Unlocking Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) in Regional Agricultural Trade in East Africa: An Analysis of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Regime for Horticultural Products in Tanzania and Its Effects on International Trade.

Generally, Non-Trade Measures (NTMs) are good for safe and ethical international trade; however, when poorly regulated and applied irregularly, they transform into Non-Tariff Barrier (NTBs) and can be harmful to trade. Our short analytical study shows that Tanzania is both a perpetrator and victim of irregular SPS measures and could be losing billions in international trade and revenue foregone from its horticultural sector

By Jacob Mokiwa, Researcher , Governance and Economic Policy Centre

(Featured  top image, Courtesy of UNDP-Tanzania, Kizimba Project, Itete Ifakara Youth) 

Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS) are standards and regulations put in place as Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) to ensure the safety and quality of food, as well as to protect humans, animals, and plants from risks associated with diseases, pests, and contaminants based on science. SPS decisions are supposed to be science based. These measures are integrated into Tanzania’s regulatory framework, including through legislation, policies, and adherence to international agreements like the WTO SPS Agreement and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) IPPC.

Also, the normative framework governing East African Community (EAC) SPS measures include but are not limited to Article 108 (c) of the EAC Treaty; Article 38 (1C) of the Customs Union Protocol, EAC SPS Protocol, SPS Information Sharing Platform, etc.).

This short policy brief analyzes Tanzania’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) regime for horticultural products, assessing their impact on international trade and concludes with recommendations for enhancing SPS policy measures to ensure safety, compliance and a facilitative smooth international trade in Tanzania horticultural products. It emanates from our economic governance work on regional economic cooperation, trade and investment, with multiple aims of creating awareness about SPS as a major regulatory tool in regional and international trade that small traders and aspiring international horticulture exporters must know.

State of Horticultural Products

Faraha Salim sells vegetables in the market in Lushoto thanks to a small loan from a community savings and lending group-VICOBA.

Tanzania is a largely an agricultural producing and exporting country with its horticulture sector becoming a rapidly expanding sector with a huge potential to contribute to Tanzania’s economy through employment, trade and export foreign income earning. The country has large chunks of arable land, water bodies and favorable climate for horticulture in many regions across the country.

Tanzania’s horticultural sector encompasses various products, including fruits, vegetables, flowers, and spices.

In recent years, Tanzania has registered impressive export performance of different horticultural products, and this presents an advantageous opportunity to the smallholder farmers to increase their production. Despite this huge potential, the horticultural sector still suffers multiple challenges, including financing, regulation and export standardization. 

The local market infrastructure  conditions are still poor. The cold storage chain for horticultural products from the gardens to the market is limited. Horticulture products are transported in hot trucks, sold in open markets damaging quality  and export standards. The net effect is that Tanzania’s export share of the regional and global horticultural trade has been growing but remains low, compared to its neighbors such as Kenya. According to Ministry of Agriculture statistics, the horticulture sector has become the second largest growth driver of the entire agricultural sector, after food crops contributing about 25% of the sector but has remained stagnant in  growth at 11% annually.

According to the Tanzania Horticultural Association (TAHA) and the BoT Monthly Economic Review (MER), for the year ending in December 2023, the value of horticultural crops’ exports grew to $417.7 million (Sh1.044 trillion) as compared to $290.1 million (Sh725.25 billion) recorded in 2022. This shows that exports grew by $127.6 million (Sh319 billion), which is equivalent to 43.9 percent. The growth in exports comes after a decline from $384.9 million (962.25 billion) reported in 2021 to $290.1 million (Sh725.25 billion) in 2022. The decline accounted for a total of $94 million (Sh237 billion), which is equal to 24.4 percent[1].

This data if extrapolated for the last five years indicates that the Horticultural sector can be a major game changer in Tanzania’s international trade exports, serving as a major source employment to the bludgeoning unemployed youthful population of foreign revenue through increased investment in horticulture and export trade.  Moreover, the sector can leap frog Tanzania to a regional competitor, outpacing its neighbors and rivals in the horticultural sector.

However, the limited awareness, selective and uncoordinated application of SPS standards by both export and importing partners in intra-regional and international trade has gradually turned them from being Non-Tariff Measures (NTM) to become Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) to trade in Horticultural products amongst others.

According to Land O Lakes Trade of Agriculture Safely & Efficiency (TRASE) report, the East African Community (EAC) represents one of the fastest growing regional economic communities in the world. And yet, trade of agricultural products from and within this region has been hindered by Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) issues 

SPS Measures Regime in Tanzania

Tanzania’s SPS regime consists of several legal frameworks articulated and differentiated under the three SPS functions of animal health, food safety and plant health. This involves the Plant Health Act, 2020 with the mandate of issuing phytosanitary certificates, among other functions, Standards Act No. 2 of 2009 with the mandate of regulating and developing mandatory standards and responsible for inspection and certification). 

The regulatory institutions include the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Tanzania Pesticides and Plant Health Authority (TPPHA) established under the Act No. 04 of 2020 with a mandate to comply with the requirements of International Plant Protection Convection (IPPC) on sanitary and phytosanitary measures[2].  The other regulatory institution is the Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) established under Act No. 3 of 1975 as the National Standards Institute and subsequently renamed Tanzania Bureau of Standards under Act No. 1 of 1977. On 20th March 2009, the Standards Act No. 3 of 1975 was repealed and replaced by the Standards Act No. 2 of 2009.

The Bureau was established as part of the efforts by the government to strengthen the supporting institutional infrastructure for the industry and commerce sectors of the economy. Specifically, TBS is mandated to undertake measures for quality control of products of all descriptions and to promote standardization in industry and commerce[3]. So far, the regime has been quite robust, enabling Tanzania to enforce its SPS measures, however faces multiple challenges that would benefit from improvement.

Challenges

The agricultural sector already faces multiple challenges but the SPS regime in Tanzania adds another layer of complexity, potentially hindering Tanzania’s ability to invest in the horticultural sector, produce, export and compete effectively in the global market. For instance, some stringent SPS requirements cannot be met by small farmers in Tanzania due to the limited resources required for modern agriculture and consequently hinder the export of horticultural products, as meeting the standards can be costly.

Additionally, inconsistent enforcement of SPS regulations across different institutions and regions within Tanzania creates confusion and delays in trade processes and hence affects the competitiveness of Tanzanian products in international markets.

Furthermore, procedural framework for SPS regulation has shortcomings in the institutional framework and that, as a result, application of the existing legislations is impaired. There is limited capacity for speedy and quality testing and certification facilities. This lead to bottlenecks in the export process, delaying shipments and increasing costs for exporters.

Other challenges are; limited funding to attract and retain high quality talent, lack of transparency in certification, duplication of regulatory functions, poor coordination among the various SPS control agencies, lack of mutual confidence between enforcement agencies in different countries and non-existence of arrangements and mutual recognition agreements signed to facilitate trade.

Impact on regional and International Trade

 The effectiveness of Tanzania’s SPS regime significantly influences its international trade in horticultural products and therefore, there is a need to balance regulatory practices for health protection with trade facilitation. However, if not addressed, the regime may, and for purposes of enforcement of SPS controls, create trade constraints such as;

  • Market Access Restrictions: Non-compliance with SPS measures restricts access to lucrative international markets that is with stringent regulations, the production costs for horticultural producers may increase and making Tanzanian products less competitive compared to those from other countries. Kenya, Tanzania’s immediate horticultural competitor has been successful in meeting the standards at lower costs and thereby dominating the regional and international market of horticultural products.
  • Loss of Revenue: Inability to meet SPS standard leads to rejected shipments, financial losses, and diminished competitiveness in global markets, affecting the revenue generated from horticultural exports and thus undermines economic growth potential in the horticultural sector.
  • Diminished Reputation: Persistent challenges in meeting SPS standards tarnish Tanzania’s reputation as a reliable supplier of safe and high-quality horticultural products, thereby reducing consumer confidence and market demand.
  • Market Diversification: Strict regulatory requirements may incentivize Tanzanian exporters to explore new markets where compliance costs are lower or where there is greater alignment between domestic and international standards.
  • Quality Perception: Adherence to rigorous quality and safety standards can enhance the perception of Tanzanian horticultural products in international markets, positioning them as premium offerings valued for their quality and reliability. This could open up opportunities for niche markets and premium pricing strategies.

Policy Recommendations

Addressing challenges in Tanzania’s SPS regime for horticultural products is crucial for unlocking the sector’s full export potential, facilitating more investment and fostering sustainable economic growth. By implementing the recommendations outlined in this brief below, Tanzania can overcome SPS-related barriers to international trade and position itself in the global horticultural market as a reliable supplier of high-quality horticultural products and maximize the benefits of international trade for the citizens and economy. The following recommendations are proposed:

  1. Improve coordination among regulatory agencies and investing in digital platforms for documentation and compliance verification to simplify and accelerate SPS certification procedures for horticultural products and this will cut costs, reduce trade barriers and enhance market access.
  2. Strengthen enforcement mechanisms by putting in place an enabling legal framework to create effective and expeditious administrative mechanisms and provide clear administrative redress mechanisms for handling trade complaints and disputes. Also, the framework should provide for coordination of the various SPS control agencies to avoid overlaps and duplication. The current regime lays a solid foundation for further improvement.
  1. Improve infrastructure by allocating resources for upgrading SPS-related infrastructure including laboratories, inspection facilities and cold chain logistics that will enable producers and exporters to meet international standards and capitalize on emerging market opportunities. Tanzania has a deficit of cold storage capacity and its location along the equator exposes horticultural products to heat waves and vulnerability rapid quality deterioration and waste.
  1. Recruit and retain high quality staff with the of international testing and certification requirements. This must also be followed by addressing administrative limitations and sealing off opportunities for corruption.
  1. Prioritize capacity building, awareness and improve dissemination of information on SPS particularly for producers, small-scale traders, exporters and raising initiatives for regulatory agencies, on legislation and regulations, processes, procedures, standards, best practices, and technological advancements to enhance competitiveness in global markets.
  1. Foster partnership between public and private sector stakeholders to develop and implement SPS-related programs, training, research & development, technology adoption and technical assistance so as to address common challenges and promote innovation in the horticultural value chain. This must be backed by scaled up SPS technical assistance, going beyond the implementing institutions but also extended to horticultural farmers.
  1. Advocate for harmonization of SPS standards with international norms and regional trade agreements to streamline trade procedures and facilitate market access for Tanzanian horticultural products. Horticulture farmers and exporters still complain of disharmony in application and enforcement between Tanzania and its trading partners such as the Tanzania-South Africa Avocado case in 2021[4].
  1. Establish and empower the National SPS Committee to address and resolve technical SPS issues faced by traders and increase transparency on SPS requirements. Moreover, the committee should also be the main source of information on new SPS regulations, including measures introduced by trading partners.
  1. Constantly review to ascertain the extent to which Tanzania’s SPS regime is aligned to the EAC SPS protocol and its application is consistent and facilitative of international trade. There are cases of selective application and enforcement even among EAC member states.

References

Ministry of Agriculture. (2022). “National Horticulture Development Strategy.” Retrieved from Online:    https://www.kilimo.go.tz/uploads/books/Mkakati_wa_Kuendeleza_Horticulture.pdf

Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS). (2022). “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures for Horticultural Products: Regulations and Compliance Guidelines.” Retrieved from Online: https://www.tbs.go.tz/uploads/files/LIST%20OF%20COMPULSORY%20TANZANIA%20STANDARD%20AS%20OF%20JULY%20%202022.pdf

Trade of Agriculture Safely and Efficiently in East Africa (TRASE) (2021). “Assessment of SPS Legal/Regulatory Frameworks in the EAC Partner States”. Retrieved from Online: https://storcpdkenticomedia.blob.core.windows.net/media/idd/media/lolorg/publications/assessment-of-sps-legal-systems-in-eac-partner-states-4th-june-2021.pdf

Trade of Agriculture Safely and Efficiently in East Africa (TRASE) (2021). “Assessment of SPS Systems in the EAC Partner States”. Retrieved from Online:  https://storcpdkenticomedia.blob.core.windows.net/media/idd/media/lolorg/publications/assessment-of-sps-systems-in-eac-partner-states-18th-march-2021-print-file-4th-june-2021.pdf

TradeMark East Africa: (2021). Standards, Quality Infrastructure, and SPS Programme: Project Brief: Retrieved from Online: https://www.trademarkafrica.com/project/standards-quality-infrastructure-and-sps-programme/

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (2021). “Good Practices for Strengthening National Plant Protection Organizations.” Retrieved from Online: https://www.fao.org/3/i6677e/i6677e.pdf

 [1] https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/magazines/what-44-percent-rise-in-horticulture-exports-means-to-tanzania-4510004

[2] https://www.tphpa.go.tz/

[3] https://www.tbs.go.tz/pages/historical-background

[4] https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/tanzanian-avocado-exports-poised-to-grace-sa-tables-3506248

Debt Budgets: A post budget political economy analysis of EAC Countries 2024/25 budget priorities, viabilities, risks and how governments can restore public confidence

Economists have always asserted that you know a country’s priorities from its budget while political scientists further suggest that a state and government’s health is reflected by the budget it makes and implements. In short, show us a good budget and we will show you a prosperous nation!

By Moses Kulaba, Gloria Shechambo, Robert Ssuuna, Dorine Irakoze, and Boboya James Edimond

Governance and Economic Policy Centre

@GEPC_TZ

The budget is an essential social contract that establishes the relationship between the government and its citizens, and the only one renewed annually, yet budget making in East Africa is becoming an exercise in futility.

This brief uses a political economy and trend analysis of the budget allocation priorities and estimates for 2023/4 and 2024/2025 as a basis to evaluate the extent to which East Africa Community (EAC) Countries budget policies and priorities are viable, fit into the local and global context but at the same time promote equity and reduce the economic burden on ordinary citizens.  We exposes the embedded risks, misalignments and further highlights the magnitude of the debt burden plaguing all EAC countries and its likely impact on budget viability and future macro-economic targets. We rekindle the need for an evaluation of budgeting processes in EAC, a revival of citizens participation in budgeting and repositioning the budget at the Centre for public policy. Our final conclusion is that there are malignant risks. Governments must budget better, tax wisely, address debt and strengthen public participation to revamp citizens confidence and trust in the national budget processes.

The 2024/25 Budget Context

The 2024/25 year’s budgeting was met with insurmountable obstacles and political economy pressures never anticipated before. East Africa is undergoing extreme budgetary pressures amidst a hectic political cycle. Governments are experiencing constantly, dwindling foreign aid, high indebtedness, a restless population, apathy to more taxation, ahead of a sensitive election period in many EAC Countries. The years 2024 to 2027 will be election years in Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. 

Normally election budgets tend to be quite generous as the incumbent regimes seeking re-election avoid taking drastic measures that alarm citizens and discourage their courted voters.   The 2024/25 financial year’s budgets however came at a time of increasing economic hardships, outcries over taxation, violent tax protests, a persistent global economic slowdown and jobless growth. This complicates the budget choices that governments can take and whether the desired budget goals can be achieved.

According to the Africa Development Bank, East Africa and Africa’s is expected to record an economic growth of 3.4% in 2024[1] but we project that this growth could be staggered by a myriad of externalities such as the ongoing tax protests, conflict, climate change hazards and a general slowdown in global economic growth.

Moreover, there is increasing uncertainty about the impact of the continuing Russia-Ukraine war and an escalating and endless Israel-Palestine war on the global economy by exerting political pressures and extracting resources away from development. Besides disruptions in international trade and commerce, the wars have devastating economic impacts on EAC country’s traditional donors such as the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union.

These traditional donors are constrained with multiple domestic political, social and economic challenges to finance at home.  There is uncertainty about foreign policy shifts. For example, the outcomes of the United States (US) Presidential election may determine a major shift in US foreign policy and therefore the future US-Africa foreign policy cannot be guaranteed.

The European Union (EU) has witnessed a resurgence in nationalistic tendencies and drastic swing to the right with increasing demands for inward looking policies to secure Europe’s future. The EU faces huge political and social challenges such as immigration to tackle. All these constrain EU budgets for external aid assistance and their continued support for Africa is jeopardized.

Faced by such unpleasant realities, EAC governments are obliged to make national budgets that can realistically be achieved, balancing economic and political targets at the same time, while reducing the economic burdens on ordinary citizens. However, a quick review of the 2024/25 national budgets passed by EAC countries indicates that this year’s budgets were a major gamble and fumble. 

Some countries such as Kenya has already failed to pass the test.  Others muddled through however their expectations look ambitious, plans misaligned, over burdened with debt. Precisely, the political and economic budgeting terrain is quite murky and tenacious and end of year collection out turns for 2024/25 financial may never be achieved.  

Yet in recent years, the budget exercise has become of less interest to ordinary citizens, viewed as quite top-down executive driven exercise, led by technocrats with less consideration of citizens views[2]. Questions are asked how can governments in the future balance between political and economic expediency, debt financing and development most significantly restore public confidence in the budget process as means of raising legitimate public money and delivering public goods. In this analysis, we explore and share commentary perspectives to answer this question and what citizens and governments can do.

Aligning EAC Budgeting to Regional and Global Context

The regional and global economic trajectory and potential outlook shows a zig zag pattern or mixed bag of hits and misses.  Globally there are signs of a general economic slowdown and inequitable growth. 

According to the OECD’s latest Economic Outlook, the global economy is continuing to growing at a modest pace, The Economic Outlook projects steady global GDP growth of 3.1% in 2024, the same as the 3.1% in 2023, followed by a slight pick-up to 3.2% in 2025[3]. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) baseline forecasts the world economy to continue growing at 3.2 percent during 2024 and 2025, at the same pace as in 2023. The IMF notes that a slight acceleration for advanced economies—where growth is expected to rise from 1.6 percent in 2023 to 1.7 percent in 2024 and 1.8 percent in 2025—will be offset by a modest slowdown in emerging market and developing economies from 4.3 percent in 2023 to 4.2 percent in both 2024 and 2025. The forecast for global growth five years from now—at 3.1 percent—is at its lowest in decades[4]. Even some spikes of growth in some insular countries such as Rwanda, Senegal and regions like Asia will not catapult the global economies to the desired targets of about 7% consistent economic growth over the next three years.

Moreover, multiple reports indicate that over 60% of Africa’s GDP is spent on debt serving and this significantly affects resources available to spend on development and real economic growth. According to the Economic Commission for Africa, the average debt-to-GDP ratio for the entire continent was projected to rise to 63.5% in 2023. The Commission warns that escalating debt levels in Africa are prompting concerns that repayment may not only constrain economic performance but could become virtually impossible for many African countries.

The AfrexExim Bank reports that Africa’s debt burden has grown significantly in the past 15 years surging by 39.3 percentage points between 2008 and 2023, resting at 68.6% of GDP in 2023[5].  At the current interest rates, less developed countries will never wean themselves off external debt and many countries defaulting in the near future is real.

The EAC governments therefore need to be extremely cautious and trend with maximum care on the economic their targets and priorities they make. The following guard rails are essential must be considered in advance planning of the budgets in the current obtaining and foreseeable context.

  • Avoid over taxation and stifling of nascent businesses by taking a precautionary facilitative approach verses ambitious revenue collection targets. Spare disposable incomes in the pockets of citizens and small business could stimulate both consumption, production and growth
  • Addressing economic stagnation, inflationary pressures and jobless growth
  • Addressing climate change and transition to clean energy by encouraging investment and financing of green businesses
  • Harnessing natural resources such as critical minerals to maximize benefits and revenues during the current and future envisaged boom
  • Weaning off the exorbitant external debt pressures and addressing persistent distortions in the global financial lending architecture
  • Designing and setting of long-term goals and tax policies which can drive politics, investment and trade into the future
  • Funding agriculture to support food security, create jobs and agriculture-based industrialization and value addition

An analysis of the budget statements indicates that these critical elements were largely missed by many governments’ economic planners. The net effect of the year’s (2024/25) budget processes is that the midterm and long-term targets in most EAC countries may never be fully gained and economic hardships could remain a persistent future moving forward.

Summary Analysis of EAC Countries Budget Priorities: A detailed Country Analysis of each is available via: xxx

Country Budget Allocation Summary Commentary
Tanzania Allocated Tsh49.35 Tln . Prioritized debt servicing (27%) and infrastructure (11%) with moderate funding of social-economic development sectors. Sectors such as Preoccupied on financing legacy infrastructure projects and continuity, missed revenue targets by 2% over the last two years raising concerns over budget sustainability. Limited citizen participation and budget reliability and credibility of have been flagged by studies and development partners under the FISCUS PEFA report 2022.
Uganda Allocated a budget of Ush72.139 Tln up from up from an initial Ush 58.34Tln (increase of Shs14.050 trillion) proposed in May 2024 and Shs 52.74 Tln in the financial year 2023/24, representing a 36% increase over the last year’s resource envelope. Debt servicing accounts for 57.8% of the total budget allocation with Human Development following at a paltry 14% A quite ambitious budget, overtaking Tanzania’s total budget allocation for the first time in history. Given the economic growth, missed revenue targets and tax protests, it is not clear how those resources will be raised. Moreover, wide spread corruption and over expenditure on political organs and projects has raised concerns, reducing credibility and interest among citizens.
Rwanda For the fiscal year 2024/25 Rwanda passed a budget of Frw 5,690.1 billion (USD4.3bln). Has prioritized Economic transformation pillar (59.6%), social transformation (26.6%) and Transformational Governance (13.8%) Despite stellar economic performance, Rwanda faces constant external threats such as the war in the neighboring DRC and a tainted image from UN accusations of Rwanda as a regional destabilizer.  Over reliance on agriculture is a risk too.
Burundi Allocated 4.4 trillion Burundi francs ($1.5 billion) in the 2024/25 representing an increase of 15% from previous years. Prioritised funding public service and agriculture. Public debt rose from 68.4% of GDP in 2022 to 72.7% in 2023.Has an international credibility issue to regain. Opportunities in Burundi’s critical minerals sector could offer a major breakthrough.
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 2024 budget data is scanty, reports indicate DRC prioritized funding defense against the war in the Eastern Part of DRC and public service. Social development sectors and infrastructure are still underfunded DRC Faces serious instability in the East, and public management challenges, a debt problem. Potential from its mineral wealth but a risk of expensive resource backed loans is real
South Sudan Failed to pass the 2024/2025 national budget. In the FY 2023/2024, allocated a budget of South Sudanese Pounds2.105 trillion (USD1.32bln). Prioritized infrastructure (22%). Other social development sectors took less than 10% each. South Sudan has a huge external debt estimated at over USD $ 2,051,335,901 The government’s petroleum revenues have suffered from the ongoing conflict in Sudan, stifling its economy and ability to raise revenue. Many public servants and essential social delivery are yet to be paid. The ongoing conflict amidst reports of corruption and a huge national debt will affect the country’s future economic possibilities.
Kenya Failed to pass a budget of Ksh3.99Tln    and reverted to using the Finance Bill 2023 to raise revenue. The country has witnessed wide spread violent tax protests, forcing the government to backdown on major tax measures.  The government is under siege and not able to tax. With a bludgeoning external debt, a government under siege and restless population opposed to more taxation, Kenya’s economy is at its weakest.  Kenya was downgraded to Junk status making it more expensive to borrow and raise external capital.  A risk of an economic meltdown is real.

Risks to EAC Countries National Budget Priorities, Viability and Success

In the final Analysis we identify the following risks to the 2024/25 budgets and budgeting generally in  East Africa

Debt Risk: Huge public debt risk is real and if unchecked will literary transform EAC governments into debt collectors on behalf of their lenders. At the current rates, over 50-60% of tax collected by EAC governments in the next 2-3 years will be spent on debt servicing, effectively locking the region into a permanent cycle of debt payment and slow progress. As observed by Uganda’s legislator, Hon Semuju Nganda, “Next financial year (2024/25) Uganda will spend Shs 34 trillion (close to half) on debt servicing  and yet the country thinks it is processing a budget.” The debt risk is significant.

Political and Democracy risks.  Politics and governance in EAC are driven with political alliances and favoritism.  As governments head towards elections there is an increased risk of proposing ambitious budgets that are unviable and could be misaligned with citizens demands. Moreover, large proportions of the budget are being spent on politicians (large cabinets, large parliaments, political advisors, Governors, MCAs etc) and political enterprises such as subsiding political parties. Political parties with representation in parliament have become state enterprises funded by public resources. This is a risk

Credibility risks– The national budgets are losing credibility as statements of macroeconomic policy and social contracts between the governments and citizens. Citizens are increasingly getting detached from the budget with stronger perceptions that their views do not matter- The tendency is never to understand government incentives and plans. If unaddressed will drive constant apathy and resistance against taxation and revenue collection strangling public expenditure.

Economic growth and equity risks: Caused by among others persistent jobless growth, misaligned priorities, unfulfilled earlier economic promises, global economic slowdown and shifting economic policies that may have significant impacts on the EAC countries and region’s growth. The risk is that Budgets may not create tangible economic impacts on ordinary people.

Conflict and Distress risks- This risk is aggravated by the ongoing internal protests against taxation and civil wars such as in the ones in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and the DRC. The risk is that available resources will continue being channeled towards war. Further, the international conflicts such as the Ukraine-Russia war will disrupt global supply chains of essential such as grain and redefine geo-economics’ alignments affecting volumes and direction flow of supportive development linkages to the EAC Countries.

Climate Risks: Unpredictability of whether patterns affecting heavily agricultural reliant countries and economies such as Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda. Affecting food supplies and foreign revenues from agricultural sources.

Corruption and Public Management risk– Rising opulence and failure to tame corruption, place and enforce guard rails to mismanagement of public expenditure, exacerbating resistances or rebellion against taxation and budgets generally.

Forward looking, Restoring National Budget Credibility and Public Confidence

  1. Develop and pass realistic national budgets with less ambitious and white elephant projects to be funded in the next few years
  2. Leverage on existing natural resources such as critical minerals and the abundant blue economy as new levers to driver the economy further
  3. Mitigate expectations of large streams revenues from fossil-based projects such as Oil and Gas, factoring in the climate change global pressure to decarbonize and how this could impact on fossil-based revenues in the future
  4. Repurpose investment in young people (the Gen-Z) with jobs created in non-traditional fields and professions such as technology, e-commerce, content creation and redistribution of economic opportunities and wealth beyond the political class
  5. Re-channel heavy investment into agriculture, as a ‘go back to basics’of agriculture as the backbone of our economies, given its potential and ability to cushion other sectors of the economy, including providing food security and incomes to millions of citizens. Remember a hungry person will always be an angry person. Addressing agriculture and food constraints can radically address the spiraling costs of living and desperation that we are currently experiencing in the region.
  6. Tax rationally, modestly, and spend less on nugatory public finance expenditures, tame corruption and malfeasance of public resources. Clearly punish the corrupt and reward the best performers.
  7. Ramp up a global campaign against debt and reform the shylock global lending system which is designed to largely constrain and drain more resources from less developed countries. 
  8. Avoid mistakes in Tax policy and administration that we experienced this year. Be consultative, listen to the views and concerns of stakeholders with mutual respect and consideration. No one wants more demonstrations and violent tax protests next year.

 

NB: The full policy brief and individual country analysis reports for Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan  will be published soon

 

[1] https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/41-african-countries-set-stronger-growth-2024-keeping-continent-second-fastest-growing-region-world-african-development-banks-economic-outlook-71384

[2] https://theconversation.com/kenya-protests-show-citizens-dont-trust-government-with-their-tax-money-can-ruto-make-a-meaningful-new-deal-234008

[3] https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/economic-outlook-steady-global-growth-expected-for-2024-and-2025.htm#:~:text=The%20global%20economy%20is%20continuing,up%20to%203.2%25%20in%202025.

[4] https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2024/04/16/world-economic-outlook-april-2024

[5] https://media.afreximbank.com/afrexim/State-of-Play-of-Debt-Burden-in-Africa-2024-Debt-Dynamics-and-Mounting-Vulnerability.pdf

Political Risk and Investment in EA: An Expose of violent tax protests and political risk on Trade and Investment in East Africa

In our previous brief on Tax and Fiscal governance in East Africa, we observed that with dwindling foreign aid, it appears the governments in East Africa have resorted to squeezing everywhere to raise some dime.  We cautioned that Taxation may be good however, when the extremes are beyond reasonableness, governments are bound to break their break the back of the economies they aspire to build[1]. The recent and ongoing tax protests that have rocked the East African regions, with violence and vandalism spiraling out of control in Kenya, clearly underscore this point. A failed tax administration and an irate society.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

@taxjustice @politicalrisk

Freedom of expression, the right to picket and demonstrate and resist punitive taxation has been established over the years.  The doctrine of no taxation without proper representation was long established by the Romans, Greeks and Americans during the famous Boston Tea Party 1773) and American war of independence, The French Revolution and the English, paving way into the famous Magna Carta.

This was further advanced by Adam Smith in his legendary Canons of Taxation asserting that generally, a good tax system must be underlined by proportionality and ability to pay[2] and political scientist Harold D Laswell’s tax law of who pays, what and when, and each individual or group should “pay their fair share. These principles that tax liability should be based on the taxpayer’s ability to pay is accepted in most countries as one of the bases of a socially just tax system and generally citizens are duty bound to reject a system that is regarded as unfair and disproportionally beyond their means[3].

However, when peaceful protests and demonstrations strategically drift towards violence, vandalism and murder like the ones we saw in Kenya, then these effectively transform into high level political risks to trade and investment.

According to multiple sources a political risk is a type of risk faced by investors, corporations, and governments that political decisions, events, or conditions will significantly affect the profitability of a business actor or the expected value of a given economic action. In simple terms, a political risk is the possibility that your business could suffer because of instability or political changes in a country: conflicts and unrest, changes in regime or government, changes in international policies or relations between countries, as well as changes that occur in a country’s policies, business laws or investment regulations[4]. Examples of political risks include; unilateral state decisions, war, terrorism, and civil unrest

By their nature, these risks are expensive to be insured against and constitute a major determinant factor for business in deciding where to invest or do business. Highly political risk countries experience sharp declines in investment and may attract low new trade and investments flows.

According to Trade and Investment experts such as Pierre Lamourelle, Deputy Global Head of Specialty Credit within Allianz Trade for Multinationals, the interconnected nature of the global economy makes it very possible that a political risk in one country may affect many businesses across the globe.

“What has changed in the 25 years since I started in this business is that we are living in a more connected world today,” says Pierre. On the upside, that means business is easier to conduct on a global scale. Almost everybody now has the ability to reach out to emerging countries or to conclude a contract and secure a sale in a foreign country.

On the downside, this means that when something goes wrong in one part of the world, you can feel the impact halfway around the globe – directly, if you are dealing with the country in question, or indirectly because of your diverse supply chain. Remember when the 20,000-ton container ship “Ever Given” got stuck in the Suez Canal in March 2021, shutting down international trade for a week?

In today’s increasingly interconnected world, “just-in-time” supply chains, global internet connection, and smartphones give SMEs the ability to conduct business in a global arena. This means the possibility for great opportunities, but also that every business is just steps away from political risk.

Persistent violent tax protests can make it difficult and unpredictable for the government to raise enough tax revenue to finance its obligations, including servicing of sovereign commitments such as paying off its debts and makes the economic environment very unpredictable. This can lead  global economic and financial institutions to flag or down grade the Country’s economic status as risky , making difficult and more expensive for the country and companies to raise external capital for investment.

Moreover, the violent protests occurred or are happening at a critical period of the year when East African Countries such as Kenya record the highest number of tourist arrivals into the Country for the summer holiday. Before the protests, national parks, hotels and beaches in Kenya’s tourist hot spots had already recorded high tourist bookings and were expecting a bumper harvest this season as the global economies and travelers rebound from the COVID 19 lock down.  Reports from multiple travel agents and hoteliers already indicate that most tourists have either cancelled or postponed their decisions to travel to Kenya and East Africa generally. Indeed, some already in the Country were gripped with fear of uncertainty and have left.

The burning image of an old plane at Uhuru Park did not send a good image either as most people around the world, unfamiliar with Kenya, thought Jomo Kenyatta International Airport was attacked and planes on the tarmac set on fire.  A recorded video clip that trended on social media of passengers crammed up at JKIA with a voice note indicating that many were fleeing the country added salt to the pinch suggesting Kenya was not safe anymore!

Similarly, travel advisories have been issued to foreigners in country and intending to travel to Kenya, to do that if it is essential and be vigilant of their security as safety during this violent period cannot be guaranteed. With all these at play, Kenya may remain a blacklisted destination among some foreign tourists for some period to come, denying the country the much-needed foreign revenue and jobs in its service sector. At least a number of high conferences that were planned for Nairobi were cancelled.

The net effects of the demonstrations therefore go beyond having the bill rejected but have long-term economic effects on Kenya’s economy. The violent Gen-Z’s may have to reconsider their approach to avoid a full economic meltdown.

Of course, there are legitimate concerns that some current established large business and investments were already not providing benefits to the young people. Multiple reports have shown that some businesses were tax dodgers while others belong to the politically connected who used their political connections to shove deals and amassing wealth on the backbone of the majority Kenyans. Moreover, given the current loopholes in the governance systems, new trade and investment opportunities would not support or create many new economic opportunities either.

However, when these arguments are advanced, it is also imperative to look at the broader picture of the net effect that violent protests can have on Kenya’s economy and future that the Gen-Z seeks to address. Kenya’s economy is extensively connected and dependent on the global economy with most global business having chosen Nairobi as a regional financial hub.  Violent demonstrations and disruption of such a magnitude can have significant long-term impacts.

With a government under siege and  constrained with a debt tinkering on the margins of default and  unrelenting rancorous youth roaming and burning the streets of Nairobi armed with negative social media, Kenya’s economy could slide into a free fall and recession, whose impacts on everyone could be far reaching.

Taxation and a strong tax system may contribute to improved governance through 3 maximum channels. Taxation establishes a fiscal social contract between citizens and the taxing state. Tax payers have a legitimate cause to expect something in return for paying taxes and are more likely to hold their governments to account. Governments have a stronger incentive to promote economic growth when they are dependent on fair taxes.

In this regard, we suggest the following;

  1. Resistance demonstrations and protests for tax rights must be expressed with limitations and restraint from both sides- The state and citizens alike
  1. Government must be rational when imposing taxes. Tax policies must be clear and predictable.  Clearly, imposing taxes on bread and blanket exemption of choppers is a sign missed priorities.
  1. Government communication apparatus must be robust enough to explain to the citizens the justifications for taxation and the political class must lead by example demonstrating frugality in public expenditure.
  1. There must be distinction between private, public and national critical infrastructure, whose destruction may or can affect Kenya’s national security interest and state existence. Lest we forget, Kenya has been a victim of terrorism and still faces extensive threats from both internal and external elements, whose interests to harm Kenya has never wavered. Attacks on its critical infrastructure exposes the Country and Kenyans further to major threats.
  1. Re-engineering of Kenya’s governance and economy to address the contemporary needs for the Gen-Z. Times have changed and the Gen-Z who now constitute an overwhelming majority will effectively from 2027 be forever a major determinant of East Africa’s political future. Women will no longer be a game changer in electoral politics and outcomes but the Gen-Z will be.
  1. There is need for both political and social sobriety. East Africa needs good leadership and peace!

[1] Tax and Fiscal Governance: Is VAT milking the broken tax cow dry? An analysis of tax trends and impacts on EAC small traders, with a case of the recent traders’ demonstrations and boycotts in Uganda:

[2] Adam Smith, in his book, The Wealth of Nations, 1776

[3] Schronharl, K,  etal; Histories of Tax Evasion , Avoidance and Resistance; https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/id/346cfc5f-6001-40e3-8a3b-fe46405df8c2/9781000823882.pdf

[4] https://www.allianz-trade.com/en_US/insights/what-is-political-risk.html#:~:text=Political%20risk%20is%20the%20possibility,country’s%20policies%2C%20business%20laws%20or

Digital Currencies and Future Monetary Policy in EA: How Governments can address the downside of cryptocurrency to advance financial inclusion in East Africa

In discussing the merits and de-merits of cryptocurrency reminds us of the simple high school definition of money. Money is what money does. In other words, anything that is widely acceptable as medium of exchange can become money. Most cryptoprenuers in East Africa just want regulation.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

@mkulaba2000 @cryptocurrency @monetary blog @teamMonetary

In our first policy brief we explored and untangled the socio-economic and macro-economic risks associated with Crypto currencies. We concluded that the skepticisms and scrutiny of crypto currency is well deserved but noted that the underlying technology behind it could be used to drive future monetary policy and financial inclusion. In this second part of our digital economic governance and monetary policy analytical series, we explore how governments can or may navigate around these latent risks to formalize and make cryptocurrencies safe and vehicle towards inclusive digital and financial economies. We suggest that regulation is required instead of total bans which are difficult to enforce and could be denying governments potential dividends.

Evolution of Money, currency and monetary policy in East Africa

In discussing the merits and de-merits of cryptocurrency reminds us of the simple high school definition of money. Money is what money does. In other words, anything that is widely acceptable as medium of exchange can become money. In monetary history, the definition and nature of money has always evolved based on the trust and what it can do.  The emergency of crypto currencies in the 21st century perhaps unleashes yet another moment in history when money and monetary policy will be redefined for the future.

Just some few decades ago, the cowrie shell was the recognized legal tender and medium of exchange and trade along the East African coast. Europeans, Arabs and Portuguese used cowries as currency to control the valuable African trade routes and markets, along the coastline and its interior

Between 13th to the 20th century, Europeans, Arab traders and their African collaborators used Cowrie shells to buy services and precious goods such as salt, ivory, iron and gold and human beings as slaves. There are no records to show that minting machines existed and it is likely that these cowrie shells were perhaps picked along the coastline of the Indian oceans as these merchants landed to transact their business.  Clearly, the cowrie shells were not regulated by any central bank or backed up with any valuable item such as gold, as we know today yet they continued to be a means of exchange and facilitated commerce in East Africa for more than 1000 years!

Potential dividends from blockchain and crypto currencies

There are many downsides to cryptocurrencies and the experience has so far not been good always but behind any technological innovation there could be some opportunity.

According to technology experts some of the rapidly evolving technology behind crypto, however, may ultimately hold greater promise. A new kind of multilateral platform driven by blockchain and crypto could improve cross-border payments, leveraging technological innovations for public policy objectives.  

According to Forbes, the advantages of cryptocurrencies include cheaper and faster money transfers and decentralized systems that do not collapse at a single point of failure. Investors just need a computer or a smartphone with an internet connection to use cryptocurrency. There’s no identification verification, credit check, or background to open a cryptocurrency wallet. It is way faster and easier compared to old financial institutions. It also allows individuals to effortlessly make internet transactions or send funds to someone.[1]

With these advances, new payment technologies including tokenization, encryption, and programmability could define the future of monetary policy and public financial transactions.

Moreover, the private sector keeps innovating and customizing financial services. The public sector too just needs to match this pace by leveraging this available technology to upgrade its payment infrastructure and ensure interoperability, safety, and efficiency in digital finance.  

Just a few years ago, the mobile money transfer and payment system-MPESA was none existent.  When it was introduced by Safaricom, there was skepticism on the use of MPESA as money transfer and payment platform in Kenya and in East Africa yet over the last 20 years the MPESA mobile payment system has become the biggest financial technological innovation of the 21st century.

Today, MPESA is the largest mobile money platform, transacting billions of shillings per day and reaching millions of people across the continent.  The system has been expanded to other service sectors such as health, education and food.  They key takeaway from this technological breakthrough is that financial evolution is a continuous process and the concept of money will evolve for many years to come.

Is the imperative for crypto and a new monetary policy inevitable?

According to Amb Prof Ndemo Bitange[2], a renowned economist and Kenya’s Ambassador to Belgium & EU, contrary to the beliefs of sceptics, the penetration of crypto, development and adoption of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) is an inevitable shift already underway.

This transformation is driven by changing business models and the increasing preference for alternative modes of payment over traditional cash. Reports from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) affirm this trend and shed light on the ongoing efforts to shape the future of monetary policy and finance.

A CBDC is a digital or virtual form of a country fiat currency (such as USD, EUR and TZS) issued and regulated by a central bank. Their value is based on the government’s ability to maintain its value by controlling supply and demand, are used as a medium of exchange in transactions, and are considered legal tender within their respective countries.

Therefore, when issued, CBDC becomes a legal tender, analogous to physical notes and coins. Based on the literature, CBDC is thought to offer a range of benefits to the economy.

Central banks from various countries, including Canada, the European Union, Japan, Switzerland, England, Sweden, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, and the Bank for International Settlements, play a crucial role in developing the foundational principles and core feature of CBDCs.

These institutions have conducted extensive research and produced valuable reports on key aspects of CBDC implementation. They acknowledge that the evolution of money is inevitable given the increasing digitalization of economies, rapidly changing user needs and the transformative impact of innovation on financial services.

Furthermore, the use of cash for transactions is declining in many jurisdictions, while non-bank private sector entities are introducing new forms of digital money, such as stablecoins. These developments highlight the need for central banks to adapt and explore how they can fulfil their public policy objectives in a rapidly changing financial landscape.

Prof Ndemo cautions however cautions that while preparations for CBDCs are underway in the global north, discussions and plans for adopting digital currencies in the south are still frozen. This disparity could lead to capacity issues and challenges for countries in the south as they try to catch up with the rest of the world during CBDC adoption.

Trends towards crypto regulation and future monetary policy in EAC

Regulation and regularization of cryptocurrencies in East Africa has been a basket of mixed goods, ranging from caution, total bans to a move towards regulation and potential new monetary policy covering digital currencies.

Tanzania currently does not have specific regulations or legislation governing digital currencies. The use of cryptocurrencies is still relatively banned, and the only accepted legal tender is the Tanzanian Shillings.

However, in January 2023, the Bank of Tanzania adopted a phased, cautious and risk-based approach to adoption of CBDCs, [3] setting in motion a potential road towards a new monetary policy terrain in the country.

This followed among others recognition despite the restrictions, mining and transacting in crypto currencies was popular widely used amongst many youths in Tanzania. The Bank of Tanzania had been researching and exploring potentiality of issuance of its CBDC. At this research stage, the Bank of Tanzania had formed a multidisciplinary technical team to examine practical aspects of CBDC and building capacity to the team in various ways.

The key considerations during this research stage involved choosing a suitable approach to CBDC adoption based on Tanzania context. This included type of CBDC to be issued (wholesale, retail or both), models for issuance and management (direct, indirect, or hybrid), form of CBDC (token-based or account-based), instrument design (remunerated or non-remunerated) and degree of anonymity or traceability.

 A particular attention was paid on risks and controls associated with issuance, distribution, counterfeit and usage of currencies. The outcome of the research at this point revealed that more than 100 countries in the world are at different stages of the CBDC adoption journey with 88 at research, 20 proof of concept, 13 pilot and 3 at launch. Analysis of these findings indicate that majority of central bankers across the world had taken a cautionary approach in the CBDC implementation roadmap, in order to avoid any potential risks that can disrupt financial stability of their economies.

Further, it was observed that, 6 countries had cancelled their CBDC adoption mainly due to structural and technological challenges in the implementation phase. The structural challenges included dominance of cash in making transactions and existence of inefficient payment systems, high implementation cost and risk of disrupting existing ecosystem.

Accordingly, to the government, the Bank of Tanzania would continue to monitor, research and collaborate with stakeholders, including other central banks, in the efforts to arrive at a suitable and appropriate use and technology for issuance of Tanzanian shillings in digital form.

Tanzania’s announcement was a pioneering move in a region whose governments have remained both non-committal but largely hostile in equal measures towards digital currencies.

In Kenya, cryptocurrency is technically legal, with no specific laws or regulations prohibiting its use or possession. However, it is not recognized as legal tender or an asset. The Central Bank of Kenya has issued warnings without specified penalties and has expressly forbidden financial institutions and payment service providers from doing business with Web3 businesses that ‘trade cryptocurrencies.’ Existing regulations are not well-communicated, and a clear legal framework is lacking.

Despite the warnings, transacting in crypto thrives and there is appetite amongst young people and online investors. Media reports suggest that overall, there are an estimated 2.7 million to 4 million cryptocurrency owners in Kenya, representing approximately 5% to 9% of the country’s populations.

On Umoja Lab’s BRAF (Blockchain Regulatory Assessment Framework), Kenya is rated a 40.63 out of 100, indicating that it is a “Developing Regulatory Environment” that is becoming clearer on where blockchain technology and cryptocurrency should go with regards to the need for regulation and expected compliance measures for crypto companies.

In 2023, the government found difficulties in prosecuting the directors of an online cryptocurrency company called One Coin. OneCoin company was accused of transacting illegally millions of Kenya shillings and duping Kenyans with a pay of Ksh7000 in exchange for their eye iris scan and biodata.

The company promised participants, among others, opportunities for making a fortune thereafter in crypto assets, a promise that never was. According to the Central Bank of Kenya, Onecoin was never registered to operate in Kenya yet it registered thousands and transacted millions without detection. 

Its co-founder, Karl Sebastian Green Wood also known as the ‘Cryptoqueen,” was arrested and sentenced to 20 years in prison for his orchestration of the massive OneCoin fraud scheme in the US and globally. Her co-founder Ruja Imatova disappeared since 2017 and it is not clear whether she is dead or alive. The Kenyan Onecoin case is not fully settled yet, bringing to light the importance of proper regulation.

Kenya Case law as cited by Justice M.W Mungai under the case of Wiseman Talent Ventures vs. Capital Markets Authority of Kenya (2019) has placed regulation of crypto currencies by the Capital Markets Authority under the ambits of  Section 2 & 11 of Capital Markets Act

Uganda does not recognize crypto-currency as a legal tender and in October 2019 the Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development issued a public statement to that effect.

However, in recent years there has been increasing calls from stakeholders for the country to regulate digital currencies. According to a USAID funded research by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), as technology continues to reposition itself around societal needs, at a fast pace, more countries around the globe are embracing and creating avenues for the use of cryptocurrencies within their local environments. Uganda should not be caught at the tail end of this drive and neither should it wait out the process of strategically positioning itself in the electronic commerce domain[4].

While back in 2011, Cyber-related legislation was passed to cater for the emerging digital landscape in Uganda. This failed to cater for crypto-currencies, despite recognizing a huge volume of online financial transactions.

CSO demand for clarity on the government position on use of cryptocurrencies; and suggests that Uganda should work with regional and international partners on establishment of an international treaty, as well as international collaborative measures in addressing cryptocurrencies.

In Rwanda, the government has banned banks from facilitating crypto transactions, however many locals are hopeful that Rwanda’s crypto scene will blossom on the back of a digitalizing economy.

Despite the bans, many young Rwandese are still cracking the webs to mine the crypto dimes and the appeal for regulation instead of criminalization and total ban is equally on.

Generally, we are yet to see some shifts towards regulation or regularization of cryptocurrencies in the other East Africa countries such the DRC and Somalia. Both policy and regulation are still blurred, exposing many to the risks but equally government missing out on the potential dividends that come with crypto and block chain-based technologies. It is for this reasons that a new monetary policy and regulation is required across the EAC.

Key policy recommendations to address cryptocurrency risks and future monetary policy

# Governments through Ministries of Finance and Central Banks must map existing crypto platforms and extent of penetration.  Kenya and Tanzania are so far reported as having the largest number of crypto entrepreneurs and transaction volumes in East Africa. These statistics are however not official. Like in Uganda and Rwanda, governments are yet to determine the detailed extent of penetration and impact in the form of self-employed jobs.

# Governments must assess the potential economic contributions to the economy in the form of financial inclusion, employment and facilitation of investment. Nigeria was the first to launch the e-naira but so far, no concrete assessment has been done to establish its success and why it failed. Government let studies on the potential economic benefits from crypto are non-publicly existent.

# Set up clear regulation (Policy and legislative)-To avoid ambiguities, fraud, money laundering for criminal enterprise, tax evasion and disruption of the formal financial systems. In our (Governance and Economic Policy Centre) interviews with crypto entrepreneurs, genuine traders who transact legitimate business exist, and just want to be regulated not banned.  The IMF and other institutions can offer support to EAC governments on building secure platforms while governments build their capacities to regulate and monitor transactions.

# Institutionalization of CBDC trading and clearing houses for crypto currencies. Tanzania may have taken a positive stride; however, this has to be followed with other supportive infrastructure such as a policy ambit and platforms for trading and exchange. A concomitant supportive monetary policy can go a long way in addressing some of the challenges and lacunas currently faced by both government and digital currency entrepreneurs.

# Explore, scaleup and leverage the opportunities that blockchain and crypto technology can offer in other sectors such as health, education and governance. In Kenya, it was reported that blockchain technology was used to secure the 2022 general elections voting and election results systems.

As global reports show, the penetration of cryptocurrency continues to take shape and without regulation the risks and exposure to the criminal abuse could increase. It is imperative that the public and private sectors work together to ensure that users can transact safely, and that criminals can’t abuse these new assets. So far the regulatory framework exists that can be used as a basis towards a new monetary policy and proper regulation and regularization.

With surging unemployment rates and a bulging tech-savy and connected youth population, online financial trading in digital currencies could increase financial inclusion, cause a digital economic revolution and penetration in the EAC countries, producing dividends in the form of jobs, employment and incomes. That is why future monetary policy must be aligned to the current and future technology and currency trends.

 

[1] https://www.forbes.com/advisor/in/investing/cryptocurrency/advantages-of-cryptocurrency/

[2]  Amb Prof Ndemo Bitange; Exploring the future of banking with CBDCs,  a blog post on his personal Linkedin page, July 15, 2023

 

[3] https://www.bot.go.tz/Adverts/PressRelease/en/2023011413181519.pdf

[4] https://cipesa.org/wp-content/files/briefs/Crypto_Currency_Regulation_and_Implications_on_CSOs_in_Uganda_Policy_Brief.pdf

Disruptive digital economies and Monetary Policy: Re-Exploring Blockchain , Crypto Currency and monetary policy in East Africa-Are governments running late?

 The pressure to digitalize our economies and adopt a new generation of monetary policies may be legitimate but the risks are also real. How can governments navigate this delicate balance between digital economy penetration, financial inclusion and monetary policy? Can governments in East Africa continue riding behind the tide?

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

@digitaleconomies @cryptocurrencies @financial inclusion @mkulaba2000

Globally, there is a debate and desire for the adoption of blockchain technology and cryptocurrency as medium for financial transactions yet in East Africa, government uptake and regulation are moving at a snail’s pace. In this first of a two-part series of our short analytical economic policy and governance policy briefings, we re-explore and unpack the future of blockchain and crypto currency penetration and the risk considerations shaping debate and monetary policy terrain in East Africa. We will later discuss how the EAC governments can leverage monetary policy and regulation to harness the dividends of blockchain and cryptocurrencies to advance financial inclusion in the region.

Generally, there is limited understanding of blockchain and crypto currency technology. The debate on the risks that these new digital currencies portend to the public and national economies is ongoing. So far there is no consensus amongst citizens, economic policy makers and central banks on which directions governments must take. The common view is that adopting block chain and crypto as a form of legal currencies should be approached with utmost care and heavy regulation. It is argued that the risks are high if crypto is adopted as legal tender as some African Central Banks have attempted to do. Moreover, if crypto assets are held or accepted by the government as means of payment, it could put monetary policy and public finances at risk.

Despite, these reservations trading in crypto currencies has continued alongside the formal currencies and could become a major part of our global financial system in the future.

All over East Africa, digital currency platforms exist, despite the bans and young digital entrepreneurs have signed up, traded and transacted in crypto with some success, while others have equally horrendous stories to tell of failure, and counting losses.  According to global reports, so far Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa are leading with Tanzania following closely along.

The driving factors crypto adoption and penetration among young people is widespread unemployment and joblessness pushing mostly young people and new unemployed graduates to look for a living online. For speculative investors the driver is that digital currencies have provided a seemingly a good alternative store of speculative value than local African legal tenders, as they experience inflationary and forex exchange pressures. Between 2020 and 2021 transactions increased by 567 percent to $15.8 trillion between before declining in 2022 after the largest crypto exchange FTX crush in 2022.

Despite the loses, the appetite to transact in crypto still continues. According to the online financial reporting resource, Statista, the Cryptocurrencies market in Tanzania is projected to grow by 10.36% (2024-2028) resulting in a market volume of €4.97m by 2028. With this trend, there are suggestions for governments to regularize and formalize crypto currencies as part of a new generation of monetary policy promoting digital economies, and advancing financial inclusion rather than banning their total use all together.

What is blockchain technology and cryptocurrency.

As a way of kicking off and unpacking this further, we will re-explore what is blockchain technology and crypto currency. Blockchain technology is an advanced database mechanism that allows transparent but secure information sharing within a business network. A blockchain database stores data in blocks that are linked together in a chain. Blockchain is a method of recording information that makes it impossible or difficult for the system to be changed, hacked, or manipulated and therefore provide the infrastructure on which crypto currencies are transacted.

The oxford online dictionary defines crypto as a digital currency in which transactions are verified and records maintained by a decentralized system using cryptography, rather than by a centralized authority. The Reserve Bank of Australia has defined cryptocurrencies as digital tokens. They are a type of digital currency that allows people to make payments directly to each other through an online system.

Cryptocurrencies have no legislated or intrinsic value; they are simply worth what people are willing to pay for them in the market. This is in contrast to national currencies, which get part of their value from being legislated as legal tender.

Cryptocurrency (or “crypto”) is therefore a digital currency that can be used to buy goods and services or traded for a profit. There are four major types of cryptocurrencies and these are; Payment cryptocurrency, Utility tokens, stablecoins and Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC). Bitcoin and Ether are the most widely used cryptocurrency.

How Cryptocurrency transactions operate.

Cryptocurrency transactions occur through electronic messages that are sent to the entire network with instructions about the transaction. The instructions include information such as the electronic addresses of the parties involved, the quantity of currency to be traded, and a time stamp. The transactions are run across multiple systems of computers using a blockchain technology, where data is stored in blocks linked together and securely shared across interlinked business networks for connected ‘miners’ to transact and trade.

How large is crypto in Africa and East Africa?

According to China Analysis reports, by 2022 Africa was one of the fastest-growing crypto markets in the world, with crypto transactions peaking at $20 billion per month in mid-2021. Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa had the highest number of users in the region, with other countries following closely.  So far, some people have used crypto assets for commercial payments. It is not clear yet whether this number has increased since 2022 after the large crypto currency crush. However, it is evident that new platforms and mediums of exchange have emerged including the Tether USDT accepted by China and other major buyers.

The Tether (USDT) also known as a “Stablecoin” is a cryptocurrency designed to provide a stable price point at all times. The USDT cryptocurrency was created by Tether Limited to function as the internet’s Digital Dollar, with each token worth $1.00 USD and backed by $1.00 USD in physical reserves.  According to crypto traders, despite the controversy, Tether has become more popular because it is pegged to the dollar and fluctuating in value with the U.S. dollar and backed by Tether’s dollar reserves.

Who owns crypto in East Africa?

In 2021 market or financial research institutions estimated that the number of crypto owners in East Africa currently was almost 12 million.  A Singaporean cryptocurrency research firm, Tripple-A, estimated that 11.7 million East Africans owned cryptocurrencies. Out of these 6.1 million were in Kenya, 2.3 million in Tanzania and two million in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The numbers are potentially higher given that many crypto owners and users are unreported or documented. The clampdown on crypto currency owners and traders in some countries pushed many under and away from advertising and transacting publicly. Bitcoin accepting points of sale closed shop and transactions became discrete.

Potential for new monetary policy in EA?

In 2017 the East African Community members were against digital currencies even as their appeal grew across the world. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda governments said trading in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin was illegal, for reasons ranging from whether they are commodities or money to being pyramid schemes that could plunge investors into losses. The Kenyan and Ugandan governments issued warnings.

The Bank of Tanzania said dealing in cryptocurrencies was tricky because they are not regulated and it was not clear who controls the market.  However, the Tanzanian government appears to have softened its stance when in 2023 announced a phased approach towards adoption of a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC).

A CBDC is a digital or virtual form of a country fiat currency (such as USD, EUR and TZS) issued and regulated by a central bank. Their value is based on the government’s ability to maintain its value by controlling supply and demand, are used as a medium of exchange in transactions, and are considered legal tender within their respective countries.

Therefore, when issued, CBDC becomes a legal tender, analogous to physical notes and coins. Based on the literature, CBDC is thought to offer a range of benefits to the economy and its adoption has been slowly garnering interest in many countries around the world.

What are monetary policy and socio-economic risks of crypto currencies?
  1. Lack of transparency and proper regulation and a high-risk potential for disruption of the financial system.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) warns that crypto currencies expose users to cyber-risks such as hacking and loss of their assets. Governments are exposed to lack of transparency around issuance and distribution of crypto assets and this can be disruptive to managing monetary policy.

  1. Susceptible to fraud, and tax evasion as captured in the Nextflix true story documentary-Bitconed.

Cryptocurrencies can be conduits for fraud, tax evasion and illicit financial conduct. Because of their volatility their value is difficult to predict and store. In 2022 it was estimated that at least 12 million people in East Africa lost billions of dollars in the cryptocurrency market crush and a contagious series of ‘Bitcoin get rich’ schemes whose value disappeared overnight. The susceptibility to fraud and sudden fall from temporary economic opulence that may arise from crypto currencies has been well captured by Netflix in a true story documentary-Bitcoined.

  1. Potentially used for money laundering and terrorism financing:

Crypto currencies can be vehicles for money laundering and criminal financing. A report by American cryptocurrency market research firm, Chaina analysis says laundering of stolen funds through cryptocurrencies and scamming of users were the highest crimes in 2021 and 2022, accounting for over half of the illicit transactions. Moreover, a Reuters investigation report claimed that the world’s largest crypto exchange by volume was used by drug lords, hackers and fraudsters to move illicit cash.  According to Reuters, cryptocurrency-based crimes hit a record high in 2021, with illicit transactions rising 79.4 percent to $14 billion, from $7.8 billion in 2020.

Other crypto crimes that increased included financing of terrorism, ransomware, money laundering of child abuse material funds, cybercriminal administration and fraud shops. The US cryptocurrency exchange, Binance, was flagged out as one of the platforms used by criminals to lauder at least Sh274.4 billion ($2.35 billion) across the world in five years.  Binance has since denied the claims but the negative image of cryptocurrencies and some associated crypto exchange companies as conduits for crime still hangs on.

  1. Crypto contributes to climate change environmental damage:

Cryptocurrency activities have been associated with contributing to emissions affecting climate change and have come under criticism from climate change and environmental activists. As indicated cryptocurrency transactions and mining occurs across multiple computer systems running on blockchain technology constantly over time, using energy and emitting heat.

The environmental effects of bitcoin are significant. Bitcoin mining, the process by which bitcoins are created and transactions are finalized, is energy-consuming and results in carbon emissions as about half of the electricity used is generated through fossil fuels.

According to environmental reports by the University of New Mexico, an average of every $1 of bitcoin mined between 2015 and 2021 resulted in $0.35 of climate change damages.  Further studies show that the cryptocurrency industry, swiftly outpaced many of the traditional top-emitting sectors and significantly contributing to climate change.

The Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Consumption Index, which tracks the real time impact of Bitcoin, in their short history shows that, Bitcoin mining alone had emitted nearly 200 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). From an environmental perspective therefore scaling up wider use of blockchain technology and crypto is a danger to the environment and climate change, the report concluded.

Despite the risks and potential down side, a United Nations University (UNU) report suggests that the negative view could change as blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies percolate across from developed economies into Africa. The monetary policy and regulative landscape is evolving and governments must be aware and leverage the benefits of technology[1].

According to a commentary by the Brookings institute, indeed, many cryptocurrency fortunes have already evaporated with the recent plunge in prices.  But whatever their ultimate fate, the ingenious technological innovations underpinning them will transform the nature of money and finance.

Are East African governments running late? In the next issue we discuss how EAC can address the downside of the crypto economy, leveraging its monetary policy to harness its dividends.

[1] https://unu.edu/press-release/un-study-reveals-hidden-environmental-impacts-bitcoin-carbon-not-only-harmful-product

Tax and Fiscal Governance: Is VAT milking the broken tax cow dry? An analysis of tax trends and impacts on EAC small traders and citizens, with a case of the recent traders’ boycotts in Uganda

With dwindling foreign aid, it appears the governments in East Africa have resorted to squeezing everywhere to raise some dime. Taxation may be good however, when the extremes are beyond reasonableness, countries are bound to break the back of the economies they aspire to build. Could the recent demonstrations in Kampala show a mismatch of tax policy and that the tax cow may be now broken or is it a case of misunderstanding of the tax system and the dividends of taxation?

By Robert Ssuuna, Researcher, Trainer, and Consultant,

Governance and Economic Policy Centre

@ Tax policy @ Tax justice @africataxproffessionals @fiscalgovernance

KAMPALA, UGANDA – APRIL 17TH 2018.
People go about their everyday business in Kikuubo, one of Kampala’s busiest trading areas.

Recently media in Uganda has been inundated by the stand-off between the Government and traders in the Central Business District of Kampala’s Capital Uganda locally known as Kikuubo with traders choosing to close shops in protest. The protest which later spread to other cities like Jinja, Mityana, and Masaka was triggered by the implementation of the Electronic Fiscal Receipt and Invoicing System (EFRIS) by the Uganda Revenue Authority.

According to the Taxman, the solution is intended to address concerns related to Value Added Tax (VAT) fraud.  VAT is known as an indirect tax charged by businesses at each stage of the production and distribution chain up to the retail stage of goods and services. VAT was introduced in 1996 replacing the sales tax and has since proved a reliable source of revenue contributing 30% of Total Tax Revenues on average and 4.4% of GDP[1]. To understand how well the VAT regime is managed in the country we use two main metrics, these are;-

  • VAT productivity which is the VAT revenue yield to GDP divided by the nominal VAT tax rate. VAT productivity measures how much each percentage point of the standard VAT rate collects in terms of GDP as given by the following ratio.
  • VAT Productivity= VAT Revenue/ GDP (Standard VAT rate)
  • VAT C-Efficiency which measures the VAT revenue performance and overall efficiency of the VAT system in an economy. The efficiency ratio is given by VAT revenue yield to the approximated proxy (Final Consumption) divided by the VAT tax rat It follows that, if VAT compliance was perfect, actual revenue over potential revenue, would be one. C-efficiency ratio is given as:- 
  • VAT-C Efficiency = Actual VAT revenue/(Final Consumption)(Standard VAT Rate)

Where actual VAT Revenue implies Total VAT collections less VAT refunds.

Using the above indicators,  we establish that in 2023 Uganda registered VAT productivity of   22%  while the VAT C-efficiency ratio  stood at 21% way below the African averages of 27.6% and 37.8% respectively (ATO, 2023)

Lower VAT productivity and C-Efficiency ratios imply a higher difference between real and declared revenues and consequently few economic agents meet their VAT obligations.

From the simple results indicated above, one might argue that the Government is justified to institute both policy and administrative mechanisms to address the low VAT productivity and VAT C- efficiency. One such intervention is the introduction of the EFRIS.

The system manages business transactions, tracks stock movements, automatically applies VAT-inclusive taxes (which directly affect informal traders’ profits), issues precise and traceable invoices, and promptly reports sales data to the revenue authority in real time. Through automated cross-checks the URA can more effectively match buyer and seller invoices, thereby preventing taxpayers from claiming input VAT credits without corresponding reports from sellers. Theoretically, this system tackles tax evasion in two main ways: Firstly, by creating a more accurate digital trail, it enhances URA’s monitoring capabilities and raises the likelihood of detecting evasion. Secondly, by offering clearer transaction records and facilitating pre-filled tax returns, it encourages voluntary compliance by simplifying the tax filing process. So one wonders why traders and the Government fail to agree on such a solution given the associated benefits.

From the informal trader’s perspective,  EFRIS exposes them to the risk of “premature formalization,” where their tax compliance costs, including penalties for non-compliance, escalate faster than any benefits gained from their efforts to sustain themselves. Traders believe that any measure that decreases the amount of money they have to spend freely is essentially a tax.

The challenges posed by the EFRIS system stem from concerns about reduced incomes caused by lower sales due to increased prices resulting from VAT on purchases made by informal sector operators, particularly Kikubo Traders, from formal sector operators. Additionally, there’s a decrease in income from their imports. These worries are intensified by URA’s strict enforcement tactics and the looming possibility of facing full taxation scrutiny from tax authorities. Critical issues associated with EFRIS are:-

First, is the general lack of awareness among the trading community on what EFRIS is,  its objectives, benefits, and associated challenges despite URA’s investment in taxpayer education since 2021 when the solution was rolled out.  It is no surprise that some traders regard this as another tax. Some of the traders also clearly seem not aware of how the VAT mechanism operates especially the Input versus output approach.

The second factor is the mode of implementation and per-requisites for the EFRIS. Traders are worried about the costs associated with  EFRIS. These include among others, hiring accountants or at least personnel with electronic numerical literacy, purchase of software, internet, purchase of the EFRIS gadgets, etc. Although all these are allowable expenses under the Income Tax Act, in the medium term they eat into traders’ working capital. To curtail these, the EFRIS regulations prescribe penalties for non-issuance of receipts generated by EFRIS and nonuse of EFRIS gadgets. The penalties are from UGX 6,000,000 and  UGX 8,000,000 respectively ( USD1700&USD 2200).

Third, is the VAT threshold. Currently, EFRIS is a requirement for only VAT-registered taxpayers with annual gross sales of UGX 150,000,000 (USD 42000).  The initial registration threshold was set at shs.20 million, and then increased to shs.50 million in November 1996, following a strike by traders. The threshold was further increased to shs.150 million in 2015, and it was argued, that including small businesses in the tax net by setting a very low VAT registration threshold can drain the limited resources available to the tax authority for administration, and yet the revenue potential is insignificant because of the low turnover and low-value addition. This is because VAT tends to impose high compliance costs on small informal traders who generally do not have sufficient resources to keep proper records of their transactions and comply with accounting rules.

With the depreciation of the UGX against the dollar since 2015, traders argue that the VAT registration threshold should be increased at least to UGX 1Bn to reflect current economic trends. Traders are also concerned that non-VAT qualifying suppliers are being denied by large supermarkets and departmental stores if they do not prove adherence to EFRIS requirements. This locks small-scale traders out of the supply chain affecting their earnings.

Finally, we note that traders are using the demonstration on EFRIS to buttress other perennial issues affecting their operations and contributing to taxpayer apathy. These include unclear application of import duties and valuation for used clothing (a blend of advalorem and specific duties), protracted VAT refund processes, general poor public service delivery, and glaring corruption scandals by politically exposed persons.

It must however be noted that the issue of VAT has been a concern of small traders across the East African Member states. The recent Ugandan demonstrations perhaps are a manifestation of the weaknesses and challenges of Tax policy and administration across the region.VAT is generally considered a regressive tax and one whose implementation has always been a source of concern and perhaps should be evaluated. 

VAT protest trends across East Africa

A man protesting Kenya’s Finance Bill 2023 is tackled by security outside Kenya’s Parliamentary Buildings in Nairobi, June 13th 2023. Courtesy Photo-Bizina

The litany of small traders’ strikes started last year (May 2023)  in Tanzania when the traders in Kariakoo, Tanzania’s, and perhaps East, Central, and Southern Africa’s largest commercial hub locked up their shops in protest over what was considered as taxation. Among the multiple taxes and levies protested was VAT. The traders wanted this reduced to 16% among others.   This later picked momentum with strikes and protests in Kenya, when the government proposed in its 2023 Finance Bill to increase the VAT, particularly on fuel products from an earlier 8% to 16%. To date, the Kenyan business community is not happy with this increase and has been complaining that a higher VAT increases the costs of living to the citizens,  doing business in Kenya and is detrimental to Kenya’s industrialization agenda.

In its 2024 Finance Bill,  the Kenyan government has proposed to introduce VAT on bread, which is largely viewed as a staple breakfast food for Kenyans.  If the proposal sails through parliament, bread, which is currently on a list of items that are zero-rated for VAT purposes— including flour, milk, and sanitary products— will attract the 16 percent tax that will see the commodity increase by at least Sh10 for 400-gram loaf. The government argues that levying bread with VAT is necessary because its zero rating was misplaced since it benefits the middle class who shop in supermarkets rather than the targeted low-income households.

Kenyans are generally not happy with this and if it is passed there could be another round of protests from different sections of what is already considered an ‘over-taxed’ Kenyan taxpayer.

Therefore the following measures should be taken to ensure that the Governments continue to milk the cow without breaking it,

  1. Invest in Taxpayer education and awareness should be a continuous process
  2. Improve accountability for the use of taxpayer money by improving the quality of public services and apprehending the corrupt to encourage voluntary compliance.
  3. Improve tax administrative efficiencies by continuously equipping URA staff with skills and ensuring that the staff numbers are adequate to manage the tax register.
  4. When introducing new systems such as EFRIS, tax administration should invest in reasonably wider consultation and ensure the participation of all those likely to be affected by the system from the design stage.
  5. Invest in agricultural commercialization, productivity, and industrialization to ensure that the majority of the agricultural sector actors are within the money economy to broaden the tax base.
  6. The government must develop a proper Tax policy to guide taxation and predictability of tax administration

 

Forthcoming Expert Webinar on Taxation and Tax Policy in East Africa

To discuss  and dissect this further we have organised an expert webinar on this subject will be coming up on the 30th May, 2024.  Please register to attend via the links below:

Title: Tax and Fiscal Governance: Is VAT milking the broken tax cow dry? An analysis of tax trends and impacts on small traders and citizens in EAC

Date: 30th May, 2024

Time: 11:00 AM to 12:30 PM EAT/ 10AMCAT
 
Meeting ID: 857 8760 2335
Passcode: 897276

[1] Author computation based on Revenue Statistics from the URA

Solar and Energy Transition: Good policy intentions but less progress: Assessing Tanzania and EAC’s Utility scale solar energy potential and policy gaps to fix

Governments are struggling with little success to attract and retain utility scale solar projects and many have died in their nascent stages. Yet utility scale solar projects could be a significant contributor to resolving the regions power shortages and increased energy access by sizeable proportions. So, what is holding back utility scale solar projects and how can governments maneuver to attract and retain more investors. 

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre

@energypolicy @cleanenergy @solarafrica @energytransition

Multiple studies have concluded that the Eastern Africa region has the highest technical potential for solar power technologies, with estimates of 175 PWh and 220 PWh annually for Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) and Photovoltaics (PV) respectively. African countries with the highest CSP and PV potentials are Algeria, Egypt, Namibia, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania.  The annual technical solar power potential in Tanzania is estimated to be 31,482 TWh for CSP technology and 38,804 TWh for PV technology. Despite this potential, Tanzania and EAC lags behind its peers such as South Africa, Algeria and Egypt. Besides the technical aspects as earlier discussed, the policy terrain in East Africa has been largely zig zag and therefore not coherent enough to support investment.

In this second part of our analytical series on solar as a clean energy source, we attempt to shade some light on the policy terrain in Tanzania and East Africa generally and how this is contributing towards holding back large-scale investment and utility scale solar penetration.

Policy and investment terrain

Generally, the policy and investment landscape in East Africa has been evolving at a snail pace. Both Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda have renewable energy policies in place however these are not backed up by adequate promotion, implementation and funding. The regulatory terrain has also been discordant.  For the region to benefit, the policy and investment trajectory will have to align and move faster, catching up with the global trends and the drive to clean energy.

Tanzania’s policy terrain.

The government passed a National Energy Policy (NEP) in 2015 with a commitment to increase the share of renewables in its energy mix. The NEP 2015 seeks to facilitate improvement of investment environment to promote and support private sector participation. The policy further commits to scaling up utilization of renewable energy source by among others introducing a.. feed-in-tariffs for renewable energy technologies and structure power purchase agreements for renewable energy.  

It further commits to facilitate integration of renewable energy technologies in buildings and industrial designs and establish frameworks for renewable energy integration into the national and isolated grids; an Promote sustainable biofuel production and usage.

However, actualization of this has been slow. To date contribution of renewables to Tanzania’s energy mix remains low at 1.2 %. By 2021 Tanzania’s electricity generation came mostly from natural gas (48%), followed by hydro (31%), petrol (18%) with solar and biofuels contributing a mere 1% each. The National energy consumption balance is still dominated with biomas (charcoal and firewood) use at around 85%.

Tanzania government admits that that solar utilization is constrained by high initial costs, poor after sales services, insufficient awareness on its potential and economic benefits offered by solar technologies plus inappropriate credit financing mechanisms.

Previous policies, particularly the 2003 was successful in the establishment and operationalization of Energy and Water utilities regulatory authorities, the Rural Energy Agency (REA) and the Rural Energy Fund, However, it fell short of making advancements on the renewable energy, particularly by not creating a designated and operational Renewable Energy Fund. By design it is implied that funding of the renewable sector would come directly from the consolidated Energy Fund. However, with conflicting priorities and government’s focus on increasing energy access to hydro and gas fired electricity, much of the available funding was channeled towards rural electrification.

In 2012 Tanzania was one of the pilot countries selected to prepare the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP). The chief objective of this plan was to transform the energy sector of Tanzania from one that is more dependent on fossil fuels to one that is more diversified with a greater share of renewable sources contributing to the energy mix through catalyzing the large–scale development of renewable energy.

The SREP–Tanzania Investment Plan was prepared by the Government of Tanzania, through a National Task Force led by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) with support from the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). However much of this plan is yet to fully takeoff and its translation into actual deliverables yet to materialise

Cognizant of the significant gaps that exist, in 2023 the Minister of energy at time, Hon January Makamba revealed that the government was developing a new Renewable Energy Policy to further enhance investments in renewable energy. This policy would capitalize on the substantial financial resources, capital markets, and advancements in new technologies dedicated to renewable energy globally. He also announced ongoing efforts to identify areas with renewable energy resources and prioritize native investments in wind and solar projects. The government would provide support in this regard and establish guidelines for project implementation.

In 2023 Tanzania entered into an agreement to construct the Country’s first-ever solar photovoltaic power station to feed into the national electricity grid. According to the Ministry of Energy, the project is part of a larger initiative of installing 150 MW of solar energy in the Kishapu district of the Shinyanga region. The first phase of the project to be constructed by Sinohydro Corporation from China was estimated at TZS 109 billion and was scheduled for completion before end of 2024.

According to the Minister, the implementation of the solar project reflected the government’s commitment to establishing a diverse mix of electricity sources in the national grid, incorporating water, gas, wind, and solar power. This approach aims to ensure a continuous supply of electricity, even in the event of a failure in one source.

There are also several large-scale solar power projects under development, including the 30 MW Singida project and the 50 MW Nyumba ya Mungu project. In addition to government efforts, there are also private companies and organizations working to develop renewable energy projects in Tanzania.

Similarly, Zanzibar, the semi-autonomous Island of Tanzania, also signed in 2023 an agreement with a Mauritius-based Generation Capital Ltd and Tanzania’s Taifa Energy to build its first large-scale 30MW solar PV power plant, as it seeks to become energy independent. The plant will cost $140 million. The Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) between the state-owned Zanzibar Electricity Corporation (Zeco) and the two companies to develop the 180 megawatts plant will be implemented in phases, according to Zanzibar’s Ministry of Energy and Minerals.

Kenya’s solar terrain

Garissa Solar Farm

So far, Kenya is leading in large solar projects.  There are at least 10 large solar farms in Kenya. The Garisa solar farm, is the largest in East and Central Africa, with 55 MW generation capacity. The solar farm sits on85 hectares (210 acres) and consists of 206,272 265Wp solar panels and 1,172 42kW inverters owned and operated by Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Corporation. Others already operational or proposed include; Malindi Solar (52MW), Alten Kasses (52 MW), Kopere Solar Project (50MW), Eldosol Solar Project (48MW), Radiant (50MW), Rumuruti (40 MW), Nakuru Solar project (40MW), Witu (40MW) and Makindu (40MW).

Kenya has buttressed its renewable energy credentials with a new Energy Transition and Investment Plan (ETIP) launched in 2023. The ETIP spells out Kenya’s road map to delivering a 100% clean energy driven economy by 2050. The country is however yet to figure out how it will fund this ambitious plan. Over the past recent years Kenya has been facing significant budgetary constraints affecting funding of its major national development plans. Even when the government has committed to achieving 100% clean energy by 2030, it bets heavily on funding from external donors. With the recent trend in aid inflows and if they remain unchanged in the short and medium term, it will be a tall order Kenya to meet this target.

Uganda’s solar uptake

Uganda has been slowly catching up with its peers. Uganda’s policy commits to make modern renewable energy a substantial part of the national energy consumption. To increase the use of modern renewable energy, from the current 4% to 61% of the total energy consumption by the year 2017[i].

The policy terrain has been zigzagging and investment in renewables is still low but the government has blended its focus on hydropower generation with small investments in solar projects as back up for its hydropower. There was a big growth in 2021, reaching 92 MW, followed by a significant increase of around 6.9 MW, reaching a total of 98.9 MW Uganda’s installed solar energy capacity in 2022.

Some of the projects contributing to this growth include Kabulasoke Solar PV Park is a 20MW solar PV power project, located in Central, Uganda, Bufulubi solar project in Tororo and Access solar plants in Soroti.  New pipeline projects include the Amea West Nile Solar PV Park, a ground-mounted solar project, whose construction was expected to commence from 2024 and subsequently enter into commercial operation in 2025. The power generated from the project will be sold to Uganda Electricity Transmission under a power purchase agreement. 

This however falls short of achieving the targets as stipulated in Uganda’s Renewable Energy policy. Uganda’s renewable energy policy commits to establish and maintain a responsive legislative, appropriate financing and fiscal policy framework for investments in renewable energy technologies. It mentions forms of financing such as strengthening the Credit Support Facility and Smart Subsidies which are intended to scale up investments in renewable energy and rural electrification.

Moreover, a special financial mechanism, a credit support facility known as the Uganda Energy Capitalisation Trust, was instituted to help realise the policy but this expired in 2012 and had never been renewed[ii]. Uganda lags in meeting its policy targets as only 10 solar projects had been completed by 2022[iii].

What is the current market and investment size?

According to global energy reports, there is a substantive market size of solar photovoltaic (PV) in East Africa and Africa generally. The Middle East & Africa solar photovoltaic (PV) market size was valued at USD 5.00 billion in 2022. The market was projected to grow from USD 6.93 billion in 2023 to USD 37.71 billion by 2030, exhibiting a cumulative Average growth rate (CAGR) of 27.4% during the forecast period.

Despite its immense solar power potential, East Africa and Africa generally continues to lag behind other continents when it comes to building up utility scale grid and off-grid solar capacity, in part due to a stagnant policy regime, overlapping institutional roles, limited research, technical capacity and lack of appropriate financing facilities for investment.  Some proposed projects have failed to take off.  As a consequence, the total investment share of utility scale projects into East Africa remains comparable low.  

So, what can EAC governments do to make utility scale solar markets attractive?

Recommendations

# Governments must make policy switches from paper to aggressive attracting of investment into the solar PV East African markets. The policies may exist but the implementation gap is too big. Policy interventions and a national course-correction is urgently needed to effectively overcome structural barriers and create local value in the emerging solar market many of which is still left behind in this progress.

# Decentralization of energy generation away from vertically integrated power monopolies such as TANESCO and Kenya power could be a game changer.  De regulation and introduction of net metering by independent Solar PV power producers to directly generate and sell to customers could improve profitability of solar projects and attract new investments.

# Financing institutions must scale up project financing of renewable energy projects.  Solar projects are still expensive and funding is difficult to come by. Kenya’s Garisa solar project required an investment of KSh13. 7 billion ($135.7 million) and was funded by the Exim Bank of China. Other projects have required substantive investment with funds generated from private developers and energy venture capitalists. The existing financial institutions are yet to master tailing project financing to utility scale solar projects.

# Addressing land rights and underlying injustices. Large solar farms require large tracts of land and these can be a source of land grabbing, land deprivation and injustice, generating conflicts and endless litigation between potential investors and the communities. The renewable policies and investments have to sit well with land rights, guaranteeing free prior informed consent, fair compensation and equity,

# Socio-economic: Identifying and prioritizing suitable areas for building large-scale solar power plants is a complex problem. In contrast with the simplistic view, identifying appropriate geographical areas for solar power installation is not only linked with the amount of received solar radiation, but there are many other technical, economic, environmental, and social factors that should be considered like: alternative land uses, topographical characteristics of the land, conserving protected areas, potential environmental impacts, water availability, potential urban expansion, proximity to demand centers, roads proximity, and potential for grid connectivity.

# Solar technology firms must address intermittence and storage of renewable energy. Solar power is generally reliant on the availability of sunshine. Depending on the weather and hours of the day and night. Unfortunately, the technology has not advanced far enough and made cheaply available to East for storage of solar power. For solar power users the days are hot and the nights are cold.

# Government leaders must have a unified political will to support renewables as part of the master energy mix and regional energy power pool. So far there is a divided political opinion on what solar power can do in helping the governments to meet their national energy demands. While Kenya is a front runner, other countries are still focused on hydro and gas. The future of distributed solar therefore depends largely on good political will driving favorable polices and changing mindset to embrace solar power as a new source of energy. This could be reflected in new generation policy drivers such as requirement for solar considerations in building designs and integrated power systems.

[i] Renewable Policy for Uganda; https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3.sourceafrica.net/documents/118159/Uganda-Renewable-Energy-Policy.pdf

 

[ii]

[iii]

Energy Transition: Understanding basics of solar energy and why it has failed to peak in East Africa

 

East Africa has abundant hot sunshine around the year yet harvesting this for large utility scale electricity has remained small. Partially, it is because the technical aspects of solar power make it a complicated energy source system than it may appear. Understanding is important in helping to shape policy and accelerated solarisation.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Center

@energy transition @solarenergy @solarafrica  @energypolicy

Early in March 2024 a heat wave hit South Sudan with temperatures soaring between 41 to 47 degrees Celsius. The temperature and its accompanying heat were too high that the South Sudanese Ministry of Health closed schools, advised the public to stay indoors and drink a lot of water to remain hydrated.  

The images of South Sudanese baking eggs under the open sun on the streets of Juba went viral rekindling the debate on the potential of harnessing solar energy to generate power. In a two part articles and policy briefs we discuss the technical aspects of solar power and the policy terrain undermining the utility scale investment levels in East Africa.

East Africa has abundant hot sunshine around the year yet harvesting this for large utility scale electricity has remained small. With about 50 MW generation, the Garissa Solar Plant is the largest grid connected solar power plant in East & Central Africa.

So far Egypt has the largest solar park in Africa. It spans 37 kilometers and has a total generation capacity of around 1.8 gigawatts, which is enough to power hundreds of thousands of homes and towns. The question is therefore asked why have we not seen large uptake of utility scale solar projects in East Africa? The answer zeros down to technology, political will and mindset.

The technical aspects of solar power make it a complicated energy source system than it may appear.  The mechanics behind solar power and how it can be harnessed with impact on a larger scale can/ is more complicated than it may appear. Harnessing solar for electricity generation requires technical expertise, political will and investment.  This brief dissects the basics of solar power and its potentials as a Peaker clean power source for East Africa.

What is solar power

According to scientists, solar energy comes from nuclear reactions which happen deep in the sun’s core. The sun is a giant hot glowing mass of hydrogen and helium at the center of our solar system.

Every second the sun burns and loses about 4 million tons of mass in a continuous complex nuclear fusion reaction. That mass when converted into energy is what drives solar energy outwards from the sun radiating into the solar system. Solar energy radiates from the sun as electromagnetic waves of different frequencies and energies which can be trapped and transformed into solar electricity.

The solar panel collects energy from the sun, this energy goes into an inverter, which is a key component of a solar PV installation. The inverter converts the steady electric power coming into the inverter into alternating current (AC) which is the predominant form of power used in an electric grid or connected to a service panel at a house.

Role of solar in global power systems

Globally the role of solar is still small although it has been increasing over the years. Solar power contributes about 10% of all renewable energy and 1% of total world energy. Bioenergy, hydro power and wind contribute the bulk (90%) of the total renewable energy of about 900 Mtoe, accounting for 10.5% of total energy use. Solar photovoltaic and solar thermal provide 5% each of renewable energy. These statistics are growing as the world constantly moves towards clean energy solutions by 2030.

According to Renewable Capacity Statistics 2024 report released by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) shows that 2023 set a new record in renewables deployment in the power sector by reaching a total capacity of 3, 870 Gigawatts (GW) globally.

With solar energy continuing to dominate renewable generation capacity expansion, the report underscores that the growth disparity did not only affect geographical distribution but also the deployment of technologies. Solar accounted for 73% of the renewable growth last year, reaching 1 419 GW, followed by wind power with 24% share of renewable expansion.

Renewables accounted for 86% of capacity additions; however, this growth is unevenly distributed across the world, indicating a trend far from the tripling renewable power target by 2030.

The 473 GW of renewables expansion was led once again by Asia with a 69% share (326 GW). This growth was driven by China, whose capacity increased by 63%, reaching 297.6 GW. This reflects a glaring gap with other regions, leaving a vast majority of developing countries behind, despite massive economic and development needs. Even though Africa has seen some growth, it paled in comparison with an increase of 4.6%, reaching a total capacity of 62 GW. Clearly, the room for solar as a new form of energy is still available.

Determinants of solar power and characteristics

The amount of solar received on the earth is determined by a number of factors such as what is technically called irradiance and irradiation. Solar Irradiance is the term generally used to measure the solar flax at a given location and is usually quoted in units of Watts per square meter. Solar Irradiation is used to measure the long-term average solar flax at a given location and usually quoted in Kwh per square meter.

This can further be categorized as Direct Normal Irradiation (DNI) which is the solar power measured at the surface of the earth at a given location with a surface element perpendicular to the sun’s rays. Diffused Horizontal Irradiance/irradiation (DHI) measuring the radiation at the earth’s surface from light scattered by the atmosphere and Global Horizontal Irradiation (GHI) which is the total irradiance from the sun measured at the earth surface on a horizontal plane.

Africa is often considered and referred to as the “Sun continent” or the continent where the Sun’s influence is the greatest.  According to the “World Sunshine Map”, Africa receives many more hours of bright sunshine during the course of the year than any other continent of the Earth and many of the sunniest places on the planet lie here.  This has also been. recognized by the international council of science who confidently pointed out that Africa has the best resources when it comes to solar power availability. This resource is usually measured in form of solar irradiance.

The amount of solar irradiation and irradiance are further determined by factors such as

  1. Geographical location and proximity to the equator, whereby close proximity to the equator provides short distance to the sun with the sun rays having a direct strike to the earth’s surface and therefore higher temperatures optimal for solar energy.
  2. Elevation above, where by the higher you go, the more exposure to sunlight and amount of sunshine received
  3. Seasonality of weather, cloud cover and precipitation, which determine how much sunshine is recorded at a given location.

Strategically located along the equator, East Africa receives between 500-3500 hours of sunshine per year, therefore making it a perfect site for harnessing solar energy throughout the year.

Trends of Solar installations and future of utility scale solar power

Solar Photo Voltaic (PV) installations have been increasing beyond expected projections, however the rate is still too low to pace the required demand.  The costs of solar PVs have been dropping constantly by around 20% for every doubling of cumulative shipped volume. At the present rates the costs could have about every 10 years.

Solar panels are made from semi-conductor materials which conduct photovoltaic cells through a complex process of doping and bonding as energy moves through different bands to release electricity. This harnessed for domestic use or as Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) for Utility scale electricity generation. According to statistics CSP is expected to grow by nearly 90% over the next 5 years and nearly tripling the rate of the past 5 years.

Solar and Socio-economic effects

Utility scale solar projects require large tracts of land to set up. For example, the 1,547 MW China Great Wall Project in the Tegger Desert occupies 1200 square kilometers of land with an installed solar field of 43 square kilometers. The US Star 1 and 2 project sits on a large piece of land with1,720,000 panels field generating 1,664 MW enough to power 255,000 homes.  This requirement for size to pave way for their establishments, can lead to land grabbing, mass evictions and displacements escalating socio-economic conflicts between the local residents and the investors. East Africa is already awash with land-based conflicts, displacement from ancestral lands and unfair compensation of victims.

Solar and the environment

Because of its low penetration, the environmental impacts of solar energy are still minimal.  These could increase as the uptake expands however the following can be noted

  • Land use and eco system. Solar farms at utility scale electricity generation requires large areas of land and this can cause disturbances to the land vegetation and sensitive eco-systems. The thousands of solar panels spread across hundreds of square meters can be an eye sore and environmental nuisance
  • Impacts on birds (avian): Solar can have adverse impacts to birds through distraction inflight eye sights and incineration. According to a study by the USGs estimated that its Ivanpah CSP plant in Nevada was incinerating about 6000 birds per year. Globally it was estimated that between 40,000 to 140,000 birds died due to large utility scale solar projects.
  • Toxic materials used; Solar panels are produced using toxic materials such as silicon which reacts and decomposes to produce tetrachloride, a toxic substance must be well disposed as an industrial waste.

Generally, solar is not carbon free based on a 30-year life cycle analysis but has a very low carbon foot print. This carbon foot print could increase as solar penetration expands matching the global drive towards a clean energy future. However, for now it remains one of cleanest source of energy.

Please read our next article on Tanzania and EAC’s potential and the policy terrain and regulation

The Petals of Blood: Dissecting the contagion effect of Sudan war on South Sudan and EAC with lessons on governance and state failure

The Sudan war has been raging for almost a year, with catastrophic effects now spreading beyond Sudan’s borders, affecting its neighboring South Sudan and the East Africa Community (EAC) in many ways.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Centre & James Boboya, Institute of Social Policy and Research (ISCPR), South Sudan

According to the United Nations, since it started, the war has now destabilized the entire region, leading to the deaths of more than 5,000 Sudanese and displacing millions both within the African nation and across seven national borders.[1]  Sudan is now home to the highest number of internally displaced anywhere in the world, with at least 7.1 million uprooted.[2] More than 6 million Sudanese are suffering from famine, and these numbers are growing every day.  The health system has broken down, and more than 1,200 children have died from malnutrition and lack of essential care. [3]The UN now describes the Sudan conflict as a forgotten humanitarian disaster, while the International Crisis Group has warned that Sudan’s future, and much else, is at stake.

Lest we forget, within a short period, the third largest nation in Africa, with a size of more than 1.8886 million square kilometers and at least 46 million people, has no properly functioning government, and all state institutions have collapsed with the effects of its meltdown spilling over to its neighbors, particularly South Sudan.

South Sudan is host to thousands of Sudanese refugees forced across the border into South Sudan, exerting social and economic pressure on an already fragile state that was already sinking under the burden of its own civil war and internal conflicts.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) reports that more than 500,000 people have now fled from the war in Sudan to South Sudan. [1]This means that over 30 percent of all the refugees, asylum seekers, and ethnic South Sudanese were forced to flee Sudan since the war exploded in April 2023 for protection in one of the poorest places on earth. “South Sudan, that has itself recently come out of decades of war, was facing a dire humanitarian situation before the war in Sudan erupted. It already had nine million people in need of humanitarian aid, and almost 60 per cent of the population facing high levels of food insecurity.

As of 28 January 2024, more than 528,000 ethnic South Sudanese, Sudanese refugees, and other third-country nationals had crossed at entry points along the South Sudan border into Abyei Administrative Area, Upper Nile, Unity, Northern, and Western Bahr El Ghazal. The majority, 81 percent, entered at Jodrah before making their way to the transit center in Renk. Ethnic South Sudanese who have crossed the border from Sudan are commonly referred to as “returnees.” Still, in reality, many of them were born in Sudan and have never been in South Sudan, and therefore have no kinship connection in host communities.

The conflict has spilled deeper into other East African countries, with thousands seeking refuge and safety from it. The education system collapsed, sending thousands of learners back home and hundreds who could afford to flee exile to continue their studies. Some of these were admitted to Rwandan and Tanzanian Universities.

The Sudan and South Sudan experiment was a governance disaster in the waiting and perhaps serves as a lesson of how a firm grip on power, corruption, and misgovernance can ultimately lead to catastrophic state failure and collapse.

Donald Kasongi, Executive Director of Governance Links and a former senior officer with the Accord, a regional conflict organization, describes the post-Garang South Sudan and post-Bashir Sudan as a protracted governance failure. The diverse strategic roles of Khartoum, Beijing, and Washington in the Sweet South Sudanese oil are now evident.  So far, none is a victor.

The role of external interests in shaping national discourse has been at play. Sudan is caught between the interests of the West and the Middle East and China, with both interested in controlling access to Sudan’s resources, cultural wealth, and strategic positioning as a buffer between the North and South. Before the war, Sudan identified itself with the Islamic world and pronounced itself as an Islamic state. Despite this alignment, the OIC and the larger Islamic world has not come to its help. Sudan remains an isolated state left to collapse at its fate.

In South Sudan, the Garang vision of a strong independent nation was lost. After his demise most of the post Garang political elites or military war generals became pre-occupied on restoring the lost years at war by amassing wealth through corruption and sharing out of the limited resources from the oil resources. As a consequence, a strong nation is yet to be built. They had won the war but lost their country. The same mistake plays out in Sudan. Perhaps the conflict is a lesson on what it means to lose what is so dear to one- A country.

In short, the transition in both countries (Sudan and South Sudan) were not well managed and what we see are petals of blood from toxic flowers of bad governance which have flourished like a forest planted along the banks of the river Nile.

According to James Boboya, the Executive Director of the South worrisome. The raging war has made South Sudan’s oil exports via Port Sudan difficult. Oil exports have collapsed by more than half from 160,000 barrels per day in 2022 to 140,000 barrels per day in 2023. This was more than half of the previous peak of 350,000 barrels per day before civil war broke out in 2013.[2] The South Sudanese dollar collapsed in value. There is a financial crunch and the South Sudanese government has not paid its public and civil servants for months. There is a risk of insurrection and demonstrations by public servants that will be likely joined by the military. This would plunge South Sudan into chaos and total collapse just like its Northern neighbor.

Moreover, this conflict and its associated effects comes in an election year for South Sudan.  The general elections are viewed as a watershed moment which may see a transition from President Salva Keir to a new cadre of leadership. With the economic crunch, South Sudan may not be able to organize and fund a credible general election. This will be not good for South Sudan’s democracy and desired future.

With the world’s media focused on the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Gaza wars, little is covered about the Sudan conflicts nor the total economic catastrophe that South Sudan faces.

If not addressed, the Sudan war will be soon inside the borders of the EAC. Can the EAC afford to stand by and watch longer as its member state, collapses.  Mediation efforts led by Kenya and Djbouti were postponed last year. Direct talks between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s army chief and de facto head of state, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, head of the RSF paramilitaries remain futile.  What can South Sudan and the EAC do now to avert further catastrophe?

During a joint webinar organized by the Governance and Economic Policy Center (GEPC) and the Institute of Social Policy and Research (ISCR) in South Sudan in April, a distinguished panel of experts discussed and enabled us to understand the contradictions and magnitude of this war with implications and lessons on extractive governance, and state collapse drawn for East Africa and Africa generally, can be taken to avert the situation and its contagion effect on the EAC and Africa generally. The panelists and participants highlighted some key lessons and takeaways that can be drawn from the conflict.

Key lessons and takeaways

Ethnicization of politics and governance can lead to a spiral of violence and catastrophic state collapse, especially when the strong ruling elite and regime finally lose control of power.

A previously united Sudan started getting balkanized when the ruling elites started practicing the politics of ethnicity and religion pitting the largely Muslims in the northern and western parts of the country against their Christian southerners.  The Christians were portrayed as slightly inferior, denied political and economic opportunity, and subjected to forced Islamisation, and inhumane conditions such as slavery. Faced with what was considered unbecoming conditions the Southerners opted for a rebellion and demand for independence. The first and second Sudanese civil war (including the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM/A) were born and the political dynamics in Sudan changed for decades after. New factions such as the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) emerged and Sudan never remained the same.  Sentiments for cessation and independence in Darfur flared and faced with an insurgency, President Omar enlisted militias including the Janjaweed to quell the rebellions. Around 10,000 were killed and over 2.5 million displaced. The balkanisation of Sudan was continuing to play out.

Militarisation of politics erodes democratic values and principles which can take decades to rebuild.

Omar Bashir came to power in 1989 when, as a brigadier general in the Sudanese Army, he led a group of officers in a military coup that ousted the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi after it began negotiations with rebels in the south. Omar Bashir subsequently replaced President Ahmed al-Mirghani as head of state and ruled with the military closely fused into the politics and governance of Sudan.

The military elites elevated to power during President Omar Bashir’s government enjoyed privileged positions.  Even with his overthrow in 2019, these generals maintained a firm grip on the Transition Military Council and the Civil-Military Sovereignty Council.  These are less likely to accept any position below total control of the central authority. The net effect is that the return to full civilian and democratic rule of state governance in an entrenched militarized political environment such as Sudan can or may take decades to be rebuilt.

Vulnerability to geopolitical manipulation and fiddle diddle can be a driver to political instability and eventual weak governance

Both Sudan and South Sudan have been victims of well-orchestrated geopolitical game plans from external powers interested in taking control of the rich natural resources wealth that these countries possess. Sudan and South Sudan have vast oil deposits and forestry products.  With eyes focused on these resources external powers succeeded in playing one community against another and one country against the other and successfully throwing the region into an abyss of endless crisis. Religion was used as a tool to play the North against the South and continues to be used in some segments of the Sudanese and South Sudanese communities.

Key Takeaways

  1. The East African Community (EAC) governments cannot afford to take a wait-and-see attitude. The problems facing Sudan and South Sudan are latently present in several other EAC countries. For this reason, therefore without taking lessons from Sudan and South Sudan other countries can also easily erupt in the future, bringing down the entire EAC. The EAC has therefore an obligation to ramp up support for the resumption of the peace process and finding lasting solutions for peace and tranquility in the two countries. For this to happen there has to be trust and objectivity of the actors to the crisis and the EAC mediators. 
  1. Stop ethnicization and militarization of politics and state governance: The Sudan experience demonstrates this, whereby the collapse of President Omar Bashir’s strong grip on power let loose the lid off a can of worms that had eaten the state to its collapse. Similar conditions of ethnic rivalry in state governance have created uncertainty about guaranteed stability in South Sudan. In some other EAC member states there have been attempts to elevate dominant ethnic groups to power and military influence in state politics built around one strong leader. The Sudan experience demonstrates that the absence of such a strong leader holding the center together can lead to a lacuna, leading to a trail of conflict and instability leading governance to fall apart and eventual state collapse.
  1. The EAC countries must stop viewing at South Sudan as merely a market but as an independent viable state whose stability is good for the entire region. According to the EAC trade statistics, South Sudan was the leading market for goods from Uganda and Kenya. With a total population of 11 million and a collapsed agricultural and industrial base, South Sudan has provided a ready market for agricultural goods and manufactured goods from Uganda and Kenya. According to UN Comtrade Data Uganda exported goods worth USD483.9Mln and Kenya’s exports to South Sudan were worth USD170Mln. Uganda’s exports to Sudan also increased by 154% from around USD48Mln in 2016 to USD123Mln in 2022.  With the eyes largely focused on trade opportunities, there can be a tendency to lose track of the human suffering that the people in these countries face. Also, the jostle for geopolitical control over trade deals can overwhelm the genuine solidarity intentions of good neighbors. The EAC members should focus on the stability of these countries. 
  1. The International Community Must not give up on Sudan and South Sudan. Despite the donor fatigue and reports of corruption, the international community has a moral obligation to continue engaging with the protagonists in the war, facilitating the avenues for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and providing humanitarian aid to the suffering people. The Sudan and South Sudan conflict must be treated with equal measure with the Ukraine-Russia, Israel, and Gaza conflicts. The EAC must scale up diplomatic efforts and be an Anchor in Chief in this process, coordinating and connecting Sudan, South Sudan to the world. 
  1. The EAC media and Civil society must continue highlighting the suffering in Sudan and South Sudan. With the Israel and Gaza war ongoing, the Sudan and South Sudan stories that were largely covered by the Western media have since died out.  There has been little coverage given within the EAC of the recent developments in this war and how it is affecting its neighbors. Moreover, with limited internet connectivity and restrictive conditions, communication advocacy from inside Sudan and South Sudan is quite difficult.  The media and civil society in the EAC therefore must speak loud on behalf of their Sudanese counterparts

 

[1] War in Sudan displaces over 500,000 to South Sudanhttps://www.nrc.no/news/2024/january/sudan-refugees-to-south-sudan/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CMore%20than%20500%2C000%20people%20have,the%20poorest%20places%20on%20earth.

[2] The East African Business Khartoum unable to ensure smooth export of South Sudan oil https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/khartoum-unable-to-ensure-smooth-export-of-south-sudanese-oil-4564064

[1] Sudan conflict: ‘Our lives have become a piece of hell’ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67438018

[2] War in Sudan: more than 7 million displaced – UNhttps://www.africanews.com/2023/12/22/war-in-sudan-more-than-7-million-displaced-un//

[3] More than 1,200 children have died in the past 5 months in conflict-wrecked Sudan, the UN sayshttps://apnews.com/article/sudan-conflict-military-rsf-children-measles-malnutrition-ec7bb2a1f49d74e7b5f01afa12f16d99

Oil and Energy Transition: Why Sudan conflict provides new hope for EACOP

The Sudan conflict is a catastrophe that must be stopped but its unintended consequences provide new optimism for the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP).

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Policy Center

With the constant fighting and insecurity along the pipeline and its pumping stations, the South Sudanese government is now open to exploring new opportunities via EACOP to guarantee its future oil exports.

On March 16th the government of Sudan admitted that it cannot guarantee the smooth export of oil from South Sudan, as a year of war has made it difficult to maintain or even protect the pipeline to Port Sudan.

In a letter to major oil companies involved in the oil production and export, Sudan’s Minister of Energy and Petroleum Dr Mohieldin Nam Mohamed Said admitted that the war had made it difficult to provide any guarantees for safety.

He acknowledged that the conflict was hampering the flow of oil to Port Sudan, as it took time to repair pipelines ruptured during the fighting. In addition, there was a telecommunications breakdown between the pumping stations (PS4) and PS5 in Sudan, which were shut down in the midst of heavy fighting. The area was an active military zone and access for repairs was not guaranteed.

As a response the South Sudanese government had declared a force majeure, making production and export impossible and thereby revamping suggestions to explore new possible safer routes for South Sudan’s oil.

The war in Sudan added to the challenges South Sudan faces in maximizing its only major resource – oil – to fund a financially constrained government and other operations.  As a consequence of the war, South Sudan’s oil production fell from 160,000 barrels per day in 2022 to 140,000 barrels per day in 2023. This is was more than half of the previous peak of 350,000 barrels per day before civil war broke out in 2013.

Talks to have South Sudan pump its oil south wards had all along been explored and presented as part of Uganda’s grand plan to make the EACOP an East African project by connecting and supplying all the EAC member states with oil and gas.

Under this grand plan and initial drawings, the Oil pipeline would radiate from its nerve center in Hoima with an artery of pipelines running northwards to South Sudan, westwards to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), eastwards to connect Kenya’s oil from Turkana and southwards with an arm extended to Rwanda and long route via Tanzania to Tanga port.

Map showing initially considered alternative EACOP routes

But the progress of this was partly hampered by Uganda’s fall out with the Kenyan route and the existing agreements signed between Khartoum and Juba during the independence talks. Provisions in these required among others a concession that Sudan will retain territorial control of some oil rich territories and that South Sudan would continue exporting its oil via Port Sudan. By doing this, the government in Khartoum would maintain some revenues from the oil sector that had been largely lost with South Sudan’s cessation and independence.

I remember in a private conversation with a friend from Sudan some years ago he confided that during one meeting with   Sudanese youth and young professionals, President Omar Bashir, before his overthrow, had admitted that he was not sure about the economic future of Sudan without South Sudan. He clearly predicted a catastrophic economic meltdown leading to chaos and that was why Sudan had to maintain a grip on South Sudan. The oil pipeline was a win-win infrastructure politically and economically anchoring the two countries as good neighbors.

By Sudan admitting that the safety cannot be guaranteed and reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure will take longer than usual provides South Sudan with a legitimate cause to start exploring new safe routes for its oil.

An oil route from Juba southward would be beneficial to South Sudan, the EACOP but also good for the East African Community as a region. South Sudan derives 90% of its revenues from oil exports and would like to have a constant flow of this oil to sustain its economy. EACOP would guarantee that flow. South Sudan would also have access to other EACOP related infrastructure such as the refinery and international airport for other logistical needs.

An extended pipeline from Hoima northwards to connect with the oil from South Sudan would increase volumes of oil pumped out of EACOP by at least 150,000 to 200,000 barrels per day, increasing EACOP’s profitability and attractiveness to investors.

Moreover, with its oil, South Sudan would become a major regional player with a stronger voice in EAC matters perhaps more than it is today. The pipeline would bring Sudan in the north closer to the EAC, increasing its prospects for joining the EAC and thus facilitating the region’s expansion ambitions.

There could be some differences in the chemical composition and technical aspects of the two oils (Uganda and South Sudan) with perhaps one being waxier than the other but these complexities can be handled through technical re-engineering and design of the oil pipeline.

The EACOP has always been a controversial project with environmental activists and anti-oil crusaders campaigning against its construction.  Environmentalists argued that the world’s longest heated pipeline will have serious environmental impacts and contribute to global warming. The future profitability of the pipeline was also questioned given the global push towards a transition away from fossil-based system and uncertainty about the future of oil as an energy source.

None the less, plans for construction of the pipeline are ongoing.  Land compensations in Uganda and Tanzania was completed. An advance consignment of pipes was delivered and a coating and insulating plant for the pipelines was commissioned and already operational in Tanzania, paving way for the pipeline construction and ground laying to commence before end of 2024.

The conflict in Sudan therefore provides more impetus to the project as it opens a new door for possible access and increased volumes from South Sudan’s oil and taping into already existing markets can be guaranteed.

The future of oil as a dominant fuel in the global energy system is a controversial subject and a debate exists whether it makes sense to construct new oil pipelines and infrastructure.  

However, the crisis and the significance of oil in driving South Sudan’s economy comes at a time when there are all indications that major global super powers such as the United States and United Kingdom are backtracking on their commitments to end and move away from fossil or oil as source of energy.

Despite the announcements made at the COP27 and 28, in his maiden speech to Parliament, King Charles in November 2023 announced that the UK government will issue new licensing rounds for exploration and drilling of oil and gas in the North Sea. The rounds will go ahead each year so long as the UK remains a net importer of oil and gas and if emissions from UK-based production remain lower than those associated with imports.

In the US, Republicans have maintained a firm support for oil and Donald Trump, the most preferred Republican nominee for President has vowed to overturn any existing legislation and commitments made by the Democrats against the fossil energy sector, by signing an executive order to issue new rounds oil and gas drilling.  According to Trump this would be his first executive order immediately signed, if he was elected to power in November of 2024. Clearly, the US political will is divided and the future US policy terrain on oil and gas cannot be guaranteed.

Quietly, the leading oil producers are strongly supporting continued pumping of oil. Despite global campaigns, large oil producers are still skeptical that renewables can replace oil in the medium term and by 2050. They believe that the focus should be on decarbonizing oil and not ending its supply and use all together. Ending use of oil would be returning the world to stone age error, one Middle East leader remarked at COP28 before backtracking after coming under intense criticism. The approved language at COP28 was phase down and not phaseout. Oil therefore may have a longer lifetime than earlier anticipated.

Despite the catastrophe that the war has caused, that we all condemn, Uganda and Tanzania should exploit the opportunity it provides to ramp up and conclude talks with South Sudan on the viability of exporting its oil via EACOP.