Tanzania’s removal of penalties on transfer pricing: What did government seek to achieve?
Tanzania Finance Hon Mwigulu Nchemba

In this year’s (2021/22) budget speech Tanzania’s Minister for Finance, Mr Mwigulu Nchemba, made a surprising announcement that government would/had scrapped the 100% penalty for transfer pricing. The announcement was surprising as transfer pricing or mispricing in international transactions and currently a point of discussion globally as one of the leading enablers of illicit financial out flows and capital flight from developing and extractive rich countries.  From a Tax justice perspective, the government’s decision was received as a slight slip in the gains scored over the past 10 years.

According to Global Financial Integrity (GFI) and the Mbeki High-Level Panel Report on IFFs latest reports, shows that IFF’s from the African continent have been increasing with losses estimated between USD50 Million and USD 80 Million over the past years. Corruption and the extractive sector has constantly provided a major conduit for tax avoidance and illicit resource outflow from Africa

Transfer pricing is an accounting practice that represents the price that one branch, subsidiary or division in a company charges another branch, subsidiary or division for goods and services provided. Transfer pricing allows for the establishment of prices for the goods and services exchanged between a subsidiary, an affiliate or commonly controlled companies that are part of the same larger enterprise.

A transfer price is based on market prices in charging another division, subsidiary, or holding company for services rendered. Transfer pricing can lead to tax savings for corporations.  However, companies have used inter-company transfer pricing to reduce the tax burden of the parent company. Companies charge a higher price to divisions in high-tax countries (reducing profit) while charging a lower price (increasing profits) for divisions in low-tax countries.  This is what is also often referred to as transfer mispricing which is problematic for tax collection purposes. We have discussed this concept in detail via another publication via: https://gepc.or.tz/how-to-curb-transfer-pricing-tax-dodging-and-illicit-financial-flows-in-extractive-sector/

Why were heavy penalties imposed in Tanzania’s statutes?

Heavy penalties were imposed for transfer pricing  in Tanzania’s tax statutes because many companies dodged taxes through complex structures and subsidiaries in foreign jurisdictions which made it difficult or impossible for government to track transactions for tax purposes.

According to Financial Secrecy Index (2018) reported that Tanzania lost billions of shillings through potential transfer arrangements between mining companies.

The government was not explicit why it had taken this dramatic decision and therefore left experts and civil society actors bewildered and speculating. The reasons given were pointing towards improving Tanzania’s investment climate. The investment motive was more than the tax revenue imperative.

The potential hefty penalty for transfer mispricing was an inhibiting factor for attracting foreign investments as companies feared or found it difficult to structure their businesses with an international network of subsidiaries and branches anchored to Tanzania making sourcing for foreign financing and sourcing or procurement difficult.

The difficulties in determining market price or an arms price in transactions between related parties and establishing without any iota of doubt whether a given transaction was a mispricing arrangement and illicit in the face of Tanzania’s statute may have been another factor.

The Minister made another drastic announcement.  Effective 2021/22 the Minister responsible for finance was empowered to grant tax exemptions on specific projects without full cabinet approval.

The Minister proposes to restore the power of the Minister to grant income tax exemption on projects funded by the government on specific projects, grants and concessional loans if there is an agreement between the donor or lender with the government providing for such exemption. The measure would streamline and make it efficient for such exemptions to be provided as it has been a pain sticking point for many projects.

The government was attempting to address bureaucracy in approving exemptions and waivers which was a major stumbling blocks to investment and vitality to the success of some strategic projects. This was certainly a welcomed change for players in the construction and large-scale investment projects. At the time of presenting the budget some big and strategic projects were in offing. These included the OreCorp Nyazanga Gold Mine project in Mwanza, Kabanga Nickel project, the ongoing Standard Gauge Railway project and the East African Oil Company project (EACOP). The government announced a specific exemption of VAT on imported and local purchases of goods and services for East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP). The government aimed to ensure the costs of EACOP are minimised.

However, by doing this, the government is walking a very tight rope and contentious terrain with a significant risk of returning to bedeviled fiscal policy regime era which dogged its tax revenue collection efforts in the early 2000s.  Hon Jerry Slaa, Member for Parliament for Ukonga Constituency in Dar es Salaam posted a passionate that perhaps the Minister may have been deceived or even this dangerous paragraph may have been smuggled into the Minister’s Speech. He passionately appealed to the Minister does not sign off this years financial appropriation bill which this provision. It is a dangerous route to take with potential risks.

In our opinion, for these latest decisions to be effective government will have to

  1. Strengthen its monitoring and surveillance capacity to ensure the international companies do not structure their operations and tax arrangements in a manner that facilitates tax avoidance and evasion.
  2. Strengthen its (TRA’s) International Tax department to detect in advance and reverse any transactions of a potential transfer pricing arrangement before they happen.
  3. Improving data collection capabilities to establish the true arm’s length price for potentially contentious transactions, such e-commerce, services, and intellectual property.
  1. Increase transparency around exemption by perhaps requesting the Minister to publish the list of all exempted projects and values within a short period of 30-90 days after approval, clearly stating the purpose and rationalisation for the exemption.
  2. Retain some mechanism for punishment for noncompliance to the commensurate level deterrent enough to the induce compliance.

Highlights of Tanzania’s Budget 2021/22

Projected Total Budget 36.6% Trln (3.2% increase) Domestic 26.0 Trln (72%)
Expected GDP Growth 5.6% Grants 2.9 Trln (8%)
Inflation forecast 3.3% Development 13.3 Trln
Tax to GDP ratio 13.5% from 12.9% (2020/21 Recurrent 23.0 Trln
Debt to GDP ratio projections 37.3% Domestic Loans 5.0 Trln (14%)
Projected Budget Outturn 2020/21 86% – 95% External Loans 2.4 Trln (6%)

** The key challenge to government will be to raise domestic revenues in the face of shrinking grants and concessional loans and the COVID 19 pandemic which is stiff affecting key sectors such as tourism.

Uganda signals new impetus to Mining with a bill in offing

The Uganda government has signaled a new impetus in the mining sector with multiple reforms and political weight over the next five years yielded to transform, its previously dormant mining sector. The government plans to scale up its work in the Mining sector. As part of improving its geological data, the government recently announced commencement of aerial surveillance of Karamoja, which is one of the areas highly believed to be mineral rich. This will improve the quality of real time Mineral and geological data.

The Ministry plans to table the new Mining Bill in Parliament soon. Civil society organisations such as the Natural Resources Governance Institute (NRGI) have worked with the Ministry experts on this, and will be monitoring the developments, debate, and the outcome from this bill.

Civil Society and expert advice to government has been that Uganda needs to have a legislative environment which attracts large investments into its mining sector but also ensures citizens benefit from extractive resources. NRGI will be engaging with new Parliament, by providing some capacity building support and making technical presentations on the extractive sector governance during Uganda’s new journey.

On the12th of May, President Yoweri Museveni was sworn into office after a tenacious election period. Despite the violence and contestation, President Museveni was declared winner for a sixth term. Since 2006, the President has constantly anchored his economic development cards on the Country’s oil wealth as a conduit to pursue his long-term development agenda and pathway to a middle-income status. The tilt towards developing the country’s mining sector expands this vision further.

Under a new mining policy passed in 2018 Uganda proposed to maximse gains from its mining sector by automatically making value addition mandatory and owning shares in every mining company granted a mining lease. This policy was a major shift from the previous policy framework where the mining companies owned 100% of ownership with government being relegated to a  spectator.

The old policy regime was characterized by abuse, land conflicts, speculation and nuisance business practices which denied government maximum economic benefits. According to the Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum (UCMP) there are over 800 mineral licenses, with over half held small companies and speculators. Uganda’s Mineral rich areas such as Karamoja are awash with prospective mineral license holders and artisanal miners. The current policy framework was not backed by commensurate enabling law.

With a comfortable majority in parliament, the President has lee way to use the advantage of numbers to push through policies that favour his vision. While  changes among the ministers are expected,  there is no expected much change regarding technical staff in the key government ministries, agencies, and departments. This may be of advantage as these technocrats can now focus on achieving this new ambition. Can Uganda pull it off?  As extractive sector stakeholders will be following the developments with keenest and wishing Uganda success.

 

Uganda-Tanzania East Africa Oil Pipeline: signed deal yes, but hurdles lie ahead.

Samia, Museveni witness pipeline project final actsThe East African Oil Pipeline project received significant boots in April 2021 with Uganda with a series of key oil infrastructure related agreements signed between the government of Uganda and Tanzania and the oil companies for the East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) project to transport crude from Uganda to the Tanzania port of Tanga.

According to the government communications, these agreements signal Final Investment Decision (FID) which could be announced soon with production, expected around 2025. There has been already significant work going on at the oil sites in Hoima and as one of the Company officials remarked, work has started. The project is very important to the East Africa region as it promises great economic benefits to the governments and their citizens in the form of jobs, revenues, and other associated economic linkages.

Despite this rekindled hope, shortly after the signing of these agreements, it was evident that multiple uncertainties still lie ahead.

The details of the signed agreements remained undisclosed and technical experts involved in the negotiations remained secret on essential information on key fiscal terms surrounding the tariffs.

The project financing arrangement remains a quagmire.  Few days after signing of the agreements, several banks in France where the lead investor Total is based announced that they were staying away from the financing of the pipeline. The French banks included, BNP Paribas, Société’ Générale and Credit Agricole, Credit Suisse of Switzerland, ANZ of Australia and New Zealand and Barclays.

According to earlier government reports, The Standard Bank of South Africa, China’s ICBC and SMBC of Japan are lead advisors of the EACOP financing. These were under immense pressure from their counterparts Bank Track, Reclaim Finance and Energy Voice for what they described as pushing responsible financing of projects worldwide. According to these banks and activists EACOP’s environmental credentials were failing.

The Uganda government announced that it was not bothered by announcement, describing it as not new. However, the announcement by the banks signalled that the project could be still facing serious negative diplomacy from environmental activists and other political interested actors regionally and globally.

President Museveni described the project and the agreement signing occasion as an act economic liberation. This followed the political liberation which in his view happened some decades ago when Tanzania helped exiled Uganda political groups to take power in Uganda and change the course of history. With the hurdles still to overcome, it was evident that perhaps the financial, environmental, and political woes were not over, and the project was yet to fully get on track.

Tanzania political transition: new era, new opportunity

In March, East Africa was gripped with shock upon the sudden death of Tanzania’s President John Pombe Magufuli. Over the past five years, President Magufuli towered like a political colossus, led with a nationalistic approach, and pursued reforms which sent zillion sentiments across many frontiers. He threw out Accacia, Barrick’s Mining subsidiary in Tanzania, for tax evasion and dubious practices that he descried as stealing against Tanzanians. Enacted new mining laws and renegotiated a 50/50 sharing deal with Barrick which has since been mirrored as a template in other Countries far away such as Papua New Guinea. However, his style was considered as a possible deterrent to potential investors and perhaps disruptive to the extractive sector.

The transition to the new President Ms Suluhu Samia Hassan was peaceful and lauded as a new era for a new opportunity. President Samia has promised to set Tanzania to a new path. Few days into office, President Samia observed that all was not very well as earlier perceived. New investments in the sector were low. The volume of Mineral exports had fallen. Despite the Mererani wall, Tanzanite, the precious gemstone from Mererani, was still being stolen. Negotiations for conclusion of the lucrative LNG project had stalled. The tax laws were impeding and the enforcement style by the Tax Authorities had seen many companies’ close shop. The President has since called a truce with the private sector and declared Tanzania is fully open to investment.

Despite her aspirations, President Samia has insurmountable hurdles to climb. The mining reforms were passed in law and therefore amending or uprooting these will require parliamentary approval. The amendments were so popular with the Tanzanian public and this could be touch political gamble to make.

Nonetheless, Tanzania still has an opportunity to excel. The Country’s extractive wealth lies in Minerals such as gold.  The Country has vast deposits of what are considered critical minerals such as rare-earth, lithium etc which are vital to industrial use during the energy transition. With a revived and careful political navigation Tanzania could still attract potential investors and comfortably reap more benefits from its extractive wealth.

Were 2020/21 National Budgets Ceremonial? A commentary of how this year’s budgets missed the Bigger Picture

National budgets are statements of how the government plans to raise and spend public money. They are based on fundamental economic parameters which inform planning.  Looking at the budget proposals and given the unusual current economic realities that the Finance Ministers found themselves in, this year’s budget can be described as largely ceremonial after all. In This brief commentary, we show why.

By Moses Kulaba; Governance and economic analysis centre

On Thursday, 11th June 2020, the Finance Ministers in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda presented their annual budget estimates for the year 202/21.  While Tanzania pitched its budget as one for nurturing industrialisation for economic transformation and human development, the Kenyan Budget was presented as a budget for growth while Uganda’s budget was presented as one for consolidation and continuity towards achieving the Five-year development plan.

Conservatively defined, a national budget is a statement of how government plans to raise and spend revenue or public money collected from various domestic and external sources. Domestically, the government largely raises revenues through taxation and externally through borrowing and grants.

Looking at the budget proposals and given the unusual current economic realities that the Finance Ministers found themselves in, this year’s budgets can be described as largely ceremonial after all.  The macro economic parameters of which the budget projections were based are hollow when subjected to the test of COVID 19. There were all indications that the Ministers would soon come back to parliament asking for supplementary budgets before the end of this financial year.

Indeed, the Finance Minister, Mathia Kasaija told Uganda’s Parliamentarians, that the COVID 19 pandemic had necessitated changes to the budget and he would come back seeking  approval for a supplementary budget to reflect the true realities. A similar sentiment was echoed by Kenyan legislators and policy experts, who expected the Treasury Minister, Mr Ukur Yatani, to return to parliament sooner than later with a more aligned budget.

The Daily Nation newspaper summed up the Kenyan National proposals as a ‘Budget for bad times’, while the Kenyan Standard described it’s a ‘Nightmare budget’, stressed with Corona virus, lost jobs, empty coffers, shrinking revenues, huge debts, funding gaps, which all combined to under cut the treasury’s ambitions. In summary, the budget added more pain to the already suffering Kenyans.

So what was contained in the budgets which make them peculiar, largely symbolic and ceremonial.

Key items of the budget frames

Budget Item Kenya Tanzania Uganda
Economic Growth projections 2.5 % 5.5% 3.1%
Total Proposed  Budget 3.4trln ($27Bln) 34.88tln ($20bln) 45tln ($12Bln)
Domestic Revenue 2.79trln 24.07trln 25.5trln
Deficit ( to be financed thru external borrowing, grants and other measures) 840.6bln (7.5% of GDP) 10.81trln 20 trln
Latest National Debt &  Debt to GDP 63% (6.4trln) 55.43tln (27.1%) USD 13.3bln (Approx 43.6%)  

 

From the figures and proposals contained in the budget speeches, it was evident that the finance Ministers were reading from a script of optimism and perhaps missed a big picture.  Tony Watima, an economist writing for the Standard Newspaper’s ‘Business daily’ concluded that positioning of the Kenyan budget as pro-growth was misguided. Stabilisation should have been the tenor of this year’s National budgets.

The East African was franker in its editorial when it wrote; ‘Finance Ministers owe Citizens the truth on budgets’. The Editor noted that despite the unusual circumstances, the Finance Ministers struck an optimistic positive, calculate perhaps to lift the spirits of a region weighed down by the ripple effects of varying levels of COVID 19 related to lockdowns.

Given, the recent changes to the budget policy and public finance requirement, clearly the Finance Ministers, perhaps could be excused. They were caught between the law and COVID 19, the Finance Ministers found themselves in a tight corner. Having prepared the budget statements before March, they had to present what they had.

The Kenyan Constitution, for example, requires the government treasury to disclose to the public spending plans two months before the end of the financial year. In Kenya, a court ruling directed that the treasury publishes the finance bill earlier so parliament can debate in parliament. The Annual Budget Policy Statement (“the BPS”) was issued in February 2020 and as the CS rightly pointed out, the economic environment had vastly changed from what they found themselves in June. Similarly, in Tanzania and Uganda, the budget policy framework papers were passed months ago.

Realities of COVID 19 on the economies

The negative realities of COVID 19 on the economies are everywhere.  The key economic sectors have all been affected. Within a short span of three months, nearly 1 million Kenyans had lost jobs, several companies had closed operations while many were on the edge. Revenue collections had plummeted and some revenue streams were on the verge of total disappearance. Kenya, East Africa’s largest economy was in free fall with rising unemployment and disruption in major economic sectors. Uganda’s economic fundamentals were in tatters while Tanzania appeared to live in self-denial of the current and long-term adverse economic effects of COVID 19. The Minister admitted that COVID19 had affected the economy but was upbeat that measures had been taken to circumvent the pandemic.

Kenya’s Finance Minister was more optimistic with an estimate of the growth at 2.5% in 2020 and 5.8% in 2021. Pre-the pandemic the economy was projected to grow at 6.1% up from 5.4% in 2019. The IMF projected that global economies were expected to contract by as much as 3% growing to 5.8% in 2021 and Kenya was expected to grow at 1% in 2020.  Kenya’s revenue collection by April 2020 was Ksh 20.1 Billion-lower than the same month last year and below target. The fiscal deficit in 2019 was 8.3% up from 6.3% in 2018.

In Uganda revenue collection by April 2020 fell by Ush789.8bln below targeted Ush1.8trln. This was the largest deficit ever recorded in a single month. With the lockdowns, there was no way URA could meet its target. Tourism and business sector was largely affected.  80% of agricultural businesses and 41 Manufacturing had reduced production and employment. Yet, these contribute to the largest share of tax revenue. Agriculture accounts for 45% of exports and employs 64% of all Ugandans. Uganda expected to receive US128bln grants from donors but had only received Ush28bln. All projections were below target.

In Tanzania, the affected areas included tourism, business (wholesale and retail), traditional export crops such as cotton, cashew nuts and coffee. On 8th of June, just three days to the budget day, Tanzania’s Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) recorded zero tradings at its equities counter. This signified an economy under distress and barely recovering from loses of COVID 19. Yet, Tanzania’s Finance Minister projected an increase in revenue collections from 14.0% in 2019/20 to 14.7% in 2020/21.

Response measures are taken

The governments undertook some fiscal and tax administration reforms and provided some stimulus packages aimed at cushioning the economies against the pandemic. However, when deeply analysed, the measures were based on shaky economic grounds, expensive in revenue foregone, difficult to achieve and can not guarantee to reverse the negative impacts of COVID 19.

Summary of some COVID 19 related response measures taken in 2020/21 budgets

Kenya Tanzania Uganda
Concessional Loans from External Lenders (IMF & WB) amounting to USD 739Mln and USD1Bln Negotiated debt relief of USD14.3Mln and potentially up to USD25.7Mln under IMF Catastrophe Containment Relief fund. Ongoing negotiations with other donors Concessional Loans (IMF & WB) –USD100Mln in 2020 and 90 Mln in 2021 and negotiation for debt relief.
Reduction of CBR from 8.25% to 7% and Cash Reserve Ration from 5.25% to 4.25%-Releasing 35bln to commercial banks Reduction of BoT Discount rate from 7% to 5% , Lowering statutory Minimum Reserve Rate (SMR) from 7% to 6% Reduce BoU Central Bank Rate from 9% to 8%
Turn over tax rates reduced from 3% to 1%, Allowance for restructuring and rescheduling of distressed loans by commercial banks and lenders Reduce the cost of Mobile Money transactions by Increasing daily minimum transfers from 3Mln to 5Mln and Minimum balance from 5mln to 7 Mln Extension of time to file Income taxes or presumptive tax  for six months
KSH 10 Bln for Kazi Mtaani Vijana Program targeting 200,000 youth, recruitment of teachers and health workers Zero-rating of import duty on raw materials for COVID 19 Manufacturers sanitizers, PPE Masks Local Manufacture and purchase of PPE for free distribution to all Ugandans
Reduction of VAT from 16% to 14%, Reduction of Corporate tax from 30% to 25% 100% allowable deductions on contributions in support of government’s COVID 19 response Ush130bln for vulnerable but able-bodied persons affected by COVID19
Reduction of PAYE for low earners of up to Ksh 24,000 per month Allowing loan restructuring and rescheduling, VAT exemption on Agricultural Crop insurance Ush1.045bln to UDB for low-interest credit to manufacturers agribusiness
500 mln for purchase of locally made hospital beds and 600mln for purchase of the locally assembled vehicles Abolishment of over 144 levies charged by MDA and Local Authorities for an improved business environment. Ush138 to UDC to facilitate public-private import substitution investment
Ksh18.3bln to support local manufacturing, 3bln for Agric Credit Guarantee schemes, 400 million in food and non food commodities to household affected by COVID 19 Subventions to TANAPA, NCAA, TMWA to meet their operational expenses,  Increase minimum threshold of Primary SACCOS liable to income tax for 50,000,000 to 100,000,000 Provide Credit through SACCOs and Micro-Finance Institutions

 

What was missed?

The plans and fiscal reforms were taken as if the economy would be normal.

The trend shows that the finance Ministers planned normally and even increased their budgets estimates, despite the odds and indications that the outturns were likely to be suppressed by COVID 19. The law firm Bowman’s noted that Budget speeches did not necessarily provide any solutions to the perineal challenges the countries faced and in some ways simply repeated what we have heard before.

What have been the budget trends?

Country 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21
Kenya Ksh 2.3bln Ksh 2.5bln Ksh3 trln Ksh 3.4trln
Tanzania Tsh 31.7trln Tsh32.4trln Tsh 33.11trln Tsh 34.88trln
Uganda Ush 29 trln Ush 32.7 trln Ush 40.487trln Ush45 trln

 

The actual budget out turns has fallen short of projections. Kenya, which is the biggest economy in the region has missed targets for the past eight years. In 2018/19 Tanzania recorded a shortfall in budget outturn only achieving 88% of its targeted revenue collection. Tanzania had collected 26.13trln (93.4%) of its budget by the end of April 2020. Uganda Tax Revenue Authority had perennially missed its targets. In the current environment, it is very unlikely that the economy will bounce back before 2021 and by all accounts, 2020 was going to turn out the tough year.

In Uganda, the budget was not significantly different from the previous Budgets.

Table of Uganda’s sectoral allocations

Sector Allocation Approved Budget 2020/21 % share Approved budget 2019/20 % share
Works  & Transport 5,846.00 12.85% 6,404.60 15.82%
Security 4,584.68 9.90% 3,620.80 8.94%
Interest Payment 4,086.50 8.98% 3,145.20 7.77%
Education 3,624.06 7.97% 3,397.60 8.39%
Health 2,772.91 6.10% 2,589.50 6.40%
Energy & Minerals 2,602.60 5.72% 3,007.20 7.43%

 

In Kenya, the 10 bln stimulus packages offered youth employment under the Ajira Mtaani program appears generous. However, experiences from the past indicate that stimulus packages never trickle down to the real people who need them. This was the case with the maize stimulus package passed during the maize shortages in 2017. The scandals that have rocked the National Youth Service program for years further underscored the weakness of Kenyan institutions in managing affirmative budget programs such as these. Kenya’s imposition of tax on pensioners was clearly off the mark as it indicated that perhaps the government was robbing from the elderly to reward the youth and wealthy.

The agricultural sector which had already been devastated by the floods and locusts a received a raw deal in Kenya and Uganda. The post-COVID 19 scenario presents the region with significant food insecurity. There is likely for a surge in food prices, squeezing further on the household incomes.

Yet, in Uganda, the Ush 1.3trln (2.9%) budget allocated to the agricultural sector was equivalent to that allocated to Uganda’s Public administration. Uganda’s Parliament accounted for Ush 667.78bln equivalent to half of the total budget allocated to the Agricultural sector. 

As Ms Salaam Musumba, a Ugandan political activist said, people, expected a clean cut for political niceties such as for conferences, meetings, benchmarking on foreign travels, health care abroad, etc. However, this was not reflected in the budgets.

In Kenya, the Governors, MCAs and their political handlers account for a substantive portion of the recurrent budget. Kenya’s parliament received a budget twice that of the entire Judiciary. In 2020/21 some political offices such as that of former Prime Minister even received 100% budget (Ksh 71.9Mln) allocations for first time since they were created.

Generally, East African public services are bloated with public servants and money guzzling politicians and their handlers, who have become too expensive for governments to carry, yet, politically costly to offload. As a net effect, the recurrent expenditures have increased tremendously to take care of this political baggage and the entities associated with this. The Finance Ministers could do nothing to reduce taxpayers of this burden.

In Tanzania, the government did not provide much booster to the tourism sector which is a leading foreign earner. The sector has faced the largest hit from COVID 19. The government instead took away powers to collect tourism-related revenues from the authorities Tanzania National Parks Authority (TANAPA), Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (NCAA), Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority(TWMA) to Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA). The revenues collected from these authorities would be directly remitted to the consolidated Fund and disbursed back through normal government budget channels. The government would provide some subventions to keep the operational and development expenses of the authorities afloat.

The Finance Minister acknowledged that Tanzania’s flagship projects aimed at putting Tanzania back to a spurring economic path faced 11 risks including COVID 19, which had affected the global economies and financing environment. The government planned to raise and spend Tsh 12.78 trln (27%) of the budget on mega infrastructure projects. According to the Minister, an evaluation conducted in April showed that the Country had not been badly affected by the pandemic, allowing it to raise its growth forecasts and maintain firm financing for its mega-development projects.

However, the truth is that the real impacts of COVID 19 on countries such as Tanzania, which are not interlinked to the global financial systems take a while to be registered and will likely be evident in the 4th Quarter of this financial year and 1st to 2nd Quarter of the new financial year 2020/21 as distressed economic sectors and business begin filling distressed tax returns for income and corporate tax purposes.

Political –economy risks underestimated

The budgets underestimated the political risks that were associated with the national general elections taking place in Tanzania (2020) and Uganda (2021) during this year’s financial year. Election seasons are largely characterised with politicking and less to production. Investment decisions and external donor commitments tend to be staggered as foreign investors and donors weigh the political barometer and wait for the electoral results and policy directions of the new government.

The electoral environment in East Africa has often been adversarial and conflictual. In Uganda and Kenya, the political environment before and during elections is often characterised with political turbulence and violence to the extent that the fundamentals of the economy, such as insecurity and government paralysis rocks the key production and business sectors of the economy.

Although, the Kenya general elections will take place in 2022, the political tension that characterises Kenya’s electoral politics had been building before being slowed down by the COVID 19 in March. It is likely as soon the lockdowns are eased, Kenyan politicians will be back to their usual political tirades and overtures. Tanzania’s Finance Minister acknowledged that political instability in the neighbouring countries, region and globally was an external risk. It did not acknowledge that it was an internal risk too and did not provide any mitigation against this risk on the economy and investment in 2020/21.

Clearly, the budgets were based on a positive scenario that COVID 19 would end soon. But given the trends, we can ably project that the journey of return to full economic recovery will be quite long. The likely upturn under a suppressed Corona Virus environment would be towards the third quarter of 2021.

Under a suppressed COVID 19 situation, the economy was still expected to shrink further by 1%.  In a worst-case scenario, the economies would shrink by at least 2% significantly affecting the key revenues sources. Governments would lose further revenue through the stimulus packages offered. For example, Kenya expected to lose cumulatively Ksh172bln to cushion vulnerable Kenyans and the economy from the vagaries of COVID19.

It was no wonder that the editor for the East African concluded, that coming against a backdrop of a back to back missed targets by the taxman and uncertainty around COVID 19 and global economy, this year’s budgets are either based on an informed optimism or simply a bluff. We conclude that this year’s budget estimates were symbolic and the Ministers would return.

Recommendations or take waypoints for budget stakeholder.

  • Tax Payers-Ready for engagement with government on real measures that will save
  • Investors- Take precautionary measure and monitoring the economic trends, avoid taking decisions which will worsen the situation further.
  • Governments-Remain conservative in expenditure and open for re-negotiation with taxpayers and adjustments of the budgets to fit the unusual 2021
  • Citizens- Expect changes in the budgets as the effects of COVID 19 bite harder, minimise luxurious consumption and expect a tight budget.

Indeed, as noted by the legendary Economist and tax theorist Adam Smith:

There is no art which one government sooner learns than that of draining money from the pockets of People-Adam Smith

National Budgeting amidst COVID 19:Why 2020/21 National budgets should be revised and steps government could take

COVID 19 has been known for many reasons but for Tanzania and East African governments in general, the pandemic arrived at a very wrong time. Coming in the middle of national economic planning and budgeting for the 2020/21 financial year, the pandemic has totally ripped apart as much as it can all the basic economic fundamentals that governments had banked on in projecting their 2020/21 revenue and economic growth forecasts.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis center

Developed close to five years ago as Five Year National Development Plans, as they are known, the plans were modelled based on a myriad of positive assumptions and designed to achieve stellar economic growth targets.

According to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Tanzania’s economy was projected to grow at 6.9%. Kenya projected to grow by 6.2% while Uganda expected an outstanding growth of 6.3% during the 2020/21. But going by the havoc currently wrecked by the COVID 19 pandemic and the global statistics so far it is highly likely that these plans will be significantly affected.

According to the World Bank, the global economy will shrink by 3% in 2020 sending millions deeper into poverty. Sub Saharan Africa’s economic growth is expected to contract from 2.4% in 2019 to between -2.1 and -5.1% in 2020, sparking the region’s first recession in 25 years.

McKinsey & Company forecast that East African economy will shrink by 3% and 1.9% during this financial year. In East Africa, Kenya, under a contained-outbreak scenario, GDP growth could decline from an already reduced 5.2 per cent accounting for the locust invasion earlier this year, to 1.9 per cent.

Under a best-case scenario, Kenya is looking at a reduction in GDP of $3billion while South Africa could be whipped to a GDP growth fall from 0.8 per cent to 2.1 per cent, representing a reduction in GDP of roughly $10 billion, the reports indicate. Other sources such as have even made higher projections that East African economies may shrink by 5.4% in 2019. It is clear now that the economic impacts of the pandemic could be more catastrophic than their health dimension.

Why Tanzania should revise its Budget Estimates

In the 2020/21 budget speech delivered to parliament in March 2020 by Tanzania’s Minister of Finance and Economic Planning the government projected to spend Tsh 34.879.8 billion for the implementation of its final year of the Five-Years National Development Plan (FYDP II) 2016/17-2020/21

The Minister highlighted that the Growth Domestic Product (GDP) had shown a positive trend, increasing at an average of 6.9% per annum for the period between 2016-2019 and government revenue collection had increased. The FYDP II indicates the government targeted to raise annual tax revenue collection from TZS 15,105,100 million during the FY 2016/17 to TZS 25,592,631 million during FY 2020/21, which translates into an increase in tax revenue to GDP ratio of 15.9 per cent by 2020.

Although the period between July 2019 and January 2020 witnessed revenue collection targets hitting high levels with TZS 10.62 trillion, which is about 97% of the target for that period which was TZS 10.96 trillion, It is sufficient to anticipate that revenue collection starting the fourth quarter of 2019/20 will experience significant decrease as a result of COVID-19 impact in the economy.

The budget ceilings for the financial year 2020/21 indicate a 5% increase of the national budget from TZS 33,105.4 billion in 2019/20 to TZS 34,879.8 billion in 2020/21. The budget proposals presented in March 2020 by the Minister of Finance and Planning for 2020/21 projected raising domestic revenue collection from TZS 23.05 trillion in 2019/20 to TZS 24.07 trillion in 2020/21 which will be equivalent to 69% of the total budget estimates.

This is despite the clear indications that the 2020/21 budget will experience serious shortfalls never experienced before.  The evidence from the economic shocks encountered so far with the closure of business, transport restrictions and exports such as horticulture, suggest tell that the current government’s economic plans and revenue projections for 2020/21 could be quite zealous and perhaps needed review.

According to the African Development Bank’s (East Africa Economic outlook report for 2019) economic growth in Tanzania and East Africa, in general, has been driven by tourism, services, agriculture and consumption sectors.  Tourism and services sector in Kenya and Tanzania grew and maintained an upward trend for the past five years.

All these vital sectors have been significantly affected and will centris pari bus record negative growth in their last and first quarters of 2020. Both the formal and the informal sector have been massively hit by this global pandemic. The economy will undoubtedly shrink substantially and therefore this should be reflected in the 2020/21 national budgets.

Global projections show that travel, hospitality and services sector will significantly be affected. Kenya, the regional economic powerhouse has so far downgraded key sectors such as the tourism sector to projected growth of about 2% in 2019 and this could even worse.

According to the World Tourism Council, the direct and indirect contribution of tourism was 14% of Tanzania’s GDP in 2014 with USD 6.7bn. This was expected to rise by 6.6% annually in the next 10 years, according to the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC).

According to the Bank of Tanzania Monthly Economic Review report, the tourism industry was the main source of foreign exchange receipts by Tanzania in 2018. In the MER report for the year ending December 2018, travel earnings (dominated by tourism) increased due to a rise in the number of tourist arrivals. The earnings reached US$2.44 billion from US$2.25 billion tabled in the same period the previous year.

The total receipts from services recorded a positive trend due to also the increase in the transport sector, which rose from $1.14 billion in 2017 to $1.22 billion in 2018.  MER reported that following an increase in travel and transport foreign receipts, the total foreign exchange receipt from services was $4.01 billion in the year to December 2018, an increase of $182.8 million from the amount registered in the corresponding period in 2017

“Transport receipt increased due to growth in the volume of transit goods to and from neighbouring countries particularly Zambia, DRC, Rwanda and Burundi partly contributed by improved competitiveness at the DSM port, including removal of Value Added Tax on auxiliary services of transit cargo, the bank reported.

The current lockdowns and travel restrictions in the neighbouring countries clearly indicate that these gains will be thrown out of the equation.

Zanzibar as a major tourist destination will be significantly affected and this will pull down the overall national economic growth of the sector and its impacts on the country.

Production and consumption will equally be affected by the economic lockdowns, staff layoffs and economic distress as disposable incomes shrink and consumer’s marginal propensities to spend drastically reduce.

Agriculture which has always been taunted as the backbone of the economy will also be affected by the menacing locusts, floods and disruptions in agricultural chains for inputs and domestic and export markets. Lending towards the sector will likely be affected and large scale production curtailed. The net effect in the wake of this will be potentially increased food insecurity, high prices (food inflation) and famine in large parts of the country.

Government costs of health care and treatment will significantly increase, drawing away resources from investment in other social and development sectors. According to public health experts, COVID 19 is one of the most expensive diseases to treat. It draws a lot of resources as it requires specialized facilities, expertise and treatment to deal per capita patient.

The financial sector will be distressed. Non-performing loans have increased and will increase significantly in defaults, distressed assets and foreclosure. The government could be a net loser too as banks, entities and individuals experience financial squeeze, fall back in tax payments and doing with on matters financial such as the purchase of government fiduciary instruments, such as treasury bills.

The industrialization agenda mooted by the government five years ago will significantly be affected as foreign capital to investment becomes difficult to mobilise. The major source countries of FDI inflows into Tanzania such as China, Europe and the United States and South Africa have been the epicentres of the pandemic and struggled to cope.

The turbulence in the global stock markets in the key financial centres such as New York, Tokyo, Frankfurt and London has worsened the situation further as major companies saw their net value and investments wiped within a short span of two months. The balance sheets and bottom lines of major companies shrunk significantly and remain extremely stressed. During and immediately after the COVID 19, investors and companies will be conservative to invest en masse and choosy in which markets and type of business they invest.

It is based on these realities that the Governance and Economic Policy Center and other Civil Society Organisations (under the umbrella of Tanzania Tax Justice Coalition) caution that the government needs to be precautionary in its projections and conservative in its estimates. As stated above that chances for the economy to shrink and domestic revenue mobilisation will adversely be impacted. It is likely that investment and revenues from key sectors such as tourism, construction and the extractive sector will likely be affected.

What governments should do

  1. Revise the previous and current budget projections to take care of the negative effects that COVID 19 will have on the economy and revenue mobilisation. (The World Bank and IMF both project that the African economy will shrink between 1.9% -3%). The new budget projections should factor this into their models to avoid a serious shortfall.
  1. Reduce VAT from the current 18% to 16% for the year 2020/21 to encourage production, tax rebates for manufacturers producing products for fighting Covid19, such as sanitisers, soap, masks and a well-reduced price for products hence increasing the purchasing power by consumers.
  1. The government should suspend all debt payments and re-negotiate future debt servicing in the context of COVID-19.
  1. Businesses and self-employed individuals in sectors hard-hit by the crisis or with serious repayment difficulties related to it should be allowed to reschedule their loan repayments or defer payments for a limited period (3 months). This will enable businesses and self-employed individuals in sectors hard-hit by the COVID-19 crisis or with serious repayment difficulties to remain in control.
  1. Halt or pause or stagger large expenditure on some large ongoing and proposed strategic projects such as infrastructure projects this year and reschedule the respective fund to short-term productive sectors for the economy and saving people’s lives.
  1. Set up an emergency fund or reserve fund at the Central bank capable of shielding the economy from the longer effects of COVID- 19 and the CB increase more liquidity into the banks to facilitate cheap lending.
  1. Businesses adversely affected by the COVID-19 should be given temporary tax payment relief in this regard. This should, however, be closely to avoid misuse.
  1. The governments need to earmark existing or additional funds to reinforce all mechanisms to fight COVID-19.
  2. Protect the public and consumers from hoarding, price hikes and disruptions in the supply chain of vital goods and services, which could gradually drift the country into structural inflation, affecting further the poor and extremely economically vulnerable.
  1. Consider pay cuts for highly paid public servants transfer some of these savings towards the national fund to finance COVID 19 response mechanisms
  1. Take measures that shield the private sector from collapse, protect jobs and hence protecting the government’s vital tax base.
  1. External borrowing at this stage to fight COVID-19 could be extremely dangerous as it is not exactly known when the situation will return to normalcy and the economy could be badly beaten after COVID-19 and not able to meet the ability for the government to pay its debt without default.

East African governments have been victims of ambitious budgeting appetites, whose targets are never achieved. According to a review of budget trends by GEPC in 2018/19 showed there were perpetual shortfalls between what was projected and what was collected. The trend showed that budgets estimates had been increasing over the years with every year’s budgets touted as the highest since independence. However, the actual budget out turns had fallen short of projections.

Kenya, which is the biggest economy in the region had missed targets for the past seven years while Uganda was a perpetual budget crusher with key ministry asking for supplementary budgets midway.

In 2018/19 Tanzania recorded a shortfall in budget outturn only achieving 88% of its targeted revenue collection. This was attributed to a number of factors, decline in domestic revenue, tighter global conditions, decline and delayed disbursement in government.

Generally, governments were net beggars, relying heavily on domestic and external borrowing to fill their budget deficits. Very little was saved. For this year, the signs are all over that the economies are glaring into the abyss. Cautionary budgeting could save the economies from further meltdown.

 

How Tanzania’s government can promote Domestic Direct Investment (DDI)

How Tanzania’s government can promote Domestic Direct Investment (DDI)

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre, Dar es Salaam-Tanzania

Tanzania has wide business opportunities in agriculture, tourism, mining, forestry, services and a large potential for attracting more DDI. Despite the wide endowment, statistics and practice shows that great attention has been on promoting and attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  FDI is viewed as the engine of growth and development and attracting it forms the tenor of Tanzania’s economic diplomacy. As the decline in FDI becomes real, with the global aid landscape moving towards aid for trade, it is rational that Tanzania (and all Aid dependent African Countries) should now look else where. Due to public interest , in this slighly updated version of a paper, published sometime ago, I highlight why attracting  DDI is imperative.

Domestic Direct Investment (DDI) can be generically defined as the total movement of capital and assets from within the Country. Domestic direct investment can in simple parlance be described as an act of local or resident entrepreneur or producer placing capital within a country into a project or business enterprise or assets with the intent of making a profit.  DDI has an opposite meaning of Foreign Direct Investment which is defined by the World Bank as the movement of private assets and capital across borders.

According to the Bank of Tanzania and Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), the total stock of Foreign Private Investments in 2013 amounted to USD15,969.5 million, which was 15.8% higher than what was recorded in 2012 (Tanzania Investment Report 2014: Foreign Private Investment).  The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that Tanzania attracted USD2, 142billion of FDI inflows in 2014, which was 14.5% increase from the previous years. With an accumulated stock of USD14.86billion, Tanzania was the highest in the East African Region (World Investment Report 2015) and came in the 10th position in Africa, ahead of all its East African neighbors (World Bank 16th Economic Outlook Report, 2015).

The Country performed well over the past two years. According to the World Investment Report 2019, the FDI inflow into Tanzania in 2018  reached USD 1.10Bln, pegging a significant increase compared to USD 938Bln recorded in 2017. UNCTAD reported that the current FDI stock is estimated at USD20.7bln representing 35.8% of Tanzania’s GDP. The Mining sector,  the oil and gas industry as well as primary agricultural products (coffee, cashew nuts and tobbaco) have always drawn the most FDI. The Country’s main foreign investors are China, India, Kenya, United Kingdom, Mauritius, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Canada, the United States, the Netherlands, South Africa and Germany.  In recent years new investors such as Turkey started appearing on the list.

Yet, the mining reforms in 2017 are particularly viewed as potentially a risk to foreign investors could shock and disrupt this trend and contribute towards a  FDI inflow in the future.  According to the World Bank Doing Bussiness Report for 2019,  Tanzania ranked 144th out of 190 countries, having lost seven positions compared to its previous rankings. Investors tend to take note of this report and therefore by any means this is not pleasant news for a country which wants to build an industrial economy by leveraging its resources for investment.

Moreover, despite performing relatively well on the external foreign front in the past years, the figures for DDI are largely unknown. Yet domestically owned enterprises are said to have a larger trickle economic down effect on the Country and the population (UNIDO, 2014). The role of DDI in building an ‘in-house’ national economic base and its associate benefits such as employment creation is significant. This therefore suggests that there is need for concerted government efforts to attract more DDI. The Indonesian and Malaysian governments have been pragmatic on this front and their experience can be drawn for learning. According to available data the Indonesian government registered approximately USD13.2Million in DDI in 2017 (Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board: Domestic and Foreign Direct Investment Realization in Quarter II and January-June, 2017). This therefore demonstrates that is possible to build a national economic architecture which attracts DDI.

The following could be potential strategies to promote DDI in Tanzania. Collectively these would contribute to a good business environment for domestic direct investors and significantly spur DDI flows.

There is need to develop a Domestic Direct Investment Attraction strategy and policy document to guide Tanzania’s priorities and intentions to encourage, attract and regulate DDI. The strategy and policy should be informed by a comprehensive analysis of the Country’s domestic investment needs and priorities. It should identify the challenges, opportunities and incentives for Domestic Direct Investors. Currently, the government investment is within the broad economic development program mirrored under the Tanzania Five Year Development Plan II 2016/17-2020/21 (FYDP II). Investment attraction has been described in general terms and has an inclination towards emphasis on attracting FDI to support government’s development ambitions. The FYDP II under its salient features asserts that policy and institutional reforms have been entrenched and private sector ‘will be called forth’ to lead in investment in industrialization but does not expound on how this will be achieved. It is for this reason that DDI investment portfolio within the country has remained low and largely unknown.

Engage in wide campaigns and about existing opportunities for domestic investment.  Currently, major government efforts have been in promoting investment opportunities abroad with the intention of attracting FDI. The outlook would be equally shifted to promoting opportunities for domestic investment. The extensive use of public advertisement and public diplomacy materials such as procurements on the existing opportunities for Domestic Direct Investment would boost local motivation to invest and extent the frontiers of DDI.

Facilitate domestic investors to access to finance and Capital mobilization to invest. This strategy has been adopted with some level of success by some Countries such as Malaysia. According to the Malaysian Investment authorities (MIDA, 2013), in an effort to promote DDI, the government in 2012 introduced a Domestic Investment Strategic Fund (DISF). The DISF is not a grant but provided on contingent on the investment of the applicant. It is provided in the form of matching funds which are reimbursable after a given period and granted on negotiated terms. Recipients of DISFs are determined on cases by case basis depending on merits, proposals and plans provided. The DISF is also restricted to investment in specific sectors of the economy and high end projects with good economic value to the Malaysian economy. In 2006 Tanzania government introduced a fund to support small enterprises. The fund was also famously known as the ‘ Kikwete 1bln fund’ was disbursed through the selected banks such as the NMB and CRDB. The weakness of this fund was that it had political inclinations, the criterion for beneficiaries and loan repayment requirements were weak. The fund was subject to abuse and as consequence; its benefits were largely unfelt. Review of this initiative based on lessons from the previous scheme and other countries such as Malaysia would inform a new strategy for funding domestic entrepreneurs.

The Tanzanian government should provide Incentives for domestic investors such as tax incentives, incentives for acquiring foreign companies for high technology, incentives for companies in production and mergers among domestic service providers or firms. According to the Malaysian investment Development Authority, a Malaysian owned company ac acquiring a foreign owned company is eligible for an annual deduction of 20% of the acquisition costs for 5 years. The acquirer must be a locally owned company with at least 60% Malaysian equity ownership involved in manufacturing and service activity.

This incentive is aimed at increasing local ownership portfolios in high end technology firms in the Country. Small firms under a specified share capital value are given tax incentives and firms which participate or are desirous to engage in production of promoted products are incentivized.  Currently, Tanzania’s domestic or resident investors can only access government incentives if they registered their projects with the Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) The minimum capital base required to qualify for an Investment Certificate and incentives is high and exorbitant for domestic direct investors.

Ring fencing of economic opportunities and sectors for domestic investors and allowing requiring joint investment ventures in some specific sectors. There have been efforts to ring fence the tourism sector. However these efforts in Tanzania are not widely extended to other sectors. Other Countries have this approach successfully to attract DDI in specific sectors.

Need to establish a dedicated Domestic Direct Investment agency or department within the Tanzania Investment Center, specializing and focusing in DDI promotion, attraction, facilitation and documentation. Currently, Tanzania’s investment attraction agenda is coordinated by Tanzania Investment Center. The centre is one stop center with all major government functions such as business and company registration, immigration and taxation. However, the focus of TIC is on attracting FDI. Yet domestic investors have peculiar needs and thus attracting DDI would benefit from a specialized department.

Make more efficient use of the business incubator model to facilitate the establishment and growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs).  Business incubators are dedicated and well equipped centers which identify nascent entrepreneurs with innovative ideas with a potential for growth to test their and develop their ideas into functional enterprises.  Where necessary, they provide the nascent entrepreneurs with start-up capital and equipment for growth. It is well established that SMEs play a key role in creating employment, developing a skilled workforce and responding to various market demands. Business incubators have been instrumental in developing the United States Computer and high-tech software industry. California’s Silicon Valley is home to many business incubators providing to young innovative software and hi-tech developers to juggle their ideas into big business. Many computer applications run by computer programs such as Microsoft and Apple are products of business incubators. In Tanzania, so far there is one known incubator hosted at Commission for Science and Technology (Costech). From this incubator innovative software ideas were developed and grew into a leading Tanzanian multinational company called Maxicom Africa. There is need to expand public knowledge and this incubator’s services and so as to encourage new ideas for innovation, technology and investment.

There is need to review the policy and operations of Export Processing Zones (EPZ) and Special Economic Zones (SEZ) with a view of encouraging true domestic investors.  Export processing zones and Special Economic Zones are specialized areas gazette by the government allowing investors and companies to produce manufactured goods in a controlled secure environment for export. Both schemes provide facilitative environment for profitable operations. Export Processing Zones (EPZ) objectives include; attraction and encouragement of new technology, attraction and promotion of investment for export-led industrialization, employment and promotion of processing of local raw materials for export. Special Economic Zones (SEZ) have an objective of promoting quick and significant progress in economic growth, export earnings and employment creation as well as attracting private investment from all productive and service sectors.

They provide generous incentives such as tax holidays and tax breaks to investors and companies using the EPZs to manufacture goods for export.  Examples in Tanzania include the Benjamin Mkapa Export Processing Zone at Mabibo Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar Special Economic Zones. Despite their existence, the volume of DDI investments attracted to these zones is still low and the generous incentives offered by the EPZ and SEZ’s have been abused by the foreign firms operating the EPZ’s. Already manufactured goods from outside the Country are smuggled into the EPZs for label and exported as Tanzanian manufactured goods. Foreign firms have set up subsidiaries in Tanzania’s EPZ so as to benefit from the generous incentives.  The net beneficiaries from the EPZ and SEZ are therefore foreign firms and not domestic investors. A through mapping and review has to be done.

There is need to address nuisances such as corruption, bureaucracy, nuisance taxes and non tariff barriers restrictions which make local investment cumbersome to domestic Investors. According to the World Bank Report Tanzania was ranked 139 out of 189 on the Ease of doing business index in 2015 (World Bank: Ease of Doing Business Report 2015). The report suggests that the business environment in Tanzania is still unfavorable and acts as a disincentive to invest. Tanzania compares badly with its neighbors such as Rwanda and Uganda. The government has strived to improve Dar es Salaam port handling and establishment of ‘One stop borders’ at major customs points to facilitate trade but other non tariff barriers exist and these have to be dealt with conclusively.

Deliberately pursuing a broad based economic growth strategy to allow the economy to expand and create more opportunities for local investment. These are key factors in determining investment decisions.  Despite registering a fast paced economic growth of 6-7% in the past years, the drivers of economic growth has been limited to specific sectors such as telecommunications, mining and construction. These sectors require large volumes of capital and specialized high skills. This can be restrictive to Domestic Direct Investors, whose capital base and technological advancement may be limited. It is important to open up economic growth and investment potentials to other sector.

As stated by Mairo Pezinni, director of OECD Development Center, “Extractives are no longer the main driver to investment. The Continent (Tanzania) is open for new investment fueled by unprecedented domestic demand” (Africa Investment Report 2016). The government should see this as an opportunity to drive Domestic Direct investment into other sectors.

In Conclusion, over the past years Tanzania has committed itself towards building a robust economy through investment. The current government industrialization agenda is based on securing more investment into the manufacturing sector.  From the policy and practice it is evident that the government’s focus has been anchored towards attracting FDI. The volume of FDI inflows into the country as recorded by TIC has increased over the past five years. However, experiences in countries such as Malaysia show that Countries cannot build their economic muscle by depending exclusively on FDI. The challenge of relying on FDI is linked to its characteristics.

FDI is sensitive and subject to cyclical factors such as global economic down turns, global stock and capital market instabilities ,changes in national policy or political environment and foreign investor  interests. It can therefore be erratic unreliable as a platform for building an economy. It is for this reason that the governments appetite needs to be shifted towards DDI. The absence of current figures and a systematic and well articulate government policy on DDI is a major flaw in national development planning.  Tanzania is an endowed with vast resources, a large population and strategically placed as country. Therefore potential for attracting more DDI is evident.  To achieve this potential a number of strategies have to be implemented and other existing ones reviewed as suggested in this paper.

References:

  • Africa Investment Report 2016, Analyse Africa, 2016
  • Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board: Domestic and Foreign Direct Investment Realization in Quarter II and January-June, 2017).Available at http://bit.ly/2YMXgsD
  • World Bank: Ease of Doing Business Report 2015
  • Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA), Maljis Peguam, Malayasia, 20th Novemeber, 2013 available at http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=4361
  • Tanzania Investment Report 2014: Foreign Private Investment
  • URT: National Five Year Development Plan 2016/17-2020/21: Nurturing Industrialisation for Economic transformation and Human Development accessed via: http://www.mof.go.tz/mofdocs/msemaji/Five%202016_17_2020_21.pdf
  • UNIDO: Tanzania Investor Survey Report: Understanding Investment and Foreign Direct Investment, 2014
  • UNCTAD: World Investment Report, 2015

Online Sources

The Citizen Newspaper, Tanzania leads Regional peers in FDI investment available athttp://bit.ly/2WsVRdd

SADC in Economic Meltdown; Can Tanzania be German of the Region?

On Saturday 17th August, Tanzania assumed the chair of the South African Development Cooperation (SADC), amidst disturbing economic figures indicating that the region was facing a serious economic meltdown. Can Tanzania be the ‘German’ of the region, playing the economic big daddy role by calling the other states into political order and bailing out the struggling member states?

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Analysis Center, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

The SADC is a 16-member state regional economic block established with among others promoting sustained economic growth and sustainable development amongst its objectives. However, the recent economic data indicates that region is witnessing an economic meltdown with most of its member states, except perhaps Tanzania, positing negative or stunted economic growth over the past years.

According to the economic and social indicators data compiled and released by its secretariat the the SADC region posted an estimated average growth rate of 1.4% in 2016 compared to 2.3% in 2015. At country level Tanzania registered the highest growth of 7% among the member states followed by Botswana with a far below rate of 4.3%[i].  

In 2017 Tanzania recorded an economic growth of 7.1% followed by Seychelles (6.3%) whilst Angola registered negative growth for the second consecutive year in order of 2.5%[ii] The region’s growth was increasing at a decreasing rate since the post global period in 2009.

The region’s economic giant South Africa has witnessed rapid economic slowdown, bring along its small neighbors and trading partners under its weight.  Countries such as Zimbabwe were collapsing under the weight of economic sanctions, Namibia and Angola recorded negative annual real GDP (at market price) of 10.8% and -2.5% respectively in 2017 due to the slump in commodity prices and other related risks. Botswana at 2.4% did not perform well either. The region posted an overall trade deficit with rest of the world of USD6.7bln. 

The AfDB report for 2018 warned that the economic outlook for Southern Africa region was cautious[iii]. Broad based economic activity was expected to recover at slow pace, but the outlook remained modest given the diverging growth patterns for the region’s economies. Upper middle income countries turned in low and declining rates of growth meanwhile lower income transitioning economies recorded moderate and improved growth, albeit at reduced rates.

Despite the improvement, economic performance remained subdued as the region’s economic outlook continued to face major headwinds. High unemployment, weak commodity prices, fiscal strain, increasing debt and high inflation.

Real GDP was estimated to have grown at an average of 1.6% in 2017 before increasing to a projected 2.0% in 2018 and 2.4% in 2019.

The future regional growth was expected to be bolstered with primary expectations of increased investment in non-oil sectors such as electricity, construction and technology in large infrastructure projects, mining as well as continued recovery in commodity prices.

However, the latest figures show that the region was not well on that front either.  The decline in commodity prices in recent years reaching the lowest point in 2015 translated into significant income loses for the economies, implying a negative impact on public and private sector spending and therefore growth in employment.

Before the 2008-2009 global recession, the region experienced moderate growth, though individual countries contributed differently. For example, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia exhibited robust growth that collectively outpaced the regional group.

Thereafter, Angola, the region’s foremost oil producer and former raising economic star received the worst bashing with its economy experiencing adverse economic growth effects due to weak oil prices.

Overall the region experienced negative GDP growth with Swaziland (-10.08%), Zimbabwe (-8.38%),  and Angola (-6.31%)  being among the worst hit[iv]  Other Countries such as Zambia, Namibia , Mozambique and Malawi were not performing better either. South Africa reported the highest public debt soaring in billions dollars followed by Angola.

South African Institute of International Affairs observed that intra-regional investment and trade levels had declined markedly since the commodity slump in 2013. Moreover, the trade and economic growth in the region remained imbalanced, exacerbating political strains among member states. Non-tariff barriers and other factors had adversely affected intra-regional trade and investment in recent years.

Assuming the mantle, at the end of its 39th Summit held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’ President John Pombe Magufuli was furious with against the Secretariat for having not provided adequate and alert to the political leadership that the region was experiencing an economic meltdown with reduced or stunted growth and an expanding trade deficit.

Speaking at the SADC People’s forum on the sidelines of the main summit in Dar es Salaam, the South African Professor, Patrick Bond, described the situation as alarming, catastrophic and turbulent and yet no one was bold enough to speak about it.

He was perhaps communist in view and radical in approach, blaming what he described as the capitalistic enterprise and its puppeteers for under mining economic justice, risking lives of by putting profit before the people and causing climate change whose effects were ravaging SADC but remained quite revolutionary in suggesting that the ordinary people perhaps needed to send a clear signal to its political leadership that all was not okay. The economic fundamentals were tattered and the regional leaders needed to wake, Prof. Bond lectured.

Can Tanzania emerge and become the ‘German’ of the region?

With this state of the Union, the question therefore arose can Tanzania emerge and become the ‘German’ of the region, playing the economic messiah role by providing both political leadership and economic bail out to its neighbors. 

In 2013 up to 2015 when the European Union experienced economic turbulence, Brussels turned to German to liberate it from the gigantic economic Dracula which was tearing down its economic block and leaving some of its small states indebted and facing bankruptcy. German wrote cheques in financial bailouts, provided guarantees and political prop up for economically struggling states such as Greece, Portugal and Italy.

German relied on its economic prowess and its political might as the industrial central pillar of the European Union. The charismatic leadership of its Chancellor, Ms Angela Merkel, was a distinct asset. Even at the risk of her own political career and constant onslaught from the German far right, Merkel could not tolerate any nonsense and was not ready to allow Europe to fall back.

In the face of the similar economic doldrums which seems now to face SADC, can Tanzania afford such muscle or a German equivalent?

Tanzania has done it before. In the 1960’s until 1990’s when the region was facing serious political, Tanzania pulled up its resources and committed it to the liberation struggle. It hosted training camps and provided pupilage to thousands of liberation fighters. Dar es Salaam became to the political headquarters of Frontline States where the idea of SADC in its current form was initiated and a spring for independence for many of the current South African states.  For some, therefore SADC at 39 years, just came back home.

In assuming the SADC Chairmanship, President Magufuli warned the Secretariat that it will not be business as usual as of now and for the next one year his interest would be to see that resources placed at the disposal of the Secretariat were not spent on conferences but on meaningful tangible projects which benefited the people. Could this be the kind of approach that region needs to take in order to deal with its increasing economic challenges.

An agile kind of leadership which places the people at the heart of politics and fights with cunning shrewdness against corruption, public waste, nepotism and personal drive to accumulate wealth by those in power.

Over the years these have been some of the vices which have dogged the region and bringing the much needed progress to stagnation and ultimate halt in some member states. Comparatively, perhaps the SADC is the largest economic group in Sub-Saharan Africa. With over an estimated population of 337.1 million people in 2017, is larger than its western equivalent, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and obviously bigger than the European Union has a just a fraction of the SADC population yet somehow progress has been considerably steady in the other regions.

According to experts the region was faced by multiple non trade barriers and low intra region trade which still at around 20%.  Technically, speaking, the members are happy to do business with other countries outside the region rather than their economic neighbors partners in SADC. The member states are living alongside each other but not fully economically and trade integrated.

Political uncertainties which has dogged the former economic giants of the region such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola created fertile conditions negative to investment and economic growth.  The governments lost grip on the economic mantle and directed attention towards managing internal politics and mechanics for political survival.  

Xenophobic attacks in South Africa could have also created a sense of fear and caused disarray in a fragile informal sector which was quietly the driving factor or fulcrum on which the South African economy relied. Crushing cost of electricity, turmoil in the extractive sector and stalemate in the platinum industry in 2016 perhaps were also a contributory factor to South Africa’s political woes. 

Overall, according, to Professor bond, the region was just poorly governed and a new leadership impetus led by the people was necessary to bring back the declining glories

For many years SADC was so much preoccupied on political stability. With good success, it has managed to tackle conflicts and bring peace amongst its member states. Overall, political conflict in the form of civil wars in the region has been declining with all except the DRC reporting any semblance of a conventional Civil war in recent years. 

Even, this has significantly been downgraded in recent years. Currently, there is no severe risk of any threat from any member state to destabilize any other through an arms insurrection. The ongoing conflict in the Eastern DRC is largely a war of survival for the remaining tribal and ethnic elements rather than a fully-fledged military configuration to overall and capture power in the DRC. If it can be dealt with, then perhaps the war in the DRC will be over or significantly reduced to minimal levels in many decades.

The future wars of the SADC will therefore be largely economic and perhaps resource based on key issues such as land, water and control of the real means of production and profit. Acute poverty could be the other driver of the masses towards insurrection. For Tanzania therefore, to take up the German challenge will be a touch endeavor.

Tanzania’s economic benefit or contribution to the region is too minimal. According to trade statistics, Tanzania is among the least exporters to SADC and its overall trade balance with its SADC neighbors was still low. It therefore lacks the economic might of German stature.

Over the past three years Tanzania’s political leadership has commitment itself to building its economy first before looking outside. Cutting back on public waste and flogging its population into line to start paying up taxes to finance its public service and infrastructure ambitions, Tanzania is building its economy from within.

Throughout the 1960s to the 1990s Tanzania sacrificed a lot in order to politically liberate virtually all the SADC member states and yet gained very minimal in return.  Political historians have even have even argued with some level of confidence that Tanzania under developed itself in sacrifice for others to develop. Tanzania would be therefore quite cautious in economic diplomatic terms and perhaps uncomfortable at this moment in giving out too much of what it has acquired over the years to salvage its economic neighbors.

The conditions in the region appear to have turned so bad in the past few years with persistent drought raving across the region only to be replaced by wrecking floods leaving behind famine and death in communities along its way.  Approximately over 1000 people dies in the last floods in Mozambique and Malawi caused by cyclone Idai and Keneth. Millions at a risk of starvation.  Essential infrastructure such as road and bridges connecting rural areas to urban centers and across countries such as the port of Beira are badly battered and incapable of supporting economic productivity.

The region has not been able to attract in Foreign Investment into its natural resource wealth and flagship infrastructure projects such as the Mighty Inga dam electro power project in the DRC which would have brought life into the SADC power master plan have remained incomplete for many years now. The region is badly in need of both reconstruction and reconfiguration to sustain itself and its ambitions.

At the end of the summit Tanzania’s former President Benjamin Mkapa advised that SADC member states should stop relying heavily on foreign donors for aid to support or finance their development agenda. Building internal capacity through a reliable market for products from the block, investment in education, technology, domestic revenue collection and unlocking the potential amongst its budging population to drive the economies forward would be a better option. Perhaps the SADC leadership should fine tune an ear to the wisdom of its elders.

The meeting concluded with signing off of three development cooperation programs worth 47 Million Euro deal with the European Union under its European Development Fund (EDF) 11 financing round. According to official statement, the funds will be used over the next five-year period to support improvement in the Investment and Business Environment (SIBE), Trade Facilitation Program (TFP) and Support to Industrial Productive Sectors (SIPS) three programs to be implemented by the SADC over the next five-year period

The SIBE program aims at achieving sustainable and inclusive growth and job creation by transforming the region into an investment zone, promoting intra-regional investments, foreign Direct Investment and a focus on Small and Medium Enterprises. The TFP will contribute to enhance inclusive economic development in the region through deepened economic integration while the SIPs aimed at contributing to the SADC industrialization agenda, improving performance and growth of selected value chains. How this EU injection translates into lifting the region from its economic downward spiral will yet to be found out at the next summit when SADC turns 40. What is clear is that something has to be done.

[i] SADC: Selected economic and social indicators, 2016

[ii] SADC: Selected economic and social indicators, 2017

[iii] AfDB: Southern Africa Economic Outlook, 2018

[iv] https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/southern-african-development-community

Elation as Kenya exports Oil; what does it mean for Oil rush in East African region

On 1st of August 2019, President Uhuru Kenyatta announced that Kenya had joined the list of world oil exporting Countries by selling its first crude oil at a cost of 12 Million United States dollars.

While the news reverberated across the Country and the region with elation, it is also possible that Kenya’s announcement could trigger a contagious rush to the bottom with East African Countries jostling to outcompete each other by signing off deals and agreements locking off future markets with potential buyers. Some of these deals may not be necessarily good.

By Moses Kulaba; Governance and Economic Analysis Center

Addressing the cabinet and media in Nairobi, President Kenyatta said Kenya had sold its barrels of crude oil to a buyer whose identity still remained a secret.

“We are now an Oil exporter. Our first deal was concluded this afternoon with 200,000 barrels at a price of USD 12 Million.  So I think we have started the journey and it is up to us to ensure that those resources are put to the best use to make our Country and to ensure we eliminate poverty, said Kenyatta.

The news reverberated in the region and globally with a new player on the market. Obviously there was more excitement and elation in the Lokichar Oil fields where Tullow Oil and its joint partners continue to explore more blocks with more vigour and determination.

Kenya discovered its first Oil in 2012 and since then, explorations have continued in the Lake Turkana basin region with deposits being reported and more projections made to increase. In its previous reports Tullow estimated some 560 Mln Barrels in possible reserves and these are now projected to increase as prospects for more discoveries are higher than before.

This would translate into 60,000 to 10,000 barrels per day of gross production, which is said to be insufficient to warrant the construction of a refinery locally hence the export plans

The sold consignment was delivered by truckers at the Kenya Petroleum Refineries facilities in Changamwe, Mombasa since July last year, under what the government described under the early oil project

What does this mean for Kenya and the East African region?

The deal concludes that Kenya once ruled off as an oil novice in the region, with the lowest volumes of discovered oil is running a head of its East African neighbors in reaching exporting oil country status many months before any of its East African neighbors can sell a drop of oil.

For Kenya, this is game changer in regional geopolitics as not only does the oil revenue bring a new line of foreign exchange earnings into its economy and thus consolidating its position as the regional economic superpower.

Galvanizing on its early market entry status, Kenya could tap the available markets and seal off any available contracts beating off any potential competition from its neighboring countries.

The oil revenues could also breathe some life into its Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor development plan which has stalled for among others lack of partners. With oil revenues flowing, Kenya can go alone developing the ambitious infrastructure projects along the corridor all the way to the Ethiopian boarder.

Contrary to nay Sayers, the oil export could be a window to emboldened security in the Turkana area as the government seeks to protect vital oil installations and export routes to the coast.  For many years, Lake Turkana basin has been one of the most volatile and insecure areas in Kenya as marauding armed warriors move from one village to another raiding for cattle. Civilians and military installations have been attacked and people killed.

In June, 2018 Turkana residents stopped five trucks from ferrying crude oil to Mombasa over rising insecurity along the border with Baringo. The resident complained of insecurity in the area but also complained of what they call consider unresolved issues on oil sharing benefits between the National governments, County governments and local communities over the 5% share which they wanted channeled to their bank accounts rather than for development as rallied by a section of leaders.

There is no way we can be a security threat to the oil we have protected and guarded for years. So the specialized and additional security personnel (protecting oil) should head to Kapedo and secure people.

Kenya’s oil export announcement could trigger a contagious rush for oil in the East African region, with each country racing to drill to bottom in search for oil. In an effort to outcompete each other, those already with oil discoveries such as Uganda and South Sudan could race to the market sealing off deals and contracts with potential buyers and agreements for future markets. Some of these deals maybe bad.

 Uganda was the first to strike oil around its Albertine graben in 2005. According to Uganda’s Ministry of energy the petroleum deposit discovered so far were estimated at 6.5barrels of which 1.5bln are considered as recoverable.

The Ugandan oil is supposed to be exported to the global market through a 1,443 electric heated East African Oil Pipeline (EACOP) via Tanzania. The East African Crude oil pipeline is expected to unlock East Africa Oil potential by attracting invest and companies to explore the potential in the region.

According to the project schedule available on the EACOP website the detailed engineering and procurement and early works were supposed to have been made in 2018 and construction started in 2019. The first oil exports were expected in 2020. But it appears all these are behind schedule.

According to Ministry of Uganda expected to conclude its financial deal for its joint pipeline with Tanzania by June, 2019, opening for the way for its construction. According to the information provided by then, Stanbic Bank Uganda, was supposed to be the lead arranger for USD2.5billion funding for the 1,455 km (EACOP) project. The deal was expected to have been concluded in June, 2019.

Kampala was also expecting that the Final Investment Decisions (FID) between the government and the oil partners to determine when funds for the project will be made available, the terms of the financing and when the project execution will commence with a projected timeline between 20 and 36 months

The pipeline was expected to jointly develop the USD 3.5 billion pipeline, described as the longest electrically heated crude oil pipeline in the world. The balance of USD 1billion is expected to come from shareholders in equity

However, by the time Kenya announced its export deal in July, the earth breaking ceremony commencing the start of the EACOP pipeline construction had not started. Negotiations were reported as ongoing. In June 2017, the Daily Business Newspaper carried an article with a headline ‘Uganda’s Oil may not flow by 2020’ as the required infrastructure may not be complete  by then[i]

What this means for Uganda is that time is of essence and the sooner the EACOP project construction takes off the better for its potential oil market.

Figure 3: The Government of Tanzania and Uganda sign the Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) for the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP)  in May, 2017

 

So why do some oil projects like take long to materialize?

Lack of astute leadership, effective institutions and canning ambition to drive the projects to fruition. In some countries the political leadership and responsible institutions can be weak, whereby the essential operational process surrounding the oil projects can be clogged in political rhetoric and undertones which make decision making quite cumbersome, inefficiently slow and less assuring to the investors

Technical aspects such as Quality of crude oil discovered

High Sulphur crude oil can such as the Ugandan and Kenyan crude oil can be waxy and costly to transport via pipeline as it requires constant heating along the route.  This explains why the 1,433 km EACOP is described as the longest electric heated pipeline in the world. This adds to complexity in technology and costs on heating required to operationalize the project. Investors may

Oil reservoir behaviors and recoverable volumes – The discovered oil reserves are not always the same as the recoverable volumes. In some projects the reserves can be large yet due to geological and technological factors the recoverable volumes are low.  The behavior of the oil reservoirs is therefore a significant factor in determining whether the recoverable volumes will be consistent with the early projections and economic models over the plateau period. A change in the recoverable volumes can trigger massive losses and may lead to complete closure of the oil project. Investors are happy to rush projects where recoverable volumes will be sustained

Financing aspects such as financing structure -Lack of financing for some reasons or high interests on the investment loans secured from investment-lending institutions can be a delaying factor.  The decision to invest may therefore take long as the investors or partners to the oil project juggle and weigh the available financial options viz a vis the current and future costs of the project on the country and the investors

Economic metric considerations such as the Net Present Value (NPV), Rate of Return (RoR) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the project.

These are calculations undertaken to determine the economic and financial viability of the project. They are used to determine how much return and how long it will take to recoup the initial investment and starting generating profit.

According to online sources such as Investopedia, the Net present value (NPV) is the difference between the present value of cash inflows and the present value of cash outflows over a period of time. NPV is used in capital budgeting and investment planning to analyze the profitability of a projected investment or project.

The Rate of Return (RoR) is the net gain or loss on an investment over a specified time period, expressed as a percentage of the investment’s initial cost. This simple rate of return is sometimes called the basic growth rate, or alternatively, return on investment, or ROI. If you also consider the effect of the time value of money and inflation, the real rate of return can also be defined as the net amount of discounted cash flows received on an investment after adjusting for inflation.

The rate of return is used to measure growth between two periods, rather than over several periods. The RoR can be used for many purposes, from evaluating investment growth to year-over-year changes in company revenues. Its calculation does not consider the effects of inflation.

The internal rate of return (IRR) is a measure used in capital budgeting to estimate the profitability of potential investments. The internal rate of return is a discount rate that makes the Net Present Value (NPV) that makes the Net Present Value (NPV) of all cash flows from a particular project equal to zero.  It is mathematically calculated as IRR=NPV=t=1∑T (1+r)t −C0 =0)

IRR is the rate of growth a project is expected to generate. The IRR is used in capital budgeting to decide which projects or investments to undertake and which to forgo.

Generally speaking, the higher a project’s internal rate of return, the more desirable it is to undertake. Assuming the costs of investment are equal among the various projects, the project with the highest IRR would probably be considered the best and be undertaken first. IRR is sometimes referred to as “economic rate of return” or “discounted cash flow rate of return.”

Social factors such as land acquisition and due diligence for compensation– The nebulous and intricate balancing act between the local laws and the international standards as guided by the International Finance Corporation can be a hindrance. Quite often the local standards for compensation can be law, corrupt unfair yet the IFC standards requires fair and equity

Negative diplomacy: The oil projects could delay or fail to take off all together due to negative diplomacy. Whereby disgruntled actors such as activists, companies, politicians who may not be excited or about the project may quietly lobby, urge, convince or cajole the financing institutions not to finance the project.

Security Risk:  Oil projects cost lots of money in investment and thus require assurances that financial investments and their installations will be guaranteed.  Oil projects can stall as investors and their partners gauge the security risks

Some or all of these factors could be now at play in the East African region and could be explanatory factors as to why some petroleum projects are progressing at a snail’s pace or stalled all together. Perhaps Kenya’s early oil export could be trigger for its neighbors to start thinking ahead.

 

 

 

[i] https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Uganda—oil—2020-Standard–Poors-Tanzania/3946234-3982464-j7rbsq/index.html

Why Rules of Origin (RoO) should not be used exclusively to pursue trade policy objectives

This article shades light on a major instrument in international trade and customs management, which has been used by states to achieve multiple trade objectives. The concept of RoO has become controversial in the current interconnected global trading system where the point of production and sale across have become quite seamless and yet international trading rules requires that the definite origin of goods are identified for preferential treatment, statistical and tax purposes. The article argues that despite the implicit functions they play RoO should never be used a tool for negative trade pursuit rather a conduit for trade facilitation. The paper defines rules of origin and trade policy, outlining the objectives of trade policy, explaining the linkages between the two and discusses other instruments which can be used to achieve trade policy objectives

By Moses Kulaba; Governance and Economic Policy Analysis Center

Rules of origin (RoO) are common defined as laws, regulations and administrative criteria applied by a country to determine the country of origin of goods, for tariff preference purposes, subject to specific conditions as defined in WTO agreements and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)[i].  The East African Customs Union has summarized the rules of origin as ‘the vital link between the goods and country where they are produced’[1][ii] RoO are categorized as Preferential and non preferential depending on their characteristics and objectives.

Preferential RoO aim at determining whether goods qualify for preferential treatment and while Non Preferential RoO used to determine goods for trade statistical purposes. Rules of origin have significant relation and influence on a country’s trade policy or member countries which are contractually related or mutually obliged under a given contractual or non contractual trade arrangement. Rules of origin also may determine or assist the countries in understanding their comparative and competitive advantage. They are commonly used as a trade policy tool to protect local markets, give preferential treatment and a measure against unfair trade.

Trade policy can be defined as a collection or law, rules and practices aimed at achieving a country’s trade objectives. Tanzania’s trade policy aims to contribute to raising per capital income to levels targeted in National Development Vision 2025, trade development measures to stimulate and expand domestic demand through product and market diversification and limited interim safe guard of domestic economic activity threatened by liberalization, while building economic competitiveness[iii] It seek to achieved sustainable growth rate in trae of not less than 14% and long-term share of exports to GDP  of about 25%, double fold increase in manufacturing and raised value of merchandise export earnings in absolute terms to USD1,700 in the next five years[iv]

The Tanzania government recognizes the importance or Rules of origin as a tool for implementing trade policy objectives and has committed towards using the RoO in a manner that can strengthen the country’s industrial and trade potential. The Tanzanian clearly articulates this position in its trade policy where it states:

The Government of Tanzania will undertake measures to observe RoO preferences requirements prevailing in the different trading arrangements with a view to maximizing benefits accruing in the cause of implementation…with priority focus on building national capacity for effective utilization of this instruments[v]”

While RoO are a common factor in Trade policy, because of the challenges that RoO have in relation to international trade, they are considered as not the tools of most preference in achieving trade policy objectives. Indeed, increasingly governments are being advised that RoO should not be used to achieve trade policy objectives for the following reasons.

Firstly, they can be distortionary and work contrary to trade policy objectives especially where there is no harmonization of trade policy objectives. “If Clear, predictable, transparent and fair, rules of origin and their application facilitate the flow of international trade. Nevertheless, RoO can create unnecessary obstacles to trade and nullify or impair the rights of members in regional and multilateral trading arrangements including the EAC, SADC and WTO. Consequently, RoO have to be applied in a transparent, predictable, consistent and neutral manner so as to avoid their negative effects[vi].

Secondly, rules of origin is also important in facilitating international trade where the objective is free flow of goods, irrespective of trade policies or various countries

It can be sometimes difficult for countries to achieve trade targets in situations where it is a member to multiple contractual obligations which may conflict with its own national trade objectives. This is a common challenge for countries like Tanzania which belongs both to the EAC and SADC and has therefore a challenge in determining or applying RoO for goods originating from both economic blockings

Implementation of rules of origin is sometimes cumbersome and sometimes can be distortionary especially where there is need to determine various technical dimensions to the items for preferential purposes.

Rules of Origin are also not the only instruments for achieving trade policy objectives. They are just one instrument and other instruments could be effectives. These instruments include a combination of other trade policies, which can be elaborated as below:

Trade policy instruments are described as measures taken by governments to influence the direction and pattern of trade development. The application of these instruments in Tanzania is guided by the need to stimulate domestic production, promotion of exports, safeguard domestic industry against dumping practices and protection of consumers. Tanzania exercises these trade policy options in line with its international obligations. These instruments include: Tariff Based (Advalorem) Instruments, NTBs: Trade defense mechanisms; trade development instruments; and international trade policy instruments.

Tariff based instruments, include;

Tariffs, which are major trade instruments for trade policy implementation which are used to achieve duo objectives of revenue generation and protection of domestic industry. Heavy import substitution protection regimes can harm unprotected industry and ultimately reduce consumer welfare. It is for this purpose that Tanzania has been reforming its tariff band structure to a current four band structure (0,10,15 and 25)

Duty Draw Back Schemes (DDB) which are tools for export promotion through refund of import taxes on imported inputs that go towards production for exports. Tanzania has implemented a DDB scheme, although the scheme faces multiple challenges, including difficulties in technical verification. This also includes the mechanisms for VAT refund

Taxation, which comprises of   tax regime characterized by different taxes and levies imposed by the central and local government to achieve a duo purpose of revenue collection and protection used for administration of quota restrictions

Export Taxes which are levied as instruments to discourage export of raw materials in favour of value added products. In Tanzania the use of export taxes has been gradually reduced, with restrictions currently imposed on export of geological or mining products and raw hides and skins.

Non Tarrif Barriers/Measures these are measures aimed the protection of industry that work on the basis of restriction of imports. These instruments include;

Import licenses which is aimed at both controlling and regulation of the volume of imports and also taking track of importers, automatic licences issued automatically without discretionary powers and non-automatic licenses

Reshipment Inspection requirements (PSI) which are sets of activities aimed at the verification of quality, quantity, price, exchange rates, financial terms and customs classification of goods undertaken in the exporting countries

Trade Related Investments Measures (TRIMS)-Local Content Requirements, falling within the WTO TRIMS agreements, which cover a number of restrictive issues on foreign investments in view of their restricting impact. These include conditionalities on local content, local equity, foreign exchange balancing, import obligations and others that are specifically prohibited. This is aimed at enabling local industry to gain the necessary capacity and competence in developing its competitiveness.

Customs Valuation; which involves determination and ascription of value to items based on WTO customs compatible valuation procedures, guided with principles of fairness, uniformity and certainty

Standards-Technical Barriers to trade (TBTs) such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and other standards, used as instruments of trade policy to authenticate the quality and specification of imports and exports in conformity with the international safety requirements and regulations aimed at consumer protection.

State Trading Operations which are undertaken by both Government and Non Government enterprises, including marketing boards, which are granted exclusive special rights or privileges including statutory or constitutional powers in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or sale the level or direction of imports or exports.  State Trading is clearly different from government procurement.

Government Procurement: This refers to a system which governs or regulates government procurement, requiring it to procure goods and services through a centralized international and national procurements process. It requires this process to be fair, transparent and allow competitiveness amongst suppliers and thus lowering costs. In pursuing trade objectives, the policy of transparence and open competitiveness has to be balanced with considerations for protection or stimulation of local industry.

Administrative procedures. These are other instruments that can be used to achieve trade policy objectives. Administrative procedures prevail in developing economies as a response to difficult situations at times of natural disasters such as the need to ensure food security when grain shortages are envisaged due to shortfalls in production yields. These may applied from one region to another as a way of balancing out the shortages. In Tanzania, this instrument has been used from time to time, especially in the control and regulation of export of maize and coffee to neighboring countries.

Trade Instruments

Trade policy objectives are also achieved through other trade defence instruments which are allowed by the WTO for safeguarding specific economic activities within a limited time-frame through application of  a set of instruments. These include:

Safeguard Measures aimed at protecting a sector or subsector of the economy or domestic industry from suffering from certain consequences. These normally take the form of raised tariffs and temporary relief measures

Antidumping aimed at protecting a country’s economy or industry from being flooded by cheap goods, which have no significant economic value. The WTO prescribes action against dumping

Subsidies and Countervailing duties: These include measures that confer benefits to producers and exporters and exist where a public body or government provides financial contribution to producers in the form of grants, soft loans or equity etc. These subsidies can be categorized into permissible and non specific subsidies that are non-actionable, permissible but actionable subsidies and prohibited subsidies. Currently Tanzania has not developed an export subsidy regime although it is permissible under the WTO arrangement.

Rules of origin are a combination of laws, regulations and administrative criteria used by a country to determine the origin of goods and determines how specific goods should be treated for tax purposes.

Trade Development instruments include:

Export Process Zones–This refers to trade development instruments used to stimulate export oriented economic activities through inculcation of a value addition and import culture, acquisition of appropriate technology

Investment Codes and rules which work through compensation for distortions which impede the flow of foreign investments largely due to market imperfections

Export promotion and market linkages which entails provision of support services to exporters with the objective of expanding trade for existing product lines

Export Facilitation which is pursued through the simplification of trade procedures and reduction of high costs involved through measures such as provision of export credit

International Policy Instruments can also be achieved to achieve trade policy objectives and these include

  • Bilateral Cooperation initiatives amongst willing countries depending on the variant agreements between contracting partner’s states
  • Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) which have evolved through the growth and expansion of Economic Integration arrangements like the EAC
  • WTO agreements and Multilateral trading system which aims at stimulation of sustainable economic growth through trade expansion, encouraging specialization and opening up of national economies through elimination and reduction of Non Tarrif Barriers (NTBs)

Conclusively, despite the limitations, rules of origin still play an important role in driving trade policy objectives. However, for them to be effective, they need to be applied in a transparent, fair and predictable manner to avoid causing distortionary effects to international trade.

[i] URT: National Trade Policy for a Competitive economy and export led growth, Ministry of Industries and Trade, February, 2003

[ii] East African Community Customs Union Rules of Origin, September 2005

[iii] ibid

[iv] ibid

[v] ibid

[vi] ibid