Uganda signals new impetus to Mining with a bill in offing

The Uganda government has signaled a new impetus in the mining sector with multiple reforms and political weight over the next five years yielded to transform, its previously dormant mining sector. The government plans to scale up its work in the Mining sector. As part of improving its geological data, the government recently announced commencement of aerial surveillance of Karamoja, which is one of the areas highly believed to be mineral rich. This will improve the quality of real time Mineral and geological data.

The Ministry plans to table the new Mining Bill in Parliament soon. Civil society organisations such as the Natural Resources Governance Institute (NRGI) have worked with the Ministry experts on this, and will be monitoring the developments, debate, and the outcome from this bill.

Civil Society and expert advice to government has been that Uganda needs to have a legislative environment which attracts large investments into its mining sector but also ensures citizens benefit from extractive resources. NRGI will be engaging with new Parliament, by providing some capacity building support and making technical presentations on the extractive sector governance during Uganda’s new journey.

On the12th of May, President Yoweri Museveni was sworn into office after a tenacious election period. Despite the violence and contestation, President Museveni was declared winner for a sixth term. Since 2006, the President has constantly anchored his economic development cards on the Country’s oil wealth as a conduit to pursue his long-term development agenda and pathway to a middle-income status. The tilt towards developing the country’s mining sector expands this vision further.

Under a new mining policy passed in 2018 Uganda proposed to maximse gains from its mining sector by automatically making value addition mandatory and owning shares in every mining company granted a mining lease. This policy was a major shift from the previous policy framework where the mining companies owned 100% of ownership with government being relegated to a  spectator.

The old policy regime was characterized by abuse, land conflicts, speculation and nuisance business practices which denied government maximum economic benefits. According to the Uganda Chamber of Mines and Petroleum (UCMP) there are over 800 mineral licenses, with over half held small companies and speculators. Uganda’s Mineral rich areas such as Karamoja are awash with prospective mineral license holders and artisanal miners. The current policy framework was not backed by commensurate enabling law.

With a comfortable majority in parliament, the President has lee way to use the advantage of numbers to push through policies that favour his vision. While  changes among the ministers are expected,  there is no expected much change regarding technical staff in the key government ministries, agencies, and departments. This may be of advantage as these technocrats can now focus on achieving this new ambition. Can Uganda pull it off?  As extractive sector stakeholders will be following the developments with keenest and wishing Uganda success.

 

Uganda-Tanzania East Africa Oil Pipeline: signed deal yes, but hurdles lie ahead.

Samia, Museveni witness pipeline project final actsThe East African Oil Pipeline project received significant boots in April 2021 with Uganda with a series of key oil infrastructure related agreements signed between the government of Uganda and Tanzania and the oil companies for the East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) project to transport crude from Uganda to the Tanzania port of Tanga.

According to the government communications, these agreements signal Final Investment Decision (FID) which could be announced soon with production, expected around 2025. There has been already significant work going on at the oil sites in Hoima and as one of the Company officials remarked, work has started. The project is very important to the East Africa region as it promises great economic benefits to the governments and their citizens in the form of jobs, revenues, and other associated economic linkages.

Despite this rekindled hope, shortly after the signing of these agreements, it was evident that multiple uncertainties still lie ahead.

The details of the signed agreements remained undisclosed and technical experts involved in the negotiations remained secret on essential information on key fiscal terms surrounding the tariffs.

The project financing arrangement remains a quagmire.  Few days after signing of the agreements, several banks in France where the lead investor Total is based announced that they were staying away from the financing of the pipeline. The French banks included, BNP Paribas, Société’ Générale and Credit Agricole, Credit Suisse of Switzerland, ANZ of Australia and New Zealand and Barclays.

According to earlier government reports, The Standard Bank of South Africa, China’s ICBC and SMBC of Japan are lead advisors of the EACOP financing. These were under immense pressure from their counterparts Bank Track, Reclaim Finance and Energy Voice for what they described as pushing responsible financing of projects worldwide. According to these banks and activists EACOP’s environmental credentials were failing.

The Uganda government announced that it was not bothered by announcement, describing it as not new. However, the announcement by the banks signalled that the project could be still facing serious negative diplomacy from environmental activists and other political interested actors regionally and globally.

President Museveni described the project and the agreement signing occasion as an act economic liberation. This followed the political liberation which in his view happened some decades ago when Tanzania helped exiled Uganda political groups to take power in Uganda and change the course of history. With the hurdles still to overcome, it was evident that perhaps the financial, environmental, and political woes were not over, and the project was yet to fully get on track.

How Tanzania’s government can promote Domestic Direct Investment (DDI)

How Tanzania’s government can promote Domestic Direct Investment (DDI)

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre, Dar es Salaam-Tanzania

Tanzania has wide business opportunities in agriculture, tourism, mining, forestry, services and a large potential for attracting more DDI. Despite the wide endowment, statistics and practice shows that great attention has been on promoting and attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  FDI is viewed as the engine of growth and development and attracting it forms the tenor of Tanzania’s economic diplomacy. As the decline in FDI becomes real, with the global aid landscape moving towards aid for trade, it is rational that Tanzania (and all Aid dependent African Countries) should now look else where. Due to public interest , in this slighly updated version of a paper, published sometime ago, I highlight why attracting  DDI is imperative.

Domestic Direct Investment (DDI) can be generically defined as the total movement of capital and assets from within the Country. Domestic direct investment can in simple parlance be described as an act of local or resident entrepreneur or producer placing capital within a country into a project or business enterprise or assets with the intent of making a profit.  DDI has an opposite meaning of Foreign Direct Investment which is defined by the World Bank as the movement of private assets and capital across borders.

According to the Bank of Tanzania and Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), the total stock of Foreign Private Investments in 2013 amounted to USD15,969.5 million, which was 15.8% higher than what was recorded in 2012 (Tanzania Investment Report 2014: Foreign Private Investment).  The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that Tanzania attracted USD2, 142billion of FDI inflows in 2014, which was 14.5% increase from the previous years. With an accumulated stock of USD14.86billion, Tanzania was the highest in the East African Region (World Investment Report 2015) and came in the 10th position in Africa, ahead of all its East African neighbors (World Bank 16th Economic Outlook Report, 2015).

The Country performed well over the past two years. According to the World Investment Report 2019, the FDI inflow into Tanzania in 2018  reached USD 1.10Bln, pegging a significant increase compared to USD 938Bln recorded in 2017. UNCTAD reported that the current FDI stock is estimated at USD20.7bln representing 35.8% of Tanzania’s GDP. The Mining sector,  the oil and gas industry as well as primary agricultural products (coffee, cashew nuts and tobbaco) have always drawn the most FDI. The Country’s main foreign investors are China, India, Kenya, United Kingdom, Mauritius, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Canada, the United States, the Netherlands, South Africa and Germany.  In recent years new investors such as Turkey started appearing on the list.

Yet, the mining reforms in 2017 are particularly viewed as potentially a risk to foreign investors could shock and disrupt this trend and contribute towards a  FDI inflow in the future.  According to the World Bank Doing Bussiness Report for 2019,  Tanzania ranked 144th out of 190 countries, having lost seven positions compared to its previous rankings. Investors tend to take note of this report and therefore by any means this is not pleasant news for a country which wants to build an industrial economy by leveraging its resources for investment.

Moreover, despite performing relatively well on the external foreign front in the past years, the figures for DDI are largely unknown. Yet domestically owned enterprises are said to have a larger trickle economic down effect on the Country and the population (UNIDO, 2014). The role of DDI in building an ‘in-house’ national economic base and its associate benefits such as employment creation is significant. This therefore suggests that there is need for concerted government efforts to attract more DDI. The Indonesian and Malaysian governments have been pragmatic on this front and their experience can be drawn for learning. According to available data the Indonesian government registered approximately USD13.2Million in DDI in 2017 (Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board: Domestic and Foreign Direct Investment Realization in Quarter II and January-June, 2017). This therefore demonstrates that is possible to build a national economic architecture which attracts DDI.

The following could be potential strategies to promote DDI in Tanzania. Collectively these would contribute to a good business environment for domestic direct investors and significantly spur DDI flows.

There is need to develop a Domestic Direct Investment Attraction strategy and policy document to guide Tanzania’s priorities and intentions to encourage, attract and regulate DDI. The strategy and policy should be informed by a comprehensive analysis of the Country’s domestic investment needs and priorities. It should identify the challenges, opportunities and incentives for Domestic Direct Investors. Currently, the government investment is within the broad economic development program mirrored under the Tanzania Five Year Development Plan II 2016/17-2020/21 (FYDP II). Investment attraction has been described in general terms and has an inclination towards emphasis on attracting FDI to support government’s development ambitions. The FYDP II under its salient features asserts that policy and institutional reforms have been entrenched and private sector ‘will be called forth’ to lead in investment in industrialization but does not expound on how this will be achieved. It is for this reason that DDI investment portfolio within the country has remained low and largely unknown.

Engage in wide campaigns and about existing opportunities for domestic investment.  Currently, major government efforts have been in promoting investment opportunities abroad with the intention of attracting FDI. The outlook would be equally shifted to promoting opportunities for domestic investment. The extensive use of public advertisement and public diplomacy materials such as procurements on the existing opportunities for Domestic Direct Investment would boost local motivation to invest and extent the frontiers of DDI.

Facilitate domestic investors to access to finance and Capital mobilization to invest. This strategy has been adopted with some level of success by some Countries such as Malaysia. According to the Malaysian Investment authorities (MIDA, 2013), in an effort to promote DDI, the government in 2012 introduced a Domestic Investment Strategic Fund (DISF). The DISF is not a grant but provided on contingent on the investment of the applicant. It is provided in the form of matching funds which are reimbursable after a given period and granted on negotiated terms. Recipients of DISFs are determined on cases by case basis depending on merits, proposals and plans provided. The DISF is also restricted to investment in specific sectors of the economy and high end projects with good economic value to the Malaysian economy. In 2006 Tanzania government introduced a fund to support small enterprises. The fund was also famously known as the ‘ Kikwete 1bln fund’ was disbursed through the selected banks such as the NMB and CRDB. The weakness of this fund was that it had political inclinations, the criterion for beneficiaries and loan repayment requirements were weak. The fund was subject to abuse and as consequence; its benefits were largely unfelt. Review of this initiative based on lessons from the previous scheme and other countries such as Malaysia would inform a new strategy for funding domestic entrepreneurs.

The Tanzanian government should provide Incentives for domestic investors such as tax incentives, incentives for acquiring foreign companies for high technology, incentives for companies in production and mergers among domestic service providers or firms. According to the Malaysian investment Development Authority, a Malaysian owned company ac acquiring a foreign owned company is eligible for an annual deduction of 20% of the acquisition costs for 5 years. The acquirer must be a locally owned company with at least 60% Malaysian equity ownership involved in manufacturing and service activity.

This incentive is aimed at increasing local ownership portfolios in high end technology firms in the Country. Small firms under a specified share capital value are given tax incentives and firms which participate or are desirous to engage in production of promoted products are incentivized.  Currently, Tanzania’s domestic or resident investors can only access government incentives if they registered their projects with the Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) The minimum capital base required to qualify for an Investment Certificate and incentives is high and exorbitant for domestic direct investors.

Ring fencing of economic opportunities and sectors for domestic investors and allowing requiring joint investment ventures in some specific sectors. There have been efforts to ring fence the tourism sector. However these efforts in Tanzania are not widely extended to other sectors. Other Countries have this approach successfully to attract DDI in specific sectors.

Need to establish a dedicated Domestic Direct Investment agency or department within the Tanzania Investment Center, specializing and focusing in DDI promotion, attraction, facilitation and documentation. Currently, Tanzania’s investment attraction agenda is coordinated by Tanzania Investment Center. The centre is one stop center with all major government functions such as business and company registration, immigration and taxation. However, the focus of TIC is on attracting FDI. Yet domestic investors have peculiar needs and thus attracting DDI would benefit from a specialized department.

Make more efficient use of the business incubator model to facilitate the establishment and growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs).  Business incubators are dedicated and well equipped centers which identify nascent entrepreneurs with innovative ideas with a potential for growth to test their and develop their ideas into functional enterprises.  Where necessary, they provide the nascent entrepreneurs with start-up capital and equipment for growth. It is well established that SMEs play a key role in creating employment, developing a skilled workforce and responding to various market demands. Business incubators have been instrumental in developing the United States Computer and high-tech software industry. California’s Silicon Valley is home to many business incubators providing to young innovative software and hi-tech developers to juggle their ideas into big business. Many computer applications run by computer programs such as Microsoft and Apple are products of business incubators. In Tanzania, so far there is one known incubator hosted at Commission for Science and Technology (Costech). From this incubator innovative software ideas were developed and grew into a leading Tanzanian multinational company called Maxicom Africa. There is need to expand public knowledge and this incubator’s services and so as to encourage new ideas for innovation, technology and investment.

There is need to review the policy and operations of Export Processing Zones (EPZ) and Special Economic Zones (SEZ) with a view of encouraging true domestic investors.  Export processing zones and Special Economic Zones are specialized areas gazette by the government allowing investors and companies to produce manufactured goods in a controlled secure environment for export. Both schemes provide facilitative environment for profitable operations. Export Processing Zones (EPZ) objectives include; attraction and encouragement of new technology, attraction and promotion of investment for export-led industrialization, employment and promotion of processing of local raw materials for export. Special Economic Zones (SEZ) have an objective of promoting quick and significant progress in economic growth, export earnings and employment creation as well as attracting private investment from all productive and service sectors.

They provide generous incentives such as tax holidays and tax breaks to investors and companies using the EPZs to manufacture goods for export.  Examples in Tanzania include the Benjamin Mkapa Export Processing Zone at Mabibo Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar Special Economic Zones. Despite their existence, the volume of DDI investments attracted to these zones is still low and the generous incentives offered by the EPZ and SEZ’s have been abused by the foreign firms operating the EPZ’s. Already manufactured goods from outside the Country are smuggled into the EPZs for label and exported as Tanzanian manufactured goods. Foreign firms have set up subsidiaries in Tanzania’s EPZ so as to benefit from the generous incentives.  The net beneficiaries from the EPZ and SEZ are therefore foreign firms and not domestic investors. A through mapping and review has to be done.

There is need to address nuisances such as corruption, bureaucracy, nuisance taxes and non tariff barriers restrictions which make local investment cumbersome to domestic Investors. According to the World Bank Report Tanzania was ranked 139 out of 189 on the Ease of doing business index in 2015 (World Bank: Ease of Doing Business Report 2015). The report suggests that the business environment in Tanzania is still unfavorable and acts as a disincentive to invest. Tanzania compares badly with its neighbors such as Rwanda and Uganda. The government has strived to improve Dar es Salaam port handling and establishment of ‘One stop borders’ at major customs points to facilitate trade but other non tariff barriers exist and these have to be dealt with conclusively.

Deliberately pursuing a broad based economic growth strategy to allow the economy to expand and create more opportunities for local investment. These are key factors in determining investment decisions.  Despite registering a fast paced economic growth of 6-7% in the past years, the drivers of economic growth has been limited to specific sectors such as telecommunications, mining and construction. These sectors require large volumes of capital and specialized high skills. This can be restrictive to Domestic Direct Investors, whose capital base and technological advancement may be limited. It is important to open up economic growth and investment potentials to other sector.

As stated by Mairo Pezinni, director of OECD Development Center, “Extractives are no longer the main driver to investment. The Continent (Tanzania) is open for new investment fueled by unprecedented domestic demand” (Africa Investment Report 2016). The government should see this as an opportunity to drive Domestic Direct investment into other sectors.

In Conclusion, over the past years Tanzania has committed itself towards building a robust economy through investment. The current government industrialization agenda is based on securing more investment into the manufacturing sector.  From the policy and practice it is evident that the government’s focus has been anchored towards attracting FDI. The volume of FDI inflows into the country as recorded by TIC has increased over the past five years. However, experiences in countries such as Malaysia show that Countries cannot build their economic muscle by depending exclusively on FDI. The challenge of relying on FDI is linked to its characteristics.

FDI is sensitive and subject to cyclical factors such as global economic down turns, global stock and capital market instabilities ,changes in national policy or political environment and foreign investor  interests. It can therefore be erratic unreliable as a platform for building an economy. It is for this reason that the governments appetite needs to be shifted towards DDI. The absence of current figures and a systematic and well articulate government policy on DDI is a major flaw in national development planning.  Tanzania is an endowed with vast resources, a large population and strategically placed as country. Therefore potential for attracting more DDI is evident.  To achieve this potential a number of strategies have to be implemented and other existing ones reviewed as suggested in this paper.

References:

  • Africa Investment Report 2016, Analyse Africa, 2016
  • Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board: Domestic and Foreign Direct Investment Realization in Quarter II and January-June, 2017).Available at http://bit.ly/2YMXgsD
  • World Bank: Ease of Doing Business Report 2015
  • Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA), Maljis Peguam, Malayasia, 20th Novemeber, 2013 available at http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=4361
  • Tanzania Investment Report 2014: Foreign Private Investment
  • URT: National Five Year Development Plan 2016/17-2020/21: Nurturing Industrialisation for Economic transformation and Human Development accessed via: http://www.mof.go.tz/mofdocs/msemaji/Five%202016_17_2020_21.pdf
  • UNIDO: Tanzania Investor Survey Report: Understanding Investment and Foreign Direct Investment, 2014
  • UNCTAD: World Investment Report, 2015

Online Sources

The Citizen Newspaper, Tanzania leads Regional peers in FDI investment available athttp://bit.ly/2WsVRdd

SADC in Economic Meltdown; Can Tanzania be German of the Region?

On Saturday 17th August, Tanzania assumed the chair of the South African Development Cooperation (SADC), amidst disturbing economic figures indicating that the region was facing a serious economic meltdown. Can Tanzania be the ‘German’ of the region, playing the economic big daddy role by calling the other states into political order and bailing out the struggling member states?

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and Economic Analysis Center, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

The SADC is a 16-member state regional economic block established with among others promoting sustained economic growth and sustainable development amongst its objectives. However, the recent economic data indicates that region is witnessing an economic meltdown with most of its member states, except perhaps Tanzania, positing negative or stunted economic growth over the past years.

According to the economic and social indicators data compiled and released by its secretariat the the SADC region posted an estimated average growth rate of 1.4% in 2016 compared to 2.3% in 2015. At country level Tanzania registered the highest growth of 7% among the member states followed by Botswana with a far below rate of 4.3%[i].  

In 2017 Tanzania recorded an economic growth of 7.1% followed by Seychelles (6.3%) whilst Angola registered negative growth for the second consecutive year in order of 2.5%[ii] The region’s growth was increasing at a decreasing rate since the post global period in 2009.

The region’s economic giant South Africa has witnessed rapid economic slowdown, bring along its small neighbors and trading partners under its weight.  Countries such as Zimbabwe were collapsing under the weight of economic sanctions, Namibia and Angola recorded negative annual real GDP (at market price) of 10.8% and -2.5% respectively in 2017 due to the slump in commodity prices and other related risks. Botswana at 2.4% did not perform well either. The region posted an overall trade deficit with rest of the world of USD6.7bln. 

The AfDB report for 2018 warned that the economic outlook for Southern Africa region was cautious[iii]. Broad based economic activity was expected to recover at slow pace, but the outlook remained modest given the diverging growth patterns for the region’s economies. Upper middle income countries turned in low and declining rates of growth meanwhile lower income transitioning economies recorded moderate and improved growth, albeit at reduced rates.

Despite the improvement, economic performance remained subdued as the region’s economic outlook continued to face major headwinds. High unemployment, weak commodity prices, fiscal strain, increasing debt and high inflation.

Real GDP was estimated to have grown at an average of 1.6% in 2017 before increasing to a projected 2.0% in 2018 and 2.4% in 2019.

The future regional growth was expected to be bolstered with primary expectations of increased investment in non-oil sectors such as electricity, construction and technology in large infrastructure projects, mining as well as continued recovery in commodity prices.

However, the latest figures show that the region was not well on that front either.  The decline in commodity prices in recent years reaching the lowest point in 2015 translated into significant income loses for the economies, implying a negative impact on public and private sector spending and therefore growth in employment.

Before the 2008-2009 global recession, the region experienced moderate growth, though individual countries contributed differently. For example, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia exhibited robust growth that collectively outpaced the regional group.

Thereafter, Angola, the region’s foremost oil producer and former raising economic star received the worst bashing with its economy experiencing adverse economic growth effects due to weak oil prices.

Overall the region experienced negative GDP growth with Swaziland (-10.08%), Zimbabwe (-8.38%),  and Angola (-6.31%)  being among the worst hit[iv]  Other Countries such as Zambia, Namibia , Mozambique and Malawi were not performing better either. South Africa reported the highest public debt soaring in billions dollars followed by Angola.

South African Institute of International Affairs observed that intra-regional investment and trade levels had declined markedly since the commodity slump in 2013. Moreover, the trade and economic growth in the region remained imbalanced, exacerbating political strains among member states. Non-tariff barriers and other factors had adversely affected intra-regional trade and investment in recent years.

Assuming the mantle, at the end of its 39th Summit held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’ President John Pombe Magufuli was furious with against the Secretariat for having not provided adequate and alert to the political leadership that the region was experiencing an economic meltdown with reduced or stunted growth and an expanding trade deficit.

Speaking at the SADC People’s forum on the sidelines of the main summit in Dar es Salaam, the South African Professor, Patrick Bond, described the situation as alarming, catastrophic and turbulent and yet no one was bold enough to speak about it.

He was perhaps communist in view and radical in approach, blaming what he described as the capitalistic enterprise and its puppeteers for under mining economic justice, risking lives of by putting profit before the people and causing climate change whose effects were ravaging SADC but remained quite revolutionary in suggesting that the ordinary people perhaps needed to send a clear signal to its political leadership that all was not okay. The economic fundamentals were tattered and the regional leaders needed to wake, Prof. Bond lectured.

Can Tanzania emerge and become the ‘German’ of the region?

With this state of the Union, the question therefore arose can Tanzania emerge and become the ‘German’ of the region, playing the economic messiah role by providing both political leadership and economic bail out to its neighbors

In 2013 up to 2015 when the European Union experienced economic turbulence, Brussels turned to German to liberate it from the gigantic economic Dracula which was tearing down its economic block and leaving some of its small states indebted and facing bankruptcy. German wrote cheques in financial bailouts, provided guarantees and political prop up for economically struggling states such as Greece, Portugal and Italy.

German relied on its economic prowess and its political might as the industrial central pillar of the European Union. The charismatic leadership of its Chancellor, Ms Angela Merkel, was a distinct asset. Even at the risk of her own political career and constant onslaught from the German far right, Merkel could not tolerate any nonsense and was not ready to allow Europe to fall back.

In the face of the similar economic doldrums which seems now to face SADC, can Tanzania afford such muscle or a German equivalent?

Tanzania has done it before. In the 1960’s until 1990’s when the region was facing serious political, Tanzania pulled up its resources and committed it to the liberation struggle. It hosted training camps and provided pupilage to thousands of liberation fighters. Dar es Salaam became to the political headquarters of Frontline States where the idea of SADC in its current form was initiated and a spring for independence for many of the current South African states.  For some, therefore SADC at 39 years, just came back home.

In assuming the SADC Chairmanship, President Magufuli warned the Secretariat that it will not be business as usual as of now and for the next one year his interest would be to see that resources placed at the disposal of the Secretariat were not spent on conferences but on meaningful tangible projects which benefited the people. Could this be the kind of approach that region needs to take in order to deal with its increasing economic challenges.

An agile kind of leadership which places the people at the heart of politics and fights with cunning shrewdness against corruption, public waste, nepotism and personal drive to accumulate wealth by those in power.

Over the years these have been some of the vices which have dogged the region and bringing the much needed progress to stagnation and ultimate halt in some member states. Comparatively, perhaps the SADC is the largest economic group in Sub-Saharan Africa. With over an estimated population of 337.1 million people in 2017, is larger than its western equivalent, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and obviously bigger than the European Union has a just a fraction of the SADC population yet somehow progress has been considerably steady in the other regions.

According to experts the region was faced by multiple non trade barriers and low intra region trade which still at around 20%.  Technically, speaking, the members are happy to do business with other countries outside the region rather than their economic neighbors partners in SADC. The member states are living alongside each other but not fully economically and trade integrated.

Political uncertainties which has dogged the former economic giants of the region such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola created fertile conditions negative to investment and economic growth.  The governments lost grip on the economic mantle and directed attention towards managing internal politics and mechanics for political survival.  

Xenophobic attacks in South Africa could have also created a sense of fear and caused disarray in a fragile informal sector which was quietly the driving factor or fulcrum on which the South African economy relied. Crushing cost of electricity, turmoil in the extractive sector and stalemate in the platinum industry in 2016 perhaps were also a contributory factor to South Africa’s political woes. 

Overall, according, to Professor bond, the region was just poorly governed and a new leadership impetus led by the people was necessary to bring back the declining glories

For many years SADC was so much preoccupied on political stability. With good success, it has managed to tackle conflicts and bring peace amongst its member states. Overall, political conflict in the form of civil wars in the region has been declining with all except the DRC reporting any semblance of a conventional Civil war in recent years. 

Even, this has significantly been downgraded in recent years. Currently, there is no severe risk of any threat from any member state to destabilize any other through an arms insurrection. The ongoing conflict in the Eastern DRC is largely a war of survival for the remaining tribal and ethnic elements rather than a fully-fledged military configuration to overall and capture power in the DRC. If it can be dealt with, then perhaps the war in the DRC will be over or significantly reduced to minimal levels in many decades.

The future wars of the SADC will therefore be largely economic and perhaps resource based on key issues such as land, water and control of the real means of production and profit. Acute poverty could be the other driver of the masses towards insurrection. For Tanzania therefore, to take up the German challenge will be a touch endeavor.

Tanzania’s economic benefit or contribution to the region is too minimal. According to trade statistics, Tanzania is among the least exporters to SADC and its overall trade balance with its SADC neighbors was still low. It therefore lacks the economic might of German stature.

Over the past three years Tanzania’s political leadership has commitment itself to building its economy first before looking outside. Cutting back on public waste and flogging its population into line to start paying up taxes to finance its public service and infrastructure ambitions, Tanzania is building its economy from within.

Throughout the 1960s to the 1990s Tanzania sacrificed a lot in order to politically liberate virtually all the SADC member states and yet gained very minimal in return.  Political historians have even have even argued with some level of confidence that Tanzania under developed itself in sacrifice for others to develop. Tanzania would be therefore quite cautious in economic diplomatic terms and perhaps uncomfortable at this moment in giving out too much of what it has acquired over the years to salvage its economic neighbors.

The conditions in the region appear to have turned so bad in the past few years with persistent drought raving across the region only to be replaced by wrecking floods leaving behind famine and death in communities along its way.  Approximately over 1000 people dies in the last floods in Mozambique and Malawi caused by cyclone Idai and Keneth. Millions at a risk of starvation.  Essential infrastructure such as road and bridges connecting rural areas to urban centers and across countries such as the port of Beira are badly battered and incapable of supporting economic productivity.

The region has not been able to attract in Foreign Investment into its natural resource wealth and flagship infrastructure projects such as the Mighty Inga dam electro power project in the DRC which would have brought life into the SADC power master plan have remained incomplete for many years now. The region is badly in need of both reconstruction and reconfiguration to sustain itself and its ambitions.

At the end of the summit Tanzania’s former President Benjamin Mkapa advised that SADC member states should stop relying heavily on foreign donors for aid to support or finance their development agenda. Building internal capacity through a reliable market for products from the block, investment in education, technology, domestic revenue collection and unlocking the potential amongst its budging population to drive the economies forward would be a better option. Perhaps the SADC leadership should fine tune an ear to the wisdom of its elders.

The meeting concluded with signing off of three development cooperation programs worth 47 Million Euro deal with the European Union under its European Development Fund (EDF) 11 financing round. According to official statement, the funds will be used over the next five-year period to support improvement in the Investment and Business Environment (SIBE), Trade Facilitation Program (TFP) and Support to Industrial Productive Sectors (SIPS) three programs to be implemented by the SADC over the next five-year period

The SIBE program aims at achieving sustainable and inclusive growth and job creation by transforming the region into an investment zone, promoting intra-regional investments, foreign Direct Investment and a focus on Small and Medium Enterprises. The TFP will contribute to enhance inclusive economic development in the region through deepened economic integration while the SIPs aimed at contributing to the SADC industrialization agenda, improving performance and growth of selected value chains. How this EU injection translates into lifting the region from its economic downward spiral will yet to be found out at the next summit when SADC turns 40. What is clear is that something has to be done.

[i] SADC: Selected economic and social indicators, 2016

[ii] SADC: Selected economic and social indicators, 2017

[iii] AfDB: Southern Africa Economic Outlook, 2018

[iv] https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/southern-african-development-community

Elation as Kenya exports Oil; what does it mean for Oil rush in East African region

On 1st of August 2019, President Uhuru Kenyatta announced that Kenya had joined the list of world oil exporting Countries by selling its first crude oil at a cost of 12 Million United States dollars.

While the news reverberated across the Country and the region with elation, it is also possible that Kenya’s announcement could trigger a contagious rush to the bottom with East African Countries jostling to outcompete each other by signing off deals and agreements locking off future markets with potential buyers. Some of these deals may not be necessarily good.

By Moses Kulaba; Governance and Economic Analysis Center

Addressing the cabinet and media in Nairobi, President Kenyatta said Kenya had sold its barrels of crude oil to a buyer whose identity still remained a secret.

“We are now an Oil exporter. Our first deal was concluded this afternoon with 200,000 barrels at a price of USD 12 Million.  So I think we have started the journey and it is up to us to ensure that those resources are put to the best use to make our Country and to ensure we eliminate poverty, said Kenyatta.

The news reverberated in the region and globally with a new player on the market. Obviously there was more excitement and elation in the Lokichar Oil fields where Tullow Oil and its joint partners continue to explore more blocks with more vigour and determination.

Kenya discovered its first Oil in 2012 and since then, explorations have continued in the Lake Turkana basin region with deposits being reported and more projections made to increase. In its previous reports Tullow estimated some 560 Mln Barrels in possible reserves and these are now projected to increase as prospects for more discoveries are higher than before.

This would translate into 60,000 to 10,000 barrels per day of gross production, which is said to be insufficient to warrant the construction of a refinery locally hence the export plans

The sold consignment was delivered by truckers at the Kenya Petroleum Refineries facilities in Changamwe, Mombasa since July last year, under what the government described under the early oil project

What does this mean for Kenya and the East African region?

The deal concludes that Kenya once ruled off as an oil novice in the region, with the lowest volumes of discovered oil is running a head of its East African neighbors in reaching exporting oil country status many months before any of its East African neighbors can sell a drop of oil.

For Kenya, this is game changer in regional geopolitics as not only does the oil revenue bring a new line of foreign exchange earnings into its economy and thus consolidating its position as the regional economic superpower.

Galvanizing on its early market entry status, Kenya could tap the available markets and seal off any available contracts beating off any potential competition from its neighboring countries.

The oil revenues could also breathe some life into its Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor development plan which has stalled for among others lack of partners. With oil revenues flowing, Kenya can go alone developing the ambitious infrastructure projects along the corridor all the way to the Ethiopian boarder.

Contrary to nay Sayers, the oil export could be a window to emboldened security in the Turkana area as the government seeks to protect vital oil installations and export routes to the coast.  For many years, Lake Turkana basin has been one of the most volatile and insecure areas in Kenya as marauding armed warriors move from one village to another raiding for cattle. Civilians and military installations have been attacked and people killed.

In June, 2018 Turkana residents stopped five trucks from ferrying crude oil to Mombasa over rising insecurity along the border with Baringo. The resident complained of insecurity in the area but also complained of what they call consider unresolved issues on oil sharing benefits between the National governments, County governments and local communities over the 5% share which they wanted channeled to their bank accounts rather than for development as rallied by a section of leaders.

There is no way we can be a security threat to the oil we have protected and guarded for years. So the specialized and additional security personnel (protecting oil) should head to Kapedo and secure people.

Kenya’s oil export announcement could trigger a contagious rush for oil in the East African region, with each country racing to drill to bottom in search for oil. In an effort to outcompete each other, those already with oil discoveries such as Uganda and South Sudan could race to the market sealing off deals and contracts with potential buyers and agreements for future markets. Some of these deals maybe bad.

 Uganda was the first to strike oil around its Albertine graben in 2005. According to Uganda’s Ministry of energy the petroleum deposit discovered so far were estimated at 6.5barrels of which 1.5bln are considered as recoverable.

The Ugandan oil is supposed to be exported to the global market through a 1,443 electric heated East African Oil Pipeline (EACOP) via Tanzania. The East African Crude oil pipeline is expected to unlock East Africa Oil potential by attracting invest and companies to explore the potential in the region.

According to the project schedule available on the EACOP website the detailed engineering and procurement and early works were supposed to have been made in 2018 and construction started in 2019. The first oil exports were expected in 2020. But it appears all these are behind schedule.

According to Ministry of Uganda expected to conclude its financial deal for its joint pipeline with Tanzania by June, 2019, opening for the way for its construction. According to the information provided by then, Stanbic Bank Uganda, was supposed to be the lead arranger for USD2.5billion funding for the 1,455 km (EACOP) project. The deal was expected to have been concluded in June, 2019.

Kampala was also expecting that the Final Investment Decisions (FID) between the government and the oil partners to determine when funds for the project will be made available, the terms of the financing and when the project execution will commence with a projected timeline between 20 and 36 months

The pipeline was expected to jointly develop the USD 3.5 billion pipeline, described as the longest electrically heated crude oil pipeline in the world. The balance of USD 1billion is expected to come from shareholders in equity

However, by the time Kenya announced its export deal in July, the earth breaking ceremony commencing the start of the EACOP pipeline construction had not started. Negotiations were reported as ongoing. In June 2017, the Daily Business Newspaper carried an article with a headline ‘Uganda’s Oil may not flow by 2020’ as the required infrastructure may not be complete  by then[i]

What this means for Uganda is that time is of essence and the sooner the EACOP project construction takes off the better for its potential oil market.

Figure 3: The Government of Tanzania and Uganda sign the Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) for the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP)  in May, 2017

 

So why do some oil projects like take long to materialize?

Lack of astute leadership, effective institutions and canning ambition to drive the projects to fruition. In some countries the political leadership and responsible institutions can be weak, whereby the essential operational process surrounding the oil projects can be clogged in political rhetoric and undertones which make decision making quite cumbersome, inefficiently slow and less assuring to the investors

Technical aspects such as Quality of crude oil discovered

High Sulphur crude oil can such as the Ugandan and Kenyan crude oil can be waxy and costly to transport via pipeline as it requires constant heating along the route.  This explains why the 1,433 km EACOP is described as the longest electric heated pipeline in the world. This adds to complexity in technology and costs on heating required to operationalize the project. Investors may

Oil reservoir behaviors and recoverable volumes – The discovered oil reserves are not always the same as the recoverable volumes. In some projects the reserves can be large yet due to geological and technological factors the recoverable volumes are low.  The behavior of the oil reservoirs is therefore a significant factor in determining whether the recoverable volumes will be consistent with the early projections and economic models over the plateau period. A change in the recoverable volumes can trigger massive losses and may lead to complete closure of the oil project. Investors are happy to rush projects where recoverable volumes will be sustained

Financing aspects such as financing structure -Lack of financing for some reasons or high interests on the investment loans secured from investment-lending institutions can be a delaying factor.  The decision to invest may therefore take long as the investors or partners to the oil project juggle and weigh the available financial options viz a vis the current and future costs of the project on the country and the investors

Economic metric considerations such as the Net Present Value (NPV), Rate of Return (RoR) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the project.

These are calculations undertaken to determine the economic and financial viability of the project. They are used to determine how much return and how long it will take to recoup the initial investment and starting generating profit.

According to online sources such as Investopedia, the Net present value (NPV) is the difference between the present value of cash inflows and the present value of cash outflows over a period of time. NPV is used in capital budgeting and investment planning to analyze the profitability of a projected investment or project.

The Rate of Return (RoR) is the net gain or loss on an investment over a specified time period, expressed as a percentage of the investment’s initial cost. This simple rate of return is sometimes called the basic growth rate, or alternatively, return on investment, or ROI. If you also consider the effect of the time value of money and inflation, the real rate of return can also be defined as the net amount of discounted cash flows received on an investment after adjusting for inflation.

The rate of return is used to measure growth between two periods, rather than over several periods. The RoR can be used for many purposes, from evaluating investment growth to year-over-year changes in company revenues. Its calculation does not consider the effects of inflation.

The internal rate of return (IRR) is a measure used in capital budgeting to estimate the profitability of potential investments. The internal rate of return is a discount rate that makes the Net Present Value (NPV) that makes the Net Present Value (NPV) of all cash flows from a particular project equal to zero.  It is mathematically calculated as IRR=NPV=t=1∑T (1+r)t −C0 =0)

IRR is the rate of growth a project is expected to generate. The IRR is used in capital budgeting to decide which projects or investments to undertake and which to forgo.

Generally speaking, the higher a project’s internal rate of return, the more desirable it is to undertake. Assuming the costs of investment are equal among the various projects, the project with the highest IRR would probably be considered the best and be undertaken first. IRR is sometimes referred to as “economic rate of return” or “discounted cash flow rate of return.”

Social factors such as land acquisition and due diligence for compensation– The nebulous and intricate balancing act between the local laws and the international standards as guided by the International Finance Corporation can be a hindrance. Quite often the local standards for compensation can be law, corrupt unfair yet the IFC standards requires fair and equity

Negative diplomacy: The oil projects could delay or fail to take off all together due to negative diplomacy. Whereby disgruntled actors such as activists, companies, politicians who may not be excited or about the project may quietly lobby, urge, convince or cajole the financing institutions not to finance the project.

Security Risk:  Oil projects cost lots of money in investment and thus require assurances that financial investments and their installations will be guaranteed.  Oil projects can stall as investors and their partners gauge the security risks

Some or all of these factors could be now at play in the East African region and could be explanatory factors as to why some petroleum projects are progressing at a snail’s pace or stalled all together. Perhaps Kenya’s early oil export could be trigger for its neighbors to start thinking ahead.

 

 

 

[i] https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Uganda—oil—2020-Standard–Poors-Tanzania/3946234-3982464-j7rbsq/index.html

Why Rules of Origin (RoO) should not be used exclusively to pursue trade policy objectives

This article shades light on a major instrument in international trade and customs management, which has been used by states to achieve multiple trade objectives. The concept of RoO has become controversial in the current interconnected global trading system where the point of production and sale across have become quite seamless and yet international trading rules requires that the definite origin of goods are identified for preferential treatment, statistical and tax purposes. The article argues that despite the implicit functions they play RoO should never be used a tool for negative trade pursuit rather a conduit for trade facilitation. The paper defines rules of origin and trade policy, outlining the objectives of trade policy, explaining the linkages between the two and discusses other instruments which can be used to achieve trade policy objectives

By Moses Kulaba; Governance and Economic Policy Analysis Center

Rules of origin (RoO) are common defined as laws, regulations and administrative criteria applied by a country to determine the country of origin of goods, for tariff preference purposes, subject to specific conditions as defined in WTO agreements and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)[i].  The East African Customs Union has summarized the rules of origin as ‘the vital link between the goods and country where they are produced’[1][ii] RoO are categorized as Preferential and non preferential depending on their characteristics and objectives.

Preferential RoO aim at determining whether goods qualify for preferential treatment and while Non Preferential RoO used to determine goods for trade statistical purposes. Rules of origin have significant relation and influence on a country’s trade policy or member countries which are contractually related or mutually obliged under a given contractual or non contractual trade arrangement. Rules of origin also may determine or assist the countries in understanding their comparative and competitive advantage. They are commonly used as a trade policy tool to protect local markets, give preferential treatment and a measure against unfair trade.

Trade policy can be defined as a collection or law, rules and practices aimed at achieving a country’s trade objectives. Tanzania’s trade policy aims to contribute to raising per capital income to levels targeted in National Development Vision 2025, trade development measures to stimulate and expand domestic demand through product and market diversification and limited interim safe guard of domestic economic activity threatened by liberalization, while building economic competitiveness[iii] It seek to achieved sustainable growth rate in trae of not less than 14% and long-term share of exports to GDP  of about 25%, double fold increase in manufacturing and raised value of merchandise export earnings in absolute terms to USD1,700 in the next five years[iv]

The Tanzania government recognizes the importance or Rules of origin as a tool for implementing trade policy objectives and has committed towards using the RoO in a manner that can strengthen the country’s industrial and trade potential. The Tanzanian clearly articulates this position in its trade policy where it states:

The Government of Tanzania will undertake measures to observe RoO preferences requirements prevailing in the different trading arrangements with a view to maximizing benefits accruing in the cause of implementation…with priority focus on building national capacity for effective utilization of this instruments[v]

While RoO are a common factor in Trade policy, because of the challenges that RoO have in relation to international trade, they are considered as not the tools of most preference in achieving trade policy objectives. Indeed, increasingly governments are being advised that RoO should not be used to achieve trade policy objectives for the following reasons.

Firstly, they can be distortionary and work contrary to trade policy objectives especially where there is no harmonization of trade policy objectives. “If Clear, predictable, transparent and fair, rules of origin and their application facilitate the flow of international trade. Nevertheless, RoO can create unnecessary obstacles to trade and nullify or impair the rights of members in regional and multilateral trading arrangements including the EAC, SADC and WTO. Consequently, RoO have to be applied in a transparent, predictable, consistent and neutral manner so as to avoid their negative effects[vi].

Secondly, rules of origin is also important in facilitating international trade where the objective is free flow of goods, irrespective of trade policies or various countries

It can be sometimes difficult for countries to achieve trade targets in situations where it is a member to multiple contractual obligations which may conflict with its own national trade objectives. This is a common challenge for countries like Tanzania which belongs both to the EAC and SADC and has therefore a challenge in determining or applying RoO for goods originating from both economic blockings

Implementation of rules of origin is sometimes cumbersome and sometimes can be distortionary especially where there is need to determine various technical dimensions to the items for preferential purposes.

Rules of Origin are also not the only instruments for achieving trade policy objectives. They are just one instrument and other instruments could be effectives. These instruments include a combination of other trade policies, which can be elaborated as below:

Trade policy instruments are described as measures taken by governments to influence the direction and pattern of trade development. The application of these instruments in Tanzania is guided by the need to stimulate domestic production, promotion of exports, safeguard domestic industry against dumping practices and protection of consumers. Tanzania exercises these trade policy options in line with its international obligations. These instruments include: Tariff Based (Advalorem) Instruments, NTBs: Trade defense mechanisms; trade development instruments; and international trade policy instruments.

Tariff based instruments, include;

Tariffs, which are major trade instruments for trade policy implementation which are used to achieve duo objectives of revenue generation and protection of domestic industry. Heavy import substitution protection regimes can harm unprotected industry and ultimately reduce consumer welfare. It is for this purpose that Tanzania has been reforming its tariff band structure to a current four band structure (0,10,15 and 25)

Duty Draw Back Schemes (DDB) which are tools for export promotion through refund of import taxes on imported inputs that go towards production for exports. Tanzania has implemented a DDB scheme, although the scheme faces multiple challenges, including difficulties in technical verification. This also includes the mechanisms for VAT refund

Taxation, which comprises of   tax regime characterized by different taxes and levies imposed by the central and local government to achieve a duo purpose of revenue collection and protection used for administration of quota restrictions

Export Taxes which are levied as instruments to discourage export of raw materials in favour of value added products. In Tanzania the use of export taxes has been gradually reduced, with restrictions currently imposed on export of geological or mining products and raw hides and skins.

Non Tarrif Barriers/Measures these are measures aimed the protection of industry that work on the basis of restriction of imports. These instruments include;

Import licenses which is aimed at both controlling and regulation of the volume of imports and also taking track of importers, automatic licences issued automatically without discretionary powers and non-automatic licenses

Reshipment Inspection requirements (PSI) which are sets of activities aimed at the verification of quality, quantity, price, exchange rates, financial terms and customs classification of goods undertaken in the exporting countries

Trade Related Investments Measures (TRIMS)-Local Content Requirements, falling within the WTO TRIMS agreements, which cover a number of restrictive issues on foreign investments in view of their restricting impact. These include conditionalities on local content, local equity, foreign exchange balancing, import obligations and others that are specifically prohibited. This is aimed at enabling local industry to gain the necessary capacity and competence in developing its competitiveness.

Customs Valuation; which involves determination and ascription of value to items based on WTO customs compatible valuation procedures, guided with principles of fairness, uniformity and certainty

Standards-Technical Barriers to trade (TBTs) such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and other standards, used as instruments of trade policy to authenticate the quality and specification of imports and exports in conformity with the international safety requirements and regulations aimed at consumer protection.

State Trading Operations which are undertaken by both Government and Non Government enterprises, including marketing boards, which are granted exclusive special rights or privileges including statutory or constitutional powers in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or sale the level or direction of imports or exports.  State Trading is clearly different from government procurement.

Government Procurement: This refers to a system which governs or regulates government procurement, requiring it to procure goods and services through a centralized international and national procurements process. It requires this process to be fair, transparent and allow competitiveness amongst suppliers and thus lowering costs. In pursuing trade objectives, the policy of transparence and open competitiveness has to be balanced with considerations for protection or stimulation of local industry.

Administrative procedures. These are other instruments that can be used to achieve trade policy objectives. Administrative procedures prevail in developing economies as a response to difficult situations at times of natural disasters such as the need to ensure food security when grain shortages are envisaged due to shortfalls in production yields. These may applied from one region to another as a way of balancing out the shortages. In Tanzania, this instrument has been used from time to time, especially in the control and regulation of export of maize and coffee to neighboring countries.

Trade Instruments

Trade policy objectives are also achieved through other trade defence instruments which are allowed by the WTO for safeguarding specific economic activities within a limited time-frame through application of  a set of instruments. These include:

Safeguard Measures aimed at protecting a sector or subsector of the economy or domestic industry from suffering from certain consequences. These normally take the form of raised tariffs and temporary relief measures

Antidumping aimed at protecting a country’s economy or industry from being flooded by cheap goods, which have no significant economic value. The WTO prescribes action against dumping

Subsidies and Countervailing duties: These include measures that confer benefits to producers and exporters and exist where a public body or government provides financial contribution to producers in the form of grants, soft loans or equity etc. These subsidies can be categorized into permissible and non specific subsidies that are non-actionable, permissible but actionable subsidies and prohibited subsidies. Currently Tanzania has not developed an export subsidy regime although it is permissible under the WTO arrangement.

Rules of origin are a combination of laws, regulations and administrative criteria used by a country to determine the origin of goods and determines how specific goods should be treated for tax purposes.

Trade Development instruments include:

Export Process ZonesThis refers to trade development instruments used to stimulate export oriented economic activities through inculcation of a value addition and import culture, acquisition of appropriate technology

Investment Codes and rules which work through compensation for distortions which impede the flow of foreign investments largely due to market imperfections

Export promotion and market linkages which entails provision of support services to exporters with the objective of expanding trade for existing product lines

Export Facilitation which is pursued through the simplification of trade procedures and reduction of high costs involved through measures such as provision of export credit

International Policy Instruments can also be achieved to achieve trade policy objectives and these include

  • Bilateral Cooperation initiatives amongst willing countries depending on the variant agreements between contracting partner’s states
  • Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) which have evolved through the growth and expansion of Economic Integration arrangements like the EAC
  • WTO agreements and Multilateral trading system which aims at stimulation of sustainable economic growth through trade expansion, encouraging specialization and opening up of national economies through elimination and reduction of Non Tarrif Barriers (NTBs)

Conclusively, despite the limitations, rules of origin still play an important role in driving trade policy objectives. However, for them to be effective, they need to be applied in a transparent, fair and predictable manner to avoid causing distortionary effects to international trade.

[i] URT: National Trade Policy for a Competitive economy and export led growth, Ministry of Industries and Trade, February, 2003

[ii] East African Community Customs Union Rules of Origin, September 2005

[iii] ibid

[iv] ibid

[v] ibid

[vi] ibid

Why governments should not sign Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with the European Union without negotiation

Why governments should not sign Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with the European Union without negotiation

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre, Dar es Salaam-Tanzania

From the tenets or principles and its design, the EPA offers critical economic challenges. Indeed, according, former Tanzanian President, HE Benjamin Mkapa, has cautioned that signing the EPA less developed Countries like Tanzania will be signing off an economic death warrant to their industries and jobs. Similar sentiments have been echoed by President John Magufuli when he described the EPAs as a form of colonialism and bad for our Country. Experts have equally warned against signing EPAs in their current form and content-perhaps there is reason to fear

The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) are bilateral agreements signed between less developed Countries and the European Union which allows free access of goods and services to   the European Union and vice versa. At the core of the EPA’s are said to be free trade between Less Developed Countries and the European Union.  They were set to replace the current existing trade relationships under the Cotonou Agreement and any other preferential trade related provisions such as the Everything But Arms (EBA).

It is from this perspective that as an expert and economic diplomat, I would advise Tanzania’s government and other least developed countries (LDCs) not to sign EPAs in their current form and pursue any future negotiations with utmost caution.

Firstly, EPAs would open up the Tanzanian market and industrial sector to extreme European competition this would be contrary to Tanzania government’s industrialization and job creation agenda. According to European Investment Reports in Tanzania, EU companies accounted for 68% of the total FDI in Tanzania. This makes the EU the single largest investment block into Tanzania. Under the EPA framework domestic industries will not be able to compete with their European counterparts. The EU also subsidizes its products through subsidizes extended to its farmers and industries making them unfavorably competitive.

The EPA does not guarantee free access of Tanzanian goods into the European Market. This is because the European market restrictions and non-tariff barriers such as quality controls and psytosanitary standards which are imposed by the EU on goods and services coming from less developed Countries.

According to the European Commission the net trade volumes between the EU and Tanzania amounted to1, 602 Million Euros. The EU also toped Tanzania as a trading partners with trade volumes estimated at USD2 Billion in 2016  Out of these Tanzania exported goods worth Euros632 million while it imported goods and services worth Euros 970 million creating a trade balance of Euros 338 million in favour of the EU. This therefore means that the trade imbalance would worsen   if Tanzania was to open up its markets to the European Union without any restriction.

Free trade between the EU and Tanzania would lead to high import revenue foregone by Tanzania. It is estimated that at the current figures (Usd2 billion in 2016) the trade created through signing of EPA would amount to 10 Billion. If an average amount of import duty charged on these goods is projected over the five-year period of the EPA, the government would lose billions in revenue foregone. This would be a major loss to the government which is struggling to build its tax base and aims to achieve a tax to GDP ratio of 19% by 2020.

There are other opportunities to trade with the EU exist under the Cotonou Agreement. The Everything But Arms provisions with in the current Cotonou Agreement allow Tanzania to export goods and services apart from arms to the EU on preferential terms. It does therefore not make prudent economic sense for the Country to enter into another agreement whose perceived economic benefits could be still achieved under the EBA. It would be to continue or re-negotiate with the EU under the EBA framework. The EPA may also be contrary to WTO rules of MFN. By signing the EPA Tanzania would be obliged to provide the same treatment to other nations. This would dangerously open up Tanzania’s economic to extreme competition and potential dumping from other Countries

The signing of the EPA would create a multiplicity and duplicity of membership to regional trade groupings. Tanzania is a member of SADC and EAC. By signing up to the EPA, Tanzania would also violate some of the economic rules of SADC which requires a common external tariff on goods coming from outside the SADC. The EPA requires that EAC signs as a region. This is requirement is oblivious to the fact that the different member states are at different economic levels. Kenya is a developing Country and therefore stands to benefit more from the EPA than Tanzania. Kenya’s flower market has already been a major export to the European Markets and this implies that Kenya would be a major beneficiary.

Obviously, by not signing up, Tanzania stands to lose its diplomatic darling status in the face of EU’s foreign policy to Africa. Tanzania’s good will have to meet high standards and heavily compete with other countries for entry into the European market. The non-preferential tax treatment and potential border taxes imposed by Tanzania on foreign goods may make EU products entering Tanzania’s markets to be highly priced and costly for local Tanzanians. Tanzania may be forced to seek alternative trading partners to replace on previously EU sourced goods.

Despite the potential economic benefits that appear to be offered by the EPA, if weighed the advantages of signing the EPA in their current forms has potential catastrophic consequences on Tanzania. A cautiously renegotiated approach would be the most appropriate pathway.

References

A comparison between the East African Community (EAC) and the   European Union (EU) in search for stronger Regional Economic Cooperation

A comparison between the East African Community (EAC) and the   European Union (EU) in search for stronger Regional Economic Cooperation:

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre, Dar es Salaam-Tanzania

The East Africa Community (EAC) is a regional economic block comprising of 6 member states. The EAC was originally established in 1967, resolved in 1977 and later revived in 1999 comprising of three founding members; Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.  It has since expanded to include Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan.  Currently, discussions are ongoing to admit Somalia into the block. A comparison of the EU and EAC shows that the two blocks have some similarities but also fundamental differences.  Despite having the longest history, the EAC’s to maturity has remained punctured and slow like a tortoise while its younger cousin towers in speed and form like a mighty colossus. What lessons can be learnt?

The European Union (EU) is a regional economic grouping of 27 member countries. The history of the EU can be traced back to 1950 when the first proposal towards integration was made by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman towards integrating the Coal and Steel industries of Western Europe. 

This culminated in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel community (ECSC) in 1951 comprising of six members: Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands. The next steps towards the EU advanced further with the signing of the treaty of Rome in 1957 and establishment of the European Economic Commission (EEC).  Since its inception the EU has evolved through various stages into one of the most successful regional economic and political blocks.

Similarities between the EAC and EU regional economic blocks

Common economic theoretical motivation

All are economic regional blocks aimed at fostering trade amongst its members. By their nature, regional economic blocks aim at promoting the economic prosperity and development of its members.

The economic theoretical motivation of the blocks is informed by liberal and neo liberal school of thought that suggests the need for mutual cooperation and common collaboration by states to address global problems.   According liberal economists such as Adam Smith who suggested that countries benefited from free trade and elimination of tariffs while Gottfried Haberler suggested that those excluded from the preference arrangements arising from economic integration should lose.  There was value for states to cooperate for the sake of enjoying trade and economic benefits. 

Economically just like any other regional blocs, the EAC and EU seek to benefit from economies of scale, trade creation, product differentiation and efficiency gains through regional trade policies created within the community blocs.

Geographical proximity is a major success factor for economic integration. In both the EU and the EAC, respective member states abide to the factor of geographical proximity by sharing common borders. Expansion to countries that are considered not sharing common borders has been largely opposed and remained a politically divisive issue. For example, EAC member states rejected Sudan’s application to join the block because it did not share a close border.  Some EU countries have used the same reason, among others, to deny Turkey’s membership to the EU.

Common historical background is evident amongst both regional groups. The EAC is bound by a common historical background linking its members to a common African cultural and linguistic heritage embed in Bantu and Kiswahili as a language of the region. Although separated by artificial colonial borders the East African people are the same and related in many aspects. The EU is a diverse block of many countries with various linguistic backgrounds but common European heritage. In recent years, the EU has been gradually trying to build a European Culture, by allowing free movement and settlement of its citizens across EU member states.

Differences between EU and EAC

In order to make an informed differentiation of the two regional blocks, one has to look at the history, rationale, organization structure, operations and political economy of these organizations.

According to Njura, the fundamental difference between the EU and EAC lies in their respective rationale.

The EU was basically established to promote peace, economic prosperity, and the well-being of its peoples based on the constitutive act of the EU Article 3. While the rationale behind the establishment EAC  as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty for the establishment of the EAC, was to develop policies aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among the Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defense, security and legal and judicial affairs for the mutual benefit.

The EU was conceived as a tool for peace. Between 1954 and 1959 the cooperation amongst European states was set up with the aim of ending the frequent and bloody wars between neighbors, which culminated in the Second World War. As of 1950, the European Coal and Steel Community began to unite European Countries economically and politically in order to secure lasting peace.

The current EAC was revived after the collapse of the first East African Community in 1977, whose prime motivation had equally focused on building economic development of the region after the struggle for independence. The first EAC had collapsed largely because of political indifference. Building a new EAC fundamentally anchored on economic cooperation made sense.

A deeper analysis reveals further that there are significant differences between the EU and the EAC in terms of stages of its integration, organs and operations. Its pillars and structures have (leadership, decisions making and accountability

Different sequencing and stages of economic integration development

The sequencing of integration is an important feature in regional economic integration. The various stages provide room for partners to build consensus on the shared degree of ambition, the size and diversity, and convergence of economic block

Classically, there are five major stages of economic integration. Free Trade Area, Preferential Trade Area, Customs Union, Common Market, Monetary Union and ultimately a political union.

The Free Trade Area (FTA) is the initial stage toward regional economic integration under which Countries agree to cooperate on selected areas. The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) is second stages where Countries agree to remove tariffs across member states while maintain independent tariff regimes on imports from outside countries. The third stage is the Customs Union where member states agree on all conditions in FTA and PTA and also establish a common external tariff (CET) on all imports from outside the block. The Common Market follows with features comprising of all the other stages including free movement of labour, capital goods and services across member states. The Monetary Union is the next stage where by member states agree to all the terms under the previous stages, including a common monetary policy and currency. The last stage is the Political Union, where the member states cooperate on political matters and cede considerable political power to a central authority.

The European Union is currently of Monetary Union with also some characteristics of a political union.  A close scrutiny of the EU shows that its stages of integration were not cleared distinct but inter-related in a reinforcing manner leading towards full economic integration.

Since the signing of the treaty of Rome in 1957 the European has developed into an internal single market through a standardized system of laws that apply in all member Countries and into a Monetary Union with a single Currency-the Euro.

EU policies aim to ensure the free movement of people, goods, services and capital within the market. It has enacted legislation concerning justice and home affairs, and maintained common policies on trade, agriculture, fisheries and regional development.

Has adopted a common external border control policy and within the Schengen Area, passport controls have been abolished allowing free movement across borders for all EU nationals and foreigners possessing a Schengen Visa. A monetary union was established in 1999 and came into full force in 2002. It is comprised of 19 EU member states which use the Euro as a common currency

On the contrary, the EAC has attempted to follow a chronological order of growth from one stage to another. The EAC was established in 1999 as a Customs Union. Because of its history and level of economic cooperation amongst its founding states, the EAC skipped the first stage of economic integration. It is currently a Common Market, which is the third stage of economic integration whereby there is supposed to be a common external tariff, free movement of labour, goods and services.

The EAC is still aspiring to achieve a monetary Union by 2024 and ultimately a political federation thereafter. Attempts to fast track to a political federation have not materialized because of a number of mitigating factors such as competing political interests and perceived leadership ambitions.

Major Timelines for EU and EAC Regional Integration

EU Timeline

EAC Timeline

Event

Year

Event

Year

European Coal and Steel  Cooperation (ECSC)

1951

Tripartite Commission for Cooperation signed

1993

Treaty of Rome –European Economic Cooperation (EEC)

1957

Treaty for EAC signed by Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda

1999

Single European Act (SEA)-Single Union

1986

Customs Union Protocol

2004

Maastricht treaty-European Union (EU) established-EU as Common Market

1992

Expansion of EAC by admission of Rwanda and Burundi

2007

Treaty of Amsterdam and Nice- Monetary Union and Euro as a Currency

2001/2

Common Market

2010

Treaty of Lisbon-Political aspects of the Union, including Constitutional issues and leadership

2007

Protocol for establishment of Monetary Union signed not yet implemented

2013

Organs of the EU and the EAC

The EU operates through a hybrid system of supra-national and intergovernmental decision making. Under this arrangement some of the member state powers have been delegated to be exercised by the EU Headquarters in Brussels on behalf and interest of its member states.

It has got seven principle institutions governing its operations. These are also known as Institutions of the European Union. These institutions do not actually directly represent the government members of the EU but actually operate within the dual supranational and intergovernmental structure. Based on the institutional provision, organization structures of the EU are:

The European Council which defines the general political direction of the EU. This is composed heads of state or government of the member states plus the president of the European Commission. The high representative of Foreign Affairs and security policy is also a member. This body forms the EU summit;

The European commission: Established in 1958, this is the EU executive body. It is the organ entitled with the management of the EU decisions, common policies and budget. It is composed of 28 members as commissioners, one from each member country;

The European Council or Council of the European Union: This is also known as the council of Ministers which was composed of 28 (27 after the exit of the United Kingdom) members. These are tasked with the responsibility of adopting EU laws and coordinating policy implementation.  It is comprised of Ministers from members from all member states and convenes regularly depending on the policy areas under discussion. The Presidency to this is held for 6 months on a rotational basis

The European Parliament: This is comprised of 751 members directly elected by the European Union member state citizens through direct adult suffrage for a five year term. They bear the responsibility of representing the citizens of the EU.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) established in 1952 comprising of 1 judge from each country and 11 advocates. This plays a significant role in interpreting the laws for the Union and its decisions and rulings have de jure binding powers on all its members.

The EU has other bodies such as the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). The ECB conducts Economic and monetary policy and manages the Euro. The EIB provides funding for EU projects.

The European Court of Auditors and Office of the Ombudsman investigates all complaints against the EU institutions and bodies.

The EAC Organisation and Institutional Structure

There are seven main organs through which the EAC works, however in contrast to the EU, there are slight differences in how some of these organs operate and exercise their powers.  These organs include:

The summit of heads of states which provides strategic direction towards realization of the goals of the EAC: it is composed of the Presidents of the member states with the authority to make final decisions on the direction the community needs to take in terms of economic developments and political cooperation;

The council of ministers: it composes of the various ministers of member state governments in charge of the EAC affairs in their respective governments. Its major responsibility is policy direction but also keeps constant review and monitoring of the EAC programs. These are major custodians of the decisions taken by the summit.

The coordination committee whose primary responsibility is to foster regional cooperation and supervision of sectoral committees: it is composed of the permanent secretaries in various member governments‟ ministries responsible for the affairs of the EAC. The responsibility of the body is to prepare reports, submit and give recommendations on the implementation of the treaty

The Sectoral committees are composed of senior officials established by the council ministers with the major responsibility of conceptualizing programs, preparing comprehensive implementation and monitoring of programs. These meet on a regularly depending on the issues

The Secretariat: this is the administrative organ of the EAC. It is the one responsible for managing the everyday affairs of the EAC but has no powers to decide the direction on which the EAC need to go; this power is reserved for presidents. It is the guardian of the EAC treaty, ensuring that the treaty and decisions made by the other organs are implemented.

The East Africa Legislative Assembly: it is the legislative arm of the EAC; it debates and approves the community budget. It is composed of 45 members (nine from each member states) and 7 ex-officio members comprising of Ministers or Cabinet officials responsible for EAC affairs from the member states. These are elected by the members of the national parliaments of member states

The East African Court of Justice: this is the court of the EAC which has the responsibility of interpreting the laws, the treaties and hears the disputes among the party states members. It is the principle judicial body of the EAC. It is comprised of judges appointed from member states. It has jurisdiction to entertain all matters related to the implementation of the EAC treaty and its associated legislations.

According to the EU regulations, its organs appear to have more independent mandate to exercise their powers and take binding decisions while the EAC organs are still subject to approval by the Summit of Head of states of the member countries.  The summit is chaired one of the head of state of the member countries on a rotational basis.

Differences in EU and EAC operations

The EU is largely a treaty-based organization.  The treaties are the major binding agreements between EU member states.  Every major decision and step is taken and effected by treaty. No major decision can be taken and applicable to all member states without a treaty. Examples of the various treaties and their application include;

Treaty

Significant decision or changes made

Treaty of Rome (1957)

Establishment of European Economic Community (EEC)

Single European Act  (SEA) 1986

Deadline for single full market

Treaty of Maastricht (1992)

Widening of the EEA and establishment of the European Union

The treaty of Amsterdam (1997)

Expansion of the EU, admission of 10 members from former communist countries, absorption of Schengen Convention into EU Law, expansion of Common Foreign Security Policy

The treaty of Maastricht –Nice (2001)

Reformed decision making, changed procedures for election of Commission President, defined role of EU institutions

The treaty of Lisbon (2007)

Major amendments to the Constitutional basis of the EU

The Paris Treaty (2015)

Climate Change

The EU decisions are also made  and transmitted to the members through Regulations, directives / guidelines, decisions and recommendations.  Regulations are legally binding to all member states and must be implemented in their entirety. For example the EU regulations on Common safeguards on goods imported from outside the EU.  Directives are EU legislative acts setting out goals that all EU member states should achieve and member states left to devise mechanisms for domestic application (eg directive on elimination of hidden costs on the internet). EU decisions are applicable to those to whom they are addressed such as Countries or specific companies (For example participation in Counter terrorism and humanitarian measures) while recommendations remain largely recommendations for best practice such as best practices in use of e-commerce

The EAC operates based on treaties and protocols. The treaty to establish the EAC was signed in 1999. Thereafter subsequent decisions have been taken through protocols. Examples of such protocols include the protocol to establish the Customs Union (2004), Protocol establishing the Common Market (2010), the EAC Monetary Union Protocol (2013) and the protocol establishing the East African Kiswahili Commission (2012). The EAC also issues guidelines to member states and has passed various legislation in line with the EAC treaty.

Difference in EU and EAC membership and benefits

The EU allows none members to enjoy some of its benefits.  The members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) are not part of the EU but are subjected to EU economic regulations. Countries such as Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland which are members of the Single market through the EEA are none EU members but enjoy trade benefits from the EU. Switzerland and Norway for example are also part of the Schengen area. Some member states of the EU such as the United Kingdom opted to keep their own currency, the Pound. The EURO is only used in only 19 member Countries of the 28 member block.

In the EAC, none members are restricted from enjoying benefits from the block. Countries such as Somalia have been given observer status since 2012 and may enjoy some economic privileges and benefits from the EAC. Discussions to have Somalia formally admitted has stalled since 2015

Differences in political development, roles and global influence

The European Union has advanced into a political organization with a formidable force on both economic, political security matters -while the EAC is still aspiring to achieve a monetary union and ultimately a political union. Through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU has developed a role in external relations and defence.  The EU has permanent diplomatic missions (EU delegations) and represents itself at the United Nations, the WTO, the G8 and the G20.  Because of its financial and political global influence, the EU has been described as a current and potential super power.

The EU has succeeded in building common democratic values and standards that must be demonstrated and respected by the member states.  The different values of democracy are reflected in the manner in which the EU is administered, how its representatives are elected and participatory nature in which major decisions, such as to join, expand or changes to key treaty provisions are made. For example, countries only the EU after express approval of their citizens through a vote or referendum. Votes of this kind have failed in countries such as Norway. 

While in the EAC there are significant political challenges, such as lack of respect to constitutionalism, peaceful transition of power through democratic means such as elections. Political, ethnic and resource based conflicts are prevalent and these have been a major hindrance toward the fast progress of the EAC.  To date, the EAC has not garnered converging common political momentum towards a political union.

Differences in geographical, population and economic size

There are significant differences in terms of Geographical and Economic size between the two bodies. The EU comprises of 508.2 million people accounting for 7.3 of the world population and 4,324,782 Square kilometers. In 2014 the total GDP of the EU was estimated at 18.495 trln USD. This constituted approximately 24% of global nominal GDP and 17% if measured terms of purchasing power parity. The GDP per capita of its residents measured at PPP was estimated at 40.486 USD. The level of industrial growth and advancement is higher compared to its EAC counterpart.

The EAC’s size is 2.5 million square kilometers. Its population and GDP were estimated at 168.5 Million and 159.5 bln respectively.  The GDP per capita was USD918 and its economy was largely driven by agricultural and semi processed goods. The total export from the EAC was USD13.6 bln while it imported 40.2bln. The total trade volume between the EU and the EAC was 6,008 million Euros.  The exports to the EU from EAC were mainly coffee, cut flowers, tea, tobacco, fish and vegetables.  The imports from the EU into the EAC were dominated by machinery, mechanical appliances, equipment and parts, vehicles and pharmaceutical products. The EAC exported goods worth 2,415 Million Euros and Imported goods worth 3,593 Million Euros creating a trade balance of 1,178 million Euros in favour of the EU. From the statistics clearly, the trade balance and terms of trade between the EU and EAC was heavily biased in favor of the EU.  Perhaps this explains why the EU has been keen on establishing strong trade relations with the EAC through the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)

In conclusion therefore, despite the fact that these two bodies are both regional economic integration blocks formed to achieve a common purpose of economic prosperity.  A careful scrutiny of the two reveals some subtle differences, their history, operation and structure, economic size and interest. Comparatively, the EU is far advanced as an economic regional block compared to its East African counterpart. Perhaps these differences explain why the relationship between the EU and EAC has been a subject of significant divergence and discussions in recent times.

The following lessons can therefore be learnt

  • Collective will and desire to unite is essential for a successful integration
  • People centeredness rather than state centeredness regional economic integration succeed
  • Elimination of personal ego and ‘big-man syndrome’ amongst the members and their leadership increases chance for success
  • Essence of having an anchor state rallying all the other member states together for the common cause and standing for and in bail of other member states whenever political and economic catastrophe strikes such as the economic meltdown and Euro financial turbulence in 2008 and indebtedness of Greece and Portugal.
  • Economic size is not a factor as both small and big member states stand chance to benefit if necessary, measures and structures are put in place and operational.

References

Jeffrey, A. (1990) “The European Community in the 1990s: Perspectives on Integration and Institutions

Monnet, J and Schuman, R. (2005), Paper series Vol. 5 No. 37. Dec. 2005 

Laursen, F. (2003). Comparing Regional Integration Schemes: International Regimes or Would-be Polities? in Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol.3, No.8, Available at: http://miami.edu/eucenter (Accessed on 29th  June 2018). 

Njura, S, Odoyo (2016). A Comparative Analysis of the European Union (EU) and the East African Community (EAC) Economic Integration models: Lessons for Africa: A research project submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of Master of Arts in International Studies at the Institute of Diplomacy and International studies, University of Nairobi, October, 2016

Online sources:

https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/eac-–-east-african-community, accessed on 28th June, 2018 at 6:pm

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151901.pdf accessed on 28th June, 2018 at 10:00pm

http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/eac/, accessed on 30th June 2018, 9:00 am

https://www.eac.int/documents/category/protocols; accessed on 30th June 2018, 11:00 am

https://europa.eu/european-union/law/treaties_en; accessed on 30th June, 2018 at 8:00 pm

https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en; accessed on 29th at 11:00am

https://www.eac.int/eac-organs; accessed on 1st July, 2018 at 2:00pm

https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies_en; accessed on 30th June at 2:00pm

Foreign Policy and state behaviour:  How US Foreign Policy to Africa changed during Presidents Bush, Obama and Trump Administrations

Foreign Policy and state behaviour:  How US Foreign Policy to Africa changed during Presidents Bush, Obama and Trump Administrations

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre

Foreign policy has been defined as a set of principles, decisions and means, adopted and followed by a nation for securing her interest in international relations. In posture and practice, the US edifies a perfect realist state and its leaders have embraced realism as a theory of choice in exercising US foreign policy and relations with other continents such as Africa. By understanding state’s foreign policy, we can predict their behavior and how to engage with them

The United States (US) is by any account a dominant super power whose foreign Policy has global influence. Historically, the US was discovered by foreign immigrants and plunderers. It acquired its independence in 1776 after a bloody revolution against British rule. The federalist triumphantly christened the new Country as ‘the land of the free’ and adopted ‘E Pluribus Unum’ a latin word meaning ‘Out of many-One’ as a national motto.

At independence, the US adopted a Bald Eagle and a Bison (North American Buffalo) as its national symbol-signifying strength, power and dominance. Since then, this historical triumph has translated into how America views and relates with other Countries and Continents. The bald eagle clenches in its talons an Olive branch and thirteen sharp arrows, perhaps reminding the entire world of America’s power -the US is ready to deploy its power to achieve its interests.

Realism scholars such as Machiavelli have argued that states’ foreign policies are solely a product of the international system—merely a reaction to external conditions and other actors.  Realism operates on the assumption of anarchy—the absence of an overarching government in the international system—as one of the most important external conditions that affect foreign policies. In an anarchic world, states must look out for their own interests.

Realists consider the state as the principal and rational actor in foreign policy, which seeks to maximise its own national interests and objectives since they believe that world politics exist in an international anarchy.  What drives realist foreign policy is its focus and responsibility to ensure national security and state survival, as well as its struggle for power.  Realists and Neorealists alike emphasise that the international system is anarchic and therefore because of this, states act the way they do in order to ensure their own survival.

As suggested by former US Secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, this has been the dominant view, taken by the US foreign policy relations with other Countries and continents such as Africa. A country’s foreign policy is determined by internal and external factors. Internal factors include; history, national values, geography, national capacity and political organisation. External factors include; international environment, internal organizations, world opinion and reaction of states to other states

Quick historical overview of U.S. Foreign Policy

US’s foreign policy has been largely influenced by its history. During the pre-World War I, the US pursued an isolationist foreign policy. The world was Eurocentric and Britain, France and German dominated global affairs. The US was protected by Oceans and technologies of the day did not directly threaten its vital interest. The US was sparsely populated and focused on its own internal destiny of building its democratic institutions and economy.  The US had trading partners, but did not exert influence globally.

The two world wars (1914-1945) ended US’s period of isolation. At the end of the Second World War, the US remained as the last standing global power. Europe and Japan were physically, financially and emotionally destroyed. German lost its industrial and military power foreign territories abroad.  Russia was financially destroyed and suffered severe losses of life. China, India and most of Asia were isolated peasant, colonial or post-colonial states with insignificant global influence. The US therefore took over this vacuum. It strengthened and asserted its global hegemony as a super power.

The years that followed the Soviet Union emerged as a superpower challenger to the U.S. In most of the world, America enjoyed an almost universal hegemony. When the Cold war ended (Fall of the Iron Curtain) in the 1990’s, America remained as the world’s only superpower.  America enjoyed world hegemony. It became de-factor world’s police and protector of the so called liberal world order. The US had financial and military power. Pax-Americana came into full flourishing replacing the Pax Britanica as the dominant world paradigm. The role of the United States was generally viewed as one of global leadership and significant engagement in international affairs. The US and its leaders have continue to pursue this view in shaping their foreign policy positions to other Countries

Extent of Change in US Foreign Policy to Africa during Presidents Bush and Obama Administrations

In order to understand the differences between Foreign Policy Approach of the two regimes, a comparative foreign policy analysis approach is used.  This is done by identifying foreign policy decision making processes related to the momentous events as well as patterns in day to day interactions of the United States and Africa during the two Presidential administrations.  The general posture of the US towards Africa and the world during the two administrations and the key policy instruments which characterized US foreign policy and presence on the African Continent between 2000 and 2015 are identified.

President George Bush’s Administration foreign policy towards Africa

President George’s Bush’s foreign policy was dominated with security and war on terror. When Bush took office before the 9/11 attacks, his foreign policy was to be based on various assumptions of classical realism. This thought assumes that the state is the main actor in foreign policy, and therefore the U.S policy would focus mainly on state-to-state relations. Classical realists also focus on the managing of relations with major powers since they are considered to be the main threats to the international system. In the case of U.S foreign policy of Bush prior to the attacks, he made it clear that the refurbishing of alliances would be a top priority in order to manage great-power relationships.

President Bush was to pursue symmetrical relations with other countries based on the view that oceans no longer protected the US from engaging overseas. However, the September 11 attacks changed dramatically President Bush’s foreign policy. The Bush administration developed a neo conservative foreign policy, focusing on regime change. He pursued an offensive realistic approach using pre-emptive force, conventional and unconventional warfare to secure American security and interests.  He divided the world as into a coalition of the willing and an axis of evil. In the war on terror President Bush asserted ‘You were either with us or against us’. The Bush administration linked the war with spread of democracy as defined by America’s foreign policy doctrine. America would pursue and defend its self and its interests anywhere in the world, including using war.

President Bush’s key foreign policy instruments for Africa

In pursuit of the war against terror, the Bush administration established an Africa Command as part of the US Military force based in Djbouti to oversee Counter terrorism and security operations in Africa. Support to African governments to establish anti terror-capabilities, including training and military equipment to African governments. The US facilitated legislative reforms supporting Counter terrorism.  The administration mobilised a coalition of other countries to counter Piracy and its threats to maritime traffic off the Coast of Somalia.

President Bush continued supporting the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA). This was a trade arrangement through which African states were eligible to export a variety of goods duty free to the US. AGOA had started during President Clinton’s administration.

In 2003, Bush established the President’s Emergence Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) through which African governments were supported to fight against Aids. In 2004 the administration established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as an innovative and independent U.S. foreign aid agency that is helping lead the fight against global poverty.

President Obama’s Administration foreign policy for Africa

As a democrat, President Obama came into office with a neo liberal perspective with his commitments to ending war and seeking for negotiated settlements through for multilateral systems such as the UN. President Obama promised to use diplomatic engagement, internationalism and soft power.  Wanted to appease an international community feeling alienated by Bush policy. Obama wanted to pursue a liberal international order as core to America’s foreign policy. Promised military disengagement from wars oversees, but use of special operations, clandestine operations and drones to target terrorist leaders and security threats.

However, he was pulled back by America’s realistic and neo realistic values of US foreign policy.  Neorealisim or structural realism as supported by writers such as Waltz emphasise  that the international system is anarchic and therefore because of this, states act the way they do in order to ensure their own survival. He argues that although states are obliged to look after themselves and regard other states as potential threats, they are not inherently aggressive. 

Obama justified his American interventionist foreign policy with a neo-realistic argument that global peace was best achieved if there is a balance of power where great powers manage the international system. President Obama approved a troop surge of US military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan.  His administration facilitated the throw of foreign regimes in the North Africa and Middle East through the famous Arab Spring. The regime authorized drone strikes on suspected terrorist targets in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan and Afghanistan.  America’s perceived actions against the Muslim world fueled an insurrection of religious fundamentalist groups such as ISIL and Alshabab in Iraq, Syria, North Africa and Somalia.

Obama’s Key Foreign Policy instruments to Africa

President Obama’s administration was a continuation of US foreign policy towards Africa.  The administration supported anti-terrorism measures in Africa.  Obama authorized drone strikes in Somalia and parts of Central Africa. The administration deployed a small American Military tactical forces and equipment to help African states to combat terror. American Special Forces were deployed in Countries such as Uganda in pursuit of rebel leader Joseph Kony in Sudan and Central Africa republic

Obama continued support for previous foreign policy instruments such as AGOA, PEPFAR and MCC. In compliment to these, Obama’s administration established the Power Africa initiative aimed at supporting African states generate enough power. Also promoted US policy to support for Renewable energy –such as solar and wind.

With the two Presidents coming from two different political ideological backgrounds, Bush being a Republican and Obama a Democrat, it was expected that there would be a shift in U.S. foreign and Africa policy from one administration to the other. Yet the evidence as supported by various scholars and actions show that in substance there was little change in the foreign policy area with regards to the War on Terror and the fight against terrorism. There was no fundamental change in US national interests. What changed was the style and how to go about such policies.

To assert U.S. foreign policy interests in the world and continuity, explains the motives of such style and consequent U.S. foreign policy behaviour and outcomes of both administrations with regards to Africa.  Perhaps, the desire to defend America’s vital interest and global power aggressively contributed towards the election of President Donald Trump as new President for the United States in 2016.

President Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy approach

Since coming to power in 2016, President Trump adopted a neoclassical realism foreign policy approach towards the world. Neoclassical realism is a combination of both classical realist and neorealist approaches. It departs from neorealism by claiming that states respond to the international system when they conduct foreign policy.  Neoclassical realists put forward that domestic political processes act as a transmission belt ‘between systemic incentives and constraints, on the one hand, and the actual diplomatic, military and foreign economic policies states select, on the other.’ Therefore, the international political outcomes usually reflect the actual distribution among states

According to President Trump, the US was gradually losing its dominant position international system to new emerging powers such as China and Russia.  This power needed to be reclaimed.

President Trump’s foreign policy approach

The tenor of President Trump’s Foreign policy is to protect the homeland, the American people and the American way of life. He has vowed to promote American prosperity, preserve peace through strength and advance American influence

According to President Trump, a nation that does not protect prosperity at home cannot protect its interests abroad. A nation that is not prepared to win a war is a nation not capable of preventing a war. A nation that is not proud of its history cannot be confident in its future. And a nation that is not certain of its values cannot summon the will to defend them.”  Donald J. Trump, December 18, 2017

The theme of the National Security as espoused in Trump’s Foreign policy towards other states is “principled realism” of an “ever-competitive world,” where the question of “how we advance our goals is more critical than ever.”

Trump’s Foreign policy strategies and position towards Africa and the world

President Trump’s strategy aims to create a ‘New Global Order’ where the US goes from dominance to leadership.  As he declared in 2015-‘From now onwards it will be America First!  His foreign policy has focused on dividing and conquering of other states by withdrawal from major multilateral arrangements such as TPP, NAFTA and seeking bilateral engagement based on strength and interest. The regime has played off China against Russia and India and Japan against China.

US foreign policy undermines and seeks to out-compete emerging power centers such as China and the EU through various actions such as tariffs seeking to “Make America Great Again”.

US defense strategy and Military organization has been structured to patrol the world with the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemonies throughout the world.  Pesident Trump uses flexing military muscle and threats for war such as was the case with North Korean to advance American interest.  The administration uses coercive means such as sanctions as a foreign policy tool towards other states such as Iran, North Korea and Yemen.

According to Haas, President Trump’s policies have contributed the rise of nativism, nationalism and Isolationism from global affairs.  The United States is now engaged in a great foreign policy debate between a besieged traditional internationalism and an energized new isolationism. President Trump’s domestic policy position has taken a radical view towards immigrants from other parts of the world as a threat to US security.

Based on this, Trump’s view of the world, Africa has largely remained off the American Foreign Policy radar. Since his administration came to power in 2016, there has been no concrete plan for Africa. It was no wonder that in early 2018, President Trump referred to Africa as a ‘shit hole’.

Morality without security is ineffectual.

In Conclusion, foreign policy is largely driven by national interests. National interests can be categorized into core, important and peripheral.   For the US, securing US global dominancy is a vital interest.  An assessment of the different regimes shows that policy of securing the US core interest never changed. Peripheral interests such as US’s position on population control and aid to poor people could have changed because of the different political ideologies between the conservative republicans and the liberal democrats. However, it is evident that the vital and important interest remained at the core. Perhaps, the different instruments used by the two administrations such as AGOA, PEPFAR, MCC and Power Africa were used as tools to generate support and alliance from the African continent in regards to protecting US vital interests such as the war on terrorism, Nuclear weapons proliferation,  access to natural resources and  securing  US’s influence in the United Nations Security Council. It is no wonder that in 2016  President Trump switched to pursue this American realistic view aggressively.

References

Caroline Muscat,  A Comparative Analysis of the George W. Bush  and Barack Obama Administration’s Foreign  Policy in the Context of the War on terror: A cases study-Pakistan’, A dissertation presented to the Faculty of Arts in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the  degree  of Bachelor of Arts (Hons) in International Relations, May, 2013

Henry A. Kissinger, ‘Continuity and change in American Foreign Policy, 1977

Lobell, S.E., Ripsman, N.M. and Taliaferro, J.W. (2009).‘Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy.’

Richard Haas;Trump’s No Isolationist. Is That a Good Thing?’

https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-01-13/richard-haass-on-trump-s-foreign-policy-and-america-first accessed on 6th July, 2018 at 3:00pm

Jeffrey. S. Lantis and Ryan Beasley: Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis: Available at http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-398

McCormick, J.M. (2010) ‘American Foreign Policy & Process’ (5th ed.) p.206-207 – Europe and Asia were to be his top foreign policy priorities since they both carry American allies as well as potential rivals. 

Waltz, K.N. (1979).‘Theory of International Politics.’ http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2013/11/06/neorealism-in-international-relations-kenneth-waltz/; accessed on 6th July, 2018 at 11:00am

https://www.pepfar.gov/ accessed on 6th July, 2018 at 2:00pm

https://www.mcc.gov/about; accessed on 6th July, 2018 at 12:00pm

Why growing influence of Non-State Actors in diplomacy and consular practice is a cause for alarm in smooth running of State foreign affairs

Why growing influence of Non-State Actors in diplomacy and consular practice is a cause for alarm in smooth running of State foreign affairs.

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre

Diplomacy has been defined by scholars such as Ernest Satow as the intelligent act of applying tact in the management of international relations by actors through relationships and interactions in the official conduct of their official activities in order to achieve the goals of their national interests guided by a nation’s foreign policy. It can equally be described as an international intercourse between sovereign states with an aim of advancing mutual interest in a peaceful manner. However, in recent years, non-state actors are becoming influential diplomats with credentials worth for government recognition.

Since diplomacy and consular practice is still largely about interaction between sovereign states, the role of the state is still significant.  However, if the current trend continues, it is likely that in the future, the state will become a player with different roles and functions, such as facilitation of diplomatic and consular interaction.

From the onset of its definition and practice, diplomacy was conceived as an activity within the exclusive purview of the state.  Realist and Classical theorists of politics and international relations at the time believed in the supremacy of the state and its dominance in diplomacy. Diplomacy was seen as a tool for seeking dominance and asserting power.

For political philosophers such as Machiavelli (1469-1527), in his book The Prince, he argued that state power and foreign relations were so sacrosanct to be entrusted with any other actor other than the prince (The leader) and the state.  For Machiavelli, diplomacy was only pursued in preservation of the safety and security of the state. This was the main goal of the state and he urged his Prince (The ruler) to pursue these interests at all costs, including war where diplomacy failed.

The realist ideas were challenged by liberal theorist such as John Locke and Immanuel Kant who saw that actors in International relations were both state and non-state actors. The world was viewed as anarchic in nature, with conflicting interests and competing egos. Restoration of the world order and the pursuit of global peace, democracy and international cooperation required a multilateral approach with multiple actors.

Indeed, overtime diplomacy has evolved. Today, diplomatic activities are carried out by non-state actors, whose activities transcend beyond their national borders and the confines of the state. 

Participation on Non state Actors in diplomacy and consular practice has become a pronounced phenomenon. Concepts such as corporate diplomacy, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) diplomacy, business diplomacy and conference diplomacy have become quite familiar in diplomacy and consular practice.  Experts such as Saner & Liu acknowledge that diplomacy has mutated overtime.

Globalization and democratization have rendered the professional boundaries more porous and put into question the territorial claims of the traditional diplomats. Alternative diplomatic actors have emerged within and outside the state and often act independently from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diplomacy as a profession has undergone changes in terms of definition, qualification and role expectation of what is or not supposed to do  (Saner & Yiu: 2003).

The following non state actors influence postmodern diplomacy and consular practice in greater proportions than before.

International Organisations and agencies have become key non state actors influencing postmodern diplomacy.  These operate at sub regional, regional and global level, pursuing different sets of predetermined goals.  Sub-Regional international organizations such the East African Community (EAC), South African Development Cooperation, Common Market for Eastern and South Africa (COMESA) and North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) may have economic integration agendas while continental and global international organizations such as the African Union and the United Nations respectively pursue broader international goals.

These organizations have vast resources and access to countries and interact with a wide range of actors and issues ranging from political affairs, peace to development.  They generate reports and international law documents shaping international diplomacy. They have a large membership base whose collective voices at times counteract or challenge individual state concerns. Indeed, this was one of the arguments advanced by the British Prime Minister Ms Theresa May in her campaign for Britain to exit the European Union. In her opinion, the United Kingdom as a state had become weak and most of its sovereign the powers to govern and diplomatic interaction had been transferred to Brussels. According to the ‘Brexit’ campaigners, the UK could not make foreign policy decisions on issues such trade and asylum without consulting the European Union headquarters in Brussels. The UK’s appropriate answer to this counter influence, in Ms Theresa May’s view, was to quit the European Union. The influence of the European Union in influencing the European Continental diplomacy is therefore significant and alarming its member states.

The International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) are the other major non state actors influencing diplomacy and consular practice. Saners and Yiu have describes this new phenomenon as Diplomacy of International or Transnational NGOs. These operate at various levels from the national to the global level. These include INGOs such as the Oxfam, Human Rights Watch and humanitarian agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.

They are engaged in various activities such as environment, human rights defense, economic and social development. Some are focused on Monitoring state excesses and bad corporate behavior. They may be concerned with the negative impacts of development and exclusion of the poor. INGOs have abilities to mobilize, protest and challenge states, corporate and multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the United Nations.

They have demanded and recieved representation in major multilateral agencies such as the United Nations. Through these representations, they have been effective in putting forward policy options, alternative models and articulating their views in the international arena, their by challenging the roles of the state and traditional diplomat in dominating policy formulation and practice at the international arena.

A good example was during the negotiations towards signing of the Kyoto protocol on climate change and the recently concluded Paris Climate Change Summit, where the environmental INGOs were instrumental into pushing the member states into signing the protocol and an agreement respectively to reduce carbon emissions and global warming. INGOs and grassroots movements were in 2000 effective in influencing the World Health Organisations and governments to negotiate the framework Convention on tobacco control with aimed at reducing exposure to effects of tobacco to the public through stringent regulations of tobacco companies and smoking in public places.

Others such as the Red Cross respond to emergencies and deliver humanitarian aid in areas of crisis.  Have strong connection with the international community and often use their extensive network to communicate with the international arena by submitting reports, policy position papers and are represented at international forums with equal status as member states, their by limiting the dominance of the traditional state in diplomacy and consular practice.

National NGOs have become influential in modern diplomacy and consular practice. These represent the interests of civil society at the national level. They constitute a broad range of Civil society ranging from small to big organizations, engaged in a broad range of issues such as corruption, economic and social development and human rights monitoring.

By constantly interacting with other foreign actors they have curved a niche in foreign relations which is now commonly referred to as diplomacy of National NGOs.  They largely receive funding from outside the Country and share their periodic reports with their local and international benefactors and constituencies. With greater access to information, they are capable of sharing their views with a wider global audience and shaping international opinion at greater speed and effect than national state actors and Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).  Their unfettered access to the global audience and influence on foreign relations is a cause of alarm in diplomatic and consular relations

Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and Multinational Corporation (MNCs) have become major non state actors in diplomacy operating across borders in both developing and transiting economies. With globalization and free movement of capital in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) companies today conduct businesses across Countries. However, this comes with a lot of challenges such as regulation, taxation, intellectual property and dispute settlement. MTNCs also interact with international organizations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on matters of trade and labour standards (Saner & Liu: 2001). Companies also want to keep good international reputation and their global market share.

In order to deal with these international challenges, MTNCs have been encouraged to start ‘diplomatic’ activities which promote or consolidate their operations. Examples of such include trans-national business councils and forums such as the Trans-Atlantic Business Council (TABC) which is a major forum both the US and Western Europe as a forum to coordinate their position at the WTO and other related issues. Similar forums exist in Tanzania such as the Tanzania-Nordic business forums, India Tanzania Business Council and Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC).

These business councils put forward policy positions and papers and form alliances through multiple networks (embassies) to promote their agenda.  Tanzania’s National Business Council is chaired by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania. TNCs and MNCs through their councils influence foreign policy positions of their countries and may also call for global action on matters of peace and war, thereby limiting the dominance of the traditional state actors in diplomacy. The American Oil Corporate lobbyists through the American Council on Foreign Relations were instrumental in influencing the United States invasion of Iraq in 1991 and 2003.

In underscoring their roles and influence in Diplomacy and Consular practice, Saners etal and Kishna suggest that the increasing participation of MTNCs in diplomacy has contributed to the rise of new terminologies to diplomacy such as Corporate Diplomacy, Commercial Diplomacy and Business diplomacy.

Eminent Individuals are also becoming major actors in diplomacy and consular practice.  These are people with influence on global affairs and impact on diplomacy and consular relations. They include eminent persons such as the late Koffi Annan, the Aga Khan, the Dalai Lama, Bill Gates or Yousaif Malala. They have international following and always invited to international forums to share view and offer policy options. They work through various informal, formal, state and international networks to influence diplomacy. For example, Ms Malala’s views on the girl Child’s education may have more global impact than the views of an education minister from poor sovereign states. Their influence is insurmountable.

There is also an increasing debate and acceptance of the view that even ordinary individuals have influence on diplomacy. For example, when an individual makes a presentation at a global conference about his country, such a person is engaging in a form of diplomacy and his or her opinions may shape the perception and views of other states against his or her Country. Although this debate is not conclusive, it is evident that diplomacy and consular practice is no longer restricted to state actors.

The role of organized criminal Gangs and armed Groups such as drug cartels, pirates, fundamentalist and terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida, International State in Syria and Levant (ISIL), Alshabab  and nationalistic movements such as the Free Syrian Army and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are equally becoming major actors in diplomacy and consular relations.  These operate across borders and have significant influence on the politics, economy, peace and security in the territories where they operate. They have access to vast resources and may use their extensive international network for mobilization and propaganda.

Recent history has shown that conflicts are largely involving non state actors. The 2001 attack on the World Trade Center by Al-Qaida operatives working through a wide network of operatives and alliances has shaped the post 911 era and global approach to peace and security. After the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, many Countries strengthened their national security apparatus by enacting strict security and counter terrorism laws. The US reviewed its relations with some states by blacklisting them as state sponsors of terrorism. The role of the UN in addressing global peace was effectively discussed and its influence as a multilateral body for pursuing global peace and diplomacy was discussed. This discussion continues to date.

In some Countries organised criminal networks have worked to overthrow or install governments and contributed largely to instability forcing state actors to negotiate for peace. A good example is the FARC in Colombia and the ongoing peace talks between the Syrian Government and the Free Syria Armed forces.

These actors have drawn states into international wars such as the US led Coalition in Afghanistan, Iraq and the current ongoing conflict in Syria and Yemen. The US has also increased its military presence in the Middle East and Africa including establishing an African Command to oversee US engagement in Africa in operations such as tracking the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in Central Africa Republic and overseeing Counter Piracy Operations in Somalia. Clearly, their influence on diplomacy and consular practice is evident.

The Media is becoming a major non state actor in diplomacy and consular practice. The advent of the internet and social media has opened forums for influencing diplomacy and consular practice to non-state diplomats. Access to the media and global community is no longer an exclusive of the state. The media and internet have challenged the power relations between the state and non-state actors. Through the internet and various social media practitioners, citizens and individual bloggers can interact with the world with greater speed and access than state actors. Using social media platforms non state actors can create content, develop imagery and mobilize. They can shape and influence foreign relations and diplomacy by sharing their independent thoughts. Through social media, they are able to galvanise support and determine, extend or counter the foreign policy of their countries. An example of the increasing role of the media was during the Arab spring in 2011 where social media, the internet and mobile phones were used to mobilize support and participation in the overthrow the governments in North Africa and the Middle East.

In emphasizing the role of the media in international relations, the US and other actors have always promoted the use of the internet and social media as a vent for free speech. The US as a major global player in diplomacy has always condemned any state acts to restrict access to internet and social media.

Despite, the increasing role of non state actors, their participation in diplomacy has raised concerns within the modern field of diplomacy and consular practice. Perhaps Melisens definition and concerns (in Saner and Yiu.pp11) best captures the post modern nature of diplomacy that is characterize by simultaneous participation of multiple state and non state actors and pulse of concerns generated from their influence when he writes

While greater representation and participation of diverse interest groups leads to a democratization of the political processes at the national and global levels, it also makes diplomacy and international relations vulnerable to fragmentation and possible outbreak of conflicts due to potential paralysis caused by too many state and non state actors with mutually exclusive policy goals

Saner further adds that the ‘New entrants’ to diplomatic arena represents different groupings and organizations of local, national and international interests. These divergent forces co-exit with each other and exercise different forms of diplomatic influence to achieve their objectives. The alarm arises from a number of reasons which include;

The representation of Non state actors may be private and not state inspired. Sometimes their interests may not necessarily be aligned to the national interests. The primary goal of a multinational company may be to maximise profit and dividends to its shareholders. This may be contrary to its Country of origin’s foreign interest in that Country.  The states interest may be to secure stronger political or military alliances rather than pursuing commercial interests.

Non state actors may be oblivious to political and cultural sensitivities of foreign states. Diplomacy and consular practice is about understanding the political and cultural sensitivities of a given country and respecting these when pursuing a Country’s foreign interests is vital concern. Their involvement is therefore seen as a risk of concern to state actors in diplomacy and international relations.

Non State Actors may be frontiers of external actors whose interests may be contrary to either the national interests of their Countries of origin or countries of operation. Prof. Mweisga Baregu, a scholar of International relations, in his book and articles on understanding obstacles to peace, the actors’ interests and strategies, deconstructs the role of international agencies in peace.  Baregu has sarcastically referred to humanitarian agencies such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent and Medicen sans Frontier and some United Nation agencies as ‘ambulance chasers’. In Baregu’s views, the interests of these agencies are sometimes not necessarily humanitarian but may be driven by other interests such as employment and foreign actors like research and pharmaceutical companies. They may therefore be interested in the continued existence of the conflict so as to maintain their status quo and other related benefits. Their influence in diplomacy and consular practice is therefore of concern.

These non state actors may not be fully equipped with diplomatic tools and customs of diplomatic practice. Diplomacy is a profession guided by a set of customs and international law such as the Vienna Convention on diplomacy and consular practice (Vienna Convention 1961 and 1963). As suggested by Zirovcic and Simonitti (Simonitti: 1994) the customs of diplomacy and legal norms of diplomatic law are positions whose violation results in sanctions. Any breach of these customs is a violation of diplomatic ethics and constitutes incorrectness in diplomatic relations (Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961) and consular relations (Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963). Violation of these customs is a blow to the international reputation of the international entity that allows such practices and may result in a breakdown of diplomatic relations between states. While non state actors such as TNCs may at times engage personnel with diplomatic training to pursue their ambitions. However, their actions cannot be subject to the global rules of International law as such as the Vienna Convention.

This position is well captured by Saner (Saner etal: pg9) when they argue that global managers are competent in managing business stakeholders in all countries they operate. They may not be able to deal with complex issues such as democracy, political pluralism and respect for human rights in countries where they operate.  Failures in dealing with these non business related issues can easily lead to crisis, open conflicts which may spark diplomatic confrontations between their home countries and their countries of operation. The increasing influence of Non state actors in diplomacy and consular practice therefore raises alarm.

The lack of centralized leadership and respect of international norms or custom of international law by non state actors such as criminal gangs and their threat to international peace and security is a ground for alarm in diplomacy and consular practice. Organised criminal groups are difficult to coordinate and may be difficult be held to account for their actions in international diplomacy and consular practice. The actions of ISIL, Al-Qaida and Alshabab in Syria, Iraq and Somalia may be clear international war crimes and crimes against humanity in international law. However with the difficulty in pinpointing their actual leadership, it is difficult for the international community to hold specific persons or states to account for their actions. These organizations also operate without respect to internationally recognized state territorial borders and are therefore threat to state and transnational diplomatic relations and practice.

In light of the above, it is proper to conclude that diplomacy in the post modern era has changed with more influence of non state actors in diplomacy and consular practice. As suggested by Saner diplomacy has mutated and the role of the state diplomat and traditional embassy in advancing diplomacy and consular practice is ebbing (Rana: 2009). This is because in the future the main consumers and beneficiaries of diplomatic interaction will be businesses and non-state actors.

Since diplomacy and consular practice is still largely about interaction between sovereign states, the role of the state is still significant.  However, if the current trend continues, it is likely that in the future, the state will become a player with different roles and functions, such as facilitation of diplomatic and consular interaction.

References