INVITATION TO A WEBINAR ON ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY-ADDRESSING MONEYOCRACY VIOLENCE AND IMPUNITY IN EAST AND AFRICA GREAT LAKES REGION

You are invited to our next webinar on Elections and Democracy: Addressing the challenge of Moneyocracy, Violence and Impunity in East and Africa Great Lakes Region

As you may be aware the East and Africa Great Lakes region is going through another electoral cycle yet the region stands at a critical crossroads, where the promise of electoral democracy is being challenged and potentially eroded by a surge in moneyocracy, violence, shrinking civic space, and the manipulation of political and legal institutions. This webinar will expose the complex interplay of corruption, commercialization of politics, and state-sponsored repression that has transformed elections from peaceful contests into battlegrounds of titanic fear and exclusion.

Our distinguished Speakers will be:

  1. Mr Don Malish, Researcher, Human Rights Expert and Colosseum Member, Governance and Economic Policy Center

Mr Don Bosco Malish is a seasoned professional with over 20 years of experience in human rights, democracy promotion, and social justice. Before venturing into private practice, Don worked as a Senior Executive for the Open Society Foundations, where he  managed a substantial grant portfolio and supported initiatives focusing on governance, rule of law, and human rights across Eastern Africa, with a significant focus on South Sudan. He has a deep understanding of the local human rights, governance and elections contextual  challenges facing East Africa. Don is currently a distinguished independent researcher, consultant and Colosseum (Advisory Council) member of the Governance and Economic Policy Centre

  1. Mr Mulle Musau, Regional Coordinator Elections Observer Group (ELOG), Kenya

Mr Musau is an elections expert with over 20 years experience in electoral democracy, with special interest in Elections and Ethics in governance. He has been involved in Elections observation both domestic and international from 2007. Currently the national coordinator for the Elections Observation Group (ELOG) in Kenya and the regional coordinator for the East and Horn of Africa Election Observers Network (E-HORN).

  1. Deus Kibamba, Executive Director Tanzania Information Bureau & Jukwa la Katiba, Elections Expert, and Lecture in International Relations

Mr Kibamba is an experienced political and governance expert, researcher and analyst with over 20 years’ experience in international development. He trained in Political Science and Public Administration, with an international relations major. He has been actively involved in electoral processes in Tanzania and served as an international observer in a number of missions across Africa. His research interests have focused on the Constitutional aspects of the electoral democracy. He is the founding Director of Tanzania Information Bureau (TIB) and a Board member of Jukwaa la Katiba Tanzania, an independent organisation focusing on promoting constitutionalism and elections in Tanzania. Deus is currently a distinguished  lecturer in International Relations and Diplomacy at the Tanzania – Dr Salim Ahmed Salim Centre for Foreign Relations, Kurasini, Dar es Salaam. 

  1. Moses Kulaba, Executive Director Governance and Economic Policy Center, Moderator

Moses Kulaba is a political economist, Governance, policy and tax law expert, and trained as an economic diplomat with over 20 years of experience in the public and civil society sector.  Has researched and written on the subjects of  elections and governance, including the Ten Principles for free and fair elections in Tanzania. He is currently the Executive Director of Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Date: Friday, 29th August, 2025

Time:  15:00 (3PM) Nairobi Time, 14hrs (CAT), 12pm Lagos

Register in advance for this webinar via: https://us06web.zoom.us/meeting/register/A-yOjAcRStCEn2Y3U3B97Q


After registering, you will receive a confirmation email containing information about joining the meeting.

 

 

Geopolitics of Critical Minerals: An Analysis of the strategic gains and risks offered by the EU Strategic Partnership, Lobito Corridor and Minerals for Security deals on East and Southern Africa’s Critical Transition Minerals
 

Featured photo credit: Sipa photo by Graeme Sloan via AP).

Authors: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre and Robert Letsatsi, Botswana Watch Organization

Background

The surging demand for minerals critical to green transition offers potential economic benefits for mineral rich countries however the dash to secure their supply chain has kicked off geopolitical interests, competition and realignments whose outcomes could have long lasting relationship with divergent unforeseen impacts. With the Eastern and Southern Africa combined as a single economic bloc, the region has the highest concentration of critical green transition minerals such as cobalt, coltan, nickel, graphite, tungsten, tantalum, copper in the world. Yet the history of governance and management of the mineral sector has never yielded very positive dividends for mineral-rich countries in the region. Minerals have fueled conflicts in the DRC and Mozambique, Debt traps in Zambia, political patronage and environmental concerns in Zimbabwe and economic inequalities in South Africa and Botswana.

So far, the EU has signed Critical Minerals Strategic Partnerships with 5 Africa green minerals rich countries and the US led Lobito Mineral Corridor partnership plan to connect the Democratic Republic Congo’s mineral rich Katanga region and Zambia with a railway line to the Angolan Port of Lobito.  Moreover, in recent months we witnessed the emergence of minerals for security deals signed between the US and Ukraine and the US with the DRC and Rwanda.  These developments offer a new geopolitical twist in this global race to secure the critical green transition minerals, pitting the developed western economic superpowers against China in the dash for Africa’s critical mineral resources. Amidst this mineral dash and geopolitical balkanization, it is feared that without strategic positioning, the Eastern and Southern Africa critical minerals rich countries could again miss out from this mineral boom.

Overview of Critical Minerals in Eastern and Southern Africa

East Africa is vastly endowed with critical minerals with Tanzania having the 5th largest graphite reserves globally (18million tons) and 1.52 million tons of high-grade nickel. With the DRC combined, the East Africa has accounts for more than 50% of Africa’s critical minerals output of graphite, copper, cobalt, coltan and nickel. The DRC holds the world’s largest cobalt reserves, accounting for about 70% global output and ranks as Africa’s largest and the world’s second-largest copper producer. The DRC government is working on policies to improve governance, local beneficiation, and attract ethical investment while reducing dependency on Chinese processing.

Despite this potential, EAC as a block has not yet maximized benefits from its mineral wealth and member states have been working on competing policies to improve governance, attract ethical investments and increase local beneficiation.

Mineral Resources in EAC

Country

Precious metal, Gemstones & Semi-Precious Metal

Metallic Minerals

Industrial minerals

Burundi

Gold

Tin, Nickel, copper, cobalt, niobium, coltan, vanadium, tungsten

Phosphate, Peat

Kenya

Gemstones, gold

Lead, zircon, iron, titanium

Soda ash, flour spar, salt, mica, chaum, oil, coal, diatomite, gypsum, meers, kaolin, rear earth

Rwanda

Gold, gemstones

Tin, tungsten, tantalum, niobium, columbium

pozzolana

Tanzania

Gold, diamond, gemstones, silver, PGMs

Nickel, bauxite, copper, cobalt, uranium, graphite

Coal, phosphate, gypsum, pozzolana, soda ash, gas

Uganda

Gold, diamond

Copper, tin, lead, nickel, cobalt, tungsten, uranium, niobium, tantalum, iron

Gypsum, kaolin, salt, vermiculite, pozzolana, marble, soapstone, rear earth, oil

Source: EAC Vision 2050 and South Sudan Development Strategy

Southern Africa holds vast deposits of the world’s critical minerals. For example, South Africa holds the largest (90%) reserves of Platinum Group Minerals (PGMs) globally[1]. South Africa and Zimbabwe account for 92% of global reserves of PGM and produced 82% of platinum globally in 2022[2].  Zambia has large Copper deposits accounting for 70% of Africa’s exports while Zimbabwe has the largest lithium reserves globally (estimated at 11 metric tons in Masvingo Province). Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia and Angola have some of the largest deposits of diamond. Angola has been diversifying beyond oil and diamonds, promoting critical minerals exploration and processing. The government is enhancing mining regulations, attracting foreign investment, and seeking strategic partnerships to develop local value chains. As one of the world’s top ten largest copper producers, Zambia is strengthening policies to boost value addition, encourage local smelting and refining, and attract Western investment. Zambia is Africa’s second-largest copper producer after Democratic Republic of Congo and the country is positioning itself as a major supplier in clean energy and EV industries.

From the above data, the Eastern and Southern Africa combined accounts for more than half of the global supply of critical minerals such as copper, coltan, platinum, graphite, manganese, nickel and lithium. In recent years there has been an increasing focus towards critical minerals with global mining exploration budgets for minerals such as lithium, copper and nickel rapidly spiking up since 2022.  This places the East and Southern Africa region at the heart of competing geopolitical interest in race for the control of critical minerals supply chains. In the midst of this rush, the Eastern and Southern Africa region countries have been competing amongst themselves and undercutting each other to attract key large-scale players in the mining sector. This race has both socio-economic, human rights and geopolitical risks and concerns.

What are the key socio-economic justice concerns in the mining sector

The history of mining in the region has not been perfect. Like in previous mining experiences generally, increased extraction of critical minerals raises serious key socio-economic justice concerns like environmental injustice, gross violation of human rights, climate change, community displacement and land grabbing, lack of transparency and accountability, corruption and unequal distribution of benefits. Such concerns have been put in even greater spotlight, where demand for these minerals worldwide began to rise and will surge over the next 20 years in support of the energy transition and technological advancements.

Mining of critical minerals is happening in new land frontiers never explored or exposed to large scale mining before. This contributes to significant environment impacts around villages and communities where they are found. Their effects range from land rights violations via new evictions to destruction of social infrastructures such as schools, hospitals and residential homes due to blasting for minerals[1]. Land degradation, dust pollution and loss of arable agricultural land through clearances for new mines affects health and livelihoods. Processing of minerals such as Lithium and Nickel requires a lot of water and this is contributing to water shortages and pollution of water sources around the mining communities[2].   

Moreover, critical minerals are driving existing and new conflicts in many African countries such as the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Mozambique. According to UN reports, the desire to control exploitation of critical minerals are a major driver for the ongoing conflict in DRC[1].

Geopolitics of Critical Minerals

The increasing demand and competition for critical minerals is driving unending geopolitical tensions over which countries can gain access to these resources and how best to manage them.  As the geopolitical competition amongst global economic superpowers; China, US, EU, Russia, United Kingdom and new emerging powers such as Australia, UAE and India has increased in recent years. The strategic partnerships and infrastructure partnerships such as the Lobito corridor have been signed.  Recently, we have witnessed the emergence of ‘Mineral for Security deals’ such as the ones signed between the US- Ukraine and the US- DRC aimed at transferring control of a portion of critical mineral supplies in exchange for security guarantees and protection. There are many geopolitical interests and tools used at play but these are the noticeable physical manifestations of this geopolitical competition for critical minerals.

The consequences of these new geopolitical realignments are diverse but alignments and signed deals force smaller countries to surrender sovereignty of their mineral natural resources by attach their political interest to the supply of critical minerals. There has been a surge in the use of counter friendshoring measures by importing countries establishing direct partnerships with exporting countries for raw critical minerals. While this may be viewed as a positive development for minerals and commodities trade, the tilted partnerships reinforce the underdevelopment of the downstream supply chain capacity for critical minerals, especially as developed countries secure the Just Energy Transition (JET) technologies. And are not willing yet to transfer this technology to the minerals source countries. The complex dynamics and intricate geopolitical forces surrounding critical minerals therefore demands a comprehensive and forward-thinking strategy to effectively navigate the evolving global landscape[2]. Without this, the risk of securing little benefits from the critical mineral wealth for Eastern and Southern Africa is real.

The EU Strategic Minerals Partnerships and implications on Africa’s critical Minerals

Amid global geopolitical tensions, the EU has been ramping up efforts to diversify its mineral value chains. The EU has forged strategic partnerships with critical minerals resource-rich African nations like Tanzania, Namibia, DRC, Zambia and Rwanda. To date the EU has established partnerships for critical raw materials with at least 14 countries[3]. These partnerships are designed to secure access to critical minerals at various stages of the value chain, strengthen European industrial resilience and accelerate the green transition of its economies while supporting Africa’s own industrialization ambitions. The EU has further established a multistakeholder partnership with the US to develop the Lobito corridor project[4]. While these partnerships are considered vital in ensuring improved mineral governance and securing investment inflows into Africa’s mining sector, on the flipside they are viewed controversially as a strategic path for continued EU dominance by tightly tying Africa as a source of raw critical materials to feed Europe’s industrial base.

The EU strategic minerals partnerships have a prospect of placing Africa as a global player in the critical minerals space and potentially securing Africa’s contributing towards a net zero future. According to the EU, the strategic partnerships will involve cooperation on supply chain integration, infrastructure financing, research and innovation, capacity building, and sustainable sourcing of minerals. With strategic leverage and tactful negotiation, Africa can potentially wean itself off the largely exploitative contracts previously signed with mining companies that were economically biased, had disregard for human rights and responsible sourcing. Without tearing the existing contracts apart, Africa can establish a new progressive framework to guide its mining

However, the EU mineral partnerships are viewed as inherently biased and pursued with less consideration of socio-economic and environmental considerations. According to SOMO, the EU strategic partnerships are not good for addressing climate change and net zero. Despite the green tint, the EU is focused on the minerals and less on the effects. Europe is ultimately pursuing a resource-intensive growth strategy to bolster its industries in profiting from low-emission technologies. This prioritization of growth neglects that affluent countries’ overconsumption of resources is the root cause of climate change and the major driver of biodiversity loss, pollution, and waste. Worse, the unfavorable trade regimes [secured under the partnerships] can prevent poor resource-rich countries from climbing up global value chains

The Lobito Corridor Initiative and its implications

The Lobito Corridor is a 1 300 km rail and infrastructure project stretching from the Angolan port of Lobito to mining regions of Kolwezi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia. Financed by the US and its EU allies, the project provides an alternative route to transport minerals such as cobalt and copper, helping to diversify mineral supply chains in the region.

According to the US Department for Finance Corporation (DFC), the Lobito corridor initiative is not just any traditional development aid project but a strategic initiative aimed at strengthening critical mineral supply chains by countering China’s dominance[1]

Justification for the Lobito Corridor Project

According to the US Department for Finance Corporation (DFC) the Lobito Corridor project is poised to spur trade, industrialization, and regional integration across Southern Africa. The advanced technologies required for the industries of the future depend on reliable access to copper and cobalt. These minerals are essential for batteries, wind farms, electric vehicles, as well as energy transmission and distribution.

But critical mineral supply chains are threatened by Chinese dominance. Companies based in China own or operate as much as 80 percent of the critical mineral production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), much of which is sent to China for processing. And China is pushing new projects to further secure its dominance, adding to the estimated $1 trillion it has spent on its global infrastructure initiative known as its Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI. 

Additionally, many of the world’s most mineral-rich countries such as the DRC lack the infrastructure to transport growing volumes of these materials to major coastal ports where they can be exported to markets around the world. DRC is the second-largest global producer of copper, and the largest producer of cobalt with a 70 percent global market share[2].

Key gains from Lobito Corridor Initiative

Offers an opportunity of revitalizing defunct infrastructure in a region severely affected by war. A railway built more than 100 years ago connecting mining sites in the DRC to the Lobito port in Angola was largely destroyed during the Angolan civil war. A reconstructed railway suffered from poor construction and upkeep. As a result, these critical minerals are currently transported by heavy-duty trucks to ports in South Africa and Tanzania over roads that can take months to travel. Growing demand for critical minerals threatens to exacerbate the problem. Analysts predict that cobalt demand will exceed the pace of production before the end of 2024 and thereby justifying the construction of new infrastructure projects such as the Lobito Corridor project[3].

The Lobito corridor project provides an opportunity for opening up new investments into the region.  According to the initial plans the US Finance Cooperation would provide a $553 million loan to the Lobito Atlantic Railway to finance the upgrade and rehabilitation of more than 800 miles (1,300 km) of the rail connecting the city of Luau on the border of the DRC to the port city of Lobito in Angola, as well as the upgrade and rehabilitation of the mineral port in Lobito.

The investment is intended to improve the cost-effectiveness, speed, and resilience of global supply chains by upgrading and rehabilitating the railway in Angola that increases the efficiency and reliability of transportation out of the DRC’s mines. And it ensures China will not secure a monopoly on critical minerals access and transit routes in this key region.  

Over the last decade, China had subsidized new construction and upgrades to rail systems in the region, including in Angola, DFC’s neighbor to the west and home to several key coastal transportation hubs, such as the Port of Lobito and the Benguela Railway that extends eastward from it into the DRC. Chinese companies and China-linked entities have worked to control regional transportation systems and restrict access to U.S. and allied businesses, creating challenges to investments in markets like the DRC. However, those projects have suffered from what The Wall Street Journal described as “poor construction and upkeep,” leading to “rundown stations, malfunctioning safety systems offline servers and frequent derailments on the train line.”

DFC’s investment will diversify away from Chinese-controlled economic corridors. It will reinforce railway tracks and bridges along the route and add containers, trains, and equipment such as mobile cranes and forklifts. These investments are expected to increase Lobito’s transportation capacity from 0.4 million metric tons per year as of the end of 2024 to 4.6 million metric tons. It will also benefit the local economy, where minerals make up 90 percent of the DRC’s total exports, accounting for 40 percent of its GDP and $30 billion in value as of last year.

 Through the upgraded railway, port, and corresponding sea routes, exports for these critical minerals to global markets are expected on average to cost 30 percent less and take 29 fewer days. Lobito and projects like will bolster trade access in and around Angola. The coordination led by DFC—which is poised to expand to new projects— presents a boom for U.S. industries, with Angolan organizations already looking to source equipment from the United States for mining, storage, and other integral elements of the project. 

More broadly, the Lobito project strengthens Angola’s role as a key security and economic partner of the United States and as a leader in Sub-Saharan Africa working to resolve issues—including those that affect American interests such as the peace process in eastern DRC. Angolan President João Lourenço also recently assumed the role of chairman of the African Union, and the Lobito project is considered as a potential lever for influencing positions and securing other strategic projects across Africa.  

According to the US DFC, within Angola, the project will upgrade critical infrastructure to international standards and will ensure that access to rail remains open to all paying customers. It is expected to create a 30% reduction in shipping costs and 29 day reduction in shipping time as a result of the DFC’s investment in the Lobito Atlantic Railway. Moreover, it is expected to generate significant local income there, with total local procurement of goods and services expected to reach more than $350 million within the first five years.  

And it is expected to create more than 1,000 new full-time jobs for Angolans, growing the existing workforce from 434 to more than 1,500. Other support projects will benefit from the investments in the Lobito Corridor.   For example, a $10 million loan from DFC to Seba Foods Zambia Ltd. is designed to support the expansion of its food production and storage capacity for maize-based, soya-based, and other nutritious and affordable consumer food products, strengthening the food value chain in Zambia, which is on the eastern end of the Lobito Corridor. Seba Foods was the first U.S. Government-financed food security and agribusiness-focused investment following the announcement of the vision for the Lobito Corridor. 

The Lobito Corridor initiative exemplifies the competition, with the US and EU aligning efforts to establish stronger supply chains. China, already investing heavily, aims to enhance its Belt and Road Initiative along the corridor. The US has indicated that China can still utilize the railway for its exports. The US-China cooperation on this project may create new avenues for sustainable development in Africa. If the two superpowers align their Lobito strategies, it could accelerate Africa’s green industrialization. Jointly-driven investments would align with Africa’s broader economic growth and sustainable development goals. Africa’s potential for growth will attract both powers, as both seek competitive positions within the Lobito Corridor. China has already recently signed a $1 billion deal to restore the TAZARA railway[4].

Key concerns of the Lobito Corridor Initiative
CSOs are concerned the Lobito Corridor project exemplifies the geopolitical interests to serve the US and EU interests rather than Africa (Zambia Angola & DRC’s) interests. As clearly stated by the US and the EU, the Lobito corridor initiative is intended to strategically increase the US and EU’s dominance and security of access to Africa’s critical minerals supply chains and diversifying Africa away from Chinese-controlled economic corridors. This project is therefore largely driven by external interests and Africa finds itself in the middle of these competing geopolitical interests.

The project exacerbates the colonial hinterland to port extractive infrastructure, designed with a major purpose of extracting and transporting Africa’s resources as raw materials from the hinterland to the port ready for export to benefit elsewhere. The Lobito initiative railway project has no interconnection with other transport nodes to facilitate in country mobility and connectivity to other economic sectors. It is therefore designed with an exploitative lens driven with an ‘extract and take away’ mindset, with less beneficial considerations to the broader national public concerns. Financing of arteries linking the railway to other transport infrastructures would address significant infrastructure problems affecting millions of people across the countries in the corridor. For example, an East-West railway connection could link Lobito and TAZARA routes, creating Africa’s first transcontinental railway. Such a corridor could bridge the Atlantic and Indian ocean[1].

The project will be financed with loans acquired from the US and EU, whose payment will be recouped from revenues from the operations and sale of the critical minerals. This is ironical as the lenders will be the major beneficiaries from the mineral export. The long-term net effect or benefit from these may be negligible as the debt burden for the corridor countries (Angola, DRC and Zambia) will increase and they may be forced to pay using their minerals resources.

The strategic partnerships and Lobito corridor project have no plans to investment in critical minerals value addition with in the participating countries. As a consequence, the project may consolidate Africa’s exclusion from the critical minerals global value chain, locking Africa to lower tier of the value chain as a supplier of critical raw materials.   Current studies and evidence show that Africa integration in the Global Value Chain is largely through forward linkages whereby it primarily provides unprocessed raw materials to feed the industrial development and economic prosperity elsewhere.

For example , the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and UNCTAD data shows that the DRC and Zambia refine only about 7% and 3.5% of all the copper produced, which is far much lower than their share in the global production.[2] In recent years China has emerged as the leading processor of critical minerals (Lithium, Copper, Nickel & Cobalt) implying that Africa’s minerals are exported raw, processed and re-exported back to Africa as intermediary or finished goods.

Moreover, the Lobito corridor does not promote intra Africa trade in minerals and therefore runs contrary to Africa’s mineral and economic development ambitions as articulated in the various propositions of the Africa Unions Agenda 2063 and the Africa Mining Vision particularly in regards to regional cooperation and beneficiation. The USGS report for 2023 shows that African Minerals are largely traded with countries outside Africa. For instance, the DRC accounts for 77% of Africa’s cobalt exports, however, its intra Africa links are few. This suggests its trade is largely more with countries outside the continent. Several countries with insignificant cobalt reserves and production re-export more beneficiated cobalt through regional networks as indicated in the table below, reaping bigger economic benefits from added value. 

Table showing Africa Major Critical Minerals Export Destination, Intra Africa Trade and Linkages

Africa Critical Mineral

Top Five Global Export Destinations

Africa trading partners

Intra Africa trade share

Implication

Cobalt

China (72%), Belgium (2%), Malaysia (2%), Switzerland (2%)

Zambia, Namibia, Morocco, Congo, Madagascar, South Africa, DR Congo, Mali, Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, and Kenya.

South Africa (1%), DRC (89% to Zambia, Namibia and Morocco), Congo (4.4%), Zambia (3.5%)

The top five global destinations consume 80% of Africa’s cobalt

More of DRC’s cobalt is re-exported by other countries.

Graphite

China (28%), Germany (15%), India (9%), USA (7%) and Malaysia (7%)

Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Niger, Guinea, Tanzania, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Sudan, Namibia, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, Mozambique, Cameroon, Egypt, 30 Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mauritius, Ghana, Botswana, Libya, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, and Mali.

South Africa (51%), Tanzania (14%), Seychelle (12%), Kenya & Morocco (3%).

The top five global destinations account for 64% of Africa’s Graphite export

These countries export to fewer African countries. Tanzania only has eight intra-Africa graphite export links (Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, DR Congo, Burundi, Comoros and Madagascar, while Seychelles has one (South Africa)

Lithium

France (7%), USA (5%), Russia (1%) Germany & China (2%)

36 African Countries

DRC (77%), South Africa (15%), Morocco (1%), Tanzania (1%)

The top five consume 15% of Africa total lithium exports from at 36 countries

DRC has the lowest intra exports links to Africa while South Africa, Kenya and Morrocco lead in number of intra Africa export links.

Managanese

China (58%), India (10%), Norway (5%), Japan (4%), and Russia (3%)

31 African Countries

Morocco (42%), Zambia (11%), South Africa (20%), Ghana (1%)

These countries account for about 80% of Africa’s Manganese exports outside Africa.

Morocco, South Africa, and Zambia (in consecutive order) emerge as countries with the highest intra-Africa export shares for Manganese.

South Africa and Kenya have the highest intra-Africa export links.

Platinum Group of Metals (PGM)

United Kingdom accounting for about 28%, Japan 17%, Belgium about 15%, United States of America 12% and Germany 9%.

45 Countries

Zimbabwe (86%), Ghana and DRC (3%),

These countries account for about 89% of Africa’s PGM export outside the region

South Africa has the highest intra-Africa export links to thirteen countries, followed by Swaziland and Malawi

 

In the long run, the Lobito corridor project will potentially weaken further existing limited intra Africa linkages and collaborative projects by setting up or creating an unfavorable competition for already existing infrastructure such as the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) and the Ports of Dar es Salaam, Beira in Mozambique and Durban, which have recently received major uplifts with costly loans from China and other global financial institutions such as the World Bank.

The Lobito Corridor project excludes itself from other major problems facing mining in the region, including addressing previous economic injustices and human rights related issues, the long-term effects of war and climate change. Because of the fear of being edged out by China, the Lobito corridor project does not come with stringent requirements and expectation for adherence to high human rights standards by the partner countries.

Mineral for Security Deals and implications on Africa’s critical minerals.

Amidst the ongoing geopolitical interest for critical minerals, recently we have witnessed the emergence of Minerals for Security Guarantee deals as a tool for control of access to critical minerals supply chains. On 30th April 2025 the US signed a Minerals for security deal with Ukraine and in June, the US signed a Mineral for Security deal with the DRC and Rwanda. The deals provide access to critical minerals in return for security guarantees from the US. Although the deals have been covered with a peace and conflict resolution imperative, they are essentially aimed at securing the US’s access to critical minerals.

According to Global witness, the deals like the extraction and trade of some critical minerals intensify new geopolitical tensions, reinforcing long-standing patterns of exploitation[3] including conflicts. The Trump Ukraine deal revealed a connection of critical minerals to the Russia and Ukraine war and how critical mineral natural resources in Ukraine have become a key bargaining chip in international diplomacy between the US and Russia.

In fact, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo reached out to the Donald Trump administration with a Ukrainian-style proposal in February 2025 in response to the rapid advance of the M23 rebel group in the east of the country. At stake are the mineral riches of North and South Kivu provinces, a major but highly problematic source of metals such as tin, tungsten and coltan[4].

According to different sources, this deal was presented as a pacification tool for eastern DRC and once signed could boost Rwanda’s processing of Congo minerals while providing the US with an assured source of processed critical minerals required to support its industrial technology and security needs.

The full contents of deal are not readily available to the public but leaked versions mentioned requirements for withdrawal of Rwandan Forces from the Eastern DRC and integration of the M23 belligerent factions into the DRC’s forces.

The mineral deals essentially consolidate a firm grip of the US on access to DRC’s critical minerals, closing off competition against other potential rival countries such as China and Russia, there by exacerbating grounds for economic injustice, opacity, lack of transparency and potential for unfair mining deals, biased in favour of the security guarantors. Mineral deals are tainted with opacity, designed with a biased exploitative and a perceived neocolonial mindset aimed at rewarding the dominant superpower and the aggressor against the victim. They are negotiated behind closed doors and their full terms are not availed neither to the public nor the citizens of the mineral rich country.

According to Kambale Musavuli of the Centre for Research on Congo-Kinshasa, the US brokered deal between the DRC and Rwanda is wild. The US is getting access to $2 trillion of worth of DRC minerals in exchange for forcing the withdrawal of Rwandan backed M23 militias. That is one tenth of the DRC’s total mineral wealth, more than any single foreign country claims. This is strange because analysts of the region have long argued that the US effectively enabled Rwandan support for the M23 in order to destabilise the DRC, prevent a functional state from arising and achieving sovereignty over its mineral wealth, and thus ensure minerals stay cheaply available for US firms. If this analysis is correct then the US has just acquired $2 trillion mineral rights in exchange for stopping a conflict that it has effectively supported. Consider also how medi discourse is playing out. Remember that in 2008 Chinese firms signed a deal with the DRC to obtain $9billion in minerals in exchange for infrastructure development. Western media went wild with narratives of “Chinese colonization”. Now the US has secured minerals deal 200x larger and the media narrative is all about how the US brings “peace”

The mining security deals were negotiated in secrecy led by political elites and diplomats. As such citizens are disempowered from having a say in the future management of a vital sector, whose benefits are signed off to another country by a few, dashing hopes for citizens stake into a better future.

The minimum threshold of minerals signed off in the form of US mining companies investing in the critical minerals sector is not clear and whether the DRC has any stake at what percentage in the minerals extracted by the US companies is largely unknown.

The deals potentially open up a can of worms for future similar deals, covering natural resources such as forestry, wild life management and critical infrastructure such as ports, airports, water ways and food supply chains.

Moreover, the deals may not be a permanent solution to ongoing conflicts. The mineral for security deals largely covers security guarantees against ‘external aggression’ and may not be fitted for dealing with internal political and socio-economic drivers for conflict such as historical injustices, land and citizenship rights, regional economic imbalances, bad governance and banditry. Local insurgent rebel groups and militias may continue to pursue their political and economic ends outside the ambits of the security deal. For example, on the very day that the US-DRC and Rwanda deal was signed, one of the rebel groups, Codeco militia attacked and killed at least 10 people at a displaced people’s camp in Ituri province.  There are more than 100 rebel groups in Eastern DRC. The M23 which was largely mentioned in the US deal has already described it as a tiny part’ of a solution to the conflict.

Further, the security guarantees provided under the deal are not clear. It is not clear what these mean and when and how such guarantees can be deployed. For instance, does security guarantee mean supply of arms or armed mercenaries, military intervention or alliances with US soldiers fighting alongside or against the aggressor. Moreover, it is not clear whether the US can be directly involved in fighting internal rebel groups and insurgents without triggering nationalistic and constitutional challenges, driving internal political conflicts further.

By nature, deals of this nature are long term and cannot easily be breached without consequences. The terms and consequences for such breach are less known to the public. The conditions for termination or renegotiation are equally not known.  Therefore, the mineral security agreement essentially locks countries towards dealing with one major economic superpower whose primary interest is access to the country’s critical mineral wealth.

Conclusion

The EU strategic partnerships, the mineral security guarantee deals and the Lobito project may entirely not be a bad idea, however their implicit risks cast shadows about their potential in advancing Africa’s critical minerals and economic development goals. The key concerns around these strategic mineral alliances and the Lobito Corrido are embedded within the broader critical development discourse of recolonization and recolonization, sovereignty, security and resource nationalism, state capture, perpetration of socio-economic injustices by dominant global capital and Africa’s wealth transfer. Specific concerns include risks for increasing mineral bad governance and economic injustices and vulnerabilities, geopolitical tension, and the need to pursue sustainable mining practices.

With these strategic partnerships, mineral for security deals and the Lobito railway in place, these countries are locked into long-term commitments to ensure the supply of metals. Without good governance and value addition,  Africa’s critical minerals will benefit others elsewhere. Over dependence on certain countries can pose risks when such countries face political instability or become embroiled in geopolitical disputes drawing in Africa’s mineral rich countries in their midst. For these alliances to be mutually beneficial, they must ensure that the resources are accessed equitably, that benefits are fairly distributed, and that environmental impacts are kept to a minimum for their sustainability in the long run.

Recommendations
  1. The strategic partnerships must go beyond critical minerals exploitation but venture into addressing broader social economic development concerns of the people in the mineral rich countries.
  2. The Lobito Corridor initiative must avoid the ‘hinterland to port’ colonial legacy by establishing railway transport interconnection nodes to other existing railway infrastructure so as to improve connectivity across the project countries to ease the bigger infrastructure challenges that these countries face.
  3. The strategic partnership and Lobito Corridor must encourage value addition by investing in processing and exporting of value-added products, so as to generate wealth at source.
  4. Africa Mineral rich countries must explore and establish south to south partnerships, thereby increasing their leverage and power to negotiate with external partners and mining companies
  5. The EU strategic partnerships and the Lobito Corridor project must not exacerbate the role of minerals as drivers of conflict by supporting and buying minerals from conflict zones.
  6. Moreover, these alliances must ensure that the resources are accessed equitably, that benefits are fairly distributed, and that environmental impacts are kept to a minimum for their sustainability in the long run.
  7. The Minerals for security deals must be transparent and not biased exclusively in favour of the dominant economic super power.
  8. The Minerals for Security deals must avoid advancing human rights abuses by US mining companies under the US government protection
  9. The strategic partnerships, security deals and their associated projects must promote national dialogues and citizens participation in governance of critical minerals and mitigation of harm from mining
Selected References

Andreoni et al., (2023) Critical Minerals and routes to diversification in Africa: Linkages, pulling dynamics and Opportunities in medium-high tech supply chains; Backup paper commissioned by the UNCTAD Secretariate for the 2023 edition of the Economic Development in Africa Reports

Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

EITI; Using Transparence Benefits EU Mineral Partnerships; Accessed via https://eiti.org/blog-post/using-transparency-benefit-eus-mineral-partnerships

Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via  https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025

IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[1] https://www.railway.supply/en/us-china-lobito-corridor-investments-drive-africas-economic-and-sustainable-growth/

[2] Andreoni et al., (2023) Critical Minerals and routes to diversification in Africa: Linkages, pulling dynamics and Opportunities in medium-high tech supply chains; Backup paper commissioned by the UNCTAD Secretariate for the 2023 edition of the Economic Development in Africa Reports

[3] Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via  https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025

[4] Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

[1] US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.

[2] ibid

[3] ibid

[4] https://www.railway.supply/en/us-china-lobito-corridor-investments-drive-africas-economic-and-sustainable-growth/

[1] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[2] ibid

[3] https://eiti.org/blog-post/using-transparency-benefit-eus-mineral-partnerships

[4] https://ecfr.eu/event/critical-minerals-and-eu-africa-strategic-partnerships-where-do-we-stand/

[1] BHRT: Briefing on “Human Rights Incidents in Transition Minerals; Quarter 1: January-March 2025

[2] Emerging Human Rights Implications of Transition Minerals Extraction and processing: Case Studies from Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Zimbabwe

[1] https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202505/critical-minerals-and-metals-strategy-south-africa-2025.pdf

[2] https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/edar2023_BP1_en.pdf

Webinar on Geopolitics of Critical Minerals and implications for Eastern and Southern Africa

Topic: An Analysis of the strategic gains and risks offered by the EU Strategic Partnership, Lobito Corridor and Minerals for Security deals on East and Southern Africa’s Critical Transition Minerals

The surging demand for minerals critical to green transition offers potential economic benefits for mineral rich countries however the dash to secure their supply chain has kicked off geopolitical interests, competition and realignments whose outcomes could have long lasting relationship with divergent unforeseen impacts.

With the Eastern and Southern Africa combined as a single economic bloc, the region has the highest concentration of critical green transition minerals such as cobalt, coltan, nickel, graphite, tungsten, tantalum, copper in the world. Yet the history of governance and management of the mineral sector has never yielded very positive dividends for mineral-rich countries in the region. Minerals have fueled conflicts in the DRC and Mozambique, Debt traps in Zambia, political patronage and environmental concerns in Zimbabwe and economic inequalities in South Africa and Botswana.

This webinar will provide an overview of the critical mineral wealth in Eastern and Southern Africa with a particular focus on the strategic gains and risks that geopolitical initiatives such as the EU Strategic Minerals Partnerships, the Lobito Corridor and emerging minerals for security deals offer. It is estimated that the mining industry needs to invest $1.7 trillion over the next 15 years to extract and supply enough metals for renewable energy and Africa possess almost half of these.   

The webinar will discuss the geostrategic machinations at play by superpowers such as the US, Europe, Russia and China in the context of the dash for control of critical minerals for the green transition and the current extractive governance challenges facing the region. While strategic alliances may not entirely be a bad idea, there are concerns over the underlying possible geopolitical, security and perceived neocolonial undertones that may come with these initiatives.

And how the historical socio-economic justice concerns of similar geopolitical jostling, security guarantees at the Berlin conference and hinterland to port initiatives contributed to the colonial exploitation of Africa’s resources for benefits elsewhere. Moreover, the mineral for security deals are tainted with opacity, designed with a biased potentially exploitative and a perceived neocolonial mindset aimed at rewarding the dominant superpower and the aggressor against the victim in exchange for its resource. The minerals for security deals are negotiated behind closed doors and their full terms are not availed neither to the public nor the citizens of the mineral rich country.

Amidst this mineral dash and possible geopolitical balkanization, it is feared that without strategic positioning, the Eastern and Southern Africa critical minerals rich countries could again miss out from this mineral boom.

Our expert speakers at this webinar will delve deeper into this topic, highlighting on the possible risks and benefits that the region can garner from these initiatives and measures the region can take so as to avert the risks and maximize benefits from these partnerships. This webinar is organized by the Governance and Economic Policy Centre in Collaboration with Botswana Watch Organisation. 

Our distinguished speakers will be

  1. Ketakandriana Rafitoson, Executive Director, Resource Justice Network (formerly PWYP): Key concerns for critical minerals Governance and our desired sustainable future. Dr Ketakandriana is a political scientist, researcher, activist, and human rights defender with distinguished career in anti-corruption, where she served as leader of Transparency International Chapter in Madagascar. Her work mainly focuses on issues of resource governance, anti-corruption, citizens’ participation, good governance and democracy.

 

  1. Adriano Nuvunga, Executive Director, Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (CDD), Mozambique: The Geopolitics of critical minerals, neocolonial extractivism and conflict. Prof Adriano Nuvunga is a Mozambican scholar, anti-corruption advocate and human rights defender. He is the director of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CDD), an organization that promotes democracy and protects human rights in Mozambique and Professor of professor of political science and governance at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. He has widely published on resource governance and violence in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province.

 

  1. Mr Robert Lestatsi, Executive Director, Botswana Watch Organisation; Assessing the Lobito corridor project and Africa’s desired benefits from critical mineral wealth. Robert Letsatsi is the Executive Director of Botswana Watch (BW), an organization focused on promoting transparency and accountability in Botswana. He is also involved with the PWYP coalition in Botswana and the UNCAC Coalition, an international anti-corruption network. Additionally, he has been involved in advocacy of mineral resource governance and training on human rights violations, in collaboration with Ditshwanelo – The Botswana Centre for Human Rights.
  1. Moses Kulaba, Executive Director, Governance and Economic Policy Centre, Moderator. Mr Moses Kulaba is a Governance and political economist, tax law expert and economic diplomat with more than 20 years of active service in international public, private and civil society sector.  Prior to joining GEPC he served as the East Africa Regional Manager for the Natural Resources Governance Institute, where he worked with various stakeholders including governments to advance governance of the extractive sector. Has served on the international board of the EITI and in consultancy roles for DFID , the EU and the UN on governance, extractives and peace processes in Eastern and Africa Great Lakes region.

 Date: 30th July, 2025

Time: 12pm EAT, 11 AM Gaborone (CAT) and 9 AM Lagos

Login:  https://us05web.zoom.us/j/84450912293?pwd=lwabYIwsvJ27A8bP0v8hVQpaUOaYQ3.1

Meeting ID: 844 5091 2293

Passcode: 7XFcHc

Critical Minerals Certification: Do Mineral Certification Mechanisms Reduce harm? A Look at the Kimberley Process, ICGLR, RMI, and OECD”

Authors:  Moses Kulaba and Roger Vutsoro, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

 

This short analytical study explores the existing   national, regional and global certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly Process, ICGLR, OECD Due diligence measures, Responsible Mining Initiatives in the quagmire of improving of minerals governance. It entangles and assesses the increasing perceptions (based on evidence from countries such as the DRC) that the current certification regime is running dangerously obsolete, not designed for critical minerals and thus needs a review and realignment for new purpose, including proposing measures that go beyond the current regional certification.

Decades ago, mineral certification was mooted as a solution to addressing the chronic problems of illegal mining, mineral smuggling and mineral driven conflicts, economic injustices and impunity in mineral rich countries.  To this regard, regional and global mineral certification mechanisms were developed with countries and mining companies required to sign up to these new certification principle and mechanisms. However, decades after, minerals continue to be drivers of conflict and harm in many countries.

As the appetite for Critical or Transitional minerals required for the green and clean energy industrial technology gains gusto momentum, there are concerns that this new mineral dash may exacerbate corruption, conflict and suffering in critical minerals rich countries. Apart from calls to establish regional value chains, there is evidence to suggest that a proper global certification mechanism should be put in place to ensure responsive sourcing of critical minerals and that their extraction does not lead to further harm.

What is mineral certification

 

Mineral certification is a process that verifies the origin and legitimacy of minerals, ensuring they are not associated with conflict or human rights abuses. It involves tracing minerals from the mine site to the final point of export and confirming they are free from illegal activities. This helps to prevent the financing of armed groups and other illicit activities linked to mineral extraction. This certification involves a thorough verification process to trace the minerals’ origin and verify they are free from illegal financing, armed group involvement, and human rights abuses.

At face value, this sounds like a good measure, however existing mechanisms of a similar nature such as the Kimberly process, ICGLR certification initiative and the OECD Due diligence measures have not succeeded in fully addressing the issue of conflict minerals and mineral smuggling. In Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, minerals continue to be a driver of conflict and mineral smuggling to neighboring countries is still rife.  This therefore puts to question the efficacy of the existing global certification mechanism in strengthening governance, regulating supply, improving ethical mining business conduct and reducing harm from extractive resources.

Existing major Regional and Global Mineral Certification regimes

 

The Kimberly Process Certification System (KPCS)

The Kimberly Process (KPCS) is a global standard certification process established in 2003 by the United Nations General Assembly (Under resolution 55/56) to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the mainstream diamond market.  KPCS was set up to ensure that diamonds as precious minerals are sourced and traded in a responsible manner, reducing financing conflicts and human rights violation. KPCS has laid out requirements for participating member countries to comply including[1]

  1. Enforcement of regulatory standards to control export and import of rough diamonds
  2. Principles of transparent practices to ensure integrity of the diamond supply chains
  3. Selective trading with only KP certified and compliant members
  4. Verification of exports to ensure every traded diamond is accompanied by a conflict free certificate.

Member countries are obliged to enforce these standards. To date 60 participants (representing 86 countries) are signatory members to the Kimberley process and have committed to applying KP principles in the certification of its traded diamonds. The standards require that;

  • Participant countries must enforce stringent legal and regulatory standards to control the import and export of rough diamonds and ensure adherence to KP requirements.
  • Participants commit to transparent practices, which are crucial for the integrity of the diamond supply chain, by exchanging accurate and timely statistical data.
  • Trade is permitted only between certified KP members who comply fully with these international standards, safeguarding the legitimacy of the diamond trade.
  • Every diamond export is closely inspected and must be accompanied by a valid KP certificate, certifying that the diamonds are conflict-free to prevent the entry of illicit stones into the market.
National Level Governance and Implementation of the Kimberly Process; A case of Tanzania

 

In Tanzania the Kimberly Process Office is situated in the Mining Commission, an Institution within the Ministry of Minerals. This office is responsible for the implementation of the KPCS activities, import and export of rough diamond; the office is under the authority of the Executive Secretary. The Mining Commission works closely with the Tanzania Revenue Authority’s Customs Department, Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service and the Police Force for strengthening internal control. The Kimberley Process Office forms a part of the Mineral Audit and Trade Department, which is under the Director for Mineral Audit and Trade who assists the Executive Secretary in administering the KPCS activities. The office issues Annual reports.

Before the issuance of Kimberley Process Certificate, the exporter of rough diamonds must submit a valid Dealer’s license/Mining license, which allows him to export minerals outside Tanzania. The Dealer’s license indicates full address, type of minerals, the premises and signature of Executive Secretary or a person authorized to sign. The exporter fills the application form which indicates license type, license number, weight, value, source of diamonds to confirm that diamonds are conflict free, place of export and declaration of exporter by putting his/her signature, name and qualification to apply for a certificate and pays to the government USD 100 as an application fee for Kimberley Process certificate. Post to the valuation process, the exporter is required to pay royalty (6% of a value) and inspection fee (1% of value) to the Government.

Any person who contravenes any of the provision in Diamond trading regulation commits an offence and liable:  In case of an individual to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine not exceeding US dollar twenty thousand (US$ 20,000) or to both. In case of body corporate, to a fine not exceeding US dollar one hundred thousand (US$ 100,000), or c. Cancelation of his license and permanently be disqualified from prospecting, mining or dealing in diamond and any other minerals.  Any rough diamonds obtained contrary to the provisions of Diamond trading regulations shall be forfeited in addition to other penalties[2].

The International Conference on Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Mineral Certification Measures

 

The ICGLR Certification mechanism was developed to address the persistent of mineral driven conflicts in the Africa Great Lakes region. It aims to create a conducive environment for cooperation among member states while also ensuring the protection and well-being of the people living in the Africa Great Lakes region.

The ICGLR Certificate confirms a mineral shipment is conflict-free and meets the ICGLR’s ethical sourcing standards, ensuring it’s free from illegal influence and responsibly traced from mine to market. This certification involves a thorough verification process to trace the minerals’ origin and verify they are free from illegal financing, armed group involvement, and human rights abuses. It provides buyers with the assurance that the minerals meet ICGLR requirements for transparency, legality, and responsible sourcing, supporting ethical supply chains in the region[3].

Currently the DRC, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi are members to the ICGLR’s certification mechanism. Mineral flows are analyzed via an ICGLR Regional Database, using the data on individual shipments collected and transmitted to the ICGLR by each Member States.  The database is verified annually via ICGLR Third Party Audits. The mechanism is viewed as an important regional standard and tool for enhancing collaboration, transparency, and development in Africa’s Great Lakes region, promoting accountability and encouraging businesses to pursue certification for adherence.  
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Mineral Supply Chain

Requires that company supply chains of all minerals from conflict affected and high-risk areas, must respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral or metal purchasing decisions and practices. Recognizes that trade and investment in natural mineral resources hold great potential for generating income, growth and prosperity, sustaining livelihoods and fostering local development. However, a large share of these resources is located in conflict affected and high-risk areas. In these areas, exploitation of natural mineral resources is significant and may contribute, directly or indirectly, to armed conflict, gross human rights violations and hinder economic and social development[4].

The OECD Due Diligence Guidance is considered as the first example of a collaborative government-backed multi-stakeholder initiative on responsible supply chain management of minerals from conflict-affected areas. Its objective is to help companies respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral sourcing practices[5].

The Guidance is also intended to cultivate transparent mineral supply chains and sustainable corporate engagement in the mineral sector with a view to enabling countries to benefit from their mineral resources and preventing the extraction and trade of minerals from becoming a source of conflict, human rights abuses, and insecurity. With its Supplements on Tin, Tantalum, Tungsten and Gold, the OECD Guidance provides companies with a complete package to source minerals responsibly in order for trade in those minerals to support peace and development and not conflict[6]

Responsible Minerals Initiative

 

The Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) is a voluntary membership body of companies and industry players with a vision to ensure that mineral supply chains contribute positively to social economic development globally. It seeks to promote the common goal of understanding and contributing to mitigating the salient social and environmental impacts of extraction and processing of minerals in supply chains. It leverages partnerships and use of international standards such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights or the OECD Due Diligence Guidance as our guideposts[7].

Comprised of more than 500 member companies; the Responsible Minerals Initiative is considered one of the most utilized and respected resources for companies from a range of industries addressing responsible mineral sourcing issues in their supply chains. RMI provides companies with tools and resources to make sourcing decisions that improve regulatory compliance and support responsible sourcing of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. RMI undertakes due diligence, assurance and reporting templates for cobalt, gold, tin, tungsten, tin, tantalum and other minerals.

The Nexus between Critical Minerals, Conflict and Harm

 

There is a strong connection between the extraction and trade of certain minerals and the exacerbation of armed conflicts and instability in various regions, particularly in developing countries. Globally, critical minerals fueling Green Tech are also fueling conflict[8] Armed groups often exploit the demand for these minerals (like tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold, collectively known as “conflict minerals”) to fund their operations, including the purchase of weapons[9]. This reliance on minerals to fuel conflict can lead to human rights abuses environmental degradation, and social unrest, hindering sustainable development. 

Critical minerals such as bauxite, manganese cobalt, lithium and uranium have fuelled conflicts in the DRC, Guinea, Niger, Mali, Chad and Central Africa Republic[10] Myanmar has also experienced a post-coup rush for control over its rare earth minerals, while Latin American countries like Chile and Colombia are grappling with how to ensure that their lithium wealth benefits local economies rather than multinational corporations[11].

Critical Minerals and conflict; A case for DRC

 

Multiple reports produced by UN and Civil society show that the ongoing violence in the DRC is linked to mineral extraction, with rebel insurgents motivated by a desire to extract from the region’s vast cobalt and coltan reserves. Since the onset of the infamous second Congo War in 1998, control over the DRC’s vast mineral resources has fuelled conflict between armed groups and militias. These factions fight over mining territories, using profits from the illegal extraction and smuggling of conflict minerals to finance their operations and purchase weapons. The struggle for control over mineral-rich areas has led to prolonged violence, contributing to the deaths of millions and leaving entire regions destabilized[12]. 

In the DRC, according to the UN Group of Experts, the M23 established control over the mineral-rich area and created a new transportation route to Rwanda. Through taxation and smuggling of minerals, the armed group is financially benefiting from DRC’s mineral resources. It’s estimated that the group is receiving approximately $800,000 USD monthly from the production and trade of minerals at Rubaya.

While some mine sites in eastern DRC may not be directly affected by the conflict, early 2025started with violence in Goma (a major mineral export and transit hub), as well as insecurity moving towards South Kivu with recent clashes in in Nyabibwe, a mineral rich area known for 3Ts and gold, located halfway between Goma and Bukavu. As of mid-February, the M23 had occupied Bukavu, another major mineral export and transit hub in the region.

Recent reports also indicate armed groups in Ituri Province are forming alliances with the M23, while new violence in the province has sparked worries of a larger regional conflict. The UN Group of Experts estimated that armed groups based in Ituri Province generated approximately $140 million USD in 2024, dwarfing the illicit revenue generated by 3Ts[13] Other armed militias and groups such as Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are equally benefiting from the loot.

In light of this reality, the abundance of critical minerals offers a potential opportunity for economic wellbeing but the geopolitics and the dash for their control and extraction has potential of increasing conflicts in Africa[14]  According to Global witness, the extraction and trade of some critical minerals is intensifying new geopolitical tensions and reinforcing long-standing patterns of exploitation[15] including conflicts.

The Trump Ukraine deal revealed a connection of critical minerals to the Russia and Ukraine war and how natural resources in Ukraine have become a key bargaining chip in international diplomacy between the US and Russia. In the same perspective, the US and the Democratic Republic of Congo are close to sign a minerals-for-security deal, highlighting the increase role of critical minerals in geopolitics and conflict.

In fact, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo reached out to the Donald Trump administration with a Ukrainian-style proposal in February 2025 in response to the rapid advance of the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group in the east of the country. The U.S. government has responded enthusiastically with a flurry of negotiations aimed at ending a decades-long conflict born out of the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

The political momentum is building towards a potential peace deal between Congo and Rwanda to be accompanied by bilateral minerals deals between both countries and the United States.  At stake are the mineral riches of North and South Kivu provinces, a major but highly problematic source of metals such as tin, tungsten and coltan[16].

According to different sources, this deal once signed could boost Rwanda processing of Congo minerals and provide the US with an assured source of processed critical minerals required to support its industrial technology and security needs.

 Gaps and why a new regime for mineral certification is required

 

The existing major regional and global mineral certification regimes have significant gaps that necessitate that a new regime is developed.

  • Narrowness in focus and scope: Existing certification mechanisms such KP are narrow in scope largely target diamonds and were not designed to cover a broader mining sector. The ICGLR covers the 3Ts and gold. The emergency of a wider list of critical minerals adds a new context which the KP and ICGLR certification mechanisms were not designed for.
  • Voluntary mechanisms; The existing mechanisms are largely voluntary and member states companies encouraged to join and comply with the standards. For instance, the 21st meeting of the CIRGL Regional Committee on the fight against the illegal exploitation of natural resources recommended CIRGL Secretariat to compile a comprehensive report on the status of implementation of the six tools of the regional certification mechanism. This report revealed that the Republic of Rwanda has not yet established the traceability chain for gold. Instead, Rwanda controls gold extraction and trade using conventional methods and does not issue ICGLR certificates for gold exports[17].”
  • Limited in geographical and legal scope: For instance, the OECD Due diligence Guidance is largely applicable to companies from OECD member countries but with limited enforcement mechanisms in non-OECD countries. Yet mining companies from non-OECD Countries such as China are emerging as the leading exploiters of Africa’s critical minerals according to WTO reports[18]. from the DRC. Chinese based companies own or operate 80 percent of the critical mineral production in the DRC, much of which is sent to China for processing for export via the global supply chain[19] Moreover the ICGLR is confined to its member states while the RMI covers only its 500 members.
  •  
  • Illicit smuggling and trading in conflict minerals continue despite the presence of current certification mechanisms. For instance, despite its membership to the Kimberley Process (KP) and ICGLR commitments, Tanzania’s diamond sector is reported as facing entrenched governance challenges: opaque supply chains, smuggling, and minimal community benefits. Tanzania’s diamonds have suffered from environmental concerns, price volatility from synthetics and smuggled diamonds from regional conflicts areas[20].

Moreover, critical minerals including diamonds are smuggled across borders, transacted in established commercial capitals and hubs such as Kigali, Kampala, Nairobi and Dubai. For instance, a Global Witness investigation report indicates that an international commodities trader Traxys bought conflict coltan smuggled from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Rwanda[21] The investigation revealed that the multibillion-dollar company headquartered in Luxembourg bought 280 tonnes of coltan from Rwanda in 2024 based on customs documents seen by Global Witness.

Analysis by Global Witness of trade data and testimonies from two coltan smugglers suggested that a big share of the coltan Traxys bought from Rwanda was connected to the ongoing war in the east of DRC. African Panther’s coltan exports soared to unprecedented volumes in 2024, exceeding the combined total of the export volumes recorded over the previous four years. This increase in exports coincided with the escalation of the war in North Kivu and increased smuggling of conflict coltan from Rubaya, further suggesting that an important share of African Panther’s 2024 exports was smuggled from conflict zones in DRC[22].

Despite having limited or no known deposits and operational mines, some countries in East Africa and the Middle East have emerged as leading exporters of critical minerals such as cobalt, lithium and coltan.  Study reports show large volumes of critical minerals transacted via East Africa to foreign markets such as the UAE and China[23].  For instance, in 2025 Kenyan authorities intercepted 10 containers of suspected smuggled copper at the port of Mombasa[24]  These illicitly acquired, smuggled and transacted minerals have found market into the UAE and Western capitals in Switzerland and New York. In 2023 alone, Kenya’s exports of copper to the United Arab Emirates were valued at US$22.27 million. The UAE exports mineral products, including critical minerals, in significant quantities, primarily to Japan, China, and India.

  • Ongoing critical minerals driven conflicts and the rise of new geopolitical conflicts in producer countries: The ongoing mineral driven conflicts have already been documented in the cobalt, coltan mineral rich Eastern DRC and elsewhere but the rush for securing access and control of mineral supply chains by superpowers is reviving geopolitical interests and may result in new geopolitical conflicts.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for instance, since the revision of its mining law in 2018, the country has attracted no responsible Western investors in the mining industry. Meanwhile, China has come to dominate the production of cobalt and copper, primarily mined in the Katanga and Lualaba regions. The recent re-negotiation by the Tshisekedi Administration of the imbalanced minerals-against infrastructure deal signed in 2008 under the Kabila administration between the DRC and China was perceived by China as triggered by the United State of America.

Aware of the security and economic implications of China’s control over the DRC’s critical minerals supply chain, the United States has signaled its return to the DRC mining sector through the recent acquisition of Australian AVZ Minerals’ assets in the Manono Lithium Project by KoBold Metals. In addition, the U.S. is committed to funding the Lobito Corridor—a strategic railway project essential for transporting critical minerals from the Central African Copperbelt to Western markets.

Through its International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the U.S. has pledged a $550 million loan to support the Lobito Corridor. This project is considered vital in countering Chinese influence in the region by providing an alternative route for exporting critical minerals. This plea was reiterated in Luanda/Angola in January 2024 by the former US President, John Biden, during his last visit to Africa as an US President, in presence of both Angola and DR Congo Presidents.

The corridor is viewed as part of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, a G7 initiative aimed at competing with China’s growing presence on the continent. While the Lobito project is designed to challenge Chinese dominance, both Western and Chinese firms will be allowed to use the infrastructure it provides. This dual-access approach raises questions about its strategic value, particularly under a US administration led by President Donald Trump, whose priority is   competition with Beijing. The Lobito Corridor railway could be a physical indicator of the resuscitated geopolitical rivalry and convergence of global superpowers on the African continent as a source for critical mineral resources.

Failure to implement due diligence and traceability mechanisms

 

During the OECD conference on responsible minerals supply chain held in May 2024 in Paris, many Congolese civil society organizations raised concern over the increasing failure in the implementation of due diligence standards in the DRC. CSO mentioned that private sector actors have failed to fully implement supply chain due diligence in alignment with international standards, most notably the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Minerals Supply Chains from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Area. IMPACT added that companies are either turning a blind eye, preferring not to ask questions about the source of their purchases, or have been complicit by over relying on industry schemes despite red flags being raised in UN Group of Experts reports.

The concern around ITSCI—the sole traceability and due diligence provider for 3Ts in DRC—has been so great that in 2024 it lost its recognition with the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI), with RMI noting that important gaps remained in the scheme’s fulfilment of recognition terms. Despite this move, the UN Group of Experts has expressed concern that many private sector actors still rely on the scheme to conduct due diligence without carrying out additional independent quality controls required by international standards[25].

Civil Society Call for reforms

 

Because of these gaps civil society organisations have constantly urged for a review and development of a new certification mechanism regime, expanded and aligned to emerging context of transition minerals. For instance, at the start of the 2025 KP plenary in Dubai the Civil Society Coalition pointed out the gaps of the KP in addressing the challenges of diamond mining, smuggling and poverty in the Central African Republic[26].  CSO observed that the KP was narrow in focus, limited to diamonds and the imposed conflict diamond embargos had targeted smugglers without protecting the diamond mining communities.

The KP does not—and likely will not soon—prevent diamonds from being associated with issues outside the narrow conflict diamond definition, including human rights abuses, violence by public and private security forces, forced labour, and environmental degradation. Rigorous due diligence is essential, yet it remains insufficiently addressed.

For instance the KP in Central Africa Republic’s (CAR) experience demonstrated that the sole existence of the certification scheme does not make diamond governance exemplary. Though diamonds share similar governance challenges with other minerals, the Kimberley Process has largely remained isolated from broader dialogues on mineral-related due diligence.

Civil society demanded for the need to bridge the gaps in the KP certification mechanism by inter alia increasing transparency and engagement with mining communities.  CSOs argued that without transparency, the KP will never effectively achieve its mandate of conflict prevention.

Moreover, the existing certification mechanisms are criticized as elitist, disconnected from the community needs and blind to social economic injustices. For example, the KP certification mechanism does not cover the extent to which the mining of the diamond minerals has benefited the communities from where they are sourced.

Investigations by the Kimberly Process Civil Society Coalition of mining operations in Sierra Leone, Lesotho, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, reveals the often-ignored consequences of large-scale diamond mining on local communities in African countries[27].

In Tanzania, despite mining diamonds for more than 100 years, Shyinyanga remains amongst the poorest remains the poorest region in the country[28]. The critical minerals rich Eastern DRC provinces of Kasai Oriental, Kasai Central, North and South Kivu are among the poorest and least developed in the world. 

For diamond resources to truly benefit communities, the documentary identifies greater transparency and independent monitoring as key elements to enhance corporate accountability. Mining companies, industry actors and states all have a role to play to protect community rights and improve both mining and sourcing practices[29].

Further, certification mechanisms do not sufficiently cover or protect citizen against state excesses and inspired violence. Yet the very atrocities committed by rebel groups, which led to the KP’s creation in 2003, are now mirrored by certain governments and their security forces. Top ranking government officials and security forces in the Eastern DRC have been accused of being complacent to illicit mineral trade. The military junta in Myanmar is accused of widespread human rights violations including killings of civilians in critical mineral rich village areas in Kayah state closer to the Thailand border[30].

Conclusion

 

While certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly process were established for a major purpose of controlling blood diamonds over the years, they have this role to an extent but equally shown inherent gaps and shortcomings. Their limitation in scope, involuntary membership nature and poor implementation is a major limitation. They were set up when diamond was among the top most traded commodity and driver of conflicts in countries such as Angola, Liberia and Siera Leone. With the increasing surge in demand for critical minerals such as Nickel, Cobalt, Coltan, Graphite, Lithium, Tin Tungsten and Rare Earth Elements, the new frontiers mineral driven conflicts have expanded and cannot continue to remain on diamonds.  In the current and future context, it will be untenable for critical minerals to remain outside the purview of mineral certification. For the existing certification mechanisms to be relevant and fitted for the changing context and era of energy of transition, substantive reviews and reforms are required.

Recommendations for future certification mechanisms
  1. Expand the KPI and ICGLR certification to cover a broad range of  critical minerals or develop a new commensurate certification measure for critical minerals, with a focus on ethical sourcing, conflict and governance.
  2. Pay attention to the ongoing problems in mining such as the environmental concerns in critical minerals mining operations and their contribution to social and ecological harm to communities and countries from where they are sourced.
  3. Pay close attention to ongoing issues within critical minerals supply chains, including human rights abuses, armed conflicts, the fair distribution of benefits to local communities, and compliance with national labor laws
  4. Review the existing mineral audit  standards, blend constitution of  audit teams with experts, civil society and community representatives to increase transparency and integrity in certification
  5. Require exporting countries to demonstrate significant economic presence of the critical mineral commensurate with export volumes.
  6. Impose export embargoes and critical mineral trading sanctions on countries or companies involved in perpetrating smuggling and export of illicitly acquired and conflict critical minerals.
  7. Expand the scope of existing certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly process to capture community benefits from diamonds and critical minerals.
  8. Demand that membership to regional and global certification and tracking mechanism must be mandatory for all critical minerals producing and exporting countries
  1. Countries that produce critical minerals should diversify their investors and pursue win-win partnerships to prevent their territories from becoming geopolitical battlegrounds for superpowers competing for access to these resources in the era of energy transition
  2. Enhance public database and reconciliation system for tracking mineral flows to better balance production, purchases, and exports at various levels (exporters, mines, mining regions, and Member States). 
  3. To maximize the benefits from critical mineral supply chains, producer countries should prioritize investments that add value to minerals and promote local content. This approach will generate more jobs for millions of unemployed youths, stimulate economic growth, and facilitate technology transfer and reduce susceptibility to conflict

References

Aikael Etal (2021) Understanding poverty dynamics and vulnerability in Tanzania: 2012–2018 available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rode.12829  accessed on 15 May 2025

Martin A, etal (2014), All that Glitters is not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the illicit trade of critical minerals, Partnership Africa Canada, May 2014

Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

Global Witness (2025) available at https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/new-investigation-suggests-eu-trader-traxys-buys-conflict-minerals-from-drc/ accessed on 15 May 2025

IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

ICGLR, Report on the Status of Implementation of the Six Tools of the ICGLR Regional Initiative on Natural Resources in Member States, P14

ISSD (2018) Green Conflict Minerals; The Fuels of conflict in the transition to a low carbon economy;  available at https://www.iisd.org/story/green-conflict-minerals/ accessed on 15 May 2025

Panzi Foundation available via https://panzifoundation.org/conflict-minerals-and-sexual-violence-in-the-drc/# accessed on 15 May 2025

The African Climate Foundation Report; Geopolitics of Critical Minerals in Renewable Supply Chains  available at https://africanclimatefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/800644-ACF-03_Geopolitics-of-critical-minerals-R_WEB.pdf  accessed on 15 May 2025

The Eastleigh Voice (2025); Police launch investigation into suspected copper smuggling at Mombasa port; available at https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/business/112007/police-probe-suspected-copper-smuggling-at-mombasa-port accessed on 15 May 2025

US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.

WTO (2024): High demand for energy-related critical minerals creates supply chain pressures; available at

Online sources

[1] https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/about/what-is-kp

[2] The United Republic of Tanzania: Mining Commission; A Report on implementation of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme for Tanzania Year 2023

[3]ICGLR; available via https://icglrcertification.com/ accessed 13 May 2025

[4]OECD Report (2016) available via https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-supply-chains-of-minerals-from-conflict-affected-and-high-risk-areas_9789264252479-en.html, accessed on 13 May 2025

[5] OECD (2016), OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas: Third Edition, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264252479-en.

[6] ibid

[7] https://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/

[8] https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/critical-minerals-conflict-eu/

[9] European Commission: Trade and Economic Security, Conflict Minerals regulation available at https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/conflict-minerals-regulation_en#:~:text=In%20politically%20unstable%20areas%2C%20armed,mobile%20phones%2C%20cars%20and%20jewellery. Accessed on 15 May 2025

[10] ISSD (2018) Green Conflict Minerals; The Fuels of conflict in the transition to a low carbon economy;  available at https://www.iisd.org/story/green-conflict-minerals/ accessed on 15 May 2025

[11] ibid

[12] Panzi Foundation available via https://panzifoundation.org/conflict-minerals-and-sexual-violence-in-the-drc/# accessed on 15 May 2025

[13] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[14] The African Climate Foundation Report; Geopolitics of Critical Minerals in Renewable Supply Chains  available at https://africanclimatefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/800644-ACF-03_Geopolitics-of-critical-minerals-R_WEB.pdf  accessed on 15 May 2025

[15] Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via  https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025

[16] Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

[17] ICGLR, Report on the Status of Implementation of the Six Tools of the ICGLR Regional Initiative on Natural Resources in Member States, P14

[18] WTO (2024): High demand for energy-related critical minerals creates supply chain pressures; available at https://www.wto.org/english/blogs_e/data_blog_e/blog_dta_10jan24_e.htm#:~:text=Exports,all%20at%206%20per%20cent). Accessed on 15 May 2025

[19] US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.

[20] URT:  Ministry of Minerals, Mining Commission; A Report on implementation of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme for Tanzania Year 2023

[21]Global Witness (2025) available at https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/new-investigation-suggests-eu-trader-traxys-buys-conflict-minerals-from-drc/ accessed on 15 May 2025

[22] ibid

[23] Martin A, etal (2014), All that Glitters is not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the illicit trade of critical minerals, Partnership Africa Canada, May 2014

[24] The Eastleigh Voice (2025); Police launch investigation into suspected copper smuggling at Mombasa port; available at https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/business/112007/police-probe-suspected-copper-smuggling-at-mombasa-port accessed on 15 May 2025

[25] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[26] https://www.kpcivilsociety.org/activity/kimberley-process-lifts-ineffective-embargo-end-of-an-era-for-the-central-african-republic-and-another-clear-signal-that-conflict-diamond-scheme-needs-serious-fixing/

[27] Kimberly Civil Society Coalition (2025); BEYOND SHINING ILLUSIONS: New documentary exposes the unspoken realities of large-scale diamond mining available at https://www.kpcivilsociety.org/press/beyond-shining-illusions-new-documentary-exposes-the-unspoken-realities-of-diamond-mining-in-african-countries/ accessed 15 May 2025

[28] Aikael Etal (2021) Understanding poverty dynamics and vulnerability in Tanzania: 2012–2018 available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rode.12829  accessed on 15 May 2025

[29] ibid

[30] https://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-land-mine-use-amounts-to-war-crimes-amnesty-report/a-62533770

Assessing Implications of Trumps Tariffs on Intra East Africa’s Regional and International Trade

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Effective 5th April 2025 (with a pause of 90 days) the US President Donald Trump slapped a global tariff of 10% on all exports to the US. The US tariffs has caused a lot of turbulence and uncertainty about the future of the WTO rules based global trade as we knew it. The future of EAC -US trade is unknown and during this period loses will be counted particularly in the agriculture, textiles, apparel and handcrafts sector. However, in the midst of turbulence, the EAC has an opportunity of re-inventing its intra-regional and international trade, and perhaps emerging stronger.  This policy brief analyses the implications of the US tariffs on EAC intra-regional trade and what options the member states can take.

Background on EAC -US Trade Relations and Trade Flows

The East African Community (EAC) and Sub-Saharan Africa generally have been major trading partners with the United States for decades and so far, the fastest growing markets in the world according to the International Monetary Fund.  The US has signed multiple trade agreements allowing smooth trade flows across the two regions, with the US enjoying an overwhelming trade surplus for decades. In 2008 the U.S. signed Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFA) with the EAC regional economic block in 2008.

The purpose of the TIFA was to strengthen the United States-EAC trade and investment relationship, expand and diversify bilateral trade, and improve the climate for business between U.S. and East African firms. Earlier in 2000 the US had passed the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA), a trade preference program that allowed selected goods from EAC duty free market entrance into the United States. AGOA had helped expand and diversify African exports to the United States, while at the same time fostering an improved business environment in many African countries through the application of eligibility requirements.  In 2015, the U.S. Congress extended AGOA through 2025. 

According to the Office of US Trade Representative data the U.S. goods exports to East African Community in 2022 were $1.1 billion, up 2.0 percent ($22 million) from 2021 and up 15 percent from 2012. U.S. goods imports from East African Community totaled $1.3 billion in 2022, up 40.4 percent ($367 million) from 2021, and up 121 percent from 2012. The U.S. trade balance with East African Community shifted from a goods trade surplus of $211 million in 2021 to a goods trade deficit of $135 million in 2022[1].Although the US suffered a goods trade deficit in 2022, it has continued to enjoy trade surpluses with individual EAC member Countries as reported by the US trade Administration.

Table of US-EAC Trade flows and Surplus for 2023-2024

Country

Total Goods Trade with US 2024 (USD)

US Exports

(2024)

US Imports

(2024)

Surplus (2024)

% Increase in Surplus compared to 2023

Kenya

1.5Bln

782.5Mln

737.3Mln

45.2Mln

110 (454.6Mln)

Tanzania

778.1Mln

573.4Mln

204.7Mln

368.7Mln

45.8 (115.8Mln)

Uganda

238.9 Mln

106.3 Mln

132.6 Mln

26.3Mln

574.3 ($31.9Mln)

Rwanda

75.0Mln

44.8Mln

30.2Mln

14.5Mln

4,060 (($14.2Mln)

Democratic Republic of Congo

576.4Mln

253.3Mln

323.1Mln

69.8M

20.9 ($18.4 Mln)

Burundi

$10.4Mln

$6.6Mln

$3.7Mln

$2.9Mln

224.3 (5.2Mln)

South Sudan

$60.1Mln

$59.3 Mln

$0.8Mln

$58.5 Mln

16.0(8.1Mln)

Somalia

$51.6Mln

$49.1 Mln

$2.5 Mln

$46.6Mln

0

Source: Office of US Trade Representative data analyzed and presented by GEPC researcher

Over the years, through its trade diplomacy, the US had cemented long lasting relations paving way for other strategic economic, political and security relations, with the EAC member states including defense. With the new tariff wall, if not changed, this long-term relationship could be bound for a new trajectory.

Knock-on Effects of Tariffs

Tariffs have knock offs whose effects can trickle down the goods and services value chain in many ways, affecting both producers, exporters and consumers down the trade supply chain.

A tariff is a duty imposed by a national government, customs territory, or supranational union on imports of goods. Besides being a source of revenue, import duties can also be a form of regulation of foreign trade and policy that burden foreign products to encourage or safeguard domestic industry[1]. At their core, tariffs are simple: they raise the domestic price of imported goods. But their effects ripple through the economy in complex ways – altering prices, wages, exchange rates and trade patterns.

Simply put, a tariff is a tax on imported products. It creates a difference between the world price and the domestic price of a product. Tariffs raise the price of imported goods relative to domestic goods (good produced at home).  For example, if a US Tarif of 10% is applied on world price of coffee of USD200, the domestic price of coffee in the US market becomes USD 220 per kilogram. The government collects the difference of USD20 dollar as tariff revenue to finance other public expenditures.

Tariffs can also affect the world price of a product, particularly when they are imposed by a large economy. The logic is that higher domestic prices reduce domestic demand, which in turn lowers world demand, and thus world prices. In our example, the world price might fall to $150 after the tariff is imposed, resulting in a domestic price of $165. In this case, part of the tariff is effectively paid by foreign producers[2].

This cost-shifting creates incentives for large economies to unilaterally impose tariffs. However, this so-called optimal tariff argument overlooks the possibility of retaliation. If country A imposes tariffs on country B, country B has an incentive to respond in kind. The end result is a trade war that leaves both sides worse off[3].

With the current US tariffs, the prices of goods entering into the US market will increase by 10%. For example, the price of coffee will increase by 10% making it more expensive for Americans to afford. Similarly, the costs for other agricultural products, textiles and handcrafts will suffer the same fate. The resultant effect of this will be a low demand for these goods in the US markets affecting EAC farmers and exporters. We can further illustrate this with a simple of the effects of the tariffs on handicrafts from the EAC. 

Because of increased tariffs and a decline in demand for the Makonde carvings, the exporter of Makonde Carvings and paintings will buy less. The Makonde carver and painter in Mtwara and Mwenge will lose business and sell less. The transporter of Makonde carvings will have little business and therefore send a few trucks to collect and deliver the carvings to Dar es Salaam. The exporter will send a few containers and therefore the port handlers and clearing firms will have no business. The Makonde artist may completely close and ultimately the transporter and port handler may lay off staff. A similar experience can be the same for the Coffee producer in Uganda and Kenya, whose knock off effect of the US tariffs will trickle down the supply chain in a similar manner.

Tariffs in the Context of WTO and GATT rules

In the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules-based system, when countries agree to open their markets for goods or services, they “bind” their commitments. A country can change its bindings, but only after negotiating with its trading partners, which could mean compensating them for loss of trade[1].

Under the WTO (GATTs, GAT and TRIPs agreements) international trade and commerce is run based on a rule-based system and principles. These include;

  1. Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN), which requires treating other people equally. Under the WTO agreements, countries cannot normally discriminate between their trading partners. Grant someone a special favour (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of their products) and you have to do the same for all other WTO members[2]
  2. National Treatment of foreigners and locals equally where by imported and locally-produced goods should be treated equally — at least after the foreign goods have entered the market. This also applies to services, trademarks, copyrights and patents. (Article 3 of GATT, Article 17 of GATS and Article 3 of TRIPS) although there can be some variations in applications depending on an existing arrangement such as a Regional Economic block or once a product, service or item of intellectual property has entered the market can be a subject to customs duty or any other applicable duties.
  3. National treatment only applies once a product, service or item of intellectual property has entered the market. Therefore, charging customs duty on an import is not a violation of national treatment even if locally-produced products are not charged an equivalent tax.
  4. Freer trade gradually through negotiations and reducing of trade barriers such customs duties (tariffs), import bans or quotas, selective restriction on quantities, bureaucracy and exchange rate policies.
  5. Predictability of trade through binding commitments and transparency. This encourages investment, job creation and consumers can enjoy the benefits of competition
  6. Promotion of fair competition, with an allowance of a limited. number of tariffs for limited protection, allowing thriving of domestic industry and protection against entry of harmful products.
  7. Generally, encouraging development and economic reforms aimed at increasing global trade flows and particularly allowing less developed countries to equally enjoy benefits of the global trade system.
    Tariffs as Tools for Trade Policy and Geopolitical Statecraft

    Tariffs are not universally banned from trade policy. Tariffs can be a useful tool for protecting domestic industries, generating revenue, and supporting economic development, especially in developing countries. They can equally be used as a foreign policy instrument to advance economic diplomatic ties between nations.

    According to the WTO, tariffs must not be used as weapon for trade distortion, carry the risk of increased costs for businesses and consumers, potentially stifling economic growth and competitiveness. However, the recent US Trump measures reorganize the rules on International Trade. Tariffs are now used as a political tool for advancing geopolitical and national security interests, including cajoling other trading partners and WTO member states into curving in to pressure aimed at achieving domestic political gains.

    There are contending views (including from the US Council on Foreign Relations) that according to the WTO rules, the US Trump tariffs are illegal, arbitrary, based on a wrong formular, not reciprocal, distortionary[1] and must be fought either at the WTO or through reciprocal measures taken by affected Countries. Poor application of tariffs can spark a contagion effect of tariffs wars across nations.

    Implications on EAC Trade and economic growth
    1. Rise in prices of EAC Export products in the US market by a commensurate percentage in response to the tariff charges unless the EAC exporters absorb or the US government cushions the consumers in someways
    2. Decline in export volumes EAC goods to the US by a commensurate percentage decline, depending on the tariff elasticity of the good affected by the US imposed tariffs
    3. Increase in import driven inflationary pressures in the EAC causing on the already current inflationary pressures in the EAC region
    4. Potential slow down in the regional economic growth in line with the IMF projected global economic slowdown of 2.8% in 2025 due to disruptions in global trade
    5. Shortage in supply of US dollars due to declining inflow from trade with the US. This could exert some depreciation of domestic currencies, as the dollar demand to purchase imports increases.
    6. Incentivize the rise in the use of Tariffs and blockades by countries in the region as tools for trade policy and coercion to achieve specific strategic interests, as countries mimic US behavior
    EAC Response options for Trade Creation and Diversion to new markets

    To date the EAC as a regional block has remained silent while its respective member states have decided to individually not to retaliate.  Uganda’s Ministry of Finance, clearly stated that it had taken a decision not to retaliate[2].  Similar statements were made by Kenya’s Ministry of Trade[3].

    Uganda’s trade volumes with the US were small and the US was a major beneficiary of this trade relationship, enjoying a goods trade surplus, while its nationals enjoyed cheap high quality agricultural exports such as coffee, tea, fruits and handcrafts from the EAC.

    The AGOA partnership agreement was bound to expire at the end of 2025 and the US and EAC were already on the road towards negotiating new trade arrangements, if AGOA was not extended. Moreover, some Countries such as Uganda, Burundi, South Sudan and Somalia were not eligible for AGOA in 2024 due to among others sanctions imposed by the US for various reasons (including conflicts, human and political rights violations) and were already searching for markets elsewhere.

    The EAC as a regional block was pushing for increased intra-regional trade. The East African Business Council, an apex body of businesses and companies, has always been concerned with low volumes of intra EAC trade as compared to other economic regions. 

    This has been widely linked to existence of tariff and non-tariff barriers, including stringent rules of origin, Stay of Applications which allows member states to charge or exempt different tariffs on some specific goods different from the Common External Tariff, differences in taxes such VAT, Income Taxes and Exercise duties. It was further concerned with the bilateral negotiations of trade deals with third parties. The East African Business Council (EABC) advocated and has been pushing the EAC to continue negotiating the EAC-EU Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) and the EAC-UK EPA as a region to avoid creating mistrust and distortion of the EAC Common External Tariff (CET)[4]

    The new US tariffs therefore offer the EAC and Sub-Saharan Africa region with a window of an opportunity to disconnect itself from the US markets by deepening intra-regional trade, diversifying and diverting its trade to other regions such as Africa via Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the EU, the Middle East and China.

    AFCTA offers flexible rules and unfettered free access to a market population of about 1.3 billion people and a combined GDP of approximately US$ 3.4 trillion[5]. The AfCFTA aims to eliminate trade barriers and boost intra-Africa trade. In particular, it is to advance trade in value-added production across all service sectors of the African Economy[6]. There are a lot of opportunities in the AfCFTA for the Private sector in the EAC as it offers a larger and diversified market for goods and services. According to President Museveni Uganda will now focus on African markets[7]

    The EU has been a major trading partner and EU trade in goods (imports and exports) with the EAC has risen steadily comparatively to 2007 volumes[8]  In 2023 the EU trade in goods and services with the EAC region amounted to EUR106Bln. The EU trade in services amounted to EUR 5.9bln. If compared to 2022 the EU trade in goods with the EAC region reached EUR 5.7bln while imports from the EAC were EUR4.9bln. Exports in services were valued at EUR3.0Bln compared to EUR2.9 bln imported from the EAC[9]. The major exports to the EU from the East African Community are mainly coffee, cut flowers, tea, tobacco, fish and vegetables. Imports from the EU into the region are dominated by machinery and mechanical appliances, equipment and parts, vehicles and pharmaceutical products[10].  Kenya and Tanzania were the leading EU trade partners.

    China is already a major trading partner with the EAC and had surpassed the EU and the US. In 2023, China was the largest source of imports for the East African Community (EAC), with imports valued at $11 billion. The EAC’s exports to China in the same year were valued at $15.8 billion. China is closely followed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at US$6.4 billion in 2023[11].

    From the statistics, the EAC already enjoys a trade surplus with China. Although there are concerns over unethical business conducts, including the risk of stifling industrial growth by flooding the EAC with cheap substandard goods, China remains a huge market of about 1billion people, it is the second largest economy in the world and the largest one in RCEP with a GDP of 16,325 billion USD in 2022 (World Bank, 2023).  Chinese demand for EAC products is enormous and projected to grow.

    The EAC also has an opportunity of benefiting from arbitrage practices, whereby producers from highly US tariffed countries set up business to produce, buy, sell or reroute their products via the EAC to take advantage of the tax and price differences. In this case highly taxed countries such as China and Lesotho would be interested in setting up business in EAC.  Kenya has already made a move with President Ruto’s visit to Beijing to attract Chinese businesses to set business in Nairobi.

    Recommendations

    For this to happen, the EAC and its member states will have to

    1. Diversify, Divert and Create trade. This happens when new or existing regional economic grouping (Free Trade Areas or Customs Unions) leads to creation of new trade that never existed before or leads to shifts in trade flows from efficient nonmember exporters to non-efficient member exporters among others due to preferential tariffs charged amongst member states.
    2. Invest in processing and industrial production of agricultural products and raw materials into finished products that can be sold or consumed locally and in the new markets
    3. Address existing tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade such as VAT, Excise duties, income taxes, bureaucracy and infrastructure which have been an obstacle to intra-regional trade.
    4. Revive old economic partnerships with the EU and explore new partnerships with the EU, South America, Middle East and China
    5. Establish linkages between the farmers and manufacturer so as to create value and sustainable supply chains of quality products for the market
    6. Address political differences, instability and conflicts affecting cordial economic cooperation and free flow of goods across EAC and African borders.

     References 

    European Commission: Trade and Security available at https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/east-african-community-eac_en

    Ralph Ossa; Views of the Chief Economist, World Trade Organisation, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/blogs_e/ce_ralph_ossa_e/blog_ro_11apr25_e.htm accessed 14 April 2025

    The New Times (May 02, 2025) available at https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/21152/news/africa/eabcs-adrian-raphael-njau-advocates-for-stronger-eac-market

    WTO; Principles of the Trading system available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm#:~:text=In%20the%20WTO%2C%20when%20countries,the%20case%20in%20developing%20countries.

    [1] https://www.cfr.org/blog/five-things-know-about-trumps-tariffs

    [2] Mr Ramadhan Ggobi , Permanent Secretary for Treasury made these remarks while addressing a press conference at the Ministry of Finance

    [3] Mr Lee Kinyanjui, PS for Trade, Kenya in an Interview with  Citizen TV available on Citizen digital via https://www.citizen.digital/news/what-it-means-for-kenya-after-us-imposes-10-export-tariff-trade-cs-kinyanjui-n360379

    [4] https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/21152/news/africa/eabcs-adrian-raphael-njau-advocates-for-stronger-eac-market

    [5] https://au-afcfta.org/about/

    [6] ibid

    [7] https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/african%20markets/140091/museveni-says-uganda-to-focus-on-african-markets-amid-us-tariff-hike

    [8] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/766228/EPRS_BRI(2024)766228_EN.pdf

    [9] ibid

    [10] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/east-african-community-eac_en

    [11] https://www.eac.int/trade/79-sector/trade#:~:text=China%20is%20the%20dominant%20source,US%246.4%20billion%20in%2020

Webinar Series: Assessing Implications of Trumps Tariffs on Intra East Africa’s Regional and International Trade

The rules of world trade are being redefined. We are delighted to invite you to plug and join in as we explore and discuss this interesting topic on regional economic cooperation, trade and investment. 

The East African Community (EAC) and Sub-Saharan Africa generally have been major trading partners with the United States for decades and so far, the fastest growing markets in the world according to the International Monetary Fund.   Since 2001, the US has signed multiple trade agreements (including AGOA in 2001 and TIFA in 2008) allowing smooth trade flows across the two regions, with the US enjoying an overwhelming trade surplus for decades. Under AGOA EAC selected products had duty free access to US markets. US trade relations with EAC member states were booming.  For instance, in 2024 the US trade surplus with Rwanda increased more than 4000% compared to 2023.

Effective 5th April 2025 the US President Donald Trump slapped a global baseline tariff of 10% on all exports to the US. The US tariffs have caused a lot of turbulence and uncertainty about the future of the WTO rules based global trade as we know it. The future of EAC -US trade is unknown and during this period loses will be counted particularly in the agriculture, textiles, apparel and artifacts sector. However, in the midst of this turbulence, the EAC may have an opportunity of re-inventing its intra-regional and international trade, and perhaps emerging stronger by looking elsewhere. 

This webinar will enable stakeholders and the public understand the issues at play and the potentially new World Trade Order that we could moving towards. Expert speakers at this webinar will analyze the implications of the US tariffs on EAC intra-regional and international trade and what options the EAC block and member states can take.

The Governance and Economic Policy Centre (GEPC) is a regional governance and development policy organization, based in Tanzania, interested among others in promoting economic and fiscal governance, with a national and regional focus on East and Africa Great Lakes Region.

The webinar is organized as part of GEPC’s project on promoting regional economic cooperation, trade and investment implemented in collaboration with the Africa Economic Diplomatic Study Circle (AEDSC), a loose network of practicing professionals, students of economic diplomacy, international relations and development based on the African continent, working to promote Africa’s position in the global space.

Our distinguished speakers will be;

Ms McDowell Juko, Chairperson East Africa Business Network (EABN): Elsa Juko-McDowell, a native of Uganda, is a remarkable individual with a deep passion for people and business. Her journey began in 2015 when she joined the East Africa Chamber of Commerce (EACC), an 18-year organization devoted to fostering trade and investments between the United States and East Africa, currently known as the East Africa Business Network. owns multiple businesses, including real estate development, investments, and consulting ventures. Additionally, Elsa serves as a North Texas District Export Council member.  Can be reached via: info@eabn.co or chairman@eabn.co

Mr. Adrian Njau, Ag. Executive Director, East African Business Council: Adrian Njau is the Executive Director of the East African Business  Council (EABN), the apex advocacy body of private sector associations and corporates from the 7 East African Community (EAC) Partner States (Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and South Sudan). Adrian holds a Master’s Degree in International Trade and a Bachelor’s Degree in Economics, both obtained from the University of Dar es Salaam. His academic background is complemented by professional certifications and specialized training in trade, investment, policy and regional integration from Switzerland, Singapore, and Sweden, among others. With over two decades of experience, Adrian has been instrumental in research and policy at the Chamber. Can be reached via: Email: info@eabc-online.com

Mr Robert Ssuna, International Trade and Tax Expert, Researcher and Consultant, Governance and Economic Policy Centre:  Robert is an Independent Consultant on Tax Trade and Investment. He is Chartered Economic Policy Analyst (CEPA), a Fellow of the Global Academy of Finance and Management with over 15 years of experience in economic policy analysis focusing on tax, trade, and investment at national, regional, and global levels. He is also a member of the Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS) Monitoring Group. Prior to this, he served as a Supervisor Research Statistics and Policy Analysis in the Research and Planning Division of the Uganda Revenue Authority. Can be reached via: ssuunaster@gmail.com

Hon: Dr Abullah H Makame, Member of East Africa Legislative Assembly (EALA):  Dr Makame, is a distinguished member of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) based in Arusha, Tanzania, where he is a commissioner and a former Chairperson of the Standing Committee in Agriculture, Environment, Tourism and Natural Resources. Dr Makame has served in various senior capacities in both the Government of United Republic of Tanzania and Zanzibar; academically, his docorate is from Birmingham UK and MSc from Strathclyde – Scotland, he holds a Professional Certificate in International Trade from Adelaide and has published both locally and internationally. Dr Makame serves in various boards across the EAC region. Can be reached via email: abdullah.makame@gmail.com

Mr Moses Kulaba, Executive Director & Convenor, Governance and Economic Policy Centre: Mr Moses is a political economist, tax and economic diplomat with more than 20 years of active service in international public, private and civil society sector.  Prior to joining GEPC he served as the East Africa Regional Manager for the Natural Resources Governance Institute, where he worked with various stakeholders including governments to advance fiscal policies and governance of the extractive sector. Has served on the international board of the EITI and in consultancy roles for UN, DFID and the EU. Can be reached via : moses@gepc.or.tz or mkulaba2000@gmail.com

Webinar Date: Tuesday, 6th May, 2025

Time: 10:30AM-12:30 PM (Nairobi Time)/ 9:30AM (CAT)/ 7:30AM (GMT)

Online Participation via Google meet video link: https://meet.google.com/odd-ysgh-dtf

Enhancing Implementation of East Africa’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for Climate Resilience: Is it an Exercise in futility?

The Paris Agreement in 2016 set targets to cut global cut global emissions and keep temperatures below 2 degrees Centigrade by 2030 and total net zero by 2010. But so far, we doing so badly, that these targets are largely likely to be missed. In the last few years C02 emissions have been hitting record new high levels ever recorded in billions of years.

Author: Nader M. Khalifa, Governance & Economics Policy Centre, Tanzania, October 2024

  1. Introduction

East Africa faces increasing climate risks, including unpredictable rainfall patterns, severe droughts, and flooding. These climate challenges threaten livelihoods, economic development, and environmental sustainability across the region. Under the Paris Agreement, East African nations have committed to ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and enhancing resilience to climate impacts. This policy paper explores the state of NDCs in East Africa and offers a comparative analysis of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda’s NDCs, emphasizing recommendations to increase funding, strengthen climate adaptation and mitigation efforts.

  1. Context of NDCs in East Africa

Countries in East Africa are committed to reducing emissions and adapting to climate impacts. Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have outlined ambitious NDCs centered on expanding renewable energy, promoting climate-smart agriculture, and building climate-resilient infrastructure. However, significant challenges hinder the implementation of these targets, including financial constraints, limited technical capacity, and political and social barriers. Addressing these challenges is essential to achieve East Africa’s climate resilience goals.

  1. Comparative Analysis of East African NDCs: Emission Targets and Key Factors

East African countries exhibit varied commitments and approaches within their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) based on their unique socio-economic contexts, vulnerability to climate impacts, and institutional capacities. Below is a detailed comparison of emission targets, adaptation and mitigation efforts, financial requirements, and implementation challenges among Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.

  • Emission Reduction Targets

  • Kenya: Kenya has committed to reducing its GHG emissions by 32% by 2030 compared to the Business-as-Usual (BAU) scenario. Kenya’s mitigation efforts focus primarily on the energy sector, which includes an ambitious plan to expand renewable energy (particularly geothermal) and enhance energy efficiency across industries.
  • Tanzania: Tanzania’s NDC commits to reducing emissions by 30% by 2030 relative to its BAU scenario. Tanzania’s mitigation focus is on increasing the share of renewable energy, combating deforestation, and improving energy efficiency in industries.
  • Uganda: Uganda aims for a 22% reduction in emissions by 2030. Like Kenya and Tanzania, Uganda’s mitigation strategy heavily emphasizes renewable energy, particularly hydropower, and afforestation efforts, along with energy efficiency improvements in households and industry.

These are quite high targets. For these to be achieved EAC will have to plant so many trees and decarbonize to zero emission in so many sectors such as manufacturing, transportation, agriculture and construction.

Adaptation Strategies

  • Kenya: Kenya is highly vulnerable to climate change, particularly in agriculture, water resources, and human settlements. Its adaptation strategies include promoting drought-resistant crops, improving irrigation and water management systems, and investing in climate-resilient infrastructure (such as flood-proof buildings and early warning systems for extreme weather events). Kenya’s NDC prioritizes ecosystem-based adaptation (EBA) practices to enhance resilience in both rural and urban areas.
  • Tanzania: Tanzania’s adaptation efforts center around sustainable agriculture and forestry, recognizing the importance of these sectors for food security and livelihoods. The country prioritizes improving water resource management, soil fertility restoration, and expanding agroforestry. Adaptation initiatives also target improving the health sector’s ability to cope with climate change-induced diseases.
  • Uganda: Uganda’s adaptation strategies are focused on improving agricultural productivity, increasing resilience in water resource management, and developing sustainable forestry practices. A major component of Uganda’s adaptation plan is strengthening community-based adaptation, particularly in regions vulnerable to extreme weather events like floods and droughts.

Renewable Energy and Mitigation

  • Kenya: Kenya is one of Africa’s renewable energy leaders, with over 90% of its electricity generated from renewable sources, predominantly geothermal, hydropower, and wind. The country aims to further increase its share of clean energy, making it central to its mitigation strategy. The government’s expansion plans include increasing solar installations and expanding geothermal capacity.
  • Tanzania: Tanzania’s renewable energy sector is less developed compared to Kenya. However, the country plans to expand its reliance on hydropower and solar energy, with targeted investments in rural electrification projects powered by renewables. Tanzania’s NDC also prioritizes improving energy efficiency in both industrial and domestic sectors.
  • Uganda: Uganda’s energy mix is primarily hydropower-based, and its NDC targets further expansion of this sector. The country is also exploring solar energy as part of its rural electrification strategy. Uganda’s mitigation efforts also focus on reducing emissions from deforestation and promoting sustainable land management practices.

Financial Requirements and Challenges

NDC is proving  too expensive for EAC Countries to achieve. The cumulative estimated mitigation and adaptation  funding requirement for Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya is about USD109.3Bln 

  • Kenya: Kenya has estimated that it will need $62 billion to implement its NDC by 2030, of which 87% is expected to come from international climate finance. Financial constraints, particularly in securing adequate international support, remain a critical challenge for implementing large-scale renewable energy projects and climate-resilient infrastructure.

 

  • Tanzania: Tanzania’s NDC estimates the need for $19.2 billion by 2030 to meet its mitigation and adaptation targets. Securing adequate financing from both domestic and international sources is a major hurdle, especially for funding long-term initiatives like reforestation, energy efficiency programs, and renewable energy development.
  • Uganda: Uganda’s NDC implementation is projected to cost $28.1 billion, with a significant portion expected from external sources. Uganda’s challenges revolve around mobilizing sufficient funds for rural electrification projects, water management systems, and agricultural resilience initiatives.

 

Implementation Barriers

  • Kenya: While Kenya has strong institutional frameworks for implementing its NDCs, challenges include weak local capacity in monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems, as well as difficulties in attracting consistent international funding. Political stability in the country helps foster a more conducive environment for climate action, but there are gaps in integrating climate policy across sectors.
  • Tanzania: Tanzania faces significant barriers in terms of technical expertise and capacity for implementing its NDCs. Limited access to data and modern technologies, particularly in rural areas, hampers the effective rollout of renewable energy and agricultural adaptation strategies. Political commitment is strong but often challenged by competing development priorities.
  • Uganda: Uganda’s main implementation challenges include a lack of technical capacity and institutional coordination. While Uganda has ambitious NDC targets, the limited financial and technical resources available for adaptation, especially in agriculture and water management, slow down progress. Moreover, the country struggles with integrating climate action into local governance structures.

The global total emissions is over 50 bln tones annually shared out per sector as follows

No Sector % Co2 Emissions
1 Manufacturing (Oil, Gas, Steel, Cement, Chemicals & Mining) 29%
2 Electricity (Coal, Natural Gas, Oil) 29%
3 Agriculture (Landuse, Waste, Crops & Livestock) 20%
4 Transportation 15%
5 Building (Cooling, Heating) 7%

Source:  Netflix Documentary; What is Next? The Future with Bill Gates

 

The long-term trend is that are not seeing any decline in Co2 emissions in the next future. The last time the planet was this hot was about 20,000,000 years ago. To get to net zero requires netting out to zero by sectors for each Country and this is a gigantic task.

  • Regional Cooperation and Potential Solutions

There is potential for stronger regional cooperation among East African countries to address common climate challenges, particularly around renewable energy development, cross-border water resource management, and shared capacity-building efforts. This includes:

  • Joint Renewable Energy Projects: Collaborative renewable energy initiatives, such as regional geothermal or hydroelectric projects, can reduce costs and improve energy access across borders.
  • Capacity Building through Regional Bodies: Institutions like the East African Community (EAC) and African Union (AU) can help facilitate knowledge sharing, technical training, and the development of MRV systems tailored to regional needs.
  • Shared Climate Finance Mechanisms: Establishing a regional climate fund or enhancing existing ones could help streamline the mobilization of climate finance to meet the collective NDC ambitions of East African countries.
  1. Recommendations for Enhancing East African Countries’ NDCs and Climate Resilience

East African countries like Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have made significant strides in formulating their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to combat climate change. However, to effectively meet their climate goals and enhance resilience, the following strategic recommendations are essential:

  • Increase Climate Financing Access

Recommendation: Establish a more structured approach to accessing international climate finance and improve domestic resource mobilization.

  • Actionable Steps:
    • Strengthen partnerships with international financial institutions such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environment Facility (GEF), and bilateral climate finance partners.
    • Develop and refine national climate finance strategies to better align with donor priorities and global climate funding criteria.
    • Encourage private sector participation by developing incentives such as tax breaks, green bonds, and public-private partnerships to fund renewable energy and adaptation projects.
    • Enhance Regional Cooperation

Recommendation: Foster collaboration among East African countries for shared climate solutions, leveraging regional strengths and resources.

  • Actionable Steps:
    • Establish regional climate action platforms under the East African Community (EAC) to facilitate joint renewable energy projects, share best practices, and coordinate climate adaptation measures.
    • Promote cross-border initiatives like regional renewable energy projects (e.g., geothermal, wind, and hydroelectric plants) that can serve multiple countries and reduce costs.
    • Strengthen regional bodies for coordinated action on shared ecosystems, such as the Nile Basin Initiative, to ensure joint management of water resources affected by climate change.
    • Strengthen Technical Capacity and MRV Systems

Recommendation: Develop and improve Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) systems to ensure more accurate tracking of NDC implementation and climate progress.

  • Actionable Steps:
    • Invest in training programs for local technical experts on MRV systems, GHG inventory, and data management, with support from international partners.
    • Collaborate with international organizations like the Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT) and UNEP to implement best practices in MRV across sectors.
    • Develop a regional MRV framework within the EAC to allow for collective data tracking, knowledge sharing, and standardization of methods for measuring progress on NDCs.
    • Focus on Climate-Resilient Agriculture

Recommendation: Prioritize climate-smart agriculture to safeguard food security, livelihoods, and ecosystem health.

  • Actionable Steps:
    • Expand the adoption of climate-smart agriculture (CSA) practices, such as promoting drought-resistant crop varieties, efficient water use systems, and agroforestry.
    • Increase investment in agricultural research and development to identify crops and farming techniques that are more resilient to changing climate conditions.
    • Provide capacity-building support to smallholder farmers through training programs on sustainable agricultural practices and offering financial mechanisms (e.g., microloans) for adopting these methods.
    • Develop Green Infrastructure and Urban Resilience

Recommendation: Promote the development of climate-resilient infrastructure to adapt to future climate risks in urban areas.

  • Actionable Steps:
    • Invest in green urban planning that includes building flood-proof structures, expanding public green spaces, and improving waste and water management systems in urban centers.
    • Encourage the adoption of eco-friendly public transportation systems, such as electric buses or improved public transport infrastructure, to reduce emissions from the transport sector.
    • Create urban climate resilience strategies that incorporate natural solutions, such as restoring wetlands and reforestation to serve as buffers against climate impacts like flooding and heatwaves.
    • Promote Renewable Energy Development

Recommendation: Expand renewable energy initiatives to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and enhance energy access.

  • Actionable Steps:
    • Fast-track the development of large-scale solar, wind, and geothermal projects to increase renewable energy capacity.
    • Provide incentives for both local and international private investments in clean energy infrastructure, including tax reliefs, subsidies, and regulatory reforms that encourage clean energy deployment.
    • Integrate renewable energy initiatives with rural electrification programs to provide off-grid renewable energy solutions to rural areas, improving both energy access and climate resilience.
    • Integrate Climate Adaptation into National Development Plans

Recommendation: Ensure climate resilience is mainstreamed across all sectors of national development policies and strategies.

  • Actionable Steps:
    • Align national development goals (e.g., poverty eradication, healthcare, and education) with climate action priorities to foster sustainable development pathways.
    • Develop sector-specific adaptation plans (e.g., in agriculture, water, health, and infrastructure) and ensure these are supported by legislation and long-term budget commitments.
    • Promote community-based adaptation strategies that empower local communities to develop localized solutions to climate impacts, such as improved land management or water conservation techniques.
    • Support Gender-Responsive Climate Action

Recommendation: Ensure that NDCs are gender-responsive and include strategies to protect vulnerable populations, particularly women and children.

  • Actionable Steps:
    • Mainstream gender considerations into all climate action projects, ensuring that women, who are disproportionately affected by climate change, are included in decision-making processes.
    • Develop gender-specific programs that focus on building women’s resilience to climate impacts in areas like agriculture, water resource management, and entrepreneurship.
    • Collaborate with women-led organizations and networks to amplify their role in climate adaptation and mitigation efforts.
    • Promote Innovation and Climate Technology Transfer

Recommendation: Accelerate the deployment of climate technologies to enhance adaptation and mitigation efforts.

  • Actionable Steps:
    • Establish a regional climate technology hub to facilitate the transfer and development of clean technologies tailored to East Africa’s unique climate challenges.
    • Create a favorable policy environment that incentivizes innovation, such as offering grants or tax credits for start-ups and businesses that develop climate solutions.
    • Encourage collaboration with international partners for access to cutting-edge technologies, including in renewable energy, early warning systems, and agricultural resilience technologies.
    • Strengthen Institutional Governance and Policy Coordination

Recommendation: Improve governance frameworks and inter-sectoral coordination to enhance the implementation of NDCs.

  • Actionable Steps:
    • Establish national climate task forces to oversee the integration of NDCs across various government departments, ensuring climate policies are effectively coordinated and implemented.
    • Improve policy coherence between climate action, agriculture, energy, and economic development sectors to avoid conflicts and inefficiencies in NDC implementation.
    • Ensure strong participation from civil society, local governments, and the private sector to promote inclusive climate governance.

 

Conclusion

Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have demonstrated strong commitment to their NDCs, yet significant challenges—such as financial constraints, technical capacity gaps, and implementation barriers—continue to hinder their climate ambitions. Overcoming these obstacles will require enhanced regional cooperation, dedicated capacity-building efforts, and innovative financing solutions, with support from the international community playing a crucial role. By embracing these strategies and recommendations, East African countries can strengthen their resilience to climate impacts, close the gap between climate goals and actions, and contribute substantially to sustainable development and global climate efforts, ultimately improving the quality of life for their citizens.

 

 

 

 

  1. References:
  1. African Development Bank (AfDB) (2020). African Economic Outlook 2020: Developing Africa’s Workforce for the Future. AfDB, Abidjan.
  1. Africa NDC Hub, https://africandchub.org/
  1. East African Community (EAC) (2021). EAC Climate Change Policy and Strategy. EAC, https://www.eac.int/environment/climate-change/eac-climate-change-policy-framework
  2. IPCC (2022). Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press.
  1. IPCC Sixth Assessment Report – Chapter 9, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-9/
  1. Kenya Ministry of Environment and Forestry (2020). Kenya’s Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). Government of Kenya, Nairobi.
  1. NDC Partnership Knowledge Portal, https://ndcpartnership.org/climate-finance
  1. Uganda Ministry of Water and Environment (2022). Uganda’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). Government of Uganda, Kampala.
  2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2015). The Paris Agreement. United Nations, Bonn, Germany.
  3. Tanzania Vice President’s Office (2021). Updated Nationally Determined Contribution of Tanzania. Government of Tanzania, Dodoma.

 

Unlocking Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) in Regional Agricultural Trade in East Africa: An Analysis of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Regime for Horticultural Products in Tanzania and Its Effects on International Trade.

Generally, Non-Trade Measures (NTMs) are good for safe and ethical international trade; however, when poorly regulated and applied irregularly, they transform into Non-Tariff Barrier (NTBs) and can be harmful to trade. Our short analytical study shows that Tanzania is both a perpetrator and victim of irregular SPS measures and could be losing billions in international trade and revenue foregone from its horticultural sector

By Jacob Mokiwa, Researcher , Governance and Economic Policy Centre

(Featured  top image, Courtesy of UNDP-Tanzania, Kizimba Project, Itete Ifakara Youth) 

Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS) are standards and regulations put in place as Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) to ensure the safety and quality of food, as well as to protect humans, animals, and plants from risks associated with diseases, pests, and contaminants based on science. SPS decisions are supposed to be science based. These measures are integrated into Tanzania’s regulatory framework, including through legislation, policies, and adherence to international agreements like the WTO SPS Agreement and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) IPPC.

Also, the normative framework governing East African Community (EAC) SPS measures include but are not limited to Article 108 (c) of the EAC Treaty; Article 38 (1C) of the Customs Union Protocol, EAC SPS Protocol, SPS Information Sharing Platform, etc.).

This short policy brief analyzes Tanzania’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) regime for horticultural products, assessing their impact on international trade and concludes with recommendations for enhancing SPS policy measures to ensure safety, compliance and a facilitative smooth international trade in Tanzania horticultural products. It emanates from our economic governance work on regional economic cooperation, trade and investment, with multiple aims of creating awareness about SPS as a major regulatory tool in regional and international trade that small traders and aspiring international horticulture exporters must know.

State of Horticultural Products

Faraha Salim sells vegetables in the market in Lushoto thanks to a small loan from a community savings and lending group-VICOBA.

Tanzania is a largely an agricultural producing and exporting country with its horticulture sector becoming a rapidly expanding sector with a huge potential to contribute to Tanzania’s economy through employment, trade and export foreign income earning. The country has large chunks of arable land, water bodies and favorable climate for horticulture in many regions across the country.

Tanzania’s horticultural sector encompasses various products, including fruits, vegetables, flowers, and spices.

In recent years, Tanzania has registered impressive export performance of different horticultural products, and this presents an advantageous opportunity to the smallholder farmers to increase their production. Despite this huge potential, the horticultural sector still suffers multiple challenges, including financing, regulation and export standardization. 

The local market infrastructure  conditions are still poor. The cold storage chain for horticultural products from the gardens to the market is limited. Horticulture products are transported in hot trucks, sold in open markets damaging quality  and export standards. The net effect is that Tanzania’s export share of the regional and global horticultural trade has been growing but remains low, compared to its neighbors such as Kenya. According to Ministry of Agriculture statistics, the horticulture sector has become the second largest growth driver of the entire agricultural sector, after food crops contributing about 25% of the sector but has remained stagnant in  growth at 11% annually.

According to the Tanzania Horticultural Association (TAHA) and the BoT Monthly Economic Review (MER), for the year ending in December 2023, the value of horticultural crops’ exports grew to $417.7 million (Sh1.044 trillion) as compared to $290.1 million (Sh725.25 billion) recorded in 2022. This shows that exports grew by $127.6 million (Sh319 billion), which is equivalent to 43.9 percent. The growth in exports comes after a decline from $384.9 million (962.25 billion) reported in 2021 to $290.1 million (Sh725.25 billion) in 2022. The decline accounted for a total of $94 million (Sh237 billion), which is equal to 24.4 percent[1].

This data if extrapolated for the last five years indicates that the Horticultural sector can be a major game changer in Tanzania’s international trade exports, serving as a major source employment to the bludgeoning unemployed youthful population of foreign revenue through increased investment in horticulture and export trade.  Moreover, the sector can leap frog Tanzania to a regional competitor, outpacing its neighbors and rivals in the horticultural sector.

However, the limited awareness, selective and uncoordinated application of SPS standards by both export and importing partners in intra-regional and international trade has gradually turned them from being Non-Tariff Measures (NTM) to become Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) to trade in Horticultural products amongst others.

According to Land O Lakes Trade of Agriculture Safely & Efficiency (TRASE) report, the East African Community (EAC) represents one of the fastest growing regional economic communities in the world. And yet, trade of agricultural products from and within this region has been hindered by Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) issues 

SPS Measures Regime in Tanzania

Tanzania’s SPS regime consists of several legal frameworks articulated and differentiated under the three SPS functions of animal health, food safety and plant health. This involves the Plant Health Act, 2020 with the mandate of issuing phytosanitary certificates, among other functions, Standards Act No. 2 of 2009 with the mandate of regulating and developing mandatory standards and responsible for inspection and certification). 

The regulatory institutions include the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Tanzania Pesticides and Plant Health Authority (TPPHA) established under the Act No. 04 of 2020 with a mandate to comply with the requirements of International Plant Protection Convection (IPPC) on sanitary and phytosanitary measures[2].  The other regulatory institution is the Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) established under Act No. 3 of 1975 as the National Standards Institute and subsequently renamed Tanzania Bureau of Standards under Act No. 1 of 1977. On 20th March 2009, the Standards Act No. 3 of 1975 was repealed and replaced by the Standards Act No. 2 of 2009.

The Bureau was established as part of the efforts by the government to strengthen the supporting institutional infrastructure for the industry and commerce sectors of the economy. Specifically, TBS is mandated to undertake measures for quality control of products of all descriptions and to promote standardization in industry and commerce[3]. So far, the regime has been quite robust, enabling Tanzania to enforce its SPS measures, however faces multiple challenges that would benefit from improvement.

Challenges

The agricultural sector already faces multiple challenges but the SPS regime in Tanzania adds another layer of complexity, potentially hindering Tanzania’s ability to invest in the horticultural sector, produce, export and compete effectively in the global market. For instance, some stringent SPS requirements cannot be met by small farmers in Tanzania due to the limited resources required for modern agriculture and consequently hinder the export of horticultural products, as meeting the standards can be costly.

Additionally, inconsistent enforcement of SPS regulations across different institutions and regions within Tanzania creates confusion and delays in trade processes and hence affects the competitiveness of Tanzanian products in international markets.

Furthermore, procedural framework for SPS regulation has shortcomings in the institutional framework and that, as a result, application of the existing legislations is impaired. There is limited capacity for speedy and quality testing and certification facilities. This lead to bottlenecks in the export process, delaying shipments and increasing costs for exporters.

Other challenges are; limited funding to attract and retain high quality talent, lack of transparency in certification, duplication of regulatory functions, poor coordination among the various SPS control agencies, lack of mutual confidence between enforcement agencies in different countries and non-existence of arrangements and mutual recognition agreements signed to facilitate trade.

Impact on regional and International Trade

 The effectiveness of Tanzania’s SPS regime significantly influences its international trade in horticultural products and therefore, there is a need to balance regulatory practices for health protection with trade facilitation. However, if not addressed, the regime may, and for purposes of enforcement of SPS controls, create trade constraints such as;

  • Market Access Restrictions: Non-compliance with SPS measures restricts access to lucrative international markets that is with stringent regulations, the production costs for horticultural producers may increase and making Tanzanian products less competitive compared to those from other countries. Kenya, Tanzania’s immediate horticultural competitor has been successful in meeting the standards at lower costs and thereby dominating the regional and international market of horticultural products.
  • Loss of Revenue: Inability to meet SPS standard leads to rejected shipments, financial losses, and diminished competitiveness in global markets, affecting the revenue generated from horticultural exports and thus undermines economic growth potential in the horticultural sector.
  • Diminished Reputation: Persistent challenges in meeting SPS standards tarnish Tanzania’s reputation as a reliable supplier of safe and high-quality horticultural products, thereby reducing consumer confidence and market demand.
  • Market Diversification: Strict regulatory requirements may incentivize Tanzanian exporters to explore new markets where compliance costs are lower or where there is greater alignment between domestic and international standards.
  • Quality Perception: Adherence to rigorous quality and safety standards can enhance the perception of Tanzanian horticultural products in international markets, positioning them as premium offerings valued for their quality and reliability. This could open up opportunities for niche markets and premium pricing strategies.

Policy Recommendations

Addressing challenges in Tanzania’s SPS regime for horticultural products is crucial for unlocking the sector’s full export potential, facilitating more investment and fostering sustainable economic growth. By implementing the recommendations outlined in this brief below, Tanzania can overcome SPS-related barriers to international trade and position itself in the global horticultural market as a reliable supplier of high-quality horticultural products and maximize the benefits of international trade for the citizens and economy. The following recommendations are proposed:

  1. Improve coordination among regulatory agencies and investing in digital platforms for documentation and compliance verification to simplify and accelerate SPS certification procedures for horticultural products and this will cut costs, reduce trade barriers and enhance market access.
  2. Strengthen enforcement mechanisms by putting in place an enabling legal framework to create effective and expeditious administrative mechanisms and provide clear administrative redress mechanisms for handling trade complaints and disputes. Also, the framework should provide for coordination of the various SPS control agencies to avoid overlaps and duplication. The current regime lays a solid foundation for further improvement.
  1. Improve infrastructure by allocating resources for upgrading SPS-related infrastructure including laboratories, inspection facilities and cold chain logistics that will enable producers and exporters to meet international standards and capitalize on emerging market opportunities. Tanzania has a deficit of cold storage capacity and its location along the equator exposes horticultural products to heat waves and vulnerability rapid quality deterioration and waste.
  1. Recruit and retain high quality staff with the of international testing and certification requirements. This must also be followed by addressing administrative limitations and sealing off opportunities for corruption.
  1. Prioritize capacity building, awareness and improve dissemination of information on SPS particularly for producers, small-scale traders, exporters and raising initiatives for regulatory agencies, on legislation and regulations, processes, procedures, standards, best practices, and technological advancements to enhance competitiveness in global markets.
  1. Foster partnership between public and private sector stakeholders to develop and implement SPS-related programs, training, research & development, technology adoption and technical assistance so as to address common challenges and promote innovation in the horticultural value chain. This must be backed by scaled up SPS technical assistance, going beyond the implementing institutions but also extended to horticultural farmers.
  1. Advocate for harmonization of SPS standards with international norms and regional trade agreements to streamline trade procedures and facilitate market access for Tanzanian horticultural products. Horticulture farmers and exporters still complain of disharmony in application and enforcement between Tanzania and its trading partners such as the Tanzania-South Africa Avocado case in 2021[4].
  1. Establish and empower the National SPS Committee to address and resolve technical SPS issues faced by traders and increase transparency on SPS requirements. Moreover, the committee should also be the main source of information on new SPS regulations, including measures introduced by trading partners.
  1. Constantly review to ascertain the extent to which Tanzania’s SPS regime is aligned to the EAC SPS protocol and its application is consistent and facilitative of international trade. There are cases of selective application and enforcement even among EAC member states.

References

Ministry of Agriculture. (2022). “National Horticulture Development Strategy.” Retrieved from Online:    https://www.kilimo.go.tz/uploads/books/Mkakati_wa_Kuendeleza_Horticulture.pdf

Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS). (2022). “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures for Horticultural Products: Regulations and Compliance Guidelines.” Retrieved from Online: https://www.tbs.go.tz/uploads/files/LIST%20OF%20COMPULSORY%20TANZANIA%20STANDARD%20AS%20OF%20JULY%20%202022.pdf

Trade of Agriculture Safely and Efficiently in East Africa (TRASE) (2021). “Assessment of SPS Legal/Regulatory Frameworks in the EAC Partner States”. Retrieved from Online: https://storcpdkenticomedia.blob.core.windows.net/media/idd/media/lolorg/publications/assessment-of-sps-legal-systems-in-eac-partner-states-4th-june-2021.pdf

Trade of Agriculture Safely and Efficiently in East Africa (TRASE) (2021). “Assessment of SPS Systems in the EAC Partner States”. Retrieved from Online:  https://storcpdkenticomedia.blob.core.windows.net/media/idd/media/lolorg/publications/assessment-of-sps-systems-in-eac-partner-states-18th-march-2021-print-file-4th-june-2021.pdf

TradeMark East Africa: (2021). Standards, Quality Infrastructure, and SPS Programme: Project Brief: Retrieved from Online: https://www.trademarkafrica.com/project/standards-quality-infrastructure-and-sps-programme/

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (2021). “Good Practices for Strengthening National Plant Protection Organizations.” Retrieved from Online: https://www.fao.org/3/i6677e/i6677e.pdf

 [1] https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/magazines/what-44-percent-rise-in-horticulture-exports-means-to-tanzania-4510004

[2] https://www.tphpa.go.tz/

[3] https://www.tbs.go.tz/pages/historical-background

[4] https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/tanzanian-avocado-exports-poised-to-grace-sa-tables-3506248

The Petals of Blood: Dissecting the contagion effect of Sudan war on South Sudan and EAC with lessons on governance and state failure

The Sudan war has been raging for almost a year, with catastrophic effects now spreading beyond Sudan’s borders, affecting its neighboring South Sudan and the East Africa Community (EAC) in many ways.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre & James Boboya, Institute of Social Policy and Research (ISCPR), South Sudan

According to the United Nations, since it started, the war has now destabilized the entire region, leading to the deaths of more than 5,000 Sudanese and displacing millions both within the African nation and across seven national borders.[1]  Sudan is now home to the highest number of internally displaced anywhere in the world, with at least 7.1 million uprooted.[2] More than 6 million Sudanese are suffering from famine, and these numbers are growing every day.  The health system has broken down, and more than 1,200 children have died from malnutrition and lack of essential care. [3]The UN now describes the Sudan conflict as a forgotten humanitarian disaster, while the International Crisis Group has warned that Sudan’s future, and much else, is at stake.

Lest we forget, within a short period, the third largest nation in Africa, with a size of more than 1.8886 million square kilometers and at least 46 million people, has no properly functioning government, and all state institutions have collapsed with the effects of its meltdown spilling over to its neighbors, particularly South Sudan.

South Sudan is host to thousands of Sudanese refugees forced across the border into South Sudan, exerting social and economic pressure on an already fragile state that was already sinking under the burden of its own civil war and internal conflicts.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) reports that more than 500,000 people have now fled from the war in Sudan to South Sudan. [1]This means that over 30 percent of all the refugees, asylum seekers, and ethnic South Sudanese were forced to flee Sudan since the war exploded in April 2023 for protection in one of the poorest places on earth. “South Sudan, that has itself recently come out of decades of war, was facing a dire humanitarian situation before the war in Sudan erupted. It already had nine million people in need of humanitarian aid, and almost 60 per cent of the population facing high levels of food insecurity.

As of 28 January 2024, more than 528,000 ethnic South Sudanese, Sudanese refugees, and other third-country nationals had crossed at entry points along the South Sudan border into Abyei Administrative Area, Upper Nile, Unity, Northern, and Western Bahr El Ghazal. The majority, 81 percent, entered at Jodrah before making their way to the transit center in Renk. Ethnic South Sudanese who have crossed the border from Sudan are commonly referred to as “returnees.” Still, in reality, many of them were born in Sudan and have never been in South Sudan, and therefore have no kinship connection in host communities.

The conflict has spilled deeper into other East African countries, with thousands seeking refuge and safety from it. The education system collapsed, sending thousands of learners back home and hundreds who could afford to flee exile to continue their studies. Some of these were admitted to Rwandan and Tanzanian Universities.

The Sudan and South Sudan experiment was a governance disaster in the waiting and perhaps serves as a lesson of how a firm grip on power, corruption, and misgovernance can ultimately lead to catastrophic state failure and collapse.

Donald Kasongi, Executive Director of Governance Links and a former senior officer with the Accord, a regional conflict organization, describes the post-Garang South Sudan and post-Bashir Sudan as a protracted governance failure. The diverse strategic roles of Khartoum, Beijing, and Washington in the Sweet South Sudanese oil are now evident.  So far, none is a victor.

The role of external interests in shaping national discourse has been at play. Sudan is caught between the interests of the West and the Middle East and China, with both interested in controlling access to Sudan’s resources, cultural wealth, and strategic positioning as a buffer between the North and South. Before the war, Sudan identified itself with the Islamic world and pronounced itself as an Islamic state. Despite this alignment, the OIC and the larger Islamic world has not come to its help. Sudan remains an isolated state left to collapse at its fate.

In South Sudan, the Garang vision of a strong independent nation was lost. After his demise most of the post Garang political elites or military war generals became pre-occupied on restoring the lost years at war by amassing wealth through corruption and sharing out of the limited resources from the oil resources. As a consequence, a strong nation is yet to be built. They had won the war but lost their country. The same mistake plays out in Sudan. Perhaps the conflict is a lesson on what it means to lose what is so dear to one- A country.

In short, the transition in both countries (Sudan and South Sudan) were not well managed and what we see are petals of blood from toxic flowers of bad governance which have flourished like a forest planted along the banks of the river Nile.

According to James Boboya, the Executive Director of the South worrisome. The raging war has made South Sudan’s oil exports via Port Sudan difficult. Oil exports have collapsed by more than half from 160,000 barrels per day in 2022 to 140,000 barrels per day in 2023. This was more than half of the previous peak of 350,000 barrels per day before civil war broke out in 2013.[2] The South Sudanese dollar collapsed in value. There is a financial crunch and the South Sudanese government has not paid its public and civil servants for months. There is a risk of insurrection and demonstrations by public servants that will be likely joined by the military. This would plunge South Sudan into chaos and total collapse just like its Northern neighbor.

Moreover, this conflict and its associated effects comes in an election year for South Sudan.  The general elections are viewed as a watershed moment which may see a transition from President Salva Keir to a new cadre of leadership. With the economic crunch, South Sudan may not be able to organize and fund a credible general election. This will be not good for South Sudan’s democracy and desired future.

With the world’s media focused on the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Gaza wars, little is covered about the Sudan conflicts nor the total economic catastrophe that South Sudan faces.

If not addressed, the Sudan war will be soon inside the borders of the EAC. Can the EAC afford to stand by and watch longer as its member state, collapses.  Mediation efforts led by Kenya and Djbouti were postponed last year. Direct talks between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s army chief and de facto head of state, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, head of the RSF paramilitaries remain futile.  What can South Sudan and the EAC do now to avert further catastrophe?

During a joint webinar organized by the Governance and Economic Policy Center (GEPC) and the Institute of Social Policy and Research (ISCR) in South Sudan in April, a distinguished panel of experts discussed and enabled us to understand the contradictions and magnitude of this war with implications and lessons on extractive governance, and state collapse drawn for East Africa and Africa generally, can be taken to avert the situation and its contagion effect on the EAC and Africa generally. The panelists and participants highlighted some key lessons and takeaways that can be drawn from the conflict.

Key lessons and takeaways

Ethnicization of politics and governance can lead to a spiral of violence and catastrophic state collapse, especially when the strong ruling elite and regime finally lose control of power.

A previously united Sudan started getting balkanized when the ruling elites started practicing the politics of ethnicity and religion pitting the largely Muslims in the northern and western parts of the country against their Christian southerners.  The Christians were portrayed as slightly inferior, denied political and economic opportunity, and subjected to forced Islamisation, and inhumane conditions such as slavery. Faced with what was considered unbecoming conditions the Southerners opted for a rebellion and demand for independence. The first and second Sudanese civil war (including the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM/A) were born and the political dynamics in Sudan changed for decades after. New factions such as the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) emerged and Sudan never remained the same.  Sentiments for cessation and independence in Darfur flared and faced with an insurgency, President Omar enlisted militias including the Janjaweed to quell the rebellions. Around 10,000 were killed and over 2.5 million displaced. The balkanisation of Sudan was continuing to play out.

Militarisation of politics erodes democratic values and principles which can take decades to rebuild.

Omar Bashir came to power in 1989 when, as a brigadier general in the Sudanese Army, he led a group of officers in a military coup that ousted the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi after it began negotiations with rebels in the south. Omar Bashir subsequently replaced President Ahmed al-Mirghani as head of state and ruled with the military closely fused into the politics and governance of Sudan.

The military elites elevated to power during President Omar Bashir’s government enjoyed privileged positions.  Even with his overthrow in 2019, these generals maintained a firm grip on the Transition Military Council and the Civil-Military Sovereignty Council.  These are less likely to accept any position below total control of the central authority. The net effect is that the return to full civilian and democratic rule of state governance in an entrenched militarized political environment such as Sudan can or may take decades to be rebuilt.

Vulnerability to geopolitical manipulation and fiddle diddle can be a driver to political instability and eventual weak governance

Both Sudan and South Sudan have been victims of well-orchestrated geopolitical game plans from external powers interested in taking control of the rich natural resources wealth that these countries possess. Sudan and South Sudan have vast oil deposits and forestry products.  With eyes focused on these resources external powers succeeded in playing one community against another and one country against the other and successfully throwing the region into an abyss of endless crisis. Religion was used as a tool to play the North against the South and continues to be used in some segments of the Sudanese and South Sudanese communities.

Key Takeaways

  1. The East African Community (EAC) governments cannot afford to take a wait-and-see attitude. The problems facing Sudan and South Sudan are latently present in several other EAC countries. For this reason, therefore without taking lessons from Sudan and South Sudan other countries can also easily erupt in the future, bringing down the entire EAC. The EAC has therefore an obligation to ramp up support for the resumption of the peace process and finding lasting solutions for peace and tranquility in the two countries. For this to happen there has to be trust and objectivity of the actors to the crisis and the EAC mediators. 
  1. Stop ethnicization and militarization of politics and state governance: The Sudan experience demonstrates this, whereby the collapse of President Omar Bashir’s strong grip on power let loose the lid off a can of worms that had eaten the state to its collapse. Similar conditions of ethnic rivalry in state governance have created uncertainty about guaranteed stability in South Sudan. In some other EAC member states there have been attempts to elevate dominant ethnic groups to power and military influence in state politics built around one strong leader. The Sudan experience demonstrates that the absence of such a strong leader holding the center together can lead to a lacuna, leading to a trail of conflict and instability leading governance to fall apart and eventual state collapse.
  1. The EAC countries must stop viewing at South Sudan as merely a market but as an independent viable state whose stability is good for the entire region. According to the EAC trade statistics, South Sudan was the leading market for goods from Uganda and Kenya. With a total population of 11 million and a collapsed agricultural and industrial base, South Sudan has provided a ready market for agricultural goods and manufactured goods from Uganda and Kenya. According to UN Comtrade Data Uganda exported goods worth USD483.9Mln and Kenya’s exports to South Sudan were worth USD170Mln. Uganda’s exports to Sudan also increased by 154% from around USD48Mln in 2016 to USD123Mln in 2022.  With the eyes largely focused on trade opportunities, there can be a tendency to lose track of the human suffering that the people in these countries face. Also, the jostle for geopolitical control over trade deals can overwhelm the genuine solidarity intentions of good neighbors. The EAC members should focus on the stability of these countries. 
  1. The International Community Must not give up on Sudan and South Sudan. Despite the donor fatigue and reports of corruption, the international community has a moral obligation to continue engaging with the protagonists in the war, facilitating the avenues for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and providing humanitarian aid to the suffering people. The Sudan and South Sudan conflict must be treated with equal measure with the Ukraine-Russia, Israel, and Gaza conflicts. The EAC must scale up diplomatic efforts and be an Anchor in Chief in this process, coordinating and connecting Sudan, South Sudan to the world. 
  1. The EAC media and Civil society must continue highlighting the suffering in Sudan and South Sudan. With the Israel and Gaza war ongoing, the Sudan and South Sudan stories that were largely covered by the Western media have since died out.  There has been little coverage given within the EAC of the recent developments in this war and how it is affecting its neighbors. Moreover, with limited internet connectivity and restrictive conditions, communication advocacy from inside Sudan and South Sudan is quite difficult.  The media and civil society in the EAC therefore must speak loud on behalf of their Sudanese counterparts

 

[1] War in Sudan displaces over 500,000 to South Sudanhttps://www.nrc.no/news/2024/january/sudan-refugees-to-south-sudan/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CMore%20than%20500%2C000%20people%20have,the%20poorest%20places%20on%20earth.

[2] The East African Business Khartoum unable to ensure smooth export of South Sudan oil https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/khartoum-unable-to-ensure-smooth-export-of-south-sudanese-oil-4564064

[1] Sudan conflict: ‘Our lives have become a piece of hell’ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67438018

[2] War in Sudan: more than 7 million displaced – UNhttps://www.africanews.com/2023/12/22/war-in-sudan-more-than-7-million-displaced-un//

[3] More than 1,200 children have died in the past 5 months in conflict-wrecked Sudan, the UN sayshttps://apnews.com/article/sudan-conflict-military-rsf-children-measles-malnutrition-ec7bb2a1f49d74e7b5f01afa12f16d99

Oil and Energy Transition: Why Sudan conflict provides new hope for EACOP

The Sudan conflict is a catastrophe that must be stopped but its unintended consequences provide new optimism for the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP).

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Center

With the constant fighting and insecurity along the pipeline and its pumping stations, the South Sudanese government is now open to exploring new opportunities via EACOP to guarantee its future oil exports.

On March 16th the government of Sudan admitted that it cannot guarantee the smooth export of oil from South Sudan, as a year of war has made it difficult to maintain or even protect the pipeline to Port Sudan.

In a letter to major oil companies involved in the oil production and export, Sudan’s Minister of Energy and Petroleum Dr Mohieldin Nam Mohamed Said admitted that the war had made it difficult to provide any guarantees for safety.

He acknowledged that the conflict was hampering the flow of oil to Port Sudan, as it took time to repair pipelines ruptured during the fighting. In addition, there was a telecommunications breakdown between the pumping stations (PS4) and PS5 in Sudan, which were shut down in the midst of heavy fighting. The area was an active military zone and access for repairs was not guaranteed.

As a response the South Sudanese government had declared a force majeure, making production and export impossible and thereby revamping suggestions to explore new possible safer routes for South Sudan’s oil.

The war in Sudan added to the challenges South Sudan faces in maximizing its only major resource – oil – to fund a financially constrained government and other operations.  As a consequence of the war, South Sudan’s oil production fell from 160,000 barrels per day in 2022 to 140,000 barrels per day in 2023. This is was more than half of the previous peak of 350,000 barrels per day before civil war broke out in 2013.

Talks to have South Sudan pump its oil south wards had all along been explored and presented as part of Uganda’s grand plan to make the EACOP an East African project by connecting and supplying all the EAC member states with oil and gas.

Under this grand plan and initial drawings, the Oil pipeline would radiate from its nerve center in Hoima with an artery of pipelines running northwards to South Sudan, westwards to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), eastwards to connect Kenya’s oil from Turkana and southwards with an arm extended to Rwanda and long route via Tanzania to Tanga port.

Map showing initially considered alternative EACOP routes

But the progress of this was partly hampered by Uganda’s fall out with the Kenyan route and the existing agreements signed between Khartoum and Juba during the independence talks. Provisions in these required among others a concession that Sudan will retain territorial control of some oil rich territories and that South Sudan would continue exporting its oil via Port Sudan. By doing this, the government in Khartoum would maintain some revenues from the oil sector that had been largely lost with South Sudan’s cessation and independence.

I remember in a private conversation with a friend from Sudan some years ago he confided that during one meeting with   Sudanese youth and young professionals, President Omar Bashir, before his overthrow, had admitted that he was not sure about the economic future of Sudan without South Sudan. He clearly predicted a catastrophic economic meltdown leading to chaos and that was why Sudan had to maintain a grip on South Sudan. The oil pipeline was a win-win infrastructure politically and economically anchoring the two countries as good neighbors.

By Sudan admitting that the safety cannot be guaranteed and reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure will take longer than usual provides South Sudan with a legitimate cause to start exploring new safe routes for its oil.

An oil route from Juba southward would be beneficial to South Sudan, the EACOP but also good for the East African Community as a region. South Sudan derives 90% of its revenues from oil exports and would like to have a constant flow of this oil to sustain its economy. EACOP would guarantee that flow. South Sudan would also have access to other EACOP related infrastructure such as the refinery and international airport for other logistical needs.

An extended pipeline from Hoima northwards to connect with the oil from South Sudan would increase volumes of oil pumped out of EACOP by at least 150,000 to 200,000 barrels per day, increasing EACOP’s profitability and attractiveness to investors.

Moreover, with its oil, South Sudan would become a major regional player with a stronger voice in EAC matters perhaps more than it is today. The pipeline would bring Sudan in the north closer to the EAC, increasing its prospects for joining the EAC and thus facilitating the region’s expansion ambitions.

There could be some differences in the chemical composition and technical aspects of the two oils (Uganda and South Sudan) with perhaps one being waxier than the other but these complexities can be handled through technical re-engineering and design of the oil pipeline.

The EACOP has always been a controversial project with environmental activists and anti-oil crusaders campaigning against its construction.  Environmentalists argued that the world’s longest heated pipeline will have serious environmental impacts and contribute to global warming. The future profitability of the pipeline was also questioned given the global push towards a transition away from fossil-based system and uncertainty about the future of oil as an energy source.

None the less, plans for construction of the pipeline are ongoing.  Land compensations in Uganda and Tanzania was completed. An advance consignment of pipes was delivered and a coating and insulating plant for the pipelines was commissioned and already operational in Tanzania, paving way for the pipeline construction and ground laying to commence before end of 2024.

The conflict in Sudan therefore provides more impetus to the project as it opens a new door for possible access and increased volumes from South Sudan’s oil and taping into already existing markets can be guaranteed.

The future of oil as a dominant fuel in the global energy system is a controversial subject and a debate exists whether it makes sense to construct new oil pipelines and infrastructure.  

However, the crisis and the significance of oil in driving South Sudan’s economy comes at a time when there are all indications that major global super powers such as the United States and United Kingdom are backtracking on their commitments to end and move away from fossil or oil as source of energy.

Despite the announcements made at the COP27 and 28, in his maiden speech to Parliament, King Charles in November 2023 announced that the UK government will issue new licensing rounds for exploration and drilling of oil and gas in the North Sea. The rounds will go ahead each year so long as the UK remains a net importer of oil and gas and if emissions from UK-based production remain lower than those associated with imports.

In the US, Republicans have maintained a firm support for oil and Donald Trump, the most preferred Republican nominee for President has vowed to overturn any existing legislation and commitments made by the Democrats against the fossil energy sector, by signing an executive order to issue new rounds oil and gas drilling.  According to Trump this would be his first executive order immediately signed, if he was elected to power in November of 2024. Clearly, the US political will is divided and the future US policy terrain on oil and gas cannot be guaranteed.

Quietly, the leading oil producers are strongly supporting continued pumping of oil. Despite global campaigns, large oil producers are still skeptical that renewables can replace oil in the medium term and by 2050. They believe that the focus should be on decarbonizing oil and not ending its supply and use all together. Ending use of oil would be returning the world to stone age error, one Middle East leader remarked at COP28 before backtracking after coming under intense criticism. The approved language at COP28 was phase down and not phaseout. Oil therefore may have a longer lifetime than earlier anticipated.

Despite the catastrophe that the war has caused, that we all condemn, Uganda and Tanzania should exploit the opportunity it provides to ramp up and conclude talks with South Sudan on the viability of exporting its oil via EACOP.