Uganda-Tanzania East Africa Oil Pipeline: signed deal yes, but hurdles lie ahead.

Samia, Museveni witness pipeline project final actsThe East African Oil Pipeline project received significant boots in April 2021 with Uganda with a series of key oil infrastructure related agreements signed between the government of Uganda and Tanzania and the oil companies for the East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) project to transport crude from Uganda to the Tanzania port of Tanga.

According to the government communications, these agreements signal Final Investment Decision (FID) which could be announced soon with production, expected around 2025. There has been already significant work going on at the oil sites in Hoima and as one of the Company officials remarked, work has started. The project is very important to the East Africa region as it promises great economic benefits to the governments and their citizens in the form of jobs, revenues, and other associated economic linkages.

Despite this rekindled hope, shortly after the signing of these agreements, it was evident that multiple uncertainties still lie ahead.

The details of the signed agreements remained undisclosed and technical experts involved in the negotiations remained secret on essential information on key fiscal terms surrounding the tariffs.

The project financing arrangement remains a quagmire.  Few days after signing of the agreements, several banks in France where the lead investor Total is based announced that they were staying away from the financing of the pipeline. The French banks included, BNP Paribas, Société’ Générale and Credit Agricole, Credit Suisse of Switzerland, ANZ of Australia and New Zealand and Barclays.

According to earlier government reports, The Standard Bank of South Africa, China’s ICBC and SMBC of Japan are lead advisors of the EACOP financing. These were under immense pressure from their counterparts Bank Track, Reclaim Finance and Energy Voice for what they described as pushing responsible financing of projects worldwide. According to these banks and activists EACOP’s environmental credentials were failing.

The Uganda government announced that it was not bothered by announcement, describing it as not new. However, the announcement by the banks signalled that the project could be still facing serious negative diplomacy from environmental activists and other political interested actors regionally and globally.

President Museveni described the project and the agreement signing occasion as an act economic liberation. This followed the political liberation which in his view happened some decades ago when Tanzania helped exiled Uganda political groups to take power in Uganda and change the course of history. With the hurdles still to overcome, it was evident that perhaps the financial, environmental, and political woes were not over, and the project was yet to fully get on track.

Tanzania political transition: new era, new opportunity

In March, East Africa was gripped with shock upon the sudden death of Tanzania’s President John Pombe Magufuli. Over the past five years, President Magufuli towered like a political colossus, led with a nationalistic approach, and pursued reforms which sent zillion sentiments across many frontiers. He threw out Accacia, Barrick’s Mining subsidiary in Tanzania, for tax evasion and dubious practices that he descried as stealing against Tanzanians. Enacted new mining laws and renegotiated a 50/50 sharing deal with Barrick which has since been mirrored as a template in other Countries far away such as Papua New Guinea. However, his style was considered as a possible deterrent to potential investors and perhaps disruptive to the extractive sector.

The transition to the new President Ms Suluhu Samia Hassan was peaceful and lauded as a new era for a new opportunity. President Samia has promised to set Tanzania to a new path. Few days into office, President Samia observed that all was not very well as earlier perceived. New investments in the sector were low. The volume of Mineral exports had fallen. Despite the Mererani wall, Tanzanite, the precious gemstone from Mererani, was still being stolen. Negotiations for conclusion of the lucrative LNG project had stalled. The tax laws were impeding and the enforcement style by the Tax Authorities had seen many companies’ close shop. The President has since called a truce with the private sector and declared Tanzania is fully open to investment.

Despite her aspirations, President Samia has insurmountable hurdles to climb. The mining reforms were passed in law and therefore amending or uprooting these will require parliamentary approval. The amendments were so popular with the Tanzanian public and this could be touch political gamble to make.

Nonetheless, Tanzania still has an opportunity to excel. The Country’s extractive wealth lies in Minerals such as gold.  The Country has vast deposits of what are considered critical minerals such as rare-earth, lithium etc which are vital to industrial use during the energy transition. With a revived and careful political navigation Tanzania could still attract potential investors and comfortably reap more benefits from its extractive wealth.

How to curb transfer pricing , tax dodging and illicit financial flows in extractive sector

Tackling tax dodging and illicit capital flight in the extractive sector can be a challenge for tax officials and policymakers in new extractive resource-rich Countries such as Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, whose tax and extractive governance regime is just in its formative stages and local expertise in its pupilage stage

Tax and development:  How to curb transfer pricing and illicit financial flows in the extractive sector

By Moses Kulaba, Governance and economic analysis centre, Dar es Salaam-Tanzania 

This brief highlights some of the basic strategies that can be used by tax authorities and governments to tackle aggressive tax planning and dodging in the extractive sector.  It touches on basics such as understanding corporate and financing structures synonymous with extractive MNE’s and how these are used as conduits for base erosion, tax-avoiding and illicit financial outflow. We conclude with a case scenario to facilitate discussion. The brief is in response to feedback from our readers reacting to our previous posted online article and in which we touched on the basics of understanding illicit capital flight in the extractive sector. After highlighting the problem, our readers have challenged us to also share some solutions.  The brief targets sector practitioners, policymakers and leaders, professionals, students and other stakeholders.

In recent years there have been legislative and policy reforms in Countries to ensure that governments have a firm grip and maximize their take from their extractive wealth. However, as governments celebrate these attempts, experience and practice suggest lacunas still exits and the current reforms maybe not enough in curbing the tax avoidance and illicit capital flight menace.

According to Global Financial Integrity (GFI) and the Mbeki High-Level Panel Report on IFFs latest reports, shows that IFF’s from the African continent have been increasing with losses estimated between USD50 Million and USD 80 Million over the past years. Corruption and the extractive sector has constantly provided a major conduit for tax avoidance and illicit resource outflow from Africa. Alarming evidence from leaked documents such as the Panama papers now shows, Multinational companies, have taken advantage of their titular counterparts in government to structure complex aggressive tax planning arrangements used to evade, avoid and ship out potentially taxable income, denying government and local billions of dollars in revenue and development. The arrangements can be so complex and entwined, making it a nightmare for tax authorities and governments to crack.

Even with the new negotiations and deals signed between governments and extractive MNEs, governments have to constantly up their game and mantra to ensure that the old normal does not evolve into just the new normal as the old saying goes “monkeys do not change. They only change their forests’.

So what are some of the basic measures which can be taken

The debunking of Corporate Structures

Governments can tackle tax dodging and illicit flight by debunking and constantly monitoring the corporate structure of the extractive MNE’s.  The corporate structure can determine whether an entity is a resident or non-resident entity for tax purposes. The rules applied for taxing resident and non-resident entities are different and the status of the MNE may be favourable depending on its resident status and the corporate vehicle and form that it chooses to take.

Extractive MNEs have corporate structures with their parent companies located in one Country as Headquarters and subsidiaries located in more than one country or tax jurisdictions, depending on the interests of the company and its shareholders.

The MNE’s headquarters or major subsidiary may be located in low or non-tax jurisdictions, such as Jersey, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Mauritius and in recent years Middle East Countries and Cities such as Bahrain, Dubai have been added on the infamous list of tax havens.  As these Middle East countries compete to economically diverse from Oil and develop themselves as a global investment and financial centres, they have created low or non-tax regimes as incentives for attracting foreign investment.

MNE’s whose corporate structures have footprints in these Countries need to be subjected to extra scrutiny and background checks to determine whether they are not used for aggressive tax planning measures.

Corporate restructuring, takeovers through mergers or acquisitions or buying shares or stakes in other companies (also known in the petroleum industry as farming in or farming out). Quite often this may be used to ensure that the company diversifies its investment portfolio and minimizes its risks by spreads its operations and ownership in other profit-making business. However, this presence in multiple companies creates a spaghetti of ownership structures which may be difficult for the tax authorities to trace and effectively control for tax purposes. Imagine, a nonresident entity operating in your country but with stakes in more than 20 companies and over 300 projects.

Debunking Management structures

Extractive MNE’s also structure the management in a manner which can likely reduce their tax and labour related obligations.

Governments, therefore, need to examine and understand, where the extractive MNE’s key decision is taken and how staff are recruited.  An extractive MNE with operations in Tanzania but whose majority board members are nonresident and board meetings take place outside Tanzania, would easily pass for a non-resident entity.  The income tax rules treatment and obligations for such a company would obviously be different from a fully registered resident entity.

As a channel for reducing employment tax and labour law obligations, extractive MNEs can outsource Human Resource and Employment related services to management companies. The outsourced Management companies handled staff contracts on behalf of the extractive company in return for a management fee.

Here two things can happen.

The Management Services can be handled by the company’s subsidiary located outside the Country, either at the Company’s headquarters located in low or non-tax jurisdiction or another subsidiary, whose majority shareholders could be domiciled in a low or non-tax jurisdiction.  The fees charged by the subsidiary or parent company can be overinflated to reduce the profit and tax burden in the country of operation and channelled out of the country to low tax jurisdiction.

Secondly, the Management Company can be a local entity paid to handle all Management and Human Resource services on behalf of the MNE.

The Management Company reduces the MNE’s employment tax obligations by directly recruiting and providing short term contracts or jobs to staff which are paid below the labour market in the extractive sector.  The MNE pays the Management Company a fee for this service and has no overall tax obligations thereafter on the staff it receives supplied by the Management CompanyThe staff are literary employees of the management company and not the extractive MNE. Therefore, any tax obligations such as employment taxes or income taxes on services including labour rights issues such as negotiations, compensations for damage or loss are handled by the Management company. The MNE, therefore, reduces its employment tax obligation by minimizing the amount it pays to the staff through the management company.

A debunking of Financing Arrangements

Multinational Extractive Companies finance their operations through arrangements structured across multiple financial institutions.  These financing arrangements can be structured in a manner which ensures that payment of interests on the loan is too high and leaves the company with a very little taxable income. In most countries, interest payments on loans are nontaxable.  Although governments have been tightening their tax laws on thin capitalization rules by ensuring that the debt to equity ratios are within the limits, companies may also restructure the financing through a complex web of financing institutions that make ultimate taxable income in the extractive resource-rich countries is left low. Debts may be sold and restructured to take longer than earlier conceived and therefore prolong the period for the company starting to pay taxes.

Remedy for adjusted tax assessments

An adjusted assessment basically refers to a notice to reduce or increase the amount of tax imposed on an entity by the tax body. The government has the power to conduct an adjusted assessment based on new or additional information which may come in the public knowledge or purview of the tax authority, even after the Company’s accounts have been implemented. The adjustments, however, need to be fair, transparent and based on solid evidence of aggressive tax planning and evasion.

Use advance tax rulings

The tax authority can issue advance tax ruling specifying how specific extractive transactions will be treated for tax purposes. Current income tax statutes and practice notes provide for this. However, the existing rulings have been too general and subject to abuse. These ruling should clear and time-bound, to ensure that the extractive MNE does not abuse them.  The government also needs to increase surveillance during this period to ensure that the MNE is not using this period to circumvent the law by either over importation or exportation, dumping overstocking or mis-invoicing aimed to reduce either current or future tax liabilities or achieving a predetermined tax benefit.

For example, if a Company receives an advance tax ruling on the importation of certain capital goods such as heavy-duty Caterpillar tires or heavy-duty mining machinery, surveillance should be put in place to ensure that the company imports and pays an amount which commensurately matches its required operation. 

Implementation of legislative reform to curb potential lacunas

There is a need for an evaluation of the legislative and fiscal reforms so far passed to seal lacunas in the Country’s fiscal and policy regimes governing the extractive sector. 

Despite being passed over the years, have remained largely unimplemented.  The Resource Governance Index released by the Natural Resources Governance Institute (NRGI) shows that Tanzania lagged behind by 26 points in the implementation of its extractive policies and legislation. Transparency and potentially tax avoidance curbing measures such as   Contract disclosure and Beneficial ownership has remained unimplemented. Smooth exchange of information for tax purposes between less developed countries where mining operations take place and the OECD countries where the Companies are headquartered has remained poor and curtailed by ridiculous international law and treaty restrictions.

Tax incentives need to be properly awarded and managed. The government has to ensure that jobs will be created and revenue will be collected from these jobs. Fiscal, legislative and policy reforms have to be predictable and applied in a non-arbitrary way to avoid uncertainty and shocks in the extractive sector. Companies have to know in advance the consequences of flouting the rules and the burden for actions such as tax avoidance, evasion and illicit outflow.

Review of Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs)

Double Tax Agreements are treaties signed between two contracting states ensuring that nationals and residents of the two states are not taxed twice. They are primarily supposed to facilitate the international flow of capital, technology, services by eliminating taxation of income and other taxes through a bilateral arrangement and occasional resolution of income. DTAs prescribe whether the income will have taxed at the source where the income is made or where the taxable entity resides (resident principle) or a combination of both. They also provide for exchange of information for tax purposes

Despite their underlying intentions, DTAs are used as conduits for tax evasion as they facilitate income to flows from less developed countries where MNEs derive it to developed countries where MNEs are resident. Since less developed countries are resource-rich and not capital-rich, essentially, income flows substantively from one directions from developing countries as a source to the developed countries as a residency country.

DTAs allows aggressive tax planning schemes such as ‘treaty shopping’ where a Company registers a subsidiary in a country with a wide treaty network and invests through it to enjoy treaty benefits. Round tripping where investments, capital, income and profits obtained in one Country are re-routed back into the Country through low tax havens as investment from abroad to enjoy tax treaty protection.

A study by the Tanzania Tax Justice Coalition in 2016[1] revealed that the current DTAs are old and contain taxation regimes that surrender Tanzania’s treaty powers in favour of economically developed partners. DTAs have capped withholding tax rates that can be levied on interests, dividends and royalties Although the current DTAs have rated higher than 10% set in Tanzania’s income tax statutes, there are potential risks for tax loss in the future.

Establish transfer pricing methods to be used in determining the arm’s length price of transactions between related extractive MNEs and training tax officials to master them.

Tax avoidance and illicit financial outflows in the extractive sector largely take place through transfer mispricing arrangements. In principle, transfer pricing is not bad in business, however, when it is used as an aggressive tax planning measure by manipulating the transfer price (mis-pricing) to achieve a tax benefit, it becomes problematic.

Transfer pricing is an accounting practice that represents the price that one division in a company charges another division for goods and services provided. Transfer pricing allows for the establishment of prices for the goods and services exchanged between a subsidiary, an affiliate, or commonly controlled companies that are part of the same larger enterprise. Transfer pricing can lead to tax savings for corporations. A transfer price is based on market prices in charging another division, subsidiary, or holding company for services rendered.

However, companies have used inter-company transfer pricing to reduce the tax burden of the parent company. Companies charge a higher price to divisions in high-tax countries (reducing profit) while charging a lower price (increasing profits) for divisions in low-tax countries.

Transfer prices that differ from market value will be advantageous for one entity while lowering the profits of the other entity. Multinational companies can manipulate transfer prices in order to shift profits to low tax regions.

To remedy this, regulations enforce an arm’s length transaction rule that requires pricing to be based on similar transactions done between unrelated parties. Several methods can be used by MNEs and tax authorities to determine the accurate arm’s length pricing for transactions between related MNEs.  The OECD has outlined five major methods which can be used these include; The Comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP), the resale price method, the Cost plus method, Transactional net margin method (TNMM) and the transactional profit split method. According to the OECD, the option that an organization chooses to use depends on the particular situation. It should take into account the amount of relevant comparable data that is available, the level of comparability of the uncontrolled and controlled transactions in question, and whether a method is appropriate for the nature of a particular transaction (determined through a functional analysis). We will discuss this subject in detail in another tax and development bulletin which will be released soon.

In recent years there have been legislative and policy reforms in Countries to ensure that governments have a firm grip and maximize their take from their extractive wealth. However, as governments celebrate these attempts, experience and practice suggest lacunas still exits and the current reforms maybe not enough in curbing the tax avoidance and illicit capital flight menace.

According to Global Financial Integrity (GFI) and the Mbeki High-Level Panel Report on IFFs latest reports, shows that IFF’s from the African continent have been increasing with losses estimated between USD50 Million and USD 80 Million over the past years. Corruption and the extractive sector has constantly provided a major conduit for tax avoidance and illicit resource outflow from Africa.

Even with the new negotiations and deals signed between governments and extractive MNEs, governments have to constantly up their game and mantra to ensure that the old normal does not evolve into just the new normal as the old saying goes “monkeys do not change. They only change their forests’.

We conclude with a fictitious case scenario which can be read for further discussion and reflection on the subject.

Extractive Company Corporate Structure and Tax Case Scenario

 

Indemen Resources Plc is a large mining company with interests in Mining and Petroleum.  The Company was registered with its Headquarters in Jugoland but has subsidiaries in Temboland, Caconia, Alsania and Mende Islands. One of these, Mende Islands is renowned for its secret laws to protect the identity of investors, it provides a litany of investment facilitation incentives, including o% tax on corporate income. In Mende Islands, an investor does not have to be physically present to establish a company.

In 2017, Indemen Resources acquired Mining Interests in Temboland where it started operations. It established   Shamudulio Energy Plc as a subsidiary in this country to take care of the Mining and Oil & Gas fields which been operational for the past 5 years. The Company’s subsidiary, Matecash Intl located in Mende Islands manages its accounts, banking and legal affairs on behalf of the other subsidiaries.

Most of its operations have declared losses for the past ten years.  However, the books of accounts of its subsidiary, Matecash in Mende Islands have continuously improved with large volumes of transaction emanating from engaging in business with its other related subsidiaries.

In the Year 2018 the company Shamudulilo Energy Plc in Temboland farmed into Calabash resources located in Alsania where it acquired 30% of its shares and therefore becoming the second-biggest shareholder.  Comodore Oil is a majority shareholder in Calabash resources and its Headquartered in Conundrum Iand which is also a renowned tax haven.  Comodore Oil owns 20 per cent in Conglomerate LLC which is located in Caconia.  Shamudulilo also owns 10% of Conglomerate LLC. Metcash, Idemen’s subsidiary in Mende Island owns 70% of Commodore Oil.

The board of Indemen Resources only sits and makes decisions in Jugoland and has only 1 of its directors from each of its subsidiaries sitting on the board as a non-executive board director.

Recently, it outsourced Labour Management to contract to Luguburious Consulting. Luguburious Consulting is registered and located in Conudrum Islands and has shares in Metcash Intl and Commodore Oil.

Luguburious Consulting is responsible for the recruitment and placement of staff in all Indemene’s subsidiaries. The staff are recruited on a 6 months’ contract, only renewable upon satisfactory assessment and passing of a regular test. Luguburious also provides copyrighted hi-tech technology to Indemene’s subsidiaries, including Shumudulilo Energy Plc in return for a fee. It also sells water purification equipment to conglomerate LLC.

Jugoland, where Indemene Resources comes from, has a Double Taxation Agreement with Temboland and under which Income taxation on dividends, interests, royalties are capped. Management or expert director fees from these Countries are exempt. Also, 100% of income repatriation from these Countries is allowed and exempt from Taxation.

In 2011, Jugoland, as a sign of reassurance of the bilateral cooperation between the two countries and has committed 100 bln dollars to support the Country’s fiscal reforms for the next five years.

Indemene Resources has been declaring losses in your Country, Temboland and in Jugoland. But recently, you have heard that Conglomerate LLC has intentions to buy Indemene Resources through either a Merger or Acquisition which will make it the biggest Company in the region. The deal valued at 890 billion dollars is the largest ever recorded in recent history.

As a Tax justice campaigner, a Tax Administration Officer or Policymaker, you have been asked to examine and brief the President on this entire scenario

What are the key issues would you bring to the attention of the President? What are the potential legal and taxation issues do you see?  What would be the appropriate transfer pricing methods you could apply in determining the arm’s length price of transactions between these companies. What policy, legislative and actions would you recommend for the government to take without necessarily being exposed to litigation and sparking of accusations of the government as being against foreign investors?

 

 

[1] Moses Kulaba:  Double Taxation Agreements: Gain or Loss to Tanzania? A study by Tanzania Tax Justice Coalition, May 2016

 

Elation as Kenya exports Oil; what does it mean for Oil rush in East African region

On 1st of August 2019, President Uhuru Kenyatta announced that Kenya had joined the list of world oil exporting Countries by selling its first crude oil at a cost of 12 Million United States dollars.

While the news reverberated across the Country and the region with elation, it is also possible that Kenya’s announcement could trigger a contagious rush to the bottom with East African Countries jostling to outcompete each other by signing off deals and agreements locking off future markets with potential buyers. Some of these deals may not be necessarily good.

By Moses Kulaba; Governance and Economic Analysis Center

Addressing the cabinet and media in Nairobi, President Kenyatta said Kenya had sold its barrels of crude oil to a buyer whose identity still remained a secret.

“We are now an Oil exporter. Our first deal was concluded this afternoon with 200,000 barrels at a price of USD 12 Million.  So I think we have started the journey and it is up to us to ensure that those resources are put to the best use to make our Country and to ensure we eliminate poverty, said Kenyatta.

The news reverberated in the region and globally with a new player on the market. Obviously there was more excitement and elation in the Lokichar Oil fields where Tullow Oil and its joint partners continue to explore more blocks with more vigour and determination.

Kenya discovered its first Oil in 2012 and since then, explorations have continued in the Lake Turkana basin region with deposits being reported and more projections made to increase. In its previous reports Tullow estimated some 560 Mln Barrels in possible reserves and these are now projected to increase as prospects for more discoveries are higher than before.

This would translate into 60,000 to 10,000 barrels per day of gross production, which is said to be insufficient to warrant the construction of a refinery locally hence the export plans

The sold consignment was delivered by truckers at the Kenya Petroleum Refineries facilities in Changamwe, Mombasa since July last year, under what the government described under the early oil project

What does this mean for Kenya and the East African region?

The deal concludes that Kenya once ruled off as an oil novice in the region, with the lowest volumes of discovered oil is running a head of its East African neighbors in reaching exporting oil country status many months before any of its East African neighbors can sell a drop of oil.

For Kenya, this is game changer in regional geopolitics as not only does the oil revenue bring a new line of foreign exchange earnings into its economy and thus consolidating its position as the regional economic superpower.

Galvanizing on its early market entry status, Kenya could tap the available markets and seal off any available contracts beating off any potential competition from its neighboring countries.

The oil revenues could also breathe some life into its Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor development plan which has stalled for among others lack of partners. With oil revenues flowing, Kenya can go alone developing the ambitious infrastructure projects along the corridor all the way to the Ethiopian boarder.

Contrary to nay Sayers, the oil export could be a window to emboldened security in the Turkana area as the government seeks to protect vital oil installations and export routes to the coast.  For many years, Lake Turkana basin has been one of the most volatile and insecure areas in Kenya as marauding armed warriors move from one village to another raiding for cattle. Civilians and military installations have been attacked and people killed.

In June, 2018 Turkana residents stopped five trucks from ferrying crude oil to Mombasa over rising insecurity along the border with Baringo. The resident complained of insecurity in the area but also complained of what they call consider unresolved issues on oil sharing benefits between the National governments, County governments and local communities over the 5% share which they wanted channeled to their bank accounts rather than for development as rallied by a section of leaders.

There is no way we can be a security threat to the oil we have protected and guarded for years. So the specialized and additional security personnel (protecting oil) should head to Kapedo and secure people.

Kenya’s oil export announcement could trigger a contagious rush for oil in the East African region, with each country racing to drill to bottom in search for oil. In an effort to outcompete each other, those already with oil discoveries such as Uganda and South Sudan could race to the market sealing off deals and contracts with potential buyers and agreements for future markets. Some of these deals maybe bad.

 Uganda was the first to strike oil around its Albertine graben in 2005. According to Uganda’s Ministry of energy the petroleum deposit discovered so far were estimated at 6.5barrels of which 1.5bln are considered as recoverable.

The Ugandan oil is supposed to be exported to the global market through a 1,443 electric heated East African Oil Pipeline (EACOP) via Tanzania. The East African Crude oil pipeline is expected to unlock East Africa Oil potential by attracting invest and companies to explore the potential in the region.

According to the project schedule available on the EACOP website the detailed engineering and procurement and early works were supposed to have been made in 2018 and construction started in 2019. The first oil exports were expected in 2020. But it appears all these are behind schedule.

According to Ministry of Uganda expected to conclude its financial deal for its joint pipeline with Tanzania by June, 2019, opening for the way for its construction. According to the information provided by then, Stanbic Bank Uganda, was supposed to be the lead arranger for USD2.5billion funding for the 1,455 km (EACOP) project. The deal was expected to have been concluded in June, 2019.

Kampala was also expecting that the Final Investment Decisions (FID) between the government and the oil partners to determine when funds for the project will be made available, the terms of the financing and when the project execution will commence with a projected timeline between 20 and 36 months

The pipeline was expected to jointly develop the USD 3.5 billion pipeline, described as the longest electrically heated crude oil pipeline in the world. The balance of USD 1billion is expected to come from shareholders in equity

However, by the time Kenya announced its export deal in July, the earth breaking ceremony commencing the start of the EACOP pipeline construction had not started. Negotiations were reported as ongoing. In June 2017, the Daily Business Newspaper carried an article with a headline ‘Uganda’s Oil may not flow by 2020’ as the required infrastructure may not be complete  by then[i]

What this means for Uganda is that time is of essence and the sooner the EACOP project construction takes off the better for its potential oil market.

Figure 3: The Government of Tanzania and Uganda sign the Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) for the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP)  in May, 2017

 

So why do some oil projects like take long to materialize?

Lack of astute leadership, effective institutions and canning ambition to drive the projects to fruition. In some countries the political leadership and responsible institutions can be weak, whereby the essential operational process surrounding the oil projects can be clogged in political rhetoric and undertones which make decision making quite cumbersome, inefficiently slow and less assuring to the investors

Technical aspects such as Quality of crude oil discovered

High Sulphur crude oil can such as the Ugandan and Kenyan crude oil can be waxy and costly to transport via pipeline as it requires constant heating along the route.  This explains why the 1,433 km EACOP is described as the longest electric heated pipeline in the world. This adds to complexity in technology and costs on heating required to operationalize the project. Investors may

Oil reservoir behaviors and recoverable volumes – The discovered oil reserves are not always the same as the recoverable volumes. In some projects the reserves can be large yet due to geological and technological factors the recoverable volumes are low.  The behavior of the oil reservoirs is therefore a significant factor in determining whether the recoverable volumes will be consistent with the early projections and economic models over the plateau period. A change in the recoverable volumes can trigger massive losses and may lead to complete closure of the oil project. Investors are happy to rush projects where recoverable volumes will be sustained

Financing aspects such as financing structure -Lack of financing for some reasons or high interests on the investment loans secured from investment-lending institutions can be a delaying factor.  The decision to invest may therefore take long as the investors or partners to the oil project juggle and weigh the available financial options viz a vis the current and future costs of the project on the country and the investors

Economic metric considerations such as the Net Present Value (NPV), Rate of Return (RoR) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the project.

These are calculations undertaken to determine the economic and financial viability of the project. They are used to determine how much return and how long it will take to recoup the initial investment and starting generating profit.

According to online sources such as Investopedia, the Net present value (NPV) is the difference between the present value of cash inflows and the present value of cash outflows over a period of time. NPV is used in capital budgeting and investment planning to analyze the profitability of a projected investment or project.

The Rate of Return (RoR) is the net gain or loss on an investment over a specified time period, expressed as a percentage of the investment’s initial cost. This simple rate of return is sometimes called the basic growth rate, or alternatively, return on investment, or ROI. If you also consider the effect of the time value of money and inflation, the real rate of return can also be defined as the net amount of discounted cash flows received on an investment after adjusting for inflation.

The rate of return is used to measure growth between two periods, rather than over several periods. The RoR can be used for many purposes, from evaluating investment growth to year-over-year changes in company revenues. Its calculation does not consider the effects of inflation.

The internal rate of return (IRR) is a measure used in capital budgeting to estimate the profitability of potential investments. The internal rate of return is a discount rate that makes the Net Present Value (NPV) that makes the Net Present Value (NPV) of all cash flows from a particular project equal to zero.  It is mathematically calculated as IRR=NPV=t=1∑T (1+r)t −C0 =0)

IRR is the rate of growth a project is expected to generate. The IRR is used in capital budgeting to decide which projects or investments to undertake and which to forgo.

Generally speaking, the higher a project’s internal rate of return, the more desirable it is to undertake. Assuming the costs of investment are equal among the various projects, the project with the highest IRR would probably be considered the best and be undertaken first. IRR is sometimes referred to as “economic rate of return” or “discounted cash flow rate of return.”

Social factors such as land acquisition and due diligence for compensation– The nebulous and intricate balancing act between the local laws and the international standards as guided by the International Finance Corporation can be a hindrance. Quite often the local standards for compensation can be law, corrupt unfair yet the IFC standards requires fair and equity

Negative diplomacy: The oil projects could delay or fail to take off all together due to negative diplomacy. Whereby disgruntled actors such as activists, companies, politicians who may not be excited or about the project may quietly lobby, urge, convince or cajole the financing institutions not to finance the project.

Security Risk:  Oil projects cost lots of money in investment and thus require assurances that financial investments and their installations will be guaranteed.  Oil projects can stall as investors and their partners gauge the security risks

Some or all of these factors could be now at play in the East African region and could be explanatory factors as to why some petroleum projects are progressing at a snail’s pace or stalled all together. Perhaps Kenya’s early oil export could be trigger for its neighbors to start thinking ahead.

 

 

 

[i] https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Uganda—oil—2020-Standard–Poors-Tanzania/3946234-3982464-j7rbsq/index.html

How will the South African 2019 Proposed Financing Provisioning Regulations affect mining companies? *

As East African Countries grapple on how best to manage environmental payments for compensation and rehabilitation of decommissioned mining sites, the new legal regime in South Africa could be a development to watch as it provides some drastic measures that have sent shockwaves with in the mining fraternity as reported by Ensight Africa, Online tax bulletin.

By Edwin Berman, Ntsiki Adonis-Kgame and Zinzi Lawrence, Ensight Africa Online Tax Newsletter

In May 2019, the South African Proposed Regulations Pertaining to the Financial Provision for the Rehabilitation and Remediation of Environmental Damage caused by Reconnaissance, Prospecting, Exploration, Mining or Production Operations, 2019 (the “2019 Regulations”) were released for public comment. The 2019 Regulations are informed by industry consultation; however, they still fail to address some of the serious concerns raised by the mining industry and introduce new onerous provisions.

The first attempt at regulating financial provision for costs associated with the remediation and rehabilitation of impacts to the environment associated with mining activities, was through the Financial Provisioning Regulations, 2015 (the “2015 Regulations”). Following an outcry from the mining industry, the 2015 Regulations were amended on 26 October 2016. Since then, two iterations of the financial provision regulations (2017 and 2019) which sought to repeal the 2015 Regulations, have been published.

Some of the effects of the 2019 Regulations on mining companies are the following:

Applicants and holders

Applicants and holders of reconnaissance permits will be required to provide financial provision for rehabilitation. By definition, reconnaissance permits, as contemplated in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002, involve non-invasive work and therefore do not lead to environmental harm. Accordingly, there is no basis for requiring holders of reconnaissance permits to make financial provision.

Double provisioning

Regulation 7(3) provides that funds set aside for financial provision must remain in place until a closure certificate is issued, unless a withdrawal as contemplated in regulation 11 is allowed”. Regulation 11 outlines the procedure for holders to follow when seeking to withdraw financial provision, and provides that the Minister of Minerals and Energy (“Minister”) must approve withdrawals with the concurrence of the Ministers of Human Settlements, Water and Sanitation and of Finance. The withdrawal of financial provision can only occur after the stringent requirements stipulated in regulation 11 are met and are only allowed for decommissioning and final closure and not for ongoing or concurrent rehabilitation.

Since the financial provision is not accessible to the holder for use during the life of the right, the holder has to effectively make double provision (the first being financial provision and the second being actual expenditure incurred for rehabilitation). The implications of regulation 7(3), read with regulation 11, is that there will be a rise in the cost of mining.

Auditing and specialist reviews

Regulation 12(2) prescribes that the determination, review and assessment of financial provision must be undertaken by a specialist. Regulation 13(1)(a) requires that the assessment undertaken by a specialist must be audited by an independent auditor, included in an environmental audit report and must be submitted for approval to the minister. This however places an extraordinarily administrative and cost burden on the industry, more so on junior mining companies.

Value-added tax

Another onerous provision introduced in the 2019 Regulations is the inclusion of value-added tax (“VAT”) in the financial provision calculation. Expanding money for rehabilitation is not a vatable supply as contemplated in the VAT Act, 1991. Inevitably, this will result in a further increased cost of mining in addition to the issues of duplicate funding/double provisioning and the burden of auditing discussed above.

Date of compliance

Holders of prospecting rights and mining rights or permits, who applied for the right or permit prior to 20 November 2015, will be required to comply with the new regulations no later than three months following the first financial year end of the holder post 19 February 2020. Given that the due date for submission of comments to the 2019 Regulations was 1 July 2019, the 2019 Regulations are most likely to be finalised later this year, giving holders insufficient time to comply with the 2019 Regulations. Current financial provision quantum calculations for holders would need to be revised in accordance with the new methodology and this would require existing holders to fund the increased financial provision. Practically, most mining companies will encounter difficulties with complying within the contemplated compliance date.

Penalties and offences

The 2019 Regulations have increased the number of offences tha are punishable, by a penalty of up to ZARR10-million, or up to 10 years imprisonment, or both a fine and imprisonment. The offences include inter alia, the failure to provide funds for annual rehabilitation from the operational budget and set aside funds for financial provision; the failure to provide funds using one of the agreed vehicles and failure to make reviews and decisions accessible to the public.

*This article first appeared in ENSAfrica ENsight Africa online tax bulletin

Extractive Transparency and Accountability

Extractive Transparency and Accountability is the pillar for citizen participation, investment attraction and use of extractive resources. If the people know, risks to tax evasion, corruption and the resource curse are reduced.

The East African region is awash with vast natural resources. Over the past five years, the East African region has registered significant discoveries of Oil in the Albertine Graben in Uganda and Turkana in Kenya. The prospects of Natural gas along the coast line of Somalia are promising. Few years ago Tanzania discovered massive natural gas deposits along its coastline adding already to its large extractive resources base. By these standards, the region has a potential for enjoying a natural resource boom.
However, experiences from Tanzania have shown that weak governance and oversight deficits can thwart benefits from the sector. Reports show that for decades the Country was not able to harness the vast extractive resources for development. The government lost revenue through bad contracts with mining companies and communities did not significantly benefit from the minerals and mining operations in their areas. In DRC minerals have been a source of conflict and the environmental impact is tremendous.

Tanzania is a signatory and  member to global transparency and accountability standards such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Tanzania has enacted  some of these principles into a national law,  the Tanzania Extractive Industries Act (TEITA) 2015. The country has established in law, a Multistakeholder body (comprising of government, civil society and companies), as platform for continuous consultation and mutual accountability. However there are deficits on some frontiers of transparency such as not publishing yet signed extractive contracts. Tanzania’s milestones on transparency partly inspired it East African neighbor  Uganda, to sign up to the initiative. The EITI provides an opportunity for East African Countries such as Tanzania, Uganda and DRC to  expand their transparency frontier  and thus expanding  citizens participation and attraction of largescale investment into their extractive sectors. However, citizens awareness and participation is still limited and governance deficits still exist.

This project  seeks to help  governments improve their transparency standards in policy and practice and citizens to be more aware and to participate in the extractive sector via;

  • Analytical pieces on extractive Transparency and Accountability
  • Local and International Advocacy on extractive governance and economic justice
  • Training and convenings on extractive sector governance

More about this work can be viewed via our latest news, reports and publications sections