Enhancing the Viability of NDCs in East Africa: Assessing Progress, Gaps and path to net zero

Author: Nader Khalifa, Researcher, Governance and Economic Policy Centre*, December 2025

Introduction: COP30 as the Implementation Milestone

The COP30 in Belém – Brazil marked a critical milestone, being framed as the “Implementation COP,” arriving a decade after the signing of the Paris Agreement and returning to Brazil over 30 years since the landmark 1992 Earth Summit. The COP concluded with some proclamations on Just Transition Mechanism and adoption of Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) indicators, and increased focus on nature and finance but little radical actions to tame the climate crisis under 1.5°C target.

Despite the milestones, global implementation remains off-track, with countries collectively failing to reduce emissions and scale resilience at the pace required. The climate crisis is still treated with suspicion, geopolitical jostling and underfunded, highlighting a clear gap between ambition and action. Only small share around 12–15% of European climate finance is accessible to the poorest and most climate-vulnerable African countries, far below their share of climate risk and need (OECD, 2023). In East Arica, analysis of climate adaptation finance shows that approximately 52.7 % of funds committed for adaptation were actually disbursed between 2009 and 2018 (Savvidou et al., 2021).

This paper assesses the state of global progress on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), with a particular focus on East African countries—Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda. It further compares the level of NDC implementation and financial support needs in these countries against the climate finance commitments and disbursements of selected European nations, evaluating whether NDCs remain viable tools for achieving the Paris Agreement objectives, identifying gaps, and proposes strategic recommendations to strengthen their viability in achieving Paris Agreement goals.

Global NDC Assessment: Are We on Track for Paris Targets?

According to the UNFCCC’s latest NDC Synthesis Report (2023–2024), global emissions remain far above Paris-aligned trajectories. Current NDCs collectively put the world on a 2.4–2.6°C warming path far from the 1.5°C target (UNEP, 2023).

NDC Implementation Gap: Structural Barriers and Evidence of Underperformance

Although East African countries have strengthened their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) since 2015—many increasing mitigations ambition by over 20–30% and expanding adaptation priorities—the region continues to face a widening implementation gap as real-world emission reductions have not followed at the required scale. This gap reflects both systemic constraints and insufficient translation of political commitments into measurable action and raises serious questions about whether NDCs, as currently designed, can deliver the Paris outcomes.

Key Implementation Gaps and Challenges

High dependence on external climate finance

  • Most East African NDCs rely on 70–90% external financing, particularly for adaptation and energy transition.
  • The region collectively requires more than USD 280–300 billion by 2030, yet receives less than 12%–15% of that annually (AfDB, 2023).
  • Adaptation finance alone is underfunded by over USD 2.5 billion per year across the region (GCA, 2023).

Limited progress in translating NDC commitments into sectoral action

  • Updated NDCs include ambitious mitigation targets—such as Kenya’s 32% by 2030, Uganda’s 22%, and Ethiopia’s conditional 68%—yet emissions continue to rise in transport, agriculture, and industry.
  • Only 20–30% of planned mitigation actions are currently being implemented at scale.

Weak MRV systems and institutional capacity

  • More than 70% of East African countries lack fully operational MRV systems across energy, agriculture, and waste sectors.
  • Inadequate data collection and reporting reduce accountability and hinder access to climate finance, which increasingly requires robust tracking frameworks (ICAT, 2022).

Limited domestic integration and mainstreaming

  • NDCs remain insufficiently embedded in national and subnational development plans.
  • Fewer than 40% of sector ministries align annual budgets with NDC priorities, creating fragmentation and slow execution.
  • Local governments—key for adaptation delivery—receive less than 10% of the required climate financing.

Slow and complex climate finance disbursement

  • Global climate funds (e.g., GCF, GEF) take 18–24 months on average from concept to approval.
  • East Africa adaptation finance disbursement ratio (≈52.7 %), considerably below what’s needed and indicating a persistent delivery gap.
  • Private-sector investment remains below USD 4 billion per year, far short of the USD 24–30 billion needed annually.

Limited community participation in planning and delivery

  • NDC implementation often excludes rural and climate-vulnerable communities, despite these groups experiencing more than 70% of climate impacts (floods, droughts, crop failures).
  • This reduces local ownership and increases the risk of maladaptation.

East African NDCs: Ambition, Progress, and Implementation Realities

The second generation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in East Africa demonstrates a clear increase in ambition compared to 2015 submissions. However, implementation continues to lag far behind targets due to systemic financing, institutional, and capacity constraints. This section synthesizes the ambition levels, progress indicators, and the underlying structural barriers limiting effective delivery of NDC commitments in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda.

Ambition Levels and Emission Reduction Targets

All four East African countries have strengthened their 2030 climate commitments, reflecting enhanced sectoral coverage (Kenya: Energy, agriculture, LULUCF, transport, waste, Tanzania: Energy, transport, forestry, waste, Uganda: Energy, forestry, agriculture, Rwanda: Energy, industry, waste, agriculture) and improved quantification of mitigation and adaptation actions.

These targets indicate rising ambition; however, nearly 80–90% of planned mitigation outcomes remain dependent on external finance, highlighting an imbalance between national ambition and the available resource base.

  • Implementation Status: Progress and Performance

Despite strong stated ambition, real implementation remains uneven and significantly below required trajectories. Key observations include:

Positive Developments

  • Kenya continues to lead the region in renewable energy deployment, with geothermal providing over 40% of total power generation, complemented by utility-scale wind and solar.
  • Rwanda operates one of the most advanced MRV systems in Africa, integrating national inventories, sectoral reporting templates, and verification frameworks.
  • Tanzania and Uganda have made notable progress in adaptation planning, particularly in agriculture, water, and disaster risk management.

However, progress falls short of NDC trajectories due to:

  • Delayed and unpredictable international climate finance disbursement, especially for adaptation.
  • Limited mainstreaming of NDCs, with weak integration into national development plans, sectoral strategies, and district-level programs.
  • Technical gaps in MRV, GHG accounting, emissions modeling, and data management.
  • Insufficient private sector participation due to regulatory uncertainty, weak incentives, and few bankable climate projects.

Overall, implementation progress remains slow, fragmented, and insufficient to place the region on a Paris-aligned trajectory.

Climate Finance Needs, Delivery, and the Widening Gap

East African NDCs require substantial financing for both mitigation and adaptation. Country estimates highlight an urgent mismatch between required and delivered resources:

Evidence of the Finance Gap

  • East Africa receives less than 12% of Africa’s total climate finance inflows (CPI, 2024).
  • Adaptation finance remains below 30% of total flows to the region, despite East Africa being among the world’s most climate-vulnerable regions (Brookings Institution, 2022).
  • GCF projects in East Africa face approval timelines averaging 24–36 months, slowing implementation of urgent projects.
  • National institutions struggle to meet stringent fiduciary and documentation requirements of major climate funds.

Institutional, Governance, and Capacity Constraints

Several deep-rooted challenges hinder NDC implementation:

Institutional Challenges

  • Weak MRV systems in several countries limit tracking, reporting, and verification of progress.
  • Fragmented inter-ministerial coordination, especially between energy, finance, agriculture, and environment ministries.
  • Data deficits in key sectors (LULUCF, agriculture, off-grid energy, transport), affecting GHG inventory accuracy.

Governance and Operational Gaps

  • Limited local government engagement, despite significant adaptation actions being subnational.
  • Low public participation, particularly in rural and climate-vulnerable communities.
  • Few mature, bankable projects, leading to under-utilization of available finance windows.
  • Private sector climate investment remains below 15% of total climate finance in East Africa.

Collectively, these challenges reinforce the structural implementation gap, limiting the region’s ability to translate Paris ambition into real, measurable outcomes.

International Climate Finance Support: European Commitments vs. Delivery

    • Pledges vs. Delivered Finance

European countries — led by Germany, France, the EU, and the UK — collectively pledge significant climate finance to Africa. However, the delivery gap remains substantial:

  • OECD data show that while European donors reported USD 34–36 billion in climate finance annually (2019–2022), the actual disbursements to African LDCs were less than USD 9–11 billion.
  • Only around 12–15% of European climate finance is accessible to the poorest and most climate-vulnerable African countries.
  • Adaptation finance remains critically low: in 2022, EU institutions allocated only 27% of their climate finance to adaptation—far below the 50% target encouraged by COP26 and COP27 decisions.
  • The UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance confirms a USD 1.2–1.3 trillion cumulative finance gaps for African NDCs by 2030.
  • According to a report by FSD Africa, the average disbursement ratio for climate finance in Africa is 79%, which includes both mitigation and adaptation flows CPI (2022).
  • According to Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) data, adaptation finance for African countries was disbursed at an average rate of 46%, compared to 56% for mitigation finance.
  • The Landscape of Climate Finance in Africa (2024) report from the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) estimates that adaptation finance flows to Africa rose from USD 11.8 billion in 2019/20 to USD 13.8 billion in 2021/22.

Misalignment with African Priorities

European finance is still mitigation-heavy, although Africa’s most urgent needs relate to adaptation:

  • More than 65–70% of EU climate finance to Africa goes to mitigation sectors (renewables, energy efficiency).
  • Adaptation sectors such as agriculture, water management, early warning systems, and climate-resilient infrastructure receive less than 30%.
  • UNEP’s Adaptation Gap Report indicates that adaptation finance globally is also constrained, Analyses show that a large majority of adaptation actions identified in African NDCs remain unfunded or underfunded, with only around 20–23% of adaptation needs being met by climate finance flows, leaving substantial gaps for implementation. (UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2023).
  • The African Development Bank estimates that Africa needs USD 52–57 billion/year in adaptation finance but currently receives less than USD 11.4 billion/year.
    • Systemic Barriers Limiting Access to European & Multilateral Funds

African LDCs face structural constraints that prevent them from accessing European climate finance effectively:

  • Approval cycles for GCF and GEF projects routinely takes time, delaying implementation.
  • High fiduciary standards, financial reporting requirements, and bankability tests result in rejection or delays for NDC-aligned proposals.
  • Only 14 African national institutions are currently accredited to the GCF, limiting direct access.
  • Less than 5% of readiness funding reaches local MRV institutions, leading to persistent data gaps.
  • Technical assistance for NDC implementation—planning, monitoring, tracking, and verification—remains insufficient for most countries.

This combination makes African NDCs remain “ambitious on paper, underfunded in practice.”

Why NDCs Still Matter

Despite finance and implementation challenges, NDCs remain central to Africa’s climate and development future because they:

  • Define and update national climate ambition every five years;
  • Guide investment pathways in mitigation and adaptation;
  • Anchor national development plans to climate-resilient trajectories;
  • Serve as the main framework for accessing climate finance;
  • Provide structure for reporting under the Enhanced Transparency Framework.

Strengthening NDC design, financing, MRV, and implementation support is fundamental post-COP30, where countries are expected to raise ambition and demonstrate credible progress.

Policy Recommendations

To close the growing implementation gap and ensure that East African NDCs deliver measurable climate outcomes, the following evidence-based policy actions are proposed. These recommendations strengthen institutional capacity, enhance climate finance access, accelerate sectoral mainstreaming, and improve accountability post-COP30.

  • Strengthen Institutional and Technical Capacity
  • Establish Dedicated NDC Implementation Units

Create permanent, inter-ministerial NDC coordination units mandated to align sectoral policies, oversee progress, and engage with development partners.

  • Upgrade MRV Systems and Technical Competencies

Invest in end-to-end MRV systems—GHG inventories, mitigation tracking, adaptation metrics, and digital monitoring tools—while providing continuous training for sector ministries.

  • Develop National Climate Data Repositories

Build centralized climate data platforms for agriculture, energy, transport, and land use to enhance evidence-based policymaking and transparency.

  • Enhance Climate Finance Mobilization and Access
  • Formulate National Climate Finance Strategies:

Align domestic priorities with the eligibility criteria of the GCF, GEF, Adaptation Fund, and bilateral donors to improve approval rates and reduce project rejection.

  • Increase Readiness and Project Preparation Funding

Expand participation in GCF Readiness, NDC Partnership support, and GEF capacity-building programs to address limited pipeline of bankable projects.

  • Promote Blended Finance and Private Sector Mobilization

Introduce policy incentives for green bonds, guarantees, concessional loans, and PPPs to unlock long-term mitigation and adaptation investments.

  • Advocate for Simplified Access Windows for LDCs

The future COPs must negotiate streamlined procedures, reduced documentation requirements, and faster approval timelines for LDC and fragile countries.

  • Mainstream NDCs into National and Local Development Planning
  • Integrate NDC Targets into National Budgets and Sector Plans

Embed climate actions in annual budget cycles, Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks, and district/county development plans.

  • Establish Performance Indicators for Line Ministries

Link ministerial scorecards and KPIs with measurable NDC outcomes to strengthen accountability and accelerate implementation.

  • Embed Adaptation into Core Sectors

Ensure NDC-aligned adaptation actions are systematically integrated into agriculture, water, health, infrastructure, and urban planning frameworks.

  • Scale Up Community and Citizen Participation
  • Adopt Community-Based Adaptation (CBA) Frameworks

Expand participatory adaptation programs in rural and climate-vulnerable regions, supported by local extension systems.

  • Link Rural Development Programs to NDC Outcomes

Prioritize climate-smart agriculture, reforestation, watershed management, and off-grid energy in rural development interventions.

  • Strengthen Gender and Youth Inclusion

Mandate gender-responsive planning and youth representation in NDC committees, local climate governance, and project implementation.

  • Enhance Regional Cooperation and Knowledge Exchange
  • Establish a Regional MRV and Knowledge Platform

Under the East African Community (EAC), create a shared platform for data exchange, methodologies, and best practices on GHG inventories and sectoral MRV.

  • Promote Cross-Border Renewable Energy Corridors

Accelerate regional geothermal, hydro, and solar initiatives, along with power-pool integration and transmission infrastructure.

  • Strengthen Transboundary Ecosystem Management

Improve joint management of critical basins—Lake Victoria, the Nile, and rangeland ecosystems—to enhance resilience and disaster risk reduction.

  • Improve Transparency, Governance, and Accountability
  • Publish Annual NDC Implementation Reports

Introduce open-access dashboards that track emissions, adaptation progress, climate finance flows, and project delivery.

  • Create Independent Oversight Mechanisms

Establish multi-stakeholder oversight bodies involving civil society, academia, and the private sector to review progress and recommend corrective actions.

  • Mandate Public Disclosure of Climate Finance

Require transparent reporting of all international and domestic climate finance flows, including donor commitments, disbursements, and utilization.

About the Author: Nader Khalifa is an engineer and energy professional with over 15 years of expertise in the energy and petroleum sectors. He currently serves with the Ministry of Energy & Petroleum of Sudan, in addition to his role as a Sudan Team Member for the Initiative on Climate Action Transparency (ICAT) project, a collaborative effort involving UNEP, CCC, and HCENR, and a distinguished researcher and a Colosseum Member at the Governance & Economic Policy Centre (GEPC).

References

  1. African Development Bank (AfDB) (2023). Climate finance in Africa: Overview and outlook. Abidjan: African Development Bank Group.
  2. Brookings Institution (2022). Finance for climate adaptation in Africa: Still insufficient and losing ground. Brookings Global Economy and Development Program. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/finance-for-climate-adaptation-in-africa-still-insufficient-and-losing-ground/.
  3. Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) (2024). Landscape of climate finance in Africa. London: Climate Policy Initiative. Available at: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/landscape-of-climate-finance-in-africa-2024/.
  4. FSD Africa & Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) (2022). Landscape of climate finance in Africa. Nairobi: FSD Africa. Available at: https://fsdafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/1.-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-in-Africa-l-Full-report.pdf 
  5. Global Center on Adaptation (GCA) (2023). Africa’s adaptation gap: Climate finance needs and priorities. Rotterdam: Global Center on Adaptation. Available at: https://gca.org/reports/state-and-trends-in-adaptation/.
  6. Government of Kenya (2020). Updated Nationally Determined Contribution. Nairobi: Ministry of Environment and Forestry.
  7. Government of Rwanda (2020). Updated NDC Submission. Kigali: Ministry of Environment.
  8. Government of Tanzania (2021). Updated Nationally Determined Contribution. Dodoma: Vice President’s Office.
  9. Government of Uganda (2022). Second Nationally Determined Contribution. Kampala: Ministry of Water and Environment.
  10. ICAT (2022). Guidance for Transparency Frameworks in LDCs. Copenhagen: Initiative on Climate Action Transparency.
  11. IPCC (2022). AR6 Working Group III: Mitigation of climate change. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/.
  1. Nature (2025). Reframing climate finance for Africa. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/d44148-025-00353-5
  1. OECD (2023). Climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries in 2013–2021. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/environment/climate-finance-provided-and-mobilised-by-developed-countries.htm.
  2. Savvidou, G., Atteridge, A., Omari-Motsumi, K. and Trisos, C. (2021). Quantifying international public finance for climate change adaptation in Africa. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute. Available at: https://www.sei.org/publications/climate-finance-adaptation-africa/.
  1. Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) (2024). How effective is climate finance in assisting farmers in low- and middle-income countries adapt to climate change? Available at: https://www.sei.org/features/how-effective-is-climate-finance-in-assisting-farmers-in-low-and-middle-income-countries-adapt-to-climate-change/
  2. UNEP (2023). Adaptation Gap Report 2023: Underfinanced, underprepared. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. Available at: https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2023
  3. UNFCCC (2023). Nationally Determined Contributions synthesis report. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Available at: https://unfccc.int/ndc-synthesis-report-2023

 

 

Climate Change action at Subnational level: Rationale for Skilling Local Government Authorities for Climate Change Action in Tanzania

By Ng’homange Merkiad James: Researcher, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

*Mr Ng’homange is a senior lecturer at the Local Government Training Institute (LGTI) at Hombolo, Dodoma

Climate change is one of the most pressing challenges facing Tanzania today, threatening livelihoods, infrastructure, and national development. Despite the growing national and global attention to climate policy, Local Government Authorities (LGAs) — the level of government closest to the people — remain inadequately skilled and resourced to respond effectively. This policy paper argues that building the capacity of LGAs is essential for translating Tanzania’s national climate change commitments into local action. It proposes targeted training, institutional support, and resource mobilization to strengthen LGAs’ roles in climate adaptation, mitigation, and energy transition initiatives.

 

  1. Introduction

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) warns that climate change is advancing rapidly, with the poorest communities in developing countries such as Tanzania facing the most severe and irreversible impacts. Prolonged droughts, erratic rainfall, and frequent floods are disrupting food systems, destroying infrastructure, and worsening health outcomes through increased exposure to diseases and air pollution.

In Tanzania, where over 80% of the rural population depends on rain-fed agriculture — a sector contributing more than 60% of the national GDP — the consequences are profound. Yet, despite these local-level vulnerabilities, climate change interventions and decision-making remain concentrated at the global and national levels, leaving LGAs on the periphery of policy and practice. Most local authorities lack the requisite knowledge, skills, and financial capacity to implement climate action plans, integrate adaptation into planning frameworks, or mobilize community-based mitigation measures.

Empowering LGAs through structured and context-relevant climate training can transform Tanzania’s climate governance landscape. Skilled LGAs can lead public education campaigns, enforce green urban planning, promote clean cooking technologies, and even issue municipal green bonds to finance sustainable infrastructure projects.

  1. The Nexus Between Climate Change and Local Governments

Local Government Authorities are semi-autonomous subnational governments mandated under the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982. They are responsible for promoting peace, order, decentralization, and socio-economic development in their jurisdictions.

The OECD defines a local authority as “a decentralized entity elected through universal suffrage and having general responsibilities and some autonomy with respect to budget, staff and assets” (OECD/UCLG, 2016[31]). While countries can be organised as unitary or federal states, they all rely on local authorities as entities for the delivery of various services[1].

The call for local adaptation action stems from the recognition that climate risks first manifest locally, and local communities and local authorities have an innate understanding of how impacts affect them and how they need to be addressed. Their proximity to communities makes them a critical actor in climate governance, as they are well positioned to identify local risks, mobilize citizens, and deliver adaptive responses.

However, low involvement in national climate processes, limited funding, and lack of technical expertise continue to hinder their potential. Without strong LGA engagement, Tanzania’s commitments to climate adaptation, resilience, and clean energy transition risk remaining unfulfilled.

  1. Climate Change Impacts and the Need to Skill Local Governments

Tanzania’s vulnerability to climate change is evident across multiple sectors — agriculture, water, energy, infrastructure, and health. Droughts and floods are already imposing economic losses, reducing productivity, and disrupting livelihoods. According to the National Climate Change Response Strategy (2021–2026), these impacts threaten to derail progress toward the country’s Vision 2025 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG7[2]).

The recent floods demonstrate Tanzania’s vulnerability and yet the, a statement on the Status of Tanzania Climate in 2022 from Tanzania Meteorological Authority revealed that extreme weather conditions such as increased seasonal variation in observed rainfall and temperature have been significant in most parts of Tanzania and this will continue in the foreseeable feature[3].

Global evidence underscores that effective climate action requires localized implementation. Transitioning to clean and renewable energy — such as solar, wind, and hydropower — is vital, but its success depends on local capacity to plan, regulate, and support adoption. LGAs, as the closest link between citizens and the state, must therefore be equipped to manage these transitions.

The OECD in 2023 observed that despite, their competencies and mandates, local governments cannot go alone, they need both national and global level support to fully tackle climate change mitigation and adaption measures.

Capacity building and empowering of local government authorities can be instrumentally transformative in advancing local community public education, municipal urban planning and green zoning, improved regulation and approval of municipal building permits that factor smart and clean energy technologies in new housing plans and settlements. Moreover, local authorities can play a significant role in the public education and distribution of clean cooking energy systems such as affordable gas stoves in rural areas.  Local municipal green bonds issued by local authorities can be a major source of unlocking local financing for green projects such as urban municipal public transportation, clean energy generation and public and private sector projects.

  1. Tanzania’s Climate Policy and Institutional Framework

Tanzania has made significant strides in developing its climate governance architecture. The country is a signatory to the Paris Agreement and aligns its national targets with the African Union Agenda 2063, emphasizing environmental sustainability and climate resilience. Domestically, the government has enacted several policies and frameworks, including:

  • National Environmental Policy (2021)
  • National Climate Change Strategy (2021–2026)
  • Nationally Determined Contributions (2021 & 2023 updates)
  • Environmental Management Act (Cap. 191 of 2004)
  • National Carbon Trading Guidelines (2022)
  • National Clean Cooking Strategy (2024)

Despite this robust framework, implementation remains centralized. Local governments, which are essential to the execution of climate adaptation and mitigation measures, are often excluded from planning and under-resourced for execution. This disconnect has limited the translation of policy commitments into community-level results.

  1. Bridging the Local Government Skills Gap

An  assessment by the Governance and Economic Policy Centre (GEPC) and the Local Government Training Institute (LGTI) at Hombolo identified major capacity and knowledge gaps among local government staff. While some departments offer courses on “Climate Change and Livelihoods,” these remain ad hoc, limited in scope, and inaccessible to most ward, village, and mtaa-level executives.

Climate change work within LGAs is often confined to environmental departments, yet the issue is multisectoral — spanning land use, infrastructure, agriculture, and social services. Many officials lack exposure to the global political economy of climate governance and energy transition. Consequently, LGAs are not effectively advising central government or local communities on context-appropriate climate actions. This skills deficit hinders local-level innovation and weakens citizen engagement. Without building LGA competencies, national adaptation and mitigation strategies risk being poorly implemented or misunderstood at the grassroots level. Moreover, the complex nature of Tanzania’s local government authority structure creates room for overlaps across multiple stakeholders and this creates information and knowledge asymmetries across the LGA structures.

  1. Policy Recommendations

To strengthen Tanzania’s climate resilience and ensure the effective localization of climate policies, this paper recommends the following:

  1. Develop and institutionalize intensive climate training programmes for LGA staff, covering adaptation, mitigation, and energy transition, aligned with national and global frameworks.
  2. Embed climate change modules in induction courses for all new LGA employees to build foundational understanding across departments.
  3. Enhance community engagement and education through LGAs on the benefits of clean energy, forest conservation, and sustainable resource use.
  4. Establish environmental and climate action teams at ward and village levels to coordinate awareness and mobilization campaigns.
  5. Produce and distribute simplified climate training manuals in Kiswahili for use by local officials and community groups.
  6. Support LGAs in action research and local climate data collection to inform evidence-based planning and monitoring.
  7. Facilitate access to local climate finance, including municipal green bonds and partnerships with development actors, to implement local adaptation projects.
  1. Conclusion

Tanzania’s climate response will only be as strong as its local institutions. Building the capacity of Local Government Authorities is not merely an administrative necessity but a strategic investment in sustainable development. Skilled and empowered LGAs can bridge the gap between national climate policy and community action — enabling Tanzania to achieve its commitments to resilience, clean energy, and inclusive green growth.

REFERENCES

Tanzania Meteorological Authority (2023) Statement on the Status of Tanzania climate in 2022, TMA, Dar es Salaam

United Republic of Tanzania (2021) National Environmental Policy 2021, Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2021) National Climate Change Response Strategy (2021-2026), Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2014) National Guidelines for Mainstreaming Gender into Environment, Vice President’s Office, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2021) National Determined Contribution, Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Government Printer, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2024) National Clean Cooking Strategy (2024 – 2034), Ministry of Energy, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2022) National Carbon Trading Guidelines, Vice President’s Office, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2010) Guidelines for The Preparation of Environmental Action Plans for Sector Ministries and Local Government Authorities, Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment, Dar es Salaam

United Republic of Tanzania (2017) National Guidelines for Strategic Environmental Assessment, Vice President’s Office, Dodoma

United Republic of Tanzania (2008) The Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania of 1977, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Republic of Tanzania (2004) National Environment Management Act of 2004, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Republic of Tanzania (2002) Local Government (District Authorities) Act, No. 7, (1982), Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Republic of Tanzania (2002) Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, No. 8, (1982), Dar es Salaam, Government Printer

United Nations (2023) Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report, UN Environment Programme

[1] OECD: Climate adaptation: why local governments cannot do it alone. Environment Policy Paper No. 38

[2] UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 7)

[3] Tanzania Meteorological Authority (2023) Statement on the Status of Tanzania climate in 2022, TMA, Dar es Salaam

Strengthening Local Governments in Climate Action Ahead of COP30

Position paper: Governance and Economic Policy Centre

 Introduction: The Local Nexus of Climate Action

Local Government Authorities (LGAs) are the closest level of governance to communities, charged with delivering essential services and implementing national policies at the grassroots. Their proximity to citizens makes them vital actors in addressing the localized impacts of climate change. However, despite their strategic role in adaptation and resilience-building, LGAs remain underrepresented in global climate policy and under-resourced in implementation.

As the world approaches COP30 in Brazil, which marks the halfway point to achieving the 2030 Paris Agreement goals, recognizing and empowering local governments is critical for translating global climate pledges into tangible local actions.

The Role of Local Governments in Climate Change Response

Climate change impacts—heatwaves, floods, droughts, and food insecurity—are experienced most acutely at the local level. Local governments possess unique knowledge of territorial vulnerabilities, socioeconomic conditions, and local adaptive capacities. They influence resilience through land-use planning, infrastructure regulation, and enforcement of environmental standards.

Local authorities play three major roles in climate response:

  1. Mitigation: Regulating emissions through energy efficiency programs, green building codes, and sustainable mobility initiatives.
  2. Adaptation: Managing land use, disaster risk reduction, and climate-sensitive infrastructure planning.
  3. Transition to Clean Energy: Promoting renewable energy solutions and expanding access to clean cooking and off-grid energy, especially in rural communities.

Yet, their contributions are constrained by limited funding, inadequate technical skills, and weak institutional mandates.

Local Governments and Global Climate Negotiations

At global forums such as the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COPs), local governments participate only through observer status—primarily via the Local Governments and Municipal Authorities (LGMA) constituency. While they have organized town hall dialogues and local “Mini-COPs,” their influence on formal decision-making remains minimal.

The exclusion of local voices from climate negotiations undermines policy coherence and weakens implementation. National commitments under the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) often fail to integrate the realities and priorities of subnational actors, leading to a persistent gap between global ambition and local action.

Barriers Limiting Local Government Engagement

  1. Political and Institutional Constraints
  • Lack of formal recognition: LGAs are treated as observers, not negotiators.
  • Weak mandates: National frameworks often omit explicit roles for local actors in international climate commitments.
  • Competing priorities: Service delivery demands (water, housing, education) often overshadow climate action.
  • Policy incoherence: Disjointed national and local strategies lead to fragmented implementation.
  1. Resource and Capacity Constraints
  • Insufficient funding: Local budgets rarely allocate funds for climate adaptation or international engagement.
  • Limited technical expertise: Few LGAs have staff capable of climate risk assessment or data-driven planning.
  • High participation costs: Travel and registration fees hinder participation in COPs, especially for developing countries.
  • Data gaps: Lack of localized climate data weakens evidence-based planning.
  1. Knowledge and Communication Gaps
  • Limited access to negotiation information and technical guidance.
  • Language barriers and lack of translation support at COP sessions.
  • Low public awareness of how global climate policy connects to local priorities.

Why Local Governments Must Be Supported

Climate change impacts are inherently territorial. Local authorities possess the contextual understanding necessary for effective adaptation and resilience-building. However, without adequate fiscal space, skills, and institutional backing, they cannot translate national and global goals into local implementation.

National governments must therefore create an enabling environment that empowers LGAs through:

  • Regulatory and fiscal reforms that integrate local adaptation priorities into national plans.
  • Technical capacity-building, including downscaled climate data and specialized training.
  • Coordinated planning mechanisms that involve LGAs in the design and implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and NDCs.
  • Targeted financing mechanisms, such as climate-resilient municipal grants and performance-based green budgeting.

Effective collaboration between national and local levels will ensure that adaptation is not only nationally planned but also locally delivered.

COP30: A Turning Point for Multilevel Climate Action

COP30 presents a pivotal opportunity to reframe climate governance through multilevel action. It comes at a critical juncture:

  • 2025 marks the deadline for countries to submit their updated NDCs under the Paris Agreement.
  • It will be the first COP in Brazil since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, symbolizing a return to the origins of the UNFCCC.
  • It represents the midpoint to 2030, demanding acceleration in implementation rather than new pledges alone.

Positioning local governments at the heart of COP30 discussions will help bridge the implementation gap between national commitments and local realities.

Policy Recommendations

  1. Elevate Local Governments in Global Climate Governance
    • Grant LGAs a formal role in negotiation processes and multilevel implementation frameworks.
    • Institutionalize the Local Governments and Municipal Authorities (LGMA) constituency within COP structures.
  2. Reassess Support Frameworks for LGAs
    • Review past support mechanisms to identify lessons and scale up successful local adaptation and mitigation models.
  3. Develop Scalable Local Climate Models
    • Document and share proven municipal adaptation and energy transition initiatives to inform peer learning.
  4. Establish Dedicated Local Climate Finance Channels
    • Create financing pipelines suitable for subnational authorities, including grants and concessional funds for green infrastructure and renewable energy projects.
  5. Promote Local Green Transitions
    • Support local greening programs, expansion of renewable energy, and universal access to clean cooking solutions.
  6. Invest in Capacity and Skills Development
    • Build technical, financial, and negotiation capacities of LGAs through training programs, partnerships, and regional knowledge hubs.

Conclusion

Achieving the Paris Agreement targets requires action at every level of government. Local governments are not just implementers—they are innovation laboratories for resilience, equity, and sustainability. Empowering them through recognition, financing, and capacity support will be key to transforming global climate commitments into grounded results.

COP30 must therefore be the moment to bring local governments from the margins to the center of the climate agenda.

 

Geopolitics of Critical Minerals: An Analysis of the strategic gains and risks offered by the EU Strategic Partnership, Lobito Corridor and Minerals for Security deals on East and Southern Africa’s Critical Transition Minerals
 

Featured photo credit: Sipa photo by Graeme Sloan via AP).

Authors: Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre and Robert Letsatsi, Botswana Watch Organization

Background

The surging demand for minerals critical to green transition offers potential economic benefits for mineral rich countries however the dash to secure their supply chain has kicked off geopolitical interests, competition and realignments whose outcomes could have long lasting relationship with divergent unforeseen impacts. With the Eastern and Southern Africa combined as a single economic bloc, the region has the highest concentration of critical green transition minerals such as cobalt, coltan, nickel, graphite, tungsten, tantalum, copper in the world. Yet the history of governance and management of the mineral sector has never yielded very positive dividends for mineral-rich countries in the region. Minerals have fueled conflicts in the DRC and Mozambique, Debt traps in Zambia, political patronage and environmental concerns in Zimbabwe and economic inequalities in South Africa and Botswana.

So far, the EU has signed Critical Minerals Strategic Partnerships with 5 Africa green minerals rich countries and the US led Lobito Mineral Corridor partnership plan to connect the Democratic Republic Congo’s mineral rich Katanga region and Zambia with a railway line to the Angolan Port of Lobito.  Moreover, in recent months we witnessed the emergence of minerals for security deals signed between the US and Ukraine and the US with the DRC and Rwanda.  These developments offer a new geopolitical twist in this global race to secure the critical green transition minerals, pitting the developed western economic superpowers against China in the dash for Africa’s critical mineral resources. Amidst this mineral dash and geopolitical balkanization, it is feared that without strategic positioning, the Eastern and Southern Africa critical minerals rich countries could again miss out from this mineral boom.

Overview of Critical Minerals in Eastern and Southern Africa

East Africa is vastly endowed with critical minerals with Tanzania having the 5th largest graphite reserves globally (18million tons) and 1.52 million tons of high-grade nickel. With the DRC combined, the East Africa has accounts for more than 50% of Africa’s critical minerals output of graphite, copper, cobalt, coltan and nickel. The DRC holds the world’s largest cobalt reserves, accounting for about 70% global output and ranks as Africa’s largest and the world’s second-largest copper producer. The DRC government is working on policies to improve governance, local beneficiation, and attract ethical investment while reducing dependency on Chinese processing.

Despite this potential, EAC as a block has not yet maximized benefits from its mineral wealth and member states have been working on competing policies to improve governance, attract ethical investments and increase local beneficiation.

Mineral Resources in EAC

Country

Precious metal, Gemstones & Semi-Precious Metal

Metallic Minerals

Industrial minerals

Burundi

Gold

Tin, Nickel, copper, cobalt, niobium, coltan, vanadium, tungsten

Phosphate, Peat

Kenya

Gemstones, gold

Lead, zircon, iron, titanium

Soda ash, flour spar, salt, mica, chaum, oil, coal, diatomite, gypsum, meers, kaolin, rear earth

Rwanda

Gold, gemstones

Tin, tungsten, tantalum, niobium, columbium

pozzolana

Tanzania

Gold, diamond, gemstones, silver, PGMs

Nickel, bauxite, copper, cobalt, uranium, graphite

Coal, phosphate, gypsum, pozzolana, soda ash, gas

Uganda

Gold, diamond

Copper, tin, lead, nickel, cobalt, tungsten, uranium, niobium, tantalum, iron

Gypsum, kaolin, salt, vermiculite, pozzolana, marble, soapstone, rear earth, oil

Source: EAC Vision 2050 and South Sudan Development Strategy

Southern Africa holds vast deposits of the world’s critical minerals. For example, South Africa holds the largest (90%) reserves of Platinum Group Minerals (PGMs) globally[1]. South Africa and Zimbabwe account for 92% of global reserves of PGM and produced 82% of platinum globally in 2022[2].  Zambia has large Copper deposits accounting for 70% of Africa’s exports while Zimbabwe has the largest lithium reserves globally (estimated at 11 metric tons in Masvingo Province). Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia and Angola have some of the largest deposits of diamond. Angola has been diversifying beyond oil and diamonds, promoting critical minerals exploration and processing. The government is enhancing mining regulations, attracting foreign investment, and seeking strategic partnerships to develop local value chains. As one of the world’s top ten largest copper producers, Zambia is strengthening policies to boost value addition, encourage local smelting and refining, and attract Western investment. Zambia is Africa’s second-largest copper producer after Democratic Republic of Congo and the country is positioning itself as a major supplier in clean energy and EV industries.

From the above data, the Eastern and Southern Africa combined accounts for more than half of the global supply of critical minerals such as copper, coltan, platinum, graphite, manganese, nickel and lithium. In recent years there has been an increasing focus towards critical minerals with global mining exploration budgets for minerals such as lithium, copper and nickel rapidly spiking up since 2022.  This places the East and Southern Africa region at the heart of competing geopolitical interest in race for the control of critical minerals supply chains. In the midst of this rush, the Eastern and Southern Africa region countries have been competing amongst themselves and undercutting each other to attract key large-scale players in the mining sector. This race has both socio-economic, human rights and geopolitical risks and concerns.

What are the key socio-economic justice concerns in the mining sector

The history of mining in the region has not been perfect. Like in previous mining experiences generally, increased extraction of critical minerals raises serious key socio-economic justice concerns like environmental injustice, gross violation of human rights, climate change, community displacement and land grabbing, lack of transparency and accountability, corruption and unequal distribution of benefits. Such concerns have been put in even greater spotlight, where demand for these minerals worldwide began to rise and will surge over the next 20 years in support of the energy transition and technological advancements.

Mining of critical minerals is happening in new land frontiers never explored or exposed to large scale mining before. This contributes to significant environment impacts around villages and communities where they are found. Their effects range from land rights violations via new evictions to destruction of social infrastructures such as schools, hospitals and residential homes due to blasting for minerals[1]. Land degradation, dust pollution and loss of arable agricultural land through clearances for new mines affects health and livelihoods. Processing of minerals such as Lithium and Nickel requires a lot of water and this is contributing to water shortages and pollution of water sources around the mining communities[2].   

Moreover, critical minerals are driving existing and new conflicts in many African countries such as the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Mozambique. According to UN reports, the desire to control exploitation of critical minerals are a major driver for the ongoing conflict in DRC[1].

Geopolitics of Critical Minerals

The increasing demand and competition for critical minerals is driving unending geopolitical tensions over which countries can gain access to these resources and how best to manage them.  As the geopolitical competition amongst global economic superpowers; China, US, EU, Russia, United Kingdom and new emerging powers such as Australia, UAE and India has increased in recent years. The strategic partnerships and infrastructure partnerships such as the Lobito corridor have been signed.  Recently, we have witnessed the emergence of ‘Mineral for Security deals’ such as the ones signed between the US- Ukraine and the US- DRC aimed at transferring control of a portion of critical mineral supplies in exchange for security guarantees and protection. There are many geopolitical interests and tools used at play but these are the noticeable physical manifestations of this geopolitical competition for critical minerals.

The consequences of these new geopolitical realignments are diverse but alignments and signed deals force smaller countries to surrender sovereignty of their mineral natural resources by attach their political interest to the supply of critical minerals. There has been a surge in the use of counter friendshoring measures by importing countries establishing direct partnerships with exporting countries for raw critical minerals. While this may be viewed as a positive development for minerals and commodities trade, the tilted partnerships reinforce the underdevelopment of the downstream supply chain capacity for critical minerals, especially as developed countries secure the Just Energy Transition (JET) technologies. And are not willing yet to transfer this technology to the minerals source countries. The complex dynamics and intricate geopolitical forces surrounding critical minerals therefore demands a comprehensive and forward-thinking strategy to effectively navigate the evolving global landscape[2]. Without this, the risk of securing little benefits from the critical mineral wealth for Eastern and Southern Africa is real.

The EU Strategic Minerals Partnerships and implications on Africa’s critical Minerals

Amid global geopolitical tensions, the EU has been ramping up efforts to diversify its mineral value chains. The EU has forged strategic partnerships with critical minerals resource-rich African nations like Tanzania, Namibia, DRC, Zambia and Rwanda. To date the EU has established partnerships for critical raw materials with at least 14 countries[3]. These partnerships are designed to secure access to critical minerals at various stages of the value chain, strengthen European industrial resilience and accelerate the green transition of its economies while supporting Africa’s own industrialization ambitions. The EU has further established a multistakeholder partnership with the US to develop the Lobito corridor project[4]. While these partnerships are considered vital in ensuring improved mineral governance and securing investment inflows into Africa’s mining sector, on the flipside they are viewed controversially as a strategic path for continued EU dominance by tightly tying Africa as a source of raw critical materials to feed Europe’s industrial base.

The EU strategic minerals partnerships have a prospect of placing Africa as a global player in the critical minerals space and potentially securing Africa’s contributing towards a net zero future. According to the EU, the strategic partnerships will involve cooperation on supply chain integration, infrastructure financing, research and innovation, capacity building, and sustainable sourcing of minerals. With strategic leverage and tactful negotiation, Africa can potentially wean itself off the largely exploitative contracts previously signed with mining companies that were economically biased, had disregard for human rights and responsible sourcing. Without tearing the existing contracts apart, Africa can establish a new progressive framework to guide its mining

However, the EU mineral partnerships are viewed as inherently biased and pursued with less consideration of socio-economic and environmental considerations. According to SOMO, the EU strategic partnerships are not good for addressing climate change and net zero. Despite the green tint, the EU is focused on the minerals and less on the effects. Europe is ultimately pursuing a resource-intensive growth strategy to bolster its industries in profiting from low-emission technologies. This prioritization of growth neglects that affluent countries’ overconsumption of resources is the root cause of climate change and the major driver of biodiversity loss, pollution, and waste. Worse, the unfavorable trade regimes [secured under the partnerships] can prevent poor resource-rich countries from climbing up global value chains

The Lobito Corridor Initiative and its implications

The Lobito Corridor is a 1 300 km rail and infrastructure project stretching from the Angolan port of Lobito to mining regions of Kolwezi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia. Financed by the US and its EU allies, the project provides an alternative route to transport minerals such as cobalt and copper, helping to diversify mineral supply chains in the region.

According to the US Department for Finance Corporation (DFC), the Lobito corridor initiative is not just any traditional development aid project but a strategic initiative aimed at strengthening critical mineral supply chains by countering China’s dominance[1]

Justification for the Lobito Corridor Project

According to the US Department for Finance Corporation (DFC) the Lobito Corridor project is poised to spur trade, industrialization, and regional integration across Southern Africa. The advanced technologies required for the industries of the future depend on reliable access to copper and cobalt. These minerals are essential for batteries, wind farms, electric vehicles, as well as energy transmission and distribution.

But critical mineral supply chains are threatened by Chinese dominance. Companies based in China own or operate as much as 80 percent of the critical mineral production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), much of which is sent to China for processing. And China is pushing new projects to further secure its dominance, adding to the estimated $1 trillion it has spent on its global infrastructure initiative known as its Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI. 

Additionally, many of the world’s most mineral-rich countries such as the DRC lack the infrastructure to transport growing volumes of these materials to major coastal ports where they can be exported to markets around the world. DRC is the second-largest global producer of copper, and the largest producer of cobalt with a 70 percent global market share[2].

Key gains from Lobito Corridor Initiative

Offers an opportunity of revitalizing defunct infrastructure in a region severely affected by war. A railway built more than 100 years ago connecting mining sites in the DRC to the Lobito port in Angola was largely destroyed during the Angolan civil war. A reconstructed railway suffered from poor construction and upkeep. As a result, these critical minerals are currently transported by heavy-duty trucks to ports in South Africa and Tanzania over roads that can take months to travel. Growing demand for critical minerals threatens to exacerbate the problem. Analysts predict that cobalt demand will exceed the pace of production before the end of 2024 and thereby justifying the construction of new infrastructure projects such as the Lobito Corridor project[3].

The Lobito corridor project provides an opportunity for opening up new investments into the region.  According to the initial plans the US Finance Cooperation would provide a $553 million loan to the Lobito Atlantic Railway to finance the upgrade and rehabilitation of more than 800 miles (1,300 km) of the rail connecting the city of Luau on the border of the DRC to the port city of Lobito in Angola, as well as the upgrade and rehabilitation of the mineral port in Lobito.

The investment is intended to improve the cost-effectiveness, speed, and resilience of global supply chains by upgrading and rehabilitating the railway in Angola that increases the efficiency and reliability of transportation out of the DRC’s mines. And it ensures China will not secure a monopoly on critical minerals access and transit routes in this key region.  

Over the last decade, China had subsidized new construction and upgrades to rail systems in the region, including in Angola, DFC’s neighbor to the west and home to several key coastal transportation hubs, such as the Port of Lobito and the Benguela Railway that extends eastward from it into the DRC. Chinese companies and China-linked entities have worked to control regional transportation systems and restrict access to U.S. and allied businesses, creating challenges to investments in markets like the DRC. However, those projects have suffered from what The Wall Street Journal described as “poor construction and upkeep,” leading to “rundown stations, malfunctioning safety systems offline servers and frequent derailments on the train line.”

DFC’s investment will diversify away from Chinese-controlled economic corridors. It will reinforce railway tracks and bridges along the route and add containers, trains, and equipment such as mobile cranes and forklifts. These investments are expected to increase Lobito’s transportation capacity from 0.4 million metric tons per year as of the end of 2024 to 4.6 million metric tons. It will also benefit the local economy, where minerals make up 90 percent of the DRC’s total exports, accounting for 40 percent of its GDP and $30 billion in value as of last year.

 Through the upgraded railway, port, and corresponding sea routes, exports for these critical minerals to global markets are expected on average to cost 30 percent less and take 29 fewer days. Lobito and projects like will bolster trade access in and around Angola. The coordination led by DFC—which is poised to expand to new projects— presents a boom for U.S. industries, with Angolan organizations already looking to source equipment from the United States for mining, storage, and other integral elements of the project. 

More broadly, the Lobito project strengthens Angola’s role as a key security and economic partner of the United States and as a leader in Sub-Saharan Africa working to resolve issues—including those that affect American interests such as the peace process in eastern DRC. Angolan President João Lourenço also recently assumed the role of chairman of the African Union, and the Lobito project is considered as a potential lever for influencing positions and securing other strategic projects across Africa.  

According to the US DFC, within Angola, the project will upgrade critical infrastructure to international standards and will ensure that access to rail remains open to all paying customers. It is expected to create a 30% reduction in shipping costs and 29 day reduction in shipping time as a result of the DFC’s investment in the Lobito Atlantic Railway. Moreover, it is expected to generate significant local income there, with total local procurement of goods and services expected to reach more than $350 million within the first five years.  

And it is expected to create more than 1,000 new full-time jobs for Angolans, growing the existing workforce from 434 to more than 1,500. Other support projects will benefit from the investments in the Lobito Corridor.   For example, a $10 million loan from DFC to Seba Foods Zambia Ltd. is designed to support the expansion of its food production and storage capacity for maize-based, soya-based, and other nutritious and affordable consumer food products, strengthening the food value chain in Zambia, which is on the eastern end of the Lobito Corridor. Seba Foods was the first U.S. Government-financed food security and agribusiness-focused investment following the announcement of the vision for the Lobito Corridor. 

The Lobito Corridor initiative exemplifies the competition, with the US and EU aligning efforts to establish stronger supply chains. China, already investing heavily, aims to enhance its Belt and Road Initiative along the corridor. The US has indicated that China can still utilize the railway for its exports. The US-China cooperation on this project may create new avenues for sustainable development in Africa. If the two superpowers align their Lobito strategies, it could accelerate Africa’s green industrialization. Jointly-driven investments would align with Africa’s broader economic growth and sustainable development goals. Africa’s potential for growth will attract both powers, as both seek competitive positions within the Lobito Corridor. China has already recently signed a $1 billion deal to restore the TAZARA railway[4].

Key concerns of the Lobito Corridor Initiative
CSOs are concerned the Lobito Corridor project exemplifies the geopolitical interests to serve the US and EU interests rather than Africa (Zambia Angola & DRC’s) interests. As clearly stated by the US and the EU, the Lobito corridor initiative is intended to strategically increase the US and EU’s dominance and security of access to Africa’s critical minerals supply chains and diversifying Africa away from Chinese-controlled economic corridors. This project is therefore largely driven by external interests and Africa finds itself in the middle of these competing geopolitical interests.

The project exacerbates the colonial hinterland to port extractive infrastructure, designed with a major purpose of extracting and transporting Africa’s resources as raw materials from the hinterland to the port ready for export to benefit elsewhere. The Lobito initiative railway project has no interconnection with other transport nodes to facilitate in country mobility and connectivity to other economic sectors. It is therefore designed with an exploitative lens driven with an ‘extract and take away’ mindset, with less beneficial considerations to the broader national public concerns. Financing of arteries linking the railway to other transport infrastructures would address significant infrastructure problems affecting millions of people across the countries in the corridor. For example, an East-West railway connection could link Lobito and TAZARA routes, creating Africa’s first transcontinental railway. Such a corridor could bridge the Atlantic and Indian ocean[1].

The project will be financed with loans acquired from the US and EU, whose payment will be recouped from revenues from the operations and sale of the critical minerals. This is ironical as the lenders will be the major beneficiaries from the mineral export. The long-term net effect or benefit from these may be negligible as the debt burden for the corridor countries (Angola, DRC and Zambia) will increase and they may be forced to pay using their minerals resources.

The strategic partnerships and Lobito corridor project have no plans to investment in critical minerals value addition with in the participating countries. As a consequence, the project may consolidate Africa’s exclusion from the critical minerals global value chain, locking Africa to lower tier of the value chain as a supplier of critical raw materials.   Current studies and evidence show that Africa integration in the Global Value Chain is largely through forward linkages whereby it primarily provides unprocessed raw materials to feed the industrial development and economic prosperity elsewhere.

For example , the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and UNCTAD data shows that the DRC and Zambia refine only about 7% and 3.5% of all the copper produced, which is far much lower than their share in the global production.[2] In recent years China has emerged as the leading processor of critical minerals (Lithium, Copper, Nickel & Cobalt) implying that Africa’s minerals are exported raw, processed and re-exported back to Africa as intermediary or finished goods.

Moreover, the Lobito corridor does not promote intra Africa trade in minerals and therefore runs contrary to Africa’s mineral and economic development ambitions as articulated in the various propositions of the Africa Unions Agenda 2063 and the Africa Mining Vision particularly in regards to regional cooperation and beneficiation. The USGS report for 2023 shows that African Minerals are largely traded with countries outside Africa. For instance, the DRC accounts for 77% of Africa’s cobalt exports, however, its intra Africa links are few. This suggests its trade is largely more with countries outside the continent. Several countries with insignificant cobalt reserves and production re-export more beneficiated cobalt through regional networks as indicated in the table below, reaping bigger economic benefits from added value. 

Table showing Africa Major Critical Minerals Export Destination, Intra Africa Trade and Linkages

Africa Critical Mineral

Top Five Global Export Destinations

Africa trading partners

Intra Africa trade share

Implication

Cobalt

China (72%), Belgium (2%), Malaysia (2%), Switzerland (2%)

Zambia, Namibia, Morocco, Congo, Madagascar, South Africa, DR Congo, Mali, Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, and Kenya.

South Africa (1%), DRC (89% to Zambia, Namibia and Morocco), Congo (4.4%), Zambia (3.5%)

The top five global destinations consume 80% of Africa’s cobalt

More of DRC’s cobalt is re-exported by other countries.

Graphite

China (28%), Germany (15%), India (9%), USA (7%) and Malaysia (7%)

Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Niger, Guinea, Tanzania, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Sudan, Namibia, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, Mozambique, Cameroon, Egypt, 30 Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mauritius, Ghana, Botswana, Libya, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, and Mali.

South Africa (51%), Tanzania (14%), Seychelle (12%), Kenya & Morocco (3%).

The top five global destinations account for 64% of Africa’s Graphite export

These countries export to fewer African countries. Tanzania only has eight intra-Africa graphite export links (Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, DR Congo, Burundi, Comoros and Madagascar, while Seychelles has one (South Africa)

Lithium

France (7%), USA (5%), Russia (1%) Germany & China (2%)

36 African Countries

DRC (77%), South Africa (15%), Morocco (1%), Tanzania (1%)

The top five consume 15% of Africa total lithium exports from at 36 countries

DRC has the lowest intra exports links to Africa while South Africa, Kenya and Morrocco lead in number of intra Africa export links.

Managanese

China (58%), India (10%), Norway (5%), Japan (4%), and Russia (3%)

31 African Countries

Morocco (42%), Zambia (11%), South Africa (20%), Ghana (1%)

These countries account for about 80% of Africa’s Manganese exports outside Africa.

Morocco, South Africa, and Zambia (in consecutive order) emerge as countries with the highest intra-Africa export shares for Manganese.

South Africa and Kenya have the highest intra-Africa export links.

Platinum Group of Metals (PGM)

United Kingdom accounting for about 28%, Japan 17%, Belgium about 15%, United States of America 12% and Germany 9%.

45 Countries

Zimbabwe (86%), Ghana and DRC (3%),

These countries account for about 89% of Africa’s PGM export outside the region

South Africa has the highest intra-Africa export links to thirteen countries, followed by Swaziland and Malawi

 

In the long run, the Lobito corridor project will potentially weaken further existing limited intra Africa linkages and collaborative projects by setting up or creating an unfavorable competition for already existing infrastructure such as the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) and the Ports of Dar es Salaam, Beira in Mozambique and Durban, which have recently received major uplifts with costly loans from China and other global financial institutions such as the World Bank.

The Lobito Corridor project excludes itself from other major problems facing mining in the region, including addressing previous economic injustices and human rights related issues, the long-term effects of war and climate change. Because of the fear of being edged out by China, the Lobito corridor project does not come with stringent requirements and expectation for adherence to high human rights standards by the partner countries.

Mineral for Security Deals and implications on Africa’s critical minerals.

Amidst the ongoing geopolitical interest for critical minerals, recently we have witnessed the emergence of Minerals for Security Guarantee deals as a tool for control of access to critical minerals supply chains. On 30th April 2025 the US signed a Minerals for security deal with Ukraine and in June, the US signed a Mineral for Security deal with the DRC and Rwanda. The deals provide access to critical minerals in return for security guarantees from the US. Although the deals have been covered with a peace and conflict resolution imperative, they are essentially aimed at securing the US’s access to critical minerals.

According to Global witness, the deals like the extraction and trade of some critical minerals intensify new geopolitical tensions, reinforcing long-standing patterns of exploitation[3] including conflicts. The Trump Ukraine deal revealed a connection of critical minerals to the Russia and Ukraine war and how critical mineral natural resources in Ukraine have become a key bargaining chip in international diplomacy between the US and Russia.

In fact, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo reached out to the Donald Trump administration with a Ukrainian-style proposal in February 2025 in response to the rapid advance of the M23 rebel group in the east of the country. At stake are the mineral riches of North and South Kivu provinces, a major but highly problematic source of metals such as tin, tungsten and coltan[4].

According to different sources, this deal was presented as a pacification tool for eastern DRC and once signed could boost Rwanda’s processing of Congo minerals while providing the US with an assured source of processed critical minerals required to support its industrial technology and security needs.

The full contents of deal are not readily available to the public but leaked versions mentioned requirements for withdrawal of Rwandan Forces from the Eastern DRC and integration of the M23 belligerent factions into the DRC’s forces.

The mineral deals essentially consolidate a firm grip of the US on access to DRC’s critical minerals, closing off competition against other potential rival countries such as China and Russia, there by exacerbating grounds for economic injustice, opacity, lack of transparency and potential for unfair mining deals, biased in favour of the security guarantors. Mineral deals are tainted with opacity, designed with a biased exploitative and a perceived neocolonial mindset aimed at rewarding the dominant superpower and the aggressor against the victim. They are negotiated behind closed doors and their full terms are not availed neither to the public nor the citizens of the mineral rich country.

According to Kambale Musavuli of the Centre for Research on Congo-Kinshasa, the US brokered deal between the DRC and Rwanda is wild. The US is getting access to $2 trillion of worth of DRC minerals in exchange for forcing the withdrawal of Rwandan backed M23 militias. That is one tenth of the DRC’s total mineral wealth, more than any single foreign country claims. This is strange because analysts of the region have long argued that the US effectively enabled Rwandan support for the M23 in order to destabilise the DRC, prevent a functional state from arising and achieving sovereignty over its mineral wealth, and thus ensure minerals stay cheaply available for US firms. If this analysis is correct then the US has just acquired $2 trillion mineral rights in exchange for stopping a conflict that it has effectively supported. Consider also how medi discourse is playing out. Remember that in 2008 Chinese firms signed a deal with the DRC to obtain $9billion in minerals in exchange for infrastructure development. Western media went wild with narratives of “Chinese colonization”. Now the US has secured minerals deal 200x larger and the media narrative is all about how the US brings “peace”

The mining security deals were negotiated in secrecy led by political elites and diplomats. As such citizens are disempowered from having a say in the future management of a vital sector, whose benefits are signed off to another country by a few, dashing hopes for citizens stake into a better future.

The minimum threshold of minerals signed off in the form of US mining companies investing in the critical minerals sector is not clear and whether the DRC has any stake at what percentage in the minerals extracted by the US companies is largely unknown.

The deals potentially open up a can of worms for future similar deals, covering natural resources such as forestry, wild life management and critical infrastructure such as ports, airports, water ways and food supply chains.

Moreover, the deals may not be a permanent solution to ongoing conflicts. The mineral for security deals largely covers security guarantees against ‘external aggression’ and may not be fitted for dealing with internal political and socio-economic drivers for conflict such as historical injustices, land and citizenship rights, regional economic imbalances, bad governance and banditry. Local insurgent rebel groups and militias may continue to pursue their political and economic ends outside the ambits of the security deal. For example, on the very day that the US-DRC and Rwanda deal was signed, one of the rebel groups, Codeco militia attacked and killed at least 10 people at a displaced people’s camp in Ituri province.  There are more than 100 rebel groups in Eastern DRC. The M23 which was largely mentioned in the US deal has already described it as a tiny part’ of a solution to the conflict.

Further, the security guarantees provided under the deal are not clear. It is not clear what these mean and when and how such guarantees can be deployed. For instance, does security guarantee mean supply of arms or armed mercenaries, military intervention or alliances with US soldiers fighting alongside or against the aggressor. Moreover, it is not clear whether the US can be directly involved in fighting internal rebel groups and insurgents without triggering nationalistic and constitutional challenges, driving internal political conflicts further.

By nature, deals of this nature are long term and cannot easily be breached without consequences. The terms and consequences for such breach are less known to the public. The conditions for termination or renegotiation are equally not known.  Therefore, the mineral security agreement essentially locks countries towards dealing with one major economic superpower whose primary interest is access to the country’s critical mineral wealth.

Conclusion

The EU strategic partnerships, the mineral security guarantee deals and the Lobito project may entirely not be a bad idea, however their implicit risks cast shadows about their potential in advancing Africa’s critical minerals and economic development goals. The key concerns around these strategic mineral alliances and the Lobito Corrido are embedded within the broader critical development discourse of recolonization and recolonization, sovereignty, security and resource nationalism, state capture, perpetration of socio-economic injustices by dominant global capital and Africa’s wealth transfer. Specific concerns include risks for increasing mineral bad governance and economic injustices and vulnerabilities, geopolitical tension, and the need to pursue sustainable mining practices.

With these strategic partnerships, mineral for security deals and the Lobito railway in place, these countries are locked into long-term commitments to ensure the supply of metals. Without good governance and value addition,  Africa’s critical minerals will benefit others elsewhere. Over dependence on certain countries can pose risks when such countries face political instability or become embroiled in geopolitical disputes drawing in Africa’s mineral rich countries in their midst. For these alliances to be mutually beneficial, they must ensure that the resources are accessed equitably, that benefits are fairly distributed, and that environmental impacts are kept to a minimum for their sustainability in the long run.

Recommendations
  1. The strategic partnerships must go beyond critical minerals exploitation but venture into addressing broader social economic development concerns of the people in the mineral rich countries.
  2. The Lobito Corridor initiative must avoid the ‘hinterland to port’ colonial legacy by establishing railway transport interconnection nodes to other existing railway infrastructure so as to improve connectivity across the project countries to ease the bigger infrastructure challenges that these countries face.
  3. The strategic partnership and Lobito Corridor must encourage value addition by investing in processing and exporting of value-added products, so as to generate wealth at source.
  4. Africa Mineral rich countries must explore and establish south to south partnerships, thereby increasing their leverage and power to negotiate with external partners and mining companies
  5. The EU strategic partnerships and the Lobito Corridor project must not exacerbate the role of minerals as drivers of conflict by supporting and buying minerals from conflict zones.
  6. Moreover, these alliances must ensure that the resources are accessed equitably, that benefits are fairly distributed, and that environmental impacts are kept to a minimum for their sustainability in the long run.
  7. The Minerals for security deals must be transparent and not biased exclusively in favour of the dominant economic super power.
  8. The Minerals for Security deals must avoid advancing human rights abuses by US mining companies under the US government protection
  9. The strategic partnerships, security deals and their associated projects must promote national dialogues and citizens participation in governance of critical minerals and mitigation of harm from mining
Selected References

Andreoni et al., (2023) Critical Minerals and routes to diversification in Africa: Linkages, pulling dynamics and Opportunities in medium-high tech supply chains; Backup paper commissioned by the UNCTAD Secretariate for the 2023 edition of the Economic Development in Africa Reports

Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

EITI; Using Transparence Benefits EU Mineral Partnerships; Accessed via https://eiti.org/blog-post/using-transparency-benefit-eus-mineral-partnerships

Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via  https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025

IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[1] https://www.railway.supply/en/us-china-lobito-corridor-investments-drive-africas-economic-and-sustainable-growth/

[2] Andreoni et al., (2023) Critical Minerals and routes to diversification in Africa: Linkages, pulling dynamics and Opportunities in medium-high tech supply chains; Backup paper commissioned by the UNCTAD Secretariate for the 2023 edition of the Economic Development in Africa Reports

[3] Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via  https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025

[4] Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

[1] US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.

[2] ibid

[3] ibid

[4] https://www.railway.supply/en/us-china-lobito-corridor-investments-drive-africas-economic-and-sustainable-growth/

[1] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[2] ibid

[3] https://eiti.org/blog-post/using-transparency-benefit-eus-mineral-partnerships

[4] https://ecfr.eu/event/critical-minerals-and-eu-africa-strategic-partnerships-where-do-we-stand/

[1] BHRT: Briefing on “Human Rights Incidents in Transition Minerals; Quarter 1: January-March 2025

[2] Emerging Human Rights Implications of Transition Minerals Extraction and processing: Case Studies from Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Zimbabwe

[1] https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202505/critical-minerals-and-metals-strategy-south-africa-2025.pdf

[2] https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/edar2023_BP1_en.pdf

Webinar on Geopolitics of Critical Minerals and implications for Eastern and Southern Africa

Topic: An Analysis of the strategic gains and risks offered by the EU Strategic Partnership, Lobito Corridor and Minerals for Security deals on East and Southern Africa’s Critical Transition Minerals

The surging demand for minerals critical to green transition offers potential economic benefits for mineral rich countries however the dash to secure their supply chain has kicked off geopolitical interests, competition and realignments whose outcomes could have long lasting relationship with divergent unforeseen impacts.

With the Eastern and Southern Africa combined as a single economic bloc, the region has the highest concentration of critical green transition minerals such as cobalt, coltan, nickel, graphite, tungsten, tantalum, copper in the world. Yet the history of governance and management of the mineral sector has never yielded very positive dividends for mineral-rich countries in the region. Minerals have fueled conflicts in the DRC and Mozambique, Debt traps in Zambia, political patronage and environmental concerns in Zimbabwe and economic inequalities in South Africa and Botswana.

This webinar will provide an overview of the critical mineral wealth in Eastern and Southern Africa with a particular focus on the strategic gains and risks that geopolitical initiatives such as the EU Strategic Minerals Partnerships, the Lobito Corridor and emerging minerals for security deals offer. It is estimated that the mining industry needs to invest $1.7 trillion over the next 15 years to extract and supply enough metals for renewable energy and Africa possess almost half of these.   

The webinar will discuss the geostrategic machinations at play by superpowers such as the US, Europe, Russia and China in the context of the dash for control of critical minerals for the green transition and the current extractive governance challenges facing the region. While strategic alliances may not entirely be a bad idea, there are concerns over the underlying possible geopolitical, security and perceived neocolonial undertones that may come with these initiatives.

And how the historical socio-economic justice concerns of similar geopolitical jostling, security guarantees at the Berlin conference and hinterland to port initiatives contributed to the colonial exploitation of Africa’s resources for benefits elsewhere. Moreover, the mineral for security deals are tainted with opacity, designed with a biased potentially exploitative and a perceived neocolonial mindset aimed at rewarding the dominant superpower and the aggressor against the victim in exchange for its resource. The minerals for security deals are negotiated behind closed doors and their full terms are not availed neither to the public nor the citizens of the mineral rich country.

Amidst this mineral dash and possible geopolitical balkanization, it is feared that without strategic positioning, the Eastern and Southern Africa critical minerals rich countries could again miss out from this mineral boom.

Our expert speakers at this webinar will delve deeper into this topic, highlighting on the possible risks and benefits that the region can garner from these initiatives and measures the region can take so as to avert the risks and maximize benefits from these partnerships. This webinar is organized by the Governance and Economic Policy Centre in Collaboration with Botswana Watch Organisation. 

Our distinguished speakers will be

  1. Ketakandriana Rafitoson, Executive Director, Resource Justice Network (formerly PWYP): Key concerns for critical minerals Governance and our desired sustainable future. Dr Ketakandriana is a political scientist, researcher, activist, and human rights defender with distinguished career in anti-corruption, where she served as leader of Transparency International Chapter in Madagascar. Her work mainly focuses on issues of resource governance, anti-corruption, citizens’ participation, good governance and democracy.

 

  1. Adriano Nuvunga, Executive Director, Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (CDD), Mozambique: The Geopolitics of critical minerals, neocolonial extractivism and conflict. Prof Adriano Nuvunga is a Mozambican scholar, anti-corruption advocate and human rights defender. He is the director of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CDD), an organization that promotes democracy and protects human rights in Mozambique and Professor of professor of political science and governance at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. He has widely published on resource governance and violence in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province.

 

  1. Mr Robert Lestatsi, Executive Director, Botswana Watch Organisation; Assessing the Lobito corridor project and Africa’s desired benefits from critical mineral wealth. Robert Letsatsi is the Executive Director of Botswana Watch (BW), an organization focused on promoting transparency and accountability in Botswana. He is also involved with the PWYP coalition in Botswana and the UNCAC Coalition, an international anti-corruption network. Additionally, he has been involved in advocacy of mineral resource governance and training on human rights violations, in collaboration with Ditshwanelo – The Botswana Centre for Human Rights.
  1. Moses Kulaba, Executive Director, Governance and Economic Policy Centre, Moderator. Mr Moses Kulaba is a Governance and political economist, tax law expert and economic diplomat with more than 20 years of active service in international public, private and civil society sector.  Prior to joining GEPC he served as the East Africa Regional Manager for the Natural Resources Governance Institute, where he worked with various stakeholders including governments to advance governance of the extractive sector. Has served on the international board of the EITI and in consultancy roles for DFID , the EU and the UN on governance, extractives and peace processes in Eastern and Africa Great Lakes region.

 Date: 30th July, 2025

Time: 12pm EAT, 11 AM Gaborone (CAT) and 9 AM Lagos

Login:  https://us05web.zoom.us/j/84450912293?pwd=lwabYIwsvJ27A8bP0v8hVQpaUOaYQ3.1

Meeting ID: 844 5091 2293

Passcode: 7XFcHc

Critical Minerals Certification: Do Mineral Certification Mechanisms Reduce harm? A Look at the Kimberley Process, ICGLR, RMI, and OECD”

Authors:  Moses Kulaba and Roger Vutsoro, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

 

This short analytical study explores the existing   national, regional and global certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly Process, ICGLR, OECD Due diligence measures, Responsible Mining Initiatives in the quagmire of improving of minerals governance. It entangles and assesses the increasing perceptions (based on evidence from countries such as the DRC) that the current certification regime is running dangerously obsolete, not designed for critical minerals and thus needs a review and realignment for new purpose, including proposing measures that go beyond the current regional certification.

Decades ago, mineral certification was mooted as a solution to addressing the chronic problems of illegal mining, mineral smuggling and mineral driven conflicts, economic injustices and impunity in mineral rich countries.  To this regard, regional and global mineral certification mechanisms were developed with countries and mining companies required to sign up to these new certification principle and mechanisms. However, decades after, minerals continue to be drivers of conflict and harm in many countries.

As the appetite for Critical or Transitional minerals required for the green and clean energy industrial technology gains gusto momentum, there are concerns that this new mineral dash may exacerbate corruption, conflict and suffering in critical minerals rich countries. Apart from calls to establish regional value chains, there is evidence to suggest that a proper global certification mechanism should be put in place to ensure responsive sourcing of critical minerals and that their extraction does not lead to further harm.

What is mineral certification

 

Mineral certification is a process that verifies the origin and legitimacy of minerals, ensuring they are not associated with conflict or human rights abuses. It involves tracing minerals from the mine site to the final point of export and confirming they are free from illegal activities. This helps to prevent the financing of armed groups and other illicit activities linked to mineral extraction. This certification involves a thorough verification process to trace the minerals’ origin and verify they are free from illegal financing, armed group involvement, and human rights abuses.

At face value, this sounds like a good measure, however existing mechanisms of a similar nature such as the Kimberly process, ICGLR certification initiative and the OECD Due diligence measures have not succeeded in fully addressing the issue of conflict minerals and mineral smuggling. In Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, minerals continue to be a driver of conflict and mineral smuggling to neighboring countries is still rife.  This therefore puts to question the efficacy of the existing global certification mechanism in strengthening governance, regulating supply, improving ethical mining business conduct and reducing harm from extractive resources.

Existing major Regional and Global Mineral Certification regimes

 

The Kimberly Process Certification System (KPCS)

The Kimberly Process (KPCS) is a global standard certification process established in 2003 by the United Nations General Assembly (Under resolution 55/56) to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the mainstream diamond market.  KPCS was set up to ensure that diamonds as precious minerals are sourced and traded in a responsible manner, reducing financing conflicts and human rights violation. KPCS has laid out requirements for participating member countries to comply including[1]

  1. Enforcement of regulatory standards to control export and import of rough diamonds
  2. Principles of transparent practices to ensure integrity of the diamond supply chains
  3. Selective trading with only KP certified and compliant members
  4. Verification of exports to ensure every traded diamond is accompanied by a conflict free certificate.

Member countries are obliged to enforce these standards. To date 60 participants (representing 86 countries) are signatory members to the Kimberley process and have committed to applying KP principles in the certification of its traded diamonds. The standards require that;

  • Participant countries must enforce stringent legal and regulatory standards to control the import and export of rough diamonds and ensure adherence to KP requirements.
  • Participants commit to transparent practices, which are crucial for the integrity of the diamond supply chain, by exchanging accurate and timely statistical data.
  • Trade is permitted only between certified KP members who comply fully with these international standards, safeguarding the legitimacy of the diamond trade.
  • Every diamond export is closely inspected and must be accompanied by a valid KP certificate, certifying that the diamonds are conflict-free to prevent the entry of illicit stones into the market.
National Level Governance and Implementation of the Kimberly Process; A case of Tanzania

 

In Tanzania the Kimberly Process Office is situated in the Mining Commission, an Institution within the Ministry of Minerals. This office is responsible for the implementation of the KPCS activities, import and export of rough diamond; the office is under the authority of the Executive Secretary. The Mining Commission works closely with the Tanzania Revenue Authority’s Customs Department, Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service and the Police Force for strengthening internal control. The Kimberley Process Office forms a part of the Mineral Audit and Trade Department, which is under the Director for Mineral Audit and Trade who assists the Executive Secretary in administering the KPCS activities. The office issues Annual reports.

Before the issuance of Kimberley Process Certificate, the exporter of rough diamonds must submit a valid Dealer’s license/Mining license, which allows him to export minerals outside Tanzania. The Dealer’s license indicates full address, type of minerals, the premises and signature of Executive Secretary or a person authorized to sign. The exporter fills the application form which indicates license type, license number, weight, value, source of diamonds to confirm that diamonds are conflict free, place of export and declaration of exporter by putting his/her signature, name and qualification to apply for a certificate and pays to the government USD 100 as an application fee for Kimberley Process certificate. Post to the valuation process, the exporter is required to pay royalty (6% of a value) and inspection fee (1% of value) to the Government.

Any person who contravenes any of the provision in Diamond trading regulation commits an offence and liable:  In case of an individual to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine not exceeding US dollar twenty thousand (US$ 20,000) or to both. In case of body corporate, to a fine not exceeding US dollar one hundred thousand (US$ 100,000), or c. Cancelation of his license and permanently be disqualified from prospecting, mining or dealing in diamond and any other minerals.  Any rough diamonds obtained contrary to the provisions of Diamond trading regulations shall be forfeited in addition to other penalties[2].

The International Conference on Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Mineral Certification Measures

 

The ICGLR Certification mechanism was developed to address the persistent of mineral driven conflicts in the Africa Great Lakes region. It aims to create a conducive environment for cooperation among member states while also ensuring the protection and well-being of the people living in the Africa Great Lakes region.

The ICGLR Certificate confirms a mineral shipment is conflict-free and meets the ICGLR’s ethical sourcing standards, ensuring it’s free from illegal influence and responsibly traced from mine to market. This certification involves a thorough verification process to trace the minerals’ origin and verify they are free from illegal financing, armed group involvement, and human rights abuses. It provides buyers with the assurance that the minerals meet ICGLR requirements for transparency, legality, and responsible sourcing, supporting ethical supply chains in the region[3].

Currently the DRC, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi are members to the ICGLR’s certification mechanism. Mineral flows are analyzed via an ICGLR Regional Database, using the data on individual shipments collected and transmitted to the ICGLR by each Member States.  The database is verified annually via ICGLR Third Party Audits. The mechanism is viewed as an important regional standard and tool for enhancing collaboration, transparency, and development in Africa’s Great Lakes region, promoting accountability and encouraging businesses to pursue certification for adherence.  
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Mineral Supply Chain

Requires that company supply chains of all minerals from conflict affected and high-risk areas, must respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral or metal purchasing decisions and practices. Recognizes that trade and investment in natural mineral resources hold great potential for generating income, growth and prosperity, sustaining livelihoods and fostering local development. However, a large share of these resources is located in conflict affected and high-risk areas. In these areas, exploitation of natural mineral resources is significant and may contribute, directly or indirectly, to armed conflict, gross human rights violations and hinder economic and social development[4].

The OECD Due Diligence Guidance is considered as the first example of a collaborative government-backed multi-stakeholder initiative on responsible supply chain management of minerals from conflict-affected areas. Its objective is to help companies respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral sourcing practices[5].

The Guidance is also intended to cultivate transparent mineral supply chains and sustainable corporate engagement in the mineral sector with a view to enabling countries to benefit from their mineral resources and preventing the extraction and trade of minerals from becoming a source of conflict, human rights abuses, and insecurity. With its Supplements on Tin, Tantalum, Tungsten and Gold, the OECD Guidance provides companies with a complete package to source minerals responsibly in order for trade in those minerals to support peace and development and not conflict[6]

Responsible Minerals Initiative

 

The Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) is a voluntary membership body of companies and industry players with a vision to ensure that mineral supply chains contribute positively to social economic development globally. It seeks to promote the common goal of understanding and contributing to mitigating the salient social and environmental impacts of extraction and processing of minerals in supply chains. It leverages partnerships and use of international standards such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights or the OECD Due Diligence Guidance as our guideposts[7].

Comprised of more than 500 member companies; the Responsible Minerals Initiative is considered one of the most utilized and respected resources for companies from a range of industries addressing responsible mineral sourcing issues in their supply chains. RMI provides companies with tools and resources to make sourcing decisions that improve regulatory compliance and support responsible sourcing of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. RMI undertakes due diligence, assurance and reporting templates for cobalt, gold, tin, tungsten, tin, tantalum and other minerals.

The Nexus between Critical Minerals, Conflict and Harm

 

There is a strong connection between the extraction and trade of certain minerals and the exacerbation of armed conflicts and instability in various regions, particularly in developing countries. Globally, critical minerals fueling Green Tech are also fueling conflict[8] Armed groups often exploit the demand for these minerals (like tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold, collectively known as “conflict minerals”) to fund their operations, including the purchase of weapons[9]. This reliance on minerals to fuel conflict can lead to human rights abuses environmental degradation, and social unrest, hindering sustainable development. 

Critical minerals such as bauxite, manganese cobalt, lithium and uranium have fuelled conflicts in the DRC, Guinea, Niger, Mali, Chad and Central Africa Republic[10] Myanmar has also experienced a post-coup rush for control over its rare earth minerals, while Latin American countries like Chile and Colombia are grappling with how to ensure that their lithium wealth benefits local economies rather than multinational corporations[11].

Critical Minerals and conflict; A case for DRC

 

Multiple reports produced by UN and Civil society show that the ongoing violence in the DRC is linked to mineral extraction, with rebel insurgents motivated by a desire to extract from the region’s vast cobalt and coltan reserves. Since the onset of the infamous second Congo War in 1998, control over the DRC’s vast mineral resources has fuelled conflict between armed groups and militias. These factions fight over mining territories, using profits from the illegal extraction and smuggling of conflict minerals to finance their operations and purchase weapons. The struggle for control over mineral-rich areas has led to prolonged violence, contributing to the deaths of millions and leaving entire regions destabilized[12]. 

In the DRC, according to the UN Group of Experts, the M23 established control over the mineral-rich area and created a new transportation route to Rwanda. Through taxation and smuggling of minerals, the armed group is financially benefiting from DRC’s mineral resources. It’s estimated that the group is receiving approximately $800,000 USD monthly from the production and trade of minerals at Rubaya.

While some mine sites in eastern DRC may not be directly affected by the conflict, early 2025started with violence in Goma (a major mineral export and transit hub), as well as insecurity moving towards South Kivu with recent clashes in in Nyabibwe, a mineral rich area known for 3Ts and gold, located halfway between Goma and Bukavu. As of mid-February, the M23 had occupied Bukavu, another major mineral export and transit hub in the region.

Recent reports also indicate armed groups in Ituri Province are forming alliances with the M23, while new violence in the province has sparked worries of a larger regional conflict. The UN Group of Experts estimated that armed groups based in Ituri Province generated approximately $140 million USD in 2024, dwarfing the illicit revenue generated by 3Ts[13] Other armed militias and groups such as Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are equally benefiting from the loot.

In light of this reality, the abundance of critical minerals offers a potential opportunity for economic wellbeing but the geopolitics and the dash for their control and extraction has potential of increasing conflicts in Africa[14]  According to Global witness, the extraction and trade of some critical minerals is intensifying new geopolitical tensions and reinforcing long-standing patterns of exploitation[15] including conflicts.

The Trump Ukraine deal revealed a connection of critical minerals to the Russia and Ukraine war and how natural resources in Ukraine have become a key bargaining chip in international diplomacy between the US and Russia. In the same perspective, the US and the Democratic Republic of Congo are close to sign a minerals-for-security deal, highlighting the increase role of critical minerals in geopolitics and conflict.

In fact, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo reached out to the Donald Trump administration with a Ukrainian-style proposal in February 2025 in response to the rapid advance of the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group in the east of the country. The U.S. government has responded enthusiastically with a flurry of negotiations aimed at ending a decades-long conflict born out of the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

The political momentum is building towards a potential peace deal between Congo and Rwanda to be accompanied by bilateral minerals deals between both countries and the United States.  At stake are the mineral riches of North and South Kivu provinces, a major but highly problematic source of metals such as tin, tungsten and coltan[16].

According to different sources, this deal once signed could boost Rwanda processing of Congo minerals and provide the US with an assured source of processed critical minerals required to support its industrial technology and security needs.

 Gaps and why a new regime for mineral certification is required

 

The existing major regional and global mineral certification regimes have significant gaps that necessitate that a new regime is developed.

  • Narrowness in focus and scope: Existing certification mechanisms such KP are narrow in scope largely target diamonds and were not designed to cover a broader mining sector. The ICGLR covers the 3Ts and gold. The emergency of a wider list of critical minerals adds a new context which the KP and ICGLR certification mechanisms were not designed for.
  • Voluntary mechanisms; The existing mechanisms are largely voluntary and member states companies encouraged to join and comply with the standards. For instance, the 21st meeting of the CIRGL Regional Committee on the fight against the illegal exploitation of natural resources recommended CIRGL Secretariat to compile a comprehensive report on the status of implementation of the six tools of the regional certification mechanism. This report revealed that the Republic of Rwanda has not yet established the traceability chain for gold. Instead, Rwanda controls gold extraction and trade using conventional methods and does not issue ICGLR certificates for gold exports[17].”
  • Limited in geographical and legal scope: For instance, the OECD Due diligence Guidance is largely applicable to companies from OECD member countries but with limited enforcement mechanisms in non-OECD countries. Yet mining companies from non-OECD Countries such as China are emerging as the leading exploiters of Africa’s critical minerals according to WTO reports[18]. from the DRC. Chinese based companies own or operate 80 percent of the critical mineral production in the DRC, much of which is sent to China for processing for export via the global supply chain[19] Moreover the ICGLR is confined to its member states while the RMI covers only its 500 members.
  •  
  • Illicit smuggling and trading in conflict minerals continue despite the presence of current certification mechanisms. For instance, despite its membership to the Kimberley Process (KP) and ICGLR commitments, Tanzania’s diamond sector is reported as facing entrenched governance challenges: opaque supply chains, smuggling, and minimal community benefits. Tanzania’s diamonds have suffered from environmental concerns, price volatility from synthetics and smuggled diamonds from regional conflicts areas[20].

Moreover, critical minerals including diamonds are smuggled across borders, transacted in established commercial capitals and hubs such as Kigali, Kampala, Nairobi and Dubai. For instance, a Global Witness investigation report indicates that an international commodities trader Traxys bought conflict coltan smuggled from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Rwanda[21] The investigation revealed that the multibillion-dollar company headquartered in Luxembourg bought 280 tonnes of coltan from Rwanda in 2024 based on customs documents seen by Global Witness.

Analysis by Global Witness of trade data and testimonies from two coltan smugglers suggested that a big share of the coltan Traxys bought from Rwanda was connected to the ongoing war in the east of DRC. African Panther’s coltan exports soared to unprecedented volumes in 2024, exceeding the combined total of the export volumes recorded over the previous four years. This increase in exports coincided with the escalation of the war in North Kivu and increased smuggling of conflict coltan from Rubaya, further suggesting that an important share of African Panther’s 2024 exports was smuggled from conflict zones in DRC[22].

Despite having limited or no known deposits and operational mines, some countries in East Africa and the Middle East have emerged as leading exporters of critical minerals such as cobalt, lithium and coltan.  Study reports show large volumes of critical minerals transacted via East Africa to foreign markets such as the UAE and China[23].  For instance, in 2025 Kenyan authorities intercepted 10 containers of suspected smuggled copper at the port of Mombasa[24]  These illicitly acquired, smuggled and transacted minerals have found market into the UAE and Western capitals in Switzerland and New York. In 2023 alone, Kenya’s exports of copper to the United Arab Emirates were valued at US$22.27 million. The UAE exports mineral products, including critical minerals, in significant quantities, primarily to Japan, China, and India.

  • Ongoing critical minerals driven conflicts and the rise of new geopolitical conflicts in producer countries: The ongoing mineral driven conflicts have already been documented in the cobalt, coltan mineral rich Eastern DRC and elsewhere but the rush for securing access and control of mineral supply chains by superpowers is reviving geopolitical interests and may result in new geopolitical conflicts.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for instance, since the revision of its mining law in 2018, the country has attracted no responsible Western investors in the mining industry. Meanwhile, China has come to dominate the production of cobalt and copper, primarily mined in the Katanga and Lualaba regions. The recent re-negotiation by the Tshisekedi Administration of the imbalanced minerals-against infrastructure deal signed in 2008 under the Kabila administration between the DRC and China was perceived by China as triggered by the United State of America.

Aware of the security and economic implications of China’s control over the DRC’s critical minerals supply chain, the United States has signaled its return to the DRC mining sector through the recent acquisition of Australian AVZ Minerals’ assets in the Manono Lithium Project by KoBold Metals. In addition, the U.S. is committed to funding the Lobito Corridor—a strategic railway project essential for transporting critical minerals from the Central African Copperbelt to Western markets.

Through its International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the U.S. has pledged a $550 million loan to support the Lobito Corridor. This project is considered vital in countering Chinese influence in the region by providing an alternative route for exporting critical minerals. This plea was reiterated in Luanda/Angola in January 2024 by the former US President, John Biden, during his last visit to Africa as an US President, in presence of both Angola and DR Congo Presidents.

The corridor is viewed as part of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, a G7 initiative aimed at competing with China’s growing presence on the continent. While the Lobito project is designed to challenge Chinese dominance, both Western and Chinese firms will be allowed to use the infrastructure it provides. This dual-access approach raises questions about its strategic value, particularly under a US administration led by President Donald Trump, whose priority is   competition with Beijing. The Lobito Corridor railway could be a physical indicator of the resuscitated geopolitical rivalry and convergence of global superpowers on the African continent as a source for critical mineral resources.

Failure to implement due diligence and traceability mechanisms

 

During the OECD conference on responsible minerals supply chain held in May 2024 in Paris, many Congolese civil society organizations raised concern over the increasing failure in the implementation of due diligence standards in the DRC. CSO mentioned that private sector actors have failed to fully implement supply chain due diligence in alignment with international standards, most notably the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Minerals Supply Chains from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Area. IMPACT added that companies are either turning a blind eye, preferring not to ask questions about the source of their purchases, or have been complicit by over relying on industry schemes despite red flags being raised in UN Group of Experts reports.

The concern around ITSCI—the sole traceability and due diligence provider for 3Ts in DRC—has been so great that in 2024 it lost its recognition with the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI), with RMI noting that important gaps remained in the scheme’s fulfilment of recognition terms. Despite this move, the UN Group of Experts has expressed concern that many private sector actors still rely on the scheme to conduct due diligence without carrying out additional independent quality controls required by international standards[25].

Civil Society Call for reforms

 

Because of these gaps civil society organisations have constantly urged for a review and development of a new certification mechanism regime, expanded and aligned to emerging context of transition minerals. For instance, at the start of the 2025 KP plenary in Dubai the Civil Society Coalition pointed out the gaps of the KP in addressing the challenges of diamond mining, smuggling and poverty in the Central African Republic[26].  CSO observed that the KP was narrow in focus, limited to diamonds and the imposed conflict diamond embargos had targeted smugglers without protecting the diamond mining communities.

The KP does not—and likely will not soon—prevent diamonds from being associated with issues outside the narrow conflict diamond definition, including human rights abuses, violence by public and private security forces, forced labour, and environmental degradation. Rigorous due diligence is essential, yet it remains insufficiently addressed.

For instance the KP in Central Africa Republic’s (CAR) experience demonstrated that the sole existence of the certification scheme does not make diamond governance exemplary. Though diamonds share similar governance challenges with other minerals, the Kimberley Process has largely remained isolated from broader dialogues on mineral-related due diligence.

Civil society demanded for the need to bridge the gaps in the KP certification mechanism by inter alia increasing transparency and engagement with mining communities.  CSOs argued that without transparency, the KP will never effectively achieve its mandate of conflict prevention.

Moreover, the existing certification mechanisms are criticized as elitist, disconnected from the community needs and blind to social economic injustices. For example, the KP certification mechanism does not cover the extent to which the mining of the diamond minerals has benefited the communities from where they are sourced.

Investigations by the Kimberly Process Civil Society Coalition of mining operations in Sierra Leone, Lesotho, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, reveals the often-ignored consequences of large-scale diamond mining on local communities in African countries[27].

In Tanzania, despite mining diamonds for more than 100 years, Shyinyanga remains amongst the poorest remains the poorest region in the country[28]. The critical minerals rich Eastern DRC provinces of Kasai Oriental, Kasai Central, North and South Kivu are among the poorest and least developed in the world. 

For diamond resources to truly benefit communities, the documentary identifies greater transparency and independent monitoring as key elements to enhance corporate accountability. Mining companies, industry actors and states all have a role to play to protect community rights and improve both mining and sourcing practices[29].

Further, certification mechanisms do not sufficiently cover or protect citizen against state excesses and inspired violence. Yet the very atrocities committed by rebel groups, which led to the KP’s creation in 2003, are now mirrored by certain governments and their security forces. Top ranking government officials and security forces in the Eastern DRC have been accused of being complacent to illicit mineral trade. The military junta in Myanmar is accused of widespread human rights violations including killings of civilians in critical mineral rich village areas in Kayah state closer to the Thailand border[30].

Conclusion

 

While certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly process were established for a major purpose of controlling blood diamonds over the years, they have this role to an extent but equally shown inherent gaps and shortcomings. Their limitation in scope, involuntary membership nature and poor implementation is a major limitation. They were set up when diamond was among the top most traded commodity and driver of conflicts in countries such as Angola, Liberia and Siera Leone. With the increasing surge in demand for critical minerals such as Nickel, Cobalt, Coltan, Graphite, Lithium, Tin Tungsten and Rare Earth Elements, the new frontiers mineral driven conflicts have expanded and cannot continue to remain on diamonds.  In the current and future context, it will be untenable for critical minerals to remain outside the purview of mineral certification. For the existing certification mechanisms to be relevant and fitted for the changing context and era of energy of transition, substantive reviews and reforms are required.

Recommendations for future certification mechanisms
  1. Expand the KPI and ICGLR certification to cover a broad range of  critical minerals or develop a new commensurate certification measure for critical minerals, with a focus on ethical sourcing, conflict and governance.
  2. Pay attention to the ongoing problems in mining such as the environmental concerns in critical minerals mining operations and their contribution to social and ecological harm to communities and countries from where they are sourced.
  3. Pay close attention to ongoing issues within critical minerals supply chains, including human rights abuses, armed conflicts, the fair distribution of benefits to local communities, and compliance with national labor laws
  4. Review the existing mineral audit  standards, blend constitution of  audit teams with experts, civil society and community representatives to increase transparency and integrity in certification
  5. Require exporting countries to demonstrate significant economic presence of the critical mineral commensurate with export volumes.
  6. Impose export embargoes and critical mineral trading sanctions on countries or companies involved in perpetrating smuggling and export of illicitly acquired and conflict critical minerals.
  7. Expand the scope of existing certification mechanisms such as the Kimberly process to capture community benefits from diamonds and critical minerals.
  8. Demand that membership to regional and global certification and tracking mechanism must be mandatory for all critical minerals producing and exporting countries
  1. Countries that produce critical minerals should diversify their investors and pursue win-win partnerships to prevent their territories from becoming geopolitical battlegrounds for superpowers competing for access to these resources in the era of energy transition
  2. Enhance public database and reconciliation system for tracking mineral flows to better balance production, purchases, and exports at various levels (exporters, mines, mining regions, and Member States). 
  3. To maximize the benefits from critical mineral supply chains, producer countries should prioritize investments that add value to minerals and promote local content. This approach will generate more jobs for millions of unemployed youths, stimulate economic growth, and facilitate technology transfer and reduce susceptibility to conflict

References

Aikael Etal (2021) Understanding poverty dynamics and vulnerability in Tanzania: 2012–2018 available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rode.12829  accessed on 15 May 2025

Martin A, etal (2014), All that Glitters is not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the illicit trade of critical minerals, Partnership Africa Canada, May 2014

Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

Global Witness (2025) available at https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/new-investigation-suggests-eu-trader-traxys-buys-conflict-minerals-from-drc/ accessed on 15 May 2025

IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

ICGLR, Report on the Status of Implementation of the Six Tools of the ICGLR Regional Initiative on Natural Resources in Member States, P14

ISSD (2018) Green Conflict Minerals; The Fuels of conflict in the transition to a low carbon economy;  available at https://www.iisd.org/story/green-conflict-minerals/ accessed on 15 May 2025

Panzi Foundation available via https://panzifoundation.org/conflict-minerals-and-sexual-violence-in-the-drc/# accessed on 15 May 2025

The African Climate Foundation Report; Geopolitics of Critical Minerals in Renewable Supply Chains  available at https://africanclimatefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/800644-ACF-03_Geopolitics-of-critical-minerals-R_WEB.pdf  accessed on 15 May 2025

The Eastleigh Voice (2025); Police launch investigation into suspected copper smuggling at Mombasa port; available at https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/business/112007/police-probe-suspected-copper-smuggling-at-mombasa-port accessed on 15 May 2025

US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.

WTO (2024): High demand for energy-related critical minerals creates supply chain pressures; available at

Online sources

[1] https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/about/what-is-kp

[2] The United Republic of Tanzania: Mining Commission; A Report on implementation of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme for Tanzania Year 2023

[3]ICGLR; available via https://icglrcertification.com/ accessed 13 May 2025

[4]OECD Report (2016) available via https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-supply-chains-of-minerals-from-conflict-affected-and-high-risk-areas_9789264252479-en.html, accessed on 13 May 2025

[5] OECD (2016), OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas: Third Edition, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264252479-en.

[6] ibid

[7] https://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/

[8] https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/critical-minerals-conflict-eu/

[9] European Commission: Trade and Economic Security, Conflict Minerals regulation available at https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/conflict-minerals-regulation_en#:~:text=In%20politically%20unstable%20areas%2C%20armed,mobile%20phones%2C%20cars%20and%20jewellery. Accessed on 15 May 2025

[10] ISSD (2018) Green Conflict Minerals; The Fuels of conflict in the transition to a low carbon economy;  available at https://www.iisd.org/story/green-conflict-minerals/ accessed on 15 May 2025

[11] ibid

[12] Panzi Foundation available via https://panzifoundation.org/conflict-minerals-and-sexual-violence-in-the-drc/# accessed on 15 May 2025

[13] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[14] The African Climate Foundation Report; Geopolitics of Critical Minerals in Renewable Supply Chains  available at https://africanclimatefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/800644-ACF-03_Geopolitics-of-critical-minerals-R_WEB.pdf  accessed on 15 May 2025

[15] Global Witness; Critical Minerals Fuel Conflicts available via  https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/transition-minerals/the-critical-minerals-scramble-how-the-race-for-resources-is-fuelling-conflict-and-inequality/#:~:text=How%20are%20critical%20minerals%20driving,communities%20in%20resource%2Drich%20nations. Accessed on 15 May 2025

[16] Andy Home, After Ukraine deal, US turns its critical minerals gaze to Africa, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/, accessed on May 22

[17] ICGLR, Report on the Status of Implementation of the Six Tools of the ICGLR Regional Initiative on Natural Resources in Member States, P14

[18] WTO (2024): High demand for energy-related critical minerals creates supply chain pressures; available at https://www.wto.org/english/blogs_e/data_blog_e/blog_dta_10jan24_e.htm#:~:text=Exports,all%20at%206%20per%20cent). Accessed on 15 May 2025

[19] US International Finance Cooperation https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-critical-mineral-supply-chains-countering-chinas-dominance#:~:text=But%20critical%20mineral%20supply%20chains,sent%20to%20China%20for%20processing.

[20] URT:  Ministry of Minerals, Mining Commission; A Report on implementation of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme for Tanzania Year 2023

[21]Global Witness (2025) available at https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/new-investigation-suggests-eu-trader-traxys-buys-conflict-minerals-from-drc/ accessed on 15 May 2025

[22] ibid

[23] Martin A, etal (2014), All that Glitters is not Gold: Dubai, Congo and the illicit trade of critical minerals, Partnership Africa Canada, May 2014

[24] The Eastleigh Voice (2025); Police launch investigation into suspected copper smuggling at Mombasa port; available at https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/business/112007/police-probe-suspected-copper-smuggling-at-mombasa-port accessed on 15 May 2025

[25] IMPACT, Actors Must Suspend Sourcing Minerals Financing Armed Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at https://impacttransform.org/, accessed on May 23, 1:46pm

[26] https://www.kpcivilsociety.org/activity/kimberley-process-lifts-ineffective-embargo-end-of-an-era-for-the-central-african-republic-and-another-clear-signal-that-conflict-diamond-scheme-needs-serious-fixing/

[27] Kimberly Civil Society Coalition (2025); BEYOND SHINING ILLUSIONS: New documentary exposes the unspoken realities of large-scale diamond mining available at https://www.kpcivilsociety.org/press/beyond-shining-illusions-new-documentary-exposes-the-unspoken-realities-of-diamond-mining-in-african-countries/ accessed 15 May 2025

[28] Aikael Etal (2021) Understanding poverty dynamics and vulnerability in Tanzania: 2012–2018 available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rode.12829  accessed on 15 May 2025

[29] ibid

[30] https://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-land-mine-use-amounts-to-war-crimes-amnesty-report/a-62533770

How AI can be leveraged to power Africa’s sustainable energy systems

The evolution of energy production and consumption has undergone significant transformations over the decades, particularly in the context of Africa, where energy poverty remains a formidable challenge. This policy brief discusses how AI can be leveraged to  Africa’s power future.

By Evans Rubara*, Guest Expert, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

Featured image: Africa Energy portal, AfdB

Historically, the continent has grappled with inadequate infrastructure, unreliable power supply, and reliance on traditional biomass, hindering socio-economic development. As the global narrative shifts towards sustainability, the advent of power-to-energy technologies offers a promising solution. These innovative systems can convert surplus renewable energy into storable forms, such as hydrogen, potentially revolutionizing energy access in Africa. This article explores the intersection of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in powering energy and the unique socio-economic landscape of the continent, highlighting both the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead.

Understanding Energy Poverty in Africa

Energy poverty is defined as the lack of access to reliable, affordable, and sustainable energy services, which severely impacts individuals’ quality of life and economic opportunities. Energy poverty is a critical issue that affects millions across the African continent. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2021), about 600 million people in Africa lack access to electricity, which accounts for nearly 46% of the population. This problem is especially severe in rural areas, where the lack of electricity can reach up to 80%. Even in regions with electrical infrastructure, power outages are common, forcing many families to rely on traditional biomass for cooking and heating. This reliance poses significant health risks and contributes to environmental degradation.

The consequences of energy poverty extend beyond mere inconvenience; they stifle economic growth, limit educational opportunities, and exacerbate health issues.

Without reliable power, businesses struggle to thrive, and families often resort to expensive and unhealthy alternatives. The World Bank (2020) estimates that the lack of access to electricity costs African countries around $5 billion annually in lost productivity. Therefore, addressing energy poverty is not only a moral imperative but also essential for broader socio-economic development across the continent.

The Role of Power-to-Energy Systems

Power-to-energy systems can play a crucial role in alleviating energy poverty in Africa. These technologies convert excess electricity into storable and transportable forms of energy, helping to manage the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources like solar and wind. In regions where energy production fluctuates seasonally, power-to-energy systems can provide a buffer, ensuring a more consistent energy supply.

For example, during sunny days, solar panels can generate surplus electricity that can be converted into hydrogen through a process known as electrolysis. This hydrogen can then be stored and used later for electricity generation or as fuel for transportation. Such flexibility allows energy supply to align more closely with demand, which is vital in areas where consumption patterns can be unpredictable.

The African Continental AI Strategy

 Artificial intelligence (AI) is technology that allows machines to simulate human intelligence and cognitive capabilities. AI can be used to help make decisions, solve problems and perform tasks that are normally accomplished by humans[1].

The African Continental AI Strategy is an initiative by the African Union aimed at leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) for socio-economic development across the continent. This strategy recognizes the transformative potential of AI (African Union, 2019) and seeks to address critical challenges in sectors such as healthcare, agriculture, education, and energy. By encouraging collaboration among member states and investing in AI research and infrastructure, the strategy aims to position Africa as a competitive player in the global AI landscape.

One of the key implications of this strategy is its potential to enhance the integration of power-to-energy systems. With nearly 600 million people affected by energy poverty, the incorporation of AI into energy systems can optimize the generation, distribution, and consumption of energy.

Power-to-energy technologies, which convert surplus renewable energy into storable forms like hydrogen, can benefit from AI-driven analytics that manage energy flow, predict demand, and improve efficiency.

Additionally, the strategy emphasizes the importance of building local capacities and skills. Investing in education and training will enable African nations to develop a workforce proficient in AI applications specific to the energy sector, ensuring that innovations are tailored to local contexts. The strategy also promotes ethical AI use, which aligns with the need for transparent and responsible implementation of technologies that impact communities and the environment.

Advantages of Power-to-Energy Systems in Africa

Power-to-energy systems offer several advantages for Africa. They can increase energy security by diversifying energy sources and enabling local fuel production, reducing reliance on imported fossil fuels. This diversification is particularly important for many African countries that are vulnerable to fluctuations in global energy prices.

These systems also create jobs. Establishing power-to-energy facilities can generate employment in construction, operation, and maintenance, thereby supporting local economies and fostering skills development. Furthermore, power-to-energy technologies facilitate the integration of renewable energy into the grid, which is essential for transitioning to a low-carbon economy. By maximizing the use of local renewable resources, countries can enhance their energy independence.

Moreover, these systems have environmental benefits. By decreasing reliance on fossil fuels and promoting cleaner energy sources, power-to-energy systems can help reduce greenhouse gas emissions, contribute to global climate goals, and improve local air quality.

Challenges and Considerations

Despite their potential, adopting power-to-energy systems in Africa is not without challenges. One major barrier is the initial investment required for these technologies. Many African nations operate with limited budgets, and the high upfront costs of establishing power-to-energy facilities can deter investment. Additionally, the absence of existing infrastructure for energy storage and distribution presents significant logistical hurdles.

The regulatory environment poses another challenge. In many African countries, energy policies are still evolving, and the lack of clear regulations can create uncertainty for investors, hindering the deployment of new technologies. Comprehensive energy policies are urgently needed to support innovation while ensuring equitable access to energy resources.

There is also the risk of creating energy inequities. If access to power-to-energy technologies is limited to urban areas or wealthier populations, rural communities may be left behind, exacerbating existing disparities. Prioritizing inclusive energy strategies is crucial to ensuring that all populations benefit from new technologies.

Power Security Issues

Transitioning to power-to-energy systems carries specific risks, particularly concerning power security. Key issues include the reliability of renewable sources, which can lead to vulnerabilities during periods of low production. For instance, solar energy generation drops significantly at night and can be affected by weather conditions. If not managed properly, power-to-energy systems could lead to an over-reliance on stored energy, compromising supply during peak demand.

Cybersecurity risks are also a significant concern. As energy systems become more interconnected and dependent on digital technologies, the threat of cyberattacks increases. Many developing nations may lack the resources and expertise to secure their energy infrastructure, making them vulnerable to disruptions that could have far-reaching economic consequences.

Furthermore, infrastructure vulnerabilities can exacerbate the challenges faced by power-to-energy systems. The physical infrastructure required, such as storage facilities and distribution networks, may be underdeveloped in many regions. Natural disasters or political instability could further disrupt energy supply.

Market volatility is another issue. As power-to-energy technologies expand, the markets for energy carriers such as hydrogen may become more unstable, creating uncertainty for investors and consumers alike.

Power-to-Energy AI and Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity threats to power-to-energy systems in Africa are complex (Cybersecurity Africa, 2021) and can pose significant risks to the stability and reliability of energy infrastructure. The increased digital interconnectivity of these systems creates vulnerabilities that can be exploited by cybercriminals. If not adequately secured, power-to-energy systems may become targets for attacks that could disrupt energy supply or compromise sensitive data.

Many African countries are still in the process of developing their cybersecurity frameworks. Existing measures may be insufficient to protect critical energy infrastructure, making power-to-energy systems more susceptible to attacks. Cyberattacks on these systems can have severe consequences, including power outages, economic disruptions, and threats to public safety.

Insider threats also pose significant risks. Employees or contractors with access to power-to-energy systems can unintentionally compromise security protocols or act maliciously. Additionally, ransomware attacks are increasingly common in various sectors, including energy, where cybercriminals can encrypt critical data and demand ransom for its release.

Moreover, the vast amounts of data generated by power-to-energy systems for operational efficiency and decision-making are at risk. Cyberattacks could compromise the integrity of this data, leading to incorrect operational decisions, inefficient energy distribution, or even equipment damage.

Enhancing Power-to-Energy AI Systems Cybersecurity

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are vital for strengthening cybersecurity efforts in the energy sector. These collaborations leverage the strengths of both sectors to create robust cybersecurity frameworks. By facilitating resource sharing and expertise, public and private entities can collaborate on threat intelligence and capacity building, enhancing situational awareness and effective incident response.

In the event of a cyber incident, PPPs can form coordinated response teams, ensuring a rapid and effective response to minimize damage and restore services. Joint initiatives in policy development can lead to the creation of cybersecurity standards that apply across sectors, providing a consistent framework for protecting critical infrastructure.

Investment in cybersecurity infrastructure can also be bolstered through PPPs. By mobilizing resources and sharing responsibilities for security measures, both sectors can contribute to the overall security landscape. Public awareness campaigns and training programs can educate stakeholders about cybersecurity risks, fostering a supportive environment for investment.

Research and development efforts can drive innovation in cybersecurity technologies, while regulatory compliance guidance can help ensure that regulations are met without imposing undue burdens on businesses. Continuous improvement through collaboration will allow both public and private entities to assess and adapt their cybersecurity measures to the evolving threat landscape.

Incentivizing Power-to-Energy Investments in Africa

A comprehensive set of policies addressing financial, regulatory, and infrastructural challenges is essential to encourage power-to-energy investments in Africa, Financial incentives, such as tax breaks or subsidies for companies investing in power-to-energy technologies, can make projects more financially viable. Establishing government-backed loan programs with favourable terms can also support businesses and communities looking to invest in power-to-energy infrastructure.

Clear regulatory frameworks outlining the permitting process and compliance requirements for power-to-energy projects can build investor confidence. Streamlined permitting processes will reduce bureaucratic delays, while technical standards ensure safety and reliability.

Investment in grid infrastructure is crucial for accommodating new power-to-energy projects. Additionally, fostering public-private partnerships can share risks and resources in developing these projects. Creating targeted support for rural areas, such as funding for projects that enhance energy access, will also be important.

International cooperation is vital for engaging with global funding sources and facilitating knowledge sharing with countries that have successfully implemented power-to-energy technologies. Establishing innovation hubs focused on renewable energy and power-to-energy technologies will encourage research and development, paving the way for new solutions and business models.

Strong regional economic cooperation can be a strong driver. While power-to-energy systems present significant opportunities for addressing energy poverty in Africa, careful planning, investment, and collaboration are essential to navigate the challenges. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have the potential to play a pivotal role in addressing energy poverty. For instance, the Southern African Development Community (SADC, 2019) has launched initiatives to enhance energy access through the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), which aims to optimize energy generation and distribution. Similarly, the East Africa power pool have all suggested the imperative for cooperation. However, the implementation of these has remained at snail pace and thus missing out on the potential dividends of a regionally integrated power and energy system

Addressing energy poverty is essential for improving livelihoods and fostering economic resilience in Africa. Collaborative efforts among RECs, governments, and international organizations are crucial to overcoming the challenges posed by energy poverty (World Bank, 2020). By fostering an inclusive approach that emphasizes capacity building and innovation, Africa can harness the potential of these technologies to create a sustainable and equitable energy future.

*Evans Rubara is an experienced Natural Resource Management specialist with a deep focus on extractive geopolitics, environmental politics and Sustainability. He can be reached through evans@africatranscribe.co.tz.

Further Reading

  • African Union. (2019). African Continental AI Strategy.
  • Cybersecurity Africa. (2021). Cybersecurity Threats in Energy Systems.
  • Government of Kenya. (2020). National Cybersecurity Strategy.
  • (2021). World Energy Outlook.
  • (2019). National Cybersecurity Policy.
  • Rwanda Government. (2020). National Cybersecurity Policy.
  • (2019). Southern African Power Pool Initiatives.
  • South African Government. (2020). Cybersecurity Policy Framework.
  • World Bank. (2020). The Impact of Energy Poverty on Economic Development.

[1] https://builtin.com/artificial-intelligence

Solar and Energy Transition: Good policy intentions but less progress: Assessing Tanzania and EAC’s Utility scale solar energy potential and policy gaps to fix

Governments are struggling with little success to attract and retain utility scale solar projects and many have died in their nascent stages. Yet utility scale solar projects could be a significant contributor to resolving the regions power shortages and increased energy access by sizeable proportions. So, what is holding back utility scale solar projects and how can governments maneuver to attract and retain more investors. 

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

@energypolicy @cleanenergy @solarafrica @energytransition

Multiple studies have concluded that the Eastern Africa region has the highest technical potential for solar power technologies, with estimates of 175 PWh and 220 PWh annually for Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) and Photovoltaics (PV) respectively. African countries with the highest CSP and PV potentials are Algeria, Egypt, Namibia, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania.  The annual technical solar power potential in Tanzania is estimated to be 31,482 TWh for CSP technology and 38,804 TWh for PV technology. Despite this potential, Tanzania and EAC lags behind its peers such as South Africa, Algeria and Egypt. Besides the technical aspects as earlier discussed, the policy terrain in East Africa has been largely zig zag and therefore not coherent enough to support investment.

In this second part of our analytical series on solar as a clean energy source, we attempt to shade some light on the policy terrain in Tanzania and East Africa generally and how this is contributing towards holding back large-scale investment and utility scale solar penetration.

Policy and investment terrain

Generally, the policy and investment landscape in East Africa has been evolving at a snail pace. Both Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda have renewable energy policies in place however these are not backed up by adequate promotion, implementation and funding. The regulatory terrain has also been discordant.  For the region to benefit, the policy and investment trajectory will have to align and move faster, catching up with the global trends and the drive to clean energy.

Tanzania’s policy terrain.

The government passed a National Energy Policy (NEP) in 2015 with a commitment to increase the share of renewables in its energy mix. The NEP 2015 seeks to facilitate improvement of investment environment to promote and support private sector participation. The policy further commits to scaling up utilization of renewable energy source by among others introducing a.. feed-in-tariffs for renewable energy technologies and structure power purchase agreements for renewable energy.  

It further commits to facilitate integration of renewable energy technologies in buildings and industrial designs and establish frameworks for renewable energy integration into the national and isolated grids; an Promote sustainable biofuel production and usage.

However, actualization of this has been slow. To date contribution of renewables to Tanzania’s energy mix remains low at 1.2 %. By 2021 Tanzania’s electricity generation came mostly from natural gas (48%), followed by hydro (31%), petrol (18%) with solar and biofuels contributing a mere 1% each. The National energy consumption balance is still dominated with biomas (charcoal and firewood) use at around 85%.

Tanzania government admits that that solar utilization is constrained by high initial costs, poor after sales services, insufficient awareness on its potential and economic benefits offered by solar technologies plus inappropriate credit financing mechanisms.

Previous policies, particularly the 2003 was successful in the establishment and operationalization of Energy and Water utilities regulatory authorities, the Rural Energy Agency (REA) and the Rural Energy Fund, However, it fell short of making advancements on the renewable energy, particularly by not creating a designated and operational Renewable Energy Fund. By design it is implied that funding of the renewable sector would come directly from the consolidated Energy Fund. However, with conflicting priorities and government’s focus on increasing energy access to hydro and gas fired electricity, much of the available funding was channeled towards rural electrification.

In 2012 Tanzania was one of the pilot countries selected to prepare the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP). The chief objective of this plan was to transform the energy sector of Tanzania from one that is more dependent on fossil fuels to one that is more diversified with a greater share of renewable sources contributing to the energy mix through catalyzing the large–scale development of renewable energy.

The SREP–Tanzania Investment Plan was prepared by the Government of Tanzania, through a National Task Force led by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) with support from the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). However much of this plan is yet to fully takeoff and its translation into actual deliverables yet to materialise

Cognizant of the significant gaps that exist, in 2023 the Minister of energy at time, Hon January Makamba revealed that the government was developing a new Renewable Energy Policy to further enhance investments in renewable energy. This policy would capitalize on the substantial financial resources, capital markets, and advancements in new technologies dedicated to renewable energy globally. He also announced ongoing efforts to identify areas with renewable energy resources and prioritize native investments in wind and solar projects. The government would provide support in this regard and establish guidelines for project implementation.

In 2023 Tanzania entered into an agreement to construct the Country’s first-ever solar photovoltaic power station to feed into the national electricity grid. According to the Ministry of Energy, the project is part of a larger initiative of installing 150 MW of solar energy in the Kishapu district of the Shinyanga region. The first phase of the project to be constructed by Sinohydro Corporation from China was estimated at TZS 109 billion and was scheduled for completion before end of 2024.

According to the Minister, the implementation of the solar project reflected the government’s commitment to establishing a diverse mix of electricity sources in the national grid, incorporating water, gas, wind, and solar power. This approach aims to ensure a continuous supply of electricity, even in the event of a failure in one source.

There are also several large-scale solar power projects under development, including the 30 MW Singida project and the 50 MW Nyumba ya Mungu project. In addition to government efforts, there are also private companies and organizations working to develop renewable energy projects in Tanzania.

Similarly, Zanzibar, the semi-autonomous Island of Tanzania, also signed in 2023 an agreement with a Mauritius-based Generation Capital Ltd and Tanzania’s Taifa Energy to build its first large-scale 30MW solar PV power plant, as it seeks to become energy independent. The plant will cost $140 million. The Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) between the state-owned Zanzibar Electricity Corporation (Zeco) and the two companies to develop the 180 megawatts plant will be implemented in phases, according to Zanzibar’s Ministry of Energy and Minerals.

Kenya’s solar terrain

Garissa Solar Farm

So far, Kenya is leading in large solar projects.  There are at least 10 large solar farms in Kenya. The Garisa solar farm, is the largest in East and Central Africa, with 55 MW generation capacity. The solar farm sits on85 hectares (210 acres) and consists of 206,272 265Wp solar panels and 1,172 42kW inverters owned and operated by Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Corporation. Others already operational or proposed include; Malindi Solar (52MW), Alten Kasses (52 MW), Kopere Solar Project (50MW), Eldosol Solar Project (48MW), Radiant (50MW), Rumuruti (40 MW), Nakuru Solar project (40MW), Witu (40MW) and Makindu (40MW).

Kenya has buttressed its renewable energy credentials with a new Energy Transition and Investment Plan (ETIP) launched in 2023. The ETIP spells out Kenya’s road map to delivering a 100% clean energy driven economy by 2050. The country is however yet to figure out how it will fund this ambitious plan. Over the past recent years Kenya has been facing significant budgetary constraints affecting funding of its major national development plans. Even when the government has committed to achieving 100% clean energy by 2030, it bets heavily on funding from external donors. With the recent trend in aid inflows and if they remain unchanged in the short and medium term, it will be a tall order Kenya to meet this target.

Uganda’s solar uptake

Uganda has been slowly catching up with its peers. Uganda’s policy commits to make modern renewable energy a substantial part of the national energy consumption. To increase the use of modern renewable energy, from the current 4% to 61% of the total energy consumption by the year 2017[i].

The policy terrain has been zigzagging and investment in renewables is still low but the government has blended its focus on hydropower generation with small investments in solar projects as back up for its hydropower. There was a big growth in 2021, reaching 92 MW, followed by a significant increase of around 6.9 MW, reaching a total of 98.9 MW Uganda’s installed solar energy capacity in 2022.

Some of the projects contributing to this growth include Kabulasoke Solar PV Park is a 20MW solar PV power project, located in Central, Uganda, Bufulubi solar project in Tororo and Access solar plants in Soroti.  New pipeline projects include the Amea West Nile Solar PV Park, a ground-mounted solar project, whose construction was expected to commence from 2024 and subsequently enter into commercial operation in 2025. The power generated from the project will be sold to Uganda Electricity Transmission under a power purchase agreement. 

This however falls short of achieving the targets as stipulated in Uganda’s Renewable Energy policy. Uganda’s renewable energy policy commits to establish and maintain a responsive legislative, appropriate financing and fiscal policy framework for investments in renewable energy technologies. It mentions forms of financing such as strengthening the Credit Support Facility and Smart Subsidies which are intended to scale up investments in renewable energy and rural electrification.

Moreover, a special financial mechanism, a credit support facility known as the Uganda Energy Capitalisation Trust, was instituted to help realise the policy but this expired in 2012 and had never been renewed[ii]. Uganda lags in meeting its policy targets as only 10 solar projects had been completed by 2022[iii].

What is the current market and investment size?

According to global energy reports, there is a substantive market size of solar photovoltaic (PV) in East Africa and Africa generally. The Middle East & Africa solar photovoltaic (PV) market size was valued at USD 5.00 billion in 2022. The market was projected to grow from USD 6.93 billion in 2023 to USD 37.71 billion by 2030, exhibiting a cumulative Average growth rate (CAGR) of 27.4% during the forecast period.

Despite its immense solar power potential, East Africa and Africa generally continues to lag behind other continents when it comes to building up utility scale grid and off-grid solar capacity, in part due to a stagnant policy regime, overlapping institutional roles, limited research, technical capacity and lack of appropriate financing facilities for investment.  Some proposed projects have failed to take off.  As a consequence, the total investment share of utility scale projects into East Africa remains comparable low.  

So, what can EAC governments do to make utility scale solar markets attractive?

Recommendations

# Governments must make policy switches from paper to aggressive attracting of investment into the solar PV East African markets. The policies may exist but the implementation gap is too big. Policy interventions and a national course-correction is urgently needed to effectively overcome structural barriers and create local value in the emerging solar market many of which is still left behind in this progress.

# Decentralization of energy generation away from vertically integrated power monopolies such as TANESCO and Kenya power could be a game changer.  De regulation and introduction of net metering by independent Solar PV power producers to directly generate and sell to customers could improve profitability of solar projects and attract new investments.

# Financing institutions must scale up project financing of renewable energy projects.  Solar projects are still expensive and funding is difficult to come by. Kenya’s Garisa solar project required an investment of KSh13. 7 billion ($135.7 million) and was funded by the Exim Bank of China. Other projects have required substantive investment with funds generated from private developers and energy venture capitalists. The existing financial institutions are yet to master tailing project financing to utility scale solar projects.

# Addressing land rights and underlying injustices. Large solar farms require large tracts of land and these can be a source of land grabbing, land deprivation and injustice, generating conflicts and endless litigation between potential investors and the communities. The renewable policies and investments have to sit well with land rights, guaranteeing free prior informed consent, fair compensation and equity,

# Socio-economic: Identifying and prioritizing suitable areas for building large-scale solar power plants is a complex problem. In contrast with the simplistic view, identifying appropriate geographical areas for solar power installation is not only linked with the amount of received solar radiation, but there are many other technical, economic, environmental, and social factors that should be considered like: alternative land uses, topographical characteristics of the land, conserving protected areas, potential environmental impacts, water availability, potential urban expansion, proximity to demand centers, roads proximity, and potential for grid connectivity.

# Solar technology firms must address intermittence and storage of renewable energy. Solar power is generally reliant on the availability of sunshine. Depending on the weather and hours of the day and night. Unfortunately, the technology has not advanced far enough and made cheaply available to East for storage of solar power. For solar power users the days are hot and the nights are cold.

# Government leaders must have a unified political will to support renewables as part of the master energy mix and regional energy power pool. So far there is a divided political opinion on what solar power can do in helping the governments to meet their national energy demands. While Kenya is a front runner, other countries are still focused on hydro and gas. The future of distributed solar therefore depends largely on good political will driving favorable polices and changing mindset to embrace solar power as a new source of energy. This could be reflected in new generation policy drivers such as requirement for solar considerations in building designs and integrated power systems.

[i] Renewable Policy for Uganda; https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3.sourceafrica.net/documents/118159/Uganda-Renewable-Energy-Policy.pdf

 

[ii]

[iii]

Energy Transition: Understanding basics of solar energy and why it has failed to peak in East Africa

 

East Africa has abundant hot sunshine around the year yet harvesting this for large utility scale electricity has remained small. Partially, it is because the technical aspects of solar power make it a complicated energy source system than it may appear. Understanding is important in helping to shape policy and accelerated solarisation.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Center

@energy transition @solarenergy @solarafrica  @energypolicy

Early in March 2024 a heat wave hit South Sudan with temperatures soaring between 41 to 47 degrees Celsius. The temperature and its accompanying heat were too high that the South Sudanese Ministry of Health closed schools, advised the public to stay indoors and drink a lot of water to remain hydrated.  

The images of South Sudanese baking eggs under the open sun on the streets of Juba went viral rekindling the debate on the potential of harnessing solar energy to generate power. In a two part articles and policy briefs we discuss the technical aspects of solar power and the policy terrain undermining the utility scale investment levels in East Africa.

East Africa has abundant hot sunshine around the year yet harvesting this for large utility scale electricity has remained small. With about 50 MW generation, the Garissa Solar Plant is the largest grid connected solar power plant in East & Central Africa.

So far Egypt has the largest solar park in Africa. It spans 37 kilometers and has a total generation capacity of around 1.8 gigawatts, which is enough to power hundreds of thousands of homes and towns. The question is therefore asked why have we not seen large uptake of utility scale solar projects in East Africa? The answer zeros down to technology, political will and mindset.

The technical aspects of solar power make it a complicated energy source system than it may appear.  The mechanics behind solar power and how it can be harnessed with impact on a larger scale can/ is more complicated than it may appear. Harnessing solar for electricity generation requires technical expertise, political will and investment.  This brief dissects the basics of solar power and its potentials as a Peaker clean power source for East Africa.

What is solar power

According to scientists, solar energy comes from nuclear reactions which happen deep in the sun’s core. The sun is a giant hot glowing mass of hydrogen and helium at the center of our solar system.

Every second the sun burns and loses about 4 million tons of mass in a continuous complex nuclear fusion reaction. That mass when converted into energy is what drives solar energy outwards from the sun radiating into the solar system. Solar energy radiates from the sun as electromagnetic waves of different frequencies and energies which can be trapped and transformed into solar electricity.

The solar panel collects energy from the sun, this energy goes into an inverter, which is a key component of a solar PV installation. The inverter converts the steady electric power coming into the inverter into alternating current (AC) which is the predominant form of power used in an electric grid or connected to a service panel at a house.

Role of solar in global power systems

Globally the role of solar is still small although it has been increasing over the years. Solar power contributes about 10% of all renewable energy and 1% of total world energy. Bioenergy, hydro power and wind contribute the bulk (90%) of the total renewable energy of about 900 Mtoe, accounting for 10.5% of total energy use. Solar photovoltaic and solar thermal provide 5% each of renewable energy. These statistics are growing as the world constantly moves towards clean energy solutions by 2030.

According to Renewable Capacity Statistics 2024 report released by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) shows that 2023 set a new record in renewables deployment in the power sector by reaching a total capacity of 3, 870 Gigawatts (GW) globally.

With solar energy continuing to dominate renewable generation capacity expansion, the report underscores that the growth disparity did not only affect geographical distribution but also the deployment of technologies. Solar accounted for 73% of the renewable growth last year, reaching 1 419 GW, followed by wind power with 24% share of renewable expansion.

Renewables accounted for 86% of capacity additions; however, this growth is unevenly distributed across the world, indicating a trend far from the tripling renewable power target by 2030.

The 473 GW of renewables expansion was led once again by Asia with a 69% share (326 GW). This growth was driven by China, whose capacity increased by 63%, reaching 297.6 GW. This reflects a glaring gap with other regions, leaving a vast majority of developing countries behind, despite massive economic and development needs. Even though Africa has seen some growth, it paled in comparison with an increase of 4.6%, reaching a total capacity of 62 GW. Clearly, the room for solar as a new form of energy is still available.

Determinants of solar power and characteristics

The amount of solar received on the earth is determined by a number of factors such as what is technically called irradiance and irradiation. Solar Irradiance is the term generally used to measure the solar flax at a given location and is usually quoted in units of Watts per square meter. Solar Irradiation is used to measure the long-term average solar flax at a given location and usually quoted in Kwh per square meter.

This can further be categorized as Direct Normal Irradiation (DNI) which is the solar power measured at the surface of the earth at a given location with a surface element perpendicular to the sun’s rays. Diffused Horizontal Irradiance/irradiation (DHI) measuring the radiation at the earth’s surface from light scattered by the atmosphere and Global Horizontal Irradiation (GHI) which is the total irradiance from the sun measured at the earth surface on a horizontal plane.

Africa is often considered and referred to as the “Sun continent” or the continent where the Sun’s influence is the greatest.  According to the “World Sunshine Map”, Africa receives many more hours of bright sunshine during the course of the year than any other continent of the Earth and many of the sunniest places on the planet lie here.  This has also been. recognized by the international council of science who confidently pointed out that Africa has the best resources when it comes to solar power availability. This resource is usually measured in form of solar irradiance.

The amount of solar irradiation and irradiance are further determined by factors such as

  1. Geographical location and proximity to the equator, whereby close proximity to the equator provides short distance to the sun with the sun rays having a direct strike to the earth’s surface and therefore higher temperatures optimal for solar energy.
  2. Elevation above, where by the higher you go, the more exposure to sunlight and amount of sunshine received
  3. Seasonality of weather, cloud cover and precipitation, which determine how much sunshine is recorded at a given location.

Strategically located along the equator, East Africa receives between 500-3500 hours of sunshine per year, therefore making it a perfect site for harnessing solar energy throughout the year.

Trends of Solar installations and future of utility scale solar power

Solar Photo Voltaic (PV) installations have been increasing beyond expected projections, however the rate is still too low to pace the required demand.  The costs of solar PVs have been dropping constantly by around 20% for every doubling of cumulative shipped volume. At the present rates the costs could have about every 10 years.

Solar panels are made from semi-conductor materials which conduct photovoltaic cells through a complex process of doping and bonding as energy moves through different bands to release electricity. This harnessed for domestic use or as Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) for Utility scale electricity generation. According to statistics CSP is expected to grow by nearly 90% over the next 5 years and nearly tripling the rate of the past 5 years.

Solar and Socio-economic effects

Utility scale solar projects require large tracts of land to set up. For example, the 1,547 MW China Great Wall Project in the Tegger Desert occupies 1200 square kilometers of land with an installed solar field of 43 square kilometers. The US Star 1 and 2 project sits on a large piece of land with1,720,000 panels field generating 1,664 MW enough to power 255,000 homes.  This requirement for size to pave way for their establishments, can lead to land grabbing, mass evictions and displacements escalating socio-economic conflicts between the local residents and the investors. East Africa is already awash with land-based conflicts, displacement from ancestral lands and unfair compensation of victims.

Solar and the environment

Because of its low penetration, the environmental impacts of solar energy are still minimal.  These could increase as the uptake expands however the following can be noted

  • Land use and eco system. Solar farms at utility scale electricity generation requires large areas of land and this can cause disturbances to the land vegetation and sensitive eco-systems. The thousands of solar panels spread across hundreds of square meters can be an eye sore and environmental nuisance
  • Impacts on birds (avian): Solar can have adverse impacts to birds through distraction inflight eye sights and incineration. According to a study by the USGs estimated that its Ivanpah CSP plant in Nevada was incinerating about 6000 birds per year. Globally it was estimated that between 40,000 to 140,000 birds died due to large utility scale solar projects.
  • Toxic materials used; Solar panels are produced using toxic materials such as silicon which reacts and decomposes to produce tetrachloride, a toxic substance must be well disposed as an industrial waste.

Generally, solar is not carbon free based on a 30-year life cycle analysis but has a very low carbon foot print. This carbon foot print could increase as solar penetration expands matching the global drive towards a clean energy future. However, for now it remains one of cleanest source of energy.

Please read our next article on Tanzania and EAC’s potential and the policy terrain and regulation

Oil and Energy Transition: Why Sudan conflict provides new hope for EACOP

The Sudan conflict is a catastrophe that must be stopped but its unintended consequences provide new optimism for the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP).

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Center

With the constant fighting and insecurity along the pipeline and its pumping stations, the South Sudanese government is now open to exploring new opportunities via EACOP to guarantee its future oil exports.

On March 16th the government of Sudan admitted that it cannot guarantee the smooth export of oil from South Sudan, as a year of war has made it difficult to maintain or even protect the pipeline to Port Sudan.

In a letter to major oil companies involved in the oil production and export, Sudan’s Minister of Energy and Petroleum Dr Mohieldin Nam Mohamed Said admitted that the war had made it difficult to provide any guarantees for safety.

He acknowledged that the conflict was hampering the flow of oil to Port Sudan, as it took time to repair pipelines ruptured during the fighting. In addition, there was a telecommunications breakdown between the pumping stations (PS4) and PS5 in Sudan, which were shut down in the midst of heavy fighting. The area was an active military zone and access for repairs was not guaranteed.

As a response the South Sudanese government had declared a force majeure, making production and export impossible and thereby revamping suggestions to explore new possible safer routes for South Sudan’s oil.

The war in Sudan added to the challenges South Sudan faces in maximizing its only major resource – oil – to fund a financially constrained government and other operations.  As a consequence of the war, South Sudan’s oil production fell from 160,000 barrels per day in 2022 to 140,000 barrels per day in 2023. This is was more than half of the previous peak of 350,000 barrels per day before civil war broke out in 2013.

Talks to have South Sudan pump its oil south wards had all along been explored and presented as part of Uganda’s grand plan to make the EACOP an East African project by connecting and supplying all the EAC member states with oil and gas.

Under this grand plan and initial drawings, the Oil pipeline would radiate from its nerve center in Hoima with an artery of pipelines running northwards to South Sudan, westwards to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), eastwards to connect Kenya’s oil from Turkana and southwards with an arm extended to Rwanda and long route via Tanzania to Tanga port.

Map showing initially considered alternative EACOP routes

But the progress of this was partly hampered by Uganda’s fall out with the Kenyan route and the existing agreements signed between Khartoum and Juba during the independence talks. Provisions in these required among others a concession that Sudan will retain territorial control of some oil rich territories and that South Sudan would continue exporting its oil via Port Sudan. By doing this, the government in Khartoum would maintain some revenues from the oil sector that had been largely lost with South Sudan’s cessation and independence.

I remember in a private conversation with a friend from Sudan some years ago he confided that during one meeting with   Sudanese youth and young professionals, President Omar Bashir, before his overthrow, had admitted that he was not sure about the economic future of Sudan without South Sudan. He clearly predicted a catastrophic economic meltdown leading to chaos and that was why Sudan had to maintain a grip on South Sudan. The oil pipeline was a win-win infrastructure politically and economically anchoring the two countries as good neighbors.

By Sudan admitting that the safety cannot be guaranteed and reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure will take longer than usual provides South Sudan with a legitimate cause to start exploring new safe routes for its oil.

An oil route from Juba southward would be beneficial to South Sudan, the EACOP but also good for the East African Community as a region. South Sudan derives 90% of its revenues from oil exports and would like to have a constant flow of this oil to sustain its economy. EACOP would guarantee that flow. South Sudan would also have access to other EACOP related infrastructure such as the refinery and international airport for other logistical needs.

An extended pipeline from Hoima northwards to connect with the oil from South Sudan would increase volumes of oil pumped out of EACOP by at least 150,000 to 200,000 barrels per day, increasing EACOP’s profitability and attractiveness to investors.

Moreover, with its oil, South Sudan would become a major regional player with a stronger voice in EAC matters perhaps more than it is today. The pipeline would bring Sudan in the north closer to the EAC, increasing its prospects for joining the EAC and thus facilitating the region’s expansion ambitions.

There could be some differences in the chemical composition and technical aspects of the two oils (Uganda and South Sudan) with perhaps one being waxier than the other but these complexities can be handled through technical re-engineering and design of the oil pipeline.

The EACOP has always been a controversial project with environmental activists and anti-oil crusaders campaigning against its construction.  Environmentalists argued that the world’s longest heated pipeline will have serious environmental impacts and contribute to global warming. The future profitability of the pipeline was also questioned given the global push towards a transition away from fossil-based system and uncertainty about the future of oil as an energy source.

None the less, plans for construction of the pipeline are ongoing.  Land compensations in Uganda and Tanzania was completed. An advance consignment of pipes was delivered and a coating and insulating plant for the pipelines was commissioned and already operational in Tanzania, paving way for the pipeline construction and ground laying to commence before end of 2024.

The conflict in Sudan therefore provides more impetus to the project as it opens a new door for possible access and increased volumes from South Sudan’s oil and taping into already existing markets can be guaranteed.

The future of oil as a dominant fuel in the global energy system is a controversial subject and a debate exists whether it makes sense to construct new oil pipelines and infrastructure.  

However, the crisis and the significance of oil in driving South Sudan’s economy comes at a time when there are all indications that major global super powers such as the United States and United Kingdom are backtracking on their commitments to end and move away from fossil or oil as source of energy.

Despite the announcements made at the COP27 and 28, in his maiden speech to Parliament, King Charles in November 2023 announced that the UK government will issue new licensing rounds for exploration and drilling of oil and gas in the North Sea. The rounds will go ahead each year so long as the UK remains a net importer of oil and gas and if emissions from UK-based production remain lower than those associated with imports.

In the US, Republicans have maintained a firm support for oil and Donald Trump, the most preferred Republican nominee for President has vowed to overturn any existing legislation and commitments made by the Democrats against the fossil energy sector, by signing an executive order to issue new rounds oil and gas drilling.  According to Trump this would be his first executive order immediately signed, if he was elected to power in November of 2024. Clearly, the US political will is divided and the future US policy terrain on oil and gas cannot be guaranteed.

Quietly, the leading oil producers are strongly supporting continued pumping of oil. Despite global campaigns, large oil producers are still skeptical that renewables can replace oil in the medium term and by 2050. They believe that the focus should be on decarbonizing oil and not ending its supply and use all together. Ending use of oil would be returning the world to stone age error, one Middle East leader remarked at COP28 before backtracking after coming under intense criticism. The approved language at COP28 was phase down and not phaseout. Oil therefore may have a longer lifetime than earlier anticipated.

Despite the catastrophe that the war has caused, that we all condemn, Uganda and Tanzania should exploit the opportunity it provides to ramp up and conclude talks with South Sudan on the viability of exporting its oil via EACOP.