East Africa.

For policymakers, civil society, and international partners, recognizing these root causes is the first step toward designing effective interventions. Supporting institutional reforms, protecting vulnerable groups, promoting transparency, and ensuring accountability for perpetrators are all essential. Only by tackling these underlying problems can East Africa hope to build more peaceful, credible, and resilient electoral systems that truly reflect the will of the people.

II. Trends in Electoral Violence in Select East Africa Countries

Case Study: Uganda

Electoral violence in Uganda is marked by systematic, state-sponsored repression designed to maintain the ruling National Resistance Movement’s (NRM) hold on power. Under President Yoweri Museveni, security forces-including the police, military, and specialized units such as the Joint Anti-Terrorism Taskforce (JATT)-are routinely deployed to intimidate, harass, and violently suppress opposition candidates and their supporters. This repression includes brutal crackdowns on opposition rallies, arbitrary arrests, beatings, and even killings, as witnessed in recent elections and by-elections like Kawempe North, where opposition teams faced targeted disruption and physical assaults.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) in Uganda operate in a highly constrained environment. Human rights defenders and election monitors face harassment, threats, and legal restrictions, especially during electoral periods. The shrinking civic space limits their ability to hold authorities accountable or mobilize citizens for peaceful participation. International and local election observers often encounter restricted access and intimidation, undermining their capacity to provide independent assessments of electoral integrity.

Women, youth, rural populations, and ethnic minorities continue to face exclusion and heightened vulnerability to electoral violence. Women candidates and activists are often targets of gender-based intimidation and violence. Youth, particularly politically active young people, face arrests and harassment, while rural voters are frequently manipulated through patronage or coerced by security forces. Ethnic minorities remain marginalized politically and are sometimes caught in violent clashes fuelled by political rivalries.

Independent media and journalists are aggressively targeted. Reporters covering opposition activities or electoral irregularities face physical attacks, arbitrary arrests, forced deletion of footage documenting state violence, and media shutdowns. This has led to widespread self-censorship, severely undermining press freedom and the public’s right to information. The suppression of media transparency fosters an atmosphere of fear that discourages political participation.

Opposition groups face continuous repression, including arrests of leaders and supporters, disruption of rallies, and legal harassment. The extraordinary rendition and terrorism charges against members of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) exemplify the state’s use of security apparatus to criminalize dissent. Opposition candidates face unfair disqualifications and intimidation, limiting genuine political competition.

Electoral institutions in Uganda are often perceived as lacking independence and being influenced by the ruling party. This perception undermines public confidence in the fairness of elections and contributes to disputes that can escalate into violence.

Uganda’s youth, a large and politically aware demographic, face significant challenges including unemployment, repression, and limited political space. Despite this, they remain a critical force for political change, often mobilizing through digital platforms. The general public’s participation is dampened by fear of violence and scepticism about electoral fairness, leading to political alienation.

Case Study: Tanzania

In Tanzania, electoral violence is closely linked to state-sponsored repression and sloganeering that overwhelmingly benefits the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party. The government blurs the line between state and party, with regional and local officials-including police-aligned with CCM and actively disrupting opposition activities. Opposition parties and pro-reform civil society groups face bans on rallies, restrictions on political association, and denial of media access, severely limiting their ability to operate.

Pro-reform civil society groups are subjected to harassment and legal restrictions, particularly during election periods. Election observers, both domestic and international, face obstacles including limited access and intimidation, which reduce their effectiveness in promoting electoral transparency. Civic education is closely guarded and restricted to follow predetermined procedures and syllabus approved by the electoral management body.

Women in Tanzania experience barriers and exclusion from political processes and are vulnerable to intimidation, and violence.  Women face economic, social and gender-based hurdles to fully engage in political processes and electoral contest.  Poor rural women are susceptible to voter bribery, by way of T-shirts, kangas and basic household items such as salt, soap and sugar, manipulating their independence to make informed political choices. Illiteracy amongst women compared to men exacerbates this factor yet rural populations often have limited access to unbiased information and are susceptible to manipulation.

Tanzania’s youth face high unemployment, low civic competence and limited political space, which fuels frustration and disengagement. The general public’s political participation is constrained by fear of repression and scepticism about electoral fairness.

In Zanzibar, opposition supporters face frequent crackdowns, exacerbating political tensions in the semi-autonomous region. In 2015 the Chair of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission unilaterally annulled general election results drawing wide spread condemnation from the opposition and international community. Since 2000 Zanzibar has witnessed more than one violent election, whose results were heavily disputed.

Independent vocal civil society and media outlets suffer from state harassment, including suspensions, censorship, and intimidation, especially when reporting critically on CCM or electoral irregularities. This suppression fosters a climate of fear and self-censorship, restricting transparency and public scrutiny.

Opposition parties face systemic obstacles such as disqualification of candidates under dubious pretexts, arrests, and intimidation. Ahead of the 2024 local elections, hundreds of opposition supporters were detained, and opposition candidates were disqualified, resulting in implausibly high victories for CCM. A head of the 2025 general election, the opposition leader, Tundu Lissu was detained and charged with treason. His political party, Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) was banned from engaging in political mobilization, remains operationally tattered and struggling to survive.

The opposition parties too contribute towards a violent election season by militant sloganeering, defying police orders for peaceful assembly and engaging in sensationalism.

Electoral commissions are widely perceived as biased in favour of CCM, undermining trust in electoral outcomes and fueling tensions. Calls to reform the electoral management body, including legal challenges in Tanzania’s court systems, against its operational structure and the use of presidential appointees as returning officers were unsuccessful.

According to Tanzania’s electoral experts such as Dr Deus Kibamba of Jukwa la Katiba, an independent network of CSOs engaged in electoral process, Tanzania’s constitutional dispensation on election is weak, and suffers from a catastrophic capture from a strong state and political elites. For elections to be sound and credible the constitutional reforms are required.

Case Study: Kenya

Kenya’s electoral violence has historically been shaped by a combination of state-sponsored repression, ethnic tensions, and suppression of opposition and media. The 2007-2008 post-election violence remains a stark reminder of the devastating consequences of disputed elections, where state security forces and pro-government militias targeted opposition supporters along ethnic lines. Militarized police tactics to intimidate protesters and opposition figures persist, contributing to a climate of fear and mistrust.

Civil society organizations and election observers play a vital role in monitoring elections and promoting transparency. However, they often face harassment and threats, particularly when exposing irregularities or human rights abuses. Despite these challenges, their work has contributed to gradual institutional improvements.

Women, youth, ethnic minorities, and rural populations face varying degrees of exclusion and vulnerability. Gender-based violence and discrimination limit women’s political participation. Ethnic mobilization remains a significant factor in electoral violence, with marginalized communities often caught in inter-ethnic conflicts. Rural voters sometimes face manipulation and intimidation.

Journalists covering elections and political dissent frequently encounter harassment, censorship, and violence, undermining media freedom and restricting transparent reporting. Despite these risks, the media remains a critical actor in informing the public and exposing abuses.

Opposition leaders and activists face arbitrary arrests, intimidation, and legal challenges. The judiciary, while making strides toward independence, still faces pressure and intimidation aimed at deterring constitutional challenges to election results.

Kenya’s electoral institutions have shown signs of maturation, with efforts to improve transparency and credibility. However, the winner-takes-all electoral system and ethnic-based political mobilization continue to fuel tensions and risks of violence. The general public remains divided, with some hopeful about reforms and others wary due to past violence.

The emergence of Generation Z (roughly ages 18 to 28) and their agitation for reforms in governance and respect to youth’s concerns has introduced new dynamics. Digitally connected and politically aware, this youth cohort actively organizes protests and demands accountability through social media. Their activism challenges traditional patronage networks but has also provoked harsher state responses. Protesting youth were violently dispersed by the police, some were killed, kidnapped and other have disappeared to date without trace. A significant percentage of youth remain unemployed, poor and vulnerable to manipulation by the political elites into perpetrating violence against opponents.

In summary, across Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, electoral violence is driven by state repression, weak institutions, and exclusion of marginalized groups. Civil society and election observers face shrinking space and intimidation, while media and opposition parties are targeted to stifle dissent. Youth activism offers potential for democratic renewal but also faces risks. The general public’s political participation is often constrained by fear and distrust, underscoring the urgent need for reforms that promote inclusion, transparency, and accountability.

Comparative Analysis of Electoral Violence in Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya

Similarities

Differences

Crosscutting Issues

– State-sponsored repression: Security forces intimidate opposition, disrupt rallies, and suppress dissent.

Uganda: Heavy militarization of elections; opposition leaders face terrorism charges and rendition.

Institutional Weakness: Electoral bodies perceived as biased; judiciary often co-opted or intimidated.

– Media suppression: Independent journalists face harassment, censorship, and violence.

Tanzania: Blurring of party (CCM) and state institutions; severe restrictions in Zanzibar.

Marginalized Groups: Women, youth, ethnic minorities, and rural populations face systemic exclusion and violence.

– Media suppression: Independent journalists face harassment, censorship, and violence.

Tanzania: Blurring of party (CCM) and state institutions; severe restrictions in Zanzibar.

Marginalized Groups: Women, youth, ethnic minorities, and rural populations face systemic exclusion and violence.

– Civil society under siege: Election observers and CSOs encounter legal restrictions, threats, and limited access.

Kenya: Emerging judicial independence; Gen Z digital activism challenges patronage systems.

Media Freedom: Widespread self-censorship due to state intimidation.

– Ethnic and socioeconomic divisions: Politicized ethnicity and economic inequality fuel violence.

Tanzania/Kenya: Rural voters manipulated via patronage; Uganda relies more on overt militarized coercion.

Regional Dynamics: AU/EAC’s limited capacity to enforce electoral standards.

– Youth disenfranchisement: High unemployment and repression limit political participation.

Kenya: History of ethnic-based electoral violence (e.g., 2007–08); Uganda/Tanzania focus on state-led repression.

Emerging Opportunities: Youth digital mobilization (Kenya) offers pathways for accountability.

 

  1. Summary Table: Stakeholder Impacts

Stakeholder

Role

How They Are Affected by Electoral Violence

Civil Society

Watchdog, advocate, educator

Harassed, restricted, silenced, limited impact

Election Observers

Transparency, reporting

Restricted access, hostility, limited enforcement power

Marginalized Groups

Voters, candidates

Targeted, excluded, manipulated, vulnerable to violence

Media/Journalists

Information, transparency

Harassed, censored, attacked, self-censorship

Opposition Parties

Alternative leadership

Intimidated, attacked, unfair competition

EMBs

Election management

Manipulated, distrusted, weak oversight

General Public

Voters

Fear, low turnout, disillusionment

Youth

Activists, mobilizers

Targeted for activism, hope for change, risk of repression

Policy Recommendations: Pathways to Peaceful and Inclusive Elections in East Africa

Electoral violence remains a major obstacle to democratic governance and political stability across East Africa. To overcome this challenge, we need a thoughtful, multi-layered approach that addresses both the deep-rooted causes and the immediate sparks of violence. The following recommendations invite all stakeholders to explore practical, innovative strategies that can transform elections into truly peaceful, credible, and inclusive processes.

  1. Governments and State Actors: Building Trust and Accountability

Governments hold a unique responsibility to create an environment where elections are safe and fair. Imagine a system where justice is swift and impartial-where those who use violence to win lose their power instead. To move toward this vision:

  • Enforce accountability without delay. Independent courts should be empowered to investigate and prosecute anyone involved in electoral violence, from political figures to security personnel and financiers. Transparent trials can break the cycle of impunity and send a clear message that violence will not be tolerated.
  • Clarify and humanize security roles during elections. Police and military forces need clear guidelines emphasizing respect for human rights and crowd management. Training security personnel to act professionally and peacefully can reduce tensions and build public confidence.
  • Invest in election management bodies (EMBs). Governments should prioritize funding EMBs so they can organize elections efficiently, transparently, and on time. Strong EMBs are the backbone of credible elections.

Looking ahead, governments can embrace technology to enhance electoral integrity. Biometric voter registration and electronic transmission of results, paired with independent audits, can reduce fraud and increase transparency. However, these technologies should be introduced thoughtfully, considering local capacities and resources.

Legal reforms are also essential. Laws must protect freedom of expression, assembly, and media independence. Harmonizing electoral laws with constitutional guarantees will ensure elections are inclusive and disputes are resolved fairly.

Finally, governments should actively promote inclusive governance by adopting gender quotas and affirmative action to empower women, rural communities, and ethnic minorities. Digital government services, equipped with strong privacy protections, can further enhance participation while bridging digital divides.

  1. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs): Catalysts for Dialogue and Inclusion

CSOs play a vital role in nurturing democracy from the grassroots up. Their work sparks curiosity and empowers citizens to claim their rights peacefully.

  • Facilitate inclusive dialogue. By regularly bringing together election officials, political parties, security agencies, community leaders, and marginalized groups, CSOs can help resolve conflicts before they escalate and build trust among stakeholders.
  • Expand civic education. Targeted campaigns, especially in rural and marginalized communities, can raise awareness about voting rights and the importance of peaceful participation, reducing vulnerability to manipulation.
  • Protect civic space. Collaborating regionally and internationally, CSOs can advocate for the repeal of restrictive laws and defend activists from harassment.

Over time, CSOs can strengthen their capacity for election monitoring and advocacy by partnering with international bodies and adopting new technologies. Programs that empower women, youth, ethnic minorities, and rural populations in governance and peacebuilding will foster more inclusive democracies.

Community-based peacebuilding initiatives, including rapid response teams, can intervene early in electoral conflicts, engaging diverse actors to prevent violence. Publicly naming those responsible for electoral violence, in partnership with media outlets, can increase accountability and deter future offenses.

  1. Election Observers: Guardians of Transparency and Reform

Election observers-both local and international-serve as impartial witnesses whose presence can deter malpractice and violence.

  • Secure full access and maintain impartiality. Observers should be granted unhindered entry to all stages of the electoral process, ensuring their reports are unbiased and credible.
  • Harness technology for real-time monitoring. Digital tools like mobile apps and biometric verification can help detect irregularities quickly, allowing timely interventions.

Beyond election day, observers can facilitate post-election dialogues to address grievances and advocate for reforms that strengthen future electoral integrity. Close collaboration with civil society and independent media can amplify findings and support civic education, nurturing democratic resilience.

  1. Regional Bodies: Architects of Peace and Standards

Regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) , East African Community (EAC) and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) have a pivotal role in preventing electoral violence and promoting democracy.

  • Enhance early warning and monitoring systems. Joint observer missions and early warning mechanisms can identify emerging threats, enabling rapid, coordinated responses.
  • Support national institutions. Providing technical assistance and training to EMBs, judiciaries, and security forces builds local capacity to manage elections peacefully.

Long-term, regional bodies can establish binding electoral standards and enforce protocols for free, fair, and transparent elections, including sanctions for violations. By creating inclusive platforms for dialogue among governments, opposition, civil society, and marginalized groups, they can foster consensus and prevent conflicts.

Championing digital governance innovations with strong human rights safeguards will help member states modernize election processes while protecting citizens’ privacy and inclusion.

  1. Donors and International Partners: Enablers of Democratic Resilience

International support can empower local actors and strengthen democratic institutions.

  • Prioritize funding for civic space and inclusion. Donors should invest in CSOs working on election monitoring, civic education, and empowerment of marginalized groups, ensuring resources reach those fostering peaceful participation.
  • Support responsible technology deployment. Funding electoral technologies and capacity-building initiatives, with safeguards against misuse or exclusion, can enhance transparency and trust.

Looking ahead, donors can facilitate cross-sector collaborations that unite governments, civil society, youth, and other stakeholders to address democracy and development holistically. Using diplomatic channels and aid conditionality, they can encourage respect for democratic principles and push for meaningful electoral reforms.

Invitation to Action and Learning

These recommendations are more than policies-they are invitations to explore, innovate, and collaborate. Each stakeholder has a role in shaping elections that reflect the true will of the people, free from fear and violence. By embracing transparency, inclusion, and accountability, East Africa can transform electoral contests into celebrations of democracy.

The journey is challenging but full of promise. What new ideas can you bring to strengthen peace during elections? How can your community or organization contribute to building trust and preventing violence? Together, by learning from experience and acting decisively, we can reclaim the ballot box as a powerful tool for justice, peace, and genuine political transformation.

This approach encourages stakeholders to reflect on their roles, inspires curiosity about innovative solutions, and motivates collective action toward democratic renewal.

 

INVITATION TO A WEBINAR ON ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY-ADDRESSING MONEYOCRACY VIOLENCE AND IMPUNITY IN EAST AND AFRICA GREAT LAKES REGION

You are invited to our next webinar on Elections and Democracy: Addressing the challenge of Moneyocracy, Violence and Impunity in East and Africa Great Lakes Region

As you may be aware the East and Africa Great Lakes region is going through another electoral cycle yet the region stands at a critical crossroads, where the promise of electoral democracy is being challenged and potentially eroded by a surge in moneyocracy, violence, shrinking civic space, and the manipulation of political and legal institutions. This webinar will expose the complex interplay of corruption, commercialization of politics, and state-sponsored repression that has transformed elections from peaceful contests into battlegrounds of titanic fear and exclusion.

Our distinguished Speakers will be:

  1. Mr Don Malish, Researcher, Human Rights Expert and Colosseum Member, Governance and Economic Policy Center

Mr Don Bosco Malish is a seasoned professional with over 20 years of experience in human rights, democracy promotion, and social justice. Before venturing into private practice, Don worked as a Senior Executive for the Open Society Foundations, where he  managed a substantial grant portfolio and supported initiatives focusing on governance, rule of law, and human rights across Eastern Africa, with a significant focus on South Sudan. He has a deep understanding of the local human rights, governance and elections contextual  challenges facing East Africa. Don is currently a distinguished independent researcher, consultant and Colosseum (Advisory Council) member of the Governance and Economic Policy Centre

  1. Mr Mulle Musau, Regional Coordinator Elections Observer Group (ELOG), Kenya

Mr Musau is an elections expert with over 20 years experience in electoral democracy, with special interest in Elections and Ethics in governance. He has been involved in Elections observation both domestic and international from 2007. Currently the national coordinator for the Elections Observation Group (ELOG) in Kenya and the regional coordinator for the East and Horn of Africa Election Observers Network (E-HORN).

  1. Deus Kibamba, Executive Director Tanzania Information Bureau & Jukwa la Katiba, Elections Expert, and Lecture in International Relations

Mr Kibamba is an experienced political and governance expert, researcher and analyst with over 20 years’ experience in international development. He trained in Political Science and Public Administration, with an international relations major. He has been actively involved in electoral processes in Tanzania and served as an international observer in a number of missions across Africa. His research interests have focused on the Constitutional aspects of the electoral democracy. He is the founding Director of Tanzania Information Bureau (TIB) and a Board member of Jukwaa la Katiba Tanzania, an independent organisation focusing on promoting constitutionalism and elections in Tanzania. Deus is currently a distinguished  lecturer in International Relations and Diplomacy at the Tanzania – Dr Salim Ahmed Salim Centre for Foreign Relations, Kurasini, Dar es Salaam. 

  1. Moses Kulaba, Executive Director Governance and Economic Policy Center, Moderator

Moses Kulaba is a political economist, Governance, policy and tax law expert, and trained as an economic diplomat with over 20 years of experience in the public and civil society sector.  Has researched and written on the subjects of  elections and governance, including the Ten Principles for free and fair elections in Tanzania. He is currently the Executive Director of Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Date: Friday, 29th August, 2025

Time:  15:00 (3PM) Nairobi Time, 14hrs (CAT), 12pm Lagos

Register in advance for this webinar via: https://us06web.zoom.us/meeting/register/A-yOjAcRStCEn2Y3U3B97Q


After registering, you will receive a confirmation email containing information about joining the meeting.

 

 

Webinar on Geopolitics of Critical Minerals and implications for Eastern and Southern Africa

Topic: An Analysis of the strategic gains and risks offered by the EU Strategic Partnership, Lobito Corridor and Minerals for Security deals on East and Southern Africa’s Critical Transition Minerals

The surging demand for minerals critical to green transition offers potential economic benefits for mineral rich countries however the dash to secure their supply chain has kicked off geopolitical interests, competition and realignments whose outcomes could have long lasting relationship with divergent unforeseen impacts.

With the Eastern and Southern Africa combined as a single economic bloc, the region has the highest concentration of critical green transition minerals such as cobalt, coltan, nickel, graphite, tungsten, tantalum, copper in the world. Yet the history of governance and management of the mineral sector has never yielded very positive dividends for mineral-rich countries in the region. Minerals have fueled conflicts in the DRC and Mozambique, Debt traps in Zambia, political patronage and environmental concerns in Zimbabwe and economic inequalities in South Africa and Botswana.

This webinar will provide an overview of the critical mineral wealth in Eastern and Southern Africa with a particular focus on the strategic gains and risks that geopolitical initiatives such as the EU Strategic Minerals Partnerships, the Lobito Corridor and emerging minerals for security deals offer. It is estimated that the mining industry needs to invest $1.7 trillion over the next 15 years to extract and supply enough metals for renewable energy and Africa possess almost half of these.   

The webinar will discuss the geostrategic machinations at play by superpowers such as the US, Europe, Russia and China in the context of the dash for control of critical minerals for the green transition and the current extractive governance challenges facing the region. While strategic alliances may not entirely be a bad idea, there are concerns over the underlying possible geopolitical, security and perceived neocolonial undertones that may come with these initiatives.

And how the historical socio-economic justice concerns of similar geopolitical jostling, security guarantees at the Berlin conference and hinterland to port initiatives contributed to the colonial exploitation of Africa’s resources for benefits elsewhere. Moreover, the mineral for security deals are tainted with opacity, designed with a biased potentially exploitative and a perceived neocolonial mindset aimed at rewarding the dominant superpower and the aggressor against the victim in exchange for its resource. The minerals for security deals are negotiated behind closed doors and their full terms are not availed neither to the public nor the citizens of the mineral rich country.

Amidst this mineral dash and possible geopolitical balkanization, it is feared that without strategic positioning, the Eastern and Southern Africa critical minerals rich countries could again miss out from this mineral boom.

Our expert speakers at this webinar will delve deeper into this topic, highlighting on the possible risks and benefits that the region can garner from these initiatives and measures the region can take so as to avert the risks and maximize benefits from these partnerships. This webinar is organized by the Governance and Economic Policy Centre in Collaboration with Botswana Watch Organisation. 

Our distinguished speakers will be

  1. Ketakandriana Rafitoson, Executive Director, Resource Justice Network (formerly PWYP): Key concerns for critical minerals Governance and our desired sustainable future. Dr Ketakandriana is a political scientist, researcher, activist, and human rights defender with distinguished career in anti-corruption, where she served as leader of Transparency International Chapter in Madagascar. Her work mainly focuses on issues of resource governance, anti-corruption, citizens’ participation, good governance and democracy.

 

  1. Adriano Nuvunga, Executive Director, Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (CDD), Mozambique: The Geopolitics of critical minerals, neocolonial extractivism and conflict. Prof Adriano Nuvunga is a Mozambican scholar, anti-corruption advocate and human rights defender. He is the director of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CDD), an organization that promotes democracy and protects human rights in Mozambique and Professor of professor of political science and governance at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. He has widely published on resource governance and violence in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province.

 

  1. Mr Robert Lestatsi, Executive Director, Botswana Watch Organisation; Assessing the Lobito corridor project and Africa’s desired benefits from critical mineral wealth. Robert Letsatsi is the Executive Director of Botswana Watch (BW), an organization focused on promoting transparency and accountability in Botswana. He is also involved with the PWYP coalition in Botswana and the UNCAC Coalition, an international anti-corruption network. Additionally, he has been involved in advocacy of mineral resource governance and training on human rights violations, in collaboration with Ditshwanelo – The Botswana Centre for Human Rights.
  1. Moses Kulaba, Executive Director, Governance and Economic Policy Centre, Moderator. Mr Moses Kulaba is a Governance and political economist, tax law expert and economic diplomat with more than 20 years of active service in international public, private and civil society sector.  Prior to joining GEPC he served as the East Africa Regional Manager for the Natural Resources Governance Institute, where he worked with various stakeholders including governments to advance governance of the extractive sector. Has served on the international board of the EITI and in consultancy roles for DFID , the EU and the UN on governance, extractives and peace processes in Eastern and Africa Great Lakes region.

 Date: 30th July, 2025

Time: 12pm EAT, 11 AM Gaborone (CAT) and 9 AM Lagos

Login:  https://us05web.zoom.us/j/84450912293?pwd=lwabYIwsvJ27A8bP0v8hVQpaUOaYQ3.1

Meeting ID: 844 5091 2293

Passcode: 7XFcHc

Critical Minerals Certification: Do Mineral Certification Mechanisms Reduce harm? A Look at the Kimberley Process, ICGLR, RMI, and OECD”

Authors:  Moses Kulaba and Roger Vutsoro, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

 

This short analytical study explores the existing   national, regional and global certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly Process, ICGLR, OECD Due diligence measures, Responsible Mining Initiatives in the quagmire of improving of minerals governance. It entangles and assesses the increasing perceptions (based on evidence from countries such as the DRC) that the current certification regime is running dangerously obsolete, not designed for critical minerals and thus needs a review and realignment for new purpose, including proposing measures that go beyond the current regional certification.

Decades ago, mineral certification was mooted as a solution to addressing the chronic problems of illegal mining, mineral smuggling and mineral driven conflicts, economic injustices and impunity in mineral rich countries.  To this regard, regional and global mineral certification mechanisms were developed with countries and mining companies required to sign up to these new certification principle and mechanisms. However, decades after, minerals continue to be drivers of conflict and harm in many countries.

As the appetite for Critical or Transitional minerals required for the green and clean energy industrial technology gains gusto momentum, there are concerns that this new mineral dash may exacerbate corruption, conflict and suffering in critical minerals rich countries. Apart from calls to establish regional value chains, there is evidence to suggest that a proper global certification mechanism should be put in place to ensure responsive sourcing of critical minerals and that their extraction does not lead to further harm.

What is mineral certification

 

Mineral certification is a process that verifies the origin and legitimacy of minerals, ensuring they are not associated with conflict or human rights abuses. It involves tracing minerals from the mine site to the final point of export and confirming they are free from illegal activities. This helps to prevent the financing of armed groups and other illicit activities linked to mineral extraction. This certification involves a thorough verification process to trace the minerals’ origin and verify they are free from illegal financing, armed group involvement, and human rights abuses.

At face value, this sounds like a good measure, however existing mechanisms of a similar nature such as the Kimberly process, ICGLR certification initiative and the OECD Due diligence measures have not succeeded in fully addressing the issue of conflict minerals and mineral smuggling. In Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, minerals continue to be a driver of conflict and mineral smuggling to neighboring countries is still rife.  This therefore puts to question the efficacy of the existing global certification mechanism in strengthening governance, regulating supply, improving ethical mining business conduct and reducing harm from extractive resources.

Existing major Regional and Global Mineral Certification regimes

 

The Kimberly Process Certification System (KPCS)

The Kimberly Process (KPCS) is a global standard certification process established in 2003 by the United Nations General Assembly (Under resolution 55/56) to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the mainstream diamond market.  KPCS was set up to ensure that diamonds as precious minerals are sourced and traded in a responsible manner, reducing financing conflicts and human rights violation. KPCS has laid out requirements for participating member countries to comply including[1]

  1. Enforcement of regulatory standards to control export and import of rough diamonds
  2. Principles of transparent practices to ensure integrity of the diamond supply chains
  3. Selective trading with only KP certified and compliant members
  4. Verification of exports to ensure every traded diamond is accompanied by a conflict free certificate.

Member countries are obliged to enforce these standards. To date 60 participants (representing 86 countries) are signatory members to the Kimberley process and have committed to applying KP principles in the certification of its traded diamonds. The standards require that;

  • Participant countries must enforce stringent legal and regulatory standards to control the import and export of rough diamonds and ensure adherence to KP requirements.
  • Participants commit to transparent practices, which are crucial for the integrity of the diamond supply chain, by exchanging accurate and timely statistical data.
  • Trade is permitted only between certified KP members who comply fully with these international standards, safeguarding the legitimacy of the diamond trade.
  • Every diamond export is closely inspected and must be accompanied by a valid KP certificate, certifying that the diamonds are conflict-free to prevent the entry of illicit stones into the market.
National Level Governance and Implementation of the Kimberly Process; A case of Tanzania

 

In Tanzania the Kimberly Process Office is situated in the Mining Commission, an Institution within the Ministry of Minerals. This office is responsible for the implementation of the KPCS activities, import and export of rough diamond; the office is under the authority of the Executive Secretary. The Mining Commission works closely with the Tanzania Revenue Authority’s Customs Department, Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service and the Police Force for strengthening internal control. The Kimberley Process Office forms a part of the Mineral Audit and Trade Department, which is under the Director for Mineral Audit and Trade who assists the Executive Secretary in administering the KPCS activities. The office issues Annual reports.

Before the issuance of Kimberley Process Certificate, the exporter of rough diamonds must submit a valid Dealer’s license/Mining license, which allows him to export minerals outside Tanzania. The Dealer’s license indicates full address, type of minerals, the premises and signature of Executive Secretary or a person authorized to sign. The exporter fills the application form which indicates license type, license number, weight, value, source of diamonds to confirm that diamonds are conflict free, place of export and declaration of exporter by putting his/her signature, name and qualification to apply for a certificate and pays to the government USD 100 as an application fee for Kimberley Process certificate. Post to the valuation process, the exporter is required to pay royalty (6% of a value) and inspection fee (1% of value) to the Government.

Any person who contravenes any of the provision in Diamond trading regulation commits an offence and liable:  In case of an individual to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine not exceeding US dollar twenty thousand (US$ 20,000) or to both. In case of body corporate, to a fine not exceeding US dollar one hundred thousand (US$ 100,000), or c. Cancelation of his license and permanently be disqualified from prospecting, mining or dealing in diamond and any other minerals.  Any rough diamonds obtained contrary to the provisions of Diamond trading regulations shall be forfeited in addition to other penalties[2].

The International Conference on Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Mineral Certification Measures

 

The ICGLR Certification mechanism was developed to address the persistent of mineral driven conflicts in the Africa Great Lakes region. It aims to create a conducive environment for cooperation among member states while also ensuring the protection and well-being of the people living in the Africa Great Lakes region.

The ICGLR Certificate confirms a mineral shipment is conflict-free and meets the ICGLR’s ethical sourcing standards, ensuring it’s free from illegal influence and responsibly traced from mine to market. This certification involves a thorough verification process to trace the minerals’ origin and verify they are free from illegal financing, armed group involvement, and human rights abuses. It provides buyers with the assurance that the minerals meet ICGLR requirements for transparency, legality, and responsible sourcing, supporting ethical supply chains in the region[3].

Currently the DRC, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi are members to the ICGLR’s certification mechanism. Mineral flows are analyzed via an ICGLR Regional Database, using the data on individual shipments collected and transmitted to the ICGLR by each Member States.  The database is verified annually via ICGLR Third Party Audits. The mechanism is viewed as an important regional standard and tool for enhancing collaboration, transparency, and development in Africa’s Great Lakes region, promoting accountability and encouraging businesses to pursue certification for adherence.  
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Mineral Supply Chain

Requires that company supply chains of all minerals from conflict affected and high-risk areas, must respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral or metal purchasing decisions and practices. Recognizes that trade and investment in natural mineral resources hold great potential for generating income, growth and prosperity, sustaining livelihoods and fostering local development. However, a large share of these resources is located in conflict affected and high-risk areas. In these areas, exploitation of natural mineral resources is significant and may contribute, directly or indirectly, to armed conflict, gross human rights violations and hinder economic and social development[4].

The OECD Due Diligence Guidance is considered as the first example of a collaborative government-backed multi-stakeholder initiative on responsible supply chain management of minerals from conflict-affected areas. Its objective is to help companies respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral sourcing practices[5].

The Guidance is also intended to cultivate transparent mineral supply chains and sustainable corporate engagement in the mineral sector with a view to enabling countries to benefit from their mineral resources and preventing the extraction and trade of minerals from becoming a source of conflict, human rights abuses, and insecurity. With its Supplements on Tin, Tantalum, Tungsten and Gold, the OECD Guidance provides companies with a complete package to source minerals responsibly in order for trade in those minerals to support peace and development and not conflict[6]

Responsible Minerals Initiative

 

The Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) is a voluntary membership body of companies and industry players with a vision to ensure that mineral supply chains contribute positively to social economic development globally. It seeks to promote the common goal of understanding and contributing to mitigating the salient social and environmental impacts of extraction and processing of minerals in supply chains. It leverages partnerships and use of international standards such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights or the OECD Due Diligence Guidance as our guideposts[7].

Comprised of more than 500 member companies; the Responsible Minerals Initiative is considered one of the most utilized and respected resources for companies from a range of industries addressing responsible mineral sourcing issues in their supply chains. RMI provides companies with tools and resources to make sourcing decisions that improve regulatory compliance and support responsible sourcing of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. RMI undertakes due diligence, assurance and reporting templates for cobalt, gold, tin, tungsten, tin, tantalum and other minerals.

The Nexus between Critical Minerals, Conflict and Harm

 

There is a strong connection between the extraction and trade of certain minerals and the exacerbation of armed conflicts and instability in various regions, particularly in developing countries. Globally, critical minerals fueling Green Tech are also fueling conflict[8] Armed groups often exploit the demand for these minerals (like tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold, collectively known as “conflict minerals”) to fund their operations, including the purchase of weapons[9]. This reliance on minerals to fuel conflict can lead to human rights abuses environmental degradation, and social unrest, hindering sustainable development. 

Critical minerals such as bauxite, manganese cobalt, lithium and uranium have fuelled conflicts in the DRC, Guinea, Niger, Mali, Chad and Central Africa Republic[10] Myanmar has also experienced a post-coup rush for control over its rare earth minerals, while Latin American countries like Chile and Colombia are grappling with how to ensure that their lithium wealth benefits local economies rather than multinational corporations[11].

Critical Minerals and conflict; A case for DRC

 

Multiple reports produced by UN and Civil society show that the ongoing violence in the DRC is linked to mineral extraction, with rebel insurgents motivated by a desire to extract from the region’s vast cobalt and coltan reserves. Since the onset of the infamous second Congo War in 1998, control over the DRC’s vast mineral resources has fuelled conflict between armed groups and militias. These factions fight over mining territories, using profits from the illegal extraction and smuggling of conflict minerals to finance their operations and purchase weapons. The struggle for control over mineral-rich areas has led to prolonged violence, contributing to the deaths of millions and leaving entire regions destabilized[12]. 

In the DRC, according to the UN Group of Experts, the M23 established control over the mineral-rich area and created a new transportation route to Rwanda. Through taxation and smuggling of minerals, the armed group is financially benefiting from DRC’s mineral resources. It’s estimated that the group is receiving approximately $800,000 USD monthly from the production and trade of minerals at Rubaya.

While some mine sites in eastern DRC may not be directly affected by the conflict, early 2025started with violence in Goma (a major mineral export and transit hub), as well as insecurity moving towards South Kivu with recent clashes in in Nyabibwe, a mineral rich area known for 3Ts and gold, located halfway between Goma and Bukavu. As of mid-February, the M23 had occupied Bukavu, another major mineral export and transit hub in the region.

Recent reports also indicate armed groups in Ituri Province are forming alliances with the M23, while new violence in the province has sparked worries of a larger regional conflict. The UN Group of Experts estimated that armed groups based in Ituri Province generated approximately $140 million USD in 2024, dwarfing the illicit revenue generated by 3Ts[13] Other armed militias and groups such as Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are equally benefiting from the loot.

In light of this reality, the abundance of critical minerals offers a potential opportunity for economic wellbeing but the geopolitics and the dash for their control and extraction has potential of increasing conflicts in Africa[14]  According to Global witness, the extraction and trade of some critical minerals is intensifying new geopolitical tensions and reinforcing long-standing patterns of exploitation[15] including conflicts.

The Trump Ukraine deal revealed a connection of critical minerals to the Russia and Ukraine war and how natural resources in Ukraine have become a key bargaining chip in international diplomacy between the US and Russia. In the same perspective, the US and the Democratic Republic of Congo are close to sign a minerals-for-security deal, highlighting the increase role of critical minerals in geopolitics and conflict.

In fact, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo reached out to the Donald Trump administration with a Ukrainian-style proposal in February 2025 in response to the rapid advance of the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group in the east of the country. The U.S. government has responded enthusiastically with a flurry of negotiations aimed at ending a decades-long conflict born out of the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

The political momentum is building towards a potential peace deal between Congo and Rwanda to be accompanied by bilateral minerals deals between both countries and the United States.  At stake are the mineral riches of North and South Kivu provinces, a major but highly problematic source of metals such as tin, tungsten and coltan[16].

According to different sources, this deal once signed could boost Rwanda processing of Congo minerals and provide the US with an assured source of processed critical minerals required to support its industrial technology and security needs.

 Gaps and why a new regime for mineral certification is required

 

The existing major regional and global mineral certification regimes have significant gaps that necessitate that a new regime is developed.

  • Narrowness in focus and scope: Existing certification mechanisms such KP are narrow in scope largely target diamonds and were not designed to cover a broader mining sector. The ICGLR covers the 3Ts and gold. The emergency of a wider list of critical minerals adds a new context which the KP and ICGLR certification mechanisms were not designed for.
  • Voluntary mechanisms; The existing mechanisms are largely voluntary and member states companies encouraged to join and comply with the standards. For instance, the 21st meeting of the CIRGL Regional Committee on the fight against the illegal exploitation of natural resources recommended CIRGL Secretariat to compile a comprehensive report on the status of implementation of the six tools of the regional certification mechanism. This report revealed that the Republic of Rwanda has not yet established the traceability chain for gold. Instead, Rwanda controls gold extraction and trade using conventional methods and does not issue ICGLR certificates for gold exports[17].”
  • Limited in geographical and legal scope: For instance, the OECD Due diligence Guidance is largely applicable to companies from OECD member countries but with limited enforcement mechanisms in non-OECD countries. Yet mining companies from non-OECD Countries such as China are emerging as the leading exploiters of Africa’s critical minerals according to WTO reports[18]. from the DRC. Chinese based companies own or operate 80 percent of the critical mineral production in the DRC, much of which is sent to China for processing for export via the global supply chain[19] Moreover the ICGLR is confined to its member states while the RMI covers only its 500 members.
  •  
  • Illicit smuggling and trading in conflict minerals continue despite the presence of current certification mechanisms. For instance, despite its membership to the Kimberley Process (KP) and ICGLR commitments, Tanzania’s diamond sector is reported as facing entrenched governance challenges: opaque supply chains, smuggling, and minimal community benefits. Tanzania’s diamonds have suffered from environmental concerns, price volatility from synthetics and smuggled diamonds from regional conflicts areas[20].

Moreover, critical minerals including diamonds are smuggled across borders, transacted in established commercial capitals and hubs such as Kigali, Kampala, Nairobi and Dubai. For instance, a Global Witness investigation report indicates that an international commodities trader Traxys bought conflict coltan smuggled from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Rwanda[21] The investigation revealed that the multibillion-dollar company headquartered in Luxembourg bought 280 tonnes of coltan from Rwanda in 2024 based on customs documents seen by Global Witness.

Analysis by Global Witness of trade data and testimonies from two coltan smugglers suggested that a big share of the coltan Traxys bought from Rwanda was connected to the ongoing war in the east of DRC. African Panther’s coltan exports soared to unprecedented volumes in 2024, exceeding the combined total of the export volumes recorded over the previous four years. This increase in exports coincided with the escalation of the war in North Kivu and increased smuggling of conflict coltan from Rubaya, further suggesting that an important share of African Panther’s 2024 exports was smuggled from conflict zones in DRC[22].

Despite having limited or no known deposits and operational mines, some countries in East Africa and the Middle East have emerged as leading exporters of critical minerals such as cobalt, lithium and coltan.  Study reports show large volumes of critical minerals transacted via East Africa to foreign markets such as the UAE and China[23].  For instance, in 2025 Kenyan authorities intercepted 10 containers of suspected smuggled copper at the port of Mombasa[24]  These illicitly acquired, smuggled and transacted minerals have found market into the UAE and Western capitals in Switzerland and New York. In 2023 alone, Kenya’s exports of copper to the United Arab Emirates were valued at US$22.27 million. The UAE exports mineral products, including critical minerals, in significant quantities, primarily to Japan, China, and India.

  • Ongoing critical minerals driven conflicts and the rise of new geopolitical conflicts in producer countries: The ongoing mineral driven conflicts have already been documented in the cobalt, coltan mineral rich Eastern DRC and elsewhere but the rush for securing access and control of mineral supply chains by superpowers is reviving geopolitical interests and may result in new geopolitical conflicts.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for instance, since the revision of its mining law in 2018, the country has attracted no responsible Western investors in the mining industry. Meanwhile, China has come to dominate the production of cobalt and copper, primarily mined in the Katanga and Lualaba regions. The recent re-negotiation by the Tshisekedi Administration of the imbalanced minerals-against infrastructure deal signed in 2008 under the Kabila administration between the DRC and China was perceived by China as triggered by the United State of America.

Aware of the security and economic implications of China’s control over the DRC’s critical minerals supply chain, the United States has signaled its return to the DRC mining sector through the recent acquisition of Australian AVZ Minerals’ assets in the Manono Lithium Project by KoBold Metals. In addition, the U.S. is committed to funding the Lobito Corridor—a strategic railway project essential for transporting critical minerals from the Central African Copperbelt to Western markets.

Through its International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the U.S. has pledged a $550 million loan to support the Lobito Corridor. This project is considered vital in countering Chinese influence in the region by providing an alternative route for exporting critical minerals. This plea was reiterated in Luanda/Angola in January 2024 by the former US President, John Biden, during his last visit to Africa as an US President, in presence of both Angola and DR Congo Presidents.

The corridor is viewed as part of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, a G7 initiative aimed at competing with China’s growing presence on the continent. While the Lobito project is designed to challenge Chinese dominance, both Western and Chinese firms will be allowed to use the infrastructure it provides. This dual-access approach raises questions about its strategic value, particularly under a US administration led by President Donald Trump, whose priority is   competition with Beijing. The Lobito Corridor railway could be a physical indicator of the resuscitated geopolitical rivalry and convergence of global superpowers on the African continent as a source for critical mineral resources.

Failure to implement due diligence and traceability mechanisms

 

During the OECD conference on responsible minerals supply chain held in May 2024 in Paris, many Congolese civil society organizations raised concern over the increasing failure in the implementation of due diligence standards in the DRC. CSO mentioned that private sector actors have failed to fully implement supply chain due diligence in alignment with international standards, most notably the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Minerals Supply Chains from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Area. IMPACT added that companies are either turning a blind eye, preferring not to ask questions about the source of their purchases, or have been complicit by over relying on industry schemes despite red flags being raised in UN Group of Experts reports.

The concern around ITSCI—the sole traceability and due diligence provider for 3Ts in DRC—has been so great that in 2024 it lost its recognition with the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI), with RMI noting that important gaps remained in the scheme’s fulfilment of recognition terms. Despite this move, the UN Group of Experts has expressed concern that many private sector actors still rely on the scheme to conduct due diligence without carrying out additional independent quality controls required by international standards[25].

Civil Society Call for reforms

 

Because of these gaps civil society organisations have constantly urged for a review and development of a new certification mechanism regime, expanded and aligned to emerging context of transition minerals. For instance, at the start of the 2025 KP plenary in Dubai the Civil Society Coalition pointed out the gaps of the KP in addressing the challenges of diamond mining, smuggling and poverty in the Central African Republic[26].  CSO observed that the KP was narrow in focus, limited to diamonds and the imposed conflict diamond embargos had targeted smugglers without protecting the diamond mining communities.

The KP does not—and likely will not soon—prevent diamonds from being associated with issues outside the narrow conflict diamond definition, including human rights abuses, violence by public and private security forces, forced labour, and environmental degradation. Rigorous due diligence is essential, yet it remains insufficiently addressed.

For instance the KP in Central Africa Republic’s (CAR) experience demonstrated that the sole existence of the certification scheme does not make diamond governance exemplary. Though diamonds share similar governance challenges with other minerals, the Kimberley Process has largely remained isolated from broader dialogues on mineral-related due diligence.

Civil society demanded for the need to bridge the gaps in the KP certification mechanism by inter alia increasing transparency and engagement with mining communities.  CSOs argued that without transparency, the KP will never effectively achieve its mandate of conflict prevention.

Moreover, the existing certification mechanisms are criticized as elitist, disconnected from the community needs and blind to social economic injustices. For example, the KP certification mechanism does not cover the extent to which the mining of the diamond minerals has benefited the communities from where they are sourced.

Investigations by the Kimberly Process Civil Society Coalition of mining operations in Sierra Leone, Lesotho, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, reveals the often-ignored consequences of large-scale diamond mining on local communities in African countries[27].

In Tanzania, despite mining diamonds for more than 100 years, Shyinyanga remains amongst the poorest remains the poorest region in the country[28]. The critical minerals rich Eastern DRC provinces of Kasai Oriental, Kasai Central, North and South Kivu are among the poorest and least developed in the world. 

For diamond resources to truly benefit communities, the documentary identifies greater transparency and independent monitoring as key elements to enhance corporate accountability. Mining companies, industry actors and states all have a role to play to protect community rights and improve both mining and sourcing practices[29].

Further, certification mechanisms do not sufficiently cover or protect citizen against state excesses and inspired violence. Yet the very atrocities committed by rebel groups, which led to the KP’s creation in 2003, are now mirrored by certain governments and their security forces. Top ranking government officials and security forces in the Eastern DRC have been accused of being complacent to illicit mineral trade. The military junta in Myanmar is accused of widespread human rights violations including killings of civilians in critical mineral rich village areas in Kayah state closer to the Thailand border[30].

Conclusion

 

While certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly process were established for a major purpose of controlling blood diamonds over the years, they have this role to an extent but equally shown inherent gaps and shortcomings. Their limitation in scope, involuntary membership nature and poor implementation is a major limitation. They were set up when diamond was among the top most traded commodity and driver of conflicts in countries such as Angola, Liberia and Siera Leone. With the increasing surge in demand for critical minerals such as Nickel, Cobalt, Coltan, Graphite, Lithium, Tin Tungsten and Rare Earth Elements, the new frontiers mineral driven conflicts have expanded and cannot continue to remain on diamonds.  In the current and future context, it will be untenable for critical minerals to remain outside the purview of mineral certification. For the existing certification mechanisms to be relevant and fitted for the changing context and era of energy of transition, substantive reviews and reforms are required.

Recommendations for future certification mechanisms
  1. Expand the KPI and ICGLR certification to cover a broad range of  critical minerals or develop a new commensurate certification measure for critical minerals, with a focus on ethical sourcing, conflict and governance.
  2. Pay attention to the ongoing problems in mining such as the environmental concerns in critical minerals mining operations and their contribution to social and ecological harm to communities and countries from where they are sourced.
  3. Pay close attention to ongoing issues within critical minerals supply chains, including human rights abuses, armed conflicts, the fair distribution of benefits to local communities, and compliance with national labor laws
  4. Review the existing mineral audit  standards, blend constitution of  audit teams with experts, civil society and community representatives to increase transparency and integrity in certification
  5. Require exporting countries to demonstrate significant economic presence of the critical mineral commensurate with export volumes.
  6. Impose export embargoes and critical mineral trading sanctions on countries or companies involved in perpetrating smuggling and export of illicitly acquired and conflict critical minerals.
  7. Expand the scope of existing certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly process to capture community benefits from diamonds and critical minerals.
  8. Demand that membership to regional and global certification and tracking mechanism must be mandatory for all critical minerals producing and exporting countries
  1. Countries that produce critical minerals should diversify their investors and pursue win-win partnerships to prevent their territories from becoming geopolitical battlegrounds for superpowers competing for access to these resources in the era of energy transition
  2. Enhance public database and reconciliation system for tracking mineral flows to better balance production, purchases, and exports at various levels (exporters, mines, mining regions, and Member States). 
  3. To maximize the benefits from critical mineral supply chains, producer countries should prioritize investments that add value to minerals and promote local content. This approach will generate more jobs for millions of unemployed youths, stimulate economic growth, and facilitate technology transfer and reduce susceptibility to conflict

References

Aikael Etal (2021) Understanding poverty dynamics and vulnerability in Tanzania: 2012–2018 available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rode.12829  accessed on 15 May 2025

Martin A, etal (2014), All that Glitters is not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the illicit trade of critical minerals, Partnership Africa Canada, May 2014

Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

Global Witness (2025) available at https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/new-investigation-suggests-eu-trader-traxys-buys-conflict-minerals-from-drc/ accessed on 15 May 2025

IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

ICGLR, Report on the Status of Implementation of the Six Tools of the ICGLR Regional Initiative on Natural Resources in Member States, P14

ISSD (2018) Green Conflict Minerals; The Fuels of conflict in the transition to a low carbon economy;  available at https://www.iisd.org/story/green-conflict-minerals/ accessed on 15 May 2025

Panzi Foundation available via https://panzifoundation.org/conflict-minerals-and-sexual-violence-in-the-drc/# accessed on 15 May 2025

The African Climate Foundation Report; Geopolitics of Critical Minerals in Renewable Supply Chains  available at https://africanclimatefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/800644-ACF-03_Geopolitics-of-critical-minerals-R_WEB.pdf  accessed on 15 May 2025

The Eastleigh Voice (2025); Police launch investigation into suspected copper smuggling at Mombasa port; available at https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/business/112007/police-probe-suspected-copper-smuggling-at-mombasa-port accessed on 15 May 2025

US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.

WTO (2024): High demand for energy-related critical minerals creates supply chain pressures; available at

Online sources

[1] https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/about/what-is-kp

[2] The United Republic of Tanzania: Mining Commission; A Report on implementation of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme for Tanzania Year 2023

[3]ICGLR; available via https://icglrcertification.com/ accessed 13 May 2025

[4]OECD Report (2016) available via https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-supply-chains-of-minerals-from-conflict-affected-and-high-risk-areas_9789264252479-en.html, accessed on 13 May 2025

[5] OECD (2016), OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas: Third Edition, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264252479-en.

[6] ibid

[7] https://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/

[8] https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/critical-minerals-conflict-eu/

[9] European Commission: Trade and Economic Security, Conflict Minerals regulation available at https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/conflict-minerals-regulation_en#:~:text=In%20politically%20unstable%20areas%2C%20armed,mobile%20phones%2C%20cars%20and%20jewellery. Accessed on 15 May 2025

[10] ISSD (2018) Green Conflict Minerals; The Fuels of conflict in the transition to a low carbon economy;  available at https://www.iisd.org/story/green-conflict-minerals/ accessed on 15 May 2025

[11] ibid

[12] Panzi Foundation available via https://panzifoundation.org/conflict-minerals-and-sexual-violence-in-the-drc/# accessed on 15 May 2025

[13] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[14] The African Climate Foundation Report; Geopolitics of Critical Minerals in Renewable Supply Chains  available at https://africanclimatefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/800644-ACF-03_Geopolitics-of-critical-minerals-R_WEB.pdf  accessed on 15 May 2025

[15] Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via  https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025

[16] Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

[17] ICGLR, Report on the Status of Implementation of the Six Tools of the ICGLR Regional Initiative on Natural Resources in Member States, P14

[18] WTO (2024): High demand for energy-related critical minerals creates supply chain pressures; available at https://www.wto.org/english/blogs_e/data_blog_e/blog_dta_10jan24_e.htm#:~:text=Exports,all%20at%206%20per%20cent). Accessed on 15 May 2025

[19] US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.

[20] URT:  Ministry of Minerals, Mining Commission; A Report on implementation of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme for Tanzania Year 2023

[21]Global Witness (2025) available at https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/new-investigation-suggests-eu-trader-traxys-buys-conflict-minerals-from-drc/ accessed on 15 May 2025

[22] ibid

[23] Martin A, etal (2014), All that Glitters is not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the illicit trade of critical minerals, Partnership Africa Canada, May 2014

[24] The Eastleigh Voice (2025); Police launch investigation into suspected copper smuggling at Mombasa port; available at https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/business/112007/police-probe-suspected-copper-smuggling-at-mombasa-port accessed on 15 May 2025

[25] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[26] https://www.kpcivilsociety.org/activity/kimberley-process-lifts-ineffective-embargo-end-of-an-era-for-the-central-african-republic-and-another-clear-signal-that-conflict-diamond-scheme-needs-serious-fixing/

[27] Kimberly Civil Society Coalition (2025); BEYOND SHINING ILLUSIONS: New documentary exposes the unspoken realities of large-scale diamond mining available at https://www.kpcivilsociety.org/press/beyond-shining-illusions-new-documentary-exposes-the-unspoken-realities-of-diamond-mining-in-african-countries/ accessed 15 May 2025

[28] Aikael Etal (2021) Understanding poverty dynamics and vulnerability in Tanzania: 2012–2018 available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rode.12829  accessed on 15 May 2025

[29] ibid

[30] https://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-land-mine-use-amounts-to-war-crimes-amnesty-report/a-62533770

Debt Budgets: A post budget political economy analysis of EAC Countries 2024/25 budget priorities, viabilities, risks and how governments can restore public confidence

Economists have always asserted that you know a country’s priorities from its budget while political scientists further suggest that a state and government’s health is reflected by the budget it makes and implements. In short, show us a good budget and we will show you a prosperous nation!

By Moses Kulaba, Gloria Shechambo, Robert Ssuuna, Dorine Irakoze, and Boboya James Edimond

Governance and Economic Policy Centre

@GEPC_TZ

The budget is an essential social contract that establishes the relationship between the government and its citizens, and the only one renewed annually, yet budget making in East Africa is becoming an exercise in futility.

This brief uses a political economy and trend analysis of the budget allocation priorities and estimates for 2023/4 and 2024/2025 as a basis to evaluate the extent to which East Africa Community (EAC) Countries budget policies and priorities are viable, fit into the local and global context but at the same time promote equity and reduce the economic burden on ordinary citizens.  We exposes the embedded risks, misalignments and further highlights the magnitude of the debt burden plaguing all EAC countries and its likely impact on budget viability and future macro-economic targets. We rekindle the need for an evaluation of budgeting processes in EAC, a revival of citizens participation in budgeting and repositioning the budget at the Centre for public policy. Our final conclusion is that there are malignant risks. Governments must budget better, tax wisely, address debt and strengthen public participation to revamp citizens confidence and trust in the national budget processes.

The 2024/25 Budget Context

The 2024/25 year’s budgeting was met with insurmountable obstacles and political economy pressures never anticipated before. East Africa is undergoing extreme budgetary pressures amidst a hectic political cycle. Governments are experiencing constantly, dwindling foreign aid, high indebtedness, a restless population, apathy to more taxation, ahead of a sensitive election period in many EAC Countries. The years 2024 to 2027 will be election years in Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. 

Normally election budgets tend to be quite generous as the incumbent regimes seeking re-election avoid taking drastic measures that alarm citizens and discourage their courted voters.   The 2024/25 financial year’s budgets however came at a time of increasing economic hardships, outcries over taxation, violent tax protests, a persistent global economic slowdown and jobless growth. This complicates the budget choices that governments can take and whether the desired budget goals can be achieved.

According to the Africa Development Bank, East Africa and Africa’s is expected to record an economic growth of 3.4% in 2024[1] but we project that this growth could be staggered by a myriad of externalities such as the ongoing tax protests, conflict, climate change hazards and a general slowdown in global economic growth.

Moreover, there is increasing uncertainty about the impact of the continuing Russia-Ukraine war and an escalating and endless Israel-Palestine war on the global economy by exerting political pressures and extracting resources away from development. Besides disruptions in international trade and commerce, the wars have devastating economic impacts on EAC country’s traditional donors such as the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union.

These traditional donors are constrained with multiple domestic political, social and economic challenges to finance at home.  There is uncertainty about foreign policy shifts. For example, the outcomes of the United States (US) Presidential election may determine a major shift in US foreign policy and therefore the future US-Africa foreign policy cannot be guaranteed.

The European Union (EU) has witnessed a resurgence in nationalistic tendencies and drastic swing to the right with increasing demands for inward looking policies to secure Europe’s future. The EU faces huge political and social challenges such as immigration to tackle. All these constrain EU budgets for external aid assistance and their continued support for Africa is jeopardized.

Faced by such unpleasant realities, EAC governments are obliged to make national budgets that can realistically be achieved, balancing economic and political targets at the same time, while reducing the economic burdens on ordinary citizens. However, a quick review of the 2024/25 national budgets passed by EAC countries indicates that this year’s budgets were a major gamble and fumble. 

Some countries such as Kenya has already failed to pass the test.  Others muddled through however their expectations look ambitious, plans misaligned, over burdened with debt. Precisely, the political and economic budgeting terrain is quite murky and tenacious and end of year collection out turns for 2024/25 financial may never be achieved.  

Yet in recent years, the budget exercise has become of less interest to ordinary citizens, viewed as quite top-down executive driven exercise, led by technocrats with less consideration of citizens views[2]. Questions are asked how can governments in the future balance between political and economic expediency, debt financing and development most significantly restore public confidence in the budget process as means of raising legitimate public money and delivering public goods. In this analysis, we explore and share commentary perspectives to answer this question and what citizens and governments can do.

Aligning EAC Budgeting to Regional and Global Context

The regional and global economic trajectory and potential outlook shows a zig zag pattern or mixed bag of hits and misses.  Globally there are signs of a general economic slowdown and inequitable growth. 

According to the OECD’s latest Economic Outlook, the global economy is continuing to growing at a modest pace, The Economic Outlook projects steady global GDP growth of 3.1% in 2024, the same as the 3.1% in 2023, followed by a slight pick-up to 3.2% in 2025[3]. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) baseline forecasts the world economy to continue growing at 3.2 percent during 2024 and 2025, at the same pace as in 2023. The IMF notes that a slight acceleration for advanced economies—where growth is expected to rise from 1.6 percent in 2023 to 1.7 percent in 2024 and 1.8 percent in 2025—will be offset by a modest slowdown in emerging market and developing economies from 4.3 percent in 2023 to 4.2 percent in both 2024 and 2025. The forecast for global growth five years from now—at 3.1 percent—is at its lowest in decades[4]. Even some spikes of growth in some insular countries such as Rwanda, Senegal and regions like Asia will not catapult the global economies to the desired targets of about 7% consistent economic growth over the next three years.

Moreover, multiple reports indicate that over 60% of Africa’s GDP is spent on debt serving and this significantly affects resources available to spend on development and real economic growth. According to the Economic Commission for Africa, the average debt-to-GDP ratio for the entire continent was projected to rise to 63.5% in 2023. The Commission warns that escalating debt levels in Africa are prompting concerns that repayment may not only constrain economic performance but could become virtually impossible for many African countries.

The AfrexExim Bank reports that Africa’s debt burden has grown significantly in the past 15 years surging by 39.3 percentage points between 2008 and 2023, resting at 68.6% of GDP in 2023[5].  At the current interest rates, less developed countries will never wean themselves off external debt and many countries defaulting in the near future is real.

The EAC governments therefore need to be extremely cautious and trend with maximum care on the economic their targets and priorities they make. The following guard rails are essential must be considered in advance planning of the budgets in the current obtaining and foreseeable context.

  • Avoid over taxation and stifling of nascent businesses by taking a precautionary facilitative approach verses ambitious revenue collection targets. Spare disposable incomes in the pockets of citizens and small business could stimulate both consumption, production and growth
  • Addressing economic stagnation, inflationary pressures and jobless growth
  • Addressing climate change and transition to clean energy by encouraging investment and financing of green businesses
  • Harnessing natural resources such as critical minerals to maximize benefits and revenues during the current and future envisaged boom
  • Weaning off the exorbitant external debt pressures and addressing persistent distortions in the global financial lending architecture
  • Designing and setting of long-term goals and tax policies which can drive politics, investment and trade into the future
  • Funding agriculture to support food security, create jobs and agriculture-based industrialization and value addition

An analysis of the budget statements indicates that these critical elements were largely missed by many governments’ economic planners. The net effect of the year’s (2024/25) budget processes is that the midterm and long-term targets in most EAC countries may never be fully gained and economic hardships could remain a persistent future moving forward.

Summary Analysis of EAC Countries Budget Priorities: A detailed Country Analysis of each is available via: xxx

Country Budget Allocation Summary Commentary
Tanzania Allocated Tsh49.35 Tln . Prioritized debt servicing (27%) and infrastructure (11%) with moderate funding of social-economic development sectors. Sectors such as Preoccupied on financing legacy infrastructure projects and continuity, missed revenue targets by 2% over the last two years raising concerns over budget sustainability. Limited citizen participation and budget reliability and credibility of have been flagged by studies and development partners under the FISCUS PEFA report 2022.
Uganda Allocated a budget of Ush72.139 Tln up from up from an initial Ush 58.34Tln (increase of Shs14.050 trillion) proposed in May 2024 and Shs 52.74 Tln in the financial year 2023/24, representing a 36% increase over the last year’s resource envelope. Debt servicing accounts for 57.8% of the total budget allocation with Human Development following at a paltry 14% A quite ambitious budget, overtaking Tanzania’s total budget allocation for the first time in history. Given the economic growth, missed revenue targets and tax protests, it is not clear how those resources will be raised. Moreover, wide spread corruption and over expenditure on political organs and projects has raised concerns, reducing credibility and interest among citizens.
Rwanda For the fiscal year 2024/25 Rwanda passed a budget of Frw 5,690.1 billion (USD4.3bln). Has prioritized Economic transformation pillar (59.6%), social transformation (26.6%) and Transformational Governance (13.8%) Despite stellar economic performance, Rwanda faces constant external threats such as the war in the neighboring DRC and a tainted image from UN accusations of Rwanda as a regional destabilizer.  Over reliance on agriculture is a risk too.
Burundi Allocated 4.4 trillion Burundi francs ($1.5 billion) in the 2024/25 representing an increase of 15% from previous years. Prioritised funding public service and agriculture. Public debt rose from 68.4% of GDP in 2022 to 72.7% in 2023.Has an international credibility issue to regain. Opportunities in Burundi’s critical minerals sector could offer a major breakthrough.
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 2024 budget data is scanty, reports indicate DRC prioritized funding defense against the war in the Eastern Part of DRC and public service. Social development sectors and infrastructure are still underfunded DRC Faces serious instability in the East, and public management challenges, a debt problem. Potential from its mineral wealth but a risk of expensive resource backed loans is real
South Sudan Failed to pass the 2024/2025 national budget. In the FY 2023/2024, allocated a budget of South Sudanese Pounds2.105 trillion (USD1.32bln). Prioritized infrastructure (22%). Other social development sectors took less than 10% each. South Sudan has a huge external debt estimated at over USD $ 2,051,335,901 The government’s petroleum revenues have suffered from the ongoing conflict in Sudan, stifling its economy and ability to raise revenue. Many public servants and essential social delivery are yet to be paid. The ongoing conflict amidst reports of corruption and a huge national debt will affect the country’s future economic possibilities.
Kenya Failed to pass a budget of Ksh3.99Tln    and reverted to using the Finance Bill 2023 to raise revenue. The country has witnessed wide spread violent tax protests, forcing the government to backdown on major tax measures.  The government is under siege and not able to tax. With a bludgeoning external debt, a government under siege and restless population opposed to more taxation, Kenya’s economy is at its weakest.  Kenya was downgraded to Junk status making it more expensive to borrow and raise external capital.  A risk of an economic meltdown is real.

Risks to EAC Countries National Budget Priorities, Viability and Success

In the final Analysis we identify the following risks to the 2024/25 budgets and budgeting generally in  East Africa

Debt Risk: Huge public debt risk is real and if unchecked will literary transform EAC governments into debt collectors on behalf of their lenders. At the current rates, over 50-60% of tax collected by EAC governments in the next 2-3 years will be spent on debt servicing, effectively locking the region into a permanent cycle of debt payment and slow progress. As observed by Uganda’s legislator, Hon Semuju Nganda, “Next financial year (2024/25) Uganda will spend Shs 34 trillion (close to half) on debt servicing  and yet the country thinks it is processing a budget.” The debt risk is significant.

Political and Democracy risks.  Politics and governance in EAC are driven with political alliances and favoritism.  As governments head towards elections there is an increased risk of proposing ambitious budgets that are unviable and could be misaligned with citizens demands. Moreover, large proportions of the budget are being spent on politicians (large cabinets, large parliaments, political advisors, Governors, MCAs etc) and political enterprises such as subsiding political parties. Political parties with representation in parliament have become state enterprises funded by public resources. This is a risk

Credibility risks– The national budgets are losing credibility as statements of macroeconomic policy and social contracts between the governments and citizens. Citizens are increasingly getting detached from the budget with stronger perceptions that their views do not matter- The tendency is never to understand government incentives and plans. If unaddressed will drive constant apathy and resistance against taxation and revenue collection strangling public expenditure.

Economic growth and equity risks: Caused by among others persistent jobless growth, misaligned priorities, unfulfilled earlier economic promises, global economic slowdown and shifting economic policies that may have significant impacts on the EAC countries and region’s growth. The risk is that Budgets may not create tangible economic impacts on ordinary people.

Conflict and Distress risks- This risk is aggravated by the ongoing internal protests against taxation and civil wars such as in the ones in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and the DRC. The risk is that available resources will continue being channeled towards war. Further, the international conflicts such as the Ukraine-Russia war will disrupt global supply chains of essential such as grain and redefine geo-economics’ alignments affecting volumes and direction flow of supportive development linkages to the EAC Countries.

Climate Risks: Unpredictability of whether patterns affecting heavily agricultural reliant countries and economies such as Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda. Affecting food supplies and foreign revenues from agricultural sources.

Corruption and Public Management risk– Rising opulence and failure to tame corruption, place and enforce guard rails to mismanagement of public expenditure, exacerbating resistances or rebellion against taxation and budgets generally.

Forward looking, Restoring National Budget Credibility and Public Confidence

  1. Develop and pass realistic national budgets with less ambitious and white elephant projects to be funded in the next few years
  2. Leverage on existing natural resources such as critical minerals and the abundant blue economy as new levers to driver the economy further
  3. Mitigate expectations of large streams revenues from fossil-based projects such as Oil and Gas, factoring in the climate change global pressure to decarbonize and how this could impact on fossil-based revenues in the future
  4. Repurpose investment in young people (the Gen-Z) with jobs created in non-traditional fields and professions such as technology, e-commerce, content creation and redistribution of economic opportunities and wealth beyond the political class
  5. Re-channel heavy investment into agriculture, as a ‘go back to basics’of agriculture as the backbone of our economies, given its potential and ability to cushion other sectors of the economy, including providing food security and incomes to millions of citizens. Remember a hungry person will always be an angry person. Addressing agriculture and food constraints can radically address the spiraling costs of living and desperation that we are currently experiencing in the region.
  6. Tax rationally, modestly, and spend less on nugatory public finance expenditures, tame corruption and malfeasance of public resources. Clearly punish the corrupt and reward the best performers.
  7. Ramp up a global campaign against debt and reform the shylock global lending system which is designed to largely constrain and drain more resources from less developed countries. 
  8. Avoid mistakes in Tax policy and administration that we experienced this year. Be consultative, listen to the views and concerns of stakeholders with mutual respect and consideration. No one wants more demonstrations and violent tax protests next year.

 

NB: The full policy brief and individual country analysis reports for Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan  will be published soon

 

[1] https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/41-african-countries-set-stronger-growth-2024-keeping-continent-second-fastest-growing-region-world-african-development-banks-economic-outlook-71384

[2] https://theconversation.com/kenya-protests-show-citizens-dont-trust-government-with-their-tax-money-can-ruto-make-a-meaningful-new-deal-234008

[3] https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/economic-outlook-steady-global-growth-expected-for-2024-and-2025.htm#:~:text=The%20global%20economy%20is%20continuing,up%20to%203.2%25%20in%202025.

[4] https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2024/04/16/world-economic-outlook-april-2024

[5] https://media.afreximbank.com/afrexim/State-of-Play-of-Debt-Burden-in-Africa-2024-Debt-Dynamics-and-Mounting-Vulnerability.pdf

The Petals of Blood: Dissecting the contagion effect of Sudan war on South Sudan and EAC with lessons on governance and state failure

The Sudan war has been raging for almost a year, with catastrophic effects now spreading beyond Sudan’s borders, affecting its neighboring South Sudan and the East Africa Community (EAC) in many ways.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre & James Boboya, Institute of Social Policy and Research (ISCPR), South Sudan

According to the United Nations, since it started, the war has now destabilized the entire region, leading to the deaths of more than 5,000 Sudanese and displacing millions both within the African nation and across seven national borders.[1]  Sudan is now home to the highest number of internally displaced anywhere in the world, with at least 7.1 million uprooted.[2] More than 6 million Sudanese are suffering from famine, and these numbers are growing every day.  The health system has broken down, and more than 1,200 children have died from malnutrition and lack of essential care. [3]The UN now describes the Sudan conflict as a forgotten humanitarian disaster, while the International Crisis Group has warned that Sudan’s future, and much else, is at stake.

Lest we forget, within a short period, the third largest nation in Africa, with a size of more than 1.8886 million square kilometers and at least 46 million people, has no properly functioning government, and all state institutions have collapsed with the effects of its meltdown spilling over to its neighbors, particularly South Sudan.

South Sudan is host to thousands of Sudanese refugees forced across the border into South Sudan, exerting social and economic pressure on an already fragile state that was already sinking under the burden of its own civil war and internal conflicts.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) reports that more than 500,000 people have now fled from the war in Sudan to South Sudan. [1]This means that over 30 percent of all the refugees, asylum seekers, and ethnic South Sudanese were forced to flee Sudan since the war exploded in April 2023 for protection in one of the poorest places on earth. “South Sudan, that has itself recently come out of decades of war, was facing a dire humanitarian situation before the war in Sudan erupted. It already had nine million people in need of humanitarian aid, and almost 60 per cent of the population facing high levels of food insecurity.

As of 28 January 2024, more than 528,000 ethnic South Sudanese, Sudanese refugees, and other third-country nationals had crossed at entry points along the South Sudan border into Abyei Administrative Area, Upper Nile, Unity, Northern, and Western Bahr El Ghazal. The majority, 81 percent, entered at Jodrah before making their way to the transit center in Renk. Ethnic South Sudanese who have crossed the border from Sudan are commonly referred to as “returnees.” Still, in reality, many of them were born in Sudan and have never been in South Sudan, and therefore have no kinship connection in host communities.

The conflict has spilled deeper into other East African countries, with thousands seeking refuge and safety from it. The education system collapsed, sending thousands of learners back home and hundreds who could afford to flee exile to continue their studies. Some of these were admitted to Rwandan and Tanzanian Universities.

The Sudan and South Sudan experiment was a governance disaster in the waiting and perhaps serves as a lesson of how a firm grip on power, corruption, and misgovernance can ultimately lead to catastrophic state failure and collapse.

Donald Kasongi, Executive Director of Governance Links and a former senior officer with the Accord, a regional conflict organization, describes the post-Garang South Sudan and post-Bashir Sudan as a protracted governance failure. The diverse strategic roles of Khartoum, Beijing, and Washington in the Sweet South Sudanese oil are now evident.  So far, none is a victor.

The role of external interests in shaping national discourse has been at play. Sudan is caught between the interests of the West and the Middle East and China, with both interested in controlling access to Sudan’s resources, cultural wealth, and strategic positioning as a buffer between the North and South. Before the war, Sudan identified itself with the Islamic world and pronounced itself as an Islamic state. Despite this alignment, the OIC and the larger Islamic world has not come to its help. Sudan remains an isolated state left to collapse at its fate.

In South Sudan, the Garang vision of a strong independent nation was lost. After his demise most of the post Garang political elites or military war generals became pre-occupied on restoring the lost years at war by amassing wealth through corruption and sharing out of the limited resources from the oil resources. As a consequence, a strong nation is yet to be built. They had won the war but lost their country. The same mistake plays out in Sudan. Perhaps the conflict is a lesson on what it means to lose what is so dear to one- A country.

In short, the transition in both countries (Sudan and South Sudan) were not well managed and what we see are petals of blood from toxic flowers of bad governance which have flourished like a forest planted along the banks of the river Nile.

According to James Boboya, the Executive Director of the South worrisome. The raging war has made South Sudan’s oil exports via Port Sudan difficult. Oil exports have collapsed by more than half from 160,000 barrels per day in 2022 to 140,000 barrels per day in 2023. This was more than half of the previous peak of 350,000 barrels per day before civil war broke out in 2013.[2] The South Sudanese dollar collapsed in value. There is a financial crunch and the South Sudanese government has not paid its public and civil servants for months. There is a risk of insurrection and demonstrations by public servants that will be likely joined by the military. This would plunge South Sudan into chaos and total collapse just like its Northern neighbor.

Moreover, this conflict and its associated effects comes in an election year for South Sudan.  The general elections are viewed as a watershed moment which may see a transition from President Salva Keir to a new cadre of leadership. With the economic crunch, South Sudan may not be able to organize and fund a credible general election. This will be not good for South Sudan’s democracy and desired future.

With the world’s media focused on the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Gaza wars, little is covered about the Sudan conflicts nor the total economic catastrophe that South Sudan faces.

If not addressed, the Sudan war will be soon inside the borders of the EAC. Can the EAC afford to stand by and watch longer as its member state, collapses.  Mediation efforts led by Kenya and Djbouti were postponed last year. Direct talks between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s army chief and de facto head of state, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, head of the RSF paramilitaries remain futile.  What can South Sudan and the EAC do now to avert further catastrophe?

During a joint webinar organized by the Governance and Economic Policy Center (GEPC) and the Institute of Social Policy and Research (ISCR) in South Sudan in April, a distinguished panel of experts discussed and enabled us to understand the contradictions and magnitude of this war with implications and lessons on extractive governance, and state collapse drawn for East Africa and Africa generally, can be taken to avert the situation and its contagion effect on the EAC and Africa generally. The panelists and participants highlighted some key lessons and takeaways that can be drawn from the conflict.

Key lessons and takeaways

Ethnicization of politics and governance can lead to a spiral of violence and catastrophic state collapse, especially when the strong ruling elite and regime finally lose control of power.

A previously united Sudan started getting balkanized when the ruling elites started practicing the politics of ethnicity and religion pitting the largely Muslims in the northern and western parts of the country against their Christian southerners.  The Christians were portrayed as slightly inferior, denied political and economic opportunity, and subjected to forced Islamisation, and inhumane conditions such as slavery. Faced with what was considered unbecoming conditions the Southerners opted for a rebellion and demand for independence. The first and second Sudanese civil war (including the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM/A) were born and the political dynamics in Sudan changed for decades after. New factions such as the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) emerged and Sudan never remained the same.  Sentiments for cessation and independence in Darfur flared and faced with an insurgency, President Omar enlisted militias including the Janjaweed to quell the rebellions. Around 10,000 were killed and over 2.5 million displaced. The balkanisation of Sudan was continuing to play out.

Militarisation of politics erodes democratic values and principles which can take decades to rebuild.

Omar Bashir came to power in 1989 when, as a brigadier general in the Sudanese Army, he led a group of officers in a military coup that ousted the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi after it began negotiations with rebels in the south. Omar Bashir subsequently replaced President Ahmed al-Mirghani as head of state and ruled with the military closely fused into the politics and governance of Sudan.

The military elites elevated to power during President Omar Bashir’s government enjoyed privileged positions.  Even with his overthrow in 2019, these generals maintained a firm grip on the Transition Military Council and the Civil-Military Sovereignty Council.  These are less likely to accept any position below total control of the central authority. The net effect is that the return to full civilian and democratic rule of state governance in an entrenched militarized political environment such as Sudan can or may take decades to be rebuilt.

Vulnerability to geopolitical manipulation and fiddle diddle can be a driver to political instability and eventual weak governance

Both Sudan and South Sudan have been victims of well-orchestrated geopolitical game plans from external powers interested in taking control of the rich natural resources wealth that these countries possess. Sudan and South Sudan have vast oil deposits and forestry products.  With eyes focused on these resources external powers succeeded in playing one community against another and one country against the other and successfully throwing the region into an abyss of endless crisis. Religion was used as a tool to play the North against the South and continues to be used in some segments of the Sudanese and South Sudanese communities.

Key Takeaways

  1. The East African Community (EAC) governments cannot afford to take a wait-and-see attitude. The problems facing Sudan and South Sudan are latently present in several other EAC countries. For this reason, therefore without taking lessons from Sudan and South Sudan other countries can also easily erupt in the future, bringing down the entire EAC. The EAC has therefore an obligation to ramp up support for the resumption of the peace process and finding lasting solutions for peace and tranquility in the two countries. For this to happen there has to be trust and objectivity of the actors to the crisis and the EAC mediators. 
  1. Stop ethnicization and militarization of politics and state governance: The Sudan experience demonstrates this, whereby the collapse of President Omar Bashir’s strong grip on power let loose the lid off a can of worms that had eaten the state to its collapse. Similar conditions of ethnic rivalry in state governance have created uncertainty about guaranteed stability in South Sudan. In some other EAC member states there have been attempts to elevate dominant ethnic groups to power and military influence in state politics built around one strong leader. The Sudan experience demonstrates that the absence of such a strong leader holding the center together can lead to a lacuna, leading to a trail of conflict and instability leading governance to fall apart and eventual state collapse.
  1. The EAC countries must stop viewing at South Sudan as merely a market but as an independent viable state whose stability is good for the entire region. According to the EAC trade statistics, South Sudan was the leading market for goods from Uganda and Kenya. With a total population of 11 million and a collapsed agricultural and industrial base, South Sudan has provided a ready market for agricultural goods and manufactured goods from Uganda and Kenya. According to UN Comtrade Data Uganda exported goods worth USD483.9Mln and Kenya’s exports to South Sudan were worth USD170Mln. Uganda’s exports to Sudan also increased by 154% from around USD48Mln in 2016 to USD123Mln in 2022.  With the eyes largely focused on trade opportunities, there can be a tendency to lose track of the human suffering that the people in these countries face. Also, the jostle for geopolitical control over trade deals can overwhelm the genuine solidarity intentions of good neighbors. The EAC members should focus on the stability of these countries. 
  1. The International Community Must not give up on Sudan and South Sudan. Despite the donor fatigue and reports of corruption, the international community has a moral obligation to continue engaging with the protagonists in the war, facilitating the avenues for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and providing humanitarian aid to the suffering people. The Sudan and South Sudan conflict must be treated with equal measure with the Ukraine-Russia, Israel, and Gaza conflicts. The EAC must scale up diplomatic efforts and be an Anchor in Chief in this process, coordinating and connecting Sudan, South Sudan to the world. 
  1. The EAC media and Civil society must continue highlighting the suffering in Sudan and South Sudan. With the Israel and Gaza war ongoing, the Sudan and South Sudan stories that were largely covered by the Western media have since died out.  There has been little coverage given within the EAC of the recent developments in this war and how it is affecting its neighbors. Moreover, with limited internet connectivity and restrictive conditions, communication advocacy from inside Sudan and South Sudan is quite difficult.  The media and civil society in the EAC therefore must speak loud on behalf of their Sudanese counterparts

 

[1] War in Sudan displaces over 500,000 to South Sudanhttps://www.nrc.no/news/2024/january/sudan-refugees-to-south-sudan/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CMore%20than%20500%2C000%20people%20have,the%20poorest%20places%20on%20earth.

[2] The East African Business Khartoum unable to ensure smooth export of South Sudan oil https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/khartoum-unable-to-ensure-smooth-export-of-south-sudanese-oil-4564064

[1] Sudan conflict: ‘Our lives have become a piece of hell’ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67438018

[2] War in Sudan: more than 7 million displaced – UNhttps://www.africanews.com/2023/12/22/war-in-sudan-more-than-7-million-displaced-un//

[3] More than 1,200 children have died in the past 5 months in conflict-wrecked Sudan, the UN sayshttps://apnews.com/article/sudan-conflict-military-rsf-children-measles-malnutrition-ec7bb2a1f49d74e7b5f01afa12f16d99

Tanzania’s new political and electoral reforms : A step to the right, a high jump to go!

 

In early February 2024 the Tanzanian parliament made sweeping electoral reforms by passing three bills governing elections and political parties in Tanzania. If ascended and signed by the President into law, these reforms usher a new political era in Tanzania’s electoral history. However, one major leap to the front remains to cement Tanzania’s political landscape and electoral democracy for the better. Simply put the new reforms are a one step to the right or left but a higher jump is required.

The three bills passed are; The National Election Commission Act 2023, Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Government Elections Bill (2023), The Political Parties Affairs Laws (Amendment) Bill (Amending the Political Parties Act RE 2019 and the Elections Expenses Act, 2010). Among the reforms passed under these bills include;

# Introduces a new and separate law governing the National Electoral Commission. Previously this was covered under the National Elections Act, which seems to be overhauled by the new law.

#  Changing the name of the electoral body from the National Electoral Commission to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).  The spirit of this is to rebrand the National Electoral Commission as a modern independent electoral management institution, capable of delivering on its mandate with minimal potential interference from the executive

# Changes to the selection process of the commissioners via a competitive hiring process presided over by a competent independent selection panel chaired by the Chief Justice of Tanzania Mainland and Chief Justice of Zanzibar as its Vice Chairperson. Previously these were solely appointed by the President.

# Introduces procedure for people to apply for positions at the electoral body.  Under the new proposed law, the position for Director of Elections will be open for all competent citizens to apply and subjected to an interview process whereafter three names will be proposed to the President for appointment. The purpose of this amendment is to detach the electoral commission from the direct ambits of the sitting President, who could also be a running candidate in an election process.

# Amendment of the law to remove a mandatory requirement for City Directors, Municipal Directors, Town Directors, District Executive Director (DED) to serve as returning officer at the district level. Under the new law, any competent officer or person can be appointed or assigned to preside over elections as a returning officer. The purpose was to address the long outcry over potential conflict of interest and lack of separation of the executive from the electoral processes. This matter had been a subject of litigation in courts but without success.

# The removal of automatic declaration of unopposed candidates as winners of an election. The new law requires that even unopposed candidates will still be subjected to a vote. If the number of opposed votes and more than in favour, the candidate cannot be declared the winner. The purpose of this was to avoid political favoritism, political intimidation or buying off of political opponents, and imposition of certain candidates on voters who may not be necessarily the best or favorite candidate for the voters.

By initiating and allowing this process to continue unhindered, President Samia Suluhu Hassan proved that she is a democrat par excellence.  President Samia demonstrated mastery of the political landscape and that she was committed to setting Tanzania on a trajectory of political and electoral reforms at a pace and standard unprecedent before by any of her predecessors.

Perhaps serving as a Vice Chairperson of the previous Constituent Assembly in 2014 and listening to the divergent views, she was exposed to the political pitfalls that dogged her country and always remained endeared to the ideas for urgent political reforms.

Key gaps remaining

Running on this inertia, President Samia can take a key leap to the front by reviving the defunct full constitutional review process towards a writing and adoption of a new Tanzania constitution.

The previous attempt at writing a new constitution suffered a still birth.  After months of collecting citizens opinions and debates by the Constituent Assembly costing billions of shillings, the political gulags killed the process before it could deliver a new constitution. Without major changes, the current new reforms will be curtailed by the Constitution limitations that exist.

A comparative study of Electoral Management Bodies (EMB) conducted by the Governance and Economic Policy Center (GEPC) in 2020 showed that despite some progress, Tanzania failed or fared poorly in many areas and required a major overhaul.  (Read more: https://gepc.or.tz/2020-general-elections-key-electoral-reforms-tanzania-must-take/

When ranked on the common standards and guidelines for electoral management and regulation of political parties developed by the European Commission for Democracy, Tanzania scored unfavorably compared to its neighbors South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria on a number of major electoral management and dispute resolution in the following aspects.

  • Direct appointment of the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Electoral Management Body with out subject to an independent public vetting process
  • Tanzania’s electoral management body had curtailed or restricted powers to organize only Presidential and parliamentary elections. The Minister for local government was responsible for organizing and coordinating local government and municipal elections. The Minister appointed returning officers.
  • The prerogative of finality of decisions made by NEC and Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) was a major lacuna in Tanzania’s electoral law compared to its neighbors. NEC and ZEC have the exclusive powers to announce Presidential and parliamentary election results. Announced Presidential elections are not subject to challenge in any court of law. This is viewed as an infringement on common standards of democratic practice, rule of law, natural justice and democratic rights to a fair hearing. The exercise of finality of decisions can also be confusing, especially where it concerns matters that can be of concern to both institutions. A case to remember was the ZEC Chairperson’s decision to annual the 2015 Presidential election.
  • Limitations on Independent Presidential candidature. The current constitution and election laws restrict this candidature to members belonging to a political party
  • Lack of clarity and potential clash in the roles of the Electoral Management Body (EMB) and the Office of Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) during election campaign period and civic education.

What it will take for reforms to succeed

For the new reforms to succeed, Tanzania needs to unpack the current constitution to ensure that its provisions are in synchrony with a new democratic dispensation.

The President will need to address the chronic single party mentality that exists amongst some political party cadres and state operatives.  Many of these are not tolerant to opposing political thought. They may not fully embrace the reforms let alone allow the INEC to function without impediments.  Guard rails must be set for what they can or cannot do  

Safe guarding of women in elections and political parties by ringfencing of women leadership positions in political parties. This must be followed by redesigning the concept of affirmative action by setting term limits for women serving in nominated positions in parliament and local governments as councilors for women and special seats.

Restriction on the use of national resources such as state media and the use national security forces and agencies to support a given political party or its candidates during elections.  This matter is considered sensitive but one that needs to be dealt with.

Moreover, our comparative analysis in 2020 showed that a mere change of name does not fully address electoral management, fairness, transparency, and dispute resolution.  Changes of the electoral body’s name from National Electoral Commission (NEC) to Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) must be followed by the political will and support to enable its independent functioning.

Experiences from Kenya show that changes in the name did not succeed in fully addressing the underlying crevasses and politically charged currents that faced the electoral body. Kenya’s Electoral commission still faces accusations of political bias and state capture. All presidential elections since 2017 have been subjected to dispute and court adjudication.  Its commissioners and executives face electoral violence, persecution and accused of presiding over botched election results. Tragically, some have been killed while others live in exile because of election related persecution.

As Tanzanians and the political class celebrate these new reforms, we must always be reminded that this is temporary and more steps must be taken. Tanzania is yet to come a full circle as a democratic country. Tanzania has and can still set a new bar higher with a full constitutional review.