AfCFTA: Dissecting the world’s largest Free Trade Area: Challenges and Opportunities for East Africa. Is AfCFTA a window of opportunity or a fallacy?

The AfCFTA entered into force on May 30, 2019. Despite the speed at which this new Africa continental trading block is unloading, there is very limited knowledge amongst ordinary citizens, particularly youth, women, and small business.  There is a fear that AfCFTA may be built on a weak ground, set itself for an uphill task and potential failure

The Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is so far the world’s largest Free Trade Area bringing together the 55 countries of the African Union (AU) and eight (8) Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The overall mandate of the AfCFTA is to create a single continental market with a population of about 1.3 billion people and a combined GDP of approximately US$ 3.4 trillion. The AfCFTA is one of the flagship projects of Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, the African Union’s long-term development strategy for transforming the continent into a global powerhouse[1].

As part of its mandate, the AfCFTA is to eliminate trade barriers and boost intra-Africa trade. It is to advance trade in value-added production across all service sectors of the African Economy. The AfCFTA is expected to contribute to establishing regional value chains in Africa, enabling investment and job creation. The practical implementation of the AfCFTA has the potential to foster industrialisation, job creation, and investment, thus enhancing the competitiveness of Africa in the medium to long term.

The AfCFTA entered into force on May 30, 2019, after 24 Member States deposited their Instruments of Ratification following a series of continuous continental engagements spanning since 2012. By end of February 2023, 54 member states had signed up and 46 already deposited their ratification instruments, paving way for effective implementation of AfCFTA.

The problem

Despite the speed at which this new Africa continental trading block is unloading, there is very limited knowledge amongst ordinary citizens, particularly youth, women, and small business.  There is a fear that AfCFTA may be built on a weak ground, set itself for an uphill task and potential failure.   AfCFTA aims to create a supra regional economic block in an environment where previous efforts to trade and economic  integration  under frameworks such as the Economic Cooperation of West Africa States (ECOWAS), Preferential Trade Area and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA- COMESA), Southern Africa Development Cooperation (SADC) and East Africa Community (EAC)  have struggled to survive and fully benefit member states , particularly in expanding opportunities for small businesses, jobs and free movement of labour. Trade barriers still exits and overlapping regional configurations, with multiple membership of states to more than one block have exacerbated problems in implementation and held back member states and citizens from enjoying the benefits of regional economic integration.

From an academic perspective, there is a continuous debate on the role of regional integration and commercial diplomacy as instruments of economic diplomacy on trade export flows among African states. A study by the European University in 2016 show that bilateral diplomatic exchange is a relatively more significant determinant of bilateral exports among African states compared to regional integration. The study found a nuanced interaction between these two instruments of economic diplomacy: the trade-stimulating effect of diplomatic exchange was less pronounced among African countries that shared membership of the same regional block. Generally, this could mean that there exists a trade-off between regional integration and commercial diplomacy in facilitating exports or a lack of complementarity between these two instruments of economic diplomacy[2].

AfCFTA is therefore viewed in some analytical circles as potentially counterproductive, as may potentially open the continent to stiff external competition.  Further, cynics view AfCFTA as a potentially well-orchestrated tactical move suitable for developed economies, to open up Africa as a single market. With AfCFTA in place, its alleged, it will be cheap for large RECs such as the European Union (EU) to easily access Africa’s markets with minimal hinderance, as it may now be easy for large and well-established trading blocs such as the EU to negotiate preferential trade deals with one major African block and not with independent states. This had proven problematic in the past negotiations for trade deals such as the controversial Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).

Window of opportunity?

None the less, the AfCFTA is here, providing potentially a land shade moment for Africa to reclaim itself, unlock its trade potential and to take its well-deserved position in the community of nations as an economic giant.

The whole existence of the AfCFTA is to create a single continental market for the free movement of goods, services and investments. The AfCFTA Agreement covers goods and services, intellectual property rights, investments, digital trade and Women and Youth in Trade among other areas. The Secretariat, therefore, works with State Parties to negotiate trade rules and frameworks for eliminating trade barriers while putting in place a Dispute Settlement Mechanism, thereby levelling the ground for increased intra-Africa trade. Could this be a reclaimed window of opportunity for Africa?.

Purpose of the webinar

The purpose of this webinar is to dissect AfCFTA create a space for sensitisation and public dialogue with key stakeholders such as Civil Society Organizations, Africa’s economic diplomats, the Private Sector, Government Officials and Agencies, Partners, and other interest groups; in a bid to create awareness about the AfCFTA Agreement and the potential opportunities it offers, thus, securing their active support in the implementation of the Agreement.

This webinar is a first in a series of the different webinars that GEPC plans to conduct on the different elements of AfCFTA, with anticipation that we can contribute towards expanding knowledge and engagement with AfCFTA in the region and propelling its effective implementation.  But more significantly creating opportunities for business economic opportunity in country, including space for youth and women led young businesses to benefit from this new continental arrangement.

This webinar will be held ahead of marking the 4th Anniversary since the AfCTA came into force on 30th May 2023. The webinar will therefore be a major point for reflection on the aspirations and progress made and in generating views and which can potentially influence its future direction.

Our distinguished panelist speakers

  1. Ms Treasure Maphanga, Chief Operating Officer (COO), Africa E-Trade Group and Former AU Director Trade and Industry
  2. Mr Deus  M. Kibamba, Lecture Tanzania Centre for Foreign Relations
  3. Mr Elibarik Shammy, Programs Manager, Trade Mark  Africa
  4. Ms Jane Nalunga, Executive Director, Southern and Eastern Africa Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI)
  5. Mr Robert Ssuna,  Tax and Trade Expert and Consultant
  6. Mr Moses Kulaba, Tax Law expert and Economic Diplomat (Convenor)

Tentative Dates: Wednesday, 10th May 2023

Time: 12-13:30 Hrs-EAT/ 11AM CET and 9:00 am Accra Time

To participate please register via: https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJIsc-ispjwiGdVn1y4w9Jks-h-zs5i9QEzV

Meeting ID: 96141487831. Passcode: 391843

[1] https://au-afcfta.org/

[2] Afesorgbor Sylvanus Kwaku (2016) Economic Diplomacy in Africa: The Impact of Regional Integration versus Bilateral Diplomacy on Bilateral Trade, European University Institute, EUI Working Paper MWP 2016/18

Tanzania’s removal of penalties on transfer pricing: What did government seek to achieve?
Tanzania Finance Hon Mwigulu Nchemba

In this year’s (2021/22) budget speech Tanzania’s Minister for Finance, Mr Mwigulu Nchemba, made a surprising announcement that government would/had scrapped the 100% penalty for transfer pricing. The announcement was surprising as transfer pricing or mispricing in international transactions and currently a point of discussion globally as one of the leading enablers of illicit financial out flows and capital flight from developing and extractive rich countries.  From a Tax justice perspective, the government’s decision was received as a slight slip in the gains scored over the past 10 years.

According to Global Financial Integrity (GFI) and the Mbeki High-Level Panel Report on IFFs latest reports, shows that IFF’s from the African continent have been increasing with losses estimated between USD50 Million and USD 80 Million over the past years. Corruption and the extractive sector has constantly provided a major conduit for tax avoidance and illicit resource outflow from Africa

Transfer pricing is an accounting practice that represents the price that one branch, subsidiary or division in a company charges another branch, subsidiary or division for goods and services provided. Transfer pricing allows for the establishment of prices for the goods and services exchanged between a subsidiary, an affiliate or commonly controlled companies that are part of the same larger enterprise.

A transfer price is based on market prices in charging another division, subsidiary, or holding company for services rendered. Transfer pricing can lead to tax savings for corporations.  However, companies have used inter-company transfer pricing to reduce the tax burden of the parent company. Companies charge a higher price to divisions in high-tax countries (reducing profit) while charging a lower price (increasing profits) for divisions in low-tax countries.  This is what is also often referred to as transfer mispricing which is problematic for tax collection purposes. We have discussed this concept in detail via another publication via: https://gepc.or.tz/how-to-curb-transfer-pricing-tax-dodging-and-illicit-financial-flows-in-extractive-sector/

Why were heavy penalties imposed in Tanzania’s statutes?

Heavy penalties were imposed for transfer pricing  in Tanzania’s tax statutes because many companies dodged taxes through complex structures and subsidiaries in foreign jurisdictions which made it difficult or impossible for government to track transactions for tax purposes.

According to Financial Secrecy Index (2018) reported that Tanzania lost billions of shillings through potential transfer arrangements between mining companies.

The government was not explicit why it had taken this dramatic decision and therefore left experts and civil society actors bewildered and speculating. The reasons given were pointing towards improving Tanzania’s investment climate. The investment motive was more than the tax revenue imperative.

The potential hefty penalty for transfer mispricing was an inhibiting factor for attracting foreign investments as companies feared or found it difficult to structure their businesses with an international network of subsidiaries and branches anchored to Tanzania making sourcing for foreign financing and sourcing or procurement difficult.

The difficulties in determining market price or an arms price in transactions between related parties and establishing without any iota of doubt whether a given transaction was a mispricing arrangement and illicit in the face of Tanzania’s statute may have been another factor.

The Minister made another drastic announcement.  Effective 2021/22 the Minister responsible for finance was empowered to grant tax exemptions on specific projects without full cabinet approval.

The Minister proposes to restore the power of the Minister to grant income tax exemption on projects funded by the government on specific projects, grants and concessional loans if there is an agreement between the donor or lender with the government providing for such exemption. The measure would streamline and make it efficient for such exemptions to be provided as it has been a pain sticking point for many projects.

The government was attempting to address bureaucracy in approving exemptions and waivers which was a major stumbling blocks to investment and vitality to the success of some strategic projects. This was certainly a welcomed change for players in the construction and large-scale investment projects. At the time of presenting the budget some big and strategic projects were in offing. These included the OreCorp Nyazanga Gold Mine project in Mwanza, Kabanga Nickel project, the ongoing Standard Gauge Railway project and the East African Oil Company project (EACOP). The government announced a specific exemption of VAT on imported and local purchases of goods and services for East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP). The government aimed to ensure the costs of EACOP are minimised.

However, by doing this, the government is walking a very tight rope and contentious terrain with a significant risk of returning to bedeviled fiscal policy regime era which dogged its tax revenue collection efforts in the early 2000s.  Hon Jerry Slaa, Member for Parliament for Ukonga Constituency in Dar es Salaam posted a passionate that perhaps the Minister may have been deceived or even this dangerous paragraph may have been smuggled into the Minister’s Speech. He passionately appealed to the Minister does not sign off this years financial appropriation bill which this provision. It is a dangerous route to take with potential risks.

In our opinion, for these latest decisions to be effective government will have to

  1. Strengthen its monitoring and surveillance capacity to ensure the international companies do not structure their operations and tax arrangements in a manner that facilitates tax avoidance and evasion.
  2. Strengthen its (TRA’s) International Tax department to detect in advance and reverse any transactions of a potential transfer pricing arrangement before they happen.
  3. Improving data collection capabilities to establish the true arm’s length price for potentially contentious transactions, such e-commerce, services, and intellectual property.
  1. Increase transparency around exemption by perhaps requesting the Minister to publish the list of all exempted projects and values within a short period of 30-90 days after approval, clearly stating the purpose and rationalisation for the exemption.
  2. Retain some mechanism for punishment for noncompliance to the commensurate level deterrent enough to the induce compliance.

Highlights of Tanzania’s Budget 2021/22

Projected Total Budget 36.6% Trln (3.2% increase) Domestic 26.0 Trln (72%)
Expected GDP Growth 5.6% Grants 2.9 Trln (8%)
Inflation forecast 3.3% Development 13.3 Trln
Tax to GDP ratio 13.5% from 12.9% (2020/21 Recurrent 23.0 Trln
Debt to GDP ratio projections 37.3% Domestic Loans 5.0 Trln (14%)
Projected Budget Outturn 2020/21 86% – 95% External Loans 2.4 Trln (6%)

** The key challenge to government will be to raise domestic revenues in the face of shrinking grants and concessional loans and the COVID 19 pandemic which is stiff affecting key sectors such as tourism.

Uganda signals new impetus to Mining with a bill in offing

The Uganda government has signaled a new impetus in the mining sector with multiple reforms and political weight over the next five years yielded to transform, its previously dormant mining sector. The government plans to scale up its work in the Mining sector. As part of improving its geological data, the government recently announced commencement of aerial surveillance of Karamoja, which is one of the areas highly believed to be mineral rich. This will improve the quality of real time Mineral and geological data.

The Ministry plans to table the new Mining Bill in Parliament soon. Civil society organisations such as the Natural Resources Governance Institute (NRGI) have worked with the Ministry experts on this, and will be monitoring the developments, debate, and the outcome from this bill.

Civil Society and expert advice to government has been that Uganda needs to have a legislative environment which attracts large investments into its mining sector but also ensures citizens benefit from extractive resources. NRGI will be engaging with new Parliament, by providing some capacity building support and making technical presentations on the extractive sector governance during Uganda’s new journey.

On the12th of May, President Yoweri Museveni was sworn into office after a tenacious election period. Despite the violence and contestation, President Museveni was declared winner for a sixth term. Since 2006, the President has constantly anchored his economic development cards on the Country’s oil wealth as a conduit to pursue his long-term development agenda and pathway to a middle-income status. The tilt towards developing the country’s mining sector expands this vision further.

Under a new mining policy passed in 2018 Uganda proposed to maximse gains from its mining sector by automatically making value addition mandatory and owning shares in every mining company granted a mining lease. This policy was a major shift from the previous policy framework where the mining companies owned 100% of ownership with government being relegated to a  spectator.

The old policy regime was characterized by abuse, land conflicts, speculation and nuisance business practices which denied government maximum economic benefits. According to the Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum (UCMP) there are over 800 mineral licenses, with over half held small companies and speculators. Uganda’s Mineral rich areas such as Karamoja are awash with prospective mineral license holders and artisanal miners. The current policy framework was not backed by commensurate enabling law.

With a comfortable majority in parliament, the President has lee way to use the advantage of numbers to push through policies that favour his vision. While  changes among the ministers are expected,  there is no expected much change regarding technical staff in the key government ministries, agencies, and departments. This may be of advantage as these technocrats can now focus on achieving this new ambition. Can Uganda pull it off?  As extractive sector stakeholders will be following the developments with keenest and wishing Uganda success.

 

Uganda-Tanzania East Africa Oil Pipeline: signed deal yes, but hurdles lie ahead.

Samia, Museveni witness pipeline project final actsThe East African Oil Pipeline project received significant boots in April 2021 with Uganda with a series of key oil infrastructure related agreements signed between the government of Uganda and Tanzania and the oil companies for the East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) project to transport crude from Uganda to the Tanzania port of Tanga.

According to the government communications, these agreements signal Final Investment Decision (FID) which could be announced soon with production, expected around 2025. There has been already significant work going on at the oil sites in Hoima and as one of the Company officials remarked, work has started. The project is very important to the East Africa region as it promises great economic benefits to the governments and their citizens in the form of jobs, revenues, and other associated economic linkages.

Despite this rekindled hope, shortly after the signing of these agreements, it was evident that multiple uncertainties still lie ahead.

The details of the signed agreements remained undisclosed and technical experts involved in the negotiations remained secret on essential information on key fiscal terms surrounding the tariffs.

The project financing arrangement remains a quagmire.  Few days after signing of the agreements, several banks in France where the lead investor Total is based announced that they were staying away from the financing of the pipeline. The French banks included, BNP Paribas, Société’ Générale and Credit Agricole, Credit Suisse of Switzerland, ANZ of Australia and New Zealand and Barclays.

According to earlier government reports, The Standard Bank of South Africa, China’s ICBC and SMBC of Japan are lead advisors of the EACOP financing. These were under immense pressure from their counterparts Bank Track, Reclaim Finance and Energy Voice for what they described as pushing responsible financing of projects worldwide. According to these banks and activists EACOP’s environmental credentials were failing.

The Uganda government announced that it was not bothered by announcement, describing it as not new. However, the announcement by the banks signalled that the project could be still facing serious negative diplomacy from environmental activists and other political interested actors regionally and globally.

President Museveni described the project and the agreement signing occasion as an act economic liberation. This followed the political liberation which in his view happened some decades ago when Tanzania helped exiled Uganda political groups to take power in Uganda and change the course of history. With the hurdles still to overcome, it was evident that perhaps the financial, environmental, and political woes were not over, and the project was yet to fully get on track.

How Tanzania’s government can promote Domestic Direct Investment (DDI)

How Tanzania’s government can promote Domestic Direct Investment (DDI)

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre, Dar es Salaam-Tanzania

Tanzania has wide business opportunities in agriculture, tourism, mining, forestry, services and a large potential for attracting more DDI. Despite the wide endowment, statistics and practice shows that great attention has been on promoting and attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  FDI is viewed as the engine of growth and development and attracting it forms the tenor of Tanzania’s economic diplomacy. As the decline in FDI becomes real, with the global aid landscape moving towards aid for trade, it is rational that Tanzania (and all Aid dependent African Countries) should now look else where. Due to public interest , in this slighly updated version of a paper, published sometime ago, I highlight why attracting  DDI is imperative.

Domestic Direct Investment (DDI) can be generically defined as the total movement of capital and assets from within the Country. Domestic direct investment can in simple parlance be described as an act of local or resident entrepreneur or producer placing capital within a country into a project or business enterprise or assets with the intent of making a profit.  DDI has an opposite meaning of Foreign Direct Investment which is defined by the World Bank as the movement of private assets and capital across borders.

According to the Bank of Tanzania and Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), the total stock of Foreign Private Investments in 2013 amounted to USD15,969.5 million, which was 15.8% higher than what was recorded in 2012 (Tanzania Investment Report 2014: Foreign Private Investment).  The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that Tanzania attracted USD2, 142billion of FDI inflows in 2014, which was 14.5% increase from the previous years. With an accumulated stock of USD14.86billion, Tanzania was the highest in the East African Region (World Investment Report 2015) and came in the 10th position in Africa, ahead of all its East African neighbors (World Bank 16th Economic Outlook Report, 2015).

The Country performed well over the past two years. According to the World Investment Report 2019, the FDI inflow into Tanzania in 2018  reached USD 1.10Bln, pegging a significant increase compared to USD 938Bln recorded in 2017. UNCTAD reported that the current FDI stock is estimated at USD20.7bln representing 35.8% of Tanzania’s GDP. The Mining sector,  the oil and gas industry as well as primary agricultural products (coffee, cashew nuts and tobbaco) have always drawn the most FDI. The Country’s main foreign investors are China, India, Kenya, United Kingdom, Mauritius, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Canada, the United States, the Netherlands, South Africa and Germany.  In recent years new investors such as Turkey started appearing on the list.

Yet, the mining reforms in 2017 are particularly viewed as potentially a risk to foreign investors could shock and disrupt this trend and contribute towards a  FDI inflow in the future.  According to the World Bank Doing Bussiness Report for 2019,  Tanzania ranked 144th out of 190 countries, having lost seven positions compared to its previous rankings. Investors tend to take note of this report and therefore by any means this is not pleasant news for a country which wants to build an industrial economy by leveraging its resources for investment.

Moreover, despite performing relatively well on the external foreign front in the past years, the figures for DDI are largely unknown. Yet domestically owned enterprises are said to have a larger trickle economic down effect on the Country and the population (UNIDO, 2014). The role of DDI in building an ‘in-house’ national economic base and its associate benefits such as employment creation is significant. This therefore suggests that there is need for concerted government efforts to attract more DDI. The Indonesian and Malaysian governments have been pragmatic on this front and their experience can be drawn for learning. According to available data the Indonesian government registered approximately USD13.2Million in DDI in 2017 (Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board: Domestic and Foreign Direct Investment Realization in Quarter II and January-June, 2017). This therefore demonstrates that is possible to build a national economic architecture which attracts DDI.

The following could be potential strategies to promote DDI in Tanzania. Collectively these would contribute to a good business environment for domestic direct investors and significantly spur DDI flows.

There is need to develop a Domestic Direct Investment Attraction strategy and policy document to guide Tanzania’s priorities and intentions to encourage, attract and regulate DDI. The strategy and policy should be informed by a comprehensive analysis of the Country’s domestic investment needs and priorities. It should identify the challenges, opportunities and incentives for Domestic Direct Investors. Currently, the government investment is within the broad economic development program mirrored under the Tanzania Five Year Development Plan II 2016/17-2020/21 (FYDP II). Investment attraction has been described in general terms and has an inclination towards emphasis on attracting FDI to support government’s development ambitions. The FYDP II under its salient features asserts that policy and institutional reforms have been entrenched and private sector ‘will be called forth’ to lead in investment in industrialization but does not expound on how this will be achieved. It is for this reason that DDI investment portfolio within the country has remained low and largely unknown.

Engage in wide campaigns and about existing opportunities for domestic investment.  Currently, major government efforts have been in promoting investment opportunities abroad with the intention of attracting FDI. The outlook would be equally shifted to promoting opportunities for domestic investment. The extensive use of public advertisement and public diplomacy materials such as procurements on the existing opportunities for Domestic Direct Investment would boost local motivation to invest and extent the frontiers of DDI.

Facilitate domestic investors to access to finance and Capital mobilization to invest. This strategy has been adopted with some level of success by some Countries such as Malaysia. According to the Malaysian Investment authorities (MIDA, 2013), in an effort to promote DDI, the government in 2012 introduced a Domestic Investment Strategic Fund (DISF). The DISF is not a grant but provided on contingent on the investment of the applicant. It is provided in the form of matching funds which are reimbursable after a given period and granted on negotiated terms. Recipients of DISFs are determined on cases by case basis depending on merits, proposals and plans provided. The DISF is also restricted to investment in specific sectors of the economy and high end projects with good economic value to the Malaysian economy. In 2006 Tanzania government introduced a fund to support small enterprises. The fund was also famously known as the ‘ Kikwete 1bln fund’ was disbursed through the selected banks such as the NMB and CRDB. The weakness of this fund was that it had political inclinations, the criterion for beneficiaries and loan repayment requirements were weak. The fund was subject to abuse and as consequence; its benefits were largely unfelt. Review of this initiative based on lessons from the previous scheme and other countries such as Malaysia would inform a new strategy for funding domestic entrepreneurs.

The Tanzanian government should provide Incentives for domestic investors such as tax incentives, incentives for acquiring foreign companies for high technology, incentives for companies in production and mergers among domestic service providers or firms. According to the Malaysian investment Development Authority, a Malaysian owned company ac acquiring a foreign owned company is eligible for an annual deduction of 20% of the acquisition costs for 5 years. The acquirer must be a locally owned company with at least 60% Malaysian equity ownership involved in manufacturing and service activity.

This incentive is aimed at increasing local ownership portfolios in high end technology firms in the Country. Small firms under a specified share capital value are given tax incentives and firms which participate or are desirous to engage in production of promoted products are incentivized.  Currently, Tanzania’s domestic or resident investors can only access government incentives if they registered their projects with the Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) The minimum capital base required to qualify for an Investment Certificate and incentives is high and exorbitant for domestic direct investors.

Ring fencing of economic opportunities and sectors for domestic investors and allowing requiring joint investment ventures in some specific sectors. There have been efforts to ring fence the tourism sector. However these efforts in Tanzania are not widely extended to other sectors. Other Countries have this approach successfully to attract DDI in specific sectors.

Need to establish a dedicated Domestic Direct Investment agency or department within the Tanzania Investment Center, specializing and focusing in DDI promotion, attraction, facilitation and documentation. Currently, Tanzania’s investment attraction agenda is coordinated by Tanzania Investment Center. The centre is one stop center with all major government functions such as business and company registration, immigration and taxation. However, the focus of TIC is on attracting FDI. Yet domestic investors have peculiar needs and thus attracting DDI would benefit from a specialized department.

Make more efficient use of the business incubator model to facilitate the establishment and growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs).  Business incubators are dedicated and well equipped centers which identify nascent entrepreneurs with innovative ideas with a potential for growth to test their and develop their ideas into functional enterprises.  Where necessary, they provide the nascent entrepreneurs with start-up capital and equipment for growth. It is well established that SMEs play a key role in creating employment, developing a skilled workforce and responding to various market demands. Business incubators have been instrumental in developing the United States Computer and high-tech software industry. California’s Silicon Valley is home to many business incubators providing to young innovative software and hi-tech developers to juggle their ideas into big business. Many computer applications run by computer programs such as Microsoft and Apple are products of business incubators. In Tanzania, so far there is one known incubator hosted at Commission for Science and Technology (Costech). From this incubator innovative software ideas were developed and grew into a leading Tanzanian multinational company called Maxicom Africa. There is need to expand public knowledge and this incubator’s services and so as to encourage new ideas for innovation, technology and investment.

There is need to review the policy and operations of Export Processing Zones (EPZ) and Special Economic Zones (SEZ) with a view of encouraging true domestic investors.  Export processing zones and Special Economic Zones are specialized areas gazette by the government allowing investors and companies to produce manufactured goods in a controlled secure environment for export. Both schemes provide facilitative environment for profitable operations. Export Processing Zones (EPZ) objectives include; attraction and encouragement of new technology, attraction and promotion of investment for export-led industrialization, employment and promotion of processing of local raw materials for export. Special Economic Zones (SEZ) have an objective of promoting quick and significant progress in economic growth, export earnings and employment creation as well as attracting private investment from all productive and service sectors.

They provide generous incentives such as tax holidays and tax breaks to investors and companies using the EPZs to manufacture goods for export.  Examples in Tanzania include the Benjamin Mkapa Export Processing Zone at Mabibo Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar Special Economic Zones. Despite their existence, the volume of DDI investments attracted to these zones is still low and the generous incentives offered by the EPZ and SEZ’s have been abused by the foreign firms operating the EPZ’s. Already manufactured goods from outside the Country are smuggled into the EPZs for label and exported as Tanzanian manufactured goods. Foreign firms have set up subsidiaries in Tanzania’s EPZ so as to benefit from the generous incentives.  The net beneficiaries from the EPZ and SEZ are therefore foreign firms and not domestic investors. A through mapping and review has to be done.

There is need to address nuisances such as corruption, bureaucracy, nuisance taxes and non tariff barriers restrictions which make local investment cumbersome to domestic Investors. According to the World Bank Report Tanzania was ranked 139 out of 189 on the Ease of doing business index in 2015 (World Bank: Ease of Doing Business Report 2015). The report suggests that the business environment in Tanzania is still unfavorable and acts as a disincentive to invest. Tanzania compares badly with its neighbors such as Rwanda and Uganda. The government has strived to improve Dar es Salaam port handling and establishment of ‘One stop borders’ at major customs points to facilitate trade but other non tariff barriers exist and these have to be dealt with conclusively.

Deliberately pursuing a broad based economic growth strategy to allow the economy to expand and create more opportunities for local investment. These are key factors in determining investment decisions.  Despite registering a fast paced economic growth of 6-7% in the past years, the drivers of economic growth has been limited to specific sectors such as telecommunications, mining and construction. These sectors require large volumes of capital and specialized high skills. This can be restrictive to Domestic Direct Investors, whose capital base and technological advancement may be limited. It is important to open up economic growth and investment potentials to other sector.

As stated by Mairo Pezinni, director of OECD Development Center, “Extractives are no longer the main driver to investment. The Continent (Tanzania) is open for new investment fueled by unprecedented domestic demand” (Africa Investment Report 2016). The government should see this as an opportunity to drive Domestic Direct investment into other sectors.

In Conclusion, over the past years Tanzania has committed itself towards building a robust economy through investment. The current government industrialization agenda is based on securing more investment into the manufacturing sector.  From the policy and practice it is evident that the government’s focus has been anchored towards attracting FDI. The volume of FDI inflows into the country as recorded by TIC has increased over the past five years. However, experiences in countries such as Malaysia show that Countries cannot build their economic muscle by depending exclusively on FDI. The challenge of relying on FDI is linked to its characteristics.

FDI is sensitive and subject to cyclical factors such as global economic down turns, global stock and capital market instabilities ,changes in national policy or political environment and foreign investor  interests. It can therefore be erratic unreliable as a platform for building an economy. It is for this reason that the governments appetite needs to be shifted towards DDI. The absence of current figures and a systematic and well articulate government policy on DDI is a major flaw in national development planning.  Tanzania is an endowed with vast resources, a large population and strategically placed as country. Therefore potential for attracting more DDI is evident.  To achieve this potential a number of strategies have to be implemented and other existing ones reviewed as suggested in this paper.

References:

  • Africa Investment Report 2016, Analyse Africa, 2016
  • Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board: Domestic and Foreign Direct Investment Realization in Quarter II and January-June, 2017).Available at http://bit.ly/2YMXgsD
  • World Bank: Ease of Doing Business Report 2015
  • Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA), Maljis Peguam, Malayasia, 20th Novemeber, 2013 available at http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=4361
  • Tanzania Investment Report 2014: Foreign Private Investment
  • URT: National Five Year Development Plan 2016/17-2020/21: Nurturing Industrialisation for Economic transformation and Human Development accessed via: http://www.mof.go.tz/mofdocs/msemaji/Five%202016_17_2020_21.pdf
  • UNIDO: Tanzania Investor Survey Report: Understanding Investment and Foreign Direct Investment, 2014
  • UNCTAD: World Investment Report, 2015

Online Sources

The Citizen Newspaper, Tanzania leads Regional peers in FDI investment available athttp://bit.ly/2WsVRdd

SADC in Economic Meltdown; Can Tanzania be German of the Region?

On Saturday 17th August, Tanzania assumed the chair of the South African Development Cooperation (SADC), amidst disturbing economic figures indicating that the region was facing a serious economic meltdown. Can Tanzania be the ‘German’ of the region, playing the economic big daddy role by calling the other states into political order and bailing out the struggling member states?

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Analysis Center, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

The SADC is a 16-member state regional economic block established with among others promoting sustained economic growth and sustainable development amongst its objectives. However, the recent economic data indicates that region is witnessing an economic meltdown with most of its member states, except perhaps Tanzania, positing negative or stunted economic growth over the past years.

According to the economic and social indicators data compiled and released by its secretariat the the SADC region posted an estimated average growth rate of 1.4% in 2016 compared to 2.3% in 2015. At country level Tanzania registered the highest growth of 7% among the member states followed by Botswana with a far below rate of 4.3%[i].  

In 2017 Tanzania recorded an economic growth of 7.1% followed by Seychelles (6.3%) whilst Angola registered negative growth for the second consecutive year in order of 2.5%[ii] The region’s growth was increasing at a decreasing rate since the post global period in 2009.

The region’s economic giant South Africa has witnessed rapid economic slowdown, bring along its small neighbors and trading partners under its weight.  Countries such as Zimbabwe were collapsing under the weight of economic sanctions, Namibia and Angola recorded negative annual real GDP (at market price) of 10.8% and -2.5% respectively in 2017 due to the slump in commodity prices and other related risks. Botswana at 2.4% did not perform well either. The region posted an overall trade deficit with rest of the world of USD6.7bln. 

The AfDB report for 2018 warned that the economic outlook for Southern Africa region was cautious[iii]. Broad based economic activity was expected to recover at slow pace, but the outlook remained modest given the diverging growth patterns for the region’s economies. Upper middle income countries turned in low and declining rates of growth meanwhile lower income transitioning economies recorded moderate and improved growth, albeit at reduced rates.

Despite the improvement, economic performance remained subdued as the region’s economic outlook continued to face major headwinds. High unemployment, weak commodity prices, fiscal strain, increasing debt and high inflation.

Real GDP was estimated to have grown at an average of 1.6% in 2017 before increasing to a projected 2.0% in 2018 and 2.4% in 2019.

The future regional growth was expected to be bolstered with primary expectations of increased investment in non-oil sectors such as electricity, construction and technology in large infrastructure projects, mining as well as continued recovery in commodity prices.

However, the latest figures show that the region was not well on that front either.  The decline in commodity prices in recent years reaching the lowest point in 2015 translated into significant income loses for the economies, implying a negative impact on public and private sector spending and therefore growth in employment.

Before the 2008-2009 global recession, the region experienced moderate growth, though individual countries contributed differently. For example, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia exhibited robust growth that collectively outpaced the regional group.

Thereafter, Angola, the region’s foremost oil producer and former raising economic star received the worst bashing with its economy experiencing adverse economic growth effects due to weak oil prices.

Overall the region experienced negative GDP growth with Swaziland (-10.08%), Zimbabwe (-8.38%),  and Angola (-6.31%)  being among the worst hit[iv]  Other Countries such as Zambia, Namibia , Mozambique and Malawi were not performing better either. South Africa reported the highest public debt soaring in billions dollars followed by Angola.

South African Institute of International Affairs observed that intra-regional investment and trade levels had declined markedly since the commodity slump in 2013. Moreover, the trade and economic growth in the region remained imbalanced, exacerbating political strains among member states. Non-tariff barriers and other factors had adversely affected intra-regional trade and investment in recent years.

Assuming the mantle, at the end of its 39th Summit held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’ President John Pombe Magufuli was furious with against the Secretariat for having not provided adequate and alert to the political leadership that the region was experiencing an economic meltdown with reduced or stunted growth and an expanding trade deficit.

Speaking at the SADC People’s forum on the sidelines of the main summit in Dar es Salaam, the South African Professor, Patrick Bond, described the situation as alarming, catastrophic and turbulent and yet no one was bold enough to speak about it.

He was perhaps communist in view and radical in approach, blaming what he described as the capitalistic enterprise and its puppeteers for under mining economic justice, risking lives of by putting profit before the people and causing climate change whose effects were ravaging SADC but remained quite revolutionary in suggesting that the ordinary people perhaps needed to send a clear signal to its political leadership that all was not okay. The economic fundamentals were tattered and the regional leaders needed to wake, Prof. Bond lectured.

Can Tanzania emerge and become the ‘German’ of the region?

With this state of the Union, the question therefore arose can Tanzania emerge and become the ‘German’ of the region, playing the economic messiah role by providing both political leadership and economic bail out to its neighbors

In 2013 up to 2015 when the European Union experienced economic turbulence, Brussels turned to German to liberate it from the gigantic economic Dracula which was tearing down its economic block and leaving some of its small states indebted and facing bankruptcy. German wrote cheques in financial bailouts, provided guarantees and political prop up for economically struggling states such as Greece, Portugal and Italy.

German relied on its economic prowess and its political might as the industrial central pillar of the European Union. The charismatic leadership of its Chancellor, Ms Angela Merkel, was a distinct asset. Even at the risk of her own political career and constant onslaught from the German far right, Merkel could not tolerate any nonsense and was not ready to allow Europe to fall back.

In the face of the similar economic doldrums which seems now to face SADC, can Tanzania afford such muscle or a German equivalent?

Tanzania has done it before. In the 1960’s until 1990’s when the region was facing serious political, Tanzania pulled up its resources and committed it to the liberation struggle. It hosted training camps and provided pupilage to thousands of liberation fighters. Dar es Salaam became to the political headquarters of Frontline States where the idea of SADC in its current form was initiated and a spring for independence for many of the current South African states.  For some, therefore SADC at 39 years, just came back home.

In assuming the SADC Chairmanship, President Magufuli warned the Secretariat that it will not be business as usual as of now and for the next one year his interest would be to see that resources placed at the disposal of the Secretariat were not spent on conferences but on meaningful tangible projects which benefited the people. Could this be the kind of approach that region needs to take in order to deal with its increasing economic challenges.

An agile kind of leadership which places the people at the heart of politics and fights with cunning shrewdness against corruption, public waste, nepotism and personal drive to accumulate wealth by those in power.

Over the years these have been some of the vices which have dogged the region and bringing the much needed progress to stagnation and ultimate halt in some member states. Comparatively, perhaps the SADC is the largest economic group in Sub-Saharan Africa. With over an estimated population of 337.1 million people in 2017, is larger than its western equivalent, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and obviously bigger than the European Union has a just a fraction of the SADC population yet somehow progress has been considerably steady in the other regions.

According to experts the region was faced by multiple non trade barriers and low intra region trade which still at around 20%.  Technically, speaking, the members are happy to do business with other countries outside the region rather than their economic neighbors partners in SADC. The member states are living alongside each other but not fully economically and trade integrated.

Political uncertainties which has dogged the former economic giants of the region such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola created fertile conditions negative to investment and economic growth.  The governments lost grip on the economic mantle and directed attention towards managing internal politics and mechanics for political survival.  

Xenophobic attacks in South Africa could have also created a sense of fear and caused disarray in a fragile informal sector which was quietly the driving factor or fulcrum on which the South African economy relied. Crushing cost of electricity, turmoil in the extractive sector and stalemate in the platinum industry in 2016 perhaps were also a contributory factor to South Africa’s political woes. 

Overall, according, to Professor bond, the region was just poorly governed and a new leadership impetus led by the people was necessary to bring back the declining glories

For many years SADC was so much preoccupied on political stability. With good success, it has managed to tackle conflicts and bring peace amongst its member states. Overall, political conflict in the form of civil wars in the region has been declining with all except the DRC reporting any semblance of a conventional Civil war in recent years. 

Even, this has significantly been downgraded in recent years. Currently, there is no severe risk of any threat from any member state to destabilize any other through an arms insurrection. The ongoing conflict in the Eastern DRC is largely a war of survival for the remaining tribal and ethnic elements rather than a fully-fledged military configuration to overall and capture power in the DRC. If it can be dealt with, then perhaps the war in the DRC will be over or significantly reduced to minimal levels in many decades.

The future wars of the SADC will therefore be largely economic and perhaps resource based on key issues such as land, water and control of the real means of production and profit. Acute poverty could be the other driver of the masses towards insurrection. For Tanzania therefore, to take up the German challenge will be a touch endeavor.

Tanzania’s economic benefit or contribution to the region is too minimal. According to trade statistics, Tanzania is among the least exporters to SADC and its overall trade balance with its SADC neighbors was still low. It therefore lacks the economic might of German stature.

Over the past three years Tanzania’s political leadership has commitment itself to building its economy first before looking outside. Cutting back on public waste and flogging its population into line to start paying up taxes to finance its public service and infrastructure ambitions, Tanzania is building its economy from within.

Throughout the 1960s to the 1990s Tanzania sacrificed a lot in order to politically liberate virtually all the SADC member states and yet gained very minimal in return.  Political historians have even have even argued with some level of confidence that Tanzania under developed itself in sacrifice for others to develop. Tanzania would be therefore quite cautious in economic diplomatic terms and perhaps uncomfortable at this moment in giving out too much of what it has acquired over the years to salvage its economic neighbors.

The conditions in the region appear to have turned so bad in the past few years with persistent drought raving across the region only to be replaced by wrecking floods leaving behind famine and death in communities along its way.  Approximately over 1000 people dies in the last floods in Mozambique and Malawi caused by cyclone Idai and Keneth. Millions at a risk of starvation.  Essential infrastructure such as road and bridges connecting rural areas to urban centers and across countries such as the port of Beira are badly battered and incapable of supporting economic productivity.

The region has not been able to attract in Foreign Investment into its natural resource wealth and flagship infrastructure projects such as the Mighty Inga dam electro power project in the DRC which would have brought life into the SADC power master plan have remained incomplete for many years now. The region is badly in need of both reconstruction and reconfiguration to sustain itself and its ambitions.

At the end of the summit Tanzania’s former President Benjamin Mkapa advised that SADC member states should stop relying heavily on foreign donors for aid to support or finance their development agenda. Building internal capacity through a reliable market for products from the block, investment in education, technology, domestic revenue collection and unlocking the potential amongst its budging population to drive the economies forward would be a better option. Perhaps the SADC leadership should fine tune an ear to the wisdom of its elders.

The meeting concluded with signing off of three development cooperation programs worth 47 Million Euro deal with the European Union under its European Development Fund (EDF) 11 financing round. According to official statement, the funds will be used over the next five-year period to support improvement in the Investment and Business Environment (SIBE), Trade Facilitation Program (TFP) and Support to Industrial Productive Sectors (SIPS) three programs to be implemented by the SADC over the next five-year period

The SIBE program aims at achieving sustainable and inclusive growth and job creation by transforming the region into an investment zone, promoting intra-regional investments, foreign Direct Investment and a focus on Small and Medium Enterprises. The TFP will contribute to enhance inclusive economic development in the region through deepened economic integration while the SIPs aimed at contributing to the SADC industrialization agenda, improving performance and growth of selected value chains. How this EU injection translates into lifting the region from its economic downward spiral will yet to be found out at the next summit when SADC turns 40. What is clear is that something has to be done.

[i] SADC: Selected economic and social indicators, 2016

[ii] SADC: Selected economic and social indicators, 2017

[iii] AfDB: Southern Africa Economic Outlook, 2018

[iv] https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/southern-african-development-community

Elation as Kenya exports Oil; what does it mean for Oil rush in East African region

On 1st of August 2019, President Uhuru Kenyatta announced that Kenya had joined the list of world oil exporting Countries by selling its first crude oil at a cost of 12 Million United States dollars.

While the news reverberated across the Country and the region with elation, it is also possible that Kenya’s announcement could trigger a contagious rush to the bottom with East African Countries jostling to outcompete each other by signing off deals and agreements locking off future markets with potential buyers. Some of these deals may not be necessarily good.

By Moses Kulaba; Governance and Economic Analysis Center

Addressing the cabinet and media in Nairobi, President Kenyatta said Kenya had sold its barrels of crude oil to a buyer whose identity still remained a secret.

“We are now an Oil exporter. Our first deal was concluded this afternoon with 200,000 barrels at a price of USD 12 Million.  So I think we have started the journey and it is up to us to ensure that those resources are put to the best use to make our Country and to ensure we eliminate poverty, said Kenyatta.

The news reverberated in the region and globally with a new player on the market. Obviously there was more excitement and elation in the Lokichar Oil fields where Tullow Oil and its joint partners continue to explore more blocks with more vigour and determination.

Kenya discovered its first Oil in 2012 and since then, explorations have continued in the Lake Turkana basin region with deposits being reported and more projections made to increase. In its previous reports Tullow estimated some 560 Mln Barrels in possible reserves and these are now projected to increase as prospects for more discoveries are higher than before.

This would translate into 60,000 to 10,000 barrels per day of gross production, which is said to be insufficient to warrant the construction of a refinery locally hence the export plans

The sold consignment was delivered by truckers at the Kenya Petroleum Refineries facilities in Changamwe, Mombasa since July last year, under what the government described under the early oil project

What does this mean for Kenya and the East African region?

The deal concludes that Kenya once ruled off as an oil novice in the region, with the lowest volumes of discovered oil is running a head of its East African neighbors in reaching exporting oil country status many months before any of its East African neighbors can sell a drop of oil.

For Kenya, this is game changer in regional geopolitics as not only does the oil revenue bring a new line of foreign exchange earnings into its economy and thus consolidating its position as the regional economic superpower.

Galvanizing on its early market entry status, Kenya could tap the available markets and seal off any available contracts beating off any potential competition from its neighboring countries.

The oil revenues could also breathe some life into its Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor development plan which has stalled for among others lack of partners. With oil revenues flowing, Kenya can go alone developing the ambitious infrastructure projects along the corridor all the way to the Ethiopian boarder.

Contrary to nay Sayers, the oil export could be a window to emboldened security in the Turkana area as the government seeks to protect vital oil installations and export routes to the coast.  For many years, Lake Turkana basin has been one of the most volatile and insecure areas in Kenya as marauding armed warriors move from one village to another raiding for cattle. Civilians and military installations have been attacked and people killed.

In June, 2018 Turkana residents stopped five trucks from ferrying crude oil to Mombasa over rising insecurity along the border with Baringo. The resident complained of insecurity in the area but also complained of what they call consider unresolved issues on oil sharing benefits between the National governments, County governments and local communities over the 5% share which they wanted channeled to their bank accounts rather than for development as rallied by a section of leaders.

There is no way we can be a security threat to the oil we have protected and guarded for years. So the specialized and additional security personnel (protecting oil) should head to Kapedo and secure people.

Kenya’s oil export announcement could trigger a contagious rush for oil in the East African region, with each country racing to drill to bottom in search for oil. In an effort to outcompete each other, those already with oil discoveries such as Uganda and South Sudan could race to the market sealing off deals and contracts with potential buyers and agreements for future markets. Some of these deals maybe bad.

 Uganda was the first to strike oil around its Albertine graben in 2005. According to Uganda’s Ministry of energy the petroleum deposit discovered so far were estimated at 6.5barrels of which 1.5bln are considered as recoverable.

The Ugandan oil is supposed to be exported to the global market through a 1,443 electric heated East African Oil Pipeline (EACOP) via Tanzania. The East African Crude oil pipeline is expected to unlock East Africa Oil potential by attracting invest and companies to explore the potential in the region.

According to the project schedule available on the EACOP website the detailed engineering and procurement and early works were supposed to have been made in 2018 and construction started in 2019. The first oil exports were expected in 2020. But it appears all these are behind schedule.

According to Ministry of Uganda expected to conclude its financial deal for its joint pipeline with Tanzania by June, 2019, opening for the way for its construction. According to the information provided by then, Stanbic Bank Uganda, was supposed to be the lead arranger for USD2.5billion funding for the 1,455 km (EACOP) project. The deal was expected to have been concluded in June, 2019.

Kampala was also expecting that the Final Investment Decisions (FID) between the government and the oil partners to determine when funds for the project will be made available, the terms of the financing and when the project execution will commence with a projected timeline between 20 and 36 months

The pipeline was expected to jointly develop the USD 3.5 billion pipeline, described as the longest electrically heated crude oil pipeline in the world. The balance of USD 1billion is expected to come from shareholders in equity

However, by the time Kenya announced its export deal in July, the earth breaking ceremony commencing the start of the EACOP pipeline construction had not started. Negotiations were reported as ongoing. In June 2017, the Daily Business Newspaper carried an article with a headline ‘Uganda’s Oil may not flow by 2020’ as the required infrastructure may not be complete  by then[i]

What this means for Uganda is that time is of essence and the sooner the EACOP project construction takes off the better for its potential oil market.

Figure 3: The Government of Tanzania and Uganda sign the Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) for the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP)  in May, 2017

 

So why do some oil projects like take long to materialize?

Lack of astute leadership, effective institutions and canning ambition to drive the projects to fruition. In some countries the political leadership and responsible institutions can be weak, whereby the essential operational process surrounding the oil projects can be clogged in political rhetoric and undertones which make decision making quite cumbersome, inefficiently slow and less assuring to the investors

Technical aspects such as Quality of crude oil discovered

High Sulphur crude oil can such as the Ugandan and Kenyan crude oil can be waxy and costly to transport via pipeline as it requires constant heating along the route.  This explains why the 1,433 km EACOP is described as the longest electric heated pipeline in the world. This adds to complexity in technology and costs on heating required to operationalize the project. Investors may

Oil reservoir behaviors and recoverable volumes – The discovered oil reserves are not always the same as the recoverable volumes. In some projects the reserves can be large yet due to geological and technological factors the recoverable volumes are low.  The behavior of the oil reservoirs is therefore a significant factor in determining whether the recoverable volumes will be consistent with the early projections and economic models over the plateau period. A change in the recoverable volumes can trigger massive losses and may lead to complete closure of the oil project. Investors are happy to rush projects where recoverable volumes will be sustained

Financing aspects such as financing structure -Lack of financing for some reasons or high interests on the investment loans secured from investment-lending institutions can be a delaying factor.  The decision to invest may therefore take long as the investors or partners to the oil project juggle and weigh the available financial options viz a vis the current and future costs of the project on the country and the investors

Economic metric considerations such as the Net Present Value (NPV), Rate of Return (RoR) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the project.

These are calculations undertaken to determine the economic and financial viability of the project. They are used to determine how much return and how long it will take to recoup the initial investment and starting generating profit.

According to online sources such as Investopedia, the Net present value (NPV) is the difference between the present value of cash inflows and the present value of cash outflows over a period of time. NPV is used in capital budgeting and investment planning to analyze the profitability of a projected investment or project.

The Rate of Return (RoR) is the net gain or loss on an investment over a specified time period, expressed as a percentage of the investment’s initial cost. This simple rate of return is sometimes called the basic growth rate, or alternatively, return on investment, or ROI. If you also consider the effect of the time value of money and inflation, the real rate of return can also be defined as the net amount of discounted cash flows received on an investment after adjusting for inflation.

The rate of return is used to measure growth between two periods, rather than over several periods. The RoR can be used for many purposes, from evaluating investment growth to year-over-year changes in company revenues. Its calculation does not consider the effects of inflation.

The internal rate of return (IRR) is a measure used in capital budgeting to estimate the profitability of potential investments. The internal rate of return is a discount rate that makes the Net Present Value (NPV) that makes the Net Present Value (NPV) of all cash flows from a particular project equal to zero.  It is mathematically calculated as IRR=NPV=t=1∑T (1+r)t −C0 =0)

IRR is the rate of growth a project is expected to generate. The IRR is used in capital budgeting to decide which projects or investments to undertake and which to forgo.

Generally speaking, the higher a project’s internal rate of return, the more desirable it is to undertake. Assuming the costs of investment are equal among the various projects, the project with the highest IRR would probably be considered the best and be undertaken first. IRR is sometimes referred to as “economic rate of return” or “discounted cash flow rate of return.”

Social factors such as land acquisition and due diligence for compensation– The nebulous and intricate balancing act between the local laws and the international standards as guided by the International Finance Corporation can be a hindrance. Quite often the local standards for compensation can be law, corrupt unfair yet the IFC standards requires fair and equity

Negative diplomacy: The oil projects could delay or fail to take off all together due to negative diplomacy. Whereby disgruntled actors such as activists, companies, politicians who may not be excited or about the project may quietly lobby, urge, convince or cajole the financing institutions not to finance the project.

Security Risk:  Oil projects cost lots of money in investment and thus require assurances that financial investments and their installations will be guaranteed.  Oil projects can stall as investors and their partners gauge the security risks

Some or all of these factors could be now at play in the East African region and could be explanatory factors as to why some petroleum projects are progressing at a snail’s pace or stalled all together. Perhaps Kenya’s early oil export could be trigger for its neighbors to start thinking ahead.

 

 

 

[i] https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Uganda—oil—2020-Standard–Poors-Tanzania/3946234-3982464-j7rbsq/index.html

Why Rules of Origin (RoO) should not be used exclusively to pursue trade policy objectives

This article shades light on a major instrument in international trade and customs management, which has been used by states to achieve multiple trade objectives. The concept of RoO has become controversial in the current interconnected global trading system where the point of production and sale across have become quite seamless and yet international trading rules requires that the definite origin of goods are identified for preferential treatment, statistical and tax purposes. The article argues that despite the implicit functions they play RoO should never be used a tool for negative trade pursuit rather a conduit for trade facilitation. The paper defines rules of origin and trade policy, outlining the objectives of trade policy, explaining the linkages between the two and discusses other instruments which can be used to achieve trade policy objectives

By Moses Kulaba; Governance and Economic Policy Analysis Center

Rules of origin (RoO) are common defined as laws, regulations and administrative criteria applied by a country to determine the country of origin of goods, for tariff preference purposes, subject to specific conditions as defined in WTO agreements and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)[i].  The East African Customs Union has summarized the rules of origin as ‘the vital link between the goods and country where they are produced’[1][ii] RoO are categorized as Preferential and non preferential depending on their characteristics and objectives.

Preferential RoO aim at determining whether goods qualify for preferential treatment and while Non Preferential RoO used to determine goods for trade statistical purposes. Rules of origin have significant relation and influence on a country’s trade policy or member countries which are contractually related or mutually obliged under a given contractual or non contractual trade arrangement. Rules of origin also may determine or assist the countries in understanding their comparative and competitive advantage. They are commonly used as a trade policy tool to protect local markets, give preferential treatment and a measure against unfair trade.

Trade policy can be defined as a collection or law, rules and practices aimed at achieving a country’s trade objectives. Tanzania’s trade policy aims to contribute to raising per capital income to levels targeted in National Development Vision 2025, trade development measures to stimulate and expand domestic demand through product and market diversification and limited interim safe guard of domestic economic activity threatened by liberalization, while building economic competitiveness[iii] It seek to achieved sustainable growth rate in trae of not less than 14% and long-term share of exports to GDP  of about 25%, double fold increase in manufacturing and raised value of merchandise export earnings in absolute terms to USD1,700 in the next five years[iv]

The Tanzania government recognizes the importance or Rules of origin as a tool for implementing trade policy objectives and has committed towards using the RoO in a manner that can strengthen the country’s industrial and trade potential. The Tanzanian clearly articulates this position in its trade policy where it states:

The Government of Tanzania will undertake measures to observe RoO preferences requirements prevailing in the different trading arrangements with a view to maximizing benefits accruing in the cause of implementation…with priority focus on building national capacity for effective utilization of this instruments[v]

While RoO are a common factor in Trade policy, because of the challenges that RoO have in relation to international trade, they are considered as not the tools of most preference in achieving trade policy objectives. Indeed, increasingly governments are being advised that RoO should not be used to achieve trade policy objectives for the following reasons.

Firstly, they can be distortionary and work contrary to trade policy objectives especially where there is no harmonization of trade policy objectives. “If Clear, predictable, transparent and fair, rules of origin and their application facilitate the flow of international trade. Nevertheless, RoO can create unnecessary obstacles to trade and nullify or impair the rights of members in regional and multilateral trading arrangements including the EAC, SADC and WTO. Consequently, RoO have to be applied in a transparent, predictable, consistent and neutral manner so as to avoid their negative effects[vi].

Secondly, rules of origin is also important in facilitating international trade where the objective is free flow of goods, irrespective of trade policies or various countries

It can be sometimes difficult for countries to achieve trade targets in situations where it is a member to multiple contractual obligations which may conflict with its own national trade objectives. This is a common challenge for countries like Tanzania which belongs both to the EAC and SADC and has therefore a challenge in determining or applying RoO for goods originating from both economic blockings

Implementation of rules of origin is sometimes cumbersome and sometimes can be distortionary especially where there is need to determine various technical dimensions to the items for preferential purposes.

Rules of Origin are also not the only instruments for achieving trade policy objectives. They are just one instrument and other instruments could be effectives. These instruments include a combination of other trade policies, which can be elaborated as below:

Trade policy instruments are described as measures taken by governments to influence the direction and pattern of trade development. The application of these instruments in Tanzania is guided by the need to stimulate domestic production, promotion of exports, safeguard domestic industry against dumping practices and protection of consumers. Tanzania exercises these trade policy options in line with its international obligations. These instruments include: Tariff Based (Advalorem) Instruments, NTBs: Trade defense mechanisms; trade development instruments; and international trade policy instruments.

Tariff based instruments, include;

Tariffs, which are major trade instruments for trade policy implementation which are used to achieve duo objectives of revenue generation and protection of domestic industry. Heavy import substitution protection regimes can harm unprotected industry and ultimately reduce consumer welfare. It is for this purpose that Tanzania has been reforming its tariff band structure to a current four band structure (0,10,15 and 25)

Duty Draw Back Schemes (DDB) which are tools for export promotion through refund of import taxes on imported inputs that go towards production for exports. Tanzania has implemented a DDB scheme, although the scheme faces multiple challenges, including difficulties in technical verification. This also includes the mechanisms for VAT refund

Taxation, which comprises of   tax regime characterized by different taxes and levies imposed by the central and local government to achieve a duo purpose of revenue collection and protection used for administration of quota restrictions

Export Taxes which are levied as instruments to discourage export of raw materials in favour of value added products. In Tanzania the use of export taxes has been gradually reduced, with restrictions currently imposed on export of geological or mining products and raw hides and skins.

Non Tarrif Barriers/Measures these are measures aimed the protection of industry that work on the basis of restriction of imports. These instruments include;

Import licenses which is aimed at both controlling and regulation of the volume of imports and also taking track of importers, automatic licences issued automatically without discretionary powers and non-automatic licenses

Reshipment Inspection requirements (PSI) which are sets of activities aimed at the verification of quality, quantity, price, exchange rates, financial terms and customs classification of goods undertaken in the exporting countries

Trade Related Investments Measures (TRIMS)-Local Content Requirements, falling within the WTO TRIMS agreements, which cover a number of restrictive issues on foreign investments in view of their restricting impact. These include conditionalities on local content, local equity, foreign exchange balancing, import obligations and others that are specifically prohibited. This is aimed at enabling local industry to gain the necessary capacity and competence in developing its competitiveness.

Customs Valuation; which involves determination and ascription of value to items based on WTO customs compatible valuation procedures, guided with principles of fairness, uniformity and certainty

Standards-Technical Barriers to trade (TBTs) such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and other standards, used as instruments of trade policy to authenticate the quality and specification of imports and exports in conformity with the international safety requirements and regulations aimed at consumer protection.

State Trading Operations which are undertaken by both Government and Non Government enterprises, including marketing boards, which are granted exclusive special rights or privileges including statutory or constitutional powers in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or sale the level or direction of imports or exports.  State Trading is clearly different from government procurement.

Government Procurement: This refers to a system which governs or regulates government procurement, requiring it to procure goods and services through a centralized international and national procurements process. It requires this process to be fair, transparent and allow competitiveness amongst suppliers and thus lowering costs. In pursuing trade objectives, the policy of transparence and open competitiveness has to be balanced with considerations for protection or stimulation of local industry.

Administrative procedures. These are other instruments that can be used to achieve trade policy objectives. Administrative procedures prevail in developing economies as a response to difficult situations at times of natural disasters such as the need to ensure food security when grain shortages are envisaged due to shortfalls in production yields. These may applied from one region to another as a way of balancing out the shortages. In Tanzania, this instrument has been used from time to time, especially in the control and regulation of export of maize and coffee to neighboring countries.

Trade Instruments

Trade policy objectives are also achieved through other trade defence instruments which are allowed by the WTO for safeguarding specific economic activities within a limited time-frame through application of  a set of instruments. These include:

Safeguard Measures aimed at protecting a sector or subsector of the economy or domestic industry from suffering from certain consequences. These normally take the form of raised tariffs and temporary relief measures

Antidumping aimed at protecting a country’s economy or industry from being flooded by cheap goods, which have no significant economic value. The WTO prescribes action against dumping

Subsidies and Countervailing duties: These include measures that confer benefits to producers and exporters and exist where a public body or government provides financial contribution to producers in the form of grants, soft loans or equity etc. These subsidies can be categorized into permissible and non specific subsidies that are non-actionable, permissible but actionable subsidies and prohibited subsidies. Currently Tanzania has not developed an export subsidy regime although it is permissible under the WTO arrangement.

Rules of origin are a combination of laws, regulations and administrative criteria used by a country to determine the origin of goods and determines how specific goods should be treated for tax purposes.

Trade Development instruments include:

Export Process ZonesThis refers to trade development instruments used to stimulate export oriented economic activities through inculcation of a value addition and import culture, acquisition of appropriate technology

Investment Codes and rules which work through compensation for distortions which impede the flow of foreign investments largely due to market imperfections

Export promotion and market linkages which entails provision of support services to exporters with the objective of expanding trade for existing product lines

Export Facilitation which is pursued through the simplification of trade procedures and reduction of high costs involved through measures such as provision of export credit

International Policy Instruments can also be achieved to achieve trade policy objectives and these include

  • Bilateral Cooperation initiatives amongst willing countries depending on the variant agreements between contracting partner’s states
  • Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) which have evolved through the growth and expansion of Economic Integration arrangements like the EAC
  • WTO agreements and Multilateral trading system which aims at stimulation of sustainable economic growth through trade expansion, encouraging specialization and opening up of national economies through elimination and reduction of Non Tarrif Barriers (NTBs)

Conclusively, despite the limitations, rules of origin still play an important role in driving trade policy objectives. However, for them to be effective, they need to be applied in a transparent, fair and predictable manner to avoid causing distortionary effects to international trade.

[i] URT: National Trade Policy for a Competitive economy and export led growth, Ministry of Industries and Trade, February, 2003

[ii] East African Community Customs Union Rules of Origin, September 2005

[iii] ibid

[iv] ibid

[v] ibid

[vi] ibid

Why governments should not sign Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with the European Union without negotiation

Why governments should not sign Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with the European Union without negotiation

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre, Dar es Salaam-Tanzania

From the tenets or principles and its design, the EPA offers critical economic challenges. Indeed, according, former Tanzanian President, HE Benjamin Mkapa, has cautioned that signing the EPA less developed Countries like Tanzania will be signing off an economic death warrant to their industries and jobs. Similar sentiments have been echoed by President John Magufuli when he described the EPAs as a form of colonialism and bad for our Country. Experts have equally warned against signing EPAs in their current form and content-perhaps there is reason to fear

The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) are bilateral agreements signed between less developed Countries and the European Union which allows free access of goods and services to   the European Union and vice versa. At the core of the EPA’s are said to be free trade between Less Developed Countries and the European Union.  They were set to replace the current existing trade relationships under the Cotonou Agreement and any other preferential trade related provisions such as the Everything But Arms (EBA).

It is from this perspective that as an expert and economic diplomat, I would advise Tanzania’s government and other least developed countries (LDCs) not to sign EPAs in their current form and pursue any future negotiations with utmost caution.

Firstly, EPAs would open up the Tanzanian market and industrial sector to extreme European competition this would be contrary to Tanzania government’s industrialization and job creation agenda. According to European Investment Reports in Tanzania, EU companies accounted for 68% of the total FDI in Tanzania. This makes the EU the single largest investment block into Tanzania. Under the EPA framework domestic industries will not be able to compete with their European counterparts. The EU also subsidizes its products through subsidizes extended to its farmers and industries making them unfavorably competitive.

The EPA does not guarantee free access of Tanzanian goods into the European Market. This is because the European market restrictions and non-tariff barriers such as quality controls and psytosanitary standards which are imposed by the EU on goods and services coming from less developed Countries.

According to the European Commission the net trade volumes between the EU and Tanzania amounted to1, 602 Million Euros. The EU also toped Tanzania as a trading partners with trade volumes estimated at USD2 Billion in 2016  Out of these Tanzania exported goods worth Euros632 million while it imported goods and services worth Euros 970 million creating a trade balance of Euros 338 million in favour of the EU. This therefore means that the trade imbalance would worsen   if Tanzania was to open up its markets to the European Union without any restriction.

Free trade between the EU and Tanzania would lead to high import revenue foregone by Tanzania. It is estimated that at the current figures (Usd2 billion in 2016) the trade created through signing of EPA would amount to 10 Billion. If an average amount of import duty charged on these goods is projected over the five-year period of the EPA, the government would lose billions in revenue foregone. This would be a major loss to the government which is struggling to build its tax base and aims to achieve a tax to GDP ratio of 19% by 2020.

There are other opportunities to trade with the EU exist under the Cotonou Agreement. The Everything But Arms provisions with in the current Cotonou Agreement allow Tanzania to export goods and services apart from arms to the EU on preferential terms. It does therefore not make prudent economic sense for the Country to enter into another agreement whose perceived economic benefits could be still achieved under the EBA. It would be to continue or re-negotiate with the EU under the EBA framework. The EPA may also be contrary to WTO rules of MFN. By signing the EPA Tanzania would be obliged to provide the same treatment to other nations. This would dangerously open up Tanzania’s economic to extreme competition and potential dumping from other Countries

The signing of the EPA would create a multiplicity and duplicity of membership to regional trade groupings. Tanzania is a member of SADC and EAC. By signing up to the EPA, Tanzania would also violate some of the economic rules of SADC which requires a common external tariff on goods coming from outside the SADC. The EPA requires that EAC signs as a region. This is requirement is oblivious to the fact that the different member states are at different economic levels. Kenya is a developing Country and therefore stands to benefit more from the EPA than Tanzania. Kenya’s flower market has already been a major export to the European Markets and this implies that Kenya would be a major beneficiary.

Obviously, by not signing up, Tanzania stands to lose its diplomatic darling status in the face of EU’s foreign policy to Africa. Tanzania’s good will have to meet high standards and heavily compete with other countries for entry into the European market. The non-preferential tax treatment and potential border taxes imposed by Tanzania on foreign goods may make EU products entering Tanzania’s markets to be highly priced and costly for local Tanzanians. Tanzania may be forced to seek alternative trading partners to replace on previously EU sourced goods.

Despite the potential economic benefits that appear to be offered by the EPA, if weighed the advantages of signing the EPA in their current forms has potential catastrophic consequences on Tanzania. A cautiously renegotiated approach would be the most appropriate pathway.

References

A comparison between the East African Community (EAC) and the   European Union (EU) in search for stronger Regional Economic Cooperation

A comparison between the East African Community (EAC) and the   European Union (EU) in search for stronger Regional Economic Cooperation:

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre, Dar es Salaam-Tanzania

The East Africa Community (EAC) is a regional economic block comprising of 6 member states. The EAC was originally established in 1967, resolved in 1977 and later revived in 1999 comprising of three founding members; Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.  It has since expanded to include Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan.  Currently, discussions are ongoing to admit Somalia into the block. A comparison of the EU and EAC shows that the two blocks have some similarities but also fundamental differences.  Despite having the longest history, the EAC’s to maturity has remained punctured and slow like a tortoise while its younger cousin towers in speed and form like a mighty colossus. What lessons can be learnt?

The European Union (EU) is a regional economic grouping of 27 member countries. The history of the EU can be traced back to 1950 when the first proposal towards integration was made by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman towards integrating the Coal and Steel industries of Western Europe. 

This culminated in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel community (ECSC) in 1951 comprising of six members: Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands. The next steps towards the EU advanced further with the signing of the treaty of Rome in 1957 and establishment of the European Economic Commission (EEC).  Since its inception the EU has evolved through various stages into one of the most successful regional economic and political blocks.

Similarities between the EAC and EU regional economic blocks

Common economic theoretical motivation

All are economic regional blocks aimed at fostering trade amongst its members. By their nature, regional economic blocks aim at promoting the economic prosperity and development of its members.

The economic theoretical motivation of the blocks is informed by liberal and neo liberal school of thought that suggests the need for mutual cooperation and common collaboration by states to address global problems.   According liberal economists such as Adam Smith who suggested that countries benefited from free trade and elimination of tariffs while Gottfried Haberler suggested that those excluded from the preference arrangements arising from economic integration should lose.  There was value for states to cooperate for the sake of enjoying trade and economic benefits. 

Economically just like any other regional blocs, the EAC and EU seek to benefit from economies of scale, trade creation, product differentiation and efficiency gains through regional trade policies created within the community blocs.

Geographical proximity is a major success factor for economic integration. In both the EU and the EAC, respective member states abide to the factor of geographical proximity by sharing common borders. Expansion to countries that are considered not sharing common borders has been largely opposed and remained a politically divisive issue. For example, EAC member states rejected Sudan’s application to join the block because it did not share a close border.  Some EU countries have used the same reason, among others, to deny Turkey’s membership to the EU.

Common historical background is evident amongst both regional groups. The EAC is bound by a common historical background linking its members to a common African cultural and linguistic heritage embed in Bantu and Kiswahili as a language of the region. Although separated by artificial colonial borders the East African people are the same and related in many aspects. The EU is a diverse block of many countries with various linguistic backgrounds but common European heritage. In recent years, the EU has been gradually trying to build a European Culture, by allowing free movement and settlement of its citizens across EU member states.

Differences between EU and EAC

In order to make an informed differentiation of the two regional blocks, one has to look at the history, rationale, organization structure, operations and political economy of these organizations.

According to Njura, the fundamental difference between the EU and EAC lies in their respective rationale.

The EU was basically established to promote peace, economic prosperity, and the well-being of its peoples based on the constitutive act of the EU Article 3. While the rationale behind the establishment EAC  as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty for the establishment of the EAC, was to develop policies aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among the Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defense, security and legal and judicial affairs for the mutual benefit.

The EU was conceived as a tool for peace. Between 1954 and 1959 the cooperation amongst European states was set up with the aim of ending the frequent and bloody wars between neighbors, which culminated in the Second World War. As of 1950, the European Coal and Steel Community began to unite European Countries economically and politically in order to secure lasting peace.

The current EAC was revived after the collapse of the first East African Community in 1977, whose prime motivation had equally focused on building economic development of the region after the struggle for independence. The first EAC had collapsed largely because of political indifference. Building a new EAC fundamentally anchored on economic cooperation made sense.

A deeper analysis reveals further that there are significant differences between the EU and the EAC in terms of stages of its integration, organs and operations. Its pillars and structures have (leadership, decisions making and accountability

Different sequencing and stages of economic integration development

The sequencing of integration is an important feature in regional economic integration. The various stages provide room for partners to build consensus on the shared degree of ambition, the size and diversity, and convergence of economic block

Classically, there are five major stages of economic integration. Free Trade Area, Preferential Trade Area, Customs Union, Common Market, Monetary Union and ultimately a political union.

The Free Trade Area (FTA) is the initial stage toward regional economic integration under which Countries agree to cooperate on selected areas. The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) is second stages where Countries agree to remove tariffs across member states while maintain independent tariff regimes on imports from outside countries. The third stage is the Customs Union where member states agree on all conditions in FTA and PTA and also establish a common external tariff (CET) on all imports from outside the block. The Common Market follows with features comprising of all the other stages including free movement of labour, capital goods and services across member states. The Monetary Union is the next stage where by member states agree to all the terms under the previous stages, including a common monetary policy and currency. The last stage is the Political Union, where the member states cooperate on political matters and cede considerable political power to a central authority.

The European Union is currently of Monetary Union with also some characteristics of a political union.  A close scrutiny of the EU shows that its stages of integration were not cleared distinct but inter-related in a reinforcing manner leading towards full economic integration.

Since the signing of the treaty of Rome in 1957 the European has developed into an internal single market through a standardized system of laws that apply in all member Countries and into a Monetary Union with a single Currency-the Euro.

EU policies aim to ensure the free movement of people, goods, services and capital within the market. It has enacted legislation concerning justice and home affairs, and maintained common policies on trade, agriculture, fisheries and regional development.

Has adopted a common external border control policy and within the Schengen Area, passport controls have been abolished allowing free movement across borders for all EU nationals and foreigners possessing a Schengen Visa. A monetary union was established in 1999 and came into full force in 2002. It is comprised of 19 EU member states which use the Euro as a common currency

On the contrary, the EAC has attempted to follow a chronological order of growth from one stage to another. The EAC was established in 1999 as a Customs Union. Because of its history and level of economic cooperation amongst its founding states, the EAC skipped the first stage of economic integration. It is currently a Common Market, which is the third stage of economic integration whereby there is supposed to be a common external tariff, free movement of labour, goods and services.

The EAC is still aspiring to achieve a monetary Union by 2024 and ultimately a political federation thereafter. Attempts to fast track to a political federation have not materialized because of a number of mitigating factors such as competing political interests and perceived leadership ambitions.

Major Timelines for EU and EAC Regional Integration

EU Timeline

EAC Timeline

Event

Year

Event

Year

European Coal and Steel  Cooperation (ECSC)

1951

Tripartite Commission for Cooperation signed

1993

Treaty of Rome –European Economic Cooperation (EEC)

1957

Treaty for EAC signed by Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda

1999

Single European Act (SEA)-Single Union

1986

Customs Union Protocol

2004

Maastricht treaty-European Union (EU) established-EU as Common Market

1992

Expansion of EAC by admission of Rwanda and Burundi

2007

Treaty of Amsterdam and Nice- Monetary Union and Euro as a Currency

2001/2

Common Market

2010

Treaty of Lisbon-Political aspects of the Union, including Constitutional issues and leadership

2007

Protocol for establishment of Monetary Union signed not yet implemented

2013

Organs of the EU and the EAC

The EU operates through a hybrid system of supra-national and intergovernmental decision making. Under this arrangement some of the member state powers have been delegated to be exercised by the EU Headquarters in Brussels on behalf and interest of its member states.

It has got seven principle institutions governing its operations. These are also known as Institutions of the European Union. These institutions do not actually directly represent the government members of the EU but actually operate within the dual supranational and intergovernmental structure. Based on the institutional provision, organization structures of the EU are:

The European Council which defines the general political direction of the EU. This is composed heads of state or government of the member states plus the president of the European Commission. The high representative of Foreign Affairs and security policy is also a member. This body forms the EU summit;

The European commission: Established in 1958, this is the EU executive body. It is the organ entitled with the management of the EU decisions, common policies and budget. It is composed of 28 members as commissioners, one from each member country;

The European Council or Council of the European Union: This is also known as the council of Ministers which was composed of 28 (27 after the exit of the United Kingdom) members. These are tasked with the responsibility of adopting EU laws and coordinating policy implementation.  It is comprised of Ministers from members from all member states and convenes regularly depending on the policy areas under discussion. The Presidency to this is held for 6 months on a rotational basis

The European Parliament: This is comprised of 751 members directly elected by the European Union member state citizens through direct adult suffrage for a five year term. They bear the responsibility of representing the citizens of the EU.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) established in 1952 comprising of 1 judge from each country and 11 advocates. This plays a significant role in interpreting the laws for the Union and its decisions and rulings have de jure binding powers on all its members.

The EU has other bodies such as the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). The ECB conducts Economic and monetary policy and manages the Euro. The EIB provides funding for EU projects.

The European Court of Auditors and Office of the Ombudsman investigates all complaints against the EU institutions and bodies.

The EAC Organisation and Institutional Structure

There are seven main organs through which the EAC works, however in contrast to the EU, there are slight differences in how some of these organs operate and exercise their powers.  These organs include:

The summit of heads of states which provides strategic direction towards realization of the goals of the EAC: it is composed of the Presidents of the member states with the authority to make final decisions on the direction the community needs to take in terms of economic developments and political cooperation;

The council of ministers: it composes of the various ministers of member state governments in charge of the EAC affairs in their respective governments. Its major responsibility is policy direction but also keeps constant review and monitoring of the EAC programs. These are major custodians of the decisions taken by the summit.

The coordination committee whose primary responsibility is to foster regional cooperation and supervision of sectoral committees: it is composed of the permanent secretaries in various member governments‟ ministries responsible for the affairs of the EAC. The responsibility of the body is to prepare reports, submit and give recommendations on the implementation of the treaty

The Sectoral committees are composed of senior officials established by the council ministers with the major responsibility of conceptualizing programs, preparing comprehensive implementation and monitoring of programs. These meet on a regularly depending on the issues

The Secretariat: this is the administrative organ of the EAC. It is the one responsible for managing the everyday affairs of the EAC but has no powers to decide the direction on which the EAC need to go; this power is reserved for presidents. It is the guardian of the EAC treaty, ensuring that the treaty and decisions made by the other organs are implemented.

The East Africa Legislative Assembly: it is the legislative arm of the EAC; it debates and approves the community budget. It is composed of 45 members (nine from each member states) and 7 ex-officio members comprising of Ministers or Cabinet officials responsible for EAC affairs from the member states. These are elected by the members of the national parliaments of member states

The East African Court of Justice: this is the court of the EAC which has the responsibility of interpreting the laws, the treaties and hears the disputes among the party states members. It is the principle judicial body of the EAC. It is comprised of judges appointed from member states. It has jurisdiction to entertain all matters related to the implementation of the EAC treaty and its associated legislations.

According to the EU regulations, its organs appear to have more independent mandate to exercise their powers and take binding decisions while the EAC organs are still subject to approval by the Summit of Head of states of the member countries.  The summit is chaired one of the head of state of the member countries on a rotational basis.

Differences in EU and EAC operations

The EU is largely a treaty-based organization.  The treaties are the major binding agreements between EU member states.  Every major decision and step is taken and effected by treaty. No major decision can be taken and applicable to all member states without a treaty. Examples of the various treaties and their application include;

Treaty

Significant decision or changes made

Treaty of Rome (1957)

Establishment of European Economic Community (EEC)

Single European Act  (SEA) 1986

Deadline for single full market

Treaty of Maastricht (1992)

Widening of the EEA and establishment of the European Union

The treaty of Amsterdam (1997)

Expansion of the EU, admission of 10 members from former communist countries, absorption of Schengen Convention into EU Law, expansion of Common Foreign Security Policy

The treaty of Maastricht –Nice (2001)

Reformed decision making, changed procedures for election of Commission President, defined role of EU institutions

The treaty of Lisbon (2007)

Major amendments to the Constitutional basis of the EU

The Paris Treaty (2015)

Climate Change

The EU decisions are also made  and transmitted to the members through Regulations, directives / guidelines, decisions and recommendations.  Regulations are legally binding to all member states and must be implemented in their entirety. For example the EU regulations on Common safeguards on goods imported from outside the EU.  Directives are EU legislative acts setting out goals that all EU member states should achieve and member states left to devise mechanisms for domestic application (eg directive on elimination of hidden costs on the internet). EU decisions are applicable to those to whom they are addressed such as Countries or specific companies (For example participation in Counter terrorism and humanitarian measures) while recommendations remain largely recommendations for best practice such as best practices in use of e-commerce

The EAC operates based on treaties and protocols. The treaty to establish the EAC was signed in 1999. Thereafter subsequent decisions have been taken through protocols. Examples of such protocols include the protocol to establish the Customs Union (2004), Protocol establishing the Common Market (2010), the EAC Monetary Union Protocol (2013) and the protocol establishing the East African Kiswahili Commission (2012). The EAC also issues guidelines to member states and has passed various legislation in line with the EAC treaty.

Difference in EU and EAC membership and benefits

The EU allows none members to enjoy some of its benefits.  The members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) are not part of the EU but are subjected to EU economic regulations. Countries such as Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland which are members of the Single market through the EEA are none EU members but enjoy trade benefits from the EU. Switzerland and Norway for example are also part of the Schengen area. Some member states of the EU such as the United Kingdom opted to keep their own currency, the Pound. The EURO is only used in only 19 member Countries of the 28 member block.

In the EAC, none members are restricted from enjoying benefits from the block. Countries such as Somalia have been given observer status since 2012 and may enjoy some economic privileges and benefits from the EAC. Discussions to have Somalia formally admitted has stalled since 2015

Differences in political development, roles and global influence

The European Union has advanced into a political organization with a formidable force on both economic, political security matters -while the EAC is still aspiring to achieve a monetary union and ultimately a political union. Through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU has developed a role in external relations and defence.  The EU has permanent diplomatic missions (EU delegations) and represents itself at the United Nations, the WTO, the G8 and the G20.  Because of its financial and political global influence, the EU has been described as a current and potential super power.

The EU has succeeded in building common democratic values and standards that must be demonstrated and respected by the member states.  The different values of democracy are reflected in the manner in which the EU is administered, how its representatives are elected and participatory nature in which major decisions, such as to join, expand or changes to key treaty provisions are made. For example, countries only the EU after express approval of their citizens through a vote or referendum. Votes of this kind have failed in countries such as Norway. 

While in the EAC there are significant political challenges, such as lack of respect to constitutionalism, peaceful transition of power through democratic means such as elections. Political, ethnic and resource based conflicts are prevalent and these have been a major hindrance toward the fast progress of the EAC.  To date, the EAC has not garnered converging common political momentum towards a political union.

Differences in geographical, population and economic size

There are significant differences in terms of Geographical and Economic size between the two bodies. The EU comprises of 508.2 million people accounting for 7.3 of the world population and 4,324,782 Square kilometers. In 2014 the total GDP of the EU was estimated at 18.495 trln USD. This constituted approximately 24% of global nominal GDP and 17% if measured terms of purchasing power parity. The GDP per capita of its residents measured at PPP was estimated at 40.486 USD. The level of industrial growth and advancement is higher compared to its EAC counterpart.

The EAC’s size is 2.5 million square kilometers. Its population and GDP were estimated at 168.5 Million and 159.5 bln respectively.  The GDP per capita was USD918 and its economy was largely driven by agricultural and semi processed goods. The total export from the EAC was USD13.6 bln while it imported 40.2bln. The total trade volume between the EU and the EAC was 6,008 million Euros.  The exports to the EU from EAC were mainly coffee, cut flowers, tea, tobacco, fish and vegetables.  The imports from the EU into the EAC were dominated by machinery, mechanical appliances, equipment and parts, vehicles and pharmaceutical products. The EAC exported goods worth 2,415 Million Euros and Imported goods worth 3,593 Million Euros creating a trade balance of 1,178 million Euros in favour of the EU. From the statistics clearly, the trade balance and terms of trade between the EU and EAC was heavily biased in favor of the EU.  Perhaps this explains why the EU has been keen on establishing strong trade relations with the EAC through the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)

In conclusion therefore, despite the fact that these two bodies are both regional economic integration blocks formed to achieve a common purpose of economic prosperity.  A careful scrutiny of the two reveals some subtle differences, their history, operation and structure, economic size and interest. Comparatively, the EU is far advanced as an economic regional block compared to its East African counterpart. Perhaps these differences explain why the relationship between the EU and EAC has been a subject of significant divergence and discussions in recent times.

The following lessons can therefore be learnt

  • Collective will and desire to unite is essential for a successful integration
  • People centeredness rather than state centeredness regional economic integration succeed
  • Elimination of personal ego and ‘big-man syndrome’ amongst the members and their leadership increases chance for success
  • Essence of having an anchor state rallying all the other member states together for the common cause and standing for and in bail of other member states whenever political and economic catastrophe strikes such as the economic meltdown and Euro financial turbulence in 2008 and indebtedness of Greece and Portugal.
  • Economic size is not a factor as both small and big member states stand chance to benefit if necessary, measures and structures are put in place and operational.

References

Jeffrey, A. (1990) “The European Community in the 1990s: Perspectives on Integration and Institutions

Monnet, J and Schuman, R. (2005), Paper series Vol. 5 No. 37. Dec. 2005 

Laursen, F. (2003). Comparing Regional Integration Schemes: International Regimes or Would-be Polities? in Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol.3, No.8, Available at: http://miami.edu/eucenter (Accessed on 29th  June 2018). 

Njura, S, Odoyo (2016). A Comparative Analysis of the European Union (EU) and the East African Community (EAC) Economic Integration models: Lessons for Africa: A research project submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of Master of Arts in International Studies at the Institute of Diplomacy and International studies, University of Nairobi, October, 2016

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